Engineering Geology, 24 (1987) 513--523

513

Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam -- Printed in The Netherlands

Prepared Discussion*
THE VAJONT SLIDE

L. MULLER-SALZBURG

Paracelsusstrasse 2, A-5020 Salzburg (Austria)

(Accepted for publication December 1986)

In this play hall, we n o w will play the story of Vajont. I will not treat or
discuss the many explanations which came up after the disaster of Vajont.
These explanations have been published (Table I) and discussed and are quite
well known to many of you, b u t less known, I think, is the history of how
this diaster, h o w this slide developed, and it is a first-class o p p o r t u n i t y to
learn how to avoid such things in the future b y studying this case history,
including: the development of findings and of errors; of interpretations and
misinterpretations; and of decisions and misdecisions. So I would rather
emphasize the chronology of the events before the slide and deal only briefly
with what has been explained after the slide, because this will be discussed
b y other speakers also. I will present facts and figures which are correct b u t
are in some cases different from figures which have been published in the
past. And I will talk about the history of the recognition of the danger, or
the consequences of a slide, which influenced very much the interpretations
made and the decisions taken b y those responsible. I will talk about the role
of decisions in this case more than about the role of analysis, because in order
to learn from such a mistake, and all of us know we only learn from mistakes,
we have to try to understand what happened not only physically, n o t only
mechanically and mathematically, but also to understand the participation
of human thinking. We have to understand it in a retrospective way, putting
ourselves in the place of those engineers and geologists in 1950, 1955, 1960,
before the slides. Only then can we get the feeling of what should be developed in our souls to avoid such things in the future.
The task is n o t easy because in each new case a different geology and quite
different problems will be encountered. Our knowledge has increased very
much since Vajont, our experience has increased very much since then, but I
think n o t increased in the same manner is our ability to reason logically,
make interpretations, and to take decisions. In future cases, the site investigations that will be made will be very much increased, compared with the
investigations made in the past, and all this will greatly increase the possibilities for analysis. But each case is different. We cannot apply the experience from one case to another without having analysed the factors which
* Oral presentation.
0013-7952/87/$03.50

1987 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

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TABLE I
Explanation after the catastrophe
I. Explanations

(A) concerning causes of the slide

(Kenney, 1965; Kiersch, 1964; Gruner, 1965; Skempton, 1966; Miiller, 1968)
(B) concerning mechanics of the slide
(Miiller, 1964; Weif~, 1964; Jaeger, 1965; Nonveiller, 1965; Mencl, 1966; Skempton,
1966; Broili, 1967; Haefeli, 1967; Kenney, 1967; Miiller, 1968)
(C) concerning failure surface
(Kiersch, 1964; Selli et al., 1964; Muller, 1964; Selli-Trevisan, 1964; Weif~, 1964;
Cambefort, 1965; Milli, 1966; Mencl, 1966; Skempton, 1966; Venzo u. Fugati 1
Semenza, 1966; Milli, 1967 ; Broili, 1967 ; Miiller, 1968)
(D) concerning friction values
(Nonveiller, 1965 ; Mencl, 1966; Skempton, 1966; Nonveiller, 1967 ; Kenney, 1967 ;
Malina, 1968; Miiller, 1968)
(E) dynamic approach
(Haefeli, 1967 ; Nonveiller, 1967 ; Jaeger, 1968 ; Rengers and Miiller, 1970; Scheidegger,
1964, 1973; Korner, 1964, 1976; Chowdhury, 1978)
II. Not attempted to explain

mechanism that initiated the slide

-- background of the decision-making process
lapses in logical reasoning
multi-layered processes involved
inability to reconcile the various premises with all the observed facts
-

basically i n f l u e n c e d t h e first case; o n l y t h e n m a y we t r a n s f e r o u r e x p e r i e n c e

t o o t h e r situations. T o d a y w e are m u c h m o r e clever, m u c h m o r e e d u c a t e d and
t r a i n e d , b u t w e are n o t wiser. T h e r e is a certain post-failure curve, a p l o t
versus t i m e o f o u r k n o w l e d g e , o u r j u d g m e n t , b u t also o u r c o n f u s i o n . S o m e
y e a r s a f t e r such a failure o u r k n o w l e d g e increases very m u c h , b u t o u r ability
to r e a s o n a n d t a k e decisions decreases a f t e r a certain t i m e . This is m y
experience.
BACKGROUND
On fig.5 o f m y p a p e r ( p . 4 3 3 ) y o u c o u l d see t h e t e r r i t o r y a f t e r t h e slide.
T h e V a j o n t river is c o v e r e d b y the huge sliding mass, m e a s u r i n g a b o u t 1 7 0 0 m
in length a n d a b o u t 1 k m in w i d t h . T h e t e r r i t o r y w i t h i n w h i c h t h e slide
o c c u r r e d , was m o r e or less a plain, called t h e " P o z z a " and t h e " P i a n del T o c " .
This t e r r i t o r y shifted a b o u t 2 6 0 - - 4 0 0 m t o w a r d t h e right b a n k . T h e figure
m e n t i o n e d b e f o r e s h o w s the p a r t o f t h e sliding p l a n e w h i c h is visible n o w a f t e r
t h e slide, b u t w h i c h n o b o d y f o r e s a w b e f o r e . T h e sliding mass r e m a i n e d
t o g e t h e r , v e r y m u c h like o n e b l o c k . S o m e zones s h o w e d t h a t d e t r i t u s s a n k
into t h e gorge. It m e a n s t h e sliding mass j u m p e d over t h e gorge leaving t h e
gorge e m p t y , and o n l y later on t h r o u g h these cones the gorge was filled.
T h e d a m resisted t h e o v e r l o a d w i t h very little d a m a g e . O n l y t h e crest o f

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the dam was slightly damaged, nothing else. Along the zone of the sliding
mass the sliding surface was more or less horizontal.
Some weeks before the major slide t o o k place, detachment of rocks
occurred and indicated the movement was in the mass. For instance, a small
part of the rock came down some metres, later on it came down even more,
and farther east about 700,000 m 3 of rock slid down. At this time the whole
mass was not motionless but, according to the measurements, showed very
little movement. Some weeks after this, when the lake was already filled to
about half the elevation of the dam, which is 276 m high, a major slide
occurred and together with this on this plain of the Pian del Toc, a lot of
vertical or sub-vertical cracks, heavy cracks, could be observed. From this we
could see there would be a major slide, not a small one. The main event was
this sliding mass dropping into the reservoir, and pushing the water very
much in the vertical sense, but also laterally. The m a x i m u m height of the
wave came up to the village of Casso where some houses were destroyed,
260 m above lake level. The water came in through the roofs to the people
laying in bed and t h e y disappeared immediately. From there the water fell
over the gorge. The tunnels of the Vajont road were filled by gravel and stone
for some 100 metres and the wave pushed down through the main valley of
the Piave river against the small city of Longarone with a population of about
10,000. Only a few houses remain there; nothing from the church, no railway, no roads, nothing, everything was washed away. Four other smaller
villages were also washed away.
On the a b u t m e n t of the dam, which was subjected to a load eight times
greater than that for which it was designed, only two or three cracks occurred.
The rock mass remained in quite good condition thanks to the tying together
of the rock by some 150 rock anchors, 50 metres long, and being prestressed
elastically, the reinforcement could keep the rock together after the shock.
Regarding the structure of the rock, horizontal layers of the Upper
Cretaceous limestone have been cut by a lot of vertical joints -- I may call it
faults -- and the layers started curving at the back, going parallel to the later
sliding surface. From such pictures, the mechanism of the slide has been very
early t h o u g h t out. Before shear movement occurred at the b o t t o m , tilting
produced clearly visible specks on the surface. Another thing was the orientation of the sliding path. There was an undulation of the layers in the direction
of the slide. According to this undulation I could answer the question : when
the slide will occur would it touch the dam or not? and I said the slide will
leave 50 metres between the sliding mass and the dam. This could be predicted
by the structure because the slide had to follow this structure in lanes.
Please consider the a m o u n t of energy involved in this slide. Twenty-five
million cubic metres of water spilled over the crest and dropped about 500
metres. It means an energy of about 170 billions of kilowatt hours.
Now, let us consider why the Vajont slide became so catastrophic. We
could ask what have been the causes, because in such catastrophic events
never is there only one cause. There are always some causes playing together.
Of course, the slide came down on the reservoir, but below the reservoir

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there was a relatively dense population. Without this dense population the
event would not have been so catastrophic. The reservoir level at the time of
the major slide was relatively high, only 30 metres were left in freeboard, so
the main volume had to go over the dam. The velocity of the slide was very
high and this high velocity was unexpected. This is one of the main reasons
why the slide became catastrophic. The height of the wave, measuring in its
m a x i m u m to 260 metres, was beyond expectation. The expectation was 26
metres. Except these two detachments some weeks before the major slide,
there were no warning indications, no natural ones, not even artificial ones,
which were produced at this time. Some facts and figures on the slide are
given in Table II.
CHRONOLOGY
There are some important figures with regard to time that are very instructive. The first time I suspected that a slide would occur was 4% years before
the catastrophe. Evidence that the slide would be a big one, i.e. having a
volume o f more than 200 million cubic meters, was produced nearly 3 years
before the failure. Observation of measuring points, starting with 8 points
and finally 23 benchmarks, was executed and evaluated for more than three
years. It should be kept in mind that during the period of first filling of the
reservoir to half of its anticipated depth, the slope behaved regularly; meaning,
according to expectation. The rising water level was expected to increase the
rate at which the benchmarks would move. With lowering water levels we
expected not a sudden stop but a gradual slowing down of the movement.
During the second filling period the sliding mass behaved completely differently. As the level of the reservoir was raised, no movement, n o m o v e m e n t a t
all, took place until the reservoir had risen more than 50 metres above the
elevation where a small slide had occurred during first filling. Only then did
the sliding mass start moving, but at much slower rate than the first time. In
the third filling period, the slide behaved nearly regularly again. We will come
back to this; it is an important fact.
Please take into account t h a t the dam was started to be built at 1957. My
appointment had nothing to do with the slides in this time. My job was the
foundation of the dam and the reinforcement of the abutment. The first
time I suspected that a slide was occurring was about April or May 1959
when the dam was already built to more than half elevation. The famous
dam builder, Carlo Semenza, with w h o m I discussed the foundation problems
and the need for rock reinforcement of the abutments, between the end of
the discussion and the time my train was leaving asked me, "did y o u already
know our beautiful reservoir?" I said, "no, I would like to see it". So he
t o o k me around the reservoir and at a point about 1 km upstream of the
dam on the right abutment, we stopped to look against the left abutment.
Immediately I asked him, " H o w m a n y cubic metres o f slides do y o u expect?"
He was very shocked. He said, "We do not expect a slide because we have
been promised by geologists, we have been promised by sliding experts, and

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T A B L E II
F a c t s a n d figures
V o l u m e o f slide mass
v o l u m e of reservoir
freeboard
v o l u m e o f reservoir at t h e t i m e of c a t a s t r o p h e
v o l u m e at flood over t h e d a m

275 million m s
169 million m 3
13m
a b o u t 115 million m 3
25 million m 3

Height o f a r c h d a m
d i f f e r e n c e in h e i g h t b e t w e e n reservoir level
a n d m a i n valley

276 m
500 m

E x t e n t o f slide
t h i c k n e s s o f slide mass
h o r i z o n t a l d i s p l a c e m e n t , average
maximum velocity

1700 m 1000 m
a b o u t 130 t o a b o u t 350 m
a b o u t 240 m
25 m / s

Height o f wave

260 m

First s u s p e c t e d slide in reservoir

e v i d e n c e t h a t a m a j o r slide w o u l d o c c u r

April, 1 9 5 9
June, 1960

Survey r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s installed

May, 1 9 6 0

Regular b e h a v i o u r d u r i n g first filling period. P a r a d o x i c a l b e h a v i o u r d u r i n g s e c o n d filling

period. Nearly regular b e h a v i o u r during t h i r d period.

b y others, there will be no slides". I said, "I d o n ' t want to interfere with
other experts because it is not m y job, b u t please I would suggest an
investigation".
Semenza immediately started investigations. His son, and others, were
involved. Borings were made for nearly one year. The report on the investigations was made in June of 1960, shortly before this small slide of 700,000
cubic meters occurred. At this time, the outline of the major slide measuring
1.7 km b y 1 km became apparent. The report pointed out that the whole mass
below Pian del Toc could slide and, furthermore, it pointed o u t that the slide
could be caused b y reservoir filling. This was three years before the catastrophic slide t o o k place!
A second geological report was given b y Prof. Dal Piaz at the end of July
1960 in which he said there would be no major slides, only superficial ones.
Then, an exploration adit was made in the higher part of the slide and piezometers were installed. My report, my only report on the slides during this
period of engagement, was given about the end of March 1961. After this I
was never called any more.
If we look once more at the time table, consider that in 1957 dam construction was started; in 1960 the dam was finished, before first filling; in
1961, the Malpasset failure occurred. In 1961, after Malpasset, I remember
talking with the dam designer, Carlo Semenza in Mexico. We went to some
dams in Mexico which he had designed, and he looked like an ill man, and
quite tired. Because m y relation to him was like father and son I asked,

518

"What is wrong with y o u ? " He answered, "I have the illness of Malpasset".
He was so depressed about this event, as he said, I have built many, many
dams but never before did I recognize how big is the responsibility of a dam
designer. Consider, also, that only in 1962 the International Society of Rock
Mechanics is founded, and in 1965 the first finite-element computation was
adapted to rock discontinuities.
EXPECTATION OF DANGER

If we want to learn something from this event, it is necessary to examine

how the expectation of danger developed. My first guess in 1959 to Semenza
was at least 20 millions, but I was not sure if I should say 20 or I should say
70. As I did not want to shock him too much in the first moments, I said
between 20 and 70 millions. The first small detachment in 1960 made those
responsible inclined to believe m y prediction, against the prediction of
geologists, of soil mechanists, and of seismologists. A seismic investigation
was made by Prof. Caloi with the result that 10 to 20 meters below the
surface the rock mass was loosened but below 20 meters it was very strong
rock. No indications of slides. Then, the superficial detachment occurred,
but still, n o b o d y except Eduardo Semenza saw it at this time in terms of a
prehistoric slide or some foregoing big event. After the thorough investigation
o f Giudici and Semenza, which I could influence in the first weeks, came the
result t h a t probably 200 million cubic meters would be involved in this slide
and later on after some discussion with Giudici and Semenza we came to a
figure of 250 million cubic meters: of this I was convinced, Giudici and
Semenza and Broili were convinced, but n o b o d y wanted to believe it because
famous experts said it was a foolish idea. Later on when the larger slides
t o o k place the meaning changed. From this time on everybody was convinced,
everybody, except the experts. Everybody on site, Semenza, and all the other
very good engineers working on site, t h e y were convinced the slide would
occur. In my report which I gave at this time, February or March of 1961, I
expressed the opinion that there will be no way to prevent the slide. This
probably was the reason why I was not called any more. It was quite impossible
to turn away the precipitation water. At that time n o b o d y would take the
responsibility to make a drainage tunnel, which was the only way at least to
reduce the velocity of the slide, maybe to stop it. As the whole mass was
already broken and divided into many faults and m a n y joints, and was really
damaged, n o b o d y would have taken the responsibility to start a 2~/~ km long
tunnel and from this tunnel to make some form of drain screens. This was
not considered to be feasible at the time. Another seismic survey was made
with the result that the loosened rock was not 10--20 m but 350 m thick. So
it became the general conviction that the slide could not be prevented.
As all the thoughts were going in this direction, the question now became:
how can we bring down the slide before filling the reservoir? The sliding
mass was moving. This was known. N o b o d y could d o u b t it, it was measured.
The volume of about 200,000,000 cubic meter was known. It was not really

519
ignored, b u t it was d o u b t e d b y some experts. By then, as I had written, no
countermeasures were possible because it was t o o late to carry o u t drainage
measures. The mass would come down, it was known to everybody. There
were the investigations o f Giudici and Semenza, which showed a high probability of a prehistoric slide, and I would say the evidence they showed was
convincing. It was absolutely convincing because some rock on the right
abutment, which was quite different from the surrounding rock of the right
abutment, corresponded exactly to the left abutment and beyGnd this rock
there was some gravel and some soil. It was clear that there was a prehistoric
slide. This was accepted b y many persons, b u t it was mainly ignored b y the
experts. Even in the last geologic report it was denied. The sliding path was
accepted to be known. Later there were many discussions on the shape of
the sliding mass, b u t generally it was known to be rather deep and more or
less horizontal in the lower part. But even so, it was n o t fully accepted that
the sliding surface would be at a depth of more than 150 m.
PROGRESSIVE FAILURE
The possibility that a progressive failure could be involved was not recognized. In 1959 and 1960, only a small number of people thought in terms of
progressive failures. At Vajont it was not recognized that changes in shear
strength could occur with time, nor was it recognized that the shear resistance
could be mobilized in some parts of the slide but not in others. The groundwater table was measured, b u t its influence on the mechanics of the slide was
ignored b y all persons. The possibility of artesian water was not known. The
velocity, and the development of the velocity to be expected, was unknown.
The mechanism of the slide we could say was k n o w n roughly, b u t u n k n o w n
or unknowable was the point in time at which the slide would occur. And
the existence of initial stresses, which plays a certain role according to m y
conviction, was not discussed at the time of Vajont.
EXPLORATIONS
What was done for the exploration of geologic and rock mechanical conditions? Detailed geologic exploration was done before and after the big slide.
A very good structural analysis measuring all the joints and the faults was
done; exploratory drillings and piezometer boreholes were made; and two
seismic surveys and a geodetic survey of leveling with an accuracy of about 2
to 21~ cm was carried out. No measurements were made to indicate how
deep the sliding surface really was. No slope indicator was used at this time,
no extensometers to measure displacements directly, or even rock talk
instruments, or geophones, for warning.
Now, the geologic knowledge, or assumptions, had an influence. The
lithology, if there were clay layers {or clay intercalations, or clay seams) on
the silted joints was discussed b u t n o b o d y came to a distinct opinion on h o w
this influenced the shear and frictional resistance and the over-all behaviour

520

of the slide. The degree and spacial distribution of the joints was well investigated. It led to the assumption of a sharp angle in the sliding path. The
existence of a prehistoric slide, from which one would have to expect clastic
materials, crushed materials, mylonite materials, this was accepted by some
but not by the most important people.
Initial stresses would have influenced the play of forces, because if there
are initial stresses the slide could go rapidly like an arrow from an archer, but
t h e y were not considered. The groundwater level was known but not evaluated. Artesian water which would create uplift, better to say an in<lepth
pressure, which was a deciding factor in the equilibrium, was not considered.
As we have already stated, the shape of the sliding surface was still not
precisely delineated but was quite reasonable. Assumptions were made
regarding the effects o f foundation displacements, i.e. whether the sliding
mass had undergone shearing displacements, and bending, and so on, which
means in terms of energy consumption. The effect of changes in joint water
pressures was not considered. I am sure that water pressure was considered in
at least one interpretation but not changes of the water table and changes in
the inclination of the water table with time. As Terzaghi has stated, if y o u
damage the rock mass, the permeability is higher and the water table becomes
flatter. As I said previously, initial stresses were not considered. Progressive
failure and creep? It was not the time in 1960 to consider these.
INTERPRETATION AND MISINTERPRETATION OF GEOLOGIC DATA

It was very clear t h a t the sliding mass would probably follow the bedding.
The existence of a prehistoric slide was clearly evidenced by the geologists
but was not considered directly. A nucleus of resistance in case a progressive
failure occurred, as Prof. Nonveiller very early had discussed, could not be
found by geologic exploration, and even not by seismic surveys.
The borings suggested, from 1961, a chair-like sliding surface and the joint
water thrust was such that it was assumed to be 24 million tons per meter.
Between the outermost and innermost piezometers there was a difference in
height of the water table of 60 m. After a long time of small movements, this
difference in height decreased and finally the water table was at the same
elevation, more or less, in all piezometers. It means that the water table was
really very flat.
INFLUENCE OF CALCULATIONS

The factors involved are listed in Table III. The mass was unstable since
the day it was detected moving, so it was not necessary to calculate if there
was equilibrium or not. Nevertheless, static calculations were tried in order
to check the possibility o f counter measures. When it became evident that
there was no chance o f counter measures, there was a big resignation, and
computations were reduced and finally terminated. The computations which
were made reached very different results depending on the input data. Most

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TABLE III
Limitations of calculations in avoiding the catastrophic event
The slope was unstable since it was detected in 1960
Static stability analyses were tried in order to check the possibility of countermeasure;
any result could be obtained depending on assumptions
The paradoxical behaviour of slide during 2nd filling could not be explained by calculation at the time
Creep calculations were impossible at the time; no prediction of movements on a time
scale was possible
Progressive failure could not be considered because of unknown properties of the sliding
mass

o f the paradoxical behaviour of the slide could not be explained by the

calculations, which were done by the owner. This is very sad to say because
it was obvious that refined calculation was n o t possible at t h a t time.
THE ROLE OF DECISIONS

A main decision was to store the reservoir at a certain freeboard below the
crest. As I was told m a n y times by different persons, this was considered a
small risk because the wave would not be higher than 26 metres, according
to large-scale model tests. A "consolidation hypothesis" was accepted by all
the experts. It means that a part of the rock which came under water is more
consolidated than it was before. This is true for many types of soil but is not
true for rock. It is wrong in principle. It was quite a decision to rely on this
hypothesis because there was a fourth opinion which opposed it. There was
the decision to follow a set storage program, despite the fact that the hypothesis did not hold true during the third filling. Then there was the decision
to favour a diversion tunnel instead of bringing down the slide progressively,
although the diversion tunnel allowed only a small variation of the water
table. I suggested in m y report of 1961 to vary the water table in a manner
which would bring the sliding mass down piece by piece at low water levels
and to create at least a certain resistance at the toe. This was tried only to a
small extent; instead it was decided to have a diversion tunnel.
CONSIDERATIONS

TO AVOID THE CATASTROPHE

It is very interesting to examine the circumstances under which the slide

would not have resulted in a catastrophe. These circumstances are summarized
in Table IV. The items are self-explanatory. I will not a t t e m p t to relate the
many, m a n y explanations given after the slide o c c u r r e d . . , all very good
explanations but, unfortunately, t h e y do not conform with one another,
which shows the complexity of the system. An explanation of the mechanism
which initiated the slide has not yet been attempted. The decisions, the lapses
in logical reasoning, the one<iimensional logic, always saying this or this, not

522
T A B L E IV
U n d e r w h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s w o u l d t h e slide n o t have r e s u l t e d in a c a t a s t r o p h e ?

-- if the sliding velocity could have been predicted

-- if more freeboard had been left
if model experiments had indicated the drastic wave height that would develop
if an early stage extensive drainage was performed
-- if more toe resistance had been created by early controlled m o v e m e n t s
if warning systems had been developed [? ]
-- if decisions had not been based on the consolidation hypothesis only
if decisions had not been m a d e so difficultby differences in expertise of the m a n y
advisors involved
-- if experts had not initiallypromised there would be no major slide
-- if the project reservoir level were reduced
-

both, the inability to draw conclusions when many factors are influencing
one another. These are the principal reasons the slide was so catastrophic.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

After the disaster of Vajont, m a n y people were saying, and writing, that it
would have been easy to avoid this catastrophe. Other people were saying
that it was an unavoidable misfortune, " u n cas de force majeure". For me,
both meanings are wrong! The disaster was the result of human error, in this
case definitely of scientific error, and a consequence of lack of knowledge.

REFERENCES
Broili, L., 1967. N e w knowledges on the geomorphology of the Vajont slide slip surface.
R o c k Mech. Eng. Geol., V: 38--88.
Cambefort, H., 1965. Glissement de terrain. Sols-Soils, 15/IV.
Chowdhury, R., 1978. Analysis of the Vajont slide -- n e w approach. R o c k Mech., 11:

29--38.
Gruner, E., 1965. Prozesse um Seeausbriiehe. Schwz. Bzt. f. Verm. Wes., 63(4): 100.
Haefeli, R., 1967. Zum progressivenBruch in Schnee, Boden, Fels und Eis. Rock Mech.
Eng. Geol., V: 117--137.
Jaeger, Ch., 1965. The Va]ont rock slide. Water Power, March/April.
Jaeger, Ch., 1968. Discontinuouscreep of masses. Water Power, pp.197--198.
Kenney, T.C., 1965. Causes of the Va]ont reservoir disaster. Civ. Eng. -- ASCE.
Kenney, T.C., 1967. Stability of the Vajont valleyslope. Rock Mech. Eng. Geol., V(2):
10--16.
Kiersch, G.A., 1964. Vajont reservoir disaster. Cir. Eng. ASCE, pp.32--40.
Kbrner, H., 1964. Schnee-und Eismechanikund einige ihrer Beziehungenzur Geologie.
Rock Mech. Eng. Geol., II: 45--67.
K6rner, H., 1976. Reichweite und Geschwindigkeityon Bergstiirzenund Flie~schneelawinen. Rock Mech., pp.225--256.
Mencl, V., 1966. The influence of the stiffness of a slidingmass on the stability of slopes.
Rock Mech. Eng. Geol., IV: 127--131.

523
Milli, 1966. Sondaggi geognostici sulla frana del Monte Toc. Rel. Tecn. 18.4.1966 (not
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