1 Ganzon V CA

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G.R.No.93252,93746,95245|Ganzonv.CourtofAppeals
ENBANC
[G.R.No.93252.August5,1991.]
RODOLFO
HONORABLECOURT
SANTOS,respondents.
T.GANZON,petitioner,
OFAPPEALS,
and
vs.THE
LUIS
T.
[G.R.No.93746.August5,1991.]
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA,petitioner, vs.HON. LUIS SANTOS, in
his capacity as Secretaryof the Department ofLocal Government,
NICANORM.PATRICIO,inhiscapacityasChief,LegalServiceofthe
Department ofLocal Government, and SALVADOR CABALUNA,
JR.,respondents.
[G.R.No.95245.August5,1991.]
RODOLFO
T.GANZON,petitioner,
vs.THE
HONORABLECOURT OFAPPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his
capacity as the Secretary ofthe Department ofLocal
Government,respondents.
NicolasP.Sonalanforpetitionerin93252.
RomeoA.Gerochiforpetitionerin93746.
EugenioOriginalforpetitionerin95245.
SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1987 CONSTITUTION LOCAL AUTONOMY,
NATURE OF LOCAL OFFICIALS REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE TO CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT. Local autonomy, under theConstitution, involves a mere
decentralization ofadministration, not of power, in which local officials remain
accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide. Autonomy
does not contemplate making ministates out of local government units. Autonomy, in
the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the
legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the
"supervision clause" itself suggests is to wean local government units from
overdependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter,
"localautonomy"isnotinstantlyselfexecuting,butsubjectto,amongotherthings,the
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passageofalocalgovernmentcode,alocaltaxlaw,incomedistributionlegislation,and
anationalrepresentationlaw,andmeasuresdesignedtorealizeautonomyatthelocal
level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, theConstitution places the local
governmentsunderthegeneralsupervisionoftheExecutive.Itisnoteworthyfinally,that
the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for
removaloflocal officials, which suggests that Congress may exercise removal powers,
and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.
2.
ID. ID. ID. NEWCONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE FEDERALISM.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountablelocalgovernmentstructureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralization."
TheConstitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the
monopolyofthe national government over the affairsoflocal governments and as put
bypoliticaladherents,to"liberatethelocalgovernmentsfromtheimperialismofManila."
Autonomy,however,isnotmeanttoendtherelationofpartnershipandinterdependence
betweenthecentraladministrationandlocalgovernmentunits,orotherwise,tousherin
a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local
governments,undertheConstitution,aresubjecttoregulation,howeverlimited,andfor
nootherpurposethanprecisely,albeitparadoxically,toenhanceselfgovernment.
3.
ID.ID.ID.CHANGEDSUPERVISIONCLAUSEDOESNOTEXEMPTLOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
FROM
LEGISLATIVE
REGULATION.
The
1987ConstitutionprovidesinArt.X,Sec.4that"[T]hePresidentofthePhilippinesshall
exercise general supervision over local governments." It modifies a counterpart
provision appearing in the 1935Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that "[T]he
Presidentshall...exercisegeneralsupervisionoveralllocalgovernmentsasmaybe
provided by law." It is the considered opinion of theCourt that notwithstanding the
change in the constitutional language, the Charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right or the President ofher prerogative as conferred by existing
legislationtoprovideadministrativesanctionsagainstlocalofficials.Itisouropinion
that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to
underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress'
"control"overlocalgovernmentaffairs.TheConstitutiondidnot,however,intend,forthe
sakeof local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations,inparticular,concerningdiscipline.Thechangeinconstitutionallanguage
did not exempt local governments from legislative regulation provided regulation is
consistentwiththefundamentalpremiseofautonomy.
4.
ID.ID.ID.NATIONALAUTHORITYCANDISCIPLINELOCALOFFICIALS.
Sincelocalgovernmentsremainaccountabletothenationalauthority,thelattermay,by
law,andinthemannersetforththerein,imposedisciplinaryactionagainstlocalofficials.
In the case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the President's alter ego, in
consonance with the specific legal provisionsof Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local
Government Code, can suspend petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and
95245)andpetitionermemberoftheSangguniangPanglunsod(G.R.No.93746).
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5.
ID. ID. ID. ID. "SUPERVISION" NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY. "Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. As
thisCourtheldinGanzonvs.Cayanan,104Phil.484,"inadministrationlawsupervision
meansoverseeingorthepowerorauthorityofanofficertoseethatsubordinateofficers
performtheirduties.Ifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthemtheformermaytakesuch
actionorstepasprescribedbylawtomakethemperformtheirduties."
6.
ID. ID. ID. ID. POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE
EXERCISED OPPRESSIVELY. While the respondent Secretary ofInterior, as alter
ego of the President, under the existing Local Government Code, has the Power to
suspendthepetitionerIloiloCityMayor,suchpowercannotbeexercisedoppressively.
Ten administrative cases have been successively filed against the City Mayor. The
Mayorhasbeenmadetoserveatotalof120daysofsuspensionforthefirsttwocases
and the respondent Secretary has issued another order preventively suspending the
formerforanother60days,thethirdtimeintwentymonths.WeareallowingtheMayor
to suffer the duration of his third suspension. Insofar as the seven remaining charges
areconcerned,weareurgingtheDepartmentofLocalGovernment,uponfinality ofthis
decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to the Mayor's usual
remediesofappeal,judicialoradministrative,orcertiorari,ifwarranted,andmeanwhile,
we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those
remainingcomplaints,notwithstandingfindingsofprimafacieevidence.
DECISION
SARMIENTO,J :
p
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
SecretaryofLocalGovernment),tosuspendand/orremovelocalofficials.
The petitioners are the Mayorof Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a
memberoftheSangguniangPanglunsodthereof(G.R.No.93746),respectively.
cdasia
The petitions ofMayor Ganzon originated from a series ofadministrative

complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in
1988, on various charges, among them, abuse ofauthority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable
violationoftheConstitution,andarbitrarydetention. 1 The personalities involved are
Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office Salvador Cabaluna, her
husband Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer Mansueto Malabor,
ViceMayor Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and
Eduardo Pea Redondo, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod and Pancho
Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the
opinionoftherespondentCourtofAppeals.2Wequote:
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Inherverifiedcomplaint(AnnexA),Mrs.Cabaluna,aclerkassignedtotheCity
Health, Office ofIloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having
supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor,
using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public,
pulled her out from rightful office where her qualification are best suited and
assigned her to a work that should be the function of a noncareer service
employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public
Services,whosedutiesarealientothecomplainant'sdutiesandfunctions,has
been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments
aimedatluringherawayfromherpermanentpositionorforcehertoresign.
InthecaseofDra.FelicidadOrtigoza,sheclaimsthatthepetitionerhandpicked
her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health
Officer ofIloilo City that her office was padlocked without any explanation or
justificationthathersalarywaswithheldwithoutcausesinceApril1,1988that
when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the runaround treatment in
theapprovalofherleaveinconnivance withDr.RodolfoVillegas andthatshe
was the object of a wellengineered trumpedup charge in an administrative
complaintfiledbyDr.RodolfoVillegas(AnnexB).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected Vice Mayor ofIloilo
City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry
Ong and Eduardo Pea Redondo are members of the Sangguniang
PanglunsodoftheCityofIloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where
CouncilorLarryOng,whosekeytohisofficewasunceremoniouslyandwithout
previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to
hold office at Plaza Libertad. The ViceMayor and the other complainants
sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner,
together with his fullyarmed security men, forcefully drove them away from
Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the
following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom
Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to
witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the
petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in
dozingwatertothepeopleandthebystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,

appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the
benefit ofcharges filed against him and no warrant ofarrest was issued, Erbite
wasarrestedanddetainedattheCityJailofIloiloCityuponordersofpetitioner.
Injail,hewasallegedlymauledbyotherdetaineestherebycausinginjuries.He
wasreleasedonlythefollowingday.3
The Mayor thereafter answered, 4 and the cases were set for hearing. The
opinionoftheCourtofAppealsalsosetforththesucceedingevents:
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TheinitialhearingintheCabalunaandOrtigozacasesweresetforhearingon
June2021,1988attheRegionalOfficeoftheDepartmentofLocalGovernment
inIloiloCity.Notices,throughtelegrams,weresenttotheparties(AnnexL)and
the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a
postponement before the scheduled dateof hearing and was represented by
counsel,Atty.SamuelCastro.Thehearingofficers,Atty.SalvadorQuebraland
Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the twoday
hearingsbutwasactuallyheldonlyonJune20,1988inviewoftheinabilityand
unpreparednessofpetitioner'scounsel.
The next hearings were reset to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue
IloiloCity.Again,thepetitionerattemptedtodelaytheproceedingsandmoved
for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel.
Nonetheless,thehearingofficersdeniedthemotiontopostpone,inviewof the
fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings
(AnnexM).
Inthesaidhearings,petitioner'scounselcrossexaminedthecomplainantsand
theirwitnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive
suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a
periodofsixty(60)days.
ThenthenextinvestigationwassetonSeptember21,1988andthepetitioner
again asked for a postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26,
1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their
respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was
denied. In these hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified in
Adm.CaseNo.C10298and10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the
complainantstestifiedincludingtheirwitnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Onginal moved for a
postponementoftheOctober24,1988hearingtoNovember7to11,1988which
was granted. However, the motion for change of venue was denied due to
lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel
were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for
postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the
depositionofwitnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed.
However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were
notifiedofthehearing,theinvestigationwassettoDecember13to15,1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his
witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to
lackoftransportation.Themotionwasdeniedandthepetitionerwasgivenupto
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December14,1988topresenthisevidence.
LexLib
On December 14, 1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for

postponementandthehearingofficersgavepetitioneruptoDecember15,1988
topresenthisevidence.OnDecember15,1988,thepetitionerfailedtopresent
evidenceandthecaseswereconsideredsubmittedforresolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
detentioncasefiledbyPanchoErbitesotherespondentorderedthepetitioner's
second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60)
days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a
writofpreliminaryinjunctionintheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch33of Iloilo City.
Thesecondpreventivesuspensionwasnotenforced.5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzoninstituted an action for

prohibitionagainsttherespondentSecretaryofLocal Government (now, Interior) in the
Regional TrialCourt, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writof preliminary
injunction. Presently, he instituted CAG.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in
therespondentCourtofAppeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order,
preventivelysuspendingMayorGanzonfor another sixty days, the third time in twenty
months, and designating meantime ViceMayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
Undaunted,MayorGanzoncommencedCAG.R.SPNo.20736oftheCourtofAppeals,
apetitionforprohibition, 6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and
hence,heisinterestedinseeingMayorGanzonousted.)
On September 7, 1989, theCourt of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CAG.R.
SPNo.16417.OnJuly5,1990,itlikewisepromulgatedadecision,dismissingCAG.R.
SPNo.20736.InaResolutiondatedJanuary24,1990,itissuedaResolutioncertifying
the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similarly charged by the respondent
Secretary,tothisCourt.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent
Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the
enforcementoftheCourtofAppeals'twodecisions.
In our Resolution ofNovember 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our
ResolutionsofJanuary15,1991,wegaveduecoursethereto.
MayorGanzonclaimsasapreliminary(G.R.No.93252),thattheDepartmentof Local
Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process oflaw
and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards
him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng
DemokratikongPilipinoparty8andtherunningpoliticalrivalrytheymaintainedinthelast
congressionalandlocalelections 9andhisallegedrefusaltooperatealotteryinIloilo
City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it
had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14,
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1988),11notwithstandingwhich,thelatterproceededwiththehearingandmetedout
two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends
that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to
reducethecostsofproceeding,buttheSecretaryrejectedhisrequest.13Hestatesthat
heaskedforpostponementon'validandjustifiable"14grounds,amongthem,thathe
wassufferingfromaheartailmentwhichrequiredconfinementthathis"vital" 15witness
wasalsohospitalized16butthatthelatterundulydeniedhisrequest.17
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the
SecretaryofLocalGovernmentisdevoid,inanyevent,ofanyauthoritytosuspendand
removelocalofficials,anargumentreiteratedbythepetitionerMaryAnnRiveraArtieda
(G.R.No.93746).
AstoMayorGanzon'schargesofdenialofdueprocess,therecordsdonotshowvery
clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the
respondentSecretary.HisclaimsthatheandSecretaryLuisSantoswere(are)political
rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and
although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he,
MayorGanzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under
lesspoliticalcircumstances,consideringfurthermorethat"politicalfeud"hasoftenbeen
agoodexcuseincontestingcomplaints.
TheMayorhasfailedfurthermoretosubstantiatehissayso'sthatSecretarySantoshad
attemptedtoseducehimtojointheadministrationpartyandtooperatealotteryinIloilo
City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept
them at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept
them,18forthesamereasonsabovestatedandfurthermore,becausehissayso'swere
never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official,
Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his
dutiesregularlyandintheabsenceofcontraryevidence,noillmotivecanbeascribedto
him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to
defer the hearing on accountofthe ninetyday ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas
Blg.337,theCourtfinds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact
restrainedtheSecretaryfromfurtherhearingthecomplaintsagainstthepetitioners.19
As to his request, finally, for postponements, theCourt is afraid that he has not given
any compelling reason why we should overturn the Courtof Appeals, which found no
convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides,
postponementsareamatterofdiscretiononthepartofthehearingofficer,andbasedon
Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been
guiltyofagraveabuseofdiscretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations
deprivedMayorGanzonofdueprocessoflaw.
Wecometothecorequestion:WhetherornottheSecretaryofLocal Government, as
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thePresident'salterego,cansuspendandorremovelocalofficials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20no longer allows the
President,asthe1935and1973Constitutionsdid,toexercisethepowerofsuspension
and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, theConstitution is
meant, first, to strengthen selfrule by local government units and second, by deleting
thephrase"asmaybeprovidedbylaw,"21tostripthePresidentofthepowerofcontrol
over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the
debatesoftheConstitutionalCommission.
Theprovisioninquestionreadsasfollows:
SECTION 4.
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervisionoverlocalgovernments.Provinceswithrespecttocomponentcities
and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions.22
Itmodifiesacounterpartprovisionappearinginthe1935Constitution,whichwequote:
SECTION 10.
The President shall have control ofall the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfullyexecuted.23
Thepetitionerssubmitthatthedeletion(of"asmaybeprovidedbylaw")issignificant,
astheirargumentgoes,since:(1)thepowerofthePresidentis"providedbylaw"and(2)
hence,nolawmayprovideforitanylonger.
LLphil
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the

Secretary ofLocal Government acted in consonance with the specific legal
provisionsofBatasBlg.337,theLocalGovernmentCode,wequote:
SECTION62.
NoticeofHearing.Withinsevendaysafterthecomplaintis
filed, the Minister of Local Government, or the sanggunianconcerned, as the
casemaybe,shallrequiretherespondenttosubmithisverifiedanswerwithin
seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
investigation ofthe case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the
respondent.Noinvestigationshallbeheldwithinninetydaysimmediatelyprior
to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said
period.Ifpreventivesuspensionhasbeenimposedpriortotheaforesaidperiod,
thepreventivesuspensionshallbelifted.24
SECTION63.
PreventiveSuspension.(1)Preventivesuspensionmaybe
imposedbytheMinisterofLocalGovernmentiftherespondentisaprovincialor
cityofficial,bytheprovincialgovernoriftherespondentisanelectivemunicipal
official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective
barangayofficial.
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(2)
Preventivesuspensionmaybeimposedatanytimeaftertheissuesare
joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence ofculpability is
strong,whenthegravityoftheoffensesowarrants,orwhenthecontinuancein
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safetyandintegrityofthe records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
suspension.
(3)
At the expiration ofsixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation ofthe proceedings
againsthimuntilitstermination.However,ifthedelayintheproceedingsofthe
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the timeof the delay shall not be
countedincomputingthetimeofsuspension.25
The issue, as the Courtunderstands it, consists ofthree questions: (1) Did the
1987Constitution,indeletingthephrase"asmaybeprovidedbylaw"intendtodivest
the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local
officials?(2)HastheConstitutionrepealedSections62and63oftheLocalGovernment
Code?(3)Whatisthesignificanceofthechangeintheconstitutionallanguage?
It is the considered opinion ofthe Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitutionallanguage,thecharterdidnotintendtodivestthelegislatureofitsright
or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrativesanctionsagainstlocalofficials.Itisouropinionthattheomission(of"as
maybeprovidedbylaw")signifiesnothingmorethantounderscorelocalgovernments'
autonomyfromcongressandtobreakCongress'"control"overlocalgovernmentaffairs.
TheConstitutiondidnot,however,intend,forthesakeoflocalautonomy,todeprivethe
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making ministates out of local government
units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or
Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations
euphemisticallyto"smallrepublics".26Autonomy,intheconstitutionalsense,issubject
to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative
responsibilityundertheConstitutionandasthe"supervisionclause"itselfsuggest
istoweanlocalgovernmentunitsfromoverdependenceonthecentralgovernment.
ItisnoteworthythatundertheCharter,"localautonomy"isnotinstantlyselfexecuting,
butsubjectto,amongotherthings,thepassageofalocalgovernmentcode, 27 a local
tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national representation law, 30 and
measures31designedtorealizeautonomyatthelocallevel.Itisalsonoteworthythatin
spite of autonomy, theConstitution places the local government under the general
supervisionoftheExecutive.Itisnoteworthyfinally,thattheCharterallowsCongressto
include in the local government code provisions for removal oflocal officials, which
suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
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GovernmentCodehasdone,delegateitsexercisetothePresident.Thus:
SECTION3.
TheCongressshallenactalocalgovernmentcodewhichshall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted
through
a
system
ofdecentralization
with
effective
mechanisms ofrecall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different
localgovernmentunitstheirpowers,responsibilitiesandresources,andprovide
forthequalifications,election,appointmentandremoval,term,salaries,powers
and functions and duties oflocal officials, and all other matters relating to the
organizationandoperationofthelocalunits.32
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court ofAppeals, like
thepoweroflocallegislation. 33TheConstitutiondidnothingmore,however,andinsofar
as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary ofLocal
Government)toproceedagainstlocalofficialsadministratively,theConstitutioncontains
noprohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that theConstitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power ofinvestigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impressionbecauselegally,"supervision"isnotincompatiblewithdisciplinaryauthority
asthisCourthasheld,34thus:
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It is true that in the caseofMondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884,
this Courthad occasion to discuss this scope and extent of the
powerofsupervisionbythePresidentoverlocalgovernmentofficialsincontrast
tothepowerofcontrol given to him over executive officialsof our government
whereinitwasemphasizedthatthetwoterms,controlandsupervision,aretwo
differentthingswhichdifferonefromtheotherinmeaningandextent.Thusin
that case theCourt has made the following digression: "In administration law
supervisionmeansoverseeingorthepowerorauthorityofanofficertoseethat
subordinateofficersperformtheirduties.Ifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthem
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
performtheirduties.Control,ontheotherhand,meansthepowerofan officer
toalterormodifyornullifyofsetasidewhatasubordinateofficerhaddoneinthe
performance ofhis duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
thatofthelatter."Butfromthispronouncementitcannotbereasonablyinferred
that the power ofsupervision ofthe President over local government officials
does not include the power ofinvestigation when in his opinion the goodof the
public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) ofthe Revised
AdministrativeCode....35
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"Control"hasbeendefinedas"thepowerofanofficertoalterormodifyornullifyorset
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitutethejudgmentoftheformerfortestofthelatter."36"Supervision"ontheother
handmeans"overseeingorthepowerorauthorityofanofficertoseethatsubordinate
officers perform their duties." 37 As we held, 38however, "investigating" is not
inconsistentwith"overseeing",althoughitisalesserpowerthan"altering".
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least
three cases, Lacson v.Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes,40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41and
possibly,afourthone,Pelaezv.AuditorGeneral. 42In Lacson, this Court said that the
President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by
law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, andMondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the
President"maynot...suspendanelectiveofficialofaregularmunicipalityortakeany
disciplinaryactionagainsthim,exceptonappealfromadecisionof the corresponding
provincial board." 44However, neither Lacson norHebron nor Mondanocategorically
banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she
didnotexercisecontrolpowers,butbecausenolawallowedhertoexercisedisciplinary
authority.Thus,accordingtoLacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and
suspension ofpublic officers are always controlled by the particular law
applicableanditsproperconstructionsubjecttoconstitutionallimitations.45
InHebron,westated:
Accordingly,whentheprocedureforthesuspensionofanofficerisspecifiedby
law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the
absence ofexpress or clear provision to the contrary which does not exist
withrespecttomunicipalofficers....46
InMondano,theCourtheld:
. . . The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervisionovermunicipalofficialsintheprovincialgovernorwhoisauthorized
to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other
formofmaladministrationofoffice, andconvictionbyfinaljudgment ofany crime
involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a
copyofsuchchargestotheaccusedeitherpersonallyorbyregisteredmail,and
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one effecting the
official integrityof the officer in question." Section 86 ofthe Revised
AdministrationCodeaddsnothingtothepowerofsupervisiontobeexercisedby
the Department Head over the administration of. . . municipalities. . . . If it be
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construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that
vestedintheDepartmentHeadbysection79(c)of the Revised Administrative
Code,thensuchadditionalpowermustbedeemedtohavebeenabrogatedby
Section110(1),ArticleVII,oftheConstitution."47
xxxxxxxxx
InPelaez,westatedthatthePresidentcannotimposedisciplinarymeasuresonlocal
officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative
Code.48
Thus,inthosecasethatthisCourtdeniedthePresidentthepower(tosuspendremove)
it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on
accountofhis limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in
thosecasesinwhichthelawgavehimthepower,theCourt,asinGanzon v.Kayanan,
foundlittledifficultyinsustaininghim.49
TheCourtdoesnotbelievethatthepetitionerscanrightfullypointtothedebatesof the
ConstitutionalCommissiontodefeatthePresident'spowers.TheCourtbelievesthatthe
deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose
Nolledo would exclude the power ofremoval from the President,50 Commissioner Blas
Oplewouldnot.51
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the newConstitution has repealed the
LocalGovernmentCode,BatasBlg.37.Aswesaid,"supervision"and"removal"arenot
incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger
expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in
spiteoftheapprovaloftheCharter,BatasBlg.337isstillinforceandeffect.52
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable
local
government
structure
instituted
through
a
53
systemofdecentralization." TheConstitution,asweobserved,doesnothingmorethan
to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governmentsandasputbypoliticaladherents,to"liberatethelocalgovernmentsfrom
the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relationofpartnershipandinterdependencebetweenthecentraladministrationandlocal
governmentunits,orotherwise,tousherinaregimeoffederalism.TheCharterhasnot
taken such a radical step. Local governments, under theConstitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically,toenhanceselfgovernment.
As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national
administrationbutnotpowertothelocallevels.Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralizationof administration or
decentralizationof power. There is decentralizationof administration when the
central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
ordertobroadenthebaseofgovernmentpowerandintheprocesstomakelocal
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest
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developmentasselfreliantcommunitiesandmakethemmoreeffectivepartners
inthepursuitofnationaldevelopmentandsocialprogress."Atthesametime,it
relieves the central government ofthe burden ofmanaging local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense
thathecansubstitutetheirjudgmentswithhisown.
Decentralizationof power, on the other hand, involves an abdication ofpolitical
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shapeitsfuturewithminimuminterventionfromcentralauthorities.Accordingto
a constitutional author, decentralizationof power amounts to "selfimmolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
thecentralauthoritiesbuttoitscontituency.55
The successive sixtyday suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit

anothermatter.WhatbotherstheCourt,andwhatindeedloomsverylarge,isthefact
thatsincetheMayorisfacingtenadministrativecharges,theMayorisinfactfacingthe
possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yieldprima
facie findings. TheCourt is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office
(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty ofmisfeasance) but it is certainly another
questiontomakehimserve600daysofsuspension,whichiseffectively,tosuspendhim
outofoffice.Asweheld:56
2.
Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayorof Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
Histermofofficedoesnotexpireuntil1986.Wereitnotforthisinformationand
thesuspensiondecreedbytheSandiganbayanaccordingtotheAntiGraftand
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full
dischargeofhisfunctionsassuchmunicipalmayor.Hewaselectedpreciselyto
do so. As ofOctober 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic
assumptionoftheelectoralprocessimplicitintherightofsuffragethatthepeople
areentitledtotheservicesofelectiveofficialsoftheirchoice.Formisfeasanceor
malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability
mustbeestablished.Moreover,iftherebeacriminalaction,heisentitledtothe
constitutional presumption ofinnocence. A preventive suspension may be
justified.Itscontinuance,however,foranunreasonablelengthoftime raises a
due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the
meanwhilehisrighttoholdofficehadbeennullified.Clearly,therewouldbein
such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is
injustice inflicted likewise on the people ofLianga. They were deprived ofthe
services ofthe man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance ofthis preventive
suspensionhadoutrunthebondsofreasonandresultedinsheeroppression.A
denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
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unconstitutionalapplicationthattheorderofsuspensionshouldbelifted.57
The plain truth is that thisCourt has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above
reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to
prevent the accused from hampering the normal causeof the investigation with his
influenceandauthorityoverpossiblewitnesses" 60ortokeephimoff"therecordsand
other evidence." 61 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a
case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can
notexceedsixtydays, 62whichistosaythatitneednotbeexactlysixtydayslongifa
shorterperiodisotherwisesufficient,andwhichisalsotosaythatitoughttobeliftedif
prosecutorshaveachievedtheirpurposeinashorterspan.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent)enjoysapresumptionofinnocenceunlessanduntilfoundguilty.
cdphil
Suspensionfinallyistemporary,andastheLocalGovernmentCodeprovides,itmaybe
imposedfornomorethansixtydays.Asweheld, 63alongersuspensionisunjustand
unreasonable,andwemightadd,nothinglessthantyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days ofsuspension which is not a remote
possibilityonMayorGanzonis to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the
restofhistermininactivity.Itisalsotomake,toallintentsandpurposes,hissuspension
permanent.
Itisalso,infact,tometeoutpunishmentinspiteofthefactthattheMayor'sguilthasnot
been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the
lengthofhissuspensionwouldhave,bythetimeheisreinstated,wipedouthistenure
considerably.
TheCourtisnottobemistakenforobstructingtheeffortsoftherespondentSecretaryto
see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on
MayorGanzonsuccessivesuspensionswhenapparently,therespondentSecretaryhas
hadsufficienttimetogatherthenecessaryevidencetobuildacaseagainsttheMayor
without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent
Secretaryhasbeencrackingdown,sotospeak,ontheMayorpiecemealapparently,
to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have
pursuedaconsolidatedeffort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the SecretaryofInterior
fromexercisingalegalpower,yetweareoftheopinionthattheSecretary ofInterior is
exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave
abuseofdiscretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under question, and that any
talk offuture suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that
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Mayor Ganzonhas been made to serve a total of 120 days ofsuspension and the
possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a
violationof the Local Government Code) which brings to light a
pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure.
TheCourtissimplyforeclosingwhatappearstousasaconcertedeffortoftheStateto
perpetuateanarbitraryact.
Aswesaid,wecannottoleratesuchastateofaffairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspensionandlifting,forthepurpose,theTemporaryRestrainingOrderearlierissued.
Insofar as the seven pertaining charges are concerned, we are urging the
DepartmentofLocalGovernment,uponthefinalityofthisDecision,toundertakestepsto
expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or
administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the
Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints,
notwithstandingfindingsofprimafacieevidence.
Inresum,theCourtislayingdownthefollowingrules:
1.
Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere
decentralization ofadministration, not of power, in which local officials remain
accountabletothecentralgovernmentinthemannerthelawmayprovide
2.
ThenewConstitutiondoesnotprescribefederalism
3.
The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause)
wasmeantbuttodenylegislativecontroloverlocalgovernmentsitdidnotexemptthe
latterfromlegislativeregulationsprovidedregulationisconsistentwiththefundamental
premiseofautonomy
4.
Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter
may,bylaw,andinthemannersetforththerein,imposedisciplinaryactionagainstlocal
officials
5.
"Supervision"and"investigation"arenotinconsistentterms"investigation"does
notsignify"control"(whichthePresidentdoesnothave)
6.
Thepetitioner,MayorRodolfoGanzon,mayservethesuspensionsofarordered,
butmaynolongerbesuspendedfortheoffenseshewaschargedoriginallyprovided:
a)
thatdelaysintheinvestigationofthosecharges"duetohisfault,neglect
or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the
timeofsuspension."[Supra,sec.63(3)]
b)
that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitionercommitsanotherorothercrimesandabusesforwhichpropercharges
arefiledagainsthimbytheaggrievedpartyorparties,hisprevioussuspension
shallnotbeabartohisbeingpreventivelysuspendedagain,ifwarrantedunder
subpar.(2),Section63oftheLocalGovernmentCode.
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary

RestrainingOrderissuedisLIFTED.ThesuspensionsofthepetitionersareAFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor RodolfoGanzon, may not be made to serve future
suspensionsonaccountofanyoftheremainingadministrativechargespendingagainst
himforactscommittedpriortoAugust11,1988.TheSecretaryofInteriorisORDERED
toconsolidateallsuchadministrativecasespendingagainstMayorGanzon.
cdasia
The sixtyday suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is
AFFIRMED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Fernan, C . J ., Narvasa, MelencioHerrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
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The petitions ofMayor Ganzon originated from a series ofadministrative

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,

On December 14, 1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzoninstituted an action for

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the

The successive sixtyday suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary

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