MORE TOWER DAMAGES CAUSED BY WATER-INDUCED PRESSURE SURGE: UNPRECEDENTED

SEQUENCES OF EVENTS
1

Ademaro Marchiori ,
Ana Lidia Wild3,
1
Aristides Yoshiaki Saito ,

Arlan Lucas de Souza2,

3

Carmen Mittmann ,
3

Christian C. Anton ,
3
Felipe Saldanha Duarte ,

Sandro L.A. Pereira3,

and Silvia Waintraub2
1

PETROBRAS/HEADQUARTERS
PETROBRAS/RESEARCH CENTER- CENPES
3
PETROBRAS/REFAP ALBERTO PASQUALINI REFINERY
2

Rio de Janeiro
Brazil

Prepared for Presentation at the AIChE 2013 Spring National Meeting,

San Antonio, April 28 May 2, 2013
Copyright PETROBRAS
March/2013
Unpublished

AIChE shall not be responsible for statements or opinions contained in papers or printed in its
publications

Abstract
Three water-induced pressure surge cases in crude towers are presented. Although different and
independent, all the cases have a common point: the water-induced pressure surge is associated to a
pressure relief valve opening event.
In the first case study, a 126,000 bpd crude distillation unit had a significant decrease in one of the
atmospheric tower side withdrawals after an emergency shutdown. The light diesel oil production was
cut in less than half. A generalized tower temperature profile reduction was noticed: 27F (15C)
temperature decrease in light diesel oil pan; 63F (35C) in heavy diesel oil pan and 18F (10C) in
atmospheric residue withdrawal.
The second case study occurred at another crude distillation unit located at the same refinery with a
capacity of 69,200 bpd. It was observed a deep reduction in the first side withdrawal (naphtha) yield
that was compensated by the other side draw products yields. No loss in total diesel production
occurred.
Compared to the second, the damages in the third case were higher and it was noticed a degradation
of products to the bottoms residue. This problem happened at the same tower of the second case, one
year later and it was caused by distinct conjugation of facts.
The paper presents the troubleshooting techniques applied to evaluate the different units problems
(operational tests, gamma scans surveys, and thermograph readings), the root causes of these
incidents and the mitigation actions.

Introduction
Crude Distillation Unit (CDU) is present in all refineries. It is the first unit that receives the
crude, determines the maximum refinery throughput, minimizes residue production with a lower cost
and separates the distillation products as LPG, Straight Run Naphtha, Kerosene and Diesel. A
simplified sketch of an Atmospheric Crude Distillation Unit is shown in Figure 1.
ATMOSPHERIC TOWER

LPG
HEAVY
NAPHTHA
KEROSENE

LIGHT
NAPHTHA

DIESEL

DESALTER

CRUDE
FEED

FIRST
TRAIN

SECOND
TRAIN
ATMOSPHERIC FURNACE

STEAM
REDUCED
CRUDE

Figure 1 Atmospheric Crude Distillation Unit Sketch

As a CDU operates with very high feed input, a distillation tower malfunction implies in a deep
profitability loss.
Despite of the huge improvement in distillation technology and knowledge, the number of tower
malfunctions increases year after year. Tower internals damage has been the third most common
tower malfunction, being most of the time caused by water-induced pressure (Kister, 2003).
Although other sources are also observed, the most common water-induced pressure surge is
due to water carry over in stripping steam lines. Water accumulation in dead pockets is the fourth
cause (Kister,2003). Kister (2006) published a special topic related to water-induced pressure surges,
showing cases due to water in feed and slop, accumulated water in transfer line to tower and in heater
passes, water accumulation in dead pockets, water pockets in pump or spare pump lines, undrained
stripping steam lines, condensed steam or refluxed water reaching hot section and oil entering waterfilled region.
Tower damages caused by water-induced pressure surges after pressure safety relief valve
(PSV) opening were not easily found in literature and were not common to happen in Petrobras

refineries. A great number of pressure relief valves are installed in a Crude Distillation Unit in order to
avoid an overpressure that can occur due to many different causes, such as fire, electric power failure,
water to condenser supply failure and valve inadvertent closure, among others (API 521, 2007).
There are two major common destinations of the liquid discharge of these pressure relief valves:
atmospheric or preflash tower flash zone or a blowdown drum. The CDU units of the majority of
Petrobras refineries have the discharge of liquid PSVs to the column flash zone. These PSVs liquid
discharges should be composed only by hydrocarbons resulting in no harm to the tower. On the other
hand, if water is carried over together with the liquid, a pressure surge can happen inside the column,
caused by abrupt expansion of water when exposed to high temperatures. It is mandatory focusing to
avoid water accumulation at all steps of the unit cycle life: basic design, detailed engineering,
construction, inspection and all the time during operation, especially after shutdowns and start-ups.
In the present paper it will be described three case studies, all different and independent, but
with a common point: the water-induced pressure surge was associated to a pressure relief valve
opening event and caused a severe damage to the tower internals.
First Case Study: PSVs liquid discharge to a pumparound return
The simplified flowsheet of the Crude Distillation Unit with a nominal capacity of 126 KBPD is
presented in Figure 2. The atmospheric column has four sidedraws (Heavy Naphtha, Kerosene, Light
Diesel and Heavy Diesel) and the reduced crude is sent to a RFCC unit.
Gas

Crude
Steam

First
train

Heavy
naphtha
Top
pumparound
system

Gas

Steam

Desalter
Atmospheric
Tower

Kerosene
LPG

Second
train

Steam

Bottom
pumparound
system

Light
diesel

Steam

Naphtha

Heavy
diesel
Steam

Reduced
Crude

Figure 2 Fisrt Case Study CDU Simplified Flowsheet

In January 2011, an electric power failure resulted in an emergency shutdown. The unit started-up
after two days and it was observed that the light diesel oil production was cut in less than half. A

generalized tower temperature profile reduction and a 1000 m3/d loss in total diesel production was
noticed as shown in Table 1.
VARIABLE
VARIATION
LIGHT DIESEL YIELD (m/d)
- 2000
HEAVY DIESEL YIELD (m/d)
+ 600
TOTAL DIESEL YIELD (m/d)
-1000
LIGHT DIESEL TEMP. (C/F)
-15/-27
HEAVY DIESEL TEMP. (C/F)
-35/-63
REDUCED CRUDE TEMP. (C/F)
-10/-18
Table 1 Conditions after Emergency Shutdown
Thermograph readings and gamma scans surveys were done in order to look for possible
damages inside the column.

LIGHT DIESEL NOZZLE

OUTLET LIGHT DIESEL

VALVE OPENED

OUTLET LIGHT DIESEL

VALVE CLOSED

LIGHT DIESEL OULET LINE

TWO TEMPERATURES
LIQUID AND VAPOR

ONE TEMPERATURE
LIQUID

Figure 3 First Case Study Thermograph Readings

Figure 4 First Case Study Crude Tower Gamma Scan (partial)

As it was possible to draw only half of the light diesel rate, thermografph readings were done
close to its draw-off nozzle. The outlet light diesel valve was completely closed and as shown in

Figure 3, the collector channel was able to retain the liquid meaning that probably the light diesel tray
itself ( #13) should be harmed. The gamma scan analysis, partially presented in Figure 4, indicated that
this tray liquid level was very low, a difference in liquid height between the north and south sides, and
also pointed out that the region between the kerosene (# 21) and light diesel draw (#13) had
problems.
The unit was shutdown in order to repair the internal mechanical tower damages. After
inspection it was observed a lot of missing pannels, many opened trapdoors, some trays partially fallen
and from observation it was concluded that an uplift from bottom to up had happened. The crude
tower sketch is presented in Figure 5.
d = 7500 mm
#28

DAMAGED TRAYS

. PUMPAROUND RETURN

#27
#26
#25
#24
#23
#22
#21
#20
#19
#18
#17
#16
#15
#14
#13

KEROSENE DRAW

LIGHT DIESEL DRAW

#12
#11
#10
#09

PUMPAROUND OULET
HEAVY DIESEL DRAW

FEED

REDUCED CRUDE

Figure 5 First Case Study - Atmospheric Crude Tower Sketch

TRAY # 21

TRAY # 20

TRAY # 13 LIGHT DIESEL DRAW

Figure 6 First Case Study Damaged Trays Pictures

Some pictures of the damaged trays are shown in Figure 6. The solid marks represent missing
panels and the dashed lines represent an upholstered region. The tower was fixed and after the new
start-up the diesel yield returned to the expected values.
Investigation to find the causes of the damages showed that a water-induced pressure surge
had happened due to water presence during the start-up after the emergency shutdown. Immediately
after the heavy diesel pump was aligned it was observed an increase of 0.66 kgf/cm2 in 30 seconds in
top and flash zone tower pressures as it can be seen in Figure 7. It was observed by the operation
team that the PSV of heavy diesel X crude exchanger had opened. The liquid discharge of this
pressure relief valve is sent to the bottom pumparound system returning to the tower as showed in
Figure 8. Unfortunately there are dead pockets that can accumulate water in this circuit and they were
not drained because the shutdown was too short. This pumparound return is just below the damaged
region of the crude tower and it was noted that the trays major harmed portions were concentrated in
the southeast side.
Crude Tower Overpressure

Heavy Diesel Pump Start-Up

Figure 7 First Case Study Overpressure

PSV

Dead Pocket

Top pumparound
system

Crude

Naphta
or
Kerosene
Heat Exchanger
PSV

Crude

Atmospheric
Distillation
Tower
Dead Pocket

Bottom pumparound
system

Heavy Diesel
or
Light Diesel
Heat Exchanger

Figure 8 First Case Study PSVs Discharged to Pumparound Returns

During the start-up operation the distillates pumps work with greater head values, close to their
shut off, being common to happen opening of the PSVs that protect these systems. In this procedure
the pumparounds pumps begin to operate later on after the tower is already heated. After returning
from the emergency shutdown and at the same moment of the heavy diesel pump start-up, the PSV
that protects the crude X HD exchanger opened, sending hydrocarbons to the pumparound system
returning to the crude tower, carrying water together and causing the overpressure due to abrupt
vaporization in high temperatures.
Ten months later another water-induced surge damaged the atmospheric tower of another crude
unit located at the same refinery and this incident will be the next case study.
Second Case Study: PSVs liquid discharge to the atmospheric tower flash zone
The simplified flowsheet and control loops of the 69,200 BPD crude distillation unit are
presented in Figure 9. There is no preflash drum nor preflash tower. The unit feed rate is controlled by
FV-106 located after the booster pumps downstream of the desalters.
HN
KERO

FV-106
FV-106
Atm
crude

1stsr desalter
Desalter
11stst train

Tower

nd desalter
22nd
Desalter

2nd train
Train

Figure 9 Second Case Study CDU sketch and control loops

In November 2011 a mechanical problem happened to the feed control valve (FV-106) and it was
abruptly closed. The charge pump remained sending crude to the unit, the system became over
pressurized and the PSVs of both desalters opened, discharging to the crude tower flash zone. The
crude tower flash zone pressure increased 1.3 kgf/cm2 and the top pressure 1.1 kgf/cm2 both in
1.5 min, as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10 Second Case Study Crude Tower Overpressure

LD
HD

After this event, it was observed a huge decrease in the first side-drawoff production (heavy
naphtha), as demonstrated in Figure 11. This reduction was compensated by the lower sidedraws
and no diesel loss to the bottoms residue was observed.

Heavy Naphta
(m3/d)

Figure 11 Second Case Study Heavy Naphta Yield Reduction

A crude tower gamma scan was done in order to show the extent of the damages. It pointed out
that only the trays located at the smaller diameter section were with problems.
One year later, in November 2012, it was the scheduled unit turnaround and the tower was
inspected. Many trays were completely fallen (15 from 44), others partially damaged and from
observation it was concluded that an uplift from bottom to up happened.
All the damaged trays were sieve type and were located at the tower upper section, in the smaller
diameter region. The valve trays located at the larger diameter section were in place. These valve trays
opened area are four times the opened area of the upper sieve trays.
The crude tower sketch is presented in Figure 12, where it can be seen in blue the valve trays, in
red the sieve trays and in highlight the region that was damaged.

UPWARDS DEFORMED
TRAYS

#44
#43
#42
#41
#40
#39
#38
#37

TOTALLY OR
PARTIALLY
FALLEN TRAYS

#36
#35
#34
#33
#32
#31
#30
#29
#28

#27
#26
#25
#24
#23
#22
#21
#20
#19

Sieve Trays
Valve Trays

#18
#17
#16
#15
#14
#13
#12
#11
#10

Figure 12 Second Case Study Crude Tower Sketch

Although the pressure surge occurred at the flash zone, the packing and the valve trays located
below the damaged trays and closer to the surge source were preserved. A possible explanation is
based in the greater open area and tower diameter in this tower section.
Some pictures of the damage trays are showed in Figure 13.

Tray # 29 fallen above tray #28

Tray # 40 fallen above tray #39

Tray # 42 with deformation

upwards

Figure 13 Second Case Study Damaged Trays Pictures

Investigation to find the causes of the incident showed a synchronism between the desalter
safety relief valve opening, the atmospheric tower flash zone over pressure and an increase in
water presence at the overhead drum. All of the observations led to a conclusion that the tray
damages were caused by water-induced pressure surge.
The source of this water was attributed to a not drained dead pocket in the second desalter
PSV discharge line as can be seen in Figure 14.

Volume

2nd Desalter
Atm crude
Tower

Figure 14 Second Case Study Water Accumulation in Dead Pocket

The trays were fixed and the entire distillates yields returned to the normal values.
Unfortunately one month after the start-up another water-induced pressure surge happened at the
same tower, which will be the third case study of this paper.

Third Case Study: PSVs liquid discharge to the atmospheric tower flash zone
In January 2013, after one month of operation, another incident happened to the same
atmospheric tower. Due to a misunderstood interlock action, the feed charge booster pump
B-120 A/B showed in Figure 9, was shutdown with continue operation of the feed charge pump
B-101 A/B. Again the desalter safety relief valve opened and once more the atmospheric tower flash
zone was pressurized. The flash zone pressure increased 0.9 kgf/cm2 in 20 sec while the top pressure
increased 0.85 kgf/cm2 in 1 min, as can be seen in Figure 15.

Figure 15 Third Case Study Crude Tower Overpressure

After this event it was not possible to draw neither heavy naphtha nor kerosene. The lower
draw-off pans were not able to compensate these losses and the bottom residue increased, meaning
reduction of the total distillates yield, as indicated in Figure 16. A general decrease in the tower
temperature profile was observed as shown in Figure 17.

Heavy Naphta
(m3/d)

Figure 16 Third Case Study Heavy Naphta Yield Reduction

Heavy diesel temp.

Light diesel temp.

Pumparound temp.
Kerosene temp.

Figure 17 Third Case Study Temperature Profile

The symptoms after this event were much worse than in case 2 and a new gamma scan (partially
reproduced in Figure 18 in blue solid line) also indicated greater tower damage, showing a lot of trays
partially damaged and trays from #40 to # 35 completely collapsed. Once again the damage trays were
located at the tower smaller diameter section, from tray # 28 to tray # 43.

Figure 18 Third Case Study Gamma Scan (partial)

Figure 19 shows schematically that many PSVs discharge liquid to the atmospheric tower. The
heavy naphtha, kerosene and first pumparound systems have their PSV discharging to the first
pumparound return, while for the light diesel, heavy diesel and second pumparound systems the
discharges are sent to the second pumparound return, and the desalters (S-102 and S-103) and the
preheating trains have their PSVs discharging to the tower flash zone.

1st PA

2nd PA

HN

Kero

PA

Atm crude
Tower

FZ

closed
opened
steam injection

LD

HD

PA

1st

2nd Train

Figure 19 Third Case Study Safety and Relief Valves (PSV) discharges
A multi-disciplinary team was designated to find the reasons of the tower damages. Once more the
conclusion was water-induced pressure surge, but this time, the water source was found and was still
in action during a visit to the operational site just two days after the incident.
During the site visit some bad practices were identified to be occurring simultaneously, which can
be understood with Figures 19 and Figure 20:
V-117 is a small drum used to indicate when any of these safety relief valves opens.
Unexpectedly the level instrument connections were blocked and in fact there was no liquid
indication;
During the incident investigation it was drained a lot of clean water from V-117 for more than
30 min;
This water source was caused by a non blocked steam injection to a valve used only with the
purpose of PSV liberation . This valve is highlighted in dashed red line in Figure 20. Steam
was flowing since the start-up and continued even after the tower damage event. Although this
PSV has a double valve block, at that moment, only one valve was closed but allowing steam
passage, and the second one was open due to a difficult access;
The spectacle blind of this PSV steam injection system was not closed as it should be. As a
matter of fact it can be seen from Figure 19 that all spectacle blinds located at the systems that
discharge to the tower flash zone were open.

1st Desalter
2nd Desalter
Atm crude
Tower

steam injection

Volume

Figure 20 Third Case Study V-117 LAH not aligned and steam injection not blocked
Conclusions
Towers malfunctions and as consequence losses in distillates yields and profitability, although
undesirable, unfortunately are very common.
Three case studies of tower internals damage caused by water-induced pressure surge were
presented.
All the cases have in common an atmospheric crude tower overpressure after a pressure relief
valve opening event, discharging hydrocarbons and carrying water into the tower. Although all the
cases are related to PSV opening and liquid discharging to the tower, the problem exists only due to
the water presence. It should be mentioned that in this CDU many other times the desalter PSV
opened discharging to the tower flash zone (in fact 16 times), but with no harm. In all of these events
no increase in water accumulation was observed at the overhead drum.
It is mandatory to avoid water presence at the PSVs collectors that discharge liquid to towers.
Focusing in eliminating water accumulation is necessary in all steps of the unit cycle life: basic design,
detailed engineering, construction, inspection and all the time during operation, especially after
shutdowns and start-ups. The liquid collector should be inclined with no dead pockets. There must be
a reliable way of identifying liquid presence. Drainage is very important.
A more conservative design, but more expensive, is to have a blowdown drum collecting all
the PSVs liquid discharges.

The case studies are summarized in Table 2.

Initial event
PSV location
PSV discharge

Case Study 1
heavy diesel pump start-up
after emergency shutdown
crude X diesel heat exchanger
pumparound atmospheric
tower return line

Case Study 2
feed charge valve closure
desalter
atmospheric tower flash
zone

Water source

possible undrained dead

pocket

possible undrained dead

pocket

Mitigation

avoid dead pockets during

design and operational
drainage routine

avoid dead pockets

during design and
operational drainage
routine

Case Study 3
feed charge booster
pump shutdown
desalter
atmospheric tower flash
zone
unlocked PSV liberation
steam valve and not
aligned level indicator
operational training

Table 2 Case Studies Summary

References
American Petroleum Institute, 2007, Pressure-relieving and Depressing Systems, ANSI/API Standard
521 5th Edition, Addendum May 2008.
Kister, H.Z., 2006, Distillation Troubleshooting (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New Jersey, USA).
Kister, H.Z. 2003, What Caused Tower Malfunctions in the last 50 years ? Trans IChemE, Vol 81,
Part A, January 2003.