Hazard and operability study

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A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic examination of

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a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that
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may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation; it is carried
dictionary.
out by a suitably experienced multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP team) during a set of
meetings. The HAZOP technique is qualitative, and aims to stimulate the imagination of participants to identify potential hazards
and operability problems; structure and completeness are given by using guideword prompts. The relevant international standard
[1] calls for team members to display 'intuition and good judgement' and for the meetings to be held in 'a climate of positive
thinking and frank discussion'. The HAZOP technique was initially developed to analyze chemical process systems and mining
operation process but has later been extended to other types of systems and also to complex operations such as nuclear power
plant operation and to use software to record the deviation and consequence.

Contents
1 Method
1.1 Outline
1.2 Guide words and parameters
2 Team
3 History
4 See also
5 Notes
6 References
7 Further reading

Method
Outline
The method applies to processes (existing or planned) for which design information is available. [a] For continuous processes, this
commonly includes a piping and instrumentation diagram and process flow diagram which is examined in sections, chosen so that
for each a meaningful design intent (the desired, or specified range of behaviour for that item, not just its design duty point ) can
be specified. For example, in a chemical plant, a pipe may be intended to transport 2.3 kg/s of 96% sulfuric acid at 20 C and a
pressure of 2 bar from a pump to a heat exchanger but a prudent designer will have allowed for foreseeable variations
hotter/stronger acid, pump no-flow pressure on the line - before the design reaches detailed HAZOP and (where possible) that
wider design envelope should be explicitly identified and taken as the design intent basis for HAZOP study . [b] The intended
duty of the heat exchanger may be to heat 2.3 kg/s of 96% sulfuric acid from 20 C to 80 C but its full design intent will also
include glimpse of the obvious functions; e.g. maintaining containment of hot acid (and of the heating fluid,and preventing
leakage of one into the other). The size of sections should be appropriate to the complexity of the system and the magnitude of
the hazards it might pose. The HAZOP team then determines what are the possible significant Deviations from each intent,
feasible Causes and likely Consequences. It can then be decided (at the HAZOP, or by subsequent analysis) whether existing,
designed safeguards are sufficient, or whether additional actions are necessary to reduce risk to an acceptable level. For batch
and other sequential operations a logic flow diagram should be available for HAZOP study as well: equipment may have different
design intents at different points in the operation (all should be considered) and hazards may arise from performing operations out
of sequence. When HAZOP meetings were recorded by hand they were generally scheduled for three to four hours per day. [c]
For a medium-sized chemical plant where the total number of items to be considered is 1200 (items of equipment and pipes or
other transfers between them) about 40 such meetings would be needed. [2] Various software programs are now available to assist
in meetings.

Guide words and parameters

In order to identify deviations, the team applies (systematically, in order [d]) a set of Guide Words to each section of the process.
To prompt discussion, or to ensure completeness, it may also be helpful to explicitly consider appropriate parameters which
apply to the design intent. These are general words such as Flow, Temperature, Pressure, Composition. The current standard [1]
notes that Guide words should be chosen which are appropriate to the study and neither too specific (limiting ideas and
discussion) nor too general (allowing loss of focus). A fairly standard set of Guide Words (given as an example in Table 3 of [1]) is

as follows:
Guide Word

Meaning

NO OR NOT

Complete negation of the design intent

MORE

Quantitative increase

LESS

Quantitative decrease

AS WELL AS

Qualitative modification/increase

PART OF

Qualitative modification/decrease

REVERSE

Logical opposite of the design intent

OTHER THAN

Complete substitution

EARLY

Relative to the clock time

LATE

Relative to the clock time

BEFORE

Relating to order or sequence

AFTER

Relating to order or sequence

(The last four guide words are applied to batch or sequential operations.) Where a guide word is meaningfully applicable to a
parameter e.g. NO FLOW, MORE TEMPERATURE, their combination should be recorded as a credible potential deviation. The
distinction between some guide words may not always be remembered by the team (LESS COMPOSITION should suggest less
than 96% sulfuric acid, AS WELL AS COMPOSITION should suggest a contaminant whereas OTHER THAN COMPOSITION
should suggest something else such as oil) or be well observed by the plant (if a 60% sulphuric/ 15% nitric acid mixture could be
fed instead, the possibility could be flagged up against LESS, AS WELL AS, OTHER THAN).
HAZOP-type studies may also be carried out by considering applicable guide words and identifying elements to which they are
applicable[1] or by considering the parameters associated with plant elements and systematically applying guide words to them;
although this last approach is not mentioned in the relevant standard, its examples of output include a study (B3) recorded in this
way.[1] The following table gives an overview of commonly used guide word - parameter pairs and common interpretations of
them.

Parameter /
Guide
Word

More

Less

None

Flow

high flow

low flow

no flow

Pressure

high
pressure

low
pressure

vacuum

delta-p

Temperature

high
low
temperature temperature

Level

high level

low level

no level

different
level

Time

too long /
too late

too short /
too soon

sequence
missing
step
backwards
actions
skipped

Agitation

fast mixing slow mixing

no
mixing

Reaction

fast
reaction /
runaway

slow
reaction

no
reaction

Start-up /
Shut-down

too fast

too slow

Draining /
Venting

too long

too short

none

Inertising

high
pressure

low
pressure

none

Utility
failure
(instrument
air, power)

reverse
flow

As well as

Part of

Other
than

deviating
deviating
contamination
concentration
material
explosion

extra actions

wrong
time

unwanted
reaction
actions
missed
deviating
pressure

wrong
recipe
wrong timing
contamination

wrong
material

failure

DCS failure
[e]

failure

Maintenance

none

Vibrations

Reverse

too low

too high

none

wrong
frequency

Once the causes and effects of any potential hazards have been established, the system being studied can then be modified to
improve its safety. The modified design should then be subject to another HAZOP, to ensure that no new problems have been
added. [f]

Team
A HAZOP study is a team effort. The team should be as small as possible consistent with their having relevant skills and
experience [g] A minimum team size of 4[1]-5 [3] is recommended. In a large process there will be many HAZOP meetings and the
team may change as different specialists and possibly different members of the design team are brought in, but the Study Leader
and Recorder will usually be fixed. As many as 20 individuals may be involved[4] but is recommended that no more than 7[1]-8[3]
are involved at any one time (a larger team will make slower progress): each team member should have a definite role as follows
[1] (with alternative names from other sources):

Name

Alternative

Role

Study leader

Chairman

someone experienced in HAZOP but not directly involved in the

design, to ensure that the method is followed carefully. Responsible
for ensuring that discussion leads to a definite conclusion and is
adequately recorded, problems are documented and
recommendations passed on

Recorder

Secretary or scribe

to record discussions (accurately but comprehensibly), to alert Study

Leader when this becomes impossible,[h] to document problems and
recommendations

Designer

(or representative of
the team which has
To explain any design details or provide further information
designed the process)

User

(or representative of
those who will use it
[i])

To consider it in use and question its operability, and the effect of

deviations

Specialist

according to
specialism; e.g.
Chemist ; Human
Factors Specialist

someone with relevant technical knowledge, e.g. knowledge about

effect of varying reaction conditions; training in human reliability
analysis, and human error identification

Maintainer

(if appropriate)

someone concerned with maintenance of the plant.

In earlier publications it was suggested that the Study Leader could also be the Recorder [4] but separate roles are now generally
recommended. Software is now available from several suppliers to aid the Study Leader and the Recorder.

History
The technique originated in the Heavy Organic Chemicals Division of ICI, which was then a major British and international
chemical company. The history has been described by Trevor Kletz[4][5] who was the company's safety advisor from 1968 to
1982, from which the following is abstracted.
In 1963 a team of 3 people met for 3 days a week for 4 months to study the design of a new phenol plant. They started with a
technique called critical examination which asked for alternatives, but changed this to look for deviations. The method was
further refined within the company, under the name operability studies, and became the third stage of its hazard analysis
procedure (the first two being done at the conceptual and specification stages) when the first detailed design was produced.
In 1974 a one-week safety course including this procedure was offered by the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) at
Teesside Polytechnic. Coming shortly after the Flixborough disaster, the course was fully booked, as were ones in the next few
years. In the same year the first paper in the open literature was also published. [6] In 1977 the Chemical Industries Association
published a guide.[7] Up to this time the term HAZOP had not been used in formal publications. The first to do this was Kletz in
1983, with what were essentially the course notes (revised and updated) from the IChemE courses. [4] By this time, hazard and
operability studies had become an expected part of chemical engineering degree courses in the UK.[4]

See also
Cybersecurity HAZOP (CS-HAZOP)
Hazard analysis
Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points

Process Safety Management

Risk assessment

Safety engineering
HAZID

Notes
a. The HAZOP technique can also be applied where design information is not fully available - and doing so may be useful in knocking
bad ideas on the head before too much time is wasted upon them - but a meeting carried out on that basis is not a 'HAZOP' within the
meaning of the standard which notes its restrictive redefinition of the term "The term HAZOP has been often associated, in a generic
sense, with some other hazard identification techniques (e.g. checklist HAZOP, HAZOP 1 or 2, knowledge-based HAZOP). The use of
the term with such techniques is considered to be inappropriate and is specifically excluded from this document." [1]

b. Otherwise the HAZOP gets bogged down

c. Hours were restricted for a number of reasons: to allow the secretary time to manage the records, to allow attendance by busy people
with valuable insights, and because HAZOP meetings (and HAZOP team members) tend to lose focus if they go on too long. The last
two considerations still apply: The success of the HAZOP study strongly depends on the alertness and concentration of the team
members and it is therefore important that the sessions are of limited duration and that there are appropriate intervals between
sessions. How these requirements are achieved is ultimately the responsibility of the study leader. [1]
d. If an individual team member spots a problem before the appropriate guideword is reached it may be possible to maintain rigid
adherence to order; if most of the team wants to take the discussion out of order no great harm is done if they do, provided the Study
Leader ensures that the secretary is not becoming too confused, and that all guidewords are (eventually) adequately considered
e. This relates to the Distributed Control System (DCS) hardware only; software (unless specially carefully written) must be assumed to
be capable of attempting incorrect or inopportune operation of anything under its control
f. ie the modifications (and their possible effect on other plant items) should undergo re-HAZOP
g. and affiliation Where a system has been designed by a contractor, the HAZOP team should contain personnel from both the contractor
and the client. [1]
h. e.g. he is unclear what conclusion has been reached against a guideword (or he suspects the Study Leader has missed one)
i. If similar plant exists, its users should also be represented

References
1. British Standard BS: IEC61882:2002 Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies)- Application Guide British Standards
Institution. This British Standard reproduces verbatim IEC 61882:2001 and implements it as the UK national standard.
2. Swann, C. D., & Preston, M. L., (1995) Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, vol 8, no 6, pp349-353 "Twenty-five
years of HAZOPs"
3. Nolan, D.P. (1994) Application of HAZOP and What-If Safety Reviews to the Petroleum, Petrochemical and Chemical Industries.
William Andrew Publishing/Noyes. ISBN 978-0-8155-1353-7
4. Kletz, T. A., (1983) HAZOP & HAZAN Notes on the Identification and Assessment of Hazards IChemE Rugby
5. Kletz, T., (2000) By Accident - a life preventing them in industry PVF Publications ISBN 0-9538440-0-5
6. Lawley, H. G.,(1974) Chemical Engineering Progress, vol 70, no 4 page 45 "Operability studies and hazard analysis" AIChE
7. Chemical Industries Association (1977) A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies

Further reading
Kletz, Trevor (2006). Hazop and Hazan (4th ed.). Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0852955065.
Tyler, Brian, Crawley, Frank & Preston, Malcolm (2008). HAZOP: Guide to Best Practice (2nd ed.). IChemE, Rugby.
ISBN 978-0-85295-525-3.
Gould, J., (2000) Review of Hazard Identification Techniques, HSE (http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/hsl_pdf
/2005/hsl0558.pdf)
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg5211/docs/RBDM_Files/PDF/RBDM_Guidelines/Volume%203/Volume%203Chapter%2010.pdf
Hazard and Operability Studies (http://www.lihoutech.com/hzp1frm.htm) Explanation by a software supplier
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/plansforaction/pdf/hazards/haz_hipap8_rev2008.pdf
Whitty, Steve; Foord, Tony. "Is HAZOP worth all the effort it takes?". Retrieved 5 March 2015. Potential problems with
HAZOPs (authors sell HAZOP expertise, so presumably some promotional intent, but the issues described are
genuine/recognisable)
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Categories: Process safety Safety Safety engineering
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