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DOI: 10.1353/csa.2014.0020
Access provided by Nanyang Technological University (24 Nov 2014 22:40 GMT)
Reproduced from Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs Vol. 36, No. 2 (August
2014) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014). This version was obtained electronically direct from the
publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior
permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at
<http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>
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version of the hudud rather than hudud itself.60 Chua himself had
remained vague about how PAS hudud differs from the hudud as
supposedly explained in traditional Islamic sources. Fathul Bari
himself concurred with the statement noting that many aspects of
PAS hudud run contrary to Islamic teachings. In sum, it is clear
that the religious scholars in ILMU support the implementation
of Islamic criminal laws and their differences with PAS are over
technical issues.61
Democracy: An Un-Islamic System
The ILMU ulamas attitude towards democracy is an important
corollary of its relations to the Saudi Salafi scholars. Salafi scholars
such as Al-Albani and Bin Baz have explicitly rejected democracy
because it challenges the Oneness of God. 62 Al-Albani had even
prohibited his followers from voting or participating in elections.
The fact that Salafi scholars in Malaysia use Al-Albani as a reference
point begs the question of how they can justify their support for
UMNO.63 The view of Rasul Dahri on this matter can shed some
light on this seemingly contradictory position. He declared that
democracy is an un-Islamic system that does not emanate from
Islam.64 For him, ultimate sovereignty lies in Gods hands and not
in the hands of the people, a core concept of democracy. Rasul
added that democracy is a system created by the Jews to divide
Muslims. Within the democratic system, there must always be
a group that governs and another group that opposes which in
essence will result in the division of Muslims.65 However, in the
Malaysian context, Rasul Dahri argued that the democratic system
ensures that the government remains in the hands of Muslims. He
argued that to strengthen the position of the Muslim community,
Muslims in Malaysia must vote for UMNO.66 This is to ensure
that political power is not divided within the Muslim community
resulting in non-Muslims usurping power.67 In essence, Rasul Dahri
views democracy as an un-Islamic concept but noted that democracy
can be utilized to protect Malay political dominance. During a
public seminar, Fathul Bari was questioned about his involvement
with UMNO. While he admitted that democracy is not an Islamic
concept, he justified his association with UMNO by arguing that
it is a necessary evil to change the system from within and that
ultimately he is working for an Islamic system to be implemented.68
The views of Salafi scholars reveal that there is an attempt on
their part to change the system from within. While most Salafis
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Conclusion
The paper has examined the factors that have motivated Salafi
ulama to collaborate with UMNO. The Salafi movement arrived
in Malaysia through students studying in the Middle East. They
brought back the ideas of the Salafiyyah proponents such as
Afghani and Abduh. However, it was the second wave of Salafi
ideas influenced by the Saudi Salafi scholars such as Albani and
Bin Baz that have become dominant in Malaysia. This Salafi strand
is of the politically quietist form and is focused on spreading the
Salafi doctrine through education.
It was in the late 2000s that the Salafis began to organize
themselves politically in order to fill a religious void within
UMNO. This move was spurred by various political and religious
considerations including to shield themselves from attacks by the
traditionalists within the governments religious bureaucracy and
to spread their religious doctrine. This decision might seem awkward
given that the Salafi ulama reject democracy, views the Malaysian
state as insufficiently Islamic and considers it obligatory for Malaysia
to implement Islamic criminal laws. However, the decision to join
UMNO has also allowed the Salafi ulama to play a key role in
shaping policies on Islam in the country such as institutionalizing
laws against the Shiites and Sufis as well as creating awareness
of the need to implement rigid Islamic laws within the state.
Fathul Bari has successfully positioned himself as a key member
of UMNO Youth and has extended his influence in the country.
On the part of UMNO, the Salafis ulama political involvement is
in line with the partys attempt to enhance its Islamic credentials
and present itself as the bastion of true Islam in Malaysia especially
in light of the political gains made by PAS. The Salafi ulama have
played important roles in defending the governments position on
a range of different issues including in opposing anti-government
demonstrations, curbing the rights of Muslims to leave Islam and
encouraging the Muslim populace to vote for UMNO by invoking
religious justifications. Regardless of the ulamas role in influencing
policies, the influence of these Salafi ulama is unlikely to increase
within UMNO and Malaysian society as a whole and it is unlikely
that it will define religious discourse within the country due to the
presence of other religious forces within the government.
The Salafi ulama in UMNO serves as another case study
which attests to the fluidity in which the Salafi movement can
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225
For more on Salafism in Indonesia, see Noorhaidi Hassan, Laskar Jihad Islam,
Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia (New York:
Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2010). For Salafism in Thailand see
Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, Islam in Modern Thailand: Faith, Philanthropy
and Politics (London: Routledge, 2014).
Three interviews were conducted with the Salafi ulama in Kuala Lumpur in
August 2011. Interviews were also conducted with several leaders of UMNO
and PAS between August 2012 and April 2014.
For a sample of works on Islamism in Malaysia, see Joseph Liow, Piety and
Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010); Farish Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the PanMalaysian Islamic Party, PAS: 19512003 (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological
Research Institute, 2004); and Kamarulnizam Abdullah, The Politics of Islam
in Contemporary Malaysia (Bangi, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia, 2002).
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226
David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London and New
York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 10.
Exceptions are the Taliban in Afghanistan and more recently Boko Haram in
Nigeria.
Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: Belnapp, 2003),
pp. 7090.
Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New
Generation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 5.
Lacroix, Between Revolution and Apoliticalism, op. cit., p. 48. For a critique
of the Salafi-jihadi ideology, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in Gods Name:
Islamic Law, Authority, and Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Adnan A. Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations
of Radical Islamism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2005), p. 220.
One of the most important works on the Sahwa movement is Stephane Lacroix,
Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi
Arabia (Harvard, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011).
Al-Hawali and Al-Ouda were both influenced by the ideas of the Muslim
Brotherhood during their student days. Al-Hawali wrote his doctorate thesis
under the supervision of Muslim Brotherhood leader, Muhammad Qutb.
They formed a political opposition group, the Committee for the Defence of
Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in 1993. This is the first Saudi Salafi opposition group
in the kingdom accusing the government leaders and Saudi religious clergy
of not doing enough to protect and accord rights to Muslims. The CDLR are
generally opposed to the Salafi-jihadi strand of Salafism criticizing terrorism as
an un-Islamic form of political action.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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227
One of the most important works discussing the Kaum Muda movement is
William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: University
of Malaya Press, 1967), pp. 5690. For more on the Al-Imam, see Abu Bakar
Hamzah, Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society, 19051908 (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka
Antara, 1991).
22
23
24
Ibid., p. 78.
25
Abdullah H., Abdul Rahman, Gerakan Islah di Perlis - Sejarah dan Pemikiran
[Islah Movement in Perlis- History and Thoughts] (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa
dan Pustaka, 1989).
26
27
Mohammad Redzuan Othman and Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak, The Malays in the
Middle East (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2000).
28
Hawwa was a key leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria who was forced
to leave the country following state repression of the Brotherhood. He fled to
Jordan and Syria upon his release from prison in 1978. Author interview with
Hadi Awang, Kampung Rusila, Terengganu, 12 January 2006.
29
For the impact of overseas students on the resurgence of Islam in Malaysia, see
Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students
(Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1987) and Chandra Muzffar,
Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1987).
For Malay politics prior to the Islamic resurgence in the 1980s, see John
Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National
Organisation and Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books,
1980).
Judith Nagata, The Re-flowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Radicals and their
Roots (Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press, 1984),
p. 120.
One key problem associated with the term Wahhabism in Malaysia is the fact
that this term is used to describe all Salafis and Wahhabis without any distinction.
Hence, any edicts on Wahhabis are in fact applicable to Salafis as well.
20
21
30
31
32
33
34
35
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36
37
Abdul Rahim Sabri, JAIS tolak 7 penceramah Wahhabi [JAIS rejects 7 Wahhabi
scholars], available at <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/117350>.
38
Traditional Islam refers to an orthodox form of Islam which refers to the Quran,
Hadith, religious decrees of classical Muslim scholars, rational thought and
local cultures as sources of Islamic reference. Traditionalist Muslims are more
tolerant of local customs, cultures and are often practitioners of Sufism. They
are highly critical of Salafi doctrines. See Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman,
Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama, Southeast Asia Research 16, no. 1
(March 2008): 135.
39
40
41
The exception is Shahidan Kassim, former chief minister of Perlis who is known
for his Salafi sympathies. Author interview with Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur,
17 August 2011.
42
43
Ibid.
44
Nakhaie has written a number of articles on his blog site against the Salafi
ulama. See <http://nakhaie.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/persoalan-aqidah-dalamislam-politik/>.
45
Anwar Hussin dan Faiza Zainuddin, 40 ulama muda masuk UMNO (40 young
ulama joined UMNO) [provide translation], Berita Harian, 26 June 2010; and
author interview with an UMNO leader (who does not want to be named),
Kuala Lumpur, 5 June 2013.
46
Jimadie Shah Othman, Ulama masuk Umno: Siapa tipu siapa? [Ulama joined
UMNO? Who cheated who?], Malaysiakini, 1 July 2010, available at <http://
www.malaysiakini.com/news/136082>.
47
Details of the formation and structure of ILMU can be found on the groups
website at <http://ilmuanmalaysia.com/>.
48
For the differences between Asri Sobri and the ILMU ulama, see the video
Ustaz Asrie Sobri - Semangat Nasionalisme Menurut Perspektif Islam [Ustaz
Asrie Sobri-The Spirit of Nationalism from Islamic Perspective], available at
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-D9uBLMzdA>.
49
All these ulama have made references to Sheikh Rabee during their talks
and sermons. See, for example, Al Madkhali Dicaci, Rabai Yahudi Dipuji
[Al Madkhali was Insulted and Jewish Rabbi was Praised], available at
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229
51
52
Rasul Dahri, Demokrasi, Pilihanraya dan Mengundi: Satu Kajian Menurut Al-Quran
dan As-Sunnah [Democracy, Elections and Voting: Research According to
AlQuran and As-Sunnah] (Johor Bahru: Ummul Qura Publications, 2013),
p. 56.
53
54
Author interviews with Fadhlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2011 and
Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur, 17 August 2011.
55
56
The hudud controversy erupted in 2012 when PAS declared that the party
would push for the implementation of hudud laws if the Pakatan Rakyat
(PR) coalition were to win the 13th general election. The party faced the
outright rejection of its objective by both its PR coalition partners and
UMNO on the basis that Malaysia was not ready for the implementation of
the laws.
57
Ustaz Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, Komen atas kenyataan Karpal Singh & Chua Soi
Lek [Comment on Karpal Singh and Chua Soi Lek], 4 November 2012, available
at <http://ustazfathulbari.wordpress.com/2012/11/04/komen-atas-kenyataankarpal-singh-chua-soi-lek/>.
58
Ida Li, Soi Lek disagrees with Umno ally over hudud, Malaysian Insider,
28 October 2012, available at <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/
article/soi-lek-disagrees-with-umno-ally-over-hudud-impact-on-non-muslims/>.
59
Hudud laws refer to a class of punishments within Islamic laws that are fixed
for certain crimes including theft, adultery, consumption of alcohol or other
intoxicants and apostasy. The punishments for these crimes are fixed by the
Quran or Hadith. Tazir refers to punishments for offences not included in
hudud. Qisas means settlement of accounts and governs crimes for which a
victim or the family of the victim can demand that the same punishment be
inflicted on the offender. In the case of murder, the victims family can demand
the offender be killed.
60
61
Mohammad Fairuz Jumain, Fathul Bari: Soi Lek persoal hudud versi Pas
[Fathul Bari: Soi Lek Questions PAS version of Hudud], Sinar Harian,
5 November 2012.
62
63
Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the
United States (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006), p. 95.
64
Ibid., p. 135.
65
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230
66
67
Ibid.
68
See the video UFB - Demokrasi - Mujahid Yusof Rawa Seleweng Ayat Quran?
[UFB-Demoracy- Mujahid Yusuf Rawa Misinterprets Quran], available at
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmV3Bdmvqk4>.
69
The high number of northern Malays in PAS was alluded to by Farish Noor.
See Farish, Islam Embedded, op. cit., p. 228.
Ijtima Tarbawi PAS 2011 - UAF - PAS & Ikhwanul Muslimin Bermasalah Aqidah
[PAS Annual Meeting 2011-UF-Problems in PAS and Muslim Brotherhoods
Theology], available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqLU-SLuT-Y>.
Debat Sinar Harian antara Ketua Pemuda Pas, Nasrudin Hassan Tantawi dan
Pengerusi Jawatankuasa Kerja Sekretariat Ulama Muda Umno, Fathul Bari
Mat Jahaya dengan tajuk PRU13 - Orang Muda Pilih Siapa? [GE13- Who
did the Young Choose?], available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
gHZH1jg36Eg>.
80
Kuek Ser Kuang Keng, Reform of Face Rallies, Bersih 2.0 warns EC, Malaysiakini,
11 November 2010, available at <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/147889>.
81
See the video Demonstrasi BERSIH 2.0 - UFMO - Silap Pendalilan Hadith
Halal [BERSIH 2.0 Demonstrations-UFMO- The Mistake of Misinterpreting
Hadith], available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TwcmcRJ188>.
82
83
For a detailed and insightful treatment of the issue, see Julian C. H. Lee,
Islamization and Activism in Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2010), pp. 6274.
84
Leven Woon, Nurul Izzah backs religious freedom for all, Free Malaysia Today,
3 November 2012, available at <http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/
nation/2012/11/03/nurul-izzah-backs-religious-freedom-for-all/>.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
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85
86
See the video Kalimah Allah: Lim Guan Eng Timbul KRISTIANOFOBIA
[The Usage of Allah: Lim Guan Eng Promoting Christianophobia], available at
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40aCCCod_9Y>.
87
Ibid.
88
For the Islamization of Pakistan, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of
the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1994) and for Sudan, see J. Millard Burr and
Robert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State,
19892000 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).
89
See Amir Mir, Talibanisation of Pakistan (New Delhi: Pentagon Security Press,
2010), pp. 117.
90
See Jabatan Mufti Perak (Perak Mufti Office), Keputusan Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa
Fatwa Negeri Perak: Fatwa Mengenai Penegahan Menyebarkan Aliran dan
Dakyah Wahabiah di Negeri Perak [Decision by the Fatwa Committee of the
State of Perak: Fatwa on Curbing the Spread and Teachings of Wahhabism in
Perak], available at <http://mufti.perak.gov.my/perkhidmatan/e-book/372-fatwapenegahan-menyebarkan-aliran-dan-dakyah-wahabiah.html>.
91
92
93
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