G.R. No.

L-72370 May 29, 1987

BF NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-72370. May 29, 1987.]
BF NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and BF
HOMES, INC. respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
The core issue for resolution is: which Court has
jurisdiction over actions to annul Orders,
Resolutions and/or Decisions of the National Water
Resources Council (NWRC) relative to water rates
the Regional Trial Court or the Court of
Appeals?
The antecedent facts have been succinctly stated in
the Solicitor General's Comment as follows:
"Respondent BF Homes, Inc. is a subdivision owner
and developer in Paraaque, Metro Manila. In 1973,
BF Homes, Inc. filed a petition for a certificate of
public convenience and for authority to charge
water rates before the then Board of Power and
Waterworks (See records of Civil Case No. 6307,
RTC, Makati, Branch 143). In 1977, the Board of
Power and Waterworks was abolished and its
powers and functions relative to waterworks were
transferred to the National Water Resources Council
(NWRC) (Sec. 11 [e], PD No. 1206).
"On October 24, 1983, NWRC in its Resolution No.
22-A, series of 1983, granted a Certificate of Public
Convenience to respondent BF Homes, Inc., for the
operation and maintenance of waterworks system at
the BF Homes Subdivision in Paraaque, Metro
Manila. In the same resolution, NWRC approved
the Compromise Agreement dated May 24, 1983
entered into between BF Homes, Inc. and BF
Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc., in
NWRC Case No. 78-037, embodying the water
rates chargeable to customers.
On November 21, 1983 and December 16, 1983,
NWRC issued two other orders increasing the water
rates in view of the increase in the costs of
electricity. . . ." (Solicitor General's Comment, pp.
84-85, Rollo).
It is the foregoing Resolution, Orders and
Compromise Agreement that triggered the
institution of three separate cases set out herein
below mainly by petitioner BF Northwest
Homeowners Association, Inc.
The First Suit
BF Northwest Homeowners Association
Inc. vs. BF Homes, Inc.
Civil Case No. 6307 below
AC-G.R. No. 02778

On February 1, 1984, petitioner BF Northwest

Homeowners Association, Inc., (the
ASSOCIATION, for brevity), filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the
Regional Trial Court in Makati, Rizal, Branch 143
(docketed as Civil Case No. 6307), to enjoin BF
Homes, Inc. (HOMES, for short) from collecting
from ASSOCIATION members the adjusted water
rates for being arbitrary and unreasonable and
praying that HOMES be ordered to refund monies it
had collected from consumers over and above the
old water rates. llcd
Regional Trial Court Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo denied
the Motion to Dismiss filed by HOMES and upheld
his jurisdiction to entertain the suit. However, on
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed by
HOMES before respondent Appellate Court (BF
HOMES, Inc. & NWRC vs. Hon. Zoilo Aguinaldo,
etc., Northwest BF Homeowners Association,
Executive Villager's Society and 5-H Club, Inc."
AC-G.R. No. SP-02778), 1 the latter Court, on
March 27, 1984, reversed and held that the Regional
Trial Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the
case since NWRC, which took over the functions of
the Public Service Commission, has the rank of a
Regional Trial Court, hence, an NWRC decision on
water rates may only be reviewed by the Supreme
Court (as then provided by CA No. 146, [section
35] as amended), 2 and now by the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to BP 129, Section 9 (3). 3 Said
Appellate Court Decision shall hereinafter be
referred to as the "SP 02778 Decision."
The Second Case
Antonio Pedro vs. B.F. Homes, Inc.
Civil Case No. 7546 below
G.R. No. 68387
On June 13, 1984, suit was filed by one Antonio
Pedro, President of the ASSOCIATION, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148 (Civil
Case No. 7546) against HOMES "to declare the
Decision of the NWRC (increasing the rates
chargeable by HOMES) null and void because it
was rendered without hearing and, therefore,
without due process of law," and to enjoin the
enforcement by HOMES of those "exhorbitant,
confiscatory and discriminatory water rates."
On August 6, 1984, Trial Judge Jesus F. Guerrero
dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction guided by the "persuasive force and
effect" of the pronouncement of the Appellate Court
in the "SP 02778 Decision."
Antonio Pedro challenged the Order of dismissal in
a Petition for Review with Mandamus &
Preliminary Writ of Injunction filed before this
Court on August 23, 1984. Originally, the case was
referred by this Court (Second Division) to the
Appellate Court on September 3, 1984, but the latter
Court, in AC-G.R. No. SP 04197 4 on September
27, 1985, returned the case to this Court, on the
Found that what is involved is a "purely legal
question, particularly, the issue of jurisdiction."

On July 7, 1986, this Court (Second Division),

dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Antonio
Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied, with the denial being declared final on
August 25, 1986. LLjur
The Third Suit and Present Petition
BF Northwest Homeowners' Association Inc.
vs. BF Homes, Inc.
Civil Case No. 7584 below
AC-G.R. CV No. 04912
On June 18, 1984, or five (5) days after the Second
Case was filed, petitioner ASSOCIATION instituted
another ordinary civil suit (Civil Case No. 7584)
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Region, in Makati, Branch 143, against
private respondent HOMES geared towards the
same objective of annulling the Decision/Orders of
the NWRC which granted HOMES authority to
charge the increased water rates on the ground that
it was rendered without procedural due process and
without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion; and that it is not bound by the
Compromise Agreement since it was not a party
thereto.
The Trial Court, with Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo again
presiding, dismissed the suit, on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. On appeal, respondent Appellate
Court, in its Decision promulgated on August 16,
1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 04912, 5 sustained the
dismissal (1) because of the non-inclusion of the
NWRC as an indispensable party defendant, and (2)
on the ground of res judicata, the same issues raised
having been previously litigated and decided by the
Appellate Court in the "SP 02778 Decision."
Hence, this Petition, with the ASSOCIATION
assailing the foregoing grounds of dismissal and
seeking a re-examination of the pronouncement in
the "SP 02778 Decision" that:
"since the National Water Resources Council was
invested with the same powers and functions of the
former Public Service Commission in so far as
waterworks is concerned it is reasonable to
conclude that the Commission and the Council that
substituted it are identical, hence, the Council is on
equal footing with the Regional Trial Court."
The re-examination sought is impressed with merit.
The National Water Resources Council (NWRC)
was created by P.D. No. 424 on March 28, 1974 and
was vested with the general power to coordinate and
integrate water resources development, and among
others, to formulate and promulgate rules and
regulations for the exploitation and optimum
utilization of water resources, including the
imposition on water appropriators of such fees or
charges as may be deemed necessary by the Council
for water resources development.
P.D. No. 1067, which enacted the Water Code of the
Philippines, identified the NWRC as the
administrative agency for the enforcement of its
provisions and was "authorized to impose and
collect reasonable fees or charges for water
resources development from water appropriators"

(Art. 83). The provisions of said statute pertinent to

this case read: prLL
"Art. 87.
The Council or its duly authorized
representatives, in the exercise of its power to
investigate and decide cases brought to its
cognizance, shall have the power to administer
oaths, compel the attendance of witnesses by
subpoena and the production of relevant documents
by subpoena duces tecum.
"Non-compliance or violation of such orders of
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum shall be
punished in the same manner as indirect contempt
of an inferior court upon application by the
aggrieved party with the proper Court of First
Instance in accordance with the provision of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court."
"Art. 89.
The decisions of the Council on
water rights controversies may be appealed to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the
subject matter of the controversy is situated within
fifteen (15) days from the date the party appealing
receives a copy of the decision, on any of the
following grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion;
(2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and
law." (all emphasis ours).
Plainly, the NWRC is ranked with "inferior courts,"
which, under the Interim Rules and Guidelines
promulgated by this Court on January 11, 1983, are
listed as the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Explicit as well is the proviso that NWRC decisions
on water rights controversies are appealable to the
Court of First Instance. In the light of those specific
provisions, we find no room for the pronouncement
of the Appellate Court in the "SP 02778 Decision"
that the NWRC is at par with the Regional Trial
Court.
Nor is there basis for the conclusion in the SP
"02778 Decision" that because the NWRC, which
substituted the Public Service Commission, is
vested with the same powers and functions as said
Commission in so far as waterworks are concerned,
they are identical. The Public Service Commission
was abolished and replaced by several specialized
regulatory boards, namely, the Board of
Transportation, the Board of Communications, and
the Board of Power and Waterworks (P.D. No. 1
[Integrated Reorganization Plan; Letter of
Implementation No. 1]. Rulings and decisions of the
Boards were appealable in the same manner as the
rulings and decisions of the Public Service
Commission, that is, to the Supreme Court. It is
those Boards therefore, which may be considered at
par with the Public Service Commission.
Pursuant to P.D. No. 1206 creating the Department
of Energy, the Board of Power and Waterworks was
abolished and its functions relative to waterworks
were transferred to the NWRC. The NWRC was not
given the stature of the Public Service Commission.
On the contrary, its inferior status, vis-a-vis the
Public Service Commission, is further shown by the
following considerations: 1) the Commissioners of

the Public Service Commission were expressly

conferred the rank and privileges of Judges of
Courts of First Instance (Sec. 2, CA No. 146, as
amended by R.A. Nos. 178 and 2677). On the other
hand, the NWRC is not composed of
Commissioners. Its membership is confined to
specified officials headed by the Secretary of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications (Sec. 3,
P.D. No. 424). 2) While the Commission may
summarily punish for contempt (Sec. 29, CA No.
146), the NWRC is not empowered to do so. The
aggrieved party must file an application with the
proper Regional Trial Court (Art. 87, P.D. No.
1067). 3) It was the Supreme Court which was
vested with jurisdiction to review, modify or set
aside any order, ruling, or decision of the
Commission (Sec. 35, CA No. 146). In contrast,
decisions of the NWRC on water rights
controversies are appealable to the proper Regional
Trial Court (Art. 89, P.D. No. 1067).
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of NWRC decisions lies
with the Regional Trial Courts, particularly, when
we take note of the fact that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over NWRC
decisions covers such broad and all embracing
grounds as grave abuse of discretion, questions of
law, and questions of fact and law (Art. 89, P.D. No.
1067. This conclusion is also in keeping with the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests
Regional Trial Courts with original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, etc.
(Sec. 21 [1], B.P. Blg. 129) relating to acts or
omissions of an inferior Court (Sec. 4, Rule 65,
Rules of Court). LLjur
Considering the specificity with which P.D. No.
1067, a special law, treats appeals from the NWRC
there is no room to apply Section 9[3] of B.P. Blg.
129, (supra), a general law, which confers exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies. The fact that
one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special (P.D. No. 1067) is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the general
(B.P. Blg. 129, section 9[3]), one as a general law of
the land, the other as the law of a particular case. 6
Neither would Section 9[2] of the same law 7
giving the Court of Appeals exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts find
applicability since the NWRC is not on equal
footing with the Regional Trial Court.
The distinction made in the "SP 02778 Decision"
between "water rights controversies" which it
maintains are appealable to the Regional Trial
Courts, and "water rates disputes" which it says are
appealable to the Court of Appeals, is not, to our
minds, well taken. Where the law makes no
distinction, Courts should neither make one. 8
Besides, considering that rate-fixing is merely an
incident to the grant of a certificate of public
convenience, it would be lopsided, indeed, if

disputes over water rates, should be held appealable

to the Court of Appeals while controversies over
water rights, the latter being the privilege granted
by the government to appropriate and use water
(Art. 13, P.D. No. 1067) and, therefore, a primary
right, would be appealable only to the Regional
Trial Court. This would also inevitably result in
"split-jurisdiction" which is not favored, and in
multiplicity of suits, a situation obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice. 9
As maintained, however, by the Solicitor General
and upheld by respondent Appellate Court since
Decision/Orders of the NWRC are assailed, the
latter agency should be impleaded as an
indispensable party defendant in order that any
judgment could be effective and binding on it, and
so that complete relief may be accorded to the
parties.
We realize that the Second Division of this Court, in
dismissing the Petition in the Second Case, had
affirmed, in effect, the "SP 02778 Decision" and
that, ordinarily, it is a final and executory judgment.
Considering, however, that under governing laws, it
is clearly the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter involved herein,
and that when the question of jurisdiction is
concerned there is no res judicata nor bar by prior
judgment, and the issue can be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, 10 particularly, where as in this
case an indispensable party, the NWRC, has not
been impleaded, weightier legal considerations and
the broader interests of justice constrain us to grant
the re-examination prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-04912 is SET
ASIDE, and this case remanded to the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 143,
for trial on the merits of Civil Case No. 7584. The
National Water Resources Council shall be deemed
impleaded as a party defendant in the said case. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
Justice Jose F. Racela, Jr., (ponente),
concurred in by Justices Simeon M. Gopengco and
Lino M. Patajo.
2.
CA No. 146 . . .
SEC. 35.
The Supreme Court is hereby
given jurisdiction to review any order, ruling, or
decision of the Commission and to modify or set
aside such order, ruling, or decision when it clearly
appears that there was no evidence before the
Commission to support reasonably such order,
ruling, or decision, or that the same is contrary to
law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of the
Commission. The evidence presented to the
Commission, together with the record of the

proceedings before the Commission, shall be

certified by the secretary of the Commission to the
Supreme Court. Any order, ruling, or decision of the
Commission may likewise be reviewed by the
Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari in proper
cases. The procedure for review, except as herein
provided, shall be prescribed by rules of the
Supreme Court.
3.
"Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate
Appellate Court shall exercise: . . .
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. . . ."
4.
Third Special Cases Division, composed of
Justices Milagros A. German, Jose A. R. Melo, and
Alfredo M. Lazaro (pontente).
5.
Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia, with the
concurrence of Justices Mariano A. Zosa, Floreliana
Castro Bartolome, and Bienvenido C. Ejercito.
6.
Sto. Domingo vs. Delos Angeles, 96 SCRA
139 (1980).
7.
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate
Appellate Court shall exercise; . . .
(2)
Exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts; and . . .
8.
Colgate-Palmolive Phil. Inc. vs. Gimenez, 1
SCRA 267 (1961).
9.
Gonzales vs. Province of Iloilo, 38 SCRA
209 (1971).
10.
See Calimlim, et als. vs. Hon. Pedro A.
Ramirez, et als., No. L-34362, November 19, 1982,
118 SCRA 399; Florendo, Jr., vs. Coloma, L-60544,
May 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 304; Encarnacion vs.
Baltazar, L-16883, March 27, 1961, 1 SCRA 860.
G.R. No. L-4827 May 31, 1979
GERARDO D. ABE-ABE, ET AL. vs. LUIS D.
MANTA, ET AL.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-4827. May 31, 1979.]
GERARDO D. ABE-ABE, FELICIANO
MADRONA, LORETO VALDEHUEZA,
MELECIO PEALOSA, PELAGIO BABIA,
JUANITO TUMILAP, TIMOTEO CHAN,
RICARDO BACOR, JESUS DORIA, VITELIANO
DORIA, PABLO SIMITARA, VIRGILIO TARDE,
POLICARPO RAGAS, EMILIANO EDULAN,
DORICO LAGUNAY, FELICIANO MADRONA,
JR., CARMEN L. BALBAS, SERVANDO TARDE,
JOSE DAGONDON, ANGEL OCLARIT,
ULDARICO BABIA, DIOGENES DIOLANTO,

ARISTON BABAEL, LEONCIO DORIA,

PLATON BACOR, LORETO DIZON, JORGE
PAHILANGCO, JESUS BARLAAN, TELESFORO
EDULAN, SEGUNDO JACULAN, ANTONIO
BARCELONA, LORENZO SILAGAN, AGUSTIN
PABELLORE, ISIDRO DAGOPLO, MAMERTO
SIMITARA, CONRADO MAHINAY, BEN
NUEZ, IGNACIA BABALCON, EPIFANIA
ABE-ABE. DONATO LLOPEZ, ANGEL TORINO,
HILARIO LLANASA, TRANQUILINO PURO,
IYONG LASAY, INES MEJOC, ROQUE
SABIDO, HOSPICIO LLOPEZ, BERNARDA
ABE-ABE, JOSE LAGUNAY, MARCELA
BABALCON, SEVERINO ABE-ABE,
MAGDALENO BACOR, ROBERTO CHAN,
ROBERTO BADANA, MACRINA P. ECOBEN,
SERGIO DAYPUYAT, FAUSTINO DAGONDON,
ALFREDO PAHILANGCO, ULPIANO OCLARIT,
CORNELIO CABASAGAN, BONIFACIO
DAGONDON, RUFO DALWAG, MIGUEL
TARDE, CESARIO EDPAN, LUISA CHAN,
IGNACIO PEALOZA, ALFONSO ARADO,
ISAAC LABOR, TEOFILO LAWRETE,
FRANCISCA BABAEL, MAXIMO HUERBANA,
FELIX DAGUPLO, TEODORO DAGONDON,
NEMESIO HONCULADA, PANCRASIO
DAGONDON, ROBERTO ABADAJOS, BEN
PAGA, RAMON RAGO, NARCISO SANCHEZ,
IIGO DAGONDON, ISIDRO SIMITARA,
BALBINO PABELLORE, CRESENCIO
PABELLORE, DEDING PABELLORE, TUAN
TIA, LEON LIGAN, FILOMENO GAMUTAN,
EMILIANO BIWANG, CECILIO AWATIN,
PEDRO GOMONIT, AVELINO TIRARIRAY,
DODO GOMONIT, TEOGENES GOMONIT,
FELIMON PABELLORE, DOMINGO IGNILAN,
MARIO PABELLORE, ROSA IPANAG,
ALFREDO BABAYRAN, VICENTE
EXCHAURE, AMBROSIO OCLARIT, MELECIO
PUTOL, ARTEMIO GUIRITAN, JUSTINIANO
DAGONDON, PATERSON BACLAYO, LAURO
DAGONDON, EUGENIO TAGOD, LAZARO
DAGONDON, JAIME DAGONDON, ANSELMO
ABIAN, IRENEO INGUITO, JOSE GAERLAN,
CATALINO JARDIN, CORAZON CALUB,
PEDRO BAJAO, FELIPE UPPOS, SOLEDAD
NERY, FELIPE JARDIN, PLACIDO JARDIN,
CONSTANCIO AGBU, CANDELARIO LADIO,
EDUARDO JARDIN, URSULA DAGUPLO,
MATIAS DAGUPLO, ISABELA NOGUERA,
DEMOCRITO APARTE, APOLONIA CIMACIO,
VICENTE TAJALE, FEDERICO RAGO,
ALBERTO ESTANILLA, RUFINO LAGRIA,
GERONIMO RAGAS, EMILIANO SONGCO,
EPIFANIO NOGUERA, FELOMINO BACOR,
NICOLASA DAGONDON, LUISITO
DAGONDON and SALVADOR CORRALES,
petitioners, vs. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA of the
Court of First Instance of Camiguin and PEDRO P.
ROMUALDO, respondents.
Pedro R. Luspo, Jr. for petitioners.

P. P. Romualdo for respondent.

DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
The legal issue in this case is whether the Court of
First Instance of Camiguin has jurisdiction to
adjudicate a dispute over water rights for irrigation
purposes even if the controversy has not yet been
passed upon by the National Water Resources
Council, the agency vested with original and
exclusive competence to resolve conflicting claims
on the appropriation of water resources.
On August 20, 1976, the one hundred thirty-seven
petitioners (farmers and owners of ricelands) filed
an injunction suit in the Camiguin court against
Pedro P. Romualdo (a lawyer and delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention).
The purpose of the suit was to secure a judicial
declaration as to the petitioners' prior vested rights
under article 504 of the Civil Code to use the water
of the Anibungan (Inobogan), Ablay and Tajong
Creeks to irrigate their ricelands located upstream in
Barrios Lumad and Baylao, Mambajao, Camiguin.
The petitioners sought to enjoin Romualdo from
using the water of the creeks at night to irrigate his
two-hectare riceland located downstream. That
nocturnal use was allegedly prejudicial to the
petitioners.
Their version is that their use of the water of the
creeks started in 1938; that in 1952 or after the
volcanic eruption, the waters of the creeks were
made to converge in a single channel and two
diversion dams were constructed with the help of
the municipal government and the Presidential Arm
on Community Development (PACD). The National
Irrigation Administration allegedly contributed
money for the improvement of the dams. The
petitioners wanted to convey the impression that the
communal irrigation system was established
primarily for the benefit of the ricelands located
upstream. cdll
In July, 1976, respondent or defendant Romualdo
started using the water of the creeks by opening the
diversion dams at night. That act provoked the
filing of the injunction suit already mentioned.
Romualdo's version in his answer is that at a
conference held on July 29, 1976 among the
petitioners (with their counsel), the provincial
commander, the district engineer, the mayor, the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan and Romualdo,
it was agreed upon that the water of the creeks
would be used on a rotation basis: the petitioners
would use it in the daytime and Romualdo and the
other landowners downstream would use the water
at night. The opening and closing of the dam would
be under the control of the provincial commander.
Romualdo alleged that on June 21, 1976 he filed a
water permit application with the district engineer's
office as required in Presidential Decree No. 424 so
that he could use legitimately the water to irrigate
his riceland located downstream near the seashore

in Sitio Boloc-Boloc. The regional director of the

Bureau of Public Works issued to Romualdo on
October 5, 1976 a temporary authority to use the
water of the creeks. In contrast, the petitioners did
not file any water permit applications although
required to do so by the district engineer's office.
Romualdo interposed the defense that the lower
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit. He contended that the petitioners' remedy
was to file their complaint with the district
engineer's office pursuant to Department Order No.
245 dated September 29, 1958 of the
Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications regarding the determination of
water rights controversies.
Romualdo also invoked Presidential Decree No.
424, which took effect on March 28, 1974 and
which created the National Water Resources
Council (to replace the Water Resources
Committee) and vested it with powers to coordinate
and integrate water resources development activities
or, according to its section 2, to "determine,
adjudicate, and grant water rights" (70 O. G. 2912).
Romualdo argued that Presidential Decree No. 424
repealed article 504 of the Civil Code which allows
the acquisition of the use of public waters by
prescription for ten years. Article 504 is the
statutory basis of petitioners' alleged preferential
water rights.
After the lower court found that on January 14,
1977 Romualdo's temporary permit to use the water
of the communal irrigation system was cancelled, as
directed by the executive director of the National
Water Resources Council it issued on February 11,
1977 an order enjoining Romualdo from diverting
the water of the creeks to his two-hectare farm.
In the meantime, the Water Code of the Philippines
or Presidential Decree No. 1067 was promulgated
on December 31, 1976 (73 O. G. 3554). Romualdo
urged the trial court to dismiss the injunction suit on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction because the
controversy should first be passed upon by the
National Water Resources Council, as allegedly
required under Presidential Decree No. 424 and
under the following provisions of the Water Code
which confer original jurisdiction upon the Council
to decide controversies on water rights and which
vest appellate jurisdiction in the Court of First
Instance to review the Council's decisions: cdphil
"ART. 88.
The Council shall have original
jurisdiction over all disputes relating to
appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
development, control, conservation and protection
of waters within the meaning and context of the
provisions of this Code.
"The decisions of the Council on water rights
controversies shall be immediately executory and
the enforcement thereof may be suspended only
when a bond, in an amount filed by the Council to
answer for damages occasioned by the suspension
or stay of execution, shall have been filed by the

appealing party, unless the suspension is by virtue

of an order of a competent court.
"All disputes shall be decided within sixty (60) days
after the parties submit the same for decision or
resolution.
"The Council shall have the power to issue writs of
execution and enforce its decisions with the
assistance of local or national police agencies.
"ART 89.
The decisions of the Council on
water rights controversies may be appealed to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the
subject matter of the controversy is situated within
fifteen (15) days from the date the party appealing
receives a copy of the decision, on any of the
following grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion;
(2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and
law."
For lack of jurisdiction and for nonexhaustion of
administrative remedies, the lower court dismissed
the case in its order of July 18, 1977. Instead of
appealing that order of dismissal to this Court, as
prescribed in Republic Act No. 5440, the petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
which dismissed the petition because the issuance
of the writ of certiorari would not be in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction (Abe-Abe vs. Judge Manta,
CA-G. R. No. SP-07103-R, March 31, 1978).
On August 19, 1978, the same 137 petitioners filed
the instant certiorari case for the belated review of
the lower court's order of dismissal.
We hold that the petition is devoid of merit. It is
incontestable that the petitioners' immediate
recourse is to ventilate their grievance with the
National Water Resources Council which, as
already noted is the administrative agency
exclusively vested with original jurisdiction to settle
water rights disputes under the Water Code and
under Presidential Decree No. 424.
That jurisdiction of the Council under section 2(b)
of Presidential Decree No. 424 is reaffirmed in
section 88 of the Water Code and in section 3(d)
thereof which provides that "the utilization,
exploitation, development, conservation and
protection of water resources shall be subject to the
control and regulation of the government through"
the Council.
It should be noted that article 100 of the Water Code
repealed the provisions of the Civil Code and the
Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 "on
ownership of waters, easements relating to waters,
use of public waters and acquisitive prescription on
the use of waters, which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the" Water Code. Article 100 also
repealed the Irrigation Law, Act No. 2152.
It is also noteworthy that section 3(e) of the Water
Code recognizes that "preference in the use and
development of waters shall consider current usages
and be responsive to the changing needs of the
country".
Article 95 of the Water Code recognizes vested
rights but requires that such rights should be
registered on or before December 31, 1978.

The Code in its article 20 acknowledges that "the

measure and limit of appropriation of water shall be
beneficial use", a rule found in the Philippine Bill of
1902 (See Sideco vs. Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80, 82-83).
The Code assumes that it is more expeditious and
pragmatic to entrust to an administrative agency the
settlement of water rights disputes rather than
require the claimants to go directly to the court
where the proceedings are subject to unavoidable
delays which are detrimental to the parties.
It is patent that the petitioners did not exhaust their
administrative remedy. Their complaint should have
been lodged with the National Water Resources
Council whose decision is reviewable by the Court
of First Instance as indicated in the aforequoted
sections 88 and 89 of the Water Code.
If a litigant goes to court without first pursuing his
administrative remedies, his action is premature or
he has no cause of action to ventilate in court. His
case is not ripe for judicial determination (Aboitiz
& Co., Inc. vs. Collector of Customs, L-29466, May
18, 1978, 83 SCRA 265, 271).
"When an adequate remedy may be had within the
Executive Department of the government, but
nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail
himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to
interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is
based not only on convenience but likewise on
respect: convenience of the party litigants and
respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a
remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort
can be made to (the) courts." (Cruz vs. Del Rosario,
119 Phil. 63, 66.)
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
before resorting to the court means that there should
be an "orderly procedure which favors a preliminary
administrative sifting process, particularly with
respect to matters peculiarly within the competence
of the administrative agency, avoidance of
interference with functions of the administrative
agency by withholding judicial action until the
administrative process has run its course, and
prevention of attempts 'to swamp the courts by a
resort to them in the first instance'" (2 Am Jur 2nd
428; Antonio vs. Tanco, Jr., L-38135, July 25, 1975,
65 SCRA 448, 454). LibLex
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Actg. C.J.), Antonio, Santos and Abad
Santos, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ., are abroad.
G.R. No. 13416 March 31, 1919
BENIGNO S. AQUINO vs. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS
039 Phil 850
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 13416. March 31, 1919.]

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, petitioner-appellee, vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellant.
Solicitor-General Paredes for appellant.
The appellee in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1.
"RES ADJUDICATA," WHAT
CONSTITUTES. To constitute res adjudicata,
there must be: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
things; (c) identity of questions involved.
2.
LAND REGISTRATION LAW; PUBLIC
LAND LAW; "RES ADJUDICATA," WHAT
CONSTITUTES, IN LAND CASES. A has
endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of
land, because of possession, under the Public Land
Law. B has notice of the proceedings but does not
intervene. The Director of Lands also has notice and
joins issue. The trial court, affirmed by the Supreme
Court, dismisses the proceedings, and holds that the
property in question is of the public domain. B
thereupon sells his right to a portion of the property
to C. C then endeavors to confirm a Spanish title,
and again the Director of Lands joins issue. The
land was actually occupied by a considerable
number ofhomesteaders. The question is whether
the decision of the Court of First Instance in the
case in which A was applicant, constitutes res
adjudicata as against B, the predecessor in interest
of C. Held: Res adjudicata.
3.
ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE
LAND REGISTRATION LAW AND UNDER
CHAPTER VI OF THE PUBLIC LAND LAW,
DISTINGUISHED. The proceedings under the
Land Registration Law and under the provisions of
Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in
that both are against the whole world, both take the
nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the
decree of registration issued is
conclusive and final.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID. The main differences
between the Land Registration Law and the Public
Land Law are: Under the first, there exists already a
title which is to be confirmed by the court; under
the second, the presumption always is that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the
occupants and possessors claim an interest only in
the same by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open, and notorious possession.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID. Under the Land Registration
Law, the court may dismiss the application of the
applicant with or without prejudice to the right to
file a new application for the registration of the
same land; under the Public Land Law, the court has
jurisdiction or power to adjudicate land in favor of
any of the conflicting claimants.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID. Under the Land Registration
Law, the only risk that an applicant runs is to have
his application denied; under the Public Land Law,
the applicant runs the risk of losing the land applied
for.

7.
HOMESTEAD LAW; OBJECT AND
PURPOSE OF. The object and purpose of the
Homestead Law is to encourage residence upon and
the cultivation and improvement of the public
domain. This paramount public purpose should be
effectuated.
8.
LAND REGISTRATION LAW; PUBLIC
LAND LAW; "STARE DECISIS," RULE OF,
APPLIED TO LAND ADJUDICATIONS. The
decision in the first action has become the "law of
the case," or at least falls within the rule of stare
decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless
manifestly erroneous. It is indispensable to the due
administration of justice especially by a court of last
resort that a question once deliberately examined
and decided should be considered as settled and
closed to further argument.
9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; HENSON vs. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS AND COMMANDING GENERAL OF
THE DIVISIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES ([1918],
37 PHIL., 912), DISTINGUISHED. The
propositions of the Henson case in so far as they
relate primarily to the Land Registration Law,
should be followed, but are not to be extended to
cover the Public Land Law.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. p
The registration history of the land involved in this
case begins a number of years ago and is rather
complicated but will have to be stated somewhat at
length in order properly to understand the legal
questions involved.
On November 19, 1914, Quintin Taedo y Perez
filed an application in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac for the registration of a parcel of land of
considerable area situated in the municipality of
Tarlac, Province of Tarlac. One of the adjoining
owners was stated to be Florencia Taedo. (The
relationship, if any, between Quintin Taedo and
Florencia Taedo is not disclosed by the record.)
The applicant relied upon possession by himself and
father for more than eighty years. Florencia Taedo
with others were duly notified of the pendency of
the action. A number of persons, not including
Florencia Tanedo, entered opposition; among them
was the Director of Lands, on the ground that the
land was a part of the public domain belonging to
the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Government of the
Philipipne Islands, and was then occupied by a
considerable number of homesteaders. The Director
of Lands further alleged that the applicant had failed
to establish in himself or his predecessors in interest
a sufficient title to warrant registration, the land not
having been acquired by any title derived from the
Spanish government. The applicant in this case in
fact did not produce any title or grant from the
State. On August 23, 1915, the Court of First
Instance rendered its judgment denying the
registration and sustaining the opposition of the

Director of Lands. To quote the concluding portion

of the decision of Judge Nepomuceno:
"The court holds that all the land comprised in the
plan Exhibit A is public land belonging to the
Government of the United States and controlled and
administered by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and therefore the claims of the petitioner
and his coheirs who appeared as opponents in this
proceeding are unfounded.
"Consequently, the court denies the application of
Quintin Taedo y Perez and accordingly sustains the
opposition filed by the Director of Lands."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, a decision, under
date of October 20, 1916,l was handed down by a
unanimous court affirming the judgment of the
Court of First Instance in the following terms:
"The Attorney-General also opposed the registration
upon the ground that the land in guestion belonged
to the public domain. The petitioner presented no
documentary evidence of title, but relies solely upon
possession. The trial court found that neither the
petitioner nor his father had been in possession of
this land, within the meaning of Act No. 926, for a
sufficient length of time to acquire title. In fact, it
clearly appears, and the court so found, that a large
portion of the land is a natural forest and that there
are some thirty persons who had obtained
homesteads on this land from the Government. The
record so fully supports the findings of the trial
court to the effect that the petitioner does not have
registerable title to the land that we think it
unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion of
the evidence.
"The judgment being in accordance with law and
the merits of the case the same is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellant."
On June 15, 1917, or a few months after the
promulgation of the confirmatory judgment of the
Supreme Court, Florencia Taedo, one of those who
it will be remembered had received notice of the
proceedings in behalf of Quintin Taedo, and who
failed to enter her opposition, sold land of
approximately 370 hectares to Benigno S. Aquino
for the sum of P2,000. This parcel of land is within
the perimeter of the parcel of land, the subject of the
registration proceedings on behalf of Quintin
Taedo, opposed by the Director of Lands.
Immediately after purchase Benigno S. Aquino filed
an application in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac for the adjudication and registration in his
name of the land purchased from Florencia Taedo.
Title was now claimed by reason of a composicion
gratuita con el estado and the benefits of Chapter 6
of the Law Registration Law were invoked. Among
others Quintin Taedo was notified of the pendency
of the proceedings. The Director of Lands again
opposed the registration on the ground that the same
pertained to the public domain, a greater portion of
it being forest land, and that it was actually cupied
by several homestead grantees. The AttorneyGeneral acting in behalf of the Director of Lands
further relied upon the unsuccessful attempt of

Quintin Taedo to aquire a good title. After a

hearing, the court, on September 4, 1917, rendered
its decision decreeing the adjudication and
registration of the land in favor of the applicant. It is
to show the errors in this judgment that the Director
of lands now appears before the appellate court.
In order to narrow the issues, certai1 facts can be set
forth which are not in dispute. Thus, it is expressly
stipulated that the tract of land, involved in the case
at bar is within the boundaries of the land, the
subject of registration proceedings on behalf of
Quintin Taedo. It is likewise agreed that the
homestead grantees mentioned in the opposition of
the Director of Lands in the case at bar entered on
their respective homesteads without opposition
from anybody; that the first homestead thus to be
occupied was in 1913, but that up to the date of the
hearing in the lower court no homestead patent had
been issued for any portion of the land.
A question which can also be placed to one side as
settled is whether or not, under the circumstances,
Aquino through his predecessor in interest has
produced documents warranting the court in
confirming his title. On this point the trial court
makes findings as follows:
"From the proofs adduced by the applicant the court
finds as conclusively established that the lam in
question was adjudicated by means of a
composition with the State for valuable
consideration, by the Direccion General de
Administracion Civil de las Islas Filipinas in favor
of Doa Florencia Taedo on June 28, 1886
(Exhibits C and D, there having been issued in favor
of the latter under No. 6628 on November 14, 1894,
(Exhibit F) the corresponding title of ownership,
which on April 24, 1896, was duly inscribed in
accordance with the Mortgage Law in the registry
of property of Tarlac (Exhibit G) and also inscribed
on December 19, 1900, in the registry of the Bureau
of Forestry, of the city of Manila, in compliance
with Section 75 of General Order No. 92 of the
Military Government of the Philippine Islands of
June 27, 1900 (Exhibit H); said Bureau of Forestry
having issued in favor of Florencia Taedo the
certificate of registry No. 8, showing that the land in
question was registered in that office in accordance
with Section 24 of Act No. 1148 (Exhibit I ); there
should have been added that at the time of the
inscription the corresponding title was exhibited to
the said Bureau (Exhibit K). The title referred to
was not exhibited in its entirety by the applicant at
the trial, but only some parts (Exhibits E, F, G, and
H.) It was satisfactorily shown that on or about the
year 1905, during the time that D. Perfecto
Mamanual was administrator of the land in
question, said title was shown him on several
occasions, and also whenever the said administrator
needed it in the issuance of guides for the cutting
and extraction of fuel wood from the land. On or
about the year 1910, on a morning when the said
Perfecto Mamanual was invited to breakfast in the
house of Florencia Taedo, the husband of the latter

left the title on a small table and accidentally it was

destroyed by the children who were playing at the
time, but as stated in the decision in Exhibit 2,
before this accident, it was exhibited to the
inspector of the Bureau of Lands, Mr. Arturo
Dancel, in an interview had with the latter
respecting the steps to be taken by the owner to
consolidate said title.
"The owner, in view of the impossibility of
reconstructing the title, picked up the fragments
which were left, and preserved and kept them until
the time when delivery was made of the same to the
present applicant, the purchaser, with which he
would prove the existence of a title showing his
ownership over the land at any given time. "It has
also been proved that the owner, from the issuance
of the title during the Spanish administration (1894)
until the day when it was registered in the Bureau of
Forestry (1900), devoted the land to the pasturage
of cattle; and after that inscription, in cutting fuel
and timber. In 1902 declaration was made of the
land for taxation, and in 1906 another declaration
was made as the original was lost in the fire which
occurred in the Provincial Building of Tarlac on that
year [1905], all taxes since the declaration up to this
date having been paid without interruption
annually."
Such findings of fact should not now be disturbed,
especially as the case was tried on a different issue
and as the Attorney-General on appeal nowhere
contests their conclusiveness. A review of the
documentary proof, moreover, permits of no other
conclusion than that from this standpoint Aquino
has proved a good title. While a mere reference to
the fragments of the Spanish title in favor of
Florencia Taedo might leave some doubt as to its
authenticity, yet corroborated as it is by other
official records, and confirmed by the decision of
another judge of first instance in the same
proceedings, any such doubt must entirely
disappear.
Another question which must be resolved before we
arrive at the main issue and when settled disposes of
the first assignment of error, is this: Has the
proceeding in which Quintin Taedo was the
applicant attempted to be affected under the Land
Registration Law or under Chapter VI of the Public
Land Law? That the applicant relied upon the
provisions of the Public Land Law is made clear
from an examination of the records in the case.
Paragraphs D and H of the application, the notice
which the Director of Lands received from the clerk
of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, which
would not otherwise have been sent, and the
decisions of the trial court and the appellate court,
are all based on the assumption that the applicant
was claiming title through the possession provided
for in the Public Land Law. Quintin Taedo made
no effort to confirm a title already in existence nor
did he produce any documents.
If the foregoing be admitted, as we think it must, we
then have presented this situation: A has endeavored

to secure title to a considerable tract of land,

because of possession, under the Public Land Law.
B has notice of the proceedings but does not
intervene. The Director of Lands also has notice and
joins issue. The trial court, affirmed by the Supreme
Court, dismisses the proceedings, and holds that the
property in question is of the public domain. B
thereupon sells his right to a portion of the property
to C for the small sum of P2,000, although the
rental value alone is several hundred pesos a year. C
then endeavors to confirm the Spanish title, and
again the Director of Lands joins issue.
These facts bring us to a resolution of the last two
assignments of error and of the argument on which
the Attorney-General rests his case in this court.
Baldly stated Did the decision of the Court of
First Instance, affirmed by the Supreme Court, in
the case in which Quintin Taedo was applicant,
constitute res adjudicata as against Florencia
Taedo, the predecessor in interest of the applicant
and appellee herein?
To support his contention that the decision in the
case in which Quintin Taedo was the applicant
constitute res adjudicata as against Florencia
Taedo, the predecessor in interest of the applicant,
the Attorney-General submits three propositions
relating to: (1) Similarities of the Land Registration
Law and Chapter VI of the Public Land-Law; (2)
distinctions between the two laws; and (3) the
doctrine of res adjudicata as applied to the case at
bar. For convenience we will follow the same order.
The proceedings under the Land Registration Law
and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the
Public Land Law are the same in that both are
against the whole world, both take the nature of
judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of
registration issued is conclusive and final. (Act No.
496, Secs. 35, 38, and 45, as amended; Act No. 926,
Secs. 59 and 63, as amended; Escueta vs. Director
of Lands [1910], 16 Phil., 482; Grey Alba vs. De la
Cruz [1910], 17 Phil., 49; Roxas vs. Enriquez
[1914], 29 Phil., 31; Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby
[1915], 31 Phil., 591.) The main differences
between the Land Registration Law and the Public
Land Law are: Under the first, there exists already a
title which is to be confirmed by the court; under
the second, the presumption always is that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the
occupants and possessors claim an interest only in
the same by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open, and notorious possession. Under
the Land Registration Law, the court may dismiss
the application of the applicant with or without
prejudice to the right to file a new application for
the registration of the same land. (Act No. 496, Sec.
37.) Under the Public Land Law, the court has
jurisdiction or power to adjudicate land in favor of
any of the conflicting claimants. Under the Land
Registration Law, the only risk that an applicant
runs is to have his application denied; under the
Public Land Law, the applicant runs the risk of
losing the land applied for. While the goal at which

the two laws finally arrive is the same, namely, a

Torrens title, which aims at complete
extinguishment once and for all of rights adverse to
the record title, one law containing certain
advantages not found in the other law, and similarly
certain disadvantages, the two laws provide
different routes to travel to attain the ultimate goal.
These differences are best realized by a study of the
principal sections of the two laws. Thus, in
corroboration of what is above said as to the Land
Registration Law, Section 37 thereof provides:
"If in any case the court finds that the applicant has
not proper title for registration, a decree shall be
entered dismissing the application, and such decree
may be ordered to be without prejudice. The
applicant may withdraw his application at any time
before final decree, upon terms to be fixed by the
court."
Section 64 of the Public Land Law provides:
"If in the hearing of any application arising under
this chapter the court shall find that more than one
person or claimant has an interest in the land, such
conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the
court and decree awarded in favor of the person or
persons entitled to the land, according to the laws of
the Philippine Islands, except that where the action
is voluntarily dismissed by the parties interested the
order of the court shall be merely one of dismissal
without affecting title."
When Quintin Taedo came into court under the
Public Land Law, when Florencia Taedo received
notice of these proceedings, when the AttorneyGeneral joined issue to protect the public domain of
the Philippine Islands, Quintin Taedo assumed the
risk of having the land adjudicated to anybody else
who had a better title, either to Florencia Taedo
who could then have invoked her Spanish grant, or
to the Government on a failure of the proof.
With the foregoing similarities and differences of
the two laws in mind, the ultimate question is
whether or not the judgment rendered in the case in
which Quintin Taedo was applicant has acquired
the status of res adjudicata as against the whole
world. To be such, there must be (a) Identity of
parties; (b) identity of things; (c) identity of
questions involved.
There is identity of parties for in the case in which
Quintin Taedo was applicant everybody in the
whole world was a party thereto and the opposition
of the Director of Lands was sustained. There is
identity of things because a portion of the same land
which Quintin Taedo claimed is now the subject of
the litigation on behalf of Benigno S. Aquino whose
predecessor in interest was Florencia Taedo. And
there is identity of questions because the issue in
both cases was the same, that the land belonged to
the public domain. We have therefore a perfect
identity of parties, of things, and of questions. The
decision of the court in the first case is now final
and conclusive. Since the period provided by law
within which any person may secure its annulment

has elapsed, the courts have lost jurisdiction over

the same.
In support of this conclusion a few other pertinent
observations may be made. Suppose that in the
original proceeding, instead of Quintin Taedo
being unsuccessful he had been successful, and that
the court gave him title to the property, could
Florencia Taedo, even with her Spanish
documents, now impeach the title acquired by
Quintin Taedo? Obviously not, in view of her own
laches and of the primary purpose of the Torrens
system. In the Grey Alba case, just as an example,
in the original proceedings for the registration of
land under Act No. 496, the appellee was made a
party defendant by publication, but was not
personally served with notice. The Supreme Court
held that the decree of the Court of Land
Registration was conclusive against him as well as
all the world. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, supra;
Cabanas vs. Director of Lands [1908], 10 Phil.,
393.) If therefore Florencia Taedo could not
successfully have assailed the title of Quintin
Taedo, just as surely she should not be permitted to
contest what was not exactly a title in the
Government, but what was at least a declaration to
that effect.
Another interpellation, and one of vital public
consequence, may be permitted. The first
homesteader in point of time on this property filed
his claim in 1913. When the first case came before
the Supreme Court, according to the decision there
were approximately thirty homesteaders on the
property. No one ever protested against a usurpation
of property rights by these men. As stipulated, up to
the day of the trial in the second case no homestead
patent had been issued. It only requires, however, a
simple mathematical addition to realize that while
this was true at that time, during the months which
have since elapsed Philippine citizens may have
been on the land for a sufficiently long time to
acquire a patent. Add 5 to 1913 and you have 1918
when the first homesteader would logically be
expected to secure his patent. According to the
doctrine announced in Zarate vs. Director of Lands
([1916], 34 Phil., 416), his title should be respected
and protected.
Momentous questions suggest themselves. Are the
courts to remain indifferent to the rights of these
poor people who have relied on the solemn
adjudication of the courts that a certain tract is
public land, and have in view of such finding given
of their time and their substance only to have a later
decision oust them from their land ? What will be
the inevitable result if poor men with a legitimate
ambition to acquire homes are thus discouraged
from developing the public domain of the
Philippine Islands? Is it not possible that such a
shifting policy will lead to aggrarian troubles and
internal strife because of the natural discontent of
the masses? The object and purpose of the
homestead law is to encourage residence upon and
the cultivation and improvement of the public

domain. This paramount public purpose should

certainly not be nullified by the tactics of the courts.
From another point of view, the decision in the first
action has become the "law of the case," or at least
falls within the rule of stare decisis. That
adjudication should be followed unless manifestly
erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the
authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the
Philippines. It is indispensable to the due
administration of justice especially by a court of last
resort that a question once deliberately examined
and decided should be considered as settled and
closed to further argument. A reading of the
following authorities will prove of some interest:
City of Cleveland vs. Cleveland, ( [1899], 93 Fed.,
113); Walker Patent Pivoted Bin Co. vs. Miller &
England ( [1904], 132 Fed., 823); Kolb vs. Swann
( [1888], 68 Md., 516).
Notwithstanding all the foregoing, it is finally
contended that the decision of this Court in Henson
vs. Director of Lands and Commanding General of
the Division of the Philippines ( [1918], 37 Phil.,
912), is controlling. Leaving out of view the
dissenting opinion which began from an entirely
different point of view, according to the syllabus the
majority decision stands for this proposition: "A
judgment dismissing an application for the
registration of land does not operate as a conclusive
adjudication res adjudicata between the applicant
and the opponent who has successfully resisted the
application. As a consequence the applicant, or any
person deriving title from him, may institute another
proceeding for the registration of the same land; and
the fact that he or his predecessor in interest was
unsuccessful in the former proceeding does not
constitute a bar thereto." The fundamental reason
why the judgment dismissing an application to
register land cannot operate as an estoppel between
the applicant and the opponent is, according to the
decision, "that in such a proceeding no contentious
issue is made between the parties." If, as we have
herein indeavored to demonstrate, when one brings
himself under the provisions of the Public Land
Law the antagonistic relationship which means an
issue is present, then the doctrine announced in the
Henson case becomes inapplicable. otherwise stated
the propositions of the Henson case stand in so far
as they relate primarily to the Land Registration
Law but are not to be extended to cover the Public
Land Law. Such a holding should have a beneficial
effect, as it leaves a passageway out of somewhat
antagonistic juridical doctrines, as it arrives at
certainty in land titles, and as it protects the
homesteader and the public interest.
Judgment is reversed and the application is
dismissed, without special finding as to costs. So
ordered.
Torres, Carson and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions

STREET, J., with whom concurs ARAULLO, J.,

dissenting:
With all due respect to a judgment signed by a
majority of the Justices of this Court. this decision
seems to the undersigned to abound in
inconsistencies and impossibilities. It is admitted
that the applicant in this case has exhibited a
registered composition title showing ownership in
himself and predecessors in interest from the year
1886. As all men know, the title thus obtained is as
perfect as any which it is within the power of
sovereignty to confer. It is not pretended that title
has been divested and transferred to any person by
any act inter vivos of the applicant or any of his
predecessors in interest, and it is not shown that he
has lost, or could have lost, the ownership of this
property by adverse possession exerted by any other
person.
One of the grounds on which the applicant's title is
now defeated is that, prior to the present
proceedings, the Government of the Philippine
Islands, considering the land in question to be
public land, had permitted a number of persons to
settle thereon as homesteaders, with a view to the
ultimate acquisition of a Government patent.
In Zarate vs. Director of Lands (34 Phil. Rep., 416),
it was expressly held by this court that the claims of
a homestead occupant who has not acquired a patent
from the Government cannot prevail over the right
of the true owner, i. e., over the right of one who
had acquired a prior title. In De los Reyes vs. Razon
(38 Phil. Rep., 480), we went further and held that
even where the patent has issued the right asserted
thereunder must yield to the superior right of one
who is shown to have a perfect title prior to the
patent. The doctrine there announced is simply this,
that the Government cannot by patent convey a title
to property which it does not own and the patentee
does not obtain an indefeasible title even by
registration under Section 122 of Act No. 496, that
is, by the mere issuance of a certificate under the
authority of that section, without the judicial
proceedings which are required for the registration
of other titles.
The decision in the last mentioned case expressed
the judgment of six judges of this Court, without a
note of dissent, and in my opinion that decision rest
upon an irrefutable basis of reason and legal
precedent. It is true that in the decision of Zarate vs.
Director of Lands (34 Phil., 416), there is a
paragraph in which it is declared that if a
homesteader actually obtains a patent, which is
registered under Section 122 of Act No. 496, the
right of such patentee is superior to that of a person
who had a prior title. No reasons are assigned for
the decision on that point, and although the ruling
then made became the law of that case, as we have
lately held in Zarate vs. Director of Lands ( p. 747,
ante), the rule thus declared, considered as a
principle of jurisprudence, was most evidently
overruled by the reasoned decision in De los Reyes
vs. Razon (supra). In the opinion of the court,

written by Justice Malcolm, in the present case the

decision in De los Reyes vs. Razon is ignored and
the earlier Zarate case is followed in so far as it
holds that, where the homesteader has obtained a
patent, his right is superior to that of any other
person. When it comes to applying this rule to the
case before us, the court is confronted by the
undisputed fact that at the time this action was
instituted no patent had been issued to any of the
settlers on this land; but this difficulty is
surmounted in the opinion of the court by the naive
suggestion that inasmuch as sufficient time has
subsequently elapsed to enable the homesteaders to
complete the five-years period of occupancy
necessary to obtain a patent, it is to be supposed that
the earlier homesteaders at least may have secured
patents.
We now proceed to consider the ground on which
the Court bases its conclusion that the land in
question is public land. In this connection it appears
that in the year 1914, one Quintin Taedo y Perez
instituted a proceeding in the Court of Land
Registration to procure in his own name a Torrens
title to this land. The applicant in that proceeding,
Quintin Taedo y Perez, was in no wise connected
with the chain of title under which Benigno S.
Aquino, the present applicant, asserts ownership;
and he therefore naturally failed in that proceeding
to show title in himself. In that case the court, upon
dismissing the application of Quintin Taedo y
Perez, expressed the opinion that the land in
question was public land, a conclusion natural
enough in view of the character of the land and the
failure of the applicant to show title in himself. The
documents showing that a composition title had
been issued in 1886 to a predecessor of the present
applicant were of course not exhibited to the court
in that case.
Under the proof adduced in the earlier case, as in
this, no doubt can arise that the court was correct in
holding that Quintin Taedo y Perez did not have a
registrable title; but the statement found in the
opinion in that case to the effect that the land was
public land is now seen to be erroneous.
The two final paragraphs in the opinion of the trial
court, upon the application of Quintin Taedo y
Perez, are as follows:
"The court holds that all the land comprised in the
plan Exhibit A is public land belonging to the
Government of the United States and controlled and
administered by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and therefore the claims of the petitioner
and his coheirs who appeared as opponents in this
proceeding are unfounded.
"Consequently, the court denies the application of
Quintin Taedo y Perez and accordingly sustains the
opposition filed by the Director of Lands."
It will be here noted that the conclusion that the
land is public land is not contained in the
dispositive part of the decision but is stated merely
as matter of inducement, to explain the reason for
denying the application of Quintin Taedo y Perez.

The court now holds that the opinion thus

expressed, to the effect that the land in question is
public land, has determined the status and title of
that land and operates as res judicata.
In order to effect connection between that
proceeding and the present proceeding, 80 as to
operate directly upon the present applicant, it is
pointed out in the court's opinion that at the time the
application in the name of Quintin Taedo y Perez
was pending the title now asserted by Benigno S.
Aquino was vested in one Florencia Taedo, who
entered no opposition in that proceeding, although
she was mentioned in the application as a person
owning land adJacent to that of which registration
was sought. This is certainly a very fragile
foundation for the plea of res adjudicata.
In Henson vs. Director of Lands and Commanding
General of the Division of the Philippines (37 Phil.
Rep., 912), it was held that a judgment dismissing
an application for the registration of land does not
operate as a conclusive adjudication (res judicata)
between the applicant and the opponent who has
successfully resisted the application. As a
consequence the applicant, or any person deriving
title from him, may institute another proceeding for
the registration of the same land; and the fact that he
or his predecessor in interest was unsuccessful in
the former proceeding does not constitute a bar
thereto.
We do not impute to the court an intention wholly to
overrule so salutary a doctrine, but the effect of the
present decision is to establish the proposition that
where an application to register land under the
Torrens Act is dismissed on the ground that the land
is public land, all the world is bound by this
declaration. I submit that there is no substantial
basis for this proposition.
The argument contained in the opinion of the
majority is principally founded on the supposed
distinction between the case, first, where the
applicant for the registration of land asserts a claim
of ownership under some other right than that
recognized in section 54, Chapter VI, of the Public
Land Act (No. 926), and secondly, where his claim
of ownership is based on the right recognized in that
section. As applied to the facts of the present case,
this distinction appears to me to be intangible and
unsound.
Chapter VI of the Public Land Act defines the
conditions under which a person whose title from
the Government was not perfected under the
Spanish regime may secure a registered title; and it
is required in Section 56 that in order for the
claimant to avail himself of the provisions of
Section 54, the application must be made under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act (Act No.
496). A perusal of Section 54 to 60, inclusive, of
this Act (No. 926) will show conclusively that these
provisions all look to Act No. 496 as supplying the
system, and the provisions of Section 54 are merely
a recognition of rights not previously granted by
law to occupants of public land. No new or different

system of registration is here created or

contemplated.
Something different is found in Section 61 of Act
No. 926, which is a miniature Cadastral Law in
itself. This section gives the Director of Lands
authority to implead the occupants of any land in
the Philippine Islands. The proceeding instituted by
Quintin Taedo y Perez to register the land now in
question was not brought under Section 61, but
under Section 56 and related provisions; and it is
therefore unnecessary to discuss what might be the
effect of a judicial declaration that the land is public
land, if made in a proceeding brought by the
Director of Lands under section 61. We observe in
passing that Section 64 contemplates the adjustment
of conflicting interests, as where there are numerous
heirs or coowners, contesting the title, or perhaps
where numerous distinct occupants are impleaded,
as provided in section 61. By section 64 the court is
authorized to adjudicate the conflicting rights
according to law. There is nothing here which can
be interpreted as in any way varying the principles
of procedure which are at the basis of the Torrens
system, nor as in any wise supplying a basis for the
decision made in this case.
Since Act No. 926 was promulgated, a printed form,
probably originating in the Bureau of Lands itself,
has been commonly used in land registration
proceedings in these Islands. According to this form
the applicant first sets forth his claim of ownership
in general terms and, if he prefers, adds a statement
showing the particular source or character of his
title. There is then added, near the end, a paragraph
by which the applicant has recourse to the benefit of
Section 54 of Act No. 926, in the contigency,
supposedly remote, that proof of the particular title
asserted by him might be wanting. That form was
followed in the application which was filed by
Quintin Taedo y Perez with respect to this land in
1914, as will be seen from the following passages
quoted from the application itself.
"1.
The undersigned Felipe A. Jose, attorney for,
and in representation of, the petitioner Quintin
Taedo y Perez, prays for the inscription, in
accordance with the Land Registration Law, of the
real estate consisting of a piece of land of which the
said petitioner is the absolute owner, the
descriptions and boundaries thereof being as
follows: . . .
"(b) In the remote case that this petition be not
proper in accordance with the said Land
Registration Law, the petitioner then claims the
benefits of Chapter VI of Act No. 926."
The practice of claiming the benefit of Section 54 of
Act No. 926, in connection with any other right
which the applicant may possess, is clearly
legitimate and shows that Section 54 has been
uniformly understood merely as conferring a
broader right. Chapter VI, in which that section is
contained, does not introduce any new system or in
any wise affect the principle of adjudication. How
can it be possibly held that the effect of a decree

with reference to the registration of land varies with

the character of the title, or proof, under which
registration is sought, or opposed, or depends on the
character of the litigant, in this case the
Government, in whose favor the pronouncement is
made? Yet such is the anomaly which is presented
in the decision now made.
Let it be supposed, for instance, that an application
is filed for the registration of a parcel of land and
two parties present themselves as opponents. One is
an individual claiming as owner, the other is the
Director of Lands in representation of the
Government, asserting that the land is public land.
Now, if the court dismissed the application on the
simple ground that the applicant has failed to prove
a registrable title in himself, or on the ground that
the individual opponent appears to be the true
owner, nobody is concluded by this judgment, and
the applicant himself, or the individual opponent, or
in fact any other person recognized by law as
competent to maintain a registration proceeding
may subsequently institute another proceeding for
the registration of the land. If, however, the court, in
the first proceeding, happens to announce that in its
opinion the land is public land, and for that reason
sustains the opposition of the Director of Lands,
everybody is concluded and the property is lost to
the true owner, even though the pronouncement as
to the character of the land is afterwards shown to
be erroneous. Comment would seem to be
superfluous.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73002. December 29, 1986.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC.,
respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, J p:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration
in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of
five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square
meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation
of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (The Public Land Act). as amended; and the

appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial

court in said proceedings in this wise:
"1.
That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation
duly organized in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December
23, 1959;
2.
That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire
real properties pursuant to the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9),
Exhibit 'M-1');
3.
That the land subject of the Land
Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29,
1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities;
4.
That the constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;
5.
That the possession of the Infiels over the
land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines
was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until the same came into
the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6.
That the possession of the applicant Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse
and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from
whom the applicant bought said land on October 29,
1962, hence the possession is already considered
from time immemorial;
7.
That the land sought to be registered is a
private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land
occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether
with the alienable or disposable public land or
within the public domain;
8.
That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements,
said improvements were seen by the Court during
its ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982;
9.
That the ownership and possession of the
land sought to be registered by the applicant was
duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and the
negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
had donated a part of the land bought by the
Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15,
1979, and which donation was accepted by the

Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela

(Exh. 'N-1'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979."
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of
these findings except as to the applicability of the
1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning
this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings
have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or
long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into
effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and
since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable
lands of the public domain, except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in
the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question from
the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme.
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
"SEC. 48.
The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of the
chapter.
(c)
Members of the National Cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to
the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof."
The Petition for Review does not dispute indeed,
in view of the quoted findings of the trial court
which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate
Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before
this Court the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel,
from whom Acme purchased the lands in question
on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and
through their progenitors, possessed and occupied
those lands since time immemorial, or for more than
the required 30-year period and were, by reason

thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in

Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title
judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension
that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels,
is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of
said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV
already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court
is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in
favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in
1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in
effect, having in mind the prohibition therein
against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000
hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the
character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then
still part of the public domain, it must be answered
in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1
where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case,
Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation
more than 60% of the capital stock of which is
Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in
Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had
been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by
their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since
prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On
December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court,
assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed
the application on the ground that Meralco, a
juridical person, was not qualified to apply for
registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural
persons to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed,
and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It
was held that:
". . ., the said land is still public land. It would cease
to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it
under section 48(b). Because it is still public land
and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given
due course or has to be dismissed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on the
one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to
which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the
other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as

to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject

to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable
public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) `presupposes that the land is public'
(Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644)."
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous
dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with
Cario in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to
Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and
reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. That said dissent
expressed what is the better and, indeed, the
correct, view becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited
therein.
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in
Cario, involving the Decree/Regulations of June
25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. It was ruled that:
"It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5
attributes title to those `who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the
argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion
that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he
had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten), as well or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called
upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. . . ."
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character
because expressed in more categorical language, in
Susi:
". . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover,
the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a

certificate of title to said land under the provisions

of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin
Susi had already acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor
is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of
Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did
not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be
mentioned, like Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7
Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and
Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the
Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely
affirmative: 11
". . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions
as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent."
12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute
itself 13 that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title . . ." No proof
being admissible to overcome a conclusive

presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in

truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cario,
". . . (T)here are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law."
If it is accepted as it must be that the land was
already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October
29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners,
it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make such acquisition, there being nothing
in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that
matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into
effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring
and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained
technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until
title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,
there can be no serious question of Acme's right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing
or acquiring interests in public land to which the
vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only
limitation then extant was that corporations could
not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands
in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental
circumstance that confirmation proceedings were
brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution
which forbids corporations from owning lands of
the public domain cannot defeat a right already
vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper, This
Court has already held, in analogous circumstances,
that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
"We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14
has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Bian Development Co., Inc. because
it had already acquired a vested right to the land
applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took
effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands
not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four

hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by

the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of
vested rights. `A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police power' (16 C.J.S.
1177-78).
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of
the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer
open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public
Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect
of segregating the said land from the public domain.
The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the
land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of
that right without due process (Director of Lands vs.
CA, 123 Phil. 919)." 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation
proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another accidental
circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more
than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there
being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land.
As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935
or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in
themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by
valid conveyance which violates no constitutional
mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the
view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in
Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is
that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the
basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this
appeal was already private property at the time it
was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at
the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that,
as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply
for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent
in Meralco:

"6.
To uphold respondent judge's denial of
Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and
would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions.
Assuming that there was a technical error in not
having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners
and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with
the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor. It
should not he necessary to go through all the rituals
at the great cost of refiling of all such applications
in their names and adding to the overcrowded court
dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City
of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore,
by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
the names of the original persons who as natural
persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged."
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from
reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter
from themselves applying for confirmation of title
and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this
would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a
liberal application of the rule on amendment to
conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in
Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier
ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and
re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of
which has passed the test of searching examination
and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on
the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article

XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited to a
brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in
that context, be considered as essentially obiter.
Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional
question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in
the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in
this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and
Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I reiterate my concurrence in
Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore,
dissent here.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that
my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco
and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein
upheld, "expressed what is the better . . . and indeed
the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the
landmark 1909 case of Cario 2 through the 1925
case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is
established doctrine . . . that an open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of a land of the
public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July
26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was
reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby
the land ceases to be land of the public domain and
becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the
same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we
are reverting to the old above-cited established
doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco
and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed
therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to
write this concurrence in amplification of my views
and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act,
such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."
The Court thus held in Susi that under the
presumption juris et de jure established in the Act,
the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate
of title should be issued an order that said grant may

be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor

is sufficient . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain, and had become private property, at least
by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his
authority to sell to any other person]." 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the
pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of
Cario (the Igorot chief who would have been
deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal
of his application for registration) which reversed
the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed
by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view
that under the decree and regulations of June 25,
1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well,
or better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns
the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto
which failed to adhere to the aforecited established
doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently
applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco
decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the
established doctrine that such acquisitive
prescription of alienable public lands takes place
ipso jure or by operation of law without the
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title.
The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain
and becomes private property, which may be
lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified
corporations such as respondent corporation. (As
stressed in Herico, supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of
public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of
the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue
of such conversion into private property, qualified
corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is
no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations
holding or acquiring title to lands of the public
domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the
simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation
purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16,
1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which
contained no prohibition against corporations
holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024
hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which
imposed an absolute prohibition, Even on the

erroneous assumption that the land remained public

land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as
owners from time immemorial, respondent
corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land
in 1962 and P45 million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the
community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the
land for the townsite created a vested right which
could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted
eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the
land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into
private land and they had a legally sufficient and
transferable title conferred by the conclusive
presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed
only to be established in confirmation of title
proceedings for formalization and issuance of the
certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending
the period for the filing of such applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete
titles to alienable and disposable public lands
expressly reiterate that it has always been the
"policy of the State to hasten the settlement,
adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands
publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated
under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership
have ipso jure been converted into private property
and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish
and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the
filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was
successively extended to December 31, 1941, then
extended to December 31, 1957, then to December
31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976
and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons
may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in
effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis
mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of
justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
the names of the original persons who as natural
persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line
from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent
insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect that the
applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather
than the natural persons-transferors, under the

particular circumstances of this case, as an

insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I
would apply by analogy, although the facts could be
distinguished, the approach followed by us in
Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question
raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken
up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction
and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I
feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b)
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the
procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from
the therein majority ruling on the question of
substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots
which are sought to be registered have ceased to be
lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are
already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner
and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable." 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing
of such applications to natural citizens who may
prove their undisputed and open possession of
public lands for the required statutory thirty-year
period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the
exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations,
can actually, physically and in reality possess public
lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled
the required statutory period of possession, the Act
confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law
that they file the applications for confirmation of
their title, although they have lawfully transferred
their title to the land. But such procedural failure
cannot and should not defeat the substance of the
law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the
lands are already private lands because of
acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by
the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance
with the evidence, confirm their title to the private
lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law,
after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and
sale of the private land to the corporation. It should
not be necessary to go in a round-about way and
have the corporation reassign its rights to the private
land to natural persons (as I understand), was
done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on
paper with the technicality of having natural

persons file the application for confirmation of title

to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
"SEC. 48.
The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or in
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a)
...
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c)
...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in
part, provides:
"SEC. 11.
. . . No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred
hectares . . ."
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law
and constitutional provision prevent a corporation
from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance
of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the
public domain (Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs.
Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon.
Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion
that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in
simple terms as follows:
(a)
The INFIELS can successfully file an
application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.
(b)
After the INFIELS secure a certificate of
title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c)
As ACME can eventually own the certificate
of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the
Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS
should first apply to the courts for the titles, and
afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the
following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric

Company vs. Castro Bartolome (114 SCRA 799,

823 [1982].
"To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land
Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons to apply for confirmation of their
title would be impractical and would just give rise
to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
was a technical error in not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the
Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition
against their sale of the land to the applicant
Meralco.
and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as
such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation
of law and the conclusive presumption therein
provided in their favor.
It should not he necessary to go through all the
rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after
all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies
the statutory provision that only citizens (natural
persons) can apply for certificates of title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11)
which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of
the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social
Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct
2507; United States v. Alpers, 338 US 680, 94 L Ed
457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am. Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
"In the construction of statutes, the courts start with
the assumption that the legislature intended to enact
an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the
enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general
principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.
If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions,
one of which will give effect to the act, while the
other will defeat it, the former construction is
preferred, One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory, or

of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general

rule against the enlargement of extension of a
statute by construction, the meaning of a statute
may be extended beyond the precise words used in
the law, and words or phrases may be altered or
supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law
from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of
a statute is general, everything which is necessary to
make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication." (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control
Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE 2d 47; cited in 73 Am.
Jur. 2d pp. 422-423).
The statutory provision and the constitutional
prohibition express a public policy. The proper
course for the Court to take is to promote in the
fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to
avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this
Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114
SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Footnotes
1.
114 SCRA 799.
2.
Cario vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935,
944.
3.
Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424.
4.
Herico vs. Dar, 95 SCRA 437.
5.
Of said Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880.
6.
underscoring supplied.
7.
63 Phil. 654.
8.
108 Phil. 251.
9.
21 SCRA 743.
10.
29 SCRA 760.
11.
There was withal a later attempt by the
ponente in Herico (Castro, J.) to somewhat soften
the import of the doctrine, in his concurrence in
Meralco (114 SCRA 799, 810-813).
12.
Underscoring supplied; the provision
referred to is Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141.
13.
Sec. 48(b).
14.
Referring, precisely, to Article XIV, Section
11, of the 1973 Constitution.
15.
Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr., 118 SCRA 492.
1.
Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA
799, and Republic vs. Villanueva and Iglesia in
Cristo, 114 SCRA 875, respectively.
2.
Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S.
449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil 132.
3.
Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424.
4.
Herico vs. Dar, 95 SCRA 437.
5.
For the text of the Act, as amended, see page
3 of the main opinion.
6.
Note in brackets supplied.
7.
Under CA 292 approved June 9, 1938; R.A.
107, approved June 2, 1947; R.A. 2061, approved
June 13, 1958; R.A. 6236, approved June 19, 1971;
and P.D. 1073 issued January 25, 1977.
8.
114 SCRA at pp. 823-824.
9.
Idem, at pp. 809-810.

10.

Idem, at p. 810.

G.R. No. L-44237 February 28, 1989

VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-44237. February 28, 1989.]
VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the RELIGIOUS OF
THE VIRGIN MARY, represented by M.O. Leoncia
Pacquing, R.V.M., respondents.
Elpedio N. Cabasan for petitioner.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS CONCLUSIVE ON THE SUPREME
COURT. Both the cadastral Court and the Court
of Appeals came to the conclusion, after analyzing
and weighing the testimonial and documentary
evidence adduced by the parties, that Virginia Ong
de Ocsio's version of the facts was not true that it
was another property, not Lot No. 1272, that she
had conveyed to the religious corporation but
that it was indeed Lot No. 1272 that was subject of
the sale and had indeed been transferred to the
latter. Now, findings of fact of this sort, contained in
a decision of the Court of Appeals are by long and
uniformly observed rule conclusive on the parties
and on the Supreme Court, as well; subject only to a
few specified exceptions, none of which obtains
here, said findings may not be reviewed on appeal.
2.
CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLE AND DEEDS;
CONTINUOUS AND EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION
OF ALIENABLE PUBLIC LAND FOR THIRTY
(30) YEARS; CONVERTS THE LAND TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY. As regards the issue of
law raised by her, petitioner fares no better. Citing
Manila Electric Co. v. Castro-Bartolome, 114
SCRA 799 (1982) and Republic v. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875 (1982), in relation to Section 11, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution, she asserts that as the
private respondent is a religious corporation, it is
disqualified to obtain judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act which grants that right only to natural
persons. The cited rulings no longer control. In
Director of Lands v. I.A.C., 146 SCRA 509 (1986),
is that open, continuous and exclusive possession of
alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in
accordance with the Public Land Act ipso jure
converts the land to private property, and a juridical
person who thereafter acquires the same may have
title thereto confirmed in its name.
3.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROHIBITION
AGAINST ACQUISITION OF LANDS BY
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS; NOT APPLICABLE

TO PUBLIC LANDS CONVERTED TO PRIVATE

OWNERSHIP UNDER PUBLIC LAND ACT.
In Director of Lands v. Manila Electric Co., 153
SCRA 686 (September 11, 1987), and Republic v.
C.A, 156 SCRA 344 (October 30, 1987) where the
same question of law was raised. In the latter it was
expressly held that the prohibitions in the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions against acquisition or
registration of lands by or in behalf of private
corporations do not apply to public lands already
converted to private owner ship by natural persons
under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the
present case, Virginia Ong de Ocsio and her
predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No.
1272 for the period and under the conditions
prescribed by law for acquisition of ownership of
disposable public land prior to the sale of the
property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary,
confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is,
under the precedents referred to, entirely in order.
DECISION
NARVASA, J p:
From the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals,
1 affirming in toto that of the Trial Court, 2 the
petitioner has come to this Court on an appeal by
certiorari to plead for reversal of (1) the factual
determination that she had sold the lot in
controversy to private respondent, and (2) the legal
conclusion that neither the 1973 nor the 1987
Constitution disqualifies the corporation known as
the Religious of the Virgin Mary, from acquiring the
land in question and registering it in its name. In
light of the time-honored rule that findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are generally final, and the
doctrine lately laid down by this Court on the
precise legal issue now raised by petitioner, her
appeal must fail.
The controversy at bar arose in connection with
cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of
Lands, in behalf of the Republic, for the settlement
and adjudication of title to a large fact of land
measuring 261.5791 hectares, divided into 1,419
lots, situated in the City of Iligan. 3
Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner)
seasonably presented an answer to the petition. She
alleged that she was the owner, by purchase, of two
(2) parcels of land with specific boundaries
comprehended in the cadastral proceeding: Lot No.
1272, measuring 256 square meters and Lot 1273 a
road lot, measuring 21 square meters; and that as
owner, she had been in possession of both lots for
fifteen (15) years, and her predecessors-in-interest,
for sixty (60) years. 4 Title to the same parcels of
land was however claimed by the Religious of the
Virgin Mary. 5 In its answer, it averred that it had
bought the lots from Victoria Ong de Ocsio and had
been in possession as owner thereof for over four
years, and its possession and that of its predecessors
was immemorial.

Evidence was received on these conflicting

assertions after which the Cadastral Court rendered
judgment, declaring that the evidence satisfactorily
established that Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in truth
sold Lot No. 1272 to the Religious of the Virgin
Mary in virtue of a deed of sale dated April 12,
1956 (Exhibit 1), and Lot No. 1273 was a road right
of way granted to the City of Iligan. The judgment
contained the following dispositive portion, viz. 6
WHEREFORE, the court renders judgment
adjudicating Cadastral Lot 1272, Iligan Cadastre, to
the Religious of the Virgin Mary, a duly registered
domestic religious corporation, the members of
which are all Filipino citizens, with main office in
the City of Manila, but the building existing thereon
is hereby declared to be the property of claimant
Victoria Ong de Ocsio who is hereby ordered to
remove said building out of the premises within 90
days from date hereof. The claim of Victoria Ong de
Ocsio with respect to said cadastral lot is dismissed.
No pronouncement is made as to costs.
Let the corresponding decree issue 30 days after this
decision shall have become final.
As aforestated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
cadastral court's decision in toto. So, too, will this
Court.
Both the cadastral Court and the Court of Appeals
came to the conclusion, after analyzing and
weighing the testimonial and documentary evidence
adduced by the parties, that Virginia Ong de Ocsio's
version of the facts was not true that it was
another property, not Lot No. 1272, that she had
conveyed to the religious corporation but that it
was indeed Lot No. 1272 that was subject of the
sale and had indeed been transferred to the latter.
Now, findings of fact of this sort, contained in a
decision of the Court of Appeals are by long and
uniformly observed rule conclusive on the parties
and on the Supreme Court, as well; 7 subject only to
a few specified exceptions, 8 none of which obtains
here, said findings may not be reviewed on appeal.
prLL
As regards the issue of law raised by her, petitioner
fares no better. Citing Manila Electric Co. v. CastroBartolome, 114 SCRA 799 (1982) and Republic v.
Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 (1982), in relation to
Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution,
she asserts that as the private respondent is a
religious corporation, it is disqualified to obtain
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which grants
that right only to natural persons. The cited rulings
no longer control. Current doctrine, first announced
by the Court en banc in Director of Lands v. I.A.C.,
146 SCRA 509 (1986), is that open, continuous and
exclusive possession of alienable public land for at
least thirty (30) years in accordance with the Public
Land Act ipso jure converts the land to private
property, and a juridical person who thereafter
acquires the same may have title thereto confirmed
in its name. Virtually the same state of facts
obtained in said case that now obtain here. A private

corporation had purchased the land originally of the

public domain from parties who had, by themselves
and through their predecessors-in-interest,
possessed and occupied it since time immemorial. It
had thereafter instituted proceedings for
confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. In upholding its right to do so, the
court held that the fact that the proceedings had
been instituted by said purchaser in its own name
and not in the name of the transferors was ". . .
simply . . . (an) accidental circumstance, productive
of a defect hardly more than procedural and in
nowise affecting the substance and merits of the
right of ownership sought to be confirmed." The
ruling was reaffirmed in two later cases, Director of
Lands v. Manila Electric Co., 153 SCRA 686
(September 11, 1987), and Republic v. C.A, 156
SCRA 344 (October 30, 1987) where the same
question of law was raised. In the latter it was
expressly held that the prohibitions in the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions against acquisition or
registration of lands by or in behalf of private
corporations do not apply to public lands already
converted to private owner ship by natural persons
under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the
present case, Virginia Ong de Ocsio and her
predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No.
1272 for the period and under the conditions
prescribed by law for acquisition of ownership of
disposable public land prior to the sale of the
property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary,
confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is,
under the precedents referred to, entirely in order.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals subject of the petition for review on
certiorari is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioner.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1.
Rendered on May 17, 1976 in CA-G.R. No.
43661-R: L.B. Reyes, J., ponente, with whom
concurred de Castro and Ericta, JJ.
2.
Rendered on August 31, 1968 in Cadastral
Case No. N-11-1, LRC Rec. No. 146 of the CFI of
Lanao del Norte, Hon. F. Pineda, presiding.
3.
The petition was filed on July 20, 1956 and
was docketed, as aforestated, as CAD Case No. N11-1, LRC Rec. No. N-146, and assigned to the sala
of Judge Pineda. The petition was filed pursuant to
Sec. 1955 of the Revised Administrative Code in
relation to Sec. 53 of the Public Land Act, Rollo, p.
30, Rec. on App., pp. 1-5.
4.
Rec. on App., pp. 9-106.
5.
The Court allowed it to file its answers
albeit tardily, upon its motion to reopen the
proceedings and upon a showing of excusable
negligence in failing to file the same on time. Rec.
on App., pp. 20-22, 36.
6.
Rec. on App., pp. 48-49.

7.
SEE e.g., Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. C.A., G.R.
No. 57493, Jan. 7, 1987.
8.
SEE e.g., Manlapaz v. CA.; G.R. No. 56989,
Jan. 12, 1987; Vallarta v. I.A.C., G.R. No. 74957,
June 30, 1987.
G.R. No. L-44222 September 30, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-44222. September 30, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF MARIA ROSALES: BALTAZAR
AZURA, BASILIO AZURA, AMBROSIO AZURA
and LUCILA AZURA ALFARO, AGAPITO
SATUR; JESUS NATONTON HEIRS OF
BRAULIO SEVILLA; MARIA EVANOSO DE
SEVILLA, AMPIL SEVILLA, JALADINO
SEVILLA, ILADIO SEVILLA, ALEJANDRINA
SEVILLA, MONINO SEVILLA, NORA
SEVILLA, LITA SEVILLA, ELSA SEVILLA,
MYRNA SEVILLA, PERLA SEVILLA, and
LINDA SEVILLA; JUSTO DUMANON;
GRACIANO PIENCENAVES; HEIRS OF
RAYMUNDO CUENCA: NARCISA PIA DE
CUENCA, DOMELINA CUENCA LUVITE,
GLORIFICACION C. JAYNA, CONRADO
CUENCA, MILAGROS CUENCA, RAYMUNDO
CUENCA, JR., JUANITA CUENCA and NIMPA C.
PLAZA; JUANA MADELO; LOURDES AQUIO;
NATIVIDAD BALANON, FELIX OLAN, ET AL.;
HEIRS OF SESINANDO GUERRERO and
RAMONA BUSA (Husband and Wife); LORENZO
GUERRERO, ELISEO GUERRERO, CIPRIANA
C. ZOZOBRADO, LEONARDO JOSUE,
EPIMACO JOSUE, BIENVENIDO JOSUE,
SIMEON DUMANON, RAMON SANCHEZ,
SALUD SANCHEZ, CANDELARIA SANCHEZ,
PILAR SANCHEZ, TERESITA SANCHEZ,
CARMEN SANCHEZ, EUGENIA BUSA, PETRA
DURBAN, and PAZ DURBAN; JOSE A.
MORDENO, respondents.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J p:
To construct the now Bancasi Airport, an action for
Eminent Domain covering several parcels of land
situated in the Barrio of Bancasi, City of Butuan
was filed on December 16, 1970 by the herein
petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, against the
herein private respondents. The then Court of First
Instance 1 of Butuan City where the case was tried
rendered a decision with the following dispositive
portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
hereby renders judgment as follows:

1.
Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the
defendants the sums corresponding to the areas of
their respective lands, computed mathematically at
P7.50 per square meter: Provided, however, That
those who have received their shares of the deposit
shall receive only the difference: And, provided,
further, that with respect to Lots Nos. 2957-A and
3018-A, the amount corresponding thereto shall be
paid to the Clerk of Court, who shall keep custody
thereof as well as of the balance of P19,693.38
stated in his report, for the benefit of the persons
who may be entitled thereto as may be finally
adjudged in Civil Case No. 453 before this Court;
2.
Decreeing the plaintiff the absolute owner of
the lands which are the subject of his proceeding
and specifically described hereinabove; Provided,
however. That the full payment thereof shall have
been made; and
3.
Ordering the plaintiff to pay the Costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
Disagreeing with the amount of just compensation
and that part of the decision which ordered the
petitioner to pay costs, the latter filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's
decision "with the sole modification that the
plaintiff-appellant should not pay costs." 3
Still unconvinced, the petitioner filed with us the
present petition for review on certiorari on both
"questions of facts and of law, in accordance with
Republic Act No. 5440, in relation to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court" 4 and assigned the following errors:
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FIXING
THE AMOUNT OF P7.50, PER SQUARE
METER, AS JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND SIMPLY
BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF SULTAN
HOTEL, SUGECO, FREE METHODIST
CHURCH AND THE PHILIPPINE ARMY
BARRACKS IN THE LOCALITY.
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE RECOMMENDATION OF
THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE
LOWER COURT SIMPLY BECAUSE OF LACK
OF OBJECTION THERETO ON THE PART OF
THE CITY FISCAL OR BUTUAN CITY,
THEREBY UTTERLY DISREGARDING THE
ADMISSION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
WITNESS, MATIAS C. DEFENSOR, ASSISTANT
TRAINING DIRECTOR OF THE BUTUAN CITY
MEMORIAL PARK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
PARK PREMISES WAS ACQUIRED ONLY FOR
A MEASLY SUM OF P0.50 PER SQUARE
METER OR P5,000.00 PER HECTARE IN THE
YEAR 1971.
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FIXING
P7.50 AS JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND ALLEGEDLY
BECAUSE OF THE DEVALUATION OF THE
PHILIPPINE MONEY AND THE INCREASE IN
THE PRICES OF COMMODITIES, THEREBY
UTTERLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE IN
EMINENT DOMAIN THAT THE MARKET

VALUE IS DETERMINED BY SUCH VALUE OF

THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OBTAINING AT THE
TIME OF THE TAKING THEREOF. 5
There is actually only one issue to be resolved here,
a laborious one which demands careful scrutiny of
the evidence on record, and this is the just
compensation to be paid by the government.
The trial court fixed the just compensation
uniformly at P7.50/sq. meter which was the lowest
amount recommended by the commissioners, the
other parcels being classified and valued thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx
1.
That the first 100 meter-distance away from
the National Highway must be appraised and valued
at P12.00 per square meter;
2.
That the next succeeding 100 meter-distance
must be appraised and valued at P10.00 per square
meter; and
3.
That the rest must be appraised and valued
(sic) at P7.50 per square meter. 6
The court in adopting the recommendation price
said:
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . despite the fact that in its resolution, the
Commission appraises the value for each of three
classes of land, no defendant presented evidence
that his land belongs to one or the other. The result
is that the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that
an lands should be appraised at P7.50 per square
meter. True, the owners of lands actually within the
P12 and P10 class will lose some amount, but
they should trace the blame to their own doorsteps. .
..7
xxx
xxx
xxx
The petitioner, on the other hand, affirms that the
just compensation of the expropriated lands must be
valued at P1.00/square meter. The presence of the
following establishments, e.g., the Sultan Hotel,
Sugeco, Free Methodist Church, and the Philippine
Army Barracks in the vicinity cannot be considered
as material to the fixing of the price of the subject
properties, much less may the presence of the
mentioned establishments be a reason for the
increase in the market value of the affected lands for
the following reasons:
xxx
xxx
xxx
SULTAN HOTEL
. . . Although it is near the old Bancasi Airport, it is
quite far from the terminal of the new airport. In
fact, it is no longer in operation for about three (3)
years after it was aforeclosed by the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
SUGECO
The Sugeco area, a one hectare lot located at the
intersection of the National Highway and the Barrio
Pinamangculan Road was acquired by the company
for its plant site in May, 1963 for P7,000.00 from
the original landowner Miguel Garay. The plant
started operation sometime in October, 1963. It is,
however, in danger of closure due to poor business.
PHILIPPINE ARMY BARRACKS

The Philippine Army Reservation at Bancasi,

Butuan City, was acquired sometime in 1936 under
Presidential Proclamation. The army barracks was
established very much later. The area which used to
be fifty (50) hectares (presently only about 9
hectares left), was previously the pasture land of
one Ismael Evanoso.
FREE METHODIST CHURCH
The one-hectare lot in Barrio Bancasi acquired by
the Free Methodist Church from the late Luiz Azura
is the nearest to the new airport. Yet, it was
purchased for only P1,500.00 or P0.15 per square
meter in 1955.
It is worthwhile mentioning that these four (4)
establishments are all along the national highway,
whereas the new Bancasi Airport is located about a
hundred meters therefrom. The area it covers were
formerly cogonal and under-developed. In fact, the
Butuan City Memorial Park which is almost
adjacent to the said airport and acquired much later
than the filing of the expropriation case in 1970 was
only bought at P5,000.00 per hectare or P0.50 per
square meter. This fact was testified to by no less
than the principal witness presented by the
defendants, Park Training Director Matias C.
Defensor. Moreover, none of the defendants
declared then lands covered by the expropriation for
more than P5,000.00 per hectare notwithstanding
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 76 dated
December 6, 1972.
Besides, the area sought to be expropriated herein is
predominantly agricultural and cogonal. This is
evident from the testimony of Lino P. Oconer,
Acting City Assessor of Butuan City, and Chairman
of the Appraisal Committee of the same City, to wit:
8
xxx
xxx
xxx
After weighing the evidence on record and
considering the pleadings filed by both parties, we
are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in
fixing the price of the affected properties at P7.50
per square meter. cdrep
(1)
Even if the lands in question were
predominantly agricultural and cogonal as
evidenced by the tax declarations of the respondents
as well as by the testimony of Lino Oconer, the then
Acting City Assessor of Butuan City, the presence
of certain establishments within the vicinity, the
Sultan Hotel, the Sugeco, the Philippine Army
Barracks, and the Free Methodist Church as earlier
mentioned may be considered reason enough to
improve the actual classification of the properties. It
is of common knowledge that if there are several
commercial establishments, in a certain area as in
the case at bar, there is no doubt that there will be
more persons interested to purchase property
adjacent to these establishments. An owner of a
parcel of land in the vicinity can, therefore,
command a higher price. llcd
The allegation that the Sultan Hotel has ceased
operations and that the Sugeco is in danger of
closure due to poor business cannot affect the fact

that the areas occupied by these establishments are

still commercial in nature and the lands surrounding
them have been advantageously affected.
(2)
The testimonies of the different witnesses
both for the petitioner and the private respondents
as to the market value of the properties do not
certainly jive with each other. Some of them opined
that the market value of the affected properties were
even lower than P1.00 per square meter. Some,
however, believed otherwise, i.e., definitely more
than P1.00 per square meter but not exceeding
P16.00 per square meter.
The testimony of Federico Lamigo, a real estate
broker is, however, very revealing.
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . that in February 1970, he was the broker of Atty.
Arsenio Ty who purchased one and a half hectares
of land from Anita Consing Llorente at P1.10 per
square meter; that the Llorentes sold that property at
P1.10 per square meter because they were in
financial stress; and that in his opinion, areas along
the road 150 meters from the highway should
demand a fair cash value of not less than P5.00 nor
more than P15.00 per square meter if one is not
forced to sell the land in the Bancasi area. 9
xxx
xxx
xxx
We choose to give great weight on Lamigo's
testimony in much the same way as the trial court
did for his credibility was never impugned. More
importantly, he was a witness for the petitioner.
(3)
The fact that the area within which the Free
Methodist Church stands was purchased for the
"measly" amount of P.15 per square meter is of no
moment in this case. As mentioned by the petitioner
herein, the land was acquired by the Free Methodist
Church in 1955 or fifteen years before the present
action was commenced and the taking of the subject
properties. Not only did the current prices rise
during the period, the subject properties likewise,
even before the taking, improved their classification
with the construction of the different edifices above
mentioned.
(5)
The different tax declarations pegging the
value per square meter of the affected land at P.25
and P.50 cannot be considered reliable. As we said
in EPZA v. Dulay: 10
xxx
xxx
xxx
Various factors can come into play in the valuation
of specific properties singled out for expropriation.
The values given by provincial assessors are usually
uniform for very wide areas covering several
barrios or even an entire town with the exception of
the poblacion. Individual differences are never
taken into account. The value of land is based on
such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice,
corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land
described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of
only two or three classes of building materials and
estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than
correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot
be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

xxx
xxx
xxx
There is no showing that the court appointed
commissioners applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them or that they had
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence. The
amount of P7.50 per square meter as adapted by the
trial court is not grossly exorbitant contrary to the
claim of the petitioner.
As regards the third assignment of error, we agree
with the petitioner that the market value of an
expropriated property is determined at the time of
the taking, 11 yet, in this case, there is no showing
that the respondent court disregarded this principle.
In affirming the decision of the court a quo. the
respondent court merely mentioned as an
afterthought the devaluation of the peso and the rise
in the prices of commodities but these were not the
bases for the fixing of the amount of P7.50 as just
compensation. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED. The petitioner is hereby
ordered to pay the amount P7.50 per square meter to
the private respondents including legal interest from
the taking of the subject properties until full
payment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and
Padilla, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
15th Judicial District, Branch II, the
Honorable Vicente B. Echaves, Jr., presiding Judge.
2.
Record on Appeal, 293-321.
3.
Rollo, 86, Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 11, 1976, penned by then
Justice Ramon C. Fernandez with the concurrence
of Justices Ricardo C. Puno and Delfin Fl. Batacan.
4.
Rollo, 41.
5.
Id., 58-59.
6.
Record on Appeal, 315.
7.
Id., 319.
8.
Rollo, 61-62.
9.
Record on Appeal, 316.
10.
G.R. No. 59603. April 29, 1987, 12-13.
11.
Commissioner of Public Highways vs.
Burgos, No. L-36706, March 31, 1980, 96 SCRA
831; Municipality of Daet vs. Court of Appeals, No.
L-35861, October 18, 1979, 93 SCRA 503.
G.R. No. 69969 December 20, 1989
ANTONIO L. TOTTOC vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 69969. December 20, 1989.]
ANTONIO L. TOTTOC, petitioner, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
SATURNINO DOCTOR, respondents.

Quirico L. Pilotin for petitioner.

Miguel M. Guevara for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BUREAU OF
FORESTRY; CLASSIFICATION MADE
THEREBY THAT A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN IS TIMBERLAND; NOT
CONTROLLING IN ALL CASES. The question
as to whether a particular portion of land is forestal
or any other class of land is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. Thus,
the mere classification or certification made by the
Bureau of Forestry that a part of the public domain
is timberland is not controlling in all cases.
2.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS;
PRESUMPTION THAT LAND IS
AGRICULTURAL; OBTAINS ONLY WHEN THE
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IS BETWEEN A
PRIVATE CITIZEN AND THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court does not lose sight of the
presumption, in lieu of contrary proof, that the land
is agricultural in character, rather than forestal, as it
is for the good of the country to have the large
public domain come under private ownership. It is
to be emphasized, however, that such presumption
obtains only when the conflict of interest is between
a private citizen and the Government, not when it
involves opposing rights of private citizens against
each other.
3.
ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; HOMESTEAD;
APPLICANT HAVING POSSESSION RIGHT
MAY VINDICATE AND DEFEND AGAINST
INTRUDERS WITHOUT BETTER TITLE.
Private respondent makes the riposte that petitioner
cannot question the validity of the title registered in
the former's name. If there is any party who can
question his title on the ground that it includes
therein a forest land, private respondent posits that
it should be the Bureau of Forest Development.
This counter-argument is an effete pretension. In the
case of Gatchalian vs. Pavilin, et al., the Court had
the occasion to render the following ruling: "As to
the alleged lack of personality of defendantsappellants to assail appellee's land grant and
certificate of title for the reason that said appellants
are mere prospective homestead applicants, it is
sufficient to remark that by reason of their prior
occupancy and cultivation, these parties have
already acquired possessory rights that they may
vindicate and defend against intruders without
better title. And if it be true that the Bureau of
Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent in favor
of appellee Francisco Gatchalian because the land
involved was still inalienable forest land when
granted, then it may be plausibly contended that her
patent title would be ab initio void subject to attack
at any time by any party adversely affected (Civil
Code, Arts. 1409, 1421; Vano vs. Insular Gov't., 41
Phil. 161; Adorable vs. Dir. of Forestry, L-13663,
25 March 1960). . . . ."

4.
ID.; ID.; FOREST LAND; ADVERSE
POSSESSION THEREOF CANNOT CONVERT
IT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY. In Vallarta, et al.
vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where
the original proceeding was also between private
citizens, we held: "It is elementary in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot
be owned by private persons. It is not registrable.
The adverse possession which can be the basis of a
grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
cannot commence until after forest land has been
declared alienable and disposable. Possession of
forest land, no matter how long cannot convert it
into private property. . . . If somehow forest land
happens to have been included in a Torrens Title,
the title is null and void insofar as the forest land is
concerned. . . . ."
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of
the former Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R.
CV No. 00034, 1 reversing in toto the decision in
Civil Case No. 2212 of the then Court of First
Instance, Branch II, Nueva Vizcaya, the disposition
of respondent court being as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from
not consistent with the facts and the law applicable,
the same is hereby set aside and another entered
1.
Declaring Patent of 124175 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 3428 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya in the name of plaintiff
Saturnino Doctor valid and existing:
2.
Ordering the defendant-appellee to restore
possession of the subject property unto the plaintiffappellant and to respect such possession;
3.
Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 annually from the
filing of the complaint until possession is fully
restored as actual damages.
4.
Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the sums
of P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and P1,000.00
as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against the defendant-appellee.
"SO ORDERED.
"REVERSED." 2
The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the
original action below are undisputed and are
hereinunder set forth as synthesized by the court a
quo and adopted by respondent court. 3
On April 9, 1949, petitioner applied for the lease of
a pasture land consisting of 78.6 hectares, situated
at Lacangan, Barrio Madiangat, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, before the Bureau of Forestry, Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thru the
office of the Provincial Forester at Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya. By virtue of said application,
petitioner was granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps993 after a survey of the area involved. Thereafter,
petitioner occupied said 78.6 hectares of pasture
land and fenced the same, without anybody

disturbing his possession thereof. Private

respondent, being a neighbor of petitioner, was
aware of such occupation of the land by petitioner
since 1949. Cdpr
On September 21, 1951, petitioner was again
granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps-993 Extension
by Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis,
authorizing the former to occupy the same area, the
first permit having expired on June 30, 1952.
Finally, on August 6, 1958, petitioner entered into a
lease agreement with the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, Juan de G. Rodriguez, under
Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1228 covering the
identical area for a period of 11 years. LibLex
Meanwhile, private respondent, upon verification
from the Bureau of Forestry supposedly before
1963 that the pasture land in question was
reportedly untouched and outside the pasture land
of petitioner, filed his application for a homestead
with the Bureau of Lands and entered the northern
portion of the land, clearing and cultivating an area
of less than 4 hectares in 1963.
On January 7, 1965, private respondent secured a
certification from Assistant Chief Maximo A.
Abuan of the Bureau of Forestry office in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, certifying to the fact
that the land in question is alienable and disposable.
Private respondent further claims to have secured
another certification from an employee of the
Bureau of Lands who based the same on a
certification on file in the Bureau of Lands office as
furnished by the Bureau of Forestry.
On February 25, 1966, petitioner caused the
relocation survey of his pasture land in the presence
of Bureau of Lands Inspector Marcelino Hernaez
and private respondent. It was found in said survey
that a portion of the land subject of private
respondent's application was within the pasture land
of petitioner and within the so-called Forest Zone.
In view thereof, petitioner requested Inspector
Hernaez to send a telegram to the Director of Lands
in Manila reading: "Lands Director Jorge, Manila.
Please hold action homestead application Saturnino
Doctor and Luis Carub, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Reinvestigation in progress. Land claimed by Mayor
Tottoc. Investigator Hernaez." cdll
Aside from this survey, petitioner requested in a
letter to the office of the Bureau of Forestry at
Nueva Vizcaya the relocation survey of his pasture
land pursuant to which the district forester sent
Forester Nicasio Pascua to relocate the same on
April 26, 1966. A cartographer of the Bureau of
Lands, Eladio Miranda, herein petitioner and private
respondent, as well as several laborers, were present
during said relocation survey. Thereafter, Forester
Pascua submitted his memorandum, dated May 3,
1966, to the bureau director indicating the different
positions of the lots that had encroached on the
pasture land of petitioner. Consequent to such
findings, Forester Pascua recommended that all
certifications and/or patents issued in favor of the

lot owners or claimants of said encroaching lots be

nullified for the good of the public service. LibLex
On March 8, 1967, petitioner was granted another
ordinary pasture permit by Acting Director of
Forestry Antonio Quejado to occupy and use for
pasture another 42 hectares of public forest land
situated in Inatub, Lacangan, Carolet and Buliwao,
Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya which made a total of
120.6 hectares of land granted to petitioner for
pasture purposes. Said additional area was likewise
fenced by petitioner.
On June 17, 1968, Original Certificate of Title No.
P-3428 under Homestead Patent No. 124175 was
issued to private respondent over a parcel of land
situated in Inatub, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya,
containing an area of approximately 20 hectares.
Thereafter, private respondent and one Luis Carub
requested the Bureau of Forestry to relocate the
pasture land of petitioner to determine any
encroachment on his land.
Forester Buenaventura Caguioa, on the instructions
of the Director of Forestry dated November 25,
1971 thru District Forester Geronimo Falloran,
conducted the relocation survey. On March 1, 1972,
Forester Caguioa submitted his memorandum to the
district forester indicating that the area in the title
granted to private respondent traversed a portion of
the pasture land of petitioner and that only 3.5
hectares, more or less, was verified to be within the
alienable and disposable area. In view thereof, a
recommendation was made that the application filed
by petitioner for the renewal of the pasture lease
agreement, which expired on June 30, 1969, be
approved and that only 3.5 hectares of land be
retained by private respondent. prcd
On March 23, 1972, said memorandum report of
District Forester Falloran, was forwarded to the
Director of Forestry, Manila, through the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Forestry, Region No. 2,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, who in turn indorsed the
same on June 23, 1972. On November 29, 1972, Mr.
Aniceto Bueno, Officer-in-Charge of the Parks,
Range and Wildlife Division of the Bureau of Forest
Development, furnished petitioner a copy of the
renewed Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1228, dated
November 9, 1972, entered into by the petitioner
with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, Jose D. Drilon, Jr. The lease was for a
period of 25 years, to expire on June 30, 1994, and
covered the 120 hectares of pasture land in
Lacangan, Inatub, Carolet, Madiangat and Buliwao,
Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya.
With these documents in favor of petitioner, private
respondent was prevented from occupying and
cultivating the disputed portion of 16.5459 hectares.
As a consequence, private respondent, filed an
action for recovery of possession with damages.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment on
May 28, 1981 in favor of therein defendant and
against the plaintiff, and ordering the plaintiff to pay
the defendant the amount of P1,400.00 as actual and

litigation expenses, P3,000.00 for attorney's fees,

and to pay the costs of the suit. 4
On a "Partial Motion for Reconsideration" filed by
petitioner, and a "Motion for Reconsideration
and/or New Trial" of private respondent, as
defendant and plaintiff, respectively, said decision
was amended by a resolution issued on January 7,
1982, the decretal portion whereof reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this
Court hereby:
1.
Denies the plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial, dated June 29,
1981, for lack of merit; and
2.
Grants the defendant's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration, dated May 29, 1981. The
dispositive portion of the decision is, therefore,
amended to read as follows:
'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, this
Court:
1.
Declaring Patent No. 124175 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 3428 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya, in favor of the plaintiff,
covering the land in dispute which is within the
Forest Zone as null and void ab initio for lack of
jurisdiction;
2.
Ordering the plaintiff not to molest the
defendant in his peaceful and public occupation in
the land in dispute the same being still a part of the
Forest Zone and a part of his pasture land; and
3.
Condemning the plaintiffs to pay the
defendant the amounts of P1,400.00 as actual and
litigation expenses and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs of the suit." 5
As stated at the outset, said decision and resolution
were appealed to respondent court which reversed
and set aside the same. A motion for
reconsideration, dated October 15, 1984, was filed
by petitioner with respondent court with a
supplemental memorandum in support thereof, but
the same was denied in respondent court's
resolution of January 28, 1985.
The present recourse is before us as a consequence.
Succinctly reduced to salient terms, petitioner's
submissions are that respondent court committed
errors of law (1) in concluding that the land in
dispute is alienable by relying on the certification
issued by District Forester Abuan and in
disregarding the contrary testimonies and
certifications of Foresters Pascua and Caguioa; (2)
in concluding that petitioner, a pasture lease
permittee, has no legal personality to question the
patent and title of private respondent Doctor over
the disputed area; and (3) when it ruled that private
respondent is entitled to the award of damages. 6
On the first assignment of error, petitioner
maintains that respondent court should not have
relied on the certification issued by District Forester
Abuan, it being hearsay evidence by reason of
Abuan's failure to testify thereon. Moreover,
petitioner assails respondent courts disregard of the
testimonies of Foresters Pascua and Caguioa who

certified that the land was within the Forest Zone

after having conducted an actual verification survey
of the area.
We agree with petitioner, but not only for the reason
that the evidence-in-chief of private respondent
may, in point of strict law, be constitutive of
hearsay. The question as to whether a particular
portion of land is forestal or any other class of land
is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case. 7 Thus, the mere classification
or certification made by the Bureau of Forestry that
a part of the public domain is timberland is not
controlling in all cases. 8
We have reviewed the testimonies of the witnesses
for private respondent and nowhere do we find any
cogent basis for the certification made by District
Forester Abuan. The testimony of Sabino Delizo,
District Land Officer of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, which could possibly have energized
private respondent's case, is itself plagued with not
a few vacuities. Aside from his assertion and
admission that the sole basis for his certification
was merely an office copy of the certification also
of Forester Abuan himself, Delizo further admitted
that he had not made any actual verification of the
subject area. 9 Neither could he even conclusively
establish that the lot mentioned in his certification
was identical to the lot in question. 10
In diametrical contrast, the pasture lease permit
granted to petitioner was issued after a series of
actual investigations, ocular and technical, of the
subject area by Foresters Pascua and Caguioa
conducted in the presence of all the interested
parties, including private respondent. While private
respondent denies having received any copy of the
memoranda executed by the foresters despite his
admitted presence during the surveys and
investigations, 11 the same does not relieve him of
the consequences of imputed knowledge of the
findings therein considering the facility in obtaining
copies of the same. Besides, it is an affront to
credulity that a person like private respondent who,
despite his zeal and desire to possess and own the
land in controversy, would prefer to remain in
deliberate ignorance of the results of said surveys
through his unexplained inaction and inexplicable
indifference. LibLex
Notably, even before the relocation survey made by
Forester Caguioa, Bureau of Lands Inspector
Hernaez conducted his own survey and found that
the land subject of private respondent's application
for a homestead patent was within the pasture land
of petitioner and within the Forest Zone. Precisely,
an advice to hold said application was sent to the
Director of Lands in Manila upon petitioner's
request. 12
It will also be recalled that consequent to Forester
Pascua's survey and findings, a further
recommendation was made to the Director of
Forestry for the nullification of all certifications
and/or patents issued in favor of the owners and/or
claimants whose lots had intruded upon petitioner's

land area, including private respondent himself,

such invalidation being necessitated for the good of
the public service. 13 All these on-the-spot surveys,
the findings where from are unassailed and
uncontradicted, more than preponderate over and
definitely override the enervated evidentiary value
of the certification of Abuan and Delizo.
While we admit an exception to the rule that the
Bureau of Forestry has the power to set aside for
forestry or mineral purposes a particular land in
question, 14 and that is when there was prior
intervention of private interests, said exception
cannot find application in private respondent's favor
since petitioner's interests commenced and vested
very much earlier than any claim thereon by the
former.
Petitioner had open, uninterrupted and peaceful
possession and occupation of the disputed land
since 1949, being a grantee of pasture lease permits
which expired in 1969. Private respondent, on the
other hand, started his controversial cultivation of
the lot only in 1963 and secured the questioned
certification in 1965. 15 The long period of time
from 1949 to 1969 during which the land was under
pasture lease permits granted to petitioner all the
more lends credence to the fact that said land was
within the Forest Zone as only lands of the category
of public forest land can be the subject of such
permits. 16
The Court neither loses sight of the presumption, in
lieu of contrary proof, that the land is agricultural in
character, rather than forestal, as it is for the good of
the country to have the large public domain come
under private ownership. 17 It is to be emphasized,
however, that such presumption obtains only when
the conflict of interest is between a private citizen
and the Government, not when it involves opposing
rights of private citizens against each other.
On the second assigned error, private respondent
makes the riposte that petitioner cannot question the
validity of the title registered in the former's name.
If there is any party who can question his title on
the ground that it includes therein a forest land,
private respondent posits that it should be the
Bureau of Forest Development. 18 This counterargument is an effete pretension.
In the case of Gatchalian vs. Pavilin, et al., 19 the
Court had the occasion to render the following
ruling:
"As to the alleged lack of personality of defendantsappellants to assail appellee's land grant and
certificate of title for the reason that said appellants
are mere prospective homestead applicants, it is
sufficient to remark that by reason of their prior
occupancy and cultivation, these parties have
already acquired possessory rights that they may
vindicate and defend against intruders without
better title. And if it be true that the Bureau of
Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent in favor
of appellee Francisco Gatchalian because the land
involved was still inalienable forest land when
granted, then it may be plausibly contended that her

patent title would be ab initio void subject to attack

at any time by any party adversely affected (Civil
Code, Arts. 1409, 1421; Vano vs. Insular Gov't., 41
Phil. 161; Adorable vs. Dir. of Forestry, L-13663,
25 March 1960). . . ."
Moreover, in Vallarta, et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., 20 where the original
proceeding was also between private citizens, we
held:
"It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registrable. The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a grant of title
in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after forest land has been declared
alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land,
no matter how long cannot convert it into private
property. . . . If somehow forest land happens to
have been included in a Torrens Title, the title is
null and void insofar as the forest land is concerned.
. . .."
Ironically, it was private respondent himself who
initiated the original action below for recovery of
possession with damages. As a consequence,
petitioner was virtually compelled to litigate in
order to protect his own right to possession which in
part hinged on the nature of the land in dispute.
Were we to uphold private respondent's theory that
petitioner is devoid of personality to question the
invalidity of the former's patent and title, that would
be a procedural inequity since it would thereby
prevent petitioner from fully protecting his interests
or, at the very least, divest him of valid defenses.
On the third supposed error, suffice it to state that
the records are bereft of any substantial evidence
showing that private respondent was deprived by
petitioner of the possession of the land through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. On
the contrary, the evidence convinces us that
petitioner was well within his rights in taking
possession of the lot in question a matter which we
need not belabor with any further disquisition.
LLphil
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision and
resolution of respondent court are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
trial court, dated January 7, 1982, on the partial
motion for reconsideration by herein petitioner as
defendant therein, except as to the award of
attorney's fees and the payment of the costs of suit
both of which have no legal bases and are
consequently ordered deleted, is hereby
REINSTATED. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and
Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
Penned by Justice Porfirio V. Sison with
Justices Abdulwahid A. Bidin and Marcelino R.
Veloso concurring.

2.
Rollo, 107-108.
3.
Ibid., 98-106.
4.
Ibid., 43; Civil Case No. 2212, Court of First
Instance of Nueva Vizcaya Branch II, Judge Cecilio
F. Balagot, presiding.
5.
Ibid., 71.
6.
Petition, 12-13; Rollo, 13-14.
7.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L46048, November 29, 1988, citing Ankron vs.
Government of the Philippine islands, 40 Phil. 10,
16 (1919).
8.
Pea, Philippine Law on Natural Resources,
4th Ed., 117.
9.
TSN, July 25, 1975, 25.
10.
Id., 34-36.
11.
Id., January 29, 1976, 29, 33.
12.
Exh. 19, Folder of Exhibits, 39.
13.
Exh. 7, ibid., 8.
14.
Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, supra.
15.
Rollo, 36.
16.
Pea, op. cit., 120, citing C.A. No. 452,
Pasture Land Act.
17.
Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175
(1918).
18.
Rollo, 131-132.
19.
6 SCRA 508 (1962).
20.
151 SCRA 679 (1987).
G.R. No. 39460 July 18, 1991
BAGUIO GOLD MINING CO. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 39460. July 18, 1991.]
BAGUIO GOLD MINING CO., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE DIRECTOR OF MINES, BERNARDO O.
VALDEZ, BONIFACIO DACANAY,
TEODORICO S. SERAFICA, ANTONIO RAMOS,
DOMINADOR LACSAMANA, FRUCTUSO O.
VALDEZ, LEONARDO O. VALDEZ, and
SILVINIO OPULENCIA, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for
petitioner.
Maximo F. Belmonte & Associates and Rico P.
Labiaga & Luis L. Lardizabal for private
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; MINING ACT;
DISCOVERIES OF MINERALS AND ACTS OF
LOCATION IN CASE AT BAR, VOID AB INITIO;
REASON. Conformably then with Section 14, in
relation to Section 28, of the Mining Act, it was
only after 19 May 1959 that the area where the
subject claims of the petitioner and the private
respondents are located was withdrawn from the

reservation and reverted to the public domain for

disposition under the provisions of the Mining Act.
Disposition in favor of any party presupposes
compliance by said party with prior requisite acts
such as exploration and prospecting for mineral
deposits, discovery of mineral deposits and location
of mining claims. It was only after such withdrawal
and reversion that any of such acts could be validly
and lawfully done. It logically follows then that the
so-called discoveries of minerals and acts of
location made within the area and done and
performed by both petitioner and private
respondents before 19 May 1959, as summarized in
the decision of the Director of Mines, had no valid
legal effects and were in fact void ab initio as they
were done within and inside a reservation which
was not open to mining entry and location, thus in
clear violation of the law.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by Baguio
Gold Miming Co. (hereinafter referred to as
petitioner) on 11 November 1974, seeking to review
and set aside the 22 July 1974 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (Special Tenth Division) in C.A.-G.R.
No. 41133-R. 1
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals
upheld the 7 March 1968 decision of public
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources of 7 March 1965 in DANR Case No.
2850 setting aside the decision of the Director of
Mines of 8 October 1964 in Mines Administrative
Case No. V-266 declaring the fourteen (14) lode
mineral claims of Bernardo O. Valdez and
associates (private respondents herein) valid and
existing and declaring the thirteen (13) lode mineral
claims of herein petitioner null and void and
without effect.
The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave
rise to the petition are as follows:
Sometime in June 1959, private respondents filed a
protest against petitioner with the Bureau of Mines
which was docketed as Mines Administrative Case
No. V-266. 2 They allege therein that they are
locators and claim-owners of fourteen (14) lode
mineral claims situated in the Res. Sec. "D", City of
Baguio (Baguio Townsite Reservation), which are
properly marked and identified on the ground and in
their respective declarations of location filed and
registered in accordance with the Mining Act on 20
May 1959 at 1:18 P.M. in the Office of the Mining
Recorder of Baguio City, a day after Presidential
Proclamation No. 572, which released for mining
purposes the area in question from the Baguio
Townsite Reservation, was concurred in by a
resolution of the Congress. Petitioner subsequently
filed on 21 May 1959 in the Office of the Mining
Recorder of Baguio City declarations of location of
thirteen (13) lode mineral claims, which conflict

with and overlap the lode mineral claims of private

respondents; the conflict in, or overlapping
between, their claims was brought about by the
subsequent filing by petitioner of its declarations of
location for the claims of the private respondents
appearing in their previously registered declarations
of location and as actually marked on the ground;
the acts of petitioner are wrongful, prejudicial and
violative of the rights of private respondents; and
that should the declarations of location and
subsequent application for lease of petitioner be
given due course, the private respondents would
sustain and incur damages. cdll
In its answer 3 to the protest dated 13 July 1959,
petitioner made admissions and denials of the
allegations of the protest and, as affirmative
defenses, averred that by reason of its underground
mining operations conducted before and after the
war on its claims immediately adjoining the area
covered by Proclamation No. 572, it discovered the
existence of minerals within said area and it then
took the necessary steps to preserve its rights arising
from such discovery of minerals; it worked for and
conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of
Mines, the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the Office of the President
of the Philippines, and the Congress of the Republic
of the Philippines, for the release of the area subject
of Presidential Proclamation No. 572 for mining
purposes; the release of the area for mining
purposes was made solely for its exclusive benefit;
private respondents never made any valid discovery
of minerals or valid location of mineral claims
within the area embraced by Presidential
Proclamation No. 572; their alleged location of
mineral claims and alleged registration of the
declarations of location of mineral claims within
such area were effected through deceit and in fraud
of petitioner's rights; the conditions set out in
Presidential Proclamation No. 572 made it
impossible for private respondents to make a
discovery of minerals in and to mine the area
covered by said Proclamation.
The Home Investment Corporation filed a
complaint in intervention dated 7 March 1960 4
alleging therein that on 29 June 1959, private
respondent Bernardo Valdez, in his own behalf and
on behalf of his associates, executed a Quitclaim
wherein they transferred, assigned and conveyed
unto it fifty (50) percent of any and all rights, title,
claim and interest in and over the aforesaid 14 lode
claims.
After due trial, the Director of Mines rendered his
decision 5 dated 8 October 1964 wherein, on the
basis of the following findings of facts:
"From the evidence presented, there appears to be
no question that the area claimed by all the parties
where they located and registered mining claims
was a part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation
established under the Resolutions of the then
Philippine Commission dated January 25, 1907 and
August 30, 1916. Being a part of a reservation

which is segregated from the mass of the public

domain for a specific public purpose, obviously the
same is not open to mining entry and location
except when released therefrom in accordance with
the provisions of Section 14 of Commonwealth Act
No. 137, as amended, otherwise known as the
Mining Act, as amended, which read as follows:
'SEC. 14.
Lands within reservation for purpose
(sic) other than mining, which, after such
reservation is made, are found to be more valuable
for their mineral contents than for the purpose for
which the reservation was made, may be withdrawn
from such reservations by the President with the
concurrence of the Congress, and thereupon such
lands shall revert to the public domain and be
subject to disposition under the provisions of this
Act.'
Pursuant to the aforequoted section of the Mining
Act, and upon the request of the parties, the said
area which contains 101.5980 hectares was released
from the said reservation under Proclamation No.
572 signed by the President of the Philippines on
April 8, 1959, and concurred in by the Congress on
May 19, 1959, declaring the same open to
disposition under the provisions of the Mining Act,
subject to the conditions therein specified.
The evidence is clear that protestants and
respondent alike located their mining claims on the
contested area before the same was released from
the Baguio Townsite Reservation, thus, from May 2
to 20, 1959, in the case of the protestants, and from
May 9 to 20, 1959, in the case of respondent. These
mining locations are, as admitted by the parties,
based on mineral discoveries made years before the
requisite acts of location have (sic) been performed,
thus, on the part of the protestants, outcrops of gold,
silica, gypsum, etc. are declared by them to have
been discovered on July 15, 1957, and such
discoveries made on later dates, by virtue of the
authority granted to them by the Baguio City
Council to search for valuable mineral deposits
thereon and in line with the declared policy of the
said Council to have said area explored and
developed for mining purposes . . . while on the part
of the respondent, its representatives discovered
outcrops of gold, silver, etc., as early as January,
1947, without permission taken from the Baguio
City Council or any competent authority to look for
minerals thereon although at a later date (September
10, 1957), it attempted to secure such permission
from the Council aforesaid but its request was
denied as it appeared that the Council had already
granted Bernardo O. Valdez and associates authority
to explore the same area applied for by said
respondent . . .
We observe from the evidence how the protestants
and the respondents tried to outwit each other in the
registration of the declarations of location of their
respective mining claims, the former having
presented to the Mining Recorder for Baguio City
their documents twice in the afternoon of May 20,
1959, and the latter once in the same afternoon, but

in all instances, said mining recorder refused to

register the documents in question for the reason
that the area covered thereby was not yet released
for mining purposes from the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, or that if the same was already
released for said purpose, he was not yet officially
advised on the matter. The mining recorder was
right in denying the registration of the said
documents for not only was he charged with official
knowledge of the fact that the area embraced within
the mining claims of both parties is a part of the
said reservation, but that upon the fact of the
documents sought to be recorded, they refer to
mineral claims, the areas of each of which were
applied for release from the reservation. Again, in
the early morning of May 21, 1959, the
representatives of both parties were in the Mining
Recorder's Office to register the same documents.
This time, as the evidence shows, said documents
presented by both parties were accepted and
registered without priority or preference having
been given in favor of anyone of them.
It is likewise observed that the protestants and the
respondents as well as the intervenor wanted to
impress the Office that each has been responsible in
having the contested area released from the Baguio
Townsite Reservation for mining purposes. This is
especially true with respect to the respondent. While
we find that the respondent may have been more
aggressive in its effort to accomplish the desired
objective, yet it could not also be said that on its
sole efforts was the objective aforesaid for, to say
so, to our mind, would not be fair to the endeavors
made by the other parties. However, over and above
the said circumstances, it still remains in bold relief
from the evidence that both the protestants and the
respondent located their mining claims from May 220, 1959, for the protestants, and from May 9-20,
1959, for the respondent, before the area embraced
therein was released from the Baguio Townsite
Reservation in accordance with law. This being so,
said claims cannot be considered as having been
validly located for said area was not then open to
mining location. And the permission granted to the
protestants by the Baguio City Council to search for
valuable mineral deposits in the area in question is
not an authority on their part to locate the register
(sic) mining claims thereon before the same is
released from said reservation. The situation is more
aggravated in the case of the respondent (herein
petitioner), for as pointed out by the evidence and in
spite of the said Council's denial to grant its request
for permission, it entered said area to do mine
prospecting work, make mineral discoveries, and
locate and register mining claims.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that reservations
are not open to mining entry and location for the
reason, among others, that such reservations are
segregated from the mass of the public domain for
certain specific public purpose and as such the same
cannot be appropriated for another purpose. In other
words, only mineral lands of the public domain or

mineral reserves open to mining location and

valuable minerals in private lands except coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils and gas which are
governed by special laws, are free and open to
exploration, occupation, location and lease by
qualified persons and entities. This is an underlying
rule on the basic concept of mineral lands
administration and disposition ordained by the
Mining Act. Sections 3 and 10 thereof are
expressions of the rule aforesaid. On the other hand,
Section 14 of said Act provides that lands within
reservations established for purposes other than
mining if found to be more valuable for their
mineral contents than for the purpose for which the
reservation was made shall first be withdrawn from
such reservations by the President of the Philippines
with the concurrence of Congress before such lands
and their valuable mineral contents can be disposed
of for mining purposes under the provisions of said
Act. So, is Section 28 which does not allow
prospecting 'in a mineral reserve which has been
closed to mining locations, and in reservations
established for other purposes, except by the
Government'. Still other sections of the same Act
envisage the same principle as they are parts of the
whole fabric which form the basis of the
fundamental concept of mineral lands
administration and disposition stated above.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the lands on
which the protestants and respondent staked and
located mining claims have not yet reverted to the
public domain to be free and open to exploration,
occupation, location and lease at the time the acts of
staking and location were performed by them.
Consequently, they have not acquired any right
incident to such staking and location. Such being
the case, and considering the other circumstances
stated above, the mining claims registered by them
are void and of no effect. Equity cannot be applied
in this regard as the acts done by the parties are
violative of law and that no rights could be
considered born at the time and on the dates said
acts were done."
he concluded and ruled that "neither the protestants
nor the respondent, much less the intervenor, can be
given any right to hold and lease the area in
conflict."
All parties to the case, except the intervenor Home
Investment Corporation, appealed the aforesaid
decision of the Director of Mines to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. The appeal was
docketed as DANR Case No. 2850 (Baguio City).
On 7 March 1965, then Secretary Fernando Lopez
of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources rendered his decision 6 on the appeal
setting aside the decision of the Director of Mines
and declaring the fourteen (14) lode mineral claims
of private respondents valid and existing, while
declaring the thirteen (13) lode mineral claims of
petitioner null and void and without effect. In
support thereof, the Secretary made the following
disquisitions: Cdpr

"The records of this case show that the area wherein

the mining claims of Valdez, et al. and the Baguio
Gold Mining Company had been located was part of
the Baguio Townsite Reservation. However, the
area was released by Presidential Proclamation No.
572 and was concurred in by a resolution of
Congress adopted on May 19, 1959. According to
the declarations of mining location filed by
appellants, Valdez, et al. located their claims from
May 2-20, 1959 while the Baguio Gold Mining
Company located its claims from May 10-20, 1959.
Considering these facts, although the locations of
mining claims of appellants were done largely at a
time when the area was not yet released, the
locations were concluded or finished two days after
the area was already released for mining purposes.
Such being the case, this Office is inclined to
validate the locations of appellants. Bearing in mind
the time, efforts and money spent by the locators, it
is more just and equitable to consider the locations
of some importance rather than disregard them
altogether which will serve no purpose at all. To
declare the area open for subsequent prospectors
will be giving way to more conflict. Besides to give
a more liberal interpretation of the provisions of the
Mining Law on locations, as in this particular case,
would not prejudice anybody's right nor would it
run counter to the interest of the state.
Be this as it may, however, after declaring the
mining locations of appellants valid there is another
issue that necessarily follows. This issue is the
question of preferential right among appellants
herein which, as a matter of fact, is the same issue
raised when Bernardo Valdez, et al. filed their
protest on June 21, 1959 against the thirteen (13)
mining claims of Baguio Gold Mining Company
resulting in this case.
In the protest of Valdez, et al. filed in the Bureau of
Mines, they alleged preference (sic) right to lease
the area in question on the ground that the filing of
the 13 declarations of location by the respondent
Baguio Gold Mining Company was subsequent to
the filing of their 14 mining locations. The claims of
protestants overlap and are in conflict with those of
respondent.
Examining the declarations of location filed by
protestants and respondent in the Office of the
Mining Recorder in Baguio City, it appears that the
14 declarations of locations filed by protestants
were received in the Office of the Mining Recorder
at 1:18 P.M. May 20, 1959, which was duly
stamped at the upper left hand margin of the
declarations. On the other hand, the 13 miming
declarations of location filed by respondent Baguio
Gold Mining Company were received at 4:30 P.M.,
also on May 20, 1959, in the Office of the Mining
Recorder of Baguio. Said time and date was (sic)
also duly stamped on the upper left hand margin of
the declarations filed. These declarations of
location, however, were not immediately recorded
or registered. All of them were recorded at the same

time the following day May 21, 1959 at 8:00

o'clock in the morning.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that protestants
Valdez, et al. have a prior right as against
respondent Baguio Gold Mining Company. Section
56 of the Mining Act (C.A. No. 137) provides:
'All declarations of location, affidavits, power of
attorney, and all other documents or instruments in
writing, regarding or affecting the possession of
mining claims or any right or title thereto, or
interest therein, shall be recorded by the mining
recorder in the order in which they are filed for
record, and from and after such recording, all such
documents or instruments in writing shall constitute
notice to all persons and to the whole world of the
contents of the same.'
The declarations of location of Valdez, et al. should
therefore be considered filed prior to those of
Baguio Gold Mining Company and as the filing of
the declarations of location by Valdez, et al. was
several hours ahead of the filing by Baguio Gold
Mining Company, the latter was bound to know of
the previous claim of the former. Consequently, the
subsequent acceptance and registration of the
declarations of location by Baguio Gold Mining
Company should be considered as of no effect.
Respondent Baguio Gold Mining Company
contends that it has been instrumental in the release
of the area in question for mining purposes.
Granting for the sake of argument that this is true,
the mining law gives no preference (sic) right for
efforts of this kind.
This Office had observed that from the evidence on
record, Baguio Gold Mining Company made its
declarations of locations based on its exploitation of
its mining claims adjacent to the area in question in
1947. The Company assumed that the vein of their
old claim extend (sic) toward the area in question.
Section 33 of the Mining Law provides that within
30 days from discovery of mineral, the discoverer
or locator must locate his claim otherwise, he would
be considered to have waived his right thereto. In
the instant case Baguio Gold waited for several
years before making its declarations of location."
Unsatisfied with the decision, petitioner filed on 19
April 1968 a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals, which was docketed therein as C.A.-G.R.
No. 41133-R. In its Memorandum of Arguments, 7
it submits the following errors as having been
committed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources:
"[A] Respondent Honorable Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources erred in holding
that the 14 lode mineral claims of respondents
Bernardo O. Valdez, Bonifacio Dacanay, Teodorico
S. Serafica, Antonio Ramos, Dominador
Lacsamana, Fructuoso O. Valdez, Leonardo O.
Valdez, and Silvino Opulencia are valid.
[B]
Respondent Honorable Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources erred in holding
that the declarations of locations of the mining
claims of respondents Bernardo O. Valdez,

Bonifacio Dacanay, Teodorico S. Serafica, Antonio

Ramos, Dominador Lacsamana, Fructuoso O.
Valdez, Leonardo O. Valdez, and Silvino Opulencia
were registered with the Mining Recorder of Baguio
City prior to the registration with the same Mining
Director of the declarations of locations of the 13
mining claims of petitioner.
[C]
Respondent Honorable Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources erred in giving
the preferential right to lease the mining area
involved to respondents Bernardo O. Valdez,
Bonifacio Dacanay, Teodorico S. Serafica, Antonio
Ramos, Dominador Lacsamana, Fructuoso O.
Valdez, Leonardo O. Valdez, and Silvino Opulencia
as against the petitioner despite the patent
incapacity of said respondents Bernardo O. Valdez,
Bonifacio Dacanay, Teodorico S. Serafica, Antonio
Ramos, Dominador Lacsamana, Fructuoso O.
Valdez, Leonardo O. Valdez, and Silvino Opulencia
to comply with the conditions set forth in the
Presidential Proclamation No. 572.
[D]
Respondent Honorable Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources erred in
declaring that the 13 lode mineral claims of
petitioner were null and void."
In its resolution of 27 December 1968, 8 the Court
of Appeals declared the petition as one for renew
and not as a special civil action for certiorari or an
ordinary appeal and directed the Department to
elevate to it the original record of the case, the
transcript of stenographic notes, the exhibits, the
minutes and the list of exhibits in order for the
Court to determine whether the conclusions drawn
by the Secretary from facts established are correct
or erroneous.
In its challenged decision 9 of 22 July 1974, the
Court of Appeals, on the basis of the following
observations and conclusions:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources found 'that the 14 declarations of
locations filed by protestants were received in the
Office of the Mining Recorder at 1:18 P.M. May 20,
1959, which was duly stamped at the upper left
hand margin of the declaration.' A cursory
examination of the declarations of location of the
protestants, private respondents herein, shows that
said declarations were all received by the Mining
Recorder of Baguio City on May 20, 1959 at 1:18
o'clock in the afternoon, (Exhs. "G-a", "G-1-a" to
"G-13-a").
It was also found by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources that the declarations of
location filed by Baguio Gold Mining Company,
petitioner herein, were received at 4:30 p.m., also
on May 20, 1959, in the Office of the Mining
Recorder of Baguio. Again on examination of the
thirteen (13) declarations of location filed by
Baguio Gold Mining Company reveals that all said
declaration (sic) were received at the Office of the
Mining Recorder of Baguio on May 20, 1959 at
4:30 in the afternoon, (Exh. "5-A" to "17-A",

inclusive). It is thus seen that the findings of facts of

the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on the time and dote of the filing of the declarations
of location by protestants, private respondents
herein, and by the Baguio Gold Mining Company,
petitioner herein, are supported by the indubitable
documentary evidence.
The conclusion of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources that protestants Valdez, et al.
have a prior right as against Baguio Gold Mining
Company, petitioner herein, is supported by Section
56 of the Mining Act, Commonwealth Act No. 137
which provides:
'All declarations of location, affidavits, power of
attorney, and all other documents or instruments in
writing, regarding or affecting the possession of
mining claims or any right or title thereto, or
interest therein, shall be recorded by the mining
recorder in the order in which they are filed for
record, and from and after such recording, all such
documents or instruments in writing shall constitute
notice to all persons and to the whole world of the
contents of the same.'
The act of the Mining Recorder in stamping all the
declarations of location filed by the protestants,
private respondents herein, and Baguio Gold
Mining Company, petitioner herein, as received on
May 21, 1959 at 3:00 o'clock in the morning is of
no moment because such act is not only belied by
the record itself but is contrary to law.
The contention of the petitioner, Baguio Gold
Mining Company, that it has been instrumental in
the release of the area in question for mining
purposes was correctly brushed aside by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources with
the statement that, 'Granting for the sake of
argument that this is true, the mining law gives no
preference (sic) right for efforts of this kind.'
It is a fact that within thirty (30) days from the
alleged discovery of minerals by the petitioner in
1947, it could not validly locate the thirteen lode
mineral claims because at that time the area was
still within the Baguio Townsite Reservation.
The contention that no locator other than the
petitioner Baguio Gold Mining Company can
comply with the condition that 'exploration and later
mining or extraction of the ore should not be made
at any point less than 600 feet downward from the
surface' has no factual basis and is irrelevant to the
resolution of the petition for review."
ruled that the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is supported by
the evidence and is in accordance with law; hence,
it denied the petition.
Its motion for reconsideration 10 having been
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution 11
of 27 September 1974, petitioner filed the instant
petition on 11 November 1974 wherein it raises the
following issues:
"I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PREFERENTIAL
RIGHT TO LEASE MINING CLAIMS SHALL BE

DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE TIME OF

PRESENTATION TO THE MINING RECORDER
OF DECLARATIONS OF LOCATION OR SHALL
IT BE DECIDED BY THE PRIORITY OF
DISCOVERIES AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 32
OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 137.
II
WHETHER OR NOT IN THE INSTANT CASE,
PROCLAMATION NO. 572, WHICH RELEASED
THE DISPUTED AREA TO MINING
EXPLOITATION, SHOULD ALSO BE
CONSIDERED IN DECIDING THE CONFLICT
OF MINING CLAIMS." 12
It argues that (a) it should be given preferential right
because under Section 32 of the Mining Act which
reads:
"SEC. 32.
In case of conflicting locations,
priority of discovery, followed by continuous
occupation and prospecting of the land, shall
determine the right to lease the claims, subject to
any question as to the validity of the location and
record of the claim and subject to the holder's
having complied with all the requirements of the
law: Provided, however, That actual discovery of
minerals made prior to the effective date of this Act,
before or after the enforcement of the Constitution,
shall constitute a valid discovery, and the persons
making such discovery shall have the preferential
right to locate and lease the mining claims covering
the minerals discovered, subject to the provisions of
this Act."
it has not only the priority of discoveries, followed
by continuous prospecting of the land, but also its
locations are valid and recorded; it has complied
with all the requirements of the Mining Law; and
Section 56 thereof should not be relied upon in
giving preferential rights to lease mining claim; and
(b) considering the conditions imposed in
Proclamation No. 572, only the petitioner would be
physically and legally qualified to explore and later
mine or extract ore from the area since it alone
would have access to mine and stake the claims in
the area released inasmuch at it has mining
properties which adjoin the area in question and
where tunnels have been driven in different levels to
follow up the rich mineral veins which also go to
the area in question; upon the other hand, private
respondents had no area to place a mill for the
mining or extraction of the ore below 600 feet from
the surface because that area of 600 feet below the
surface of the area in question is petitioner's mining
territory and not open to placement of milling
plants. 13
In Our resolution of 15 November 1974, 14 We
required respondents to comment on the petition.
Private respondents filed their Comment on 17
December 1974, 15 to which a Reply was filed by
petitioner on 26 December 1974. 16
The public respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed their Comment on 5
February 1975; 17 they sustained the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Without prior leave, petitioner

filed on 14 February 1975 a reply 18 to the

comment of the Solicitor General.
The parties thereafter filed their respective Briefs.
There is merit in the petition; however, We cannot
grant the prayer of petitioner that We declare that its
thirteen (13) lode claims be preferred to the fourteen
(14) lode claims of private respondents. We are of
the opinion, and so hold, that the decision of the
Director of Mines of 8 October 1964 in Mines
Administrative Case No. V-266 is correct and that
the decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources of 7 March 1968 in DANR Case
No. 2859 and the Court of Appeals of 22 July 1974
in C.A.-G.R. No. 41133-R fail to consider the legal
implications of Proclamation No. 572 on the
discoveries and locations made before it was
concurred in by the Congress, and the validity of the
registration of the claims of the parties on 20 May
1959. Furthermore, the Secretary acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
validating acts of location made prior to the
Congressional concurrence. LexLib
There is no dispute as to the fact that the lode
mineral claims of petitioner and that of private
respondents are situated within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation established under the Resolutions of the
then Philippine Commission of 25 January 1907
and 30 August 1916. Therefore, as correctly noted
by the Bureau of Mines in its aforesaid decision:
". . . Being a part of a reservation which is
segregated from the mass of the public domain for a
specific public purpose, obviously the same is not
open to mining entry and location except when
released therefrom in accordance with the
provisions of Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No.
137, as amended, otherwise known as the Mining
Act, as amended, . . ." 19
Under said Section 14:
"Lands within a reservation for purposes other than
mining, which, after such reservation is made, are
found to be more valuable for their mineral contents
than for the purpose for which the reservation was
made, may be withdrawn from such reservations by
the President with the concurrence of the Congress,
and thereupon such lands shall revert to the public
domain and be subject to disposition under the
provisions of this Act."
Section 28 of the same Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 746, 20 disallows prospecting in "mineral
reserves which had been proclaimed closed to
mining locations, and in reservations established for
other purposes, except by the Government."
On 18 April 1959, the President of the Philippines
signed Proclamation No. 572 releasing from the
Baguio Townsite Reservation an area of 101.5980
hectares and declaring said area open to disposition
under the provisions of the Mining Act, subject to
the conditions therein provided. 21
The Proclamation expressly provides that it shall
take effect only upon the concurrence of Congress,
which was subsequently given in its Resolution of
19 May 1959.

Conformably then with Section 14, in relation to

Section 28, of the Mining Act, it was only after 19
May 1959 that the area where the subject claims of
the petitioner and the private respondents are
located was withdrawn from the reservation and
reverted to the public domain for disposition under
the provisions of the Mining Act. Disposition in
favor of any party presupposes compliance by said
party with prior requisite acts such as exploration
and prospecting for mineral deposits, 22 discovery
of mineral deposits and location of mining claims.
23 It was only after such withdrawal and reversion
that any of such acts could be validly and lawfully
done. It logically follows then that the so-called
discoveries of minerals and acts of location made
within the area and done and performed by both
petitioner and private respondents before 19 May
1959, as summarized in the decision of the Director
of Mines, had no valid legal effects and were in fact
void ab initio as they were done within and inside a
reservation which was not open to mining entry and
location, thus in clear violation of the law. cdphil
The protest of private respondents alleges that each
of the fourteen claims was "located" by the
individual claimants on May 2-20, 1959, 24 and
properly marked on the ground and in their
respective declarations. The areas of the claims
range from .0780 hectares to 9 hectares. Seven (7)
of the claims are, coincidentally, 9 hectares, more or
less, each; while two are, also coincidentally,
8.4000 hectares each. As found by the Director of
Mines, the discoveries of the minerals in said claims
were made in 1957.
Upon the other hand, petitioner's evidence
established that the staking and location of its
mining claims began on 9 May 1959 and was
completed on 20 May 1959; it admitted that it
adopted for the purpose the mineral "discoveries"
made in 1947. 25
We are not prepared to accept the claims of
petitioner and private respondents as to the period
of time they located their mining claims (May 9-20,
1959, in respect to petitioner, and May 2-20, 1959,
in respect to each of the private respondents). Since,
as asserted by petitioner, its discoveries of the
minerals dated as far back as 1947 and, as asserted
by private respondents in their case, as far back as
1957, by virtue of the authority granted to them by
the City Council of Baguio, and each group had
claimed to have worked for the release of the area
from the reservation, it is logical to presume that
they also immediately performed all the requisite
acts of location. But both parties were fully aware
that to claim or admit the conduct of locations
earlier than 20 May 1959 would be fatal to their
cause. Were it otherwise, they could have simply
indicated much earlier dates considering that their
"discoveries" were made years back. It was then
necessary, if not indispensable, that there be a
showing that the locations were completed after
Congress passed the concurring resolution. It is not
therefore surprising that both petitioner and private

respondents, without any prior agreement, were one

in designating 20 May 1959 as the date of the
completion or conclusion of the location just a
day after Congress enacted the resolution. Since
priority of registration was of utmost importance for
a preferential right, 20 May 1959 was the earliest
available date which must, nevertheless, be
reflected as the end of the acts of locations to give a
semblance of truth to the claim that such acts
continued until said late. Both rushed to the Office
of the Mining Recorder in the afternoon of that day.
They did not do so in the morning as the entry of 20
May being the termination of the location would
become obviously suspect. Indeed, if the
declarations were submitted for filing in the
morning, no reasonable mind can accept that acts of
locations were indeed done up to 20 May 1959,
taking into account the requirements for the
completion of the declarations.
As picturesquely described by the Director of
Mines, "protestants and the respondent tried to
outwit each other in the registration of the
declarations of location of their respective mining
claims." 26 Stated elsewise, the good faith of both
parties is placed in serious doubt.
The conclusion is inevitable that neither petitioner
nor private respondents made staking and locations
of mining claims within the released area after 19
May 1959 and that the declarations they registered
were based on void or invalid discoveries or
locations since they took place before the release of
the subject area from the Baguio Townsite
Reservation. Neither then acquired any valid right
over their respective mining claims and the
registrations thereof are invalid or void from the
beginning. Apropos this point, We cannot divine at
the logic of both the Secretary and the respondent
Court of Appeals when, in furtherance of their
postulations that petitioner does not have a
preferential right, they considered its failure to
locate its claim within thirty (30) days from
discovery in 1947 as a waiver of its right thereto
pursuant to Section 33 of the Mining Law, and yet it
did not apply the rigors of said section to the private
respondents who also claimed to have made
discoveries in 1957 but made no location within
thirty days thereafter. Both parties, having admitted
that their locations were made only in May of 1959,
must equally suffer the same fate.
Finally, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources acted without jurisdiction or gravely
abused his discretion in validating the locations of
the petitioner and the private respondents based on
the following reasons: LLjur
". . . Bearing in mind the time, efforts and money
spent by the locators, it is more just and equitable to
consider the locations of some importance rather
than disregard them altogether which will serve no
purpose at all. To declare the area open for
subsequent prospectors will be giving way to more
conflict. Beside to give a more liberal interpretation
of the provisions of the Mining Law on locations as

in this particular case, would not prejudice

anybody's right nor would it run counter to the
interest of the state."
He does not have any authority to validate acts
clearly done in violation of the Mining Act itself. If
there had been any intention on the part of the State
to validate acts of exploration and prospecting,
discovery of mineral deposits and location of
mining claims within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation before the issuance of Proclamation
No. 572, then the latter should have so expressly
provided.
The foregoing renders unnecessary any discussion
on the issues raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals of 22 July 1974 in C.A.-G.R. No. 41133-R
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Decision of the Director of Mines of 8 October
1964 in Mines Administrative Case No. V-266 is
REINSTATED.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C. J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
Per then Associate Justice Ramon C.
Fernandez, and concurred in by Associate Justices
Godofredo P. Ramos and Francisco Tantuico, Jr.
2.
Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 64-67.
3.
Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 63-73.
4.
Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 74.
5.
Annex "F" of Petition; Id., 85-93.
6.
Annex "H" of Petition; Rollo, 122-124.
7.
Annex "F" of Petition; Rollo, 127, et seq.
8.
Annex "I" of Petition; Rollo, 153, et seq.
9.
Annex "J" of Petition; Rollo, 155-168.
10.
Annex "K" of Petition; Rollo, 182-186.
11.
Annex "M" of Petition; Id., 191.
12.
Id., 18.
13.
Rollo, 29-30.
14.
Id., 201.
15.
Rollo, 205.
16.
Id., 212.
17.
Id., 236.
18.
Id., 246.
19.
Rollo, 49.
20.
It took effect on 18 June 1952.
21.
Published in the 20 April, 1959 issue of the
Official Gazette, vol. 55, no. 16.
22.
Sections 24, 26, and 27, Mining Act.
23.
Sections 29-63, inclusive, op. cit.
24.
Rollo, 64-65.
25.
Id., 88.
26.
Rollo, 91.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented
by
HON.
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of the
DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
(DENR),
CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his
capacity
as
the
Regional
Executive Director of DENRRegion
XI
and
ENGR.
BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his
capacity
as
the
Regional
Director
of
the
DENRENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT
BUREAU
(DENR-EMB),
Region
XI,
petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF
DAVAO,
represented
by
BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, City
Mayor, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on

certiorari assailing the decision dated May 28,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 33, which granted the writ of
mandamus and injunction in favor of
respondent, the City of Davao, and against
petitioner, the Republic, represented by the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
The trial court also
directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of NonCoverage in favor of respondent.

pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No.

1586, otherwise known as the Environmental
Impact Statement System, in relation to
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No, 1151, also
known as the Philippine Environment Policy,
the City of Davao must undergo the
environmental impact assessment (EIA)
process
to
secure
an
Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can
proceed with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate
of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a petition
for mandamus and injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Davao, docketed as Civil Case
No. 28,133-2000. It alleged that its proposed
project was neither an environmentally critical
project nor within an environmentally critical
area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS
system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of
the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to
issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon
submission of the required documents.
The Regional Trial Court rendered
judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to
be meritorious, judgment granting the writ
of mandamus and injunction is hereby
rendered in favor of the petitioner City of
Davao
and
against
respondents
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and the other respondents by:

[1]

[2]

The antecedent facts of the case are as

follows:
On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an
application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City
Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI.
Attached to the application were the required
documents for its issuance, namely, a) detailed
location map of the project site; b) brief project
description; and c) a certification from the City
Planning and Development Office that the
project is not located in an environmentally
critical area (ECA). The EMB Region XI
denied the application after finding that the
proposed
project
was
within
an
environmentally critical area and ruled that,

1)
directing
the
respondents to issue in favor of
the petitioner City of Davao a
Certificate of Non-Coverage,
pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1586 and related laws, in
connection with the construction
by the City of Davao of the Artica
Sports Dome;
2)
making
the
preliminary injunction issued on
December 12, 2000 permanent.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[3]

The trial court ratiocinated that there is

nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and
Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing
guidelines for compliance with the EIA system),
which requires local government units (LGUs)
to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government,
including government owned or controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations,
firms and entities are mandated to go through
the EIA process for their proposed projects
which have significant effect on the quality of
the environment. A local government unit, not
being an agency or instrumentality of the

National Government, is deemed excluded

under the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.

has the duty to ensure the quality of the

environment, which is the very same objective
of PD 1586.

The trial court also declared, based on the

certifications
of
the
DENR-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from
the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the
Artica Sports Dome was not within an
environmentally critical area. Neither was the
project an environmentally critical one.
It
therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR,
through the EMB Region XI, to approve
respondents application for CNC after it has
satisfied all the requirements for its issuance.
Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a
writ of mandamus to issue the CNC, if it
refuses to do so.

Further, it is a rule of statutory construction

that every part of a statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every
part must be considered with other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the
enactment. The trial court, in declaring local
government units as exempt from the coverage
of the EIS law, failed to relate Section 2 of PD
1586 to the following provisions of the same
law:

Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration, however, the same was
denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.
With
the
supervening
change
of
administration, respondent, in lieu of a
comment, filed a manifestation expressing its
agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs
to secure an ECC for its proposed project. It
thus rendered the instant petition moot and
academic. However, for the guidance of the
implementors of the EIS law and pursuant to
our symbolic function to educate the bench and
bar, we are inclined to address the issue
raised in this petition.
[4]

Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,

otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, defines a local government unit as a
body politic and corporate endowed with
powers to be exercised by it in conformity with
law. As such, it performs dual functions,
governmental and proprietary. Governmental
functions are those that concern the health,
safety and the advancement of the public
good or welfare as affecting the public
generally. Proprietary functions are those that
seek to obtain special corporate benefits or
earn pecuniary profit and intended for private
advantage and benefit. When exercising
governmental
powers
and
performing
governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of
the national government. When engaged in
corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the
community in the administration of local affairs.

[5]

[6]

[7]

[11]

[12]

WHEREAS, the pursuit of a

comprehensive
and
integrated
environmental
protection
program
necessitates the establishment and
institutionalization of a system whereby
the
exigencies
of
socio-economic
undertakings can be reconciled with the
requirements of environmental quality; x x
x.
Section 1. Policy. It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to attain
and maintain a rational and orderly
balance between socio-economic growth
and environmental protection.
xxx

xxx
xxx

Section 4. Presidential Proclamation

of Environmentally Critical Areas and
Projects. The President of the
Philippines may, on his own initiative or
upon recommendation of the National
Environmental Protection Council, by
proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as
environmentally critical. No person,
partnership or corporation shall undertake
or
operate
any
such
declared
environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the
President
or
his
duly
authorized
representative.
For
the
proper
management of said critical project or
area, the President may by his
proclamation reorganize such government
offices, agencies, institutions, corporations
or
instrumentalities
including
the
realignment of government personnel, and
their specific functions and responsibilities.

[8]

[9]

Found in Section 16 of the Local

Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to
promote the peoples right to a balanced
ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the
City of Davao, can not claim exemption from
the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic
endowed with governmental functions, an LGU
[10]

Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that

no person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative. The Civil Code
defines a person as either natural or juridical.
The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the
local government units are juridical persons.
[13]

[14]

[15]

Undoubtedly therefore, local government units

are not excluded from the coverage of PD
1586.
Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586
that said law intends to implement the policy of
the state to achieve a balance between socioeconomic development and environmental
protection, which are the twin goals of
sustainable development. The above-quoted
first paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses
that this can only be possible if we adopt a
comprehensive and integrated environmental
protection program where all the sectors of
the community are involved, i.e., the
government and the private sectors. The local
government units, as part of the machinery of
the government, cannot therefore be deemed
as outside the scope of the EIS system.
[16]

The foregoing arguments, however,

presuppose that a project, for which an
Environmental Compliance Certificate is
necessary, is environmentally critical or within
an environmentally critical area. In the case at
bar, respondent has sufficiently shown that the
Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant
negative environmental impact because it is
not an environmentally critical project and it is
not located in an environmentally critical area.
In support of this contention, respondent
submitted the following:
1.
Certification from the City
Planning and Development Office that the
project is not located in an environmentally
critical area;
2.
Certification
from
the
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO-West) that the
project area is within the 18-30% slope, is
outside the scope of the NIPAS (R.A.
7586), and not within a declared
watershed area; and
3.
Certification from PHILVOCS
that the project site is thirty-seven (37)
kilometers southeast of the southernmost
extension of the Davao River Fault and
forty-five (45) kilometers west of the
Eastern Mindanao Fault; and is outside
the required minimum buffer zone of five
(5) meters from a fault zone.

The trial court, after a consideration of the

evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is
not within an environmentally critical area.
Neither is it an environmentally critical project.
It is axiomatic that factual findings of the trial
court, when fully supported by the evidence on
record, are binding upon this Court and will not
be disturbed on appeal. This Court is not a
trier of facts.
[17]

[18]

There are exceptional instances when this

Court may disregard factual findings of the trial

court, namely: a) when the conclusion is a

finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; c) where there is a grave abuse
of discretion; d) when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; f) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; g) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; i) when the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of
evidence but is contradicted by the evidence
on record; and j) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
None of these exceptions, however, obtain in
this case.
[19]

The Environmental Impact Statement

System,
which
ensures
environmental
protection and regulates certain government
activities affecting the environment, was
established by Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Section 2 thereof states:
There is hereby established an
Environmental Impact Statement System
founded and based on the environmental
impact statement required under Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 1151, of all
agencies and instrumentalities of the
national
government,
including
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations,
as
well
as
private
corporations, firms and entities, for every
proposed project and undertaking which
significantly affect the quality of the
environment.

Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand,

provides:
Environmental Impact Statements.
Pursuant to the above enunciated policies
and
goals,
all
agencies
and
instrumentalities
of
the
national
government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, as well as
private corporations, firms and entities
shall prepare, file and include in every
action, project or undertaking which
significantly affects the quality of the
environment a detailed statement on
(a)
the environmental
impact of the proposed action,
project or undertaking
(b)

any

adverse

environmental
effect
which
cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented
(c)
alternative
proposed action

to

the

(d)
a determination that
the short-term uses of the
resources of the environment are
consistent with the maintenance
and enhancement of the longterm productivity of the same;
and
(e)
whenever
a
proposal involves the use of
depletable
or
nonrenewable
resources, a finding must be
made that such use and
commitment are warranted.
Before an environmental impact
statement is issued by a lead agency, all
agencies having jurisdiction over, or
special expertise on, the subject matter
involved shall comment on the draft
environmental impact statement made by
the lead agency within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the same.

Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and

Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the
declaration of certain projects or areas as
environmentally critical, and which shall fall
within the scope of the Environmental Impact
Statement System, shall be by Presidential
Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of
PD 1586 quoted above.
Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146
was issued on December 14, 1981,
proclaiming the following areas and types of
projects as environmentally critical and within
the scope of the Environmental Impact
Statement System established under PD 1586:
A.
Environmentally
Projects
I.

Critical

Heavy Industries

a.
Non-ferrous metal
industries
b.
Iron and steel mills
c.
Petroleum
and
petro-chemical
industries
including oil and gas
d.
Smelting plants
II.

Resource Extractive Industries

a.
Major mining and
quarrying projects
b.
Forestry projects
1. Logging
2. Major
wood
processing projects
3. Introduction of
fauna (exotic-animals) in
public/private forests

4. Forest
occupancy
5. Extraction
mangrove products
6. Grazing
c.

of

Fishery Projects

1. Dikes
for/and
fishpond
development
projects
III.

Infrastructure Projects
a.
b.

c.
projects
d.
bridges
B.
Areas

Major dams
Major power plants
(fossil-fueled,
nuclear
fueled,
hydroelectric
or
geothermal)
Major
reclamation
Major

roads

Environmentally

and
Critical

1.

All areas declared by law as

national
parks,
watershed
reserves, wildlife preserves and
sanctuaries;
2.
Areas set aside as aesthetic
potential tourist spots;
3.
Areas which constitute the
habitat for any endangered or
threatened
species
of
indigenous Philippine Wildlife
(flora and fauna);
4.
Areas
of
unique
historic,
archaeological, or scientific interests;
5.
Areas which are traditionally
occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
6.
Areas frequently visited and/or
hard-hit by natural calamities
(geologic
hazards,
floods,
typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
7.
Areas with critical slopes;
8.
Areas classified as prime
agricultural lands;
9.
Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by
one or any combination of the following
conditions;
a.
purposes
b.

tapped for domestic

within the controlled

and/or
protected
areas declared by
appropriate
authorities
c.
which
support
wildlife and fishery activities
11. Mangrove areas characterized
by one or any combination of the following
conditions:
a.
with primary pristine
and dense young growth;
b.
adjoining mouth of

major river systems;

c.
near or adjacent to
traditional productive fry or fishing
grounds;
d.
which act as natural
buffers
against
shore
erosion,
strong winds and
storm floods;
e.
on which people are
dependent for their livelihood.
12. Coral reefs, characterized by
one or any combinations of the following
conditions:
a.
with 50% and above
live coralline cover;
b.
spawning
and
nursery grounds for fish;
c.
which act as natural
breakwater of coastlines.

In this connection, Section 5 of PD 1586

expressly states:
Environmentally Non-Critical Projects.
All other projects, undertakings and
areas not declared by the President as
environmentally
critical
shall
be
considered as non-critical and shall not be
required to submit an environmental
impact
statement.
The National
Environmental Protection Council, thru the
Ministry of Human Settlements may
however require non-critical projects and
undertakings
to
provide
additional
environmental safeguards as it may deem
necessary.

The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does

not come close to any of the projects or areas
enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to
any of them. It is clear, therefore, that the said
project is not classified as environmentally
critical, or within an environmentally critical
area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice
but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It
becomes its ministerial duty, the performance
of which can be compelled by writ of
mandamus, such as that issued by the trial
court in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
33, in Civil Case No. 28,133-2000, granting the
writ of mandamus and directing the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to issue in favor of the City of
Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related
laws, in connection with the construction of the
Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2869 March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIO vs. INSULAR GOVERNMENT
008 Phil 150
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2869. March 25, 1907.]
MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE
INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers, for appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.
REALTY; PUBLIC LANDS; TITLE.
Under the express provisions of the law, a piece of
land being of common origin presumptively
belonged to the State during its former sovereignty,
and in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of
such land by private persons it was necessary that
the same passed from the possession of the State by
title of egression, title under agreement or
composicion or title by way of possessory
proceedings equivalent during a certain period to
that of adjustment (composicion).
2.
ID.; ID.; POSSESSORY INFORMATION;
TITLE. The title under possessory proceedings,
the only title presented herein, is not a proprietary
title authorized in substitution for that of agreement
or adjustment by royal decree of February 13, 1894,
this being that last law or decree of the former
sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter
of common lands: First, for the reason that the land
referred to is not covered nor does it come within
any of the conditions required in article 19; second,
because the possessory proceedings authorized in
said royal decree for the purpose of acquiring
proprietary title, equivalent to that of agreement or
adjustment, can only be brought or instituted within
a period of one year, in accordance with article 21,
and the possessory information or proceedings
presented in this case was instituted on March 7,
1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same
month and year.
3.
ID.; ID.; REVERSION. After the
expiration of the period of one year allowed by such
royal decree, the right of the cultivators and persons
in possession to obtain a free title thereto becomes
canceled and lapses, and the land and the full
possession thereof reverts to the State or to the
community, as the case may be.
4.
ID.; ID.; POSSESSION; TITLE. The
possessors not included or mentioned in the said
provisions of the royal decree can only acquire, by
time, the ownership and title to public alienable
lands in accordance with common law.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSORY
INFORMATION. In accordance with common
law, the possession as attested to and shown in a
possessory information could not go further to show
right of ownership or title until after the expiration

of twenty years from the time of verification or

registry of the same in the Registry of Properties, as
prescribed in article 393 of the Mortgage Law and
upon other conditions required by this law.
6.
ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION. Section 6 of
Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission admits
prescription, in accordance with the terms and
conditions prescribed in Act No. 190, covering the
title for the obtaining of the right of ownership of
lands not exceeding an extension of 16 hectares, but
not when the land in question consists of an
extension of 40 hectares, as is the case with the
petition presented herein, or of an extension of 28
hectares as referred to in the possessory information
proceeding upon which such petition has been
based.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J p:
Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of
February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration praying that there be granted to
him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the
town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with
a house erected thereon and constructed of wood
and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On
the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20
decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H. Phelps
Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running
991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of
Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil
Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters
and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on
the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20
decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and
Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition,
No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente
Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together
for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small
portion of land included in the parcel set out in the
former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of
these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of
land is public property of the Government and that
the same was never acquired in any manner or
through any title of egresion from the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral
proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its
judgment in these terms:
"Therefore the court finds that Cario and his
predecessors have not possessed exclusively and
adversely any part of the said property prior to the
date on which Cario constructed the house now
there that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898,
and Cario held possession for some years
afterwards of but a part of the property to which he
claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and the
property in question is adjudged to be public land.
(Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite

terms in the decision of the court below are the
following:
"From the testimony given by Cario as well as
from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year
1884 Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a
house on the property situated to the north of that
property now in question, property which,
according to the plan attached to expediente No.
561, appears to be property belonging to Donaldson
Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said
house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the
same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on
the adjoining property, which appears on the plan
aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps
Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the
grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and
Minse, had lived . . .
"In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the
property of Whitmarsh and located on the property
described in the plan attached to expediente No.
561, having constructed a house thereon in which
he now lives, and which house is situated in the
center of the property, as is indicated on the plan;
and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied
some portion of the property now claimed by him."
(Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1.
Therefore it is evident that this court can not
decree the registration of all of the superficial
extension of the land described in the petition and
as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension
containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares,
inasmuch as the documentary evidence
accompanying the petition is conclusive proof
against the petitioners; this documentary proof
consists of a possessory information under date of
March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the
same month and year; and, according to such
possessory information, the land therein described
contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by
"the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road
appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the
land, as might be said, in half, or running through
its center from north to south, a considerable
extension of land remaining on the other side of the
said road, the west side, and which could not have
been included in the possessory information
mentioned.
2.
As has been shown during the trial of this
case, this land, of which mention is made in said
possessory information, and upon which is situated
the house now actually occupied by the petitioner,
all of which is set forth as argument as to the
possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and
sowing," and belongs to the class called public
lands.
3.
Under the express provisions of law, a parcel
of land, being of common origin, presumptively
belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in
order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such
land by private persons, it was necessary that the

possession of the same pass from the State. And

there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of
this land from the domain of the Spanish
Government, nor is there any possessory
information equivalent to title by composicion or
under agreement.
4.
The possessory information filed herein is
not the title to property authorized in substitution
for that of adjustment by the royal decree of
February 13, 1894, this being the last law or legal
disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to
the present subject-matter of common lands: First,
for the reason that the land referred to herein is not
covered nor does it come within any one of the
three conditions required by article 19 of the said
royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an
uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of
six years last past; or that the same has been
possessed without interruption during a period of
twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation
up to the date of the information and during the
three years immediately preceding such
information; or that such land had been possessed
openly without interruption during a period of thirty
or more years, notwithstanding the land had not
been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the
testimony given by the two witnesses to the
possessory information for the following reason:
Second, because the possessory information
authorized by said royal decree or last legal
disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or
for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right,
equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish
Government and required and necessary at all times
until the publication of said royal decree was
limited in time to one year, in accordance with
article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one
year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the
possessory informations which are referred to in
articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period
of the right of the cultivators and persons in
possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses
and the land together with full possession reverts to
the state, or, as the case may be, to the community,
and the said possessors and cultivators or their
assigns would simply have rights under universal or
general title of average in the event that the land is
sold within a period of five years immediately
following the cancellation. The possessors not
included under this chapter can only acquire by time
the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal
lands in accordance with common law."
5.
In accordance with the preceding provisions,
the right that remained to Cario, if it be certain that
he was the true possessor of the land in question,
was the right of average in case the Government or
State could have sold the same within the period of
five years immediately following for example, if the
denouncement of purchase had been carried out by
Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from
the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this
right, in such event, his possession as attested in the

possessory information herein could not, in

accordance with common law, go to show any right
of ownership until after the expiration of twenty
years from the expiration of twenty years from the
verification and registry of the same in conformity
with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage
Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.
6.
The right of possession in accordance with
common law that is to say, civil law remains
at all times subordinate to the Spanish
administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of
force when pertaining to royal transferable or
alienable lands, which condition and the
determination thereof is reversed to the government,
which classified and designated the royal alienable
lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from
those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands
which could at no time pass to private ownership
nor be acquired through time even after the said
royal decree of February 13, 1894.
7.
The advent of the new sovereignty
necessarily brought a new method of dealing with
lands and particularly as to the classification and
manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or
common lands then appropriated, which were
thenceforth merely called public lands, the
alienation of which was reserved to the
Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13
of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 1 and in
conformity with other laws enacted under this act of
Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing
rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act
No. 648, 2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in
connection with Act No. 627, 3 which appears to be
the law upon which the petition herein is founded.
8.
Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits
prescription, in accordance with the provisions
contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining
the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title
under the period of prescription of ten years
established by that act, as well as by reason of his
occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial."
(Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription
for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to
lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in
extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by
Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into
consideration his petition, or an extension of 28
hectares, according to the possessory information,
the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it
follows that the judgment denying the petition
herein and now appealed from was strictly in
accordance with the law invoked herein.
9.
And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in
the possessory information, one part of same,
according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to
Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not
determined. From all of which it follows that the
precise extent has not been determined in the trial of
this case on which judgment might be based in the
event that the judgment and title be declared in
favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we

should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the

intention of Congress in granting ownership and
title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his
children have already exceeded such amount in
various acquirements of lands, all of which is
shown in different cases decided by the said Court
of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that
could only have been made efficacious as to the
conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new
laws.
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen
that the court below did not err:
"1.
In finding that Mateo Cario and those from
whom he claims his right had not possessed and
claimed as owners the lands in question since time
immemorial;
"2.
In finding that the land in question did not
belong to the petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it
was the property of the Government." (Allegation
21.)

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed

with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
After the expiration of twenty days from the
notification of this decision let judgment be entered
in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let
the case be remanded to the court from whence it
came for proper action. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.

I Pub. Laws, 1056.

II Pub. Laws, 311.
II Pub. Laws, 288.