SPEC PRO FULL TEXT CASES 1

Contents
WRITTEN REPORTS..................................................................................................... 2
SALUDO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTL INC.............................................................2
AVELINO v. COURT OF APPEALS..........................................................................13
AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS...........................................................................16
GR 127990 CANNOT BE FOUND.........................................................................28
ALABAN v. COURT OF APPEALS..........................................................................28
IN RE ESTATE OF HIX; FLUEMER v. HIX...............................................................34
RULE 73................................................................................................................. 36
FULE v CA........................................................................................................... 36
ROBERTS v. LEONIDAS........................................................................................ 44
US v CLAVERIA................................................................................................... 47
PHIL. SAVINGS BANK v. LANTIN..........................................................................50
INTESTATE ESTATE OF GARCIA. UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA.................................58
SAMPILO and SALACUP v. COURT OF APPEALS and SINOPERA...........................61
ONGSINGCO v. TAN............................................................................................ 66
CAYETANO v. LEONIDAS...................................................................................... 69
RP v. COURT OF APPEALS and BOBILES..............................................................74
JAO v. COURT OF APPEALS and JAO....................................................................79
JIMENEZ v. IAC.................................................................................................... 84
RULE 72................................................................................................................. 87
HEIRS OF GABATAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and PACANA....................................87
MONTAER v. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT................................................................97
HILADO v. COURT OF APPEALS.........................................................................103

WRITTEN REPORTS
SALUDO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTL INC
FIRST DIVISION

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., G.R. No. 159507

Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
AMERICAN EXPRESS CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
and/or IAN T. FISH and Promulgated:
DOMINIC MASCRINAS,
Respondents. April 19, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr.
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set
aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R3172, and enjoined the presiding judge [2] thereof from conducting further
proceedings in said case, except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground
of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate
courts Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express
International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country
Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) is a Filipino
citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident
of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines. On the other hand, defendant
(herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) is a corporation doing business in the Philippines
and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with
office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati
City. The other defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of
respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other court processes at
their office address.

The complaints cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of
petitioner Saludos AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his
daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludos daughter used her
supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in
April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal
credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there
with other delegates from the Philippinesto attend the Congressional Recognition in
honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted
from respondents unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludos account for his
failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo
denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was
allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit
card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings,
mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and
professional standing as a result of respondents acts which were committed in gross
and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus
prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the
complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action
and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the complaint should
be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the
parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents
of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner
Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his
community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaints
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued atPasay City. To
buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludos complaint
was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city.Respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for PreTrial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue)
to which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative
Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency
in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the
congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He
urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of
Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution
including that of being a resident of his district.He was also a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever
since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued
at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger

obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not
determinative of ones residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative
defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. The court a
quo likewise denied respondents affirmative defense that venue was improperly
laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and
still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with
residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all
doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the
province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal,
actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never
be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated
by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, residence, for
purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined
as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the
sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A
man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he
may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence.
(Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])[3]

Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the
same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a
petition forcertiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and
January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents posting of a bond, the appellate court
issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the
presiding judge of the court a quo from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case
No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting
respondents petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It
directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10,
2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further
proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against
respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on
venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be
commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court,
because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it
declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court
pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.[4]
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of
Appeals[5] where the Court distinguished the terms residence and domicile in this
wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the
term residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws
that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person
while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory
must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless
persons.
xxxx
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate
a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A
man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time,

but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is
his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. [6] (Italicized for
emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte,
the appellate court referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his
complaints verification and certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued
at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as
indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents Fish and
Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160, [7] the community tax certificate shall be
paid in the place of residence of the individual, or in the place where the principal
office of the juridical entity is located.[8] It also pointed out that petitioner Saludos
law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The
foregoing circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial
admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer
required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent
congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of
the fact of petitioner Saludos residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced
that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual
resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was
actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a
quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that
under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any
place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left
to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by
the Rules of Court.[9] Further, fundamental in the law governing venue of actions
that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to
attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into
consideration the maximum accessibility to them i.e., to both plaintiff and
defendant, not only to one or the other of the courts of justice. [10]
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to
respondents affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion
that petitioner Saludos motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only
to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield influence in the
outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in the
said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a specie of forum
shopping akin to that inInvestors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle [11] where the Court
mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in Pagadian City was a
specie of forum shopping considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person
in the locality.

The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate
court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as
they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one
acting in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further
proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier
issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting
this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this
decision, of a bond in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer
for all damages that private respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of
the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are
not entitled thereto.Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the
Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate
court, in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review with the Court
alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned
Decision and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not
in accord with law or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
(a)
the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact
that herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern
Leyte and as such, he is a residence (sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of
improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;
(c)
the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions
of this Honorable Court; and
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules
on venue, and even speculated that herein petitioners motive in filing the complaint
in Maasin City was only to vex the respondents.[13]

In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Courts resolution is whether the appellate
court committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the
court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including
petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time
of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner Saludos complaint for damages against respondents before the court a
quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff
but not to plaintiffs caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
[14]
The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of
every action and proceeding. [15] The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable
by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the
place where plaintiff resides.If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.
[16]

Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint
with the court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his
complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of
Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the
rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents theory, made the finding that
petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his
complaint.It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludos
community tax certificate, indicated in his complaints verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City
was also taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludos claim of
residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was
not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and
consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento,[17] the Court had the occasion to explain at
length the meaning of the term resides for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term resides as employed in the
rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant,
as distinguished from domicile which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning.
It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court)
that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to
attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into
consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is,
likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal
contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of
Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person
while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory
must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless
persons.
This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954,
reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, that
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate
a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A
man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no

length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. (Italicized

for emphasis)
We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules
of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words resides or may be found, and
not is domiciled, thus:
Sec. 2(b) Personal actions All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff
or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. (Italicized for
emphasis)
Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that
private respondent Colomas protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
based on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife
from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against
petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of
paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at
the time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of
Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions. (Koh v. Court of
Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word resides as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the
Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Pao, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on
November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term resides mean? Does it
refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his
death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term resides connotes ex vi
termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term
resides, like the terms residing and residence is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode.It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residencesimply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.[18]

There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the

representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it states
that it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin
City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house.[19]
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was
deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said
[20]
including that he was then a resident of the district which
representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election
term residence is synonymous with domicile, thus:

correctly
position,
he was
law, the

x x x [T]he Court held that domicile and residence are synonymous. The term
residence, as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x [21]
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of residence for purposes of election law
is more stringent in that it is equated with the term domicile. Hence, for the said
purpose, the term residence imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.[22] When parsed, therefore, the term residence requires two elements: (1)
intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court
elucidated, the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. [23]
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of residence
is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it ones domicile.[24]
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of
Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in
relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence
therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner,
Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the
term is understood in its popular sense. This is because residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals[25] is misplaced. Contrary
to its holding,[26] the facts of the present case are not similar to the facts
therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San

Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias,
Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that
he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not
established that he was actually a resident therein at the time of the filing of his
complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because
although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of
personal presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as
the terms are taken as synonyms, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.[27]
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern
Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any
evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said
position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the
term residence for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the
intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his bodily
presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to
be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries
and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by
living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the
place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established
in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is
also established in some other place.

Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his
domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of
Baguio, and another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he
would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[]s legal
residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or
habitation or place of abode if he stays there with intention to stay there
permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of
exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he
also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in
these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and
recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without
also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when
such residence is required by law.[28]
The fact then that petitioner Saludos community tax certificate was issued at Pasay
City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a
resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern
Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.[29]

That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by
the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner
Saludos residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be
taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because
courts are allowed to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. [30] Courts are likewise bound to take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines,
[31]
including its Constitution.
The concept of facts of common knowledge in the context of judicial notice has
been explained as those facts that are so commonly known in the community as to
make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it
indisputable among reasonable men.[32] Moreover, though usually facts of common
knowledge will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis
for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court
sits.[33] Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative
of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the
court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community
where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludos residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly
taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the
Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the
House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be
elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludos act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be
characterized as a specie of forum-shopping or capricious on his part because,
under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.
Finally, respondents claim that the instant petition for review was not properly
verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on information
and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludos verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he
has read the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and
correct of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at
hand. The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above
requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September
10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

AVELINO v. COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000]
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA
AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO,
PATRICK
MICHAEL
AVELINO
and
MARK
ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents. Sdaa miso
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated
April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed
Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters
of administration to an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late
Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony
all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an
American, is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents are
siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino,
Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the
administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a
motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition
which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which
reads:
"Acting on the Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition,
considering that the petitioner is the only heir not amenable to a simple partition,
and all the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious
settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of
deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete
inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the deceased. Set the
hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Notify all the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
in an Order dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting
private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her petition was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574. Sdaad

On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed
decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly
dismissed."[2]
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on
April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION
OF THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE. [3]
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here
is whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely
abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case
as no determination has yet been made of the character and extent of the
decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA
197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of other properties of the
decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the
proper mode of resolving the same. [4] In addition, petitioner contends that the
estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and
attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of
a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial
partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and
should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or
the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the
bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the
order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. [5]The exceptions to this rule are found in
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74[6] which provide:
"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves
as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition.. Scs daad
"SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.- Whenever the gross value
of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not
exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial

Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and
upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may
direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or
administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any
there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts
of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own
right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees
legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive
and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of
the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course
thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or
award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office."
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at
the moment of the latter's death.[7] Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows
heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of
being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs,
are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. [8]
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no
debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age." [9] With this finding, it is our view
that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that
there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet
to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be
done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the
lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration
into an action for judicial partition. Sup rema
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting
an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the
Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs
disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible,
then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have
held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs,
then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings.[10] The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's
action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of

the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of

Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals is CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Juris

AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS

THIRD DIVISION
FELIX AZUELA, G.R. No. 122880
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS,
GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO Promulgated:
substituted by ERNESTO G.
CASTILLO, April 12, 2006
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by
Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In
refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is
provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution
of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on
which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation
clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And
perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an

acknowledgment, but a merejurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these

defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects
is just aching for judicial rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a
comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full
and faithful compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code
leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will.
Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that
they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A
notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to
nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to
admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10
June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in
full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila,
pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay
nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento,
at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sangayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Exec
utor) nghabiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala
sa
akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pama
ngkin na
si
Felix
Azuela,
na siyang nag-alaga sa
akin
sa mahabang panahon, yaong mgabahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24
at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng ka
rapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahankong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pagaari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapat
an sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc,
Manila kay Felix
Azuela
at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubalit at kondiciones;
PangatloNa ninunumbrahan ko si
VART
PAGUE
na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kaila
nman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.

Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito,
na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito,
na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia
E.
Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981,
ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at
sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon,
sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin,
atkami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at
sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin,
sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at
sa kaliwang panig ng lahat atbawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite
on Feb. 7, 1981
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.

Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10,

1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.

(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-8[1]
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the
decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to
have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters
testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who
represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of the
decedent.[2]Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true
purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court
cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and
usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the
properties of the decedent. [3] It also asserted that contrary to the representations of
petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her
grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was subsequently
alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965, [4] and
the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother
by three (3) months.[5]
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested
to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear
on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These
twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August
1992.[6] The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3)
witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC
also called to fore the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes;[7] and from this perspective, rebutted oppositors
arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in accordance
with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the
subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in
respectto the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the
interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is
persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by
the testatrix in accordance with law.

On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of
the will after the signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under
the sub-title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi:
Ang kasulatang ito,
na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito,
na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia
N.
Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang HulingHabilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981,
ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at
sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon,
saharap ng lahat at bawat sa amin,
at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at
sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin,
sa ilalim ngnasabing kasulatan at
sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with
the requirements of the law.
On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the
subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the
signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the
will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom
thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the
will.
With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively
in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state
the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only
two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions,
and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and
acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to
invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her
signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion
of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a
forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing
enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due
execution of the will.[8]
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had
substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision
dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of the petition for probate. [9] The Court of Appeals noted that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus
rendering the will void and undeserving of probate. [10]

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the
number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely
directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as the
substantial compliance rule.[11]
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil
Code, which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of
the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be

interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of
the will itself reveals several more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of
pages of the will.[12] There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite,
a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the
attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left
uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the
process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca[13] and In re: Will of Andrada.[14] InUy Coque, the
Court noted that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will. [15]In ruling that

the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following
consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: The purpose of requiring
the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the
document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would
completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the
absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might
be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top
of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of
sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will
involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator
and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty. [16]
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which
failed to state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was
sufficient for the Court to declare unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed
out in the attesting clause is fatal.[17] It was further observed that it cannot be
denied that the x x x requirement affords additional security against the danger that
the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this
requirement, it must be considered material. [18]
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino[19] and Taboada v.
Hon. Rosal,[20] wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein
despite the fact that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the
will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and
made the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we
adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit D), will readily show that the
attestation does not state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in Manuel Singson
versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon.
Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195, to the effect that a will may still be valid even if
the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is
written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the
aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of Manuel Singson
versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra, although the attestation in the subject Will
did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in
the last part of the body of the Will:
xxx

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages
or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be
mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or

omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the
property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque
vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata,
54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these
cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the
number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is
omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be
supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will
itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state
the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part
of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages,
which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of
construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more
liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being
defeated by purely technical considerations. (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring
supplied)
In Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al. supra, the
acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages used in the:

notarial

xxx

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed
to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal
defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the
entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at
the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other
page which is marked as Pagina dos comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that this Last Will and
Testament consists of two pages including this page (pages 200-201, supra)
(Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated
in any part of the Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment
wherein the number of pages of the will should be stated. [21]
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code
in 1950, at a time when the statutory provision governing the formalrequirement of
wills was Section

618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.[22] Reliance on these cases remains apropos,
considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of
the will is extant from Section 618. [23] However, the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least
insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy
that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: In the absence
of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805.
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which
stated that the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on
the [law] on [wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of
their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in
[expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern tendency]
in respect to the formalities in the execution of wills. [24] However, petitioner
conveniently omits the qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very
same paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization be but with
sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the
exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. [25]
Caneda v. Court of Appeals[26] features an extensive discussion made by
Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of
interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution of the attestation
clause in wills.[27] Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other
cases, as examples of the application of the rule of strict construction. [28] However,
the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the
substantial compliance rule under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by
an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered;
whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself
can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause
can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the probate proceedings.[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed
decision, considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the
attestation clause is one of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded.
In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation
clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to
the will in the presence of the testator and of each other, [30] the other omission cited
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.

Caneda suggested: [I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that
omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the
need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would
not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those
omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. [31] Thus, a
failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be
liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a
failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one anothers
presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual
guarantee of compliance.[32]
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will
was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in
requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and
to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. [33] The failure to state the number
of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental
witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial
compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it
is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case,
there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under
Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the
will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the
formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of
the members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains
that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as
enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these
remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills.
[34]
Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in impression, affords
the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided
to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will. [35] The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments
of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable
desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an
examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that
should necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the lefthand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause
which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.

Cagro v. Cagro[36] is material on this point. As in this case, the signatures of the
three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin.[37] While three (3) Justices[38] considered the signature requirement had been
substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief
Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering
the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The
attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily
bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an
act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the
left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are
in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand
margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at
the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to
a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of
the witnesses.[39]
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the
will, from the requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by [the instrumental
witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct
from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify,
among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms
part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish
that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation
clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the
disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will.
Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate
these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on
the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed
the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing
such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses signatures
on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause
which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article
805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that

the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these
elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the
instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition
should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses has also not
been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact
that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806
in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article
805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista,
wrote Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10
(sic),
1981 dito sa Lungsodng Maynila.[40] By no manner of contemplation can those words
be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to
be his act or deed.[41] It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor
actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the
notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not
hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the
notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by
the executor.[42] Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document
was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary
public averred that he himself signed and notarized the document. Possibly though,
the word ninotario or notarized encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the
executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will
would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that
the will be acknowledged, and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does
not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed.
The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal
safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the
testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. [43] The
acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare
before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as
their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury,
thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the
execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the
testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain

mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had

designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is
under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by
the will in question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are nolonger
material to the disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and
the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin,
except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the
witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature
appearing at the so-called logical end [44] of the will on its first page. Also, the will
itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered
with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that
these two requirements be construed as mandatory. [45] Taken in isolation, these
omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even
as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not
be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for
the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes
the probate denial inexorable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

GR 127990 CANNOT BE FOUND

ALABAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DIVISION
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, G.R. No. 156021
FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE

P. COLLADO, JUDITH Present:

PROVIDO, CLARITA PROVIDO,
ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PUNO, J.,
PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA Chairman,
E. PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO CALLEJO, SR.,
ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH TINGA, and
BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO
MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and
MATHILDE MARIN, Promulgated:
Petitioners,
September 23, 2005
- versus COURT OF APPEALS and
FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 69221,[2] dismissing petitioners petition for annulment of judgment.
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition,
docketed as SP Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of theLast Will and Testament[3] of
the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent), who died on 26 October 2000 in
Janiuay, Iloilo.[4] Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in
P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision,[5] allowing the probate of
the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.[6]
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a
motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. [7] Likewise, they filed an
opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of
letters testamentary to respondent, [8] claiming that they are the intestate heirs of
the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and
lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have
been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will
was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below
the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute
and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper
pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of
her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having
included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed
that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of
the decedent disposed of under intestate succession. [9]
On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order[10] denying petitioners motion for
being unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners
were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the
payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It
merely
required
respondent
to
pay
the
deficiency. [11] Moreover,
the
RTCs Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners filing of the
motion to reopen.[12]
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition [13] with an application for preliminary injunction
with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decisiondated 30 May 2001
and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed that after the death of the
decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several conferences to
discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing
to a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise
agreement to implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the
agreement, respondent refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that
respondent feigned interest in participating in the compromise agreement so that
they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of the will. [14] They
claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result
of which they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their
opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the

RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. [15]
In its Resolution[16] promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition.
It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of their own. [17] Moreover, the CA declared as
baseless petitioners claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic
fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion
for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added.
[18]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by
the CA for lack of merit.[19]
Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the
alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through no
fault of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court
during the proceedings before the RTC. [20] In addition, they assert that this Court has
yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, the
instant petition should be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar. [21]
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the
remedies provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion
for new trial.[22] Moreover, they could have resorted to a petition for relief from
judgment since they learned of the RTCs judgment only three and a half months
after its promulgation.[23] Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud
exists to warrant the annulment of the RTCs Decision, since there was no showing
that they were denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to the
probate proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs.
[24]
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of
notice to them is not a fatal defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a matter
of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. [25] Finally, respondent
charges petitioners of forumshopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving
the same issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that is SP No. 1181 [26] filed before Branch
23, RTC of General Santos City and subsequently pending on appeal before the CA
in CA-G.R. No.74924.[27]
It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores (Flores), who is a
niece of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of
General Santos City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue,
survived by five groups of collateral heirs. Flores, armed with a Special Power of
Attorney from most of the other petitioners, prayed for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has
jurisdiction since the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent is the place where the decedent died. This is also in accordance with the
rule that the first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the
exclusion of other courts, the RTC added. [28] On 9 January 2002, Flores filed a Notice
of Appeal [29] and on 28 January 2002, the case was ordered forwarded to the CA. [30]

Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the
decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed
of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and
other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that
respondents offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate
of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTCs
judgment.[31]
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new
trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same

Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive
award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or
that the decision or final order is contrary to law. [32] Both motions should be filed
within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted
to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter
taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to
set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry
thereof.[33]
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are
remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed

judgment is rendered.[34] In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a
party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition
for relief from judgment.[35]
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have
not become parties to the probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. [36] Notice of
the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, [37] as well as furnished
to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
[38]
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is onein rem,
such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction
extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the
decedent.[39]
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.[40] Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for
probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the
publication of the notice of hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion
for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting
of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of
time, long after theDecision became final and executory.
Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final,
they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their
motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4
October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained
finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available
to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment;
otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence. [41]

Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment
must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate
court ruled.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case

where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. [42] The purpose of such
action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a
renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner, [43] and is based on only two
grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. [44] A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential
that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud
and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby. [45]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character.[46] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents
a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is
that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court.[47]
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of
respondents deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and
residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will,
they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in
court. In addition, they claim that respondents offer of a false compromise even
before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the
petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. [48] A perusal of the will shows that respondent
was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces
of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs [49] who are entitled to be
notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify
them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal
notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite.[50]
The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to
personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from
participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forumshopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or
related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially same reliefs, [51] on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
[52]
Obviously, the parties in the instant case, as well as in the appealed case before
the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the existence and validity of the alleged
will of the decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy.
In the probate proceedings, petitioners position has always been that the decedent
left no will and if she did, the will does not comply with the requisites of a valid will.
Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their present petition. Of course, respondent
maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the petition for letters of
administration, petitioner Flores prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the

estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal which is the
subject of review in CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly, therefore, there is forum-shopping.
Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their
certification against forum- shopping. Neither have they done so at any time
thereafter. The Court notes that even in the petition for annulment of judgment,
petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their appeal in CA-G.R. No.
74924, even though the notice of appeal was filed way before the petition for
annulment of judgment was instituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

IN RE ESTATE OF HIX; FLUEMER v. HIX

G.R. No. L-32636

March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Harvey & O' Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a
decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document
alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized
to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have
been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the
allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be
permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West
Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and
that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p.
1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far
from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove

themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to
take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
[1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no
was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the
law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the
sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on
this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was
nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence
of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to
require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by
some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in
West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will
and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings
orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by
attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant
presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence
the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a
paper writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the
clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven
by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses
thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document
that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West
Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of
the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted
that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on
February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been
initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make
the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary
administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with
Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to
have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no
showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine
Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been
awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the

State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged

divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant.
Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur

RULE 73

FULE v CA
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court
of
First
Instance
of
Laguna,
Branch
Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA
GARCIA
FULE,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the
appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26,
1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time,
she
moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even
date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973,

contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was
issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of
administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has
been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be
preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a
debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that
she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and
as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa
B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for
reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through
erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule
has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable
as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration
filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was
published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in theBayanihan, a weekly publication of
general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the
Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental
petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during
the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional
Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at
Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina
Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio,
who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule
be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental
petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it
attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the
court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was
deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction,
venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and
disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for
authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of
third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion,

calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties
making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by
Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to
reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by
the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in
interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia
G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G.
Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G.
Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to
enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands
of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia;
another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and
against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction,
and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of
Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the
motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix
are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to
the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the
properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the
special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20,
1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and
personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia
all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to
Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar
ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2,
1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia
G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to
allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of
the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her

objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix

of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify
or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order
limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory.
Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the
petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B.
Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix,
and the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables
her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or
failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of
Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and
removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of
checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa
B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge
Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of
the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and
final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount
due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule
two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing
Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the
name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to
Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia
showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part,
Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973
showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City.
Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna
at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special
action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings
before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or,

in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated
March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their
motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among
others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the
delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to
the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the
proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule
forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed
as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of
Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for
letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of
Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted
the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond
of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of
the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on
January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before
the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become
final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before
his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case
pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed
on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question
Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special
appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of
Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been
appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and
that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued
an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there
hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No.
Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules
of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence
of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary
facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence,
and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of
the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be
appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the
country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of
the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is
conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is
another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and
was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not
altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the
power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if
the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that

the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to
sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to
the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the
country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where
each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in
settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does
not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court
properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it
refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original
petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for
failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For
her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G.

Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in

Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B.
Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G.
Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that
Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by
Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence
certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the
administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8,
1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna
to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was
at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for
Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is
that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion
to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had
reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or
venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse,
while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special
administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to
the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator
was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is
now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by
any
cause e.g.,
parties
cannot
agree
among

themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not

lies in the probate court. 15That, however, is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to
rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity,
justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her
share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not
more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than
the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of
the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that
Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a
mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this
point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of
special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator
is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in
the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the
court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a
Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973
in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B.
Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the
Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1,
1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced
with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of
special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the
Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and

instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting
the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering
the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of
P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R.
No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Muoz Palma, J., took no part.

ROBERTS v. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL
GRIMM
ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila;
MAXINE
TATE-GRIMM,
EDWARD
MILLER
GRIMM
II
and
LINDA
GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a
partition, approved in anintestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of
First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah
district court).
Antecedents. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the
Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife,
Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and
Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his
two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp.
36-47, Rollo).

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will
disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself
and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of
the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate
situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the
testator said: t.hqw
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm
Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I
have provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine
property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E.
LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court
of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs.
Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the
probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by
Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third
Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil It was issued
upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the
attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar
Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm
Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete,
as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley
Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed
by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and
Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita
Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine
estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the
estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus
the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the
computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the estate was
liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share
equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should
each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital
share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the
parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).

Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that fortythree days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first
marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg,
filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No.
113024for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the
pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved
that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of
Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the
record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a
new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate
case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine,
Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done
pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored
the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of
the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl
Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed
with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling
Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts,
and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for
P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135,
Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by
lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge
Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8)
of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or
12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with
Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the
project of partition. The court considered the motion moot considering that it had
already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no
longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl
Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex
Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to
him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal
Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that Maxine paid

P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection to

the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the
certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no
movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris,
through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties
can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del
Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed
again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her
two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had previously
appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion
to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's
will. As already noted, the firm was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On September 8,
1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda,
filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's
two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the
intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine
be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for
the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35,
Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement
was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and
that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit
in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or.
alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and
that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior
to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
Ruling. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and
"no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed"
(Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil.
249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the
estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding

and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss
and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in
the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers
in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Escolin, J., concur in the result.
Concepcion, Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.

US v CLAVERIA
G.R. No. L-9282

February 13, 1915

THE
UNITED
vs.
AGUSTIN CLAVERIA, defendant-appellee.

STATES, plaintiff-appellant,

Attorney-General
Jose Escaler for appellee.

for

Villamor

appellant.

CARSON, J.:
The information filed in this case was dismissed in the court below on the ground of
a former judgment of conviction of the offense charged therein. The record is before
us upon the Attorney-General's appeal from the judgment dismissing the
information. The following extract from the brief of the Attorney-General sets forth
the ground upon which he bases his right of appeal, and the substance of his
argument in support of his contentions that the judgment entered in the lower court
should be reversed and the record remanded for further proceedings:
A demurrer was interposed to the complaint by counsel for the defendant on the
ground that the latter had already been tried and convicted in another case for the
same crime with which he is charged herein, and consequently that he has been
once in jeopardy.
In reply to the demurrer interposed by counsel for the defendant, the AttorneyGeneral prayed the court to overrule the said demurrer on the ground that the
allegation of once in jeopardy does not constitute one of the reasons for demurrer
according to General Orders No. 58.

In view of the demurrer interposed by counsel for the defendant and the arguments
presented by him in support thereof, the court sustained said demurrer on the
ground alleged by the defense and dismissed the information.
From the order of the court sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information
the provincial fiscal filed an appeal, by virtue whereof this case has been brought up
before this court for review.
It is an elementary fact in criminal procedure that a demurrer hypothetically admits
the fact alleged in the complaint, and on these facts, and only on them, bases the
question of law as to whether or not the defendant can be compelled by the court to
answer the complaint. (U. S. vs. Perez, 1 Phil. Rep., 203.) For this reason section 21
of General Orders No. 58 does not include as one of the grounds or reasons for
demurrer the fact that the defendant has been once in jeopardy that is, that he
has been tried or has been in danger of being convicted for the same crime but
section 24 thereof [includes it] as a defense that must be set up in the answer,
since it requires evidence tending to show that the crime for which the defendant
had previously been tried, convicted, or acquitted was identical with the crime for
which it is proposed to try him again, evidence that can not be adduced in the
hearing on the demurrer, which only raises a purely legal question.
In the case of the United States vs. Garcia Gavieres (10 Phil. Rep., 694), the
Supreme Court has declared that "in pleading a former jeopardy it is not sufficient
that the defendant simply allege that he has been once in jeopardy; he must both
allege and prove specifically that the offense, of which he was formerly convicted,
or acquitted, is the same offense for which it is proposed to try him again.
An examination of the record, however, clearly discloses, as we think, that no
demurrer was filed in the court below, and that the judgment entered by the trial
court was based upon an oral plea of a former conviction of the offense charged in
the information in the present case, supported by competent evidence.
It sufficiently appears from the relation of facts set forth in the opinion of the trial
judge that, after arraignment, an oral plea of "autrefois convict" was submitted in
open court, and that the judgment dismissing the complaint was based upon that
plea, supported by the record of the former trial which was had in the same court
two days prior to the trial of the present case. Counsel were permitted to file written
arguments in support of their respective contentions, and in these arguments the
plea is referred to and discussed as an "excepcion dilatoria" (demurrer); but the
mistaken designation or description of the proceedings had in the court below by
counsel in their briefs is by no means conclusive as to the real nature of those
proceedings, and, as we have said, the account of the incident set forth in the
opinion of the trial judge leaves no room for doubt that his judgment was entered,
not upon a demurrer to the information, but upon an oral plea of "autrefois convict"
submitted in open court on behalf of the accused after his arraignment and after the
case had been called for trial.
Sections 24 and 25 of Generals Orders No. 58 are as follows:

SEC. 24. Should the demurrer be disallowed, the court must require the defendant
to plead. If he refuses, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
There are four kinds of pleas to an information or complaint: (1) Guilty; (2) not
guilty; (3) a former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged,
which may be pleaded either with or without the plea of not guilty; (4) once in
jeopardy, which may be pleaded with or without the plea of not guilty.
The plea must be oral, and a minute thereof in writing filed with the papers in the
case.
SEC. 25. A plea of guilty can be put in only by the defendant himself in open court.
The court may at any time before judgment upon a plea of guilty permit it to be
withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.
It will be seen that in the case at bar the accused was wholly within his rights in
entering an oral plea of a former judgment of conviction of the offense charged,
without at the same time pleading either guilty or not guilty; and we are of opinion
that upon the entry of that plea the court properly proceeded to try the issues
raised thereby, without entering upon the trial of the accused, upon the merits, for
the offense with which he was charged in the case then pending.
In general the best evidence in support of such a plea where the identity of the
accused is not challenged, consists of the record of the former case, showing the
judgment of conviction entered therein and the nature of the offense of which the
accused was convicted; though, of course, cases may and do arise wherein it is
found necessary to offer other and additional evidence in support of the plea. As a
rule, however, where the identity of the accused is not challenged, the issues raised
by a plea of "autrefois convict" are sufficiently developed for its proper disposition
by the production of the record in the former case.
It is, of course incumbent upon the accused to produce that record or a duly
certified copy thereof, or secondary evidence as to its contents in the event that the
original has been lost or destroyed; and the Attorney-General insists that the
judgment entered in the court below is fatally defective because, as he contends,
the record does not disclose that any competent evidence was submitted in the
court below in support of the plea of the accused. The Attorney- General, treating
the plea actually entered as in truth and effect no more than a demurrer to the
information, assumes that the record in the former case was not submitted at the
trial and contends that the trial judge was without authority to look to it for the facts
upon which he based his judgment. The contention would seem to be that the trial
judge improperly took judicial notice of the contents of the record of the former
case, and assumed the right so to do on the ground that the former trial had been
had before him and that the record was filed in the clerk's office of the court in
which the case before him was pending.
The record is highly unsatisfactory in its relation of the incidents as they actually
occurred in the course of the proceedings had in the court below, and as a result
there is some apparent ground for the contentions of the Attorney- General. But we

think it sufficiently appears, from the opinion of the trial judge and the briefs filed in
the court below, that at the time when the plea was submitted in the record of the
former case had been physically withdrawn from the files of the clerk's office, and
submitted in the pending case, or if not that it was treated as though it were
actually before the court, and that the trial judge and counsel for both parties dealt
with it as an exhibit submitted without objection in support of the plea.
We agree with the Attorney-General, that in general, courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them of the contents
of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending
in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge. But in the absence of objection,
and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any
party of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a
case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference
is made to it for that purpose, by name and number on in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or
any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the
request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of
the case then pending.
In the case at bar we think the record sufficiently discloses that the record of the
former case was before the court at the time when the plea was submitted, either
by reference or by its actual production in open court; and it is very clear that
without objection, and indeed with the tacit if not express consent of counsel, the
trial judge so regarded it. No question was raised as to the identity of the accused,
and the record of the former case was not only the best evidence but all the
evidence which, from the nature of the case, could properly have been submitted or
considered by the trial judge in ruling on the plea. We conclude that there was no
such error in procedure as is relied upon by the Attorney-General as a ground for
this appeal.
In the record of the proceedings in the court below the plea entered by the
defendant is sometimes referred to as a plea of "double jeopardy on the ground of a
former conviction of the same offense." It may be well to observe that while the
words "double jeopardy have sometimes been used in a board sense in pleas
wherein the accused relies on a plea of former acquittal or conviction as a bar to a
new trial, section 24 and 25 of General Orders No. 58 clearly indicate the intention
of the legislator that the appropriate distinction should be made in the form of the
plea, in accordance with the precise nature of the fact to be proved thereunder.
Where, however, the use of the broader term leads to no confusion, and especially
where it is coupled, as in this case, with explanatory words showing that the
accused relies expressly on a former conviction or acquittal, there is manifestly no
fatal error in accepting proof of a former conviction or acquittal as sufficient to
maintain a plea of double jeopardy, which was understood by the parties to be a
plea in bar on the ground of the former conviction or acquittal.

We expressly reserve our opinion not only as to the merits of the case decided in
the court below, but also as to the right of the Attorney-General to bring the
judgment entered there to this court for review upon the merits, neither of these
question having been raised or submitted by him in his brief.
The grounds upon which the Attorney-General rests his right to appeal in this case
not being well founded in the record, the appeal should be dismissed, with the costs
of this instance de officio. So ordered.
Arellano,
C.J.,
Johnson, J., dissents.

Torres,

Trent

and

Araullo,

JJ., concur.

PHIL. SAVINGS BANK v. LANTIN

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-33929. September 2, 1983.]
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, v. HON. GREGORIO T. LANTIN,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, and
CANDIDO RAMOS, Respondents.
Jose Diokno for Petitioner.
Romeo C . Carlos for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION; CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF

CREDITS; INSUFFICIENT ASSETS OF DEBTOR RAISES QUESTION OF PREFERENCE AS
WELL AS QUESTION OF CONSEQUENCE IN CONCURRENCE OF CREDITS.
Concurrence of credits occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all
of his property is subjected to the claims of several creditors. The concurrence of
credits raises no questions of consequence were the value of the property or the
value of all assets of the debtor is sufficient to pay in fall all the creditors. However,
it becomes material when said assets are insufficient for then some creditors of
necessity will not be paid or some creditors will not obtain the full satisfaction of
their claims. In this situation, the question of preference will then arise, that is to
say who of the creditors will be paid the all of the others (Caguioa, Comments and
Cases on Civil Law, 1970 ed., Vol. VI, p. 472).
2. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE OF CREDITS; ARTICLES 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONSTRUED. Under the system established by Article

2249 of the civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes and assessments upon
immovable property enjoy absolute preference. All the remaining specified classes
of preferred creditors under Article 2242 enjoy no priority among themselves. Their
credits shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in proportion to the amount of the respective
credits.
3. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE; PAIL REQUISITE TO
THEIR FULL APPLICATION UNDER THE DE BARRETO CASE. Under the De Barreto
decision, the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that there must
first be some proceeding where the class of all the preferred creditors may be
bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the settlement of a decedents estate
under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other liquidation proceedings of similar
import.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS AND SETTLEMENT OF A DECEDENTS
ESTATE; BOTH PROCEEDINGS IN REM, OTHER EQUIVALENT GENERAL LIQUIDATION
OF SIMILAR NATURE. Insolvency proceedings end settlement of a decedents
estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding the whole world. All persons
having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not,
are equally bound. Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or other equivalent
general liquidation must also necessarily be a proceeding in rem so that all
interested persons whether known to the parties or not may be bound by such
proceeding.
3. ID.; ACTION FOR COLLECTION OF UNPAID CONTRACTORS FEE; NOT AN ACTION IN
REM. The proceedings in the court below do not partake of the insure of
insolvency proceedings or settlement of a decedents estate. The action filed by
Ramos was only to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex
apartment. It is far from being a general liquidation of the estate of the Tabligan
spouses.
6. CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION; ANNOTATION OF CLAIMS AND CREDITS AS
STATUTORY LIENS; RELEVANCE TO THE STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM. In
the case at bar, although the lower court found that "there were no known creditors
other than the plaintiff and the defendant herein," this cannot be conclusive. It will
not bar other creditors in the event they show up and present their claims State
petitioner bank, claiming that they also have preferred liens against the property
involved. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 issued in favor of
the bank which is supposed to be indefeasible would remain constantly unstable
and questionable. Such could not have been the intention of Article 2243 of the Civil
Code although it considers claims and credits under Article 2242 as statutory liens.
Neither does the De Barreto case sanction such instability. In fact, an annotation, as
suggested above, would insure to the benefit of the public, particularly those who
may subsequently wish to buy the property in question or who have a business
transaction in connection therewith. It would facilitate the enforcement of a legal
statutory right which cannot be barred by laches (See Manila Railroad Co. v. Luzon
Stevedoring Co., 100 Phil. 135).

7. ID.; SALE; BUYER IN GOOD FAITH OF REALTY; TAKES IT FEE FROM LIENS AND
ENCUMBRANCES OTHER THAN STATUTORY LIENS AND THOSE ANNOTATED IN THE
TITLE; CASE AT BAR. Since the action filed by the private respondent is not one
which can be considered as "equivalent general liquidation" having the same import
as an insolvency or settlement of the decedents estate proceeding, the well
established principle must be applied that a purchaser in good faith and for value
takes register land free from liens and encumbrances other than statutory liens and
those recorded in the Certificate of Title. It Is an limited fact that at the time the
deeds of real estate mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank were constituted, the
transfer certificate of title of the spouses Tabligan was free from any recorded lien
and encumbrances, so that the only registered liens in the title were deeds in favor
of the petitioner.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, presided over by respondent Judge Gregorio T. Lantin, in Civil Case No.
79914 entitled Candido Ramos v. Philippine Savings Bank and of the order denying
a motion for its reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P15,000.00 as his
pro-rata share in the value of the duplex-apartment house which was built by the
plaintiff for the spouses likewise Filomeno Tabligan and Socorro Espiritu, which is
now registered in the name of the defendant under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
101864 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, on August 6, 1970,
with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; to pay
the sum of P500.00 as attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.
"The counterclaim interposed by the defendant is hereby dismissed."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Involved in this case is a duplex-apartment house on a lot covered by TCT No.
86195 situated at San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and owned by the spouses
Filomeno and Socorro Tabligan.

The duplex-apartment house was built for the spouses by private respondent
Candido Ramos, a duly licensed architect and building contractor, at a total cost of
P32,927.00. The spouses paid private respondent the sum of P7,139.00 only. Hence,
the latter used his own money, P25,788.50 in all, to finish the construction of the
duplex-apartment.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Meanwhile, on December 16, 1966, February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, the
spouses Tabligan obtained from petitioner Philippine Savings Bank three (3) loans in
the total amount of P35,000.00, the purpose of which was to complete the
construction of the duplex-apartment. To secure payment of the l2oans, the spouses
executed in favor of the petitioner three (3) promissory notes and three (3) deeds of
real estate mortgages over the property subject matter of this litigation.
On December 19, 1966, the petitioner registered the December 16, 1966 deed of
real estate mortgage with the Register of Deeds of Manila. The subsequent
mortgages of February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, were registered with the
Register of Deeds of Manila on February 2, 1967 and March 1, 1967, respectively. At
the time of the registration of these mortgages, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
86195 was free from all liens and encumbrances.
The spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations. As a result thereof, the
petitioner bank foreclosed the mortgages, and at the public auction held on July 23,
1969, was the highest bidder.
On August 5, 1969, the petitioner bank registered the certificate of sale issued in its
favor. On August 9, 1970, the bank consolidated its ownership over the property in
question, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Manila in the name of the petitioner bank.
Upon the other hand, the private respondent filed an action against the spouses to
collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex-apartment before the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, which case was docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 69228. During its pendency, the private respondent succeeded in obtaining the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and pursuant thereto, had the
property in question attached. Consequently, a notice of adverse claim was
annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86195.
On August 26, 1968, a decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 69228 in favor of the
private respondent and against the spouses. A writ of execution was accordingly
issued but was returned unsatisfied.
As the spouses did not have any properties to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No.
69228, the private respondent addressed a letter to the petitioner for the delivery to
him (private respondent) of his pro-rata share in the value of the duplex-apartment
in accordance with Article 2242 of the Civil Code. The petitioner refused to pay the
pro-rata value prompting the private respondent to file the instant action. As earlier
stated, a decision was rendered in favor of the private Respondent.chanrobles

virtual lawlibrary
The parties are agreed that the only issue is whether or not the private respondent
is entitled to claim a pro-rata share in the value of the property in question. The
applicable provision, Article 2242 of the Civil Code, reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of the
debtor, the following claims, mortgages and liens shall be preferred, and shall
constitute an encumbrance on the immovable or real right:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Taxes due upon the land or building;
"(2) For the unpaid price of real property sold, upon the immovable sold;
"(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of
architects, engineers and contractors, engaged in the construction, reconstruction
or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other
works;
"(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction reconstruction, or
repair of buildings, canals or other works upon said buildings, canals or other works;
"(5) Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry of Property, upon the real estate
mortgaged;
"(6) Expenses for the preservation or improvement of real property when the law
authorizes reimbursement, upon the immovable preserved or improved;
"(7) Credits annotated in the Registry of Property, in virtue of a judicial order, by
attachments or executions, upon the property affected, and only as to later credits;
"(8) Claims of co-heirs for warranty in the partition of an immovable among them,
upon the real property thus divided;
"(9) Claims of donors of real property for pecuniary charges or other conditions
imposed upon the donee, upon the immovable donated;
"(10) Credits of insurers upon the property insured, for the insurance premium for
two years."cralaw virtua1aw library
Both the petitioner bank and private respondent Ramos rely on the case of De
Barreto v. Villanueva (6 SCRA 928).
The petitioner bank would impress upon this Court that the proceedings had before
the court below is not one of the proceedings contemplated in the De Barreto case
that will sustain the authority of the respondent court to adjudicate the claims of all

preferred creditors under Article 2242 of the Civil Code. Petitioner argues that for
Article 2242 of the Civil Code to apply, there must have been an insolvency
proceeding or other liquidation proceedings of similar import. And under the facts
then obtaining, there could have been no insolvency proceeding as there were only
two known creditors. ** Consequently, it is argued that private respondents unpaid
contractors claim did not acquire the character of a statutory lien equal to the
petitioners registered mortgage.
Upon the other hand, private respondent Ramos maintains that the proceedings had
before the court below can qualify as a general liquidation of the estate of the
spouses Tabligan because the only existing property of said spouses is the property
subject matter of this litigation.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Concurrence of credits occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all
of his property is subjected to the claims of several creditors. The concurrence of
credits raises no questions of consequence where the value of the property or the
value of all assets of the debtor is sufficient to pay in full all the creditors. However,
it becomes material when said assets are insufficient for then some creditors of
necessity will not be paid or some creditors will not obtain the full satisfaction of
their claims. In this situation, the question of preference will then arise, that is to
say who of the creditors will be paid ahead of the others. (Caguioa, Comments and
Cases on Civil Law, 1970 ed., Vol. VI, p. 472.)
Under the system established by Article 2249 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
only taxes and assessments upon immovable property enjoy absolute preference.
All the remaining specified classes of preferred creditors under Article 2242 enjoy no
priority among themselves. Their credits shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in
proportion to the amount of the respective credits.
Under the De Barreto decision, the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249
demands that there must first be some proceeding where the claims of all the
preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the
settlement of a decedents estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other
liquidation proceedings of similar import.
The pertinent ruling reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Thus, it becomes evident that one preferred creditors third-party claim to the
proceeds of a foreclosure sale (as in the case now before us) is not the proceeding
contemplated by law for the enforcement of preferences under Article 2242, unless
the claimant were enforcing a credit for taxes that enjoy absolute priority. If none of
the claims is for taxes, a dispute between two creditors will not enable the Court to
ascertain the pro rata dividend corresponding to each because the rights of the
other creditors likewise enjoying preference under Article 2242 can not be
ascertained. Wherefore, the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila now
appealed from, decreeing that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale be apportioned

only between appellant and appellee, is incorrect and must be reversed.

"In the absence of insolvency proceedings (or other equivalent general liquidation of
the debtors estate), the conflict between the parties now before us must be
decided pursuant to the well established principle concerning registered lands; that
a purchaser in good faith and for value (as the appellant concededly is) takes
registered property free from liens and encumbrances other then statutory liens and
those recorded in the certificate of title. There being no insolvency or liquidation,
the claim of the appellee, as unpaid vendor, did not acquire the character and rank
of a statutory lien co-equal to the mortgagees recorded encumbrance, and must
remain subordinate to the latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
The resolution of this petition, therefore, hinges on the determination of whether an
insolvency proceeding or other liquidation proceeding of similar import may be
considered to have been conducted in the court below.
The respondent court ruled in the affirmative holding that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There were no known creditors, other than the plaintiff and defendant herein, and
the proceedings in the present case may ascertain and bindingly adjudicate the
respective claims of the plaintiff and the defendant, serving as a substantial
compliance with what the Supreme Court stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . it is thus apparent that the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands
that there must be first some proceeding where the claims of all the preferred
creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the settlement of a
decedents estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other liquidation
proceedings of similar import. (de Barretto v. Villanueva, Et Al., G.R. No. L-14938,
December 29, 1962)."
A careful considering of this petition leads us to agree with the petitioner. The
conclusions of the lower court are not supported by the law and the facts.
The proceedings in the court below do not partake of the nature of the insolvency
proceedings or settlement of a decedents estate. The action filed by Ramos was
only to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex apartment. It is far
from being a general liquidation of the estate of the Tabligan spouses.
Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedents estate are both proceedings
in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the
subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound.
Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or "other equivalent general
liquidation must also necessarily be a proceeding in rem so that all interested
persons whether known to the parties or not may be bound by such proceeding.
In the case at bar, although the lower court found that "there were no known
creditors other than the plaintiff and the defendant herein", this can not be

conclusive. It will not bar other creditors in the event they show up and present
their claims against the petitioner bank, claiming that they also have preferred liens
against the property involved. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864
issued in favor of the bank which is supposed to be indefeasible would remain
constantly unstable and questionable. Such could not have been the intention of
Article 2243 of the Civil Code although it considers claims and credits under Article
2242 as statutory liens. Neither does the De Barretto case sanction such instability.
It emphasized the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We are understandably loath (absent a clear precept of law so commanding) to
adopt a rule that would undermine the faith and credit to be accorded to registered
Torrens titles and nullify the beneficient objectives sought to be obtained by the
Land Registration Act. No argument is needed to stress that if a person dealing with
registered land were to be held to take it in every instance subject to all the
fourteen preferred claims enumerated in Article 2242 of the new Civil Code, even if
the existence and import thereof can not be ascertained from the records, all
confidence in Torrens titles would be destroyed, and credit transactions on the faith
of such titles would be hampered, if not prevented, with incalculable results. Loans
on real estate security would become aleatory and risky transactions, for no
prospective lender could accurately estimate the hidden liens on the property
offered as security, unless he indulged in complicated, tedious investigations. The
logical result might well be a contraction of credit to unforeseable proportions that
could lead to economic disaster.
"Upon the other hand, it does not appear excessively burdensome to require the
privileged creditors to cause their claims to be recorded in the books of the Register
of Deeds should they desire to protect their rights even outside of insolvency or
liquidation proceedings.
In fact, an annotation, as suggested above, would inure to the benefit of the public,
particularly those who may subsequently wish to buy the property in question or
who have a business transaction in connection therewith. It would facilitate the
enforcement of a legal statutory right which cannot be barred by laches. (See
Manila Railroad Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., 100 Phil. 135).chanrobles law library
Respondent Ramos admitted in the partial stipulation of facts submitted by both
parties that at the time of the loans to the spouses, the petitioners bank had no
actual or constructive knowledge of any lien against the property in question. The
duplex apartment house was built for P32,927.00. The spouses Tabligan borrowed
P35,000.00 for the construction of the apartment house. The bank could not have
known of any contractors lien because, as far as it was concerned, it financed the
entire construction even if the stated purpose of the loans was only to "complete"
the construction.
Since the action filed by the private respondent is not one which can be considered
as "equivalent general liquidation" having the same import as an insolvency or
settlement of the decedents estate proceeding, the well established principle must

be applied that a purchaser in good faith and for value takes registered land free
from liens and encumbrances other than statutory liens and those recorded in the
Certificate of Title. It is an admitted fact that at the time the deeds of real estate
mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank were constituted, the transfer certificate of
title of the spouses Tabligan was free from any recorded lien and encumbrances, so
that the only registered liens in the title were deeds in favor of the petitioner.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the private respondents claim must remain
subordinate to the petitioner banks title over the property evidenced by TCT No.
101864.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VII is, hereby, reversed and set aside. The complaint and the
counterclaim are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF GARCIA. UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA

G.R. No. 45904

September 30, 1938

Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO, applicantappellee,

vs.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano
B.
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.

Gardiner

for

appellant.

IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial administrator of the
property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property (special proceedings
No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein
oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate
children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the
widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G.
Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said
deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only
forced heirs being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same
court the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (special

proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself
and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the
deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan
Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said
deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial
administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant
as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no
indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she
stated that should the court grant the administration of the property, she should be
appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the
applicant. After the required publications, trial was had and the court, on August 28,
1936, finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted and
thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and approved.
The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial court,
but these assigned errors raise only two questions for resolution, namely: whether
upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the property left by the
deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent appointment of an administrator, and
whether the appellant has a better right to the said office than the appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure
providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the
general rule that when a person dies living property in the Philippine Islands, his
property should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint
a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor
therein. This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596
and 597 of the same Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the
heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree
in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator. According to the second, if the
property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the
competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary
partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property
constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a person
dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings
(Ilustre vs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;
Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemorvs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367;
Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317).
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions of articles
657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed to all the property

left by the deceased from the time of his death. In the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other
words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased
ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the
estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have
that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be
divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the
division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no
occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of
the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no
debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and
expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the
absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They
are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the
division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to
show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they
intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are any heirs of the
estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition
for partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs. Bondad, supra,
and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated. And in the
case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified the same doctrine in
the following language:
Upon the second question Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to
appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule? it may be said (a) that
it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death
no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule
were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the
Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies
intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8
Phil., 546; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin vs.Nacianceno, 19 Phil.,
238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73;
Bondadvs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his
heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason can there be for the
appointment of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and to

deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled?
In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano,
discussing this question, said: Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to
661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of
the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the
estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have
that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be
divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division.
(Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why
the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The
administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the
estate among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against
the
estate.
(Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra;
Baldemor vs.Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property
left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners or owners in
common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any other
coowners of undivided property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502;
Mcintyre vs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exist in the
divisions of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the
division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the
deceased owner is maintenable where the estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of
age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof.
(Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible of being held in
common which may not be divided by the coowners. It may be of personal property
as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of noncontiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners
as well as of the whole. (Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698;
Pipes vs.Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine
so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases
to which it has application, their files would not have been replete with unnecessary
administration proceedings as they are now. There is no weight in the argument
adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator

is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the
deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right
of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that
he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced
heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living . In order to intervene
in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not
necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted
an administration which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and
unnecessary expenses.
2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties has
preferential right to the office of administrator.
The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to the
applicant-appellee. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

SAMPILO and SALACUP v. COURT OF APPEALS and SINOPERA

G.R. No. L-10474

February 28, 1958

BENNY
SAMPILO
and
HONORATO
SALACUP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
Clodualdo
P.
Moises B. Ramos for respondents.

Surio

for

petitioners.

LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with
slight modification a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring
plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land described in the
complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an action instituted by Felisa
Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants
one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the
deceased Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate
in January, 1945. He left for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and
12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow,
Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers
and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed
an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent
neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters,
nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the

deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties" (Record on
Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels
of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950,
Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for
P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the
estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having
secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on June 20,
1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said
notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26,
1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale,
in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the
affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands
sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said
properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the
complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred
by the statute of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and
that the complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and
inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa
Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale
Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void; declaring plaintiff
owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in question, and finally
declaring that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are
terminated. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the
annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct
but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the
properties, conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the
heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that
Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby
conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it
ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of
the estate of Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of the
lands described in the complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to
claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties
may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the
damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.

Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and
have assigned the following errors in their brief:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right
of action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in
question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent
purchasers for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's
motion for new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was
instituted almost four years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of
the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought
within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, and as decided in the cases of McMickingvs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time
within two years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in
accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule,
that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of
the such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the
courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such
lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. If the
decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to

himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the
death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first
referring to a case in which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a
deceased person, and the second in which there is only one heir. The section was
taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended
by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings.
Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and
legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts
have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all
of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among
themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is
required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in
the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old
law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By
the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to
answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is
also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial
settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge
thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of
the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if
they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the
estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest
within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable
to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance
with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the twoyear period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice
of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express
provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their
claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to
them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any
express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to
due process of law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants
in this case, we held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of
distribution may be had upon the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made for
notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding,

therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is
very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex
parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by
which the court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons,
can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by
affidavit, is an ex parteproceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended
that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no
knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or
affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by
implication. We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no
similarity at all between the circumstances on which the ruling therein had been
predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur,
supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74,
barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken
part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all
the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of
Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and
nieces living at the time of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of
limitations. The origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this
contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the
contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows
clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a
bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not
against third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of
limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if
Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would
naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the
defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner
of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no
nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on
fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article
1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial
proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been

instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the
burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense,
and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four years had
already elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of
the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent
purchasers for value was rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court
said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or
notice of the claim of the heirs of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in
question does not find support in the evidence of record. As regards
defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a nephew of
Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo
and the heirs of the deceased who are claiming the property are residents of
San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny Sampilo
did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they
were nephews and nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased
Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his
aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public
Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare the
affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B"
by which on the same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the property which
she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she acknowledged before said
notary public, coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that
the consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid,
strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased
Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property, and that the
immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem concocted to defeat
the former's rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no
notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to
Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might be true, for he
purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis pendens was
noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot
claim that he was a purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is
well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered lands who
has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and investigate as
to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such
inquiry and investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for
value and he had acquired a valid title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong
Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto,
with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

ONGSINGCO v. TAN
G.R. No. L-7635

July 25, 1955

TASIANA ONGSINGCO, Guardian of Francisco de Borja, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and JOSE DE BORJA, administrator of the estate of the late Josefa
Tangco, respondents.
Jose
W.
Diokno,
Sycip,
David Guevara for respondents.

Quisumbing

and

Salazar

for

petitioner.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with prohibition to annul and restrain the enforcement
of two orders of respondent judge dated January 20, 1954 and February 18, 1954
issued in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal entitled
"Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco" which prohibit petitioner, inter
alia,from continuing in possession of certain parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa,
Nueva Ecija, on the ground that they were issued without or in excess of his
jurisdiction.
Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of one Francisco de
Borja who was declared incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special
Proceedings No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco
whose estate is being settled in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the same court.
Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja, who, on June 29, 1953,
was appointed administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.
Francisco de Borja, according to petitioner, is the owner of two parcels of land
situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, which he acquired by inheritance from his late
father Marcelo de Borja and as such form part of his separate properties.
On October 27, 1953, Francisco de Borja was declared incompetent by the court as
aforesaid, and petitioner, his second wife, was appointed his guardian. As such
guardian, petitioner took over from her husband the possession of said two parcels
of land and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon for the
benefit of her ward.
On January 16, 1954, respondent Jose de Borja, as administrator of the estate of
Josefa Tangco, filed a motion in the estate proceedings of the latter praying that
petitioner be restrained from threshing the palay on the lands until the ownership
thereof has been definitely determined either by the court or by agreement of the
parties. Petitioner opposed the motion challenging the jurisdiction of the court and

contending that if its purpose is to pass on the question of ownership, such can only
be threshed out elsewhere and not by the probate court.
Because it became obvious to petitioner that respondent administrator would insist
in his motion whose main aim is to prevent petitioner and her laborers from
threshing the crop standing on the lands and, on the other hand, the several
attempts made to agree on the identity of the lands had failed, petitioner filed an
action on January 21, 1954 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to restrain
respondent administrator from interferring with the harvesting and threshing of the
crop on the claim that the lands were the exclusive property of her ward Francisco
de Borja (Civil Case No. 1350). On the same date, the court granted the preliminary
injunction prayed for upon the filing by petitioner of a bond of P5,000. On January
25, 1954, respondent Jose de Borja filed an urgent petition in the same case asking
the court to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction and to dissolve the preliminary
injunction that was issued. This petition was denied.
On January 29, 1954, respondent court issued an order the dispositive part of which
reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the guardian Tasiana Ongsingco is
hereby ordered not to meddle in the threshing of the palay harvested in the lands
declared under Tax Declaration No. 540 (Annexes A and A-1). The administrator and
the guardian are ordered to find from among the properties of the incapacitated
Francisco de Borja in Tabuanting, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, the two parcels of land
having an approximate area as those two lots adjudicated in his favor by the
Commissioners on Partition, and once found, let the parties agree on the matter, so
as to avoid any future controversy, and to notify this Court of their agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On February 10, 1954, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration calling attention
to the fact that both the guardian and the administrator had already attempted to
arrive at an agreement as to the identity of the lots which are claimed to be the
exclusive property of Francisco de Borja, but they failed to do so, and because of
such inability and the immediate need of harvesting and threshing the crop
standing thereon, petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija precisely to determine once and for all the title to, and ownership of, said
lands and to issue a preliminary injunction restraining respondent Jose de Borja from
interferring with the work of petitioner; but, in view of respondent Borja's
opposition, respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration.
The present petition poses the following issues: (1) considering that the dispute
between petitioner and respondent administrator involves the ownership of two
parcels of land now the subject of an action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, has respondent court jurisdiction to determine said dispute in the estate
proceedings of the late Josefa Tangco?; and (2) having the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija issued a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain respondent
administrator from interferring with the threshing of the crop standing on said lands,

can respondent court, after having been apprised of said order, issue an order the
effect of which is to nullify and render ineffective said writ of preliminary injunction?.
There is no dispute that the two parcels of land in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija are
claimed by petitioner as part of the separate property of Francisco de Borja so much
so that she took possession thereof when she assumed her commission as guardian
on October 27, 1953. That she succeeded in taking actual possession of said lands
is shown by the fact that when she commenced the threshing of the crop standing
thereon, respondent Jose de Borja filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Josefa
Tangco to restrain her from threshing said crop. Then a dispute arose as to the
ownership of said parcels of land. On one hand, petitioner claims that they belong
exclusively to her ward having inherited them from his late father Marcelo de Borja,
while, on the other, respondent administrator contends that they are not the land
adjudicated to the incompetent by the commissioners on partition. The parties had
made several attempts to arrive at an agreement as to the identity of the disputed
lands, but they failed, and because there was a pressing need of immediately
threshing the crop standing thereon, petitioner filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija to determine once and for all the title and ownership of said
lands. In the same case, the court issued a preliminary injunction restraining
respondent administrator from interferring with the administration of said
properties. But such action notwithstanding, respondent court issued the orders in
question which not only go into the issue of ownership but render ineffective the
writ of injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Can
respondent court do so?
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of
decisions that, "the question of ownership of property is one which should be
determined in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether
or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate" (Franco vs. O'Brien, 13 Phil.,
359). In another case, it was held that "The general rule is that questions as to title
to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings"
(Pascual vs. Pascual,
73
Phil.,
561,
562; See also
Cordova
Vda.
de
Maalac vs.Ocampo, 73 Phil., 661, 662), or stating the rule more elaborately, "When
questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of
a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as a probate court,
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance . . .."
(Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil., 61.)
The dispute between petitioner and respondent administrator involving, as it does,
the ownership of two parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and this
question having been squarely raised in an action pending in the court of first
instance of said province, which was instituted by petitioner against respondent
administrator precisely because of the dispute that had arisen between them over
said property, it is the sense of this Tribunal that respondent court exceeded its

jurisdiction in acting upon the said question in its capacity as probate court. On the
face of such issue which necessarily involves the ownership of the properties, we
consider of no consequence the claim that what respondent court merely did was to
look into the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the
greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one can hardly draw the line of
demarcation that would separate one from the other.
As regards the question whether the order of respondent court restraining petitioner
from threshing the palay crop standing on the lands has been properly issued on the
face of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, the answer is not difficult to find: the court should not have issued the
order, for "It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court has
power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought
by injunction. . . . The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila are in
a sense coordinate courts and to allow them to interfere with each other's
judgments or decrees by injunctions would obviously lead to confusion and might
seriously hinder the administration of justice." (Cabigao vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil.,
182; See also
Philippine
National
Bank vs. Javellana,
92
Phil.,
525;
Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Company, 92 Phil., 25.)
Wherefore, petition is granted without costs. The orders of respondent court dated
January 29, 1954 and February 18, 1954 are hereby set aside.
Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion,
and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ.,concur.

CAYETANO v. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY
CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which
admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C.
Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.

On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia,
Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes
Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication
under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself
the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly
executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time
of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while
temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her
lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according
to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as
executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was
appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor
in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore,
there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and
eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein
petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the
will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void;
and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the
same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco
Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests)
stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence,
an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was
made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in
her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent
residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when
alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3b) that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in
the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the
United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.

Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of
the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby
admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is
hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of
Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the
withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and
deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the
order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his
opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him,
the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed
in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also
alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his
counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He
made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or
Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in
the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable
Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the
case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the
case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his
motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief.
Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for
failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will,
which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced

heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly
Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a
motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by
the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and
her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12,
1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic)
upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests
against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the
hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public
or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by
way of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law
especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30
days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was
adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to
afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition a denial of the due process and
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the
time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently Cavite
Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R.
No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the
withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof
was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was
secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel
of record. The records show that after the firing of the contested motion, the
petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion
to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the
motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long

withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in
turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old
man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the
withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the
probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed
the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus,
the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given
away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law
should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the

decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case ofBellis v. Bellis (20
SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the
records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on
separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his
motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the
petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished
the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was
repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he
requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at
the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu
of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion
and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly
devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged
and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of
Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from

questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a
settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon.
Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), took no part.

RP v. COURT OF APPEALS and BOBILES

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on
February 20, 1990 1 which affirmedin toto the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Legaspi City 2 granting the petition of herein private respondent to
adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present
petition for review oncertiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat,
then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4)
months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as
Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued
an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28,
1988. 4 The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the
Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat,
father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order

was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required
for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. 5
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing,
the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband,
Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, JASON
CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents
and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles,
and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the
surname of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of
Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi
City, and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this
decision. 6
Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed
the aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present petition with the
following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code
cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by
Zenaida C. Bobiles; and
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of
spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on
February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed
by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered
its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals,
Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the
said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption
should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without
joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires
joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied

retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a
vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.
We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of
Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an
outright dismissal on that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground
of non-joinder since petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this
objection has been raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court.
Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated
assignment of errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application
will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses the concept of present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened
free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot
deny. 10 Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of
a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has
vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a
petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs.
Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right
under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to
have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at
the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. 12 We do not find in the present case such facts as
would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and
foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of
the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a
retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions

and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied
as to defeat procedural steps completed before their enactment. 13
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and
procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending
proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment although,
with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only procedural steps taken
after their enactment.14
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions
and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation,
is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken
before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it
at the time the question of procedure arises. 15
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is
substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be
dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and
effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the
court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. 16 To
repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal
or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance. 17
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code
should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial
court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C.
Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a
tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition
for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as
Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself
actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written
consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire
to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being
six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi
City, Albay, also in the Philippines;

3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said

minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in
the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my
lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have
continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT
since birth;
6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of
maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising
therein the care, concern and diligence of a good father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for
whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this
minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA
BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice;
(Emphasis supplied.) 18
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open
court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then
obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal
advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the
petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language
and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the
higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not
be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on
the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to
this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that
adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution
and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result
of the adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not
be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the
validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and
technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results
or to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was
complied with.

In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the
judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be
enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act
consummated years before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to
uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial compliance with the
statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to
adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should
contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to
those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly,
it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies
with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court
jurisdiction. 21
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and
welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a
child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the
propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for
adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests
and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to
accomplish that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the
best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child
are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this
discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed. 24
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of
adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent
of his natural parents. 25 The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for
adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several
commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting
parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written
consent of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for
adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by
respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in
the light of the foregoing doctrine, 28 We are of the opinion and so hold that the
decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards
promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a
useful and happy life." 29
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to

allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 30
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

JAO v. COURT OF APPEALS and JAO

G.R. No. 128314

May 29, 2002

RODOLFO
V.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.

JAO, petitioner,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left
real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the
estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507. 1 Pending the
appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as
special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating
the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real
properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging
to their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either
during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedents actual residence
was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in
Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose
of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary
evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns,
voters affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments,
motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1wphi1.nt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in
Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it

was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before
they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City. 4 Rodolfo himself even
supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and
affixed his own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
decedents residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest
mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that their parents
were treated in their late years at the Medical City General Hospital in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the
same way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos
residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not,
therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents residence in light of
the other documents showing otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the
position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition
be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. 8 After the
parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated
Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag
and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to
wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988
and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of
residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death
certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature
appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own representation
by taking an inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of
merit movants motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo
having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
order of the respondent Judge is affirmedin toto.
SO ORDERED.11

Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997. 12 Hence, this petition for review,
anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY
INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT
THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER THAN
THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE
IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO
A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC.
1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF
THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES
OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE
CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST
PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION
OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN
ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE
THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING
TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507. 13

The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in
Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,
where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where
we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the
decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In
determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of
choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein
permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be
physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that
they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.1wphi1.nt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent
therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his
personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart
ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence,
which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon
City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that
Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando,
Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly
speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to
petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute
respondents assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three
to four years before they died in the late 1980s.

Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both
residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner
himself who filled up his late mothers death certificate. To our mind, this
unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased
mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the
entry in Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus
properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with
the appellate courts observation that since the death certificates were
accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their
parents death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the
time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner.
To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at
the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent
residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms
"residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have
been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior
thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A
close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioners
assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents physical presence in
Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was
more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower

courts factual findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence

presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4,
Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former
understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving
summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule
73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only
refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records
of the properties are kept and where most of the decedents properties are located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in
the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons
properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It
may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his
records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No
generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to
keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice
and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between
venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v.
Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary
civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As
thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals
correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was
properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

JIMENEZ v. IAC
G.R. No. 75773

April 17, 1990

TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ, ANTONIO JIMENEZ,

AMADEO JIMENEZ, MODESTO JIMENEZ and VIRGINIA JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. AMANDA VALERACABIGAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch

XXXVII, Lingayen, Pangasinan, LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and CORAZON

JIMENEZ, respondents.
Simplicio
M.
Sevilleja
Bitty
S.
Viliran
for
Leonardo B. Jimenez, Jr. for respondents.

for
private

petitioners.
respondents.

FERNAN, CJ.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 29, 1986 which dismissed the petition
for certiorari and mandamus in AC-G.R. No. 06578 entitled "Tomas Jimenez, et. al.
vs. Hon. Amanda Valera-Cabigao."
The facts are as follows:
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced four (4)
children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the
existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five (5) parcels of land in
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom
he begot the seven petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo,
Modesto and Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez died on August 11, 1951
while Genoveva Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346,
praying to be appointed as administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses
Lino and Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the
deceased spouses which included herein co-petitioners and the four children of Lino
Jimenez by Consolacion Ungson, his previous wife. 2
In October, 1979, herein private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo
Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of
Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of
the union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy and because they have already received their inheritance
consisting of five (5) parcels of lands in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. 3
On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy. 4 On May 21, 1981, she filed
an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy
wherein she included the five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. As a consequence, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of
these properties from the inventory on the ground that these had already been
adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased
father Lino Jimenez. Private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. presented testimonial

and documentary evidence in support of his motion while petitioner Virginia

Jimenez, other than cross-examining the witnesses of Leonardo, presented no
evidence of her own, oral or documentary.
On September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5)
parcels of land from the inventory on the basis of the evidence of private
respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among others of: (1) Tax
Declaration showing that the subject properties were acquired during the conjugal
partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson; and, (2) a Deed of Sale dated
May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva Caolboy stated, that the subject properties had
been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his children by a previous marriage, namely:
Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles.5 The motion for reconsideration of said
order was denied on January 26, 1982.6
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. SP-13916, seeking the
annulment of the order dated September 29, 1981 as well as the order of January
26, 1982. On November 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
because (1) Genoveva Caolboy, petitioners' mother, had admitted that the subject
parcels of land had been adjudicated to the children of the previous nuptial; (2) the
subject properties could not have been acquired during the marriage of Lino
Jimenez to Genoveva Caolboy because they were already titled in the name of Lino
Jimenez even prior to 1921, long before Lino's marriage to Genoveva in 1940; (3)
the claim of Virginia Jimenez was barred by prescription because it was only in 1981
when they questioned the adjudication of the subject properties, more than ten (10)
years after Genoveva had admitted such adjudication in a public document in 1964;
and, (4) petitioner Virginia Jimenez was guilty of laches. This decision became final
and executory.7
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10,
1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat
as Civil Case No. 16111, to recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5)
parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to
order private respondents to render an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the
action was barred by prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 dated November 18,
1982 and by prescription and laches. However, petitioners opposed the motion to
dismiss contending that (1) the action was not barred by prior judgment because
the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of
ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a separate action; and, (2) the
action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or laches because private
respondents' forcible acquisition of the subject properties occurred only after the
death of petitioners' mother, Genoveva Caolboy in 1978.
On February 13, 1985, the trial court resolved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. 8 On May 31, 1985, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of
the
resolution
was
denied.
As
earlier
intimated,
the
petition

forcertiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners before the appellate court was
likewise denied due course and dismissed in a decision dated May 29, 1986. 9
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate)
the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res
judicata exists as to bar petitioners' present action for the recovery of possession
and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In the negative, is the present action
for reconveyance barred by prescription and/or laches?
We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is
appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive
being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership
of the five (5) parcels of land. 11
The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. 12
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so. 13
The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property
was again reiterated in the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 14 Junquera vs. Borromeo, 15Borromeo vs. Canonoy, 16 Recto vs. de
la Rosa. 17 It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will,
the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. 18 This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an
intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.
Res judicata 19 does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions.
Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action was for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy while Civil Case No. 16111 was an
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.
Moreover, while admittedly, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in
S.P. No. 5346 had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any
pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and could still be attacked
in a separate proceeding. Civil Case No. 16111, on the other hand. was lodged
before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the exercise of the
court's general jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such "separate or ordinary proceedings"
contemplated by the rules for a final determination of the issue of ownership of the
disputed properties. To repeat, since the determination of the question of title to the

subject properties in S.P. 5346 was merely provisional, petitioners are not barred
from instituting the appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.
Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss
do not appear to be indubitable.1wphi1 Res judicata has been shown here to be
unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and laches pleaded by private
respondents are seriously disputed. The allegation in the complaint is that the heirs
of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr. (referring to private respondents,) forcibly intruded into and
took possession of the disputed properties only in 1978, after the death of
Genoveva Caolboy. Since the action for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it
would appear that the same has not yet prescribed or otherwise barred by laches.
There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners before the lower court
which cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial
and which make the grounds for dismissal dubitable. Among others, the alleged
admission made by petitioners' mother in the deed of sale is vehemently denied, as
well as the fact itself of adjudication, there being no showing that the conjugal
partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson had been liquidated nor that a
judicial or extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken
whereby such adjudication could have been effected.
The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss not being indubitable, the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
16111.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby
REVERSED. Civil Case No. 16111 is reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed to proceed in said case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano,
Bidin
Gutierrez, Jr., J, is on leave.

and

Cortes,

RULE 72

HEIRS OF GABATAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and PACANA

FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS
OF
TEOFILO G.R. No. 150206
GABATAN,namely:
LOLITA
GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, Present:
PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO
GABATAN,
NILA PUNO, C.J.,*
GABATAN and JESUS
JABINIS, YNARES-SANTIAGO,**
RIORITA
GABATAN CARPIO,***

JJ.,

concur.

TUMALAand FREIRA GABATAN,

Petitioners,

CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION,**** JJ.

-versusHON.
COURT
APPEALS andLOURDES
PACANA,
Respondents.

OF
EVERO
Promulgated:

March 13, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari
are the Decision[1] dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution [2] dated September 12,
2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged
Decision affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for
Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by
respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as
Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was
declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC,
respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the
same
from
her
deceased
mother,
Hermogena
Gabatan
Evero
(Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only
child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon
the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo
Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also
claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but
to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also did the same but petitioners
refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject
property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite
respondents demands for them to vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the
daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent
is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died
single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and
two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and
Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan
and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50)
years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the

whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the
husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added
that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita
Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the
case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners
contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any,
the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were
individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan,
Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira
Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the
disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of
Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at
Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented
by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316
in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the
defendants to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as Attorneys
fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of
the RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court
dated October 20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan,
the CA declared that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was
sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence
that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are not
disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not
supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale [5] executed by Macaria
Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein
Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently
residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN
GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration
which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a
tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan
Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 130[6] of the Rules of Court on the declaration
against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very
own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan
Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners possession of the
disputed property could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their
predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an owner.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally
contending that the CA committed the following reversible errors:
FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single
and without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee
(respondent) as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a
certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN;
THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto
GABATAN is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;
FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance
of evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and
the heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving
heirs of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter
hereof;
FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of
plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.
[7]

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary
matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this
particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts. [8] It is not our function
to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the
concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based. [9]
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the
findings of fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded

entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is

manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. [10]
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned.Thus, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if
they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not
assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but
raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination
of a question properly assigned, is dependent. [11]
In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the
merits of the case.
The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of
ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject
property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his
lifetime.[12] Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal
heir(s) of the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take
precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court
has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil
action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be

made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right. [13]
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14] this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action.This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals[15] where the Court
held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil
action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of
the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of
the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial
court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the
deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife,
Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we
ruled that such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent)
is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the
court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not
be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,[16] the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must
be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely
for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,
[17]
this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir
to a decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as
in this case, was for the recovery of property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,
[18]
where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for
annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate
estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs
is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could
and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pretrial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed
by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate
Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a

decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis

supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being
claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would
be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially
in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the
same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We GRANT the petition.
After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and
questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole
heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property,
pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was
incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation
shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates[19] of respondent were presented at the
RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported
certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her
mothers maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other
hand, presented a certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate
which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was
respondents mothers full maiden name which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito
in the handwritten birth certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting
Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are
Exhibit A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is
genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious
scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit A for the plaintiff which is a
certified true copy is in due form and bears the as is and where is rule. It has the

impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the
1950s. Her mothers maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito
Gabatan. While Exhibit 1, the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very
unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage. The entry on the
space for mothers maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an
apparent attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother filiation with the omission of the
surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is inclined to
believe that Exhibit A for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of
live birth.[20]
Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree
with the above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial
court noted, was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or
facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s vintage[21] but this Court is unable to concur in the
trial courts finding that Exhibit 1 [22] was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was
one of the trial courts bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the
contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states
Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945) which makes it an older form than
Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding which form was of more recent
vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature
appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who
purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents
birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local
civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also
merely typewritten beside their names. The words A certified true copy: July 6, 1977
above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the
same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and
the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in
1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify
Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were
identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed
sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were
handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true
copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and
8) were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms.
Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan
de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics
Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their
official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective offices, [23] and
(b) the certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful
reproduction of the original birth certificate registered in their respective offices.
[24]
Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten
birth certificate before the trial court and respondents counsel confirmed that the
certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful
reproduction of the original.[25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other
copy of respondents birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten
birth certificate.[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondents

handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which
Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the
Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro. [27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho
testified and brought their respective offices copies of respondents birth certificate
in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no showing that
they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between
respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents
deserve to be given greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented
by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient
to prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that
Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have proven was that
respondents mother was a certain Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does not prove
that same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA
held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the
parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena. [28]
It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she convincingly
proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the
relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best
evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register,
or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent
should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence
is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court
of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have
been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never
offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic
document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to
Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac
Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew
Hermogena (respondents mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan
Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan
and Laureana.However, none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact
of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and
Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly
married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of
them were present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas birth. These
witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard from,
others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents witnesses
testimonies. The records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and
impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a
man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.

[29]

His testimony regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly
reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children
of Justa Gabatan Nagac,[30] this Court is wary of according probative weight to their
testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her
(respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana. [31] In other words,
although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the
mother and the aunt of respondents husband.They cannot be said to be entirely
disinterested in the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA
relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale [32] (Exhibit H) presented by
respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the
siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from
Lot 3095 C-5, Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan was
indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an
affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest,
that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. [33] The CA considered the
same statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan. [34]
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the
signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected
to by petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly
authenticated.[35] After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.
[36]
Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances
where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the
original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of
secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education
Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario, [37] we held that a party must first satisfactorily
explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary
evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the original instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac
Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows
that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it
was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public
document. For this, respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of
the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by a
certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the
local assessors office.Regarding the authentication of public documents, the Rules
of Court[38] provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy. [39] The attestation

of the certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. [40]
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of
Exhibit H was registered or exists in the records of the local assessors
office.Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient
authentication of Exhibit H since Velezs certification did not state that Exhibit H was
a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a witness to
attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful
that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessors office is not the
official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the
legal custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It
is the notary public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial register that
could have produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed
of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing
to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from
her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged
certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who
secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessors office. [41] To be sure, the roundabout
and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the
purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted
the status of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and
consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof
that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not
show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As
discussed above, the only document that respondent produced to demonstrate her
filiation to Hermogena Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in
doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against
respondent. According to respondents own testimony, [42] Juan Gabatan died
sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to
recover the decedents property from third parties or to quiet title to their
inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they
were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is
only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of
Teofilo Gabatan.[43] However, that case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to
prosecute.[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of
action, i.e. the present case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita
Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already old. [46]
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan
and her contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters
litigated in this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent

should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate
her claim. As we held in Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy: Vigilantibus, sed non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on
their rights[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its
pristine purity.[47]
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with
convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the
sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under
litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that
(a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a
tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b)
she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court
cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 52273, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89092, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint
in Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

MONTAER v. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT

FIRST DIVISION

LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO

MONTAER,
JR.,
LILLIBETH
MONTAER-BARRIOS,
AND
RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAERDALUPAN,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 174975

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,

SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH

AZCUNA, and

SHARIA
JUDICIAL
DISTRICT,
MARAWI
CITY,
LILING
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN
LILING S. MONTAER,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Respondents.
Promulgated:

JANUARY 20, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia
District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22,
2006[1]and September 21, 2006.[2]
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.
[3]
Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor
Montaer-Dalupan are their children. [4] On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.
[5]

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter,
Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial
partition of properties before the Sharia District Court. [6] The said complaint was
entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and
Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer,
Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 7-05. [7] In the said complaint, private respondents made the
following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the
decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling
S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list
of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. [8] Private respondents
prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the
partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator
for the estate of the decedent.[9]
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following
grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late
Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents
failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents

complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between

Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family
Code.[10]
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents
complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and
its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.[11]
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
[12]
On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of
hearing.[13] On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners
opposition.[14]Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration lacked notice
of hearing, the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners were
notified of the existence of the pleading, and it took cognizance of the said motion.
[15]
The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration.[16]
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court
reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005. [17] The district court
allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. [18] In its second assailed
order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the continuation
of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference.[19]
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER
PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT
SHARIA
DISTRICT
COURT MARAWI CITY DID
NOT
ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO
MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO
BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.
IV.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE
OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS
FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A NOTICE OF HEARING.

V.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION
7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER,
SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO
MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the
Sharia District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question
of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has
jurisdiction.[20]
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is
dependent on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a
Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a
determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that
the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The
assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the

averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. [21] The

designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the
courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on a falsa
descriptio or defective caption, courts are guided by the substantive averments of
the pleadings.[22]
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia
District Court as a Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of
the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased Muslim,[23] such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death
as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are
the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the
reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek
judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent. [24] These include the following: (1)
the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the
appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does
not have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a
motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the
nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set
forth in an answer[25] or a motion to dismiss. [26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant[27] or result in having a case either thrown out of
court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. [28] Indeed, the defense
of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the
court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction. [29]
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. [30] In the case at
bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because
petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The
Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the
deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the
deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding
before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased
person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a
quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia
District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants
and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the
proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding
as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. [31] In a petition for the

issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the

applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly
recognized as among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their
right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.
[32]
Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death
and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be
recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from
being a party defendant in a civil action [33] applies to a special proceeding such as
the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action
which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse
party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the
Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or
defendant.[35] On the other hand, a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to
establish a status, right, or a particular fact, [36] has one definite party, who petitions
or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite
adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent
is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of
the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate,[37] pay its liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the
same.[39]
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for nonpayment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents
petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation
estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private
respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially
involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket
fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the
docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket
fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. [40] If the party filing
the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the
amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency
assessment lies with the same clerk of court. [41] In such a case, the lower court
concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on
the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees. [42] As every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties
knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the
case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment.
[43]
However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency. [44]
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the
docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no
determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without
the clerk of courts assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration
before the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail
as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this
requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the
applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned. [45] The Rules
also provide that no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of service thereof.[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of
its provisions in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [47] Moreover, this Court has
upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases
where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned
final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein.[48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no party
can even claim a vested right in technicalities, and for this reason, cases should, as
much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities. [49]
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the
settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its
inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law
and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the
notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of
hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held
that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the
rights of the adverse party were not affected. [50] The purpose for the notice of
hearing coincides with procedural due process, [51] for the court to determine
whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix
any period within which to file a reply or opposition. [52] In probate proceedings, what
the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. [53] In the case at bar, as evident from
the Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received
a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not
denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an
opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District Court reset the hearing for the
motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the
opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural
process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet
determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the
event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is
pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to
recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding. [54] The
court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs

of the decedent.[55] In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent
depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District
Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court,
dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED.Cost
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

HILADO v. COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DIVISION
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108
SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING Present:
CORPORATION,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated:
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May

2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. [1] At
the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto
involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo
Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then
pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. [2]
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant
to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to
Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of
liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing
letters of administration in her favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and
Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. [5] In the List of Liabilities attached
to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the abovementioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
[6]
Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two
cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil
Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit
a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate. [8]
On 24
September
2001,
petitioners
filed
with
the
Manila
RTC
a
[9]
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of
petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before
the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private
respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate. [10] Petitioners also
filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory
that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the

manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The
petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision [12] dismissing the
petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact
that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or
expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before
other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts
erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in
support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other
provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings. [13]
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the
courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all
processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by
administratrix Benedicto with the said court. [14] Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. [15] Third, petitioners
moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the
date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them
and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate.[16]
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed
by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that
point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
x x x While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners
from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that
the legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement
of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the
Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further
provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as
set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is

based on a contingent claim. The definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply

does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene
in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then
before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as
intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to
intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to
intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us
now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons
or any persons interested in the estate to participate in varying capacities in the
testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely:
(1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of any person interested to
oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;
(2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the
petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows
a person interested in the estate to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6
of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased to
complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any
asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5)
Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrators account to persons interested; (6)
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to the persons
interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or
encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which
allows any person interested in the estate to petition for an order for the distribution
of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied
or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under
the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after
granting letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately
after the issuance of such notice. [19] However, it appears that the claims against
Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with
Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do
not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required
under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No.

11178, whereas the other civil case[21] was already pending review before this Court
at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the
civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the
event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right
to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may
they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it
does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts
therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages
against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial
court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had
sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead
Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a coadministrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that
the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated.
When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the
pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on
the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the
estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the
termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings
it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing
that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is
the only property of the estate left subject of administration and
distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil
case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said
civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in
the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of
civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case
but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the
two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its
jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the
intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the
reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration
proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has
been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against
the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs
desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the
ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that

questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but

claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would
be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed
by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x [23] (Emphasis supplied)
[Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an

action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the
spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court,
citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect
that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so
to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. [24]
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they
are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person interested or persons
interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect their respective
interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action
for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time
judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already
been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor
or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the
testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when
such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is
no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for
under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests
can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought
by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed
by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such
relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the
intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their
interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain
to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are
mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with
service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming
to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be
furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed,
to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and
pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims,
would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would
ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by
this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of
petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v.
Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same
petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the
records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from
them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of
every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were
interested persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings.
We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the
assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as
the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al.,
they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in
fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x [26]

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate

proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of
court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor
in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance
with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records,
rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter
how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate
court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable
means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require
notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties will be
entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested
parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of
examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b)
of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell
personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3)
Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution

of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her
submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set
for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair
market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon
submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within
three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there
are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person
whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so.
Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims
against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the

proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court
the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent
one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the
creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for
the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is
necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.
Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners,
as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to
such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice