G.R. No.

L-4963

January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in
the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario
and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda,
who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and
her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a
parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in
dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that
Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late
Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With
this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot
be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio
and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the
latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were

declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil
Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right
should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or
event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the
new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of
pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that
they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to
assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that
this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a
donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may
be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or
in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been
followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. 195670

December 3, 2012

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,

vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing
the October 8, 2009 Decision2 and January 24, 2011 Resolution3 of the court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 01940, which affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the
conjugal partnership of gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and
distributed the properties forming part of the said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several
years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the
Decision5 dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the formers psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership 6 dated December 14,
2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252
square meters (sq.m.), including a residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of
806 sq.m., including a residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of
756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an
area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an
area of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.). 7
In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1
and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth
being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her
personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. 9 She submitted a joint affidavit
executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the
improvements thereon using her own money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the
petition for dissolution as well as payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. 11
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government
as his disability benefit12since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete
City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came
exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as

products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for
annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along
with him certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc.
She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00. 15
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the
parties conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal
properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2)
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that
their marriage was previously annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby
declared paraphernal properties of respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while these real
properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a
foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through
inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought
out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the
petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846
are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired
during their marital union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and
residential units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval
their project of partition on the two houses aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorneys fees
considering the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The
prayer for moral damages are likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4,
petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still
attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of private lands.17 This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner
executed purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive
funds of his wife, the herein respondent.18 Petitioners plea for reimbursement for the amount he had
paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having
come to court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and
4 in favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came
from his own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because
of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of
one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the
other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife.19

On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision20 affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." 21 Hence, he cannot invoke
equity to support his claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision
due to the following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE
PETITIONERS ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF
OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES
SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of PropertyElena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had already denied a claim for
reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut
Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land 24 enshrined
under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered
the subject properties in the latters name.26 Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable
intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for
reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done
inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. 27
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the
subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed
a joint affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, 28 he likewise claimed
that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies
show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is
now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner
given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.29 Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil
Code,31 petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the
money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract

or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from
an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment.33 As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary
reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment
does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.
1wphi1

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO
PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for
recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso.
This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an
accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said
properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that
a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill
in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it
is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the
real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."34 (Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. 35 Precisely,
it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning
Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony 36 and it is this
policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and
January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45320

January 26, 1939

Intestate estate of the deceased Macario Carrillo.

ROSENDA ALMEIDA VIUDA DE CARRILLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CORAZON EDELMIRA CARRILLO DE GALANG, GRACIA CARRILLO, and ROMULO
CARRILLO, oppositors-appellants.
Deogracias J. Puyat for appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
Macario Carrillo died in the City of Manila on May 17, 1931, leaving as next of kin, his widow,
Rosenda Almeida, the appellee, and his three children by his first marriage, Corazon Edelmira
Carrillo, Romulo Carrillo and Gracia Carrillo, the appellants. With the consent of all the relatives, the
appellee caused the remains of the deceased to be buried in the private lot of the Intengan family in
the North Cemetery, Manila, to be transferred later after a period of three years but not more than
five, upon paying P100 for the use of the lot. Later on, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
intestate proceedings of the decedent were commenced, special proceedings No. 39632, and in the
project of partition submitted by all the co-heirs, and approved by the court, said co-heirs agreed
upon the following:
(6) Out of love for her late husband, Macario Carrillo, the party of the first part (Rosenda
Almeida) undertakes to pay the expenses of the last illness of the decedent, such as
medicine, physician's fees and nurses; cost of the funeral and the care of the tomb.
Sometime in January, 1963, the appellee built a mausoleum in Bian, Province of Laguna, for the
remains of her late husband. Shortly before the expiration of the period of five years for the
exhumation of said remains, the appellants secured the consent of the appellee to have the remains
of the deceased transferred to the Ermita Church in Manila. As we was made to understand that
such transfer would only be a temporary and that it would be easier to transfer the remains from that
place to the mausoleum, which she had built in Bian, the appellee gave her consent. Having been
informed by her lawyer that she should not have given her consent, she withdrew it, and inasmuch
as the appellants were about to remove and transfer the remains, the appellee moved the court to
enjoin the appellants from removing the remains to the Ermita Church. The motion was duly heard
and thereafter the court made permanent the preliminary injunction which had been issued, and
ordered the appellants to abstain from removing the remains of the deceased and transferring them
to another place. Thereupon, the appeal was perfected.

The only question raised in the three assignments of error made by the appellants, is whether or not
they have a better right than the appellee to disinter the remains of the deceased and transfer them
to the place they had chosen. The court held that the appellee's right, as the widow, is preferred, as
may be gathered from the spirit of section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code and from some
American cases. We hold that the court correctly decided the case and did not commit any of the
assigned errors.
In this jurisdiction there is no express law which determines the preference, among the next of kin of
a deceased, with regard to the disposition of his remains.
Leaving aside for the moment the law upon the matter and the American cases, to which we will later
on refer, we believe that the agreement between the parties is decisive of the controversy. The
parties agreed in the partition approved by the court that the widow, the appellee, out of love for her
late husband, would undertake the care of his tomb. The word tomb, which in this case means the
grave where the body of the deceased was buried, for at the time of the partition-agreement Macario
Carrillo had already died, has been used without any restriction or limitation, and it should be
interpreted as meaning both the grave at the North Cemetery and that which might be determined
after the five-year period for the conservation of the remains of the deceased. If the intention of the
parties referred only to the burial of the deceased in the North Cemetery for five years, which is the
maximum period allowed by law, this idea could have been easily expressed.
We hold, then, that under the terms of said agreement, the appellee has a better right than the
appellants, and the latter cannot object to the transfer of the remains of the deceased by the
appellee to the mausoleum she built in Bian, Laguna.
The appellants allege that the appellee consented to the transfer of the remains to the Ermita
Church and that now she cannot validly oppose it. We find no merit in this contention because it
appears that the appellee erroneously gave her consent, for she was made to believe by the
appellants that the transfer of the remains to the Ermita Church would only be temporary, and that
her consent thereto would facilitate the subsequent transfer to the mausoleum in Bian.
In this jurisdiction there is no law that expressly determines the right care, possession and
disposition of the remains of the deceased. Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, quoted by the court, provides that the obligation to bury the remains of a deceased, falls,
firstly, on the surviving spouse; if the deceased was not married, the obligation falls upon the closest
next of kin; and if he dies with no surviving relative, the burial is the concern of the authorities of the
municipality where he died. This legal provision has no direct application to the controversy, for the
simple reason that it refers to the burial of a dead body, which he is not the case here. However, it is
being mentioned merely to point out that even in the case the right of the surviving spouse is
considered preferred and superior to that of the next of kin. In the United States of America the
superior and preferred right of the surviving spouse to the burial and any other legal disposition of
the remains of the husband or of the wife, has always been held undisputed. "It is generally
conceded that on the death of a husband or a wife, the primary and paramount right to possession of
the body and to control the burial or other legal disposition thereof is in the surviving spouse, and not
in the next of kin, at least in the absence of a different provision by the deceased." (15 Am. Jur., par.
9, p. 834; Southern L. & Health Ins. Co. vs. Morgan, 21 Ala. App., 5; 105 So., 161; Enos vs. Snyder,
131 Cal., 68; 63 Pac., 170; O'Donnell vs. Slack, 123 Cal., 285; 55 Pac., 906; Boyle vs. Chandler, 33
Del., 323; 138 A., 273; Louisville & N. R. Co. vs. Wilson, 123 Ga., 62; 51 S. E., 24;
Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; 110 N. W., 335.) "The surviving spouse is entitled to select
the place of burial and the place of reinterment if the remains are removed after burial." (15 Am. Jur.,
par. 9, p. 834.) "The better rule seems to be, however, that if the widow has not waived her right, she
may, against the objections of the next of kin, remove her husband's body, after interment, to another
place of sepulture." (15 Am. Jur., par. 21, p. 843; Bunol vs. Bunol, 12 La App., 675; 127 So., 70;
Hackett vs. Hackett, 19 L. R. A., 558; 49 Am. St. Rep., 762.)
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order is affirmed, with costs in this instance against the
appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996

ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C.
GONZALES (for herself and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A.
CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ,
assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.

MELO, J.:p
The petition before us has its roots in a complaint for specific performance to compel herein
petitioners (except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel of
land with its improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by the
parties sometime in January 1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00.
The undisputed facts of the case were summarized by respondent court in this wise:
On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. (hereinafter
referred to as Coronels) executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment"
(Exh. "A") in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (hereinafter referred to as
Ramona) which is reproduced hereunder:
RECEIPT OF DOWN PAYMENT
P1,240,000.00 Total amount
50,000 Down payment

P1,190,000.00 Balance
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT
No. 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of
P1,240,000.00.
We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father,
Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon receipt of the
down payment above-stated.
On our presentation of the TCT already in or name, We will immediately execute the
deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall
immediately pay the balance of the P1,190,000.00.
Clearly, the conditions appurtenant to the sale are the following:
1. Ramona will make a down payment of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos upon
execution of the document aforestated;

2. The Coronels will cause the transfer in their names of the title of the property
registered in the name of their deceased father upon receipt of the Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos down payment;
3. Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property, the Coronels will execute
the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona and the latter will pay the former the
whole balance of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand (P1,190,000.00) Pesos.
On the same date (January 15, 1985), plaintiff-appellee Concepcion D. Alcaraz
(hereinafter referred to as Concepcion), mother of Ramona, paid the down payment
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos (Exh. "B", Exh. "2").
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels'
father was transferred in their names under TCT
No. 327043 (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4")
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to
intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (hereinafter referred to as Catalina) for
One Million Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00) Pesos after the latter
has paid Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. "F-3"; Exh. "6-C")
For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract (Exh. "A") with
Ramona by depositing the down payment paid by Concepcion in the bank in trust for
Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.
On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for specific performance
against the Coronels and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the
back of TCT No. 327403 (Exh. "E"; Exh. "5").
On April 2, 1985, Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim
covering the same property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (Exh. "F";
Exh. "6").
On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
property in favor of Catalina (Exh. "G"; Exh. "7").
On June 5, 1985, a new title over the subject property was issued in the name of
Catalina under TCT No. 351582 (Exh. "H"; Exh. "8").
(Rollo, pp. 134-136)
In the course of the proceedings before the trial court (Branch 83, RTC, Quezon City) the parties
agreed to submit the case for decision solely on the basis of documentary exhibits. Thus, plaintiffs
therein (now private respondents) proffered their documentary evidence accordingly marked as
Exhibits "A" through "J", inclusive of their corresponding submarkings. Adopting these same exhibits
as their own, then defendants (now petitioners) accordingly offered and marked them as Exhibits "1"
through "10", likewise inclusive of their corresponding submarkings. Upon motion of the parties, the
trial court gave them thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously submit their respective
memoranda, and an additional 15 days within which to submit their corresponding comment or reply
thereof, after which, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
On April 14, 1988, the case was submitted for resolution before Judge Reynaldo Roura, who was
then temporarily detailed to preside over Branch 82 of the RTC of Quezon City. On March 1, 1989,
judgment was handed down by Judge Roura from his regular bench at Macabebe, Pampanga for
the Quezon City branch, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering

defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel
of land embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now
TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, together with all the
improvements existing thereon free from all liens and encumbrances, and once
accomplished, to immediately deliver the said document of sale to plaintiffs and upon
receipt thereof, the said document of sale to plaintiffs and upon receipt thereof, the
plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance of the purchase price
amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby canceled and
declared to be without force and effect. Defendants and intervenor and all other
persons claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate the subject property and
deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' claim for damages and attorney's
fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are hereby
dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So Ordered.
Macabebe, Pampanga for Quezon City, March 1, 1989.
(Rollo, p. 106)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner before the new presiding judge of the Quezon
City RTC but the same was denied by Judge Estrella T. Estrada, thusly:
The prayer contained in the instant motion, i.e., to annul the decision and to render
anew decision by the undersigned Presiding Judge should be denied for the
following reasons: (1) The instant case became submitted for decision as of April 14,
1988 when the parties terminated the presentation of their respective documentary
evidence and when the Presiding Judge at that time was Judge Reynaldo Roura.
The fact that they were allowed to file memoranda at some future date did not
change the fact that the hearing of the case was terminated before Judge Roura and
therefore the same should be submitted to him for decision; (2) When the defendants
and intervenor did not object to the authority of Judge Reynaldo Roura to decide the
case prior to the rendition of the decision, when they met for the first time before the
undersigned Presiding Judge at the hearing of a pending incident in Civil Case No.
Q-46145 on November 11, 1988, they were deemed to have acquiesced thereto and
they are now estopped from questioning said authority of Judge Roura after they
received the decision in question which happens to be adverse to them; (3) While it
is true that Judge Reynaldo Roura was merely a Judge-on-detail at this Branch of the
Court, he was in all respects the Presiding Judge with full authority to act on any
pending incident submitted before this Court during his incumbency. When he
returned to his Official Station at Macabebe, Pampanga, he did not lose his authority
to decide or resolve such cases submitted to him for decision or resolution because
he continued as Judge of the Regional Trial Court and is of co-equal rank with the
undersigned Presiding Judge. The standing rule and supported by jurisprudence is
that a Judge to whom a case is submitted for decision has the authority to decide the
case notwithstanding his transfer to another branch or region of the same court (Sec.
9, Rule 135, Rule of Court).
Coming now to the twin prayer for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 1,
1989 rendered in the instant case, resolution of which now pertains to the
undersigned Presiding Judge, after a meticulous examination of the documentary
evidence presented by the parties, she is convinced that the Decision of March 1,
1989 is supported by evidence and, therefore, should not be disturbed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the "Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Annul

Decision and Render Anew Decision by the Incumbent Presiding Judge" dated
March 20, 1989 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 12, 1989.
(Rollo, pp. 108-109)
Petitioners thereupon interposed an appeal, but on December 16, 1991, the Court of Appeals
(Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Abad Santos (P), JJ.) rendered its decision fully agreeing with the trial
court.
Hence, the instant petition which was filed on March 5, 1992. The last pleading, private respondents'
Reply Memorandum, was filed on September 15, 1993. The case was, however, re-raffled to
undersigned ponente only on August 28, 1996, due to the voluntary inhibition of the Justice to whom
the case was last assigned.
While we deem it necessary to introduce certain refinements in the disquisition of respondent court
in the affirmance of the trial court's decision, we definitely find the instant petition bereft of merit.
The heart of the controversy which is the ultimate key in the resolution of the other issues in the case
at bar is the precise determination of the legal significance of the document entitled "Receipt of
Down Payment" which was offered in evidence by both parties. There is no dispute as to the fact
that said document embodied the binding contract between Ramona Patricia Alcaraz on the one
hand, and the heirs of Constancio P. Coronel on the other, pertaining to a particular house and lot
covered by TCT No. 119627, as defined in Article 1305 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
reads as follows:
Art. 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
While, it is the position of private respondents that the "Receipt of Down Payment" embodied a
perfected contract of sale, which perforce, they seek to enforce by means of an action for specific
performance, petitioners on their part insist that what the document signified was a mere executory
contract to sell, subject to certain suspensive conditions, and because of the absence of Ramona P.
Alcaraz, who left for the United States of America, said contract could not possibly ripen into a
contract absolute sale.
Plainly, such variance in the contending parties' contentions is brought about by the way each
interprets the terms and/or conditions set forth in said private instrument. Withal, based on whatever
relevant and admissible evidence may be available on record, this, Court, as were the courts below,
is now called upon to adjudge what the real intent of the parties was at the time the said document
was executed.
The Civil Code defines a contract of sale, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere consent. The
essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price;

b) Determinate subject matter; and

c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale because the
first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell, the prospective seller explicity reserves the
transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or
consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an
event, which for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the
seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill is promise to sell the subject property when the
entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words the full payment of the
purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the
obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further
remedies by the prospective buyer. In Roque vs. Lapuz (96 SCRA 741 [1980]), this Court had
occasion to rule:
Hence, We hold that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent was a
contract to sell where the ownership or title is retained by the seller and is not to pass
until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive
condition and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event
that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force.
Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the
purchase price, the prospective seller's obligation to sell the subject property by entering into a
contract of sale with the prospective buyer becomes demandable as provided in Article 1479 of the
Civil Code which states:
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain
is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct
from the price.
A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective
buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of
the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as a conditional contract of
sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment
of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is
present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not
occur. If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is completely
abated (cf. Homesite and housing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777 [1984]). However, if
the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such that if there had
already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto
automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be
performed by the seller.
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the
purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the property may
have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the
prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale.

It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale specially in
cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted with, but
to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the
property, a third person buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such
as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and
the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property. There is no double sale
in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration because there is no
defect in the owner-seller's title per se, but the latter, of course, may be used for damages by the
intending buyer.
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the sale
becomes absolute and this will definitely affect the seller's title thereto. In fact, if there had been
previous delivery of the subject property, the seller's ownership or title to the property is
automatically transferred to the buyer such that, the seller will no longer have any title to transfer to
any third person. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, such second buyer of the property who
may have had actual or constructive knowledge of such defect in the seller's title, or at least was
charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a registrant in good faith. Such
second buyer cannot defeat the first buyer's title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the
first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.
With the above postulates as guidelines, we now proceed to the task of deciphering the real nature
of the contract entered into by petitioners and private respondents.
It is a canon in the interpretation of contracts that the words used therein should be given their
natural and ordinary meaning unless a technical meaning was intended (Tan vs. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 586 [1992]). Thus, when petitioners declared in the said "Receipt of Down
Payment" that they
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT
No. 1199627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of
P1,240,000.00.
without any reservation of title until full payment of the entire purchase price, the natural and
ordinary idea conveyed is that they sold their property.
When the "Receipt of Down Payment" is considered in its entirety, it becomes more manifest that
there was a clear intent on the part of petitioners to transfer title to the buyer, but since the transfer
certificate of title was still in the name of petitioner's father, they could not fully effect such transfer
although the buyer was then willing and able to immediately pay the purchase price. Therefore,
petitioners-sellers undertook upon receipt of the down payment from private respondent Ramona P.
Alcaraz, to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title in their names from that of their father,
after which, they promised to present said title, now in their names, to the latter and to execute the
deed of absolute sale whereupon, the latter shall, in turn, pay the entire balance of the purchase
price.
The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which
prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers
themselves (the certificate of title was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase
price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely presume
that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have
been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and consummated
right there and then.
Moreover, unlike in a contract to sell, petitioners in the case at bar did not merely promise to sell the
properly to private respondent upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition. On the contrary,

having already agreed to sell the subject property, they undertook to have the certificate of title
changed to their names and immediately thereafter, to execute the written deed of absolute sale.
Thus, the parties did not merely enter into a contract to sell where the sellers, after compliance by
the buyer with certain terms and conditions, promised to sell the property to the latter. What may be
perceived from the respective undertakings of the parties to the contract is that petitioners had
already agreed to sell the house and lot they inherited from their father, completely willing to transfer
full ownership of the subject house and lot to the buyer if the documents were then in order. It just
happened, however, that the transfer certificate of title was then still in the name of their father. It
was more expedient to first effect the change in the certificate of title so as to bear their names. That
is why they undertook to cause the issuance of a new transfer of the certificate of title in their names
upon receipt of the down payment in the amount of P50,000.00. As soon as the new certificate of
title is issued in their names, petitioners were committed to immediately execute the deed of
absolute sale. Only then will the obligation of the buyer to pay the remainder of the purchase price
arise.
There is no doubt that unlike in a contract to sell which is most commonly entered into so as to
protect the seller against a buyer who intends to buy the property in installment by withholding
ownership over the property until the buyer effects full payment therefor, in the contract entered into
in the case at bar, the sellers were the one who were unable to enter into a contract of absolute sale
by reason of the fact that the certificate of title to the property was still in the name of their father. It
was the sellers in this case who, as it were, had the impediment which prevented, so to speak, the
execution of an contract of absolute sale.
What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that when the said
"Receipt of Down Payment" was prepared and signed by petitioners Romeo A. Coronel, et al., the
parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, consummation of which is subject only to the
successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father, Constancio P.
Coronel, to their names.
The Court significantly notes this suspensive condition was, in fact, fulfilled on February 6, 1985
(Exh. "D"; Exh. "4"). Thus, on said date, the conditional contract of sale between petitioners and
private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz became obligatory, the only act required for the
consummation thereof being the delivery of the property by means of the execution of the deed of
absolute sale in a public instrument, which petitioners unequivocally committed themselves to do as
evidenced by the "Receipt of Down Payment."
Article 1475, in correlation with Article 1181, both of the Civil Code, plainly applies to the case at
bench. Thus,
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From the moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the
extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening
of the event which constitutes the condition.
Since the condition contemplated by the parties which is the issuance of a certificate of title in
petitioners' names was fulfilled on February 6, 1985, the respective obligations of the parties under
the contract of sale became mutually demandable, that is, petitioners, as sellers, were obliged to
present the transfer certificate of title already in their names to private respondent Ramona P.
Alcaraz, the buyer, and to immediately execute the deed of absolute sale, while the buyer on her
part, was obliged to forthwith pay the balance of the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00.

It is also significant to note that in the first paragraph in page 9 of their petition, petitioners
conclusively admitted that:
3. The petitioners-sellers Coronel bound themselves "to effect the transfer in our
names from our deceased father Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of
title immediately upon receipt of the downpayment above-stated". The sale was still
subject to this suspensive condition. (Emphasis supplied.)
(Rollo, p. 16)
Petitioners themselves recognized that they entered into a contract of sale subject to a suspensive
condition. Only, they contend, continuing in the same paragraph, that:
. . . Had petitioners-sellers not complied with this condition of first transferring the title
to the property under their names, there could be no perfected contract of sale.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(Ibid.)
not aware that they set their own trap for themselves, for Article 1186 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that:
Art. 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment.
Besides, it should be stressed and emphasized that what is more controlling than these mere
hypothetical arguments is the fact that the condition herein referred to was actually and indisputably
fulfilled on February 6, 1985, when a new title was issued in the names of petitioners as evidenced
by TCT No. 327403 (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4").
The inevitable conclusion is that on January 19, 1985, as evidenced by the document denominated
as "Receipt of Down Payment" (Exh. "A"; Exh. "1"), the parties entered into a contract of sale subject
only to the suspensive condition that the sellers shall effect the issuance of new certificate title from
that of their father's name to their names and that, on February 6, 1985, this condition was fulfilled
(Exh. "D"; Exh. "4").
We, therefore, hold that, in accordance with Article 1187 which pertinently provides
Art. 1187. The effects of conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been
fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation . . .
In obligation to do or not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the
retroactive effect of the condition that has been complied with.
the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the perfected contract of sale became
mutually due and demandable as of the time of fulfillment or occurrence of the suspensive
condition on February 6, 1985. As of that point in time, reciprocal obligations of both seller
and buyer arose.
Petitioners also argue there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because they
were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to be extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent
Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of
law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes
insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining
thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil
Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850 [1952]).
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be declared unless the creditors have
been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to the
property from the decedent's name to their names on February 6, 1985.
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into
an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which
they took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The
Civil Code expressly states that:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.
Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time of
sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that
time.
Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of sale between them
and Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal obligation when she rendered impossible
the consummation thereof by going to the United States of America, without leaving her address,
telephone number, and Special Power of Attorney (Paragraphs 14 and 15, Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 43), for which reason, so petitioners
conclude, they were correct in unilaterally rescinding rescinding the contract of sale.
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the instant
case. We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners' rescission, are mere allegations found
only in their responsive pleadings, which by express provision of the rules, are deemed controverted
even if no reply is filed by the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The records are
absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate petitioners' allegations. We have
stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng
Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]. Mere allegation is not an
evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of America on February
6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioner-sellers' act of unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the
contract of sale, there being no express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extarjudicially rescind
the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132 SCRA
722 [1984])
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz because
although the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the
buyer, the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz, Ramona's mother, who had acted
for and in behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made
by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check (Exh. "B"; Exh. "2") for and in behalf of
Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners ever questioned Concepcion's

authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her personal check. Neither did they
raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as far as
petitioners are concerned, the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the
contract of sale.
Corollarily, Ramona P. Alcaraz cannot even be deemed to be in default, insofar as her obligation to
pay the full purchase price is concerned. Petitioners who are precluded from setting up the defense
of the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz as above-explained offered no proof whatsoever to
show that they actually presented the new transfer certificate of title in their names and signified their
willingness and readiness to execute the deed of absolute sale in accordance with their agreement.
Ramona's corresponding obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price in the amount of
P1,190,000.00 (as buyer) never became due and demandable and, therefore, she cannot be
deemed to have been in default.
Article 1169 of the Civil Code defines when a party in a contract involving reciprocal obligations may
be considered in default, to wit:
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something, incur in delay from the time
the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their
obligation.
xxx xxx xxx
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or
is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From
the moment one of the parties fulfill his obligation, delay by the other begins.
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is thus neither factual nor legal basis to rescind the contract of sale between petitioners and
respondents.
With the foregoing conclusions, the sale to the other petitioner, Catalina B. Mabanag, gave rise to a
case of double sale where Article 1544 of the Civil Code will apply, to wit:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as proof of the
second contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the
second paragraph of Article 1544 shall apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer, the
exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first
buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer, in
good faith, acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer
satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first
buyer.

In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now a distinguished
member of the Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug, explains:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights
except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares
vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of
the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since knowledge taints his
registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26
December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA
656), it has held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed
of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R.
No. 95843, 02 September 1992).
(J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604).
Petitioner point out that the notice of lis pendens in the case at bar was annoted on the title of the
subject property only on February 22, 1985, whereas, the second sale between petitioners Coronels
and petitioner Mabanag was supposedly perfected prior thereto or on February 18, 1985. The idea
conveyed is that at the time petitioner Mabanag, the second buyer, bought the property under a
clean title, she was unaware of any adverse claim or previous sale, for which reason she is buyer in
good faith.
We are not persuaded by such argument.
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer
was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good
faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good faith,
registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early as February 22, 1985, a
notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names of
petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time
of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had already been
previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a previous
buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the defect
in petitioners' title to the property at the time of the registration of the property.
This Court had occasions to rule that:
If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that
there was a previous sale of the same property to a third party or that another person
claims said property in a pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in
bad faith and will not confer upon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349
[1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43
Phil. 554; Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, perfected on
February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985,
was correctly upheld by both the courts below.
Although there may be ample indications that there was in fact an agency between Ramona as
principal and Concepcion, her mother, as agent insofar as the subject contract of sale is concerned,
the issue of whether or not Concepcion was also acting in her own behalf as a co-buyer is not
squarely raised in the instant petition, nor in such assumption disputed between mother and
daughter. Thus, We will not touch this issue and no longer disturb the lower courts' ruling on this
point.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
judgment AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.]
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC.,
claimant-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, presided by Judge Hermogenes Caluag, dismissing its claim against the Estate
of K. H. Hemady (Special Proceeding No. Q-293) for failure to state a cause of
action.
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal
and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in

consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.s of having guaranteed, the various principals
in favor of different creditors. The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity agreements,
all contained the following stipulations:
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Premiums. As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and

severally, agree to pay the COMPANY the sum of ________________ (P______) pesos,
Philippines Currency, in advance as premium there of for every __________ months or
fractions thereof, this ________ or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect.
Indemnity. The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify
the COMPANY and keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and
against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and
expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any
time sustain or incur in consequence of having become surety upon this bond or
any extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of
the undersigned or any of them or any order executed on behalf of the undersigned
or any of them;
and to pay, reimburse and make good to the COMPANY, its
successors and assigns, all sums and amount of money which it or its
representatives shall pay or cause to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account of
the undersigned or any of them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of
the amount involved in the litigation or other matters growing out of or connected
therewith for counsel or attorneys fees, but in no case less than P25. It is hereby
further agreed that in case of extension or renewal of this ________ we equally bind
ourselves for the payment thereof under the same terms and conditions as above
mentioned without the necessity of executing another indemnity agreement for the
purpose and that we hereby equally waive our right to be notified of any renewal or
extension of this ________ which may be granted under this indemnity agreement.
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Interest on amount paid by the Company. Any and all sums of money so paid by
the company shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum which interest, if not
paid, will be accummulated and added to the capital quarterly order to earn the
same interests as the capital and the total sum thereof, the capital and interest,
shall be paid to the COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY shall have become liable
therefore, whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or
not.
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Waiver. It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any
question which may arise between them by reason of this document and which has
to be submitted for decision to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court of
competent jurisdiction in the City of Manila, waiving for this purpose any other
venue. Our right to be notified of the acceptance and approval of this indemnity
agreement is hereby likewise waived.
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Our Liability Hereunder. It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit
against the principal upon his default, or to exhaust the property of the principal,
but the liability hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and
severally, a primary one, the same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible
immediately upon the occurrence of such default. (Rec. App. pp. 98- 102.)
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of
the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further
asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to
the bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemadys estate,
the lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon
Surety Co., on two grounds:
(1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary
stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the
undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after
the execution of the counterbonds;
and (2) that whatever losses may occur after
Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he
ceased to be guarantor.
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Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the
reasoning of the court below ran as follows:
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The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as
a guarantor terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or
damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court
believes that there is merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of
the new Civil Code. It should be noted that a new requirement has been added for a
person to qualify as a guarantor, that is:
integrity. As correctly pointed out by the
Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon
the death of Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors.
Whatever loss therefore, may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his
estate because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.
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Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied
on the personality, character, honesty and integrity of the now deceased K. H.
Hemady, was the fact that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is a
paragraph entitled Security by way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived
and renounced by the security company. The security company has not demanded
from K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security by way of first
mortgage. In the supporting papers of the claim presented by Luzon Surety
Company, no real property was mentioned in the list of properties mortgaged which
appears at the back of the indemnity agreement. (Rec. App., pp. 407-408).
We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as
well as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that
Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their
decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code
(and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby
confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:

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Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated
to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and cannot be
regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a
party, touching the estate of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
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The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the
new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle, the heirs of a
deceased person cannot be held to be third persons in relation to any contracts
touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of
inheritance;
they take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon
in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.
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(See also Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman vs.
Salak, 91 Phil., 265).
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered
by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said

heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate
is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been
entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the
progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed
by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions. From the
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into
a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly
personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by
a specific person and by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of
the imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the
surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual
qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the
creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as
surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the
Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the
principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting
from an obligation to give;
and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the
reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his
behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.
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The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the

parties. Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility
should not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least,
clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the
agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. Lo general es la transmisibilidad de darechos y
obligaciones;
le excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada se diga en
contrario impera el principio de la transmision, como elemento natural a toda
relacion juridica, salvo las personalisimas. Asi, para la no transmision, es menester
el pacto expreso, porque si no, lo convenido entre partes trasciende a sus
herederos.
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Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen
los efectos de los vinculos juridicos creados por sus antecesores, y para evitarlo, si
asi se quiere, es indespensable convension terminante en tal sentido.
Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir ms all de las personas que
les dieron vida, y a ejercer presion sobre los sucesores de esa persona;
cuando no
se quiera esto, se impone una estipulacion limitativa expresamente de la
transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la concresion del
concreto a las mismas personas que lo otorgon. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil, Tomo XX,
p. 541-542) (Emphasis supplied.)
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Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is
deemed to have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary
for him to expressly stipulate to that effect;
hence, his failure to do so is no sign
that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon
Surety Co., did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates
nothing more than the companys faith and confidence in the financial stability of
the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly personal.
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The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists
when they are not transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes
reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are
extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental
authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article
1726), partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles
of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084)

contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the
guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that
one who is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses
integrity, capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the
obligation which he guarantees. It will be noted, however, that the law requires
these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of
guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and
binding, the supervening incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to
exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted;
and if that be true of
his capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his integrity, which is a quality
mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.
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The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs as follows:

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ART. 2057. If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime

involving dishonesty or should become insolvent, the creditor may demand another
who has all the qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is excepted
where the creditor has required and stipulated that a specified person should be
guarantor.
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty
of the guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity after he has
become bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to
demand a replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the
creditor:
it is his right, not his duty;
he may waive it if he chooses, and hold the
guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article 2057 of the present Civil Code is
incompatible with the trial courts stand that the requirement of integrity in the
guarantor or surety makes the latters undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his
individuality that the guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.
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The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety

Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by
the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual
liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts,
therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5,
Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437;
Gaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 814).
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The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a
person is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead.
Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against
his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the
obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the
surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety
has contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the
secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody
no claim that could be reduced to judgment. (May vs. Vann, 15 Pla., 553;
Gibson
vs. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519;
Maxey vs. Carter, 10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521 Reeves vs.
Pulliam, 7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119;
Ernst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)
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For Defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case
where the surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor;
and it is
urged that the rule does not apply to the case before us, where the late Hemady
was a surety, not a principal debtor. The argument evinces a superficial view of the
relations between parties. If under the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as
guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal debtors if
the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim
against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his
principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal
debtor it may equally claim from the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing
solidarity, the latter does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of
the principal debtor.
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The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the

administratrix against the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the
New Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his
death, and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the
estate a contingent claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to
discuss the estates liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of
the solution to this question, the Luzon Suretys claim did state a cause of action,
and its dismissal was erroneous.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed in accordance with law.
Costs against the Administratrix- Appellee. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4275. March 23, 1909. ]
PAULA CONDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMAN ABAYA, Defendant-Appellant.
C. Oben, for Appellant.
L. Joaquin, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ESTATES: ACTION AGAINST EXECUTION OR ADMINISTRATIONS. While an estate is in the course of
settlement in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained by a person claiming to be an heir,
against the executor or administrator, for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHTS OF ACTION BY LEGITIMATE AND BY NATURAL CHILDREN TO COMPEL
RECOGNITION. As a general rule, the right of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy lasts
during the lifetime of such child, but the right of a natural child to compel acknowledgment of its status
continues only during the life of the alleged parents. The right of action for a declaration of legitimacy is
transmitted to the heirs of the child only when the latter dies during minority or while insane, or in case the
action has already been instituted. Action by a natural child can only be brought against the heirs of the
parents in the event of the death of the parents during the minority of the child, or upon the discovery of a
document, after the death of the parents, expressly acknowledging such child. This right of action which the
law concedes to this natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. (Arts. 18 and 137,
Civil Code.)
Per Torres, J., dissenting:

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3. NATURAL CHILDREN; SUCCESSION AND TRANSMISSION OF RIGHTS TO DEMAND RECOGNITION.

Although article 137 of the Civil Code contains no disposition authorizing the transfer, in favor of the natural
mother in her capacity of heir of her natural child, of the right to judicially demand the recognition of her
child by the heirs of his late natural father; yet there is no express provision therein that prohibits such
transfer or that declares such right to be nontransferable.
4. ID.; ID. The relation of paternity and filiation between natural parents and children is also of a natural
character, and therefore, reciprocal intestate succession between them is exclusively governed by articles
944 and 945 of the Civil Code.
5. ID.; ID. If the right of succession granted by the law to the natural children corresponds reciprocally to
the natural father or mother in the same cases, and if the estate includes all property, rights and obligations
of a person which do not expire at the latters death, it is certain that, among the rights transferred to the
natural mother by inheritance, at the time of the death of her natural child, is the right held by such child
during his lifetime to demand his recognition as such by his natural father, should the latter still live, or by
his heirs.
6. ID.; ID. There is no legal provision that declares the said right to demand the recognition of a natural
child to be nontransferable to the latters heirs, and specially to his natural mother, nor is there any rule
declaring such right extinguished at the death of the natural child.

7. ID.; ID. In the intestate succession of a natural child who dies during his minority, recognized by the
law in favor of his father or mother who have acknowledged him, no limitation has been established
excluding the said right from transferable rights, nor has it been expressly declared that the abovementioned right to demand the recognition of the natural child is extinguished at the latters death,
wherefore it is necessary to admit that the mother inherits from the natural child at his death, and that she
is entitled to institute the corresponding action.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings brought in the Court
of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of the property
of Casiano Abaya it appears:
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I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died on
the 6th of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde,
whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the
said intestate succession; that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th of
November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, the parents of the
late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the
nearest relative of the deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that
on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him
to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to
be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him;
and that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the declaration of heirs and
distribution of the property of the estate.
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the foregoing motion of Roman Abaya, filed
a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she
considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of
the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the
property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding
products thereof.
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and the court below
entered the following judgment:
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"That the administrator of the estate of Casiana Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being
natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of
her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it
is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of
the administrator, Roman Abaya."
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IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court, and presented the
following statement of errors:
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1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural children
under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in special probate proceedings.
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child, the mother of
such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her
deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuous possession of the deceased children of Paula
Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in these
proceedings; and
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate estate to Paula Conde, as
improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not having declared that said property should be
reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in not having previously demanded
securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the property to those who might fall within the
reservation.
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special proceedings for the
administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action might be brought to enforce the
acknowledgment of the natural child of the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say,
whether one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the deceased, not
having been so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or compulsory by reason of a preexisting
judicial decision, but asking at the same time that, in the special proceeding itself, he be recognized by the
presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to be entitled to the succession opened in the special

proceeding.
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure
"If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of the deceased
person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as
to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath and signed by witness. Any party in
interest whose distributive share is affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within the time
and in the manner provided in the last preceding section."
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This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana Pimental v. Engracio
Palanca (5 Phil. Rep. 436.)
The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the mother of a natural child
now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may
bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his
behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his natural father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the only foundation:

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"In resolving a similar question Manresa says: An acknowledgment can only be demanded by the natural
child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such
person as legally represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is under her
authority. On this point no positive declaration has been made, undoubtedly because it was not considered
necessary. A private action is in question and the general rule must be followed. Elsewhere the same author
adds: It may so happen that the child dies before four years have expired after attaining majority, or that
the document supporting his petition for acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps
occurring after his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their lifetime. In any case such
right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment may interest. (See
Commentaries to arts. 135 and 137, Civil Code. Vol. I.)
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil Code, lacks legal and
doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child to his descendants
can not be sustained under the law, and still less to his mother.
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive, limiting in form,
when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action after the death of the presumed
parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up to the present time no
argument has been presented, upon which even an approximate conclusion could be based.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural children, granting them
rights and actions that they did not possess under the former laws, they were not, however, placed upon the
same plane as legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two classes of children is still great, as
proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the family and with succession in relation to the
members thereof. It may be laid down as a legal maxim, that whatever the code does not grant to the
legitimate children, or in connection with their rights, must still less be understood as granted to recognized
natural children or in connection with their rights. There is not a single exception in its provisions.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of the child, the
acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family of the
father or the mother who recognizes him, and affords him a participation in the rights of the family,
relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether they concur with other individuals
of the family of his purely natural father or mother.
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code nothing is more logical than to establish a comparison
between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce acknowledgment.
"Art. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its lifetime and shall
be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall
be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action.
"The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not lapsed before
then.
"Art. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted only during the life of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
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"1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may institute the
action before the expiration of the first four years of its majority.
"2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be discovered in
which the child is expressly acknowledged.
"In this case the action must be instituted within the six months following the discovery of such
instrument."
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On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other consists in that the
right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the child, that is, it can always be brought
against the presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right of action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it can not be
instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of
the presumed parents.
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents of the
obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the natural filiation, there exists the most radical
difference in that the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and he may
demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or indirectly and secondarily from
the heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as a general rule, it only lasts during the
life of the presumed parents. Hence the other difference, derived as a consequence, that an action for
legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter,
while the action for acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the exception of
the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed above.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to acknowledge
the natural filiation.
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latters action to claim his legitimacy, or to obtain the
acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the code grants it in the first case, but not the second.
It contains provisions for the transmission of the right of action which, for the purpose of claiming his
legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard to the transmission of the right to
obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of action
which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in
certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural
children to which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no
mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of action to secure
acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his
heirs, while the right of action to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly, independently, or,
as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception.
Consequently, the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment
of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to
sustain such pretension, nor can an argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no
basis for the greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the
heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a matter of fact,
the position of a natural child is no better than, nor even equal to, that of a legitimate child.
From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived:

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The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the
right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, he
may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure the
acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the
presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and pertains
exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in
three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or
while insane, or after action had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of
the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the
child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed
by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It can not be
transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:

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Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise on Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether said action should be
considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child, whether he had or had not
exercised it up to the time of his death, and decides it as follows;
"There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed admissible as a solution,
that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by analogy to his heirs
on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate child, to claim his

legitimacy, under article 118, but nothing more; because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of
a natural child on a better footing than those of the legitimate child, and even to compare them would not
fail to be a strained and questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the
simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists, while for those of the
natural child, as we have said, there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the other
hand there is none that prohibits it." (Vol. V.)
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by the supreme court of
Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:
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"Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children, grants them the right to
claim said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even authorizes the transmission of said right for the space of
five years to the heirs thereof, if the child die during his minority or in a state of insanity. But as article 137
is based on the consideration that in the case of a natural child, ties are less strong and sacred in the eyes
of the law, it does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the action; it limits it to the life
of the parents, excepting in the two cases mentioned in said article; and it does not allow, as does article
118, the action to pass on to the heirs, inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it
might be deemed on general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the
reason that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is not, nor can
it be, an omission, but a deliberate intent to establish a wide difference between the advantages granted to
a legitimate child and to a natural one."
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(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)

Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Codigo Civil) raises the question: "Can the heirs of a natural child claim
the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are under obligation to acknowledge" ?
And says:
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"Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the right of investigation
forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The
affirmation is altogether too categorical to be admissible. If it were correct the same thing would happen as
when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of action to demand the legitimacy
is not transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an absolute right, but under certain limitations and
circumstances. Now, were we to admit the doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result would be that the
claim for natural filiation would be more favored than one for legitimate filiation. This would be absurd,
because it can not be conceived that the legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the
natural child, which is only granted under great limitations and in very few cases to those of a legitimate
one. Some persons insist that the same rules that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural
filiation, and that in this conception the heirs of the natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases
prescribed by article 118. The majority, however, are inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment
as a personal right, and consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really there are not legal grounds to
warrant the transmission." (Vol. 2, 229.)
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of analogy for the purpose
of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to the right of action which article 118 concedes
to the heirs of the legitimate child. The existence of a provision for the one case and the absence thereof for
the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and it can not be understood that
the provision of law should be the same when the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the
other.
The theory of the law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This theory, which in the
Roman Law expressed the general rule that an heir who did not accept an inheritance during his lifetime was
incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs, included at the same time the idea that if the inheritance
was not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there were, however, certain things which the heir
held and could transmit. Such was the law and the right to accept the inheritance, for the existing reason
that all rights, both real and personal, shall pass to the heir; quia haeres representat defunctum in omnibus
et per omnia. According to article 659 of the Civil Code, "the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and
obligations of a person, which are not extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her natural
child, and the latter, among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action for his
acknowledgment against his father, during the life of the latter, or after his death in some of the excepting
cases of article 137, such right, which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as being
his heir, and it was so understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in question, not as a
personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by his death, but as any other right which
might be transmitted after his death. This right of supposed transmission is even less tenable than that
sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of the child
who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of action to claim his
legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it
forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity
to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the
code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the childs inheritance, it is necessary that the
conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the
child held during his lifetime, being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not
susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no
express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child

is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted as a portion of
the inheritance of the deceased child.
On the other hand, it said right of action formed a part of the childs inheritance, it would be necessary to
establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and
from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain circumstances as in the
case of the heirs of a legitimate child; and if it is unreasonable to compare a natural child with a legitimate
one to place the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a legitimate
child would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated in one of the above citations, most absurd and illegal in
the present state of the law and in accordance with the general principles thereof.
For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all its parts, without any
special ruling as to the costs of this instance.
Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:

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The questions arising from the facts and points of law discussed in this litigation between the parties
thereto, decided in the judgment appealed from, and set up and discussed in this instance by the said
parties in their respective briefs, are subordinate in the first place to the main point, submitted among
others to the decision of this court, that is, whether the right of action brought to demand from the natural
father, or from his heirs, the acknowledgment of the natural child which the former left at his death was, by
operation of the law, transmitted to the natural mother by reason of the death of the said child
acknowledged by her.
The second error assigned by the appellant in his brief refers exclusively to this important point of law.
Article 846 of the Civil Code prescribes:

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"The right of succession which the law grants natural children extends reciprocally in similar cases to the
natural father or mother."
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Article 944 reads:

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"If the acknowledged natural or legitimized child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged
by it, the father or mother who acknowledged it shall succeed to its entire estate, and if both acknowledged
it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike."
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It can not be inferred from the above legal provisions that from the right of succession which the law grants
the natural father or mother upon the death of their natural child, the right of the heirs of any of the said
parents to claim the acknowledgment of the natural child is excluded. No article is to be found in the Civil
Code that expressly provides for such exclusion or elimination of the right of the heirs of the deceased child
to claim his acknowledgment.
If under article 659 of said code, the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a
person, which are not extinguished by his death, it is unquestionable that among such rights stands that
which the natural child had, while alive, to claim his acknowledgment as such from his natural father, or
from the heirs of the latter. There is no reason or legal provision whatever to prevent the consideration that
the right to claim acknowledgment of the filiation of a deceased child from his natural father, or from the
heirs of the latter, is included in the hereditary succession of the deceased child in favor of his natural
mother.
It is to be regretted that such an eminent writer as Manresa is silent on this special point; or that he is not
very explicit in his comments on article 137 of the Civil Code. Among the various noted writers on law,
Professor Sanchez Roman is the only one who has given his opinion in a categorical manner as to whether or
not the right of action for the acknowledgment of a deceased natural child shall be considered transmissive
to his heirs, as may be seen from the following:
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"In order to complete the explanation of this article 137 of the Civil Code, three points must be decided: (1)
Against whom shall an action for acknowledgment be brought under the cases and terms to which the two
exceptions indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 137 refer? (2) Who is to represent the miner in bringing
this action when neither the father nor the mother has acknowledged him? (3) Should this right of action be
considered as transmitted to the heirs or descendants of the natural child whether or not it was exercised at
the time of his death?
"With respect to the third, there is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed
admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child is
transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the
descendants of the legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article 118, but no more; because on this
point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than those of the legitimate
child, and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and questionable matter, and one of great
difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate child the said

article 118 exists, while for those of the natural child, as we have said, there is no provision in the code
authorizing the same, although on the other hand there is none that prohibits it."
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Certainly there is no article in the Civil Code, or any special law that bars the transmission to the heirs of a
natural child, particularly to his natural mother, of the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of said
natural child from the heirs of his deceased natural father.
According to the above-cited article 944 of the Civil Code, the only persons designated to succeed to the
intestate estate of a natural child who died during minority or without issue are its natural father or mother
who acknowledged it; consequently if by operation of the law his parents are his legal successors or heirs, it
is unquestionable that by reason of the childs death the property, rights, and obligations of the deceased
minor were, as a matter of fact, transmitted to them, among which was the right to demand the
acknowledgment of the said deceased natural child from the heirs of the deceased natural father or mother,
respectively, on account of having enjoyed uninterruptedly the status of natural child of the said deceased
parents. (Arts. 135 and 136, Civil Code.)
At the death of the children, Teopista in 1902, and Jose in 1903, during their minority, and after the death of
their natural father which took place in 1899, the natural mother of the said minors, Paula Conde, succeeded
them in all of their property and rights, among which must necessarily appear and be included the right of
action to claim the acknowledgment of said two children from the heirs of Icasiano Abaya, their deceased
natural father. There is no legal provision or precept whatever excluding such right from those which, by
operation of the law, were transmitted to the mother, Paula Conde, or expressly declaring that the said right
to claim such acknowledgment is extinguished by the death of the natural children.
It is true that, as a general rule, an action for acknowledgment can not be brought by a surviving natural
child after the death of his parents, except in the event that he was a minor at the time of the death of
either of his parents, as was the case with the minors Teopista and Jose Conde, who, if living, would
unquestionably be entitled to institute an action for acknowledgment against the presumed heirs of their
natural father; and as there is no law that provides that said right is extinguished by the death of the same,
and that the mother did not inherit it from the said minors, it is also unquestionable that Paula Conde, the
natural mother and successor to the rights of said minors, is entitled to exercise the corresponding action for
acknowledgment.
If the natural mother had no right of action against the heirs of the natural father, for the acknowledgment
of her natural child, the unlimited and unconditional reciprocity established by article 846 of the code would
neither be true nor correct. It should be noticed that the relation of paternity and that of filiation between
the above-mentioned father and children are both natural in character; therefore, the intestate succession of
the said children of Paula Conde is governed exclusively by articles 944 and 945 of the said code.
It is true that nothing is provided by article 137 with reference to the transmission to the natural mother of
the right to claim the acknowledgment of her natural children, but, as Sanchez Roman says, it does not
expressly prohibit it; and as opposed to the silence of the said article, we find the provisions of articles 846
and 944 of the Civil code, which expressly recognized the right of the natural mother to succeed her natural
child, a right which is transmitted to her by operation of law from the moment that the child ceases to exist.
The question herein does not bear upon the right of a child to claim his legitimacy, as provided in article 118
of the code, nor is it claimed that the rights of natural children and of their mother are equal to those of
legitimate ones, even by analogy.
The foundations of this opinion are based solely on the provisions of the above-mentioned articles of the
code, and I consider that they are sustainable so long as it is not positively proven that the so oftenmentioned right of action for acknowledgment is extinguished by the death of the minor natural child, and is
not transmitted to the natural mother by express declaration or prohibition of the law, together with the
property and other rights in the intestate succession.
In view of the considerations above set forth it is my opinion that it should be held: That Paula Conde, as
the natural mother and sole heir of her children Teopista and Jose, was and is entitled to the right to
institute proceedings to obtain the acknowledgment of the latter as natural children of the late Icasiano
Abaya, from Roman Abaya, as heir and administrator of the estate of the said Icasiano Abaya; and that the
said Teopista and Jose who died during their minority, three years after the death of their father, should be
considered and acknowledged as such natural children of the latter, for the reason that while living they
uninterruptedly enjoyed the status of his natural children. The judgment appealed from should be affirmed
without any special ruling as to costs.
With regard to the declaration that the property of the late Icasiano, which Paula Conde might take, are of a
reservable character, together with the other matter contained in the third error assigned by the appellant to
the said judgment, the writer withholds his opinion until such time as the question may be raised between
the parties in proper form.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 44837. November 23, 1938.]
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITO LEDESMA, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Adriano T. de la Cruz, for Appellants.
Simeon Bitanga, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION: FILING OF CLAIM AGAINST A DECEASED SON BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
ON CLAIMS AND APPRAISAL IN THE INTESTATE OF HIS FATHER: PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION FOR THE
RECOVERY OF THE CLAIM. The filing of a claim before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed
in the intestate of the father, for a monetary obligation contracted by a son who died before him, does not
suspend the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said indebtedness.
2. ID.; ID.; The claim for the payment of an indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be
filed for its collection before the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of his father,
and the properties inherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment
of the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.

DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, jr.,
Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads:
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"For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in this case declaring Ana Quitco Ledesma an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for legal purposes, but absolving the
defendants as to the prayer in the first cause of action that the said Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared
entitled to share in the properties left by the deceased Eusebio Quitco.
"As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma,
jointly and severally, only the sum of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500), with the legal interest
thereon from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. No pronouncement is made as to the costs. So
ordered."
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In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court in
its aforesaid decision:
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"1. That the trial court erred in holding that the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing
the last installment of the note Exhibit C has not yet prescribed.
"2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property inherited by the defendants from their deceased
grandfather by the right of representation is subject to the debts and obligations of their deceased father
who died without any property whatsoever.
"3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff Socorro
Ledesma the sum of P1,500."
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The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal questions raised in this appeal are those set
out in the appealed decision, which have been established at the trial, namely:
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"In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was
still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana
Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems that the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came
an end but the latter executed a deed (Exhibit A), acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his
natural daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory
note (Exhibit C), of the following tenor:
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"P2,000.00. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of two thousand pesos
(P2,000), Philippine currency under the following terms: Two hundred and fifty pesos (P250) to be paid on
the first day of March 1922: another two hundred fifty pesos (P250) to be paid on the first of November
1922; the remaining one thousand and five hundred (P1,500) to be paid two years from the date of the
execution of this note. San Enrique, Occ. Negros, P.I. Jan. 21, 1922.
"Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four
children, who are the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died (Exhibit 5), and, still
later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and
personal properties upon his death, administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this
court, the said case being known as the Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, civil case No. 6153 of this
court.
"Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of the committee
on claims and appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935, filed before said committee the
aforequoted promissory note for payment, and the commissioners, upon receipt of said promissory note,
instead of passing upon it, elevated the same to this court en consulta (Exhibit F), and as the Honorable
Jose Lopez Vito, presiding over the First Branch, returned said consulta and refreained from giving his
opinion thereon (Exhibit C), the aforesaid commissioners on claims and appraisal, alleging lack of jurisdiction
to pass upon the claim, denied the same (Exhibit H).
"On November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the
deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs, Socorro
Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the reconsideration of said order, a petition which the
court denied. From the order denying the said petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu thereof there was
filed the complaint which gives rise to this case."
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The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised in the first assignment of alleged error, in whether or
not the action to recover the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment for the payment of the
promissory note Exhibit C, has prescribed.
According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21,
1922, the last installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from the date of execution of said promissory
note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complainant in the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is,
more than ten years after the expiration of the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed
her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of

Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the running of the prescriptive period of judicial action for the recovery of
said debt, because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should not have
been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed the
same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said Socorro
Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said
case through the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten
years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the
action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.
As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the trial court erred in holding that the
properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the
payment of debts and by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their
deceased father, who died without leaving any property, while it is true that under the provisions of articles
924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child represents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of
his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the
obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The
herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not
bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did inherit anything.
The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.
Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors, the third assignment of error is also wellfounded.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the filing of a claim before the
committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of the father, nor a monetary obligation
contracted by a son who died before him, does not suspend the prescriptive period of the judicial action for
the recovery of said indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its collection before
the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his father, and the properties inherited
from the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of the indebtedness
contracted during the lifetime of said person.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are absolved from the complaint, with
the costs to the appellees. So ordered.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 48372. July 24, 1942.]
GENEROSA TEVES DE JAKOSALEM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NICOLAS RAFOLS, ET ALS.,DefendantsAppellees.
Tomas Alonso and Silvano Jakosalem, for Appellant.
Nicolas Rafols, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; VALIDITY OF THE SALE OF AN INHERITANCE BY AN HEIR. The sale
made by S. M. in favor of P. C. was valid, but it would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to
the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her deceased father J. M. And as on December 12,
1920, upon the partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to S. M., the sale of the
whole land which the latter made in favor of P. C. was entirely confirmed.
2. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE SALE OF A PROPERTY; PREFERENCE OF THE ONE FIRST IN POSSESSION. Upon the
confirmation of the sale on December 12, 1920 in favor of P. C., the conveyance by S. M. in favor of N. R. in
1921 could no longer be done. And even in the case of a double sale, where neither of the purchasers has
registered the sale, the first in possession, namely, P. C., should be preferred. When the sale made in the
latters favor was confirmed on December 12, 1920, S. M. was in possession of the land as lessee, and this
possession should be considered as that of P. C. The possession of N. R. commenced in 1921 only,
wherefore, it is subsequent to that of P. C.

DECISION

MORAN, J.:

The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally belonged to Juan Melgar. The latter died
and the judicial administration of his estate was commenced in 1915 and came to a close on December 2,
1924, only. During the pendency of the said administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar,
daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the
stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue in possession of the land as lessee
of the purchaser. On December 12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was
made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of
professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant- appellee Nicolas Rafols, who entered upon
the portion thus conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro
Cui brought an action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other
defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in
question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and declaring the
plaintiff owner of the other half by express acknowledgment of the other defendants. The plaintiff appealed
from that part of the judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar could not have sold anything to
Pedro Cui because the land was then in custodia legis, that is, under judicial administration. This is error.
That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of the heirs
may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under
administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid
interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance,
subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs
"becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it
remains undivided." (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala v. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And according to article 399 of the Civil
Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such
assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the
dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of the
heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court,
speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect
thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was valid, but it would be
effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her
deceased father Juan Melgar. And as on December 12, 1920, upon the partition of said property, the land in
question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor of
Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.
Upon the confirmation of the sale on December 12, 1920 in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance by Susana
Melgar in favor of Nicolas Rafols in 1921 could no longer be done. And even in the case of a double sale,
where neither of the purchasers has registered the sale, the first in possession, namely, Pedro Cui, should be
preferred. When the sale made in the latters favor was confirmed on December 12, 1920, Susana Melgar
was in possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be considered as that of Pedro Cui. The
possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced in 1921 only, wherefore, it is subsequent to that of Pedro Cui.
Nicolas Rafols may not allege prescription of action, for Pedro Cui filed the first complaint in 1921, or the
year following the confirmation of the sale in his favor. And as Nicolas Rafols deprived Pedro Cui of the
possession and enjoyment of one-half of the land since 1921 to the present, it is only just that he should
pay an indemnity therefor. Six per cent of P1,500, which is the price of one- half of the land, may be
considered as the reasonable amount of this indemnity.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed, and Nicolas Rafols is sentenced to deliver to the plaintiff
Generosa Teves de Jakosalem, one-half of the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and to pay, by way
of damages, the sum of P90 a year from the filing of the complaint, that is, from July 23, 1921, until the
delivery of the land, with the costs of both instances against him. So ordered.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5064. February 27, 1953.]
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESPERANZA, M. PO, Defendant-Appellee.
Quirico del Mar for Appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; TRANSMISSION TO HEIRS, FROM MOMENT OF DEATH; SALE MADE BY
WIDOW OF DECEDENTS PROPERTY. The moment of death is the determining factor when the children of
a decedent acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. No formal or
judicial declaration is needed to confirm the childrens title. Sale made by the widow of the decedents
property after his death is null and void so far as it included the childrens share.
2. ID.; SALE OF DECEDENTS PROPERTY, WITH COURTS AUTHORITY; NECESSITY OF REGISTRATION OF
SALE. Sale made of decedents property with authority of the competent court is legal and effective even
if not registered.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the
defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land which previously had been sold,
along with the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiffs grantors. Judgment was against the plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the pertinent parts of which are
thus summarized in the appealed decision:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"1st. That Leonard J. Winstantley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former having died on
June 6, 1946 leaving as heir the surviving spouse and some minor children;
"2nd. That upon the death of L. J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate
of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu;
"3rd. That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
"4th. That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire
parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed
money for the support of her children;
"5th. That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land to
the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
"6th. That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have never been registered up
to date;
"7th. That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her
appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special Proceeding No. 212-R) sold one-half of the
land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the
children of the above named spouses."
cralaw virtua1aw library

As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity of the sale to Esperanza M.
Po, the last purchaser. This question in turn depends upon the validity of the prior sale to Maria Canoy and
Roberto Canoy.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death." In a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as
article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:

jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance,
whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses
between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance
because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death." (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the
entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the sellers children. No formal or
judicial declaration being needed to confirm the childrens title, it follows that the first sale was null and void
in so far as it included the childrens share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration
were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause
than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision, of the right of the plaintiff
and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action against Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be
appropriate for such damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in their favor.

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE
BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja,appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,
special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendantappellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.

L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p

Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja, 1 from the approval of a compromise
agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled,
"Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his
first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is
under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946,
Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was
appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja
allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was
appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in
said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued
with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases
remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been
unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a
compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963, 2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of
Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The
terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND

The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality,
the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them
in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and
distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without
any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms
and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties
situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del
Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los
herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la
Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per
square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000)
Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment
and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well
as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No.
7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by
the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The
funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full
payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that
particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines,
amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share
of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or
the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala,
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name
of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.

5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose

de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors,
executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw,
waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause
or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims
and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or
may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and
1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI
Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against
Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to
completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and
assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from
the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of
the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de
Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically
renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of
Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under
paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and
documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said
heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion",
otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND
VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966,
to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement,
but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R.
case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case
No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja;
(2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja
and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the
Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedentleft no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the

Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses
that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule
74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion
of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the
parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is
a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will
is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from
an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco
shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary
share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis
Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent
of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. 4 Of course, the effect of
such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the
aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the
coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal
Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be
dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a
compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of
suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the
heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the
perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The
only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the
Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is
explicit on the point:

8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no
definite period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory
period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that
such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by
said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde
and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at
P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which
contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of
the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja,
namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no
sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the
purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from
the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this
particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no
date, the day being left blank "this day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was
not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification
clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2
heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000
represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja"
which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is
proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963
(Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the
other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1)
not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is
moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made
within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly
omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was
to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of
Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days
counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the
terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate
of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja,
whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that
eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not
bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of
the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.

If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could
not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it
amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point
is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A")
describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is
nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as
the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in
L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by
the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the
proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion
above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been
formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that
some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the
compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval
of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse
of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by
the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that
Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de
Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the
widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement
before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately
entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief
for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21
September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a
more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the
original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order
for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore
described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of
the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order
should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should
be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the
value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of
the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement
(Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And
as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with
every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly
opposite in the present case.

Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the
husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it
forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome
the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has
become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in
the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying
reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible
creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly
registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda
was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong
section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco
de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena
Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of
13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7
and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452)
against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first
wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of
Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal
property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of
1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary,
as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had
adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then
appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question
as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco
de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the
same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda.

de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7
September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the
Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as
administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed
the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de
Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal"
(Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against
interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial
proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not
conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the
strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte,
337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala,
Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had
been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by
Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand
from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo
that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the
proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount
would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de
Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions
in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not
finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio
de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private
funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as
exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4)
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de
Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay,
hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja
had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both
Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A
ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.

As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not
clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers
precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two
real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600,
and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In
addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly selfserving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7")
are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they
are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his
executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the selfserving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal
character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually
confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should
be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3)
cases.

[G.R. NOS. 154391-92. September 30, 2004]

Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, Petitioners, v. Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO
MACASAET, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The present case involves a dispute between parents and children.The children were invited by the parents
to occupy the latters two lots, out of parental love and a desire to foster family solidarity.Unfortunately, an
unresolved conflict terminated this situation.Out of pique, the parents asked them to vacate the
premises.Thus, the children lost their right to remain on the property.They have the right, however, to be
indemnified for the useful improvements that they constructed thereon in good faith and with the consent of
the parents.In short, Article 448 of the Civil Code applies.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 22, 2002
Decision2 and the June 26, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP Nos. 56205 &
56467.The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
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WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1.Vicente and Rosario should reimburse Ismael and Teresita one-half of the value of the useful
improvements introduced in the premises prior to demand, which is equivalent
toP475,000.00.In case the former refuse to reimburse the said amount, the latter may remove
the improvements, even though the land may suffer damage thereby.They shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
2.The award of attorneys fees is DELETED.
3.The records of these consolidated cases are REMANDED to the Court of origin for further
proceedings to determine the option to be taken by Vicente and Rosario and to implement the
same with dispatch.4
cralawre d

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita5 Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-degree
relatives.Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife. 6
cralawre d

On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City an
ejectment suit against the children.7 Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa
City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and
used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite repeated
demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.8
cralawred

Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement.They claimed that respondents had
invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in order that they could all live
near one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the problems of the family.9 They
added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance
in favor of their children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T-103141 had been allotted

to Ismael as advance inheritance.On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly
given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents house. 10

cralawred

The MTCC11 ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises.It opined that
Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of
Vicente and Rosario.12 As their stay was by mere tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied
promise to vacate the lots upon demand.13 The MTCC dismissed their contention that one lot had been
allotted as an advance inheritance, on the ground that successional rights were inchoate.Moreover, it
disbelieved petitioners allegation that the other parcel had been given as payment for construction
materials.14
cralawre d

On appeal, the regional trial court15 (RTC) upheld the findings of the MTCC.However, the RTC allowed
respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by Petitioners, after payment of
the indemnity provided for by Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code. 16 It added that
respondents could oblige petitioners to purchase the land, unless its value was considerably more than the
building.In the latter situation, petitioners should pay rent if respondents would not choose to appropriate
the building.17
cralawre d

Upon denial of their individual Motions for Reconsideration, the parties filed with the CA separate Petitions
for Review, which were later consolidated.18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the
subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.19 Thus, possession of the subject lots by petitioners
became illegal upon their receipt of respondents letter to vacate it. 20
cralawred

Citing Calubayan v. Pascual,21 the CA further ruled that petitioners status was analogous to that of a lessee
or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the
owner.22 Consequently, in ascertaining the right of petitioners to be reimbursed for the improvements they
had introduced on respondents properties,23 the appellate court applied the Civil Codes provisions on
lease.The CA modified the RTC Decision by declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code was inapplicable.The
CA opined that under Article 1678 of the same Code, Ismael and Teresita had the right to be reimbursed for
one half of the value of the improvements made.24
cralawre d

Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioners brought this recourse to this Court. 25
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

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1. a) Whether or not Section 17[,] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on Judgment should apply in the rendition
of the decision in this case;
b) Whether or not the Complaint should have been dismissed;
c) Whether or not damages including attorneys fees should have been awarded to herein
petitioners;
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2. a) Whether or not the rule on appearance of parties during the Pretrial should apply on appearance of
parties during Preliminary Conference in an unlawful detainer suit;
b) Whether or not the case of Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals(230 SCRA
164) is applicable to appearance of parties in an unlawful detainer suit;
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3.Whether or not Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the case on the matters of improvements, or
is it Article 447 of the Civil Code in relation to the Article 453 and 454 thereof that should apply, if ever to
apply the Civil Code;
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4.Whether or not the [D]ecision of the Court of Appeals is supported by evidence, appropriate laws, rules
and jurisprudence;
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5.Whether or not Assisting Judge Norberto Mercado of the MTCC Lipa City should be held accountable in
rendering the MTCC [D]ecision;
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6.Whether or not Atty. Glenn Mendoza and Atty. Andrew Linatoc of the same [l]aw office should be held
accountable for pursuing the [e]jectment case[.]26
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Ejectment
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises?At the outset, we stress that this is
the main issue in ejectment proceedings.27 In the present case, petitioners failed to justify their right to
retain possession of the subject lots, which respondents own.Since possession is one of the attributes of
ownership,28 respondents clearly are entitled to physical or material possession.
Allegations of the Complaint
Petitioners allege that they cannot be ejected from the lots, because respondents based their Complaint
regarding the nonpayment of rentals on a verbal lease agreement, which the latter failed to
prove.29 Petitioners contend that the lower courts erred in using another ground (tolerance of possession) to
eject them.
In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the expiration
or termination of the defendants right to possess, arising from an express or implied contract. 30 In other
words, the plaintiffs cause of action comes from the expiration or termination of the defendants right to
continue possession.31 The case resulting therefrom must be filed within one year from the date of the last
demand.
To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is illegally withholding
possession from the plaintiff is sufficient.The complaint may lie even if it does not employ the terminology of
the law, provided the said pleading is couched in a language adequately stating that the withholding of
possession or the refusal to vacate has become unlawful. 32 It is equally settled that the jurisdiction of the
court, as well as the nature of the action, is determined from the averments of the complaint. 33
cralawre d

In the present case, the Complaint alleged that despite demands, petitioners refused to pay the accrued
rentals and [to] vacate the leased premises.34 It prayed that judgment be rendered [o]rdering [petitioners]
and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the properties x x x and remove the structures x x x
constructed thereon.35 Effectively then, respondents averred that petitioners original lawful occupation of the
subject lots had become unlawful.
The MTCC found sufficient cause to eject petitioners.While it disbelieved the existence of a verbal lease
agreement, it nevertheless concluded that petitioners occupation of the subject lots was by mere tolerance
of respondents.Basing its conclusion on the fact that the parties were close relatives, the MTCC ruled
thus:
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x x x [T]he parties herein are first degree relatives.Because of this relationship, this Court takes judicial
notice of the love, care, concern and protection imbued upon the parents towards their [children], i.e., in the
instant case, the love, care, concern and protection of the [respondents] to the [petitioners].With this in
mind, this Court is inclined to believe the position of the [petitioners] that there was no such verbal lease
agreement between the parties herein that took place in 1992.x x x.
From the allegations of the [petitioners], this Court is convinced that their stay and occupancy of the subject
premises was by mere tolerance of the [respondents], and not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement
between them.36
cralawred

Having found a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the MTCC (as well as the RTC and the CA) did not err in
ordering the ejectment of petitioners as prayed for by respondents.There was no violation of Section 17 of
Rule 7037 of the Rules of Court.As earlier explained, unlawful detainer was sufficiently alleged in the
Complaint and duly proven during the trial.Significantly, the issue of whether there was enough ground to
eject petitioners was raised during the preliminary conference. 38
cralawred

Not Merely Tolerated

Possession
Petitioners dispute the lower courts finding that they occupied the subject lots on the basis of mere
tolerance.They argue that their occupation was not under such condition, since respondents had invited,
offered and persuaded them to use those properties. 39
cralawred

This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the
occupants will vacate the property upon demand.40 A summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy to
enforce this implied obligation.41 The unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from
the date of the demand to vacate.42
cralawred

Toleration is defined as the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly approved
of.43 Sarona v. Villegas44 described what tolerated acts means, in this language:
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Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness
or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are
generally those particular services or benefits which ones property can give to another without material
injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.x x x.And, Tolentino
continues, even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription. x x
x.Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts
which are merely tolerated.Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can
be considered mere tolerance.By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or
license, acts of possession are realized or performed.The question reduces itself to the existence or nonexistence of the permission.45
cralawre d

We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of possession by mere tolerance.Petitioners
were able to establish that respondents had invited them to occupy the subject lots in order that they could
all live near one other and help in resolving family problems. 46 By occupying those lots, petitioners
demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation.Hence, there was a meeting of minds, and an agreement
regarding possession of the lots impliedly arose between the parties.
The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely something not wholly approved of by
respondents.Neither did it arise from what Tolentino refers to as neighborliness or familiarity. In point of
fact, their possession was upon the invitation of and with the complete approval of respondents, who desired
that their children would occupy the premises.It arose from familial love and a desire for family solidarity,
which are basic Filipino traits.
Right to Use the Lots Terminated
That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear.The issue is the duration of
possession.In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Article 1197 of the Civil Code allows the courts to fix
the duration or the period.
Article 1197.If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.
In every case the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably
contemplated by the parties.Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.
Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period.Such qualification cannot
be inferred from the facts of the present case.
To repeat, when Vicente and Rosario invited their children to use the lots, they did so out of parental love
and a desire for solidarity expected from Filipino parents.No period was intended by the parties.Their mere
failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or authorize the courts to do so. 47

cralawred

Based on respondents reasons for gratuitously allowing petitioners to use the lots, it can be safely concluded
that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually benefited from the
arrangement.Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement. 48 Thus, when a change in the

condition existing between the parties occurs -- like a change of ownership, necessity, death of either party
or unresolved conflict or animosity -- the agreement may be deemed terminated.Having been based on
parental love, the agreement would end upon the dissipation of the affection.
When persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity between the parents and the
children, the purpose of the agreement ceased.49 Thus, petitioners no longer had any cause for continued
possession of the lots.Their right to use the properties became untenable.It ceased upon their receipt of the
notice to vacate.And because they refused to heed the demand, ejectment was the proper remedy against
them.Their possession, which was originally lawful, became unlawful when the reason therefor -- love and
solidarity -- ceased to exist between them.
No Right to Retain
Possession
Petitioners have not given this Court adequate reasons to reverse the lower courts dismissal of their
contention that Lots T-78521 and T-103141, respectively, were allegedly allotted to them as part of their
inheritance and given in consideration for past debts.
The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon the latters
demise.Indisputably, rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment of death of the
decedent.50 Assuming that there was an allotment of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained with
respondents.Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons in the future is not inconsistent with the
owners taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. 51 Other than their selfserving testimonies and their affidavits, petitioners offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish
claim of inheritance allocation.
We also agree with the lower courts that petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through a dation in
payment, Lot T-78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for respondents debts. 52 The evidence
presented by petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the parents arising from the latters
purported purchases and advances.53 There was no sufficient proof that respondents had entered into a
contract of dation to settle the alleged debt.Petitioners even stated that there was a disagreement in the
accounting of the purported debt,54 a fact that disproves a meeting of the minds with the parents.
Petitioners also admitted that a portion of the alleged debt is the subject matter of a collection case against
respondents (Civil Case No. 0594-96).55 Thus, the formers allegation that the indebtedness has been paid
through a dation cannot be given credence, inconsistent as it is with their action to recover the same debt.
Despite their protestations, petitioners recognized the right of the parents to recover the premises when
they admitted in their Position Paper filed with the MTCC that respondents had a title to the lots.
The [respondents] want to get their property because the title is theirs, the [petitioners] do not object but
what is due the [petitioners] including the reparation for the tarnish of their dignity and honor must be given
the [petitioners] for the benefits of their children before the premises will be turned over.56
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As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.

Second Issue:
Appearance at the Preliminary Conference
Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant during
the preliminary conference.On the basis of this provision, petitioners claim that the MTCC should have
dismissed the case upon the failure of respondents to attend the conference.However, petitioners do not
dispute that an attorney-in-fact with a written authorization from respondents appeared during the
preliminary conference.57 The issue then is whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to
substitute for a partys personal appearance.
Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary
conference.58 Under Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of
a valid cause; or by the appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter
into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.59
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Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70.Thus, the spirit behind the exception to personal
appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference.If there are valid reasons
or if a representative has a special authority, a partys appearance may be waived.As petitioners are
challenging only the applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule on preliminary conference, the written
authorization from respondents can indeed be readily considered as a special authorization.
Third Issue:
Rights of a Builder in Good Faith
As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of the owner to everything that is incorporated
or attached to the property.60 Accession industrial -- building, planting and sowing on an immovable -- is
governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code.
Articles 447 and 1678 of the
Civil Code Inapplicable
To buttress their claim of reimbursement for the improvements introduced on the property, petitioners cite
Article 447.61 They allege that the CA erred in applying Article 1678, since they had no lease agreement with
respondents.
We clarify.Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that apply when the owner of the
property uses the materials of another.It does not refer to the instance when a possessor builds on the
property of another, which is the factual milieu here.
In view of the unique factual setting of the instant case, the contention of petitioners regarding the
inapplicability of Article 1678 deserves attention.The CA applied the provisions on lease, because it found
their possession by mere tolerance comparable with that of a lessee, per the pronouncement inCalubayan v.
Pascual,62 from which we quote:
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x x x .It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.The status of
defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner.In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is
to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. 63(Emphasis in the original.)
As explained earlier, Ismael and Teresitas possession of the two lots was not by mere tolerance, a
circumstance that negates the applicability of Calubayan.
Article 448 Applicable
On the other hand, when a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable provision is
Article 448, which reads:64
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Article 448.The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the
one who sowed, the proper rent.However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. 65 It does not apply when the
interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary.66From these
pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that -- by some title -- one
has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.67
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However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited
definition.Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia,68 this provision was applied to one whose house -- despite having
been built at the time he was still co-owner -- overlapped with the land of another.69This article was also
applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner.The Court

ruled that the law deemed the builder to be in good faith. 70 InSarmiento v. Agana,71 the builders were found
to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to
be the owner of the land.72
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Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual milieu.The established facts
of this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvements introduced by petitioners.In fact,
because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of the
construction of the improvements introduced thereon.73 Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in
good faith when they built the structures on those lots.
The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier.74 In that case, this Court deemed the son to be in
good faith for building the improvement (the house) with the knowledge and consent of his father, to whom
belonged the land upon which it was built.Thus, Article 448 75 was applied.
Rule on Useful Expenses
The structures built by petitioners were useful improvements, because they augmented the value or income
of the bare lots.76 Thus, the indemnity to be paid by respondents under Article 448 is provided for by Article
546, which we quote:
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Art. 546.Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses
or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own -- the building and other
improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the
increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof.They have the option to oblige petitioners to
pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures -- in which case,
petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,77 this case must be remanded to the trial court to determine matters
necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546.Such matters include the option
that respondents would take and the amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to
appropriate the improvements on the lots.We disagree with the CAs computation of useful expenses, which
were based only on petitioners bare allegations in their Answer.78
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Ruling on Improvement Justified

While, ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the MTCC on ejectment proceedings is limited to the issue of physical or
material possession of the property in question, this Court finds it necessary to abbreviate the issue on the
improvements in relation to Article 448.First, the determination of the parties right to those improvements is
intimately connected with the MTCC proceedings in the light of the ejectment of petitioners.Second, there is
no dispute that while they constructed the improvements, respondents owned the land.Third, both parties
raised no objection when the RTC and the CA ruled accordingly on this matter.
Equitable considerations compel us to settle this point immediately, pro hoc vice, to avoid needless
delay.Both parties have already been heard on this issue; to dillydally or equivocate would not serve the
cause of substantial justice.
Other Issues Raised
Given the foregoing rulings, it is no longer necessary to address petitioners allegation that the MTCC judge
and respondents lawyers should be respectively held personally accountable for the Decision and for filing
the case.79 The insinuation of petitioners that the lawyers manipulated the issuance of a false barangay
certification is unavailing.80 Their contention that respondents did not attend the barangay conciliation
proceedings was based solely on hearsay, which has little or no probative value. 81
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WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
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1.The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse one half of the value of the
useful improvements, amounting to P475,000, and the right of Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to
remove those improvements (if the former refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.
2.The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to the
proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, specifically to the following matters:
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a.Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets option to appropriate -- as their own -- the improvements on the
lots, after paying the indemnity, as provided under Article 546 in relation to Article 448 of the Civil Code; or
in requiring Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to pay for the value of the lots, unless it is considerably
more than that of the improvements, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent based upon the
terms provided under the Civil Code
b.The value of the useful expenses incurred by Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet in the construction of
the improvements on the lots
c.The increase in value acquired by the lots by reason of the useful improvements
d.Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets choice of type of indemnity to be paid (whether b or c)
e.Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the improvements built thereon
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129008 - January 13, 2004]
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA
UNGOS, Petitioners, v.COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA,
ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
administrator is the issue in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside theDecision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as itsResolution2 dated March
26, 1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and real
properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City.3 He also left a widow, respondent
Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are

the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. OrfinadaHappenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and
Angelo P. Orfinada.4
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children.
They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital
relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and copetitioners Veronica5, Alberto and Rowena.6
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995,
petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and
that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and
63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena
Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from
the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the
extra-judicial settlement.7
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that
letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him. 8
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related Documents with
Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.9
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that
the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally
belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero10 and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance
inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name. 11Petitioners also raised the
affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. 12 On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed
a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing13on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as
heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed
in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise denied.16
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053.17 Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. 18
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision19 dated January 31, 1997, stating that it discerned no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he
denied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary nature.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.20 Hence, the petition before this
Court.
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal standing to
prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration
proceedings.21
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for preliminary hearing
on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not
the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies
in the discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this
rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be
had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. 22 (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional character
of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory
effect.23 Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in the discretion of the Court", apart from the retention of the
word "may" in Section 6,24 in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts doorstep for not hearing petitioners
affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as
heirs to bring the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit
in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code
"that (t) he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The
provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.25
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 26 and Section 2, Rule 8727 of the
Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs
to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an
administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on
behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate
have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs
cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated
or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor
or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of31 and he is made a party defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for the
heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed
administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring
suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the
estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there
is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse to
this Court is not warranted. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 137582 - August 29, 2012]
JOSE I. MEDINA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF THE LATE ABUNDIO
CASTAARES, Represented by ANDRES CASTAARES, Respondents.
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 42634, reversing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate, Masbate,.
Branch 46 in Civil Case No. 4080.
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages with prayer for Preliminary Attachment and
docketed as Civil Case No. 3561. In a Decision dated 27 December 1985, the RTC ordered Arles
Castaares (Arles), now deceased and represented by his heirs, to pay damages for running over and
causing injuries to four-year old Wenceslao Mahilum, Jr. The four-year old victim was left in the custody of
petitioner Jose I. Medina, who also represented the victim s father, Wenceslao Mahilum, Sr. in the aforesaid
case.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 3561 became final and executory on 3 June 1987. The motion for issuance of
a writ of execution3 filed by petitioner was granted on 29 September 1987 and the corresponding Writ of
Execution4 was issued on 1 October 1987. The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC served a Notice of
Levy and Seizure on Arles two (2) parcels of lands located at Goldbag, Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate described
as follows:
PARCEL-I

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A parcel of coconut land located at Goldbag, Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate, registered in the name of deceased
Arles Castaares under Tax Dec. No. 1107, bounded on the North, by Abundio Castaares; East, by
public land; South, by Provincial Road and on the West, by Abundio Castaares with an area of 5.0000
hectares and assessed at P6,810.00.
PARCEL-II
A parcel of coconut, rice, unirrigated & cogon located at Goldbag, Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate, registered in
the name of Abundio Castaares, under Tax Dec. No. 1106, bounded on the North, by Masbate Goldfield
Min. C.; East, by Timberland; South, by National Road and on the West, by National Road with an area of
18.8569 hectares and assessed at P 15,660.00.5
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When the heirs of Arles failed to settle their account with petitioner, Parcel-I under Tax Declaration No.
11076 was sold at a public auction. Only petitioner participated in the bidding, thus the subject lot was
awarded to him and a Certificate of Sale was issued on 24 December 1987. 7 In the Sheriff s Final Deed of
Sale, Parcel-I was transferred to Wenceslao Mahilum, Sr., represented by Jose I. Medina. 8 A survey was
conducted on the property. On 23 January 1989, the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted
by the trial court commanding the sheriff to physically oust the heirs of Arles and to deliver the subject lot to
petitioner.
On 26 April 1991, petitioner applied for the registration of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107,
docketed as LRC Case No. N-374. Petitioner alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of such parcel of land
by virtue of a Waiver of Rights and Interests9 executed by Wenceslao Mahilum, Sr. in his favor. Attached to
the application is the Survey Plan which particularly described the land as follows:
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A parcel of coconut land containing an area of 5.0000 (sic) hectares located at Goldbag-Syndicate, Aroroy,
Masbate, declared for taxation purposes in the name of Wenceslao Mahilum, Sr. (rep. by Jose I. Medina)
under Tax Dec. No. 7372, and bounded on the North, by Abundio Castaares, South, by Atlas Mining &
Development Corporation and Provincial Road, East, by Public Land and on the West, by Provincial Road with
the latest assessment at P 6,810.00.10
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Andres Castaares (Andres), brother of Arles and representing the heirs of the late Abundio Castaares
(Abundio), filed an Opposition claiming that after the death of his father Abundio, the tax declaration of the
property was cancelled and in its place, a tax declaration was issued in his favor; that during the lifetime of
his father and up to his death, Andres had been in peaceful, open, notorious, public and adverse possession
of the lot; that sometime in 1988, petitioner, through stealth and strategy, encroached and occupied
practically the entirety of the property in question by encircling it with barbed wires, destroying in the
process scores of fruit-bearing coconut trees; and that there is a pending case, Civil Case No. 4051, for
recovery of ownership and possession of real estate.11
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The pending case mentioned by Andres was later dismissed by the trial court without prejudice to refiling
the same.12 Thus, on 28 April 1992, Andres filed another Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Damages and with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as Civil
Case No. 4080.13
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The action for recovery of possession and ownership in Civil Case No. 4080 and the land registration case in
LRC No. N-374 were jointly tried.

Andres testified that upon Abundio s death, the latter left his children a parcel of agricultural land with an
area of 18 hectares,14 declared for taxation in Abundio s name under Tax Declaration No. 1106, bounded as
follows:
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North by Sta. Clara Goldfield (Masbate Goldfield)

East by Timberland
South National Road
West National Road15

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Andres presented a sketch plan on 26 May 1983 of Lots 224 and 2187, Pls-77 16 and pointed out that the
alleged lot of Arles covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 is outside Lot 224 and lies to the south of Abundio s
lot.17 He averred that petitioner encroached on and fenced a portion of said lot, occupying an area of about
five (5) hectares. Based on the sketch plan, petitioner fenced Line 2 to Line 8. 18
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Petitioner presented Tax Declaration No. 1107 under the name of Arles showing the boundaries of his lot as
follow:
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North Abundio Castaares

South Provincial Road
East Public Land
West Abundio Castaares19

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Petitioner insisted that the lots contained in Tax Declaration Nos. 1107 and 1106 are not separate and
distinct, but refers to only one parcel of land, Lot 224. The lot in Tax Declaration No. 1107 is denominated as
Lot 224-A and is derived from Tax Declaration No. 1106, as certified by the wife of Arles, Patricia
Castaares (Patricia).20 Petitioner likewise submitted a sketch plan prepared on 12 March 1992 to show the
real location of the lot described in Tax Declaration No. 1107.
On 10 May 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The dispositive portion reads:

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant-applicant, to wit:

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1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4080 with costs against the plaintiff-oppositors;
2. Declaring the defendant-applicant, Jose I. Medina, the absolute owner of the land subject of his
application in L.R.C. Case No. 374;
3. Declaring the title of the applicant over the property designated in Plan Csd-05-009053 together with all
the improvements thereon, CONFIRMED and REGISTERED pursuant to the provision of P.D. No. 1529; and

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4. Ordering the plaintiff-oppositors to pay the defendant-applicant the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney s
fees and P 5,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the corresponding decree of registration issue. 21

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The trial court found that petitioner lawfully acquired the land through a Deed of Waiver of Rights and
Interest executed by Wenceslao Mahilum, Sr., the winning party in the damages suit. The trial court gave
credence to a Certification22 issued by the Provincial Sheriff and even signed by Patricia, the wife of Arles,
certifying that the sketch plan of Lot 224-A reflects the true location and area of the property subject of the
writ of possession and execution.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the trial court as follows:

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WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered, to wit:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the Application of Jose I. Medina in Land Registration Case No. N-374;

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2. Declaring the heirs of the late Abundio Castaares represented by Andres Castaares the absolute
owner of the land subject of application in L.R.C. Case No. N-374;
3. Ordering the Applicant Jose I. Medina to pay plaintiffs-oppositors Heirs of Abundio Castaares the
following sum:
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A. P 20,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P 1,000.00 rental per month from February 24, 1989 until fully paid;
c. P 1,000.00 refund of the yield of the crops of the land from February 24, 1989 until fully paid, and
d. Costs of suit.23

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The Court of Appeals stated that the lot under Tax Declaration No. 1107 in the name of Arles is separate and
distinct from Lots 224 and 2187 declared under Tax Declaration No. 1106. The appellate court took into
consideration the separate and distinct location of the lots, as well as the difference in their boundaries. It
also noted that since there has been no settlement yet of the estate of Abundio, it was premature for Arles
to have allocated unto himself a distinct portion of Lots 224 and 2187 as his share in the estate. And even if
there was partition among the heirs of Abundio, the appellate court concluded that the share of Arles is only
limited to 3.1432 hectares. The Court of Appeals further observed that the boundary on the west of the
property sought to be registered by petitioner in the land registration case was changed from "Abundio
Castanares" to "Provincial Road," in conflict with the boundary of the property as stated in Tax Declaration
No. 1107. The appellate court concluded that the changes in the boundary on the west were purposely made
to justify the illegal occupancy and fencing of the southern portion of Lot 224.
Petitioner elevated the case before this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari and assigned the following
alleged errors committed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
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1. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 46 OF MASBATE.
2. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BOUNDARIES IN THE TAX
DECLARATION WERE CHANGED TO SUIT THE PURPOSE OF JOSE I. MEDINA.
3. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT REFERRING PROPERLY TO THE SKETCH PLAN OF
THE LAND IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION.
4. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE LAND SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE AT BAR STILL FORMS PART OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ABUNDIO CASTAARES.
5. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AS AGAINST PETITIONERDEFENDANT-APPLICANT JOSE I. MEDINA, WHO RECEIVED THE PROPERTY IN GOOD FAITH FROM THE
OFFICER OF THE COURT.24
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Petitioner contends that a comparison of the respective boundaries of the lots covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1107 and Tax Declaration No. 1106 readily shows that Lot 224-A in Tax Declaration No. 1107 is well
within the boundaries of Lot 224 in Tax Declaration No. 1106. Petitioner dismisses the observation of the
appellate court regarding the purported "change in boundaries" as a mere typographical error. Petitioner
scores the appellate court for relying on a homestead application of Abundio to establish the latter s
ownership on the subject land. Petitioner harps on the inconsistencies of respondent first, in Civil Case
No. 4051 (which was dismissed prior to the filing of Civil Case No. 4080), respondent claimed that the land
of Abundio was transferred to him when his father died but he later changed his stand and made it appear
that the land is still owned by the heirs of Abundio; second, respondent testified that the share of Arles in
the lot was sold to Ildefonso and Juan Castaares; and third, respondent s son, Adrian, had filed a third
party claim during the public auction sale, alleging that the land is already owned by him by virtue of a sale
by the heirs of Abundio. Petitioner insists that the land is already segregated from the land of Abundio as
evidenced by the mortgage executed by Arles in 1966 with Masbate Rural Bank, as shown in Tax Declaration
No. 876.
In its Comment, respondent points out that the issues raised by petitioner are factual questions which
cannot be reviewed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari .
As correctly pointed out by respondent, the assigned errors are factual in character. It is axiomatic that a
question of fact is not appropriate for a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. This rule provides
that the parties may raise only questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by
the tribunals below. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are

conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any
of the following recognized exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 25
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We find no cogent reason to apply the exceptions. While we slightly deviate from one of the findings of the
appellate court, we nonetheless affirm its conclusion. We explain.
The boundaries of the subject lot were clearly delineated and were, as a matter of fact, undisputed. Lot 224,
as stated in Tax Declaration No. 1106, is bounded by Sta. Clara Goldfield (Masbate Goldfield) in the North,
by Timberland in the East, by National Road in the South, and National Road in the West. On the other hand,
Lot 224-A is bounded on the North by the land owned by Abundio, on the South by the Provincial Road, on
the East by Public Land, and on the West by Abundio.
As per the Sketch Plans26 submitted by the parties, Lot 224 and Lot 224-A are illustrated below:
(pls. see image: G.R. No. 137582, page 11, Aug. 29, 2012)
Comparing the two sketches, it is unmistakable that Lot 224-A forms part and parcel of Lot 224. Moreover,
the boundaries, as admitted by both parties, more or less established the location of Lot 224-A, which
location is inside and forms part of Lot 224. While it appears that Lot 224-A was a subdivision of Lot 224, it
does not necessarily establish petitioner s ownership over Lot 224-A.
Quite obviously, the two sketches are purportedly referring to only one lot. Hence, the pith and core of the
controversy is the ownership of the disputed property.
The appellate court is correct in stating that there was no settlement of the estate of Abundio. There is no
showing that Lot 224 has already been partitioned despite the demise of Abundio. It has been held that an
heir s right of ownership over the properties of the decedent is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned. This means that the impending heir has yet no absolute dominion over
any specific property in the decedent s estate that could be specifically levied upon and sold at public
auction. Any encumbrance of attachment over the heir s interests in the estate, therefore, remains a mere
probability, and cannot summarily be satisfied without the final distribution of the properties in the
estate.27 Therefore, the public auction sale of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 is void
because the subject property is still covered by the Estate of Abundio, which up to now, remains
unpartitioned. Arles was not proven to be the owner of the lot under Tax Declaration No. 1107. It may not
be amiss to state that a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership. 28
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Against a mere tax declaration, respondents were able to present a more credible proof of ownership over
Lot 224. The Court of Appeals relied on the Certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) Officer of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) which
certifies that Abundio, and now the heirs, is the holder of a homestead application and an order for the
issuance of patent had already been issued as early as 7 July 1952. 29
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Pertinent portions of the Certification are reproduced hereunder:

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This is to certify that per records of this office, Abundio Castaares (deceased) now the heirs represented
by Juan Castaares is the holder of Homestead Application No. 178912 (E-96030) which was issued an
order: Issuance of Patent on July 7, 1952.
It is also shown that in BL Conflict No. 220 (N), DLO Conflict No. 274, entitled F.P.A. No. 11-1-1823 of
Exequiela Jaca-Claimant-Protestant v. H.A. No. 178912 (E-96030) of Abundio Castaares (deceased), now
the heirs rep. by Juan Castaares, B.L. Claim No. 220 (N), R.L.O. Claim No. 473, D.L.O. Claim No. 274, a
decision was rendered on May 19, 1976 the dispositive portion reads:
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"WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the Homestead Application No. 178912 (E-96030) of the Heirs of Abundio
Castaares, represented by Juan Castaares shall cover only Lots No. 224 and 2187 in Pls-77, Aroroy,
Masbate and as thus amended, shall continue to be given further due course. Likewise, the Free Patent
Application No. 11-1-1823 of Exequiela Jaca for Lot No. 19, in the same subdivision, shall be given further
due course."30
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The Land Management Bureau of the DENR outlines the steps leading to the issuance of a homestead
patent:
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1. Filing of application;
2. Preliminary Investigation;
3. Approval of application;
4. Filing of final proof which consists of two (2) parts;

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A. Notice of intention to make Final Proof which is posted for 30 days.

b. Testimony of the homesteader corroborated by two (2) witnesses mentioned in the notice.
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The Final Proof is filed not earlier than 1 year after the approval of the application but within 5 years from
the said date.
5. Confirmatory Final Investigation;
6. Order of Issuance of Patent;
7. Preparation of patent using Judicial Form No. 67 and 67-D and the technical description duly inscribed at
the back thereof;
8. Transmittal of the Homestead patent to the Register of Deeds concerned. 31(Emphasis supplied.)
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In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,32 citing the early case of Balboa v. Farrales33 we ruled that when a
homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for a particular
tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein, enough to be regarded as the equitable owner
thereof. Where the right to a patent to land has once become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is
equivalent to a patent actually issued. The execution and delivery of patent, after the right to a particular
parcel of land has become complete, are the mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with that duty. Even
without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that
the paramount title to the land is still in the government. Such land may be conveyed or inherited.
Also, in Nieto v. Quines and Pio34 involving ownership over a contested lot, it was held that:

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x x x As a homestead applicant, Quines had religiously complied with all the requirements of the Public Land
Act and, on August 29, 1930, a homestead patent was issued in his favor. Considering the requirement that
the final proof must be presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead application x x x, it is
safe to assume that Bartolome Quines submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923 and that the Director
of Lands approved the same not long thereafter or before the land became the subject of the cadastral
proceedings in 1927. Unfortunately, there was some delay in the ministerial act of issuing the patent and the
same was actually issued only after the cadastral court had adjudicated the land to Maria Florentino.
Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle him to a patent,
Bartolome Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has unquestionably acquired a vested right on the
land and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof (citation omitted). Under these circumstances and
applying by analogy the principles governing sales of immovable property to two different persons by the
same vendor, Bartolome Quines title must prevail over that of Maria Florentino not only because he had
always been in possession of the land but also because he obtained title to the land prior to that of Maria
Florentino.
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In the instant case, it was clear that there has been an issuance of patent way back in 7 July 1952. The only
two acts left for the CENRO to do are to prepare the patent and to transmit it to the Register of Deeds. As to
whether these acts have already been complied with is not borne in the records, but the fact remains that
these acts are merely ministerial. Respondents have already acquired vested rights to a patent which is
equivalent to actual issuance of patent. They have become owners of the land.
As evidence of ownership of land, a homestead patent prevails over a land tax declaration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 11 September 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42634 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188417 : September 24, 2012

MILAGROS DE BELEN VDA. DE CABALU, MELITON CABALU, SPS. ANGELA CABALU and RODOLFO
TALAVERA, and PATRICIO ABUS, Petitioners, v. SPS. RENATO DOLORES TABU and LAXAMANA,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tarlac City, Branch II, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a "Petition for Review on Certiorari (under Rule 45)" of the Rules of Court assailing the June 16, 2009
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 81469 entitled "Milagros De Belen Vda de Cabalu v.
Renato Tabu."
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The Facts
The property subject of the controversy is a 9,000 square meter lot situated in Mariwalo, Tarlac, which was a
portion of a property registered in the name of the late Faustina Maslum (Faustina) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16776 with a total area of 140,211 square meters. 2
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On December 8, 1941, Faustina died without any children. She left a holographic will, dated July 27, 1939,
assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces. The said holographic will, however, was
not probated. One of the heirs was the father of Domingo Laxamana (Domingo), Benjamin Laxamana, who
died in 1960. On March 5, 1975, Domingo allegedly executed a Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land
disposing of his 9,000 square meter share of the land to Laureano Cabalu. 3
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On August 1, 1994, to give effect to the holographic will, the forced and legitimate heirs of Faustina
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition. The said deed imparted 9,000 square meters of
the land covered by TCT No. 16776 to Domingo. Thereafter, on December 14, 1995, Domingo sold 4,500
square meters of the 9,000 square meters to his nephew, Eleazar Tabamo. The document was captioned
Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land. On May 7, 1996, the remaining 4,500 square meters of Domingos share in
the partition was registered under his name under TCT No. 281353. 4
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On August 4, 1996, Domingo passed away.

On October 8, 1996, two months after his death, Domingo purportedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
TCT No. 281353 in favor of respondent Renato Tabu (Tabu). The resultant transfer of title was registered as
TCT No. 286484. Subsequently, Tabu and his wife, Dolores Laxamana (respondent spouses), subdivided the
said lot into two which resulted into TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339. 5
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On January 15, 1999, respondent Dolores Laxamana-Tabu, together with Julieta Tubilan-Laxamana, Teresita
Laxamana, Erlita Laxamana, and Gretel Laxamana, the heirs of Domingo, filed an unlawful detainer action,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7106, against Meliton Cabalu, Patricio Abus, Roger Talavera, Jesus Villar, Marcos
Perez, Arthur Dizon, and all persons claiming rights under them. The heirs claimed that the defendants were
merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by their late father, Domingo, but, when asked to vacate the
property, they refused to do so. The case was ruled in favor of Domingos heirs and a writ of execution was
subsequently issued.6
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On February 4, 2002, petitioners Milagros de Belen Vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabalu, Spouses Angela Cabalu
and Rodolfo Talavera, and Patricio Abus (petitioners), filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale, Joint Affidavit of Nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 291338 and 291339, Quieting of
Title, Reconveyance, Application for Restraining Order, Injunction and Damages (Civil Case No. 9290)
against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City (RTC). 7
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In their complaint, petitioners claimed that they were the lawful owners of the subject property because it
was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 5,
1975. Hence, being the rightful owners by way of succession, they could not be ejected from the subject
property.8
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In their Answer, respondent spouses countered that the deed of sale from which the petitioners anchored
their right over the 9,000 square meter property was null and void because in 1975, Domingo was not yet
the owner of the property, as the same was still registered in the name of Faustina. Domingo became the
owner of the property only on August 1, 1994, by virtue of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with
Partition executed by the forced heirs of Faustina. In addition, they averred that Domingo was of unsound
mind having been confined in a mental institution for a time. 9
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On September 30, 2003, the RTC dismissed the complaint as it found the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
March 5, 1975, null and void for lack of capacity to sell on the part of Domingo. Likewise, the Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject property
was declared ineffective having been executed by Domingo two months after his death on August 4, 1996.
The fallo of the Decision10 reads:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision is hereby
rendered by way of:
1. declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 5, 1975, executed by Domingo Laxamana
in favor of Laureano Cabalu;
2. declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 8, 1996, executed by Domingo Laxamana
in favor of Renato Tabu, and that TCT Nos. 293338 and 291339, both registered in the name of Renato Tabu,
married to Dolores Laxamana be cancelled;
3. restoring to its former validity, TCT No. 16770 in the name of Faustina Maslum subject to partition by her
lawful heirs.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.11

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Not in conformity, both parties appealed to the CA. Petitioners contended that the RTC erred in declaring
void the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 5, 1975. They claimed that Domingo owned the property, when
it was sold to Laureano Cabalu, because he inherited it from his father, Benjamin, who was one of the heirs
of Faustina. Being a co-owner of the property left by Benjamin, Domingo could dispose of the portion he
owned, notwithstanding the will of Faustina not being probated.
Respondent spouses, on the other hand, asserted that the Deed of Sale, dated March 5, 1975, was spurious
and simulated as the signature, PTR and the document number of the Notary Public were different from the
latters notarized documents. They added that the deed was without consent, Domingo being of unsound
mind at the time of its execution. Further, they claimed that the RTC erred in canceling TCT No. 266583 and
insisted that the same should be restored to its validity because Benjamin and Domingo were declared heirs
of Faustina.
On June 16, 2009, the CA rendered its decision and disposed as follows:

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WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is partially GRANTED in that the decision of the
trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that sub-paragraphs 2 & 3 of the disposition, which reads:
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"2. declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 8, 1996, executed by Domingo
Laxamana in favor of Renato Tabu, and that TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339, both registered in the name of
Renato Tabu, married to Dolores Laxamana be cancelled;
3. restoring to its former validity, TCT No. 16776 in the name of Faustina Maslum subject to partition by her
lawful heirs," are DELETED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.12

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In finding Domingo as one of the heirs of Faustina, the CA explained as follows:

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It appears from the records that Domingo was a son of Benjamin as apparent in his Marriage Contract and
Benjamin was a nephew of Faustina as stated in the holographic will and deed of succession with partition.
By representation, when Benjamin died in 1960, Domingo took the place of his father in succession. In the
same vein, the holographic will of Faustina mentioned Benjamin as one of her heirs to whom Faustina
imparted 9,000 square meters of her property. Likewise, the signatories to the Deed of Extra-judicial
Succession with Partition, heirs of Faustina, particularly declared Domingo as their co-heir in the succession
and partition thereto. Furthermore, the parties in this case admitted that the relationship was not an
issue.13
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Although the CA found Domingo to be of sound mind at the time of the sale on March 5, 1975, it sustained
the RTCs declaration of nullity of the sale on the ground that the deed of sale was simulated.

The CA further held that the RTC erred in canceling TCT No. 266583 in the name of Domingo and in ordering
the restoration of TCT No. 16770, registered in the name of Faustina, to its former validity, Domingo being
an undisputed heir of Faustina.
Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition before this Court anchored on the following:
GROUNDS
(A)
THE DEED OF SALE OF UNDIVIDED PARCEL OF LAND EXECUTED ON MARCH 5, 1975 BY DOMINGO
LAXAMANA IN FAVOR OF LAUREANO CABALU IS VALID BECAUSE IT SHOULD BE ACCORDED THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND DECLARED VALID FOR ALL PURPOSES AND INTENTS.
(B)
THE SUBPARAGRAPH NO. 2 OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD STAY BECAUSE
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DISCUSS THE ISSUE AND DID NOT STATE THE LEGAL BASIS
WHY SAID PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE DELETED FROM THE SEPTEMBER 30, 2003 DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.14
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The core issues to be resolved are 1) whether the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the
9,000 square meter property executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on March 5, 1975, is valid;
and 2) whether the Deed of Sale, dated October 8, 1996, covering the 4,500 square meter portion of the
9,000 square meter property, executed by Domingo in favor of Renato Tabu, is null and void.
Petitioners contend that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on
March 5, 1975 should have been declared valid because it enjoyed the presumption of regularity. According
to them, the subject deed, being a public document, had in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to
contradict the same, there must be clear, convincing and more than preponderant evidence, otherwise, the
document should be upheld. They insist that the sale transferred rights of ownership in favor of the heirs of
Laureano Cabalu.
They further argue that the CA, in modifying the decision of the RTC, should not have deleted the portion
declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, executed by Domingo in favor of
Renato Tabu, because at the time of execution of the said deed of sale, the seller, Domingo was already
dead. Being a void document, the titles originating from the said instrument were also void and should be
cancelled.
Respondent spouses, in their Comment15 and Memorandum,16 counter that the issues raised are not
questions of law and call for another calibration of the whole evidence already passed upon by the RTC and
the CA. Yet, they argue that petitioners reliance on the validity of the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale of
Undivided Parcel of Land, based on presumption of regularity, was misplaced because both the RTC and the
CA, in the appreciation of evidence on record, had found said deed as simulated.
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It is well to note that both the RTC and the CA found that the evidence established that the March 5, 1975
Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu was a fictitious
and simulated document. As expounded by the CA, viz:
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Nevertheless, since there are discrepancies in the signature of the notary public, his PTR and the document
number on the lower-most portion of the document, as well as the said deed of sale being found only after
the plaintiffs-appellants were ejected by the defendants-appellants; that they were allegedly not aware that
the said property was bought by their father, and that they never questioned the other half of the property
not occupied by them, it is apparent that the sale dated March 5, 1975 had the earmarks of a simulated
deed written all over it. The lower court did not err in pronouncing that it be declared null and void. 17
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Petitioners, in support of their claim of validity of the said document of deed, again invoke the legal
presumption of regularity. To reiterate, the RTC and later the CA had ruled that the sale, dated March 5,
1975, had the earmarks of a simulated deed, hence, the presumption was already rebutted. Verily and as
aptly noted by the respondent spouses, such presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the facts proven
and already established in the records of this case.
Even on the assumption that the March 5, 1975 deed was not simulated, still the sale cannot be deemed
valid because, at that time, Domingo was not yet the owner of the property. There is no dispute that the

original and registered owner of the subject property covered by TCT No. 16776, from which the subject
9,000 square meter lot came from, was Faustina, who during her lifetime had executed a will, dated July 27,
1939. In the said will, the name of Benjamin, father of Domingo, appeared as one of the heirs. Thus, and as
correctly found by the RTC, even if Benjamin died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could not yet validly
dispose of the whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the sole heir of Benjamin, as
his mother only died sometime in 1980.
Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law." Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered
into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the
succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the
promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. 18
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In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustinas will was not yet probated; the object of the
contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the estate
of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right therein.
Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000 square meter lot was
adjudicated to him.
The CA, therefore, did not err in declaring the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale null and void.
Domingos status as an heir of Faustina by right of representation being undisputed, the RTC should have
maintained the validity of TCT No. 266583 covering the 9,000 square meter subject property. As correctly
concluded by the CA, this served as the inheritance of Domingo from Faustina.
Regarding the deed of sale covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject property executed in
favor of Renato Tabu, it is evidently null and void. The document itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
October 8, 1996, readily shows that it was executed on August 4, 1996 more than two months after the
death of Domingo. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the
contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable
of contracting and a party capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract
was already dead at the time of its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and,
therefore, null and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the party who appears as one
of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity.19
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The contract being null and void, the sale to Renato Tabu produced no legal effects and transmitted no rights
whatsoever. Consequently, TCT No. 286484 issued to Tabu by virtue of the October 8, 1996 Deed of Sale, as
well as its derivative titles, TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339, both registered in the name of Rena to Tabu,
married to Dolores Laxamana, are likewise void.
The CA erred in deleting that portion in the RTC decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October
8, 1996, null and void and canceling TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The decretal portion of the June 16, 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 5, 1975, executed by Domingo Laxamana in favor of Laureano
Cabalu, is hereby declared as null and void.
2. The Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, executed by Domingo Laxamana in favor of Renato
Tabu, and TCT No. 286484 as well as the derivative titles TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339, both registered in
the name of Renato Tabu, married to Dolores Laxamana, are hereby declared null and void and cancelled.
3. TCT No. 281353 in the name of Domingo Laxamana is hereby ordered restored subject to the partition by
his lawful heirs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 10806. July 6, 1918. ]
MONICA BONA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. HOSPICIO BRIONES, ET AL., objectors-appellees.
Ramon Pimentel, for Appellant.
Ocampo & De la Rosa, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; NOTARY AS WITNESS TO EXECUTION. A will was executed by a person capable of making it
before two attesting witnesses and a notary who, by the order and under the direction of the testator, was
charged with the drafting of the said will, and who understood the instrument drafted by him as wholly
containing the will of the above-mentioned testator, who certified as to the execution and authenticity of the
said will and as to its having been signed by the testator and the two witnesses in the act of its execution
and in his presence, stating further that these witnesses affirm that they were present when the testator
and the said notary signed the said will. Held: That it cannot be questioned that in the execution of the will
the requisites laid down by section 618 of Act NO. 190 are present, and therefore it should be admitted to
probate, inasmuch as Domingo de la Fuente was present and intervened in the making of the will by
Francisco Briones more as an attesting witness than as a notary the latters services being no longer
necessary in the execution of a will in accordance with the said Act.
2. ID.; APPLICATION OF ACT NO. 2645, PASSED AFTER DEATH OF TESTATOR. The will in question having
been executed in September, 1911, five years before Act No. 2645, amending said section 618 of Act No.
190 went into effect (July 1, 1916), which amendment took place two years and some months after the
death of the testator Briones (August 14, 1913), it is evident that said amendatory Act cannot apply to this
case.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF NEW LAW. The principle that a new law shall
not have any retroactive effect only governs the rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former
law; but if the right be declared for the first time by the subsequent law it shall take effect from that time
even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another
acquired right of the same origin. It is well known that hereditary rights are not born nor does the will
produce any effect except from the moment of the death of the person whose inheritance is concerned.
(Decision of the supreme court of Spain of June 24, 1897.)

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased Francisco Briones who died on
August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of the will which the said deceased husband on September 16,
1911, executed during his lifetime; for the fixing of a day for the hearing and presentation of evidence after
all the interested parties had been cited; and then for the approval of the partition of property made by the
testator in the said will. By an order dated January 20, 1915, Monica Bonas petition was granted and a date
set for the trial and other necessary proceedings for the probate of said will.
Counsel for Hospicio, Gregoria, and Carmen, all surnamed Briones, the legitimate children by the first

marriage of the testator, by a pleading dated March 5, 1915, opposed the probate of the will presented by
the widow of the deceased Briones, alleging that the said will was executed before two witnesses only and
under unlawful and undue pressure or influence exercised upon the person of the testator who thus signed
through fraud and deceit; and he prayed that for that reason the said will be declared null and of no value,
with costs against the petitioners.
The trial of the case was opened and in the presence of counsel for both parties, Gregorio Bustilla, one of
the witnesses of the said will, was examined and he stated under oath: That he, as well as Sixto Barrameda
and Domingo de la Fuente, was actually present as attesting witness when Francisco Briones executed his
will in the month of September in his (Bustillas) house situated in the municipality of Bao, Ambos
Camarines; that Francisco Briones knowing of the presence of notary Domingo de la Fuente in the house, he
went upstairs and announced himself; that on being asked what he wanted, Briones stated that he wanted
to execute his will; that after Briones and the notary had talked with each other, the former left and after a
while returned bringing with him some paper; that then Domingo de la Fuente, under the direction of
Francisco Briones, began to draft the will, which when finished was signed by the latter in the presence of
the notary, of the declarant, and of another witness, Sixto Barrameda; that then the three witnesses the
declarant, de la Fuente, and Barrameda signed in the presence of each other. The declarant identified the
signature placed on the will by the testator Briones and those of the other witnesses Sixto Barrameda and
Domingo de la Fuente, who all signed in the presence of the testator himself. He stated further that the
testator at that moment was in his sound judgment and not forced to execute the will. He identified the
document Exhibit A as the will executed by Francisco Briones and the signature of the latter as the one
placed by the testator. By agreement of both parties it was made to appear in the record that, if the
witnesses Sixto Barrameda and Domingo de la Fuente were called, they would have testified in the same
terms as witness Gregorio Bustilla.
In view of the above, the judge rendered judgment, dated March 27, 1915, denying probate to the will
Exhibit A as executed by Francisco Briones. From the judgment, counsel for Monica Bona appealed and
prayed to be allowed to sue further as a pauper; whereupon, by order of March 31, 1915, the judge
admitted the appeal, ordered the original records to be brought up, and reiterated his order of December 23,
1913, declaring Bona as a pauper, for the purposes of the appeal interposed.
The whole issue discussed by the parties and submitted for the decision of this court resolves itself as to
whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by section 618 of Act No.
190 have been observed.
But before proceeding further it is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by Francisco
Briones on September 16, 1911, as already stated and the order denying probate was rendered on March
27, 1915, both dates being prior to that of Act No. 2645 amending said section 618 and promulgated on
February 24, 1916, which took effect only from July first of the last named year; so that, in order to explain
whether or not the above-mentioned will was executed in accordance with the law then in force, the last
named law cannot be applied and the will in question should be examined in accordance with, and under the
rules of, the law in force at the time of its execution.
The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:

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"No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testators name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall
state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his
express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the
will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided."
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A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will Exhibit A shows in a clear manner that the
said will in its form and contents expresses without shadow of doubt the will of the testator; and that in its
execution the solemnities prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of Act No. 190 have been
observed.
Even though Domingo de la Fuente drafted the will and intervened in its preparation as a notary, by the
order and under the express direction of the testator, it is nevertheless true that he did it as a witness to the
execution of the said will with positive and concrete acts, while the two other witnesses Gregorio Bustilla and
Sixto Barrameda merely attested all that appeared in the second of the four paragraphs mentioned; for in it
they certify that the foregoing testament contains the last will of the testator Francisco Briones; that the
latter told them that before and at the time that he dictated his will, there was no inducement nor threat by
anybody; and that as he did not know how to write the Spanish language, said testator requested Domingo
de la Fuente to write the will, and he did it as it is now drafted, certifying also, that the testator Briones
signed his will voluntarily with his own hand, in the presence of the declarants who, as witnesses, signed the
instrument on the date expressed. Domingo de la Fuente on his part declared that the two said witnesses
formally swore before him on the certification which precedes the said will and, according to this testimony
as shown in the records and the testimony of the above-mentioned witnesses, the said Domingo de la
Fuente wrote and drafted the said will Exhibit A by the order and under the direction of the testator
Francisco Briones, who signed in the presence of the witnesses, Bustilla and Barrameda and of Notary
Domingo de la Fuente, all of whom immediately signed also in the presence of the testator, each doing it in
the presence of each other. So that, although it is not shown expressly that Domingo de la Fuente was an
attesting witness to the will, yet it cannot be denied that it was he who wrote it by the order and under the

direction of the testator; that he was a witness to its execution from the first to its last line; and that he was
perfectly aware of the fact that all that he had written in the document Exhibit A expresses the genuine and
true will of the testator. He saw and was present when the latter signed his will, as also when the two
witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda affixed their signatures; said witnesses also saw and were present when
Domingo de la Fuente signed at the end of the said document.
The name of Domingo de la Fuente appears as that of a notary who certifies as to the certainty of the will
made by Francisco Briones and of the signatures of the testator as well as of the witnesses at its end; and
as the law does not require that one of the witnesses must necessarily be a notary, and it cannot be denied
that Domingo de la Fuente attested the execution and the signing of the will not only by the testator but
also by the attesting witnesses, it cannot but be admitted that Domingo de la Fuente intervened, attested,
and signed the testament as a witness.
This is a case in which the judicial criterion should be inspired in the sense that it is not defeated, and if the
wish of the testator is so manifest and express as in the instant case, it is not proper nor just to invalidate
the will of Francisco Briones merely because of some small defect in form which is not essential nor of great
importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente was also a witness to the said will
when he signed it twice. As a matter of fact, he understood the contents of the will better than the two other
attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness and he attested the execution of the will during its making
until it was terminated and signed by the testator, by the witnesses, and by himself, even though he did it in
the capacity of a notary.
The last paragraph of section 618 of Act No. 190 supplies a legal basis to support the validity of the will in
question with the conditions for its probate because, notwithstanding the existence of such defect merely in
the form and not in the substance, the certification of authenticity and the very text of the will show in a
clear and indubitable manner that the will Exhibit A contains the last will of the testator, and that it was
signed by the latter and attested as being true and legitimate not only by the two witnesses Bustilla and
Barrameda but also by the one who wrote it, Domingo de la Fuente, who was also a truthful and reliable
witness, even though he be called a notary public.
The requisites established by Act No. 2645 which amended the oft-repeated section 618 cannot be required
in the probate of the will here inasmuch as this document was executed in September, 1911, five years
before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died on August 14, 1913,
two years and some months before the enforcement of the said law; and so, the only law applicable to the
present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No. 190, and in accordance with the provisions
of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has been presented to the court many months before
the amendatory act went into effect.
It is well known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs the rights
arising from acts done under the rule of the former law; but if the right be declared for the first time by a
subsequent law it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former
laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.
It is well known that hereditary rights are not born nor does the will produce any effect until the moment of
the death of the person whose inheritance is concerned. (Decision rendered in cassation by the supreme
court of Spain on June 24, 1897.)
In view of these facts, it follows that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and it should be
declared as we hereby declare that the will Exhibit A has been executed in due form by Francisco Briones on
September 16, 1911, and that the said will contains and expresses the last will and testamentary wishes of
the deceased testator. Consequently, let the records be returned to the court wherefrom they came with a
certified copy of this resolution in order that the judge, upon petition by the proper party, may provide for
the necessary proceedings with respect to the inheritance, and the clerk of the court may issue certified
copies of the said testament; without any special ruling as to costs. So ordered.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 14074. November 7, 1918. ]
In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa. MARCELINO CASAS
Vicente de Vera for petitioner and Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; CHANGE OF STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO EXECUTION OF WILL. The rule laid
down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testators death are controlling,
and that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient
at the time it was made.
2. ID.; ID. The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will
must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted
have no retrospective effect.
3. ID.; ID. A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in the
States of Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the
necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made and, when
they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to
the law in force at the time of their making.
4. ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE RULE. The second rule above set forth is adopted. In the Philippine Islands, the
law existing at the date of the execution of a will is controlling.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. A will was executed prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 in accordance with the law
then existing, namely, Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The death of the testator occurred after
the enactment of the new law. Held: That the will is valid.
6. ID.; ID.; ID. The recent decisions of this court in Caraig v. Tatlonghari (R.G. No. 12558, promulgated
March 23, 1918, not published), and Bona v. Briones ([1918], 38 Phil., 276), distinguished.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. The general rule of statutory construction that "all statutes
are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect"
applied to the Law of Wills.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the
execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of
an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force,

namely, Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No.
2645, amendatory of said Section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and
attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the
testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor
were the pages numbered correlatively by letters, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law,
therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the
testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

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"No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testators name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall
state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his
express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the
will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided."
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Act No. 2645 has amended Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as
follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass
any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testators name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other."
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This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made after the
date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig v.
Tatlonghari, R.G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a decision
handed down by Justice Torres, as to a will executed by a testator whose death took place prior to the
operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona v. Briones, [19181. 38 Phil. .
276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was executed prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, as to the effect of a change in
the statutes prescribing the formalities necessary to be observed in the execution of a will, when such
change is made intermediate to the execution of a will and the death of a testator. (See generally 40 Cyc.,
1076 and any textbook on Wills, and Lanes Appeal from Probate [1889], 57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid down
by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testators death are controlling, and
that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at
the time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying the later statute are the following: "As until the
death of the testator the paper executed by him, expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate
act which may or may not be a will, the law in force at the testators death applies and controls the proof of
the will." (Sutton v. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the foregoing proposition and the
reasons assigned for it, it would logically result that the will of Jose Riosa would have to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by
the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no
retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the old
English view; in Downs (or Downing) v. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said
that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testators death, is
regarded." It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of
Vermont from which State many of the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands
relating to wills are taken. (Giddings v. Turgeon [1886], 58Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor v.
Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the
following:
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"Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the
mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the
requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of
disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
"While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a
case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new law would affect his past act, and rest
satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is ambulatory until the death of the

testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually take effect until then. General words apply to the
property of which the testator dies possessed, and he retains the power of revocation as long as he lives.
The act of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go into effect
at a future time."
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A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in the States of
Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the necessary
formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made and, when they lessen
the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to the law in
force at the time of their making. (Hoffman v. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535; Price v. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr.
N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described. Our selection, under
such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose
sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his property and that his
desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the second and third rules on the
subject.
The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think, fallacious. The act of
bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed
act when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on the
property until a future time.
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give
them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every
case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect." (Montilla v. Corporacion de PP.
Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong v. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. v. American Sugar
Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof
provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of
Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the, uniform tendency of
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession.
(Abello v. Kock de Monasterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol v. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona v. Briones,
supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquina [1918], R.G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the
language of the Will. See also Section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of Section 634 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the
first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part
and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as
provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general
principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said Section 634. Our statute
announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be complied with as a completed act
at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made
subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that
date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule, particularly
as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the will
of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the
said will to probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 4445. September 18, 1909. ]
CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee, v. FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario for Appellants.
Fernando Salas for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. EXECUTION OF WILLS; WITNESSES. While a number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged
subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or a single contradiction
as to a particular incident to which the attention of such witnesses must have been directed, may in certain
cases justify the conclusion that the alleged witnesses were not present, together, at the time when the
alleged will was executed, a mere lapse of memory on the part of one of these witnesses as to the precise
details of an unimportant incident, to which his attention was not directed, does not necessarily put in doubt
the truth and veracity of the testimony in support of the execution of the will.
2. ID.; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY DEFINED. Proof of the existence of all the elements in the following
definition of testamentary capacity, which has frequently been adopted in the United States, held sufficient
to establish the existence of such capacity in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstance:
"Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty."

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, admitting to probate a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was
propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by
the appellants, who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it
appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the alleged will
in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when
it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and
mentally incapable of making a will.
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, signed
by him in the present of three subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears upon its face to have been
duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the making of wills.
Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Marino, testified in support of the will, the
latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it was executed; and their testimony was
corroborated in all important details by the testimony of the proponent herself, who was present when the

will was made. It does not appear from the record why the third subscribing witness was not called; but
since counsel for contestants makes no comment upon his absence, we think it may safely be inferred that
there was some good and sufficient reason therefore. In passing, however, it may be well to observe that,
when because of death, sickness, absence, or for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness
stand all the subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason for the absence of any of these
witnesses should be made to appear of record, and this especially in cases such as the one at bar, wherein
there is a contest.
The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore that the
testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind and memory, and in their presence attached his
signature thereto as his last will and testament, and that in his presence and in the presence of each other,
they as well as the third subscribing witness signed the instrument as attesting witnesses. Despite the
searching and exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel for appellants could
point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single incident which occurred at or
about the time when the will was executed, a contradiction, however, which we think is more apparent than
real. One of the witnesses stated that the decease sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and that
after its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting
position, and was given something to eat before he signed his name. We think the evidence discloses that
his wife aided the sick man to sit up in bed at the time when he signed his name to the instrument, and that
he was given nourishment while he was in that position, but it is not quite clear whether this was
immediately before or after, or both before and after he attached his signature to the will. To say that the
sick man sat up or raised himself up in bed is not necessarily in conflict with the fact that he received
assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or impossible that nourishment might have been given
to him both before and after signing the will, and that one witness might remember the former occasion and
the other witness might recall the latter, although neither witness could recall both. But, however this may
have been, we do not think that a slight lapse of memory on the part of one or the other witness, as to the
precise details of an unimportant incident, to which his attention may not have been particularly directed, is
sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses, or as to the truth and accuracy of their
recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument. Of course, a number of contradictions in the
testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or
even a single contradiction as to a particular incident, where the incident was of such a nature that the
attention of any person who was present must have been directed to it, and where the contradictory
statements in regard to it are also clear and explicit as to negative the possibility or probability take, might
well be sufficient to justify the conclusion that the witnesses could not possibly have been present, together,
at the time when it is alleged the will was executed; but the apparent contradictions in the testimony of the
witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt as to their veracity, and on the other hand their
testimony as a whole gives such a clear, and is so convincing and altogether satisfactory that we have no
doubt that the trial judge who heard them testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy of entire
confidence and belief.
The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at the time and on the
occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was executed, these witnesses were not in
the house with the testator, and that the alleged testator was at that time in such physical and mental
condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. Two of these witnesses, upon crossexamination, admitted that they were not in the house at or between the hours of four and six in the
afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have been made, this being the time at which the
witnesses in support of the will testified that it was executed. Of the other two witnesses, one is a contestant
of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These
witnesses swore that they were in the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill, at or about the time
when it is alleged that the will executed, and that at that time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in
the house, and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to make
himself understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the testimony of Macario Ubag
is our opinion wholly unworthy of credence. In addition to his manifest interest in the result of the
investigation, it clearly discloses a fixed and settled purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to that
end an utter disregard of the truth, and a readiness to swear to any fact which he imagined would aid in
securing his object. An admittedly genuine and authentic signature of the deceased was introduced in
evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the will, but this witness in his anxiety to deny the
genuineness of the signature of his brother to the will, promptly and positively swore that the admittedly
genuine signature was not his brothers signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in response
to a somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently gave him to understand that his former
answer was likely to prejudice his own cause. On cross-examination, he was forced to admit that because
his brother and his brothers wife (in whose favor the will was made) were Aglipayanos, he and his other
brothers and sister had not visited them for many months prior to the one particular occasion as to which he
testified; and he admitted further, that, although he lived near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any
of the other members of his family visit their dying brother, and that they did not even attend his funeral. If
the testimony of this witness could be accepted as true, it would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that
the subscribing witnesses to the alleged will should have falsely pretended to have joined in its execution on
the very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness happened to pay his only visit to this
brother during his last illness, so that the testimony of this witness would furnish conclusive evidence in
support of the allegations of the contestants that the alleged will was not executed at the time and place or
in the manner and form alleged by the subscribing witnesses. We do not think the testimony of this witness
nor any of the other witnesses for the contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the
testimony of the subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the will, or as to the manner and
form in which it was executed.
In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was introduced in

evidence, and upon a comparison of this signature with the signature attached to the instrument in
question, we are wholly of the opinion of the trial judge, who held in this connection as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"No expert evidence had been adduced with regard to those two signatures, and the presiding judge of this
court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in the matter of signatures; nevertheless, the
court has compared these two signatures, and does not find that any material difference exists between the
same. It is true that the signature which appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that at
the time of writing the subscriber was more deliberate in his movements, but two facts must be
acknowledged: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and the other fact, that for some reason which is not
stated the testator was unable to see, and was a person who was not in the habit of signing his name
everyday.
"These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two signatures, but the
court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are identical."
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That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony
of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind
and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an
advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick
to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to raise himself to a sitting position; and that
during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of
physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and
indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing
the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land
set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear
and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his
testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his
widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary
capacity and undue influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so
unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their contention that
the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of
his death had no heirs in the ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated
him from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his
wife were adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers
or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his
funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow
and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown men and women, by no
means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife,
or in any wise corroborates contestants allegation that the will never was executed.
It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine the degree of mental
capacity of a particular person has been everywhere recognized, and grows out of the inherent impossibility
of measuring mental capacity, or its impairment by disease or other causes" (Greene v. Greene, 145 Ill.,
264, 276); and that "it is probable that no court has ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect
to the exact amount of mental capacity requisite for the making of a valid will, without appreciating the
difficulty of the undertaking" (Trish v. Newell, 62 Ill., 196, 203).
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are
numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held that "mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable
of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and
memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about and how or to whom he is disposing of his
property" (Lodge v. Lodge, 2 Houst. (Del.) , 418); that, "To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise" (Sloan v.
Maxwell, N. J. Eq., 563); that "It has not been understood that a testator must posses these qualities (of
sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . . Few indeed would be the wills confirmed,
if this is correct. Pain sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity, would, according to its violence or
duration, in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement
must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man" (Den. v. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L., 680);
and, that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of
degree" (Boughton v. Knight, L. R., 3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that
"testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an
unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great bodily
infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator incapable of making a valid will,
providing such weakness really disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or
consequences of the act she is engaged in" (Manatt v. Scott, 106 Iowa,, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of
testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, as will be
seen from what has already been said, the testator was, at the time of making the instrument under
consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of
testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and the
United States; and while in some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof

of some of these elements, there can be no question that, in the absence of proof of very exceptional
circumstances, proof of the existence of all these elements is sufficient to establish the existence of
testamentary capacity.
"Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty."
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(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 23, p. 71, second
edition.)
In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the execution of the
instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased; that it was made in strict conformity
with the requisites prescribed by law; and that, at the time of its execution, the deceased was of sound mind
and memory and executed the instrument of his own free will and accord.
The order probating the will should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellants.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 6650. December 5, 1913. ]
SANTIAGO GALVEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CANUTA GALVEZ, Opponent-Appellee.
Eugenio Paguia, for Appellant.
Antonio Constantino, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; MENTAL CAPACITY OF THE TESTATOR. In order to hold that a testator, as the result of cholera,
was not of sound mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and was incapable of executing a valid
will, it is indispensable that the proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental incapacity and of his lack
of reason and judgment at the time he executed his will in due form. In this case, aside from the evidence
by the witnesses who testified that the mental faculties of the testator were unimpaired, the contents of the
will, and the desire manifested by the latter to rectify an error he incurred in the execution of his first will,
show that the testator was of sound mind and perfectly aware of his duties with respect to the legal,
inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir.
2. ID.; ID.; PHYSICIANS TESTIMONY BASED ON A GENERAL RULE. Statements by a physician who did
not see or examine the testator at the time the latter was making his will, based on the condition and
mental state of a cholera patient in ordinary cases and in the regular course of the disease, cannot serve as
a ground for declaring the testator incompetent when, notified of an error incurred by him in his firsts will
executed a few hours before, and exhibited in court, he declared his desire to correct the same by executing
a second will; inasmuch as the testimony of the subscribing witnesses and of the person who drew up the
document, shows that the mental and physical condition of the testator was an exception to the general rule
enunciated by the said physician, since the patient demonstrated that he had sufficient moral energy and
clear intelligence, in spite of the inroads made by the disease, to have been able to execute his last will and
testament in accordance with the requirements of the law.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

This is appeal was raised by counsel for Santiago Galvez from the judgment of October 25, 1910, whereby
the Honorable Simplicio del Rasorio, judge, denied the petition presented by the said Galvez for the probate
of the will, Exhibit B, and appointed as adminsitratix of the testators estate, the latters only legitimate
daughter, Canuta Galvez, under condition that she furnish bond in the sum of P2,000 for the faithful
discharged of the duties of her office.
Counsel for Santiago Galvez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of the will
which it was alleged Victor executed in the dialect of the province, on August 12, 1910, in presence of the
witnesses Juan Dimanlig, J. Leoquinco, and Nazaria Galves. This instrument appears also to have been
signed by the witness Lorenzo Galvez, below the name and surname of the testator. (p. 3, B. of E.,
translated into Spanish on p.5.)
Further on in the same record, pages 6 to 7, there appears another will written in Tagalog and executed on
the same date by Victor Galvez in presence of the witnesses Cirilo Paguia, Florentino Sison, and Juan
Mendoza.

In the course of the proceedings various witnesses were examined by the petitioner and by the respondent,
Canuta Galvez, the only daughter of the alleged testator, and the attorney Antonio Constantino stated that
he waived the right to present evidence and acquiesced in the petition made by Santiago Galvez for the
probate of the will, in view of a transaction entered into by the parties; but the court did not accept the
compromise, on the ground that it is improper to hold that a will is the faithful expression of the last wishes
of a decedent, upon the mere fact of the parties petitioning to that effect, when such will, as in the case at
bar, was assailed at the commencement of the suit.
After due trial the judgment aforementioned was rendered, from which an appeal was entered by counsel for
the petitioner, Santiago Galvez.
This case deals with the probate of the second will executed by Victor Galvez on August 12, 1910, and
signed in his presence by the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, and, as the
testator was no longer able to sign on account of his sickness, Lorenzo Galvez, at his request, affixed his
own signature to the instrument, for him and below his written name. This will, written in Tagalog and
translated into Spanish, is marked as Exhibit B and is found on pages 3 and 5 of the bill of exceptions.
The other will, written in Tagalog and marked Exhibit A, was presented during the proceedings; it was the
first one the testator executed on the same date, and, for the purpose of correcting an error contained in
this first will, he executed another will, the second, which is the one exhibited for probate.
Notwithstanding the opposition by Canuta Galvez, the testators daughter, who alleged that her father, owing
to his very serious sickness with cholera, lacked the intellectual capacity and clear judgment requisite for
making a will, and notwithstanding her testimony adduced in corroboration of her brief, the record
sufficiently proved the contrary; the subscribing witnesses to the will affirmed under oath that they were
present when Victor Galvez, then such in his house, stated to them that the document read before them by
Lorenzo Galvez contained his last will and testament, and that, as the testator was no longer able to sign, he
charged his nephew Lorenzo to do so in his stead, which the latter did by affixing his own signature to the
document, after having written at the foot of the same the name and surname of the testator, Victor Galvez,
who, as these witnesses observed, was of sound mind and in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties; he
talked intelligently and with perfect knowledge of what was taking place. They further testified that they all,
including the said Lorenzo Galvez, signed the will in the presence of the testator, Victor Galvez, who was at
the time lying on his bed.
In order to hold that Victor Galvez, on account of serious sickness, was not then of sound mind and did not
have full knowledge of his acts and, therefore, was incapable to execute a will, it is necessary that the
proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental incapacity and of his evident lack of reason and
judgment at the time he executed his will in the presence of the witnesses whose signatures appear at the
foot thereof, for these witnesses positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on executing his will, showed that he
was in full possession of his intellectual faculties and was perfectly cognizant of his acts.
The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects and results of cholera on a
patient in ordinary cases and in the regular course of this disease; but his statements, taken in general,
cannot, in the present suit, serve as a ground upon which to predicate incapacity, for the reason that he did
not examine Victor Galvez, nor did he even see him between the hours of 12 in the morning and 3 in the
afternoon of the 12th of August, 1910, during which period the testator ordered his will drawn up and the
attesting witnesses signed it, Galvez having died at about 6 oclock that same afternoon. It may be true that
cholera patients do, in the majority of cases, become incapacitated in the manner described by the
witnesses; but there may be exceptions to the general rule, and to judge from the testimony of the
witnesses who saw and communicated with the patient Victor Galvez at the time he executed his will, his
physical and mental condition mush have been an exception, since he demonstrated that he had sufficient
energy and clear intelligence to execute his last will in accordance with the requirements of the law.
Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents of the will and the testators
positive determination to rectify the error he incurred in the execution of this first will, show that Victor
Galvez was in his sound mind and was perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal, inviolable rights
of his daughter and sole heir, Canuta Galvez.
Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second will (Exhibit B), signed in the name of the testator
by Lorenzo Galvez and the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, the formalities
prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure were observed, for the testators name appears
written at the foot of the will and under this name Lorenzo Galvez signed by direction of the testator himself,
and the instrument was also signed by the attesting witnesses before mentioned who affirmed that they
heard and attested the dispositions made by the testator and witnessed the reading of the will, that they
were present when the said Lorenzo Galvez signed the will in the name of the testator and that they signed
it in the presence of all the persons assembled in the latters house, the conclusion is inevitable that Victor
Galvez, in executing his will, did so with a sound mind and the full use of his mental faculties; therefore, the
will must be admitted to probate.
For the foregoing reasons, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from in so far as it denies the probate
of the said will, we hereby hold that the same was duly executed by Victor Galvez and expresses his last
wishes, and we affirm the rest of the said judgment, with respect to the appointment, as administratrix, of
Canuta Galvez, the testators daughter and sole heir.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 24569. February 26, 1926. ]
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner and appellant, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant, v. MARGARITA
LOPEZ, Opponent-Appellee.
Araneta & Zaragoza for Appellants.
Marcaida, Capili & Ocampo and Thomas Cary Welch for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; DEFINITION. Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend
the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to
comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his
bounty. (Bugnao v. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163; Bagtas v. Paguio t1912], 22 Phil., 227; and Jocson v. Jocson
[1922], 46 Phil., 701.)
2. ID; ID.; TIME AS OF WHICH CAPACITY TO BE DETERMINED. The mental capacity of the testator is
determined as of the date of the execution of his will.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTS OF CAPACITY. Neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of
the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show
testamentary incapacity. The nature and rationality of the will is of some practical utility in determining
capacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.
4. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE. On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a
wide range in order that all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The
testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great
weight where they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of the will and
of the attending physician is also to be relied upon.
5. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS. The presumption is that every adult is sane. But where the question of
insanity is put in issue in guardianship proceedings, and a guardian is named for the person alleged to be
incapacitated, a presumption of the mental infirmity of the ward is created; the burden of proving sanity in
such case is cast upon the proponents of the will.
6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN. The effect of an order naming a guardian for an
incapacitated person is not conclusive with respect to the condition of the person, pursuant to the provisions
of section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree does not conclusively show that the testamentary
capacity of a person under guardianship is entirely destroyed. The presumption created by the appointment
of a guardian may be overcome by evidence proving that such person at the time he executed a will was in
fact of sound and disposing mind and memory.
7. ID.; ID.; MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE; INSANITY. A will to be valid must, under sections 614 and 634 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, be made by a testator of sound mind. The question of mental capacity is one of
degree. There are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy. (Bagtas v. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227,
and Bugnao v. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be

wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the
full possession of his reasoning faculties. The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory
possessed by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? (Buswell on Insanity, sec. 365; Campbell v.
Campbell [1889], 130 Ill., 466, and Bagtas v. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SENILE DEMENTIA." Senile dementia is childishness. In the first stages of the
disease, a person may possess reason and have will power.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE CASES ON TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY EXAMINED. An examination of
the Philippine cases on testamentary capacity discloses a consistent tendency to protect the wishes of the
deceased whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also show great tenderness on the part of the
court towards the last will and testament of the aged.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. On January 3, 1924, when the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, made his
will, he was 76 years old, physically decrepit, weak of intellect, suffering from a loss of memory, had a
guardian of his person and his property, and was eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of
life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that
intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity." Two of the subscribing witnesses testified clearly to
the regular manner in which the will was executed, and one did not. The attending physician and three other
doctors who were present at the execution of the will expressed opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of
the testator. Three other members of the medical profession expressed opinions entirely unfavorable to the
capacity of the testator and certified that he was of unsound mind. Held, That Tomas Rodriguez on January
3, 1924, possessed sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding
testamentary capacity; that the proponents of the will have carried successfully the burden of proof and
have shown him of sound mind on that date; and that it was reversible error on the part of the trial court
not to admit his will to probate.
12. ID.; UNDUE INFLUENCE; DEFINITION. Undue influence as used in connection with the law of wills,
may be defined as that which compels the testator to do that which is against the will from fear, the desire
of peace, or from other feeling which he is unable to resist.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Field, That the theory that undue influence was exercised by the persons
benefited in the will in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf, and that there was a preconceived
plan on the part of the persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez to secure his signature to the testament,
must be rejected as not proved.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez.
Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, on February 25, 1924, leaving a considerable
estate. Shortly thereafter, Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will, asked that the will of
Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased, on the
grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of the execution of the supposed
will he was suffering from senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been
exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf;
and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit. After
a prolonged trial, judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will. In the decision of the trial
judge appeared, among others, these findings:
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"All this evidence taken together with the circumstance that before, and at, the time Tomas Rodriguez was
caused to sign the supposed will, Exhibit A, and the copies thereof, there already existed a final judgment as
to his mental condition, wherein he was declared physically and mentally incapacitated to take care of
himself and manage his estate, shows in a clear and conclusive manner that at the time of signing the
supposed will, Tomas Rodriguez did not possess such mental capacity as was necessary to enable him to
dispose of his property by the supposed will.
"But even supposing, as contended by petitioners counsel, that Tomas Rodriguez was at the time of
executing the will, competent to make a will, the court is of the opinion that the will cannot be probated, for
it appears from the declaration of the attesting witness Elias Bonoan that when the legatee Luz Lopez
presented the supposed will, Exhibit A, to Tomas Rodriguez, she told him to sign said Exhibit A because it
was a document relative to the complaint against one Castito, which is Exhibit 4, then pending in the justice
of the peace court, and for the further reason that said Tomas Rodriguez was then under guardianship, due
to his being mentally and physically incapacitated, and therefore unable to manage his property and take
care of himself. It must also be taken into account that Tomas Rodriguez was an old man 76 years of age,
and was sick in the hospital when his signature to the supposed will was obtained. All of this shows that the
signature of Tomas Rodriguez appearing in the will was obtained through fraudulent and deceitful
representations of those who were interested in it." (Record on Appeal, p. 23.)
From the decision and judgment above-mentioned, the proponents have appealed. Two errors are specified,

viz: (1) The court below erred in holding that at the time of signing his will, Tomas Rodriguez did not
possess the mental capacity necessary to make the same; and (2) the court below erred in holding that the
signatures of Tomas Rodriguez to the will were obtained through fraudulent and deceitful representations,
made by persons interested in the execution of said will.
The record is voluminous close to two thousand type-written pages, with a varied assortment of exhibits.
One brief contains two hundred seventy-four pages, the other four hundred fifteen pages. The usual oral
argument has been had. The court must scale this mountain of evidence more or less relevant and of
argument intense and prolific to discover the fertile valleys of fact and principle.
The topics suggested by the assignments of error Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence will be
taken up separately and in order. An attempt will be made under each subject, first, to make findings of fact
quite separate and apart from those of the trial judge, and, second. to make findings of law. Finally, it is
proposed to consolidate the facts and the law by rendering judgment.
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
A. Facts. For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble health. His breakdown
was undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing years, and to an accident which occurred in 1921
(Exhibit 6). Ultimately, on August 10, 1923, on his own initiative, Rodriguez designated Vicente F. Lopez as
the administrator of his property (Exhibit 7).
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila to name a guardian
for Tomas Rodriguez because of his old age and pathological state. This petition was opposed by Attorney
Gregorio Araneta acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that while Rodriguez was far from
strong on account of his years, he was yet capable of looking after his property with the assistance of his
administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The deposition of Tomas Rodriguez was taken and a perusal of the same
shows that he was able to answer nearly all of the questions propounded intelligently (Exhibit 54-G). A trial
was had at which considerable oral testimony for the petitioner was received. At the conclusion of the
hearing, an order was issued by the presiding judge, declaring Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to take care
of himself and to manage his property, and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his guardian. (Exhibit 37.)
Inasmuch as counsel for the appellee make much of one incident which occurred in connection with the
guardianship proceedings, it may as well be mentioned here as later. This episode concerns the effort of
deputy sheriff Joaquin Garcia to make service on Tomas Rodriguez on October 31, 1923. We will let the
witness tell in his own words what happened on the occasion in question:
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"I found him lying down on his bed . . . And when it (the cleaning of his bed) was finished, I again entered
his room and told him that I had an order of the court which I wanted to read as I did read to him, but after
reading the order he asked me what the order meant; I read it to you so that you may appear before the
court, because you have to appear before the court I do not understand, then I read it again, but he
asked what the order said; in view of that fact I left the order and departed from the house." (S. R., p.
642.)
To return to our narrative possibly inspired by the latter portion of the order of Judge Diaz, Tomas Rodriguez
was taken to the Philippine General Hospital on November 27, 1923. There he was to remain sick in bed
until his death. The physician in charge during this period was Dr. Elias Domingo. In the clinical case record
of the hospital under the topic "Diagnosis (in full)," we find the following: "Senility; Hernia inguinal;
Decubitus" (Exhibit 8).
On the door of the patients room was placed a placard reading "No visitors, except father, mother,
sisters, and brothers." (Testimony of head nurse Carmen Baldonado, S. R., p. 638.) By order of the
attending physician, there were permitted to visit the patient only the following named persons: Santiago
Lopez, Manuel Ramirez, Romana Lopez, Luz Lopez de Bueno, Remedios Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad
Vizcarra, Apolonia Lopez, Antonio Haman, and Gregorio Araneta (Exhibit 9). The list did not include the
names of Margarita Lopez and her husband Antonio Ventura. Indeed the last named persons experienced
considerable difficulty in penetrating into the room of Rodriguez.
Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital, Rodriguez
expressed to him a desire to make a will and suggested that the matter be taken up with Vicente F. Lopez
(S. R., p. 550). This information Santiago Lopez communicated to Vicente F. Lopez, who then interviewed
Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City of Manila, for the purpose of securing him to prepare the
will. In accordance with this request, Judge Mina conferred with Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital on
December 16th and December 29th. He ascertained the wishes of Rodriguez and wrote up a testament in
rough draft. The attorney expected to return to the hospital on December 31st to have the will executed but
was unable to do so on account of having to make a trip to the provinces. Accordingly, the papers were left
with Santiago Lopez.
In corroboration of the above statements, we transcribe a portion of Judge Minas testimony which has not
been challenged in any way:
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"ARANETA:

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Q. Will you please tell your motive for holding an interview with Vicente Lopez?
"MAXIMINO MINA:

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"A. When I arrived in the house of Vicente Lopez, after the usual greetings and other unimportant things, he
consulted me or presented the question as to whether or not D. Tomas could make his will, having
announced his desire to do so. I told him that it seemed that we were not called upon to decide or give an
opinion as to whether or not he can make a will; it is a question to be submitted to the court, but as he had
announced his desire, it is our duty to comply with it. Then he requested me to do what was necessary to
comply with his wishes; I told him I was to see him; then we agreed that on the morning next to the
following evening, that is, on the 16th, I should go to the General Hospital, and so I did.
"Q. Did you go to the hospital in the evening of the 16th?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you meet D. Tomas.? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did D. Tomas tell you his desire to make a will?
"OCAMPO: Leading.
"ARANETA: I withdraw. What, if anything, did D. Tomas tell you on that occasion when you saw him there?
"A. He told me that.
"Q. Please tell us what conversation you had with D. Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. The conversation I had with him that evening according to my best recollection I cannot tell the
exact words and perhaps the order. After the usual greetings, Good evening, D. Tomas, Good evening,
How are you, How do you do? Very well, just as you find me. Then I introduced myself saying, I came
here in the name of D. Vicente Lopez, because according to him you stated your desire to make a will. Yes,
he said, and where is Vicente Lopez, why does he not come. He cannot come because he has many things
to do, and besides it is hard for him and makes him tired, so he told me to come. Then he asked me, Who
are you? I am Maximino Mina, your tenant, attorney. Are you an attorney? Yes. Where do you live? I
live in Quiapo. Oh, in Quiapo, a good district, it is gay, a commercial place, you must have some business
there because that is a commercial place. Unfortunately, I have none, D. Tomas. Well, you must have
because the profession alone does not give enough. Where is your office? I work in the office of Mr.
Chicote. That-Mr. Chicote must be rich, it seems to me that he is. The profession gives almost nothing, it is
better to have properties. I am an attorney but do not depend upon my profession. I interrupted D. Tomas
saying, since you want to make a will, when and to whom do you want to leave your fortune? Then he said,
To whom else? To my cousin Vicente Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez. Which properties do you want to
give to your cousin and niece? All my properties. Wont you specify the property to be given to each of
them? What for?, all my property. Dont you have any other relatives? Yes, sir, I have. Wont you give
any to those relatives? What for?, was his answer.Well do you want to specify said properties, to say what
they are? and he again said, What for?, they know them, he is my attorney-in-fact as to all my property. I
also said, Well and as a legacy, wont you give anything to other persons? The answer, I think, something,
they will know it. After being asked, Whom do you think, whom do you want to be your executor? After
hesitating a little, This Torres, Manuel or Santiago Lopez also. Then I asked him, What is your religion? He
answered, Roman Apostolic Catholic, and then he also asked me, And yours? Also Roman Apostolic
Catholic. Where have you studied? In the University of Santo Tomas. It is convenient to preserve the
Catholic religion that our ascendants have left us. And you, what did you study in the university, he asked.
I said, Do you have anything more to say as to your testamentary dispositions? No, he answered. Then I
reminded him, You know that Vicente Lopez has sent me to get these dispositions of yours, and he said,
Yes, do it. I asked him, When do you want it done? Later on, I will send for you. After this, believing to
have done my duty, I bade him good-bye.
"Q. Did you have any other occasion to see him?
"A. Yes.
"Q. When?
"A. On December 29, 1923, also in the evening.
"Q. Why did you go to see him?
"A. Because as I had not received any message either from Vicente Lopez or from Tomas Rodriguez, and as I
had received notices in connection with the few cases I had in the provinces, particularly in Tayabas, which
compelled me to be absent from Manila until January 1st at least, for I might be there for several days, so I
went to the General Hospital of my own accord since I had not received any message from them with a
rough draft which I had prepared in accordance with what he had told me in our conversation. After the
greetings, I told him, Here I am, D. Tomas; this is the rough draft of your will in accordance with your
former statements to me in order to submit it to you. Do you want to read it? Please do me the favor of
reading it. I read it slowly to him in order that he could understand it. After reading, It is all right, that is
the way, few words you see it takes only a few minutes; now I can execute the will. We can do it, it
takes only a few minutes. In view of that statement of his, I called his attention, But we dont have
witnesses, D. Tomas. I looked out through the door to see if I could call some witnesses, but it was late then
and it was thought better to do it on the 31st of December, and so I told D. Tomas that I would be coming

on the 31st of December. Then we talked about other things, and he -again asked, Where were you born? I
told him in Quiapo.Ah, good district, and especially now that the fiesta of Quiapo is coming near, and then I
interrupted him, Yes, the fiestas of the Holy Child and of Our Lady of Mount Carmel because we also talked
about the fiesta of San Sebastian. I again reminded him that we could not do it because the witnesses were
not there and he explained, Good Christmas present, isnt it? I did not tell him anything, and in view of that
I did not deem it necessary to stay there any longer.
"Q. With whom did you make the arrangement to make the will on the evening of the 31st of December
you said that it was agreed that the will be executed on the evening of December 31st?
"A. With Santiago Lopez and Don Tomas.
"Q. Was the will executed on the 31st of December?
"A. What happened is this: In view of that agreement, I fixed up the rough draft which I had, dating it the
31st of December, putting everything in order; we agreed that Santiago Lopez would meet me on said 31st
day between five and six in the evening or a little before, but it happened that before the arrival of that date
Santiago Lopez came and told me that I need not trouble about going to the General Hospital because it
could not be carried out for the reason that certain requisites were lacking. In view of this and bearing
always in mind that on the following day I had to go to the provinces, I told Santiago Lopez that I would
leave the papers with him because I might go to the provinces.
"Q. What may be the meaning of those words good Christmas present?
"A. They are given as a Christmas present when Christmas comes or on the occasion of Christmas.
"Q. I show you this document which is marked Exhibit A, tell me if that is the will or copy of the will which
you delivered to Santiago Lopez on December 31, 1923?
"A. With the exception of the words 3 de enero de 1924 it seems to be literally identical." (S. R., pp. 244249.)
As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with that signed by the testator and
the attesting witnesses with the single exception of the change of the date from December 31, 1923, to
January 3, 1924. Two copies besides the original of the will were made. The will is brief and simple in
terminology.
For purposes of record, we copy the will as here translated into English:

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"ONLY PAGE
"In the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, this January 3, 1924, I, Tomas Rodriguez, of age and resident of
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, do freely and voluntarily make this my will and testament in the
Spanish language which I know, with the following clauses:
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"First. I declare that I am a Roman Apostolic Catholic, and order that my body be buried in accordance with
my religion, standing, and circumstances.
"Second. I name my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as my only and universal
heirs of all my property.
"Third. I appoint D. Manuel Torres and D. Santiago Lopez as my executors.
"In witness whereof I sign this typewritten will, consisting of one single page, in the presence of the
witnesses who sign below.
(Sgd.) "TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
(Left marginal signatures:)
"TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
"ELIAS BONOAN
"V L. LEGARDA
"A. DE ASIS"
"We hereby certify that on the date and in the place above indicated, Don Tomas Rodriguez executed this
will, consisting of one single typewritten page, having signed at the bottom of the will in the presence of us
who saw as witnesses the execution of this will, and we signed at the bottom thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
(Sgd.) "V. L. LEGARDA

"ELIAS BONOAN
"A. DE ASIS"
(Exhibit A.)
On the afternoon of January 3, 1924, there gathered in the quarters of Tomas Rodriguez in the Philippine
General Hospital, Santiago Lopez, his relative; Mr. V. L. Legarda, Dr. Elias Bonoan, and Dr, A. de Asis,
attesting witnesses; and Dr. Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo, and Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians,
there for purposes of observation. (Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8; testimony of V. L. Legarda, S. R.,
p. 34.) Possibly also Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at least they were
hovering in the background.
As to what actually happened, we have in the record two absolutely contradictory accounts. One emanates
from the attesting witness, Doctor Bonoan. The other is the united testimony of all the remaining persons
who were there.
Doctor Elias Bonoan was the first witness called at the trial. He testified on direct examination as to formal
matters, such as the identification of the signatures to the will. On cross-examination, he rather startled the
proponents of the will by stating that Luz Lopez de Bueno told Tomas Rodriguez to sign the document
because it concerned a complaint against Castito and that nobody read the will to the testator. Doctor
Bonoans testimony along this line is as follows:
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"QUESTIONS.
"MARCAIDA:

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"Q. Why were you a witness to the will of Tomas Rodriguez?

"ARANETA:

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I object to the question as being immaterial.

"COURT:

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Objection overruled.
"ARANETA:

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Exception.
"Dr. BONOAN:

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"A. Because I was called up by Mrs. Luz by telephone telling me to be in the hospital at 3 oclock sharp in
the afternoon of the 3d of January.
"Q. Who is that Luz whom you have mentioned?
"A. Luz Lopez, daughter of Vicente Lopez.
"Q. What day, January 3, 1924?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When did Luz Lopez talk to you in connection with your going to the hospital?
"A. On the morning of the 3d she called me up by telephone.
"Q. On the morning?
"A. On the morning.
"Q. Before January 3, 1924, when the will of Tomas Rodriguez was signed, did Luz Lopez talk to you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How many days approximately before was it?
"A. I cannot tell the day, it was approximately one week before, on that occasion when I was called up by
her about the deceased Vicente Lopez.
"Q. What did she tell you when you went to the house of Vicente Lopez one week approximately before
signing the will?
"A. That Tomas Rodriguez would make a will.

"Q. Dont you know where the will of Tomas Rodriguez was made?
"A. In the General Hospital.
"Q. Was that document written in the hospital.?
"A. I have not seen it.
"Q. When you went to the General Hospital on January 3, 1924, who were the persons you met in the room
where the patient was?
"A. I met one of the nieces of the deceased Tomas Rodriguez, Mrs. Nena Lopez, and Da. Luz Lopez.
"Q. Were those the only persons?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What time approximately did you go to the General Hospital on January 3d?
"A. A quarter to 3.
"Q. After you, who came?
"A. Antonino de Asis, Doctor Herrera, later on Doctor Calderon arrived with Doctor Elias Domingo, and lastly
Santiago Lopez came and then Mr. Legarda.
"Q. When you entered the room of the patient, D. Tomas Rodriguez, in the General Hospital in what position
did you find him?
"A. He was Lying down.
"Q. Did you greet D. Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. I did.
"Q. Did D. Tomas Rodriguez answer you?
"A. Da. Nena immediately answered in advance and introduced me to him saying that I was the brother of
his godson.
"Q. Did other persons whom you have mentioned, viz, Messrs. Calderon, Herrera, Domingo, De Asis, and
Legarda, greet Tomas Rodriguez?
"ARANETA:

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I object to the question as being improper cross-examination. It has not been the subject of the direct
examination.
"COURT:

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Objection overruled.
"ARANETA:

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Exception.
"A. No, sir, they joined us.
"Q. What was D. Tomas told when he signed the will?
"A. To sign it.
"Q. Who told D. Tomas to sign the Will?
"A. Luz Lopez.
"Q. What did Luz Lopez tell Tomas Rodriguez in order that he should sign the Will?
"A. She told him to sign the document; the deceased Tomas Rodriguez before signing the document asked
what that was which he was to sign.
"Q. What did anybody answer to that question of D. Tomas?
"A. Luz Lopez told him to sign it because it concerned a complaint against Castito. D. Tomas said, What is
this? And Luz Lopez answered, You sign this document, uncle Tomas, because this is about the complaint
against Castito.

"Q. Then Tomas Rodriguez signed the will?

"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Who had the will? Who was holding it?
"A. Mr. Vicente Legarda had it in his own hands.
"Q. Was the will signed by Tomas Rodriguez lying down, on his feet, or seated?
"A. Lying down.
"Q. Was the will read by Tomas Rodriguez or any person present at the time of signing the will, did they read
it to him?
"A. Nobody read the will to him.
"Q. Did not D. Tomas read the will?
"A. I have not seen it.
"Q. Were you present?
"A. Yes, sir." (S. R., p. 8.) As it would be quite impracticable to transcribe the testimony of all the others who
attended the making of the will, we will let Vicente L. Legarda, who appears to have assumed the leading
role, tell what transpired. He testified in part:
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"ARANETA:

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Q. Who exhibited to you those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2?

LEGARDA:

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"A. Santiago Lopez.

"Q. Did he show you the same document?
"A. First, that is to say the first document he presented to me was a rough draft, a tentative will, and it was
dated December 31st, and I called his attention to the fact that the date was not December 31, 1923, and
that it was necessary to change the date to January 3, 1924, and it was done.
"Q. And it was then, was it not, when Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were written?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you know where it was written?
"A. In the General Hospital.
"Q. Did any time elapse from your making the suggestion that the document which you delivered to
Santiago Lopez be rewritten until those three exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were presented to you?
"A. About nine or ten minutes approximately.
"Q. The time to make it clean.?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Where were you during that time?
"A. In the room of D. Tomas Rodriguez.
"Q. Were you talking with him during that time?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. About what things were you talking with him?
"A. He was asking me about my health, that of my family, how my family was, my girl, whether we were
living in Pasay, he asked me about the steamer Ildefonso, he said that it was a pity that it had been lost
because he knew that my father-in-law was the owner of the steamer Ildefonso.
x

"Q. When those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2, that is, the original and the two copies of the will
signed by D. Tomas Rodriguez were written clean, will you please tell what happened?
"A. When Santiago Lopez gave them to me clean, I approached D. Tomas Rodriguez and told him: Don
Tomas, here is this will which is ready for your signature
"Q. What did D. Tomas do when you said that his will you were showing to him was ready?
"A. The first thing he asked was: the witnesses? Then I called the witnesses Gentlemen, please come
forward, and they came forward, and I handed the documents to D. Tomas. D. Tomas got up and then took
his eyeglasses, put them on and as he saw that the electric lamp at the center was not sufficiently clear, he
said: There is no more light; then somebody came forward bringing an electric lamp.
"Q. What did D, Tomas do when that electric lamp was put in place?.
"A. The eyeglasses were adjusted again and then he began to read, and as he could not read much for a
long time, for he unexpectedly felt tired and took off the eyeglasses, and as I saw that the poor man was
tired, I suggested that it be read to him and he stopped reading and I read the will to him.
"Q. What happened after you had read it to him?
"A. He said to me, Well, it is all right. It is my wish and my will. Dont you have any pen? I asked a pen of
those who were there and handed it to D. Tomas.
"Q. Is it true that Tomas Rodriguez asked at that time What is that which I am going to sign? and Luz
Lopez told him: It is in connection with the complaint against Castito?
"A. It is not true, no, sir.
"Q. During the signing of the will, did you hear Luz Lopez say anything to Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. No, sir, she said nothing.
"Q. According to you, Tomas Rodriguez signed of his own accord?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did nobody tell him to sign?
"A. Nobody.
"Q. What happened after the signing of the will by Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. I called the witnesses and we signed in the presence of each other and of Tomas Rodriguez.
"Q. After the signing of the will, did you have any conversation with Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. Doctor Calderon asked D. Tomas Rodriguez some questions.
"Q. Do you remember the questions and the conversation held between Doctor Calderon and D. Tomas after
the signing of the will?
"A. I remember that afterwards Doctor Calderon talked to him about business. He asked him how the
business was going on, everything is going wrong, except the business of making loans at 18 per cent. It
seems that Tomas Rodriguez answered: That loan at 18 per cent is illegal, it is usury." (S. R., p. 38.)
In addition to the statements under oath made by Mr. Legarda, an architect and engineer in the Bureau of
Public Works and professor of engineering and architecture in the University of Santo Tomas, suffice it to say
that Luz Lopez de Bueno denied categorically the statements attributed to her by Doctor Bonoan (S. R., p.
568). In this stand, she is corroborated by Doctor De Asis, an attesting witness, and by Doctors Calderon,
Domingo, and Herrera, the at- tending physicians. On this point, Doctor Calderon, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital and Dean of the College of Medicine in the University of the Philippines,
testified:
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"Mr. ARANETA:

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"Q. What have you seen or heard with regard to the execution of the will?
"Dr. CALDERON:

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"A. Mr. Legarda handed the will to D Tomas Rodriguez. D. Tomas asked for his eyeglasses, wanted to read,
and it was extremely hard for him to do so. Mr. Legarda offered to read the will, it was read to him and he
heard that in that will Vicente Lopez and Luz Lopez were appointed heirs; we also saw him sign that will, and
he signed not only the original but also the other copies of the will and we also saw how the witnesses
signed the will; we heard that D. Tomas asked for light at that moment; he was at that time in a perfect
mental state. And we remained there after the will was executed. I asked him, How do you feel, how are

you? Well, I am well, he answered.How is the business? There is a crisis, but there is one good business,
namely, that of making loans at the rate of 18 per cent, and he answered, That is usury. When a man
answers in that way, That is usury, it shows that he is all right.
"Q. Were you present when Mr. Legarda handed the will to him?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did any person there tell Don Tomas that that was a complaint to be filed against one Castito?
"A. No, sir, I have not heard anything of the kind.
"Q. It was said here that when the will was handed to him, D. Tomas Rodriguez asked what that was which
he was to sign and that Luz Lopez answered, That is but a complaint in connection with Castito. Is that
true?
"A. I have not heard anything of the kind.
"Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Was Luz Lopez there?
"A. I dont remember having seen her; I am not sure; D, Santiago Lopez and the three witnesses were
there; I dont remember that Luz Lopez was there.
"Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did D. Tomas sign of his own accord?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you remember whether he was given a pen or he himself asked for it?
"A. I dont know; it is a detail which I dont remember well; so that whether or not he was given a pen or he
himself asked for it, I do not remember.
"Q. But did he sign without hesitation?
"A. With no hesitation.
"Q. Did he sign without anybody having indicated to him where he was to-sign?
"A. Yes, without anybody having indicated it to him.
"Q. Do you know whether D. Tomas Rodriguez asked for more light before signing?
"A. He asked for more light, as I have said before.
"Q. Do you remember that detail?
"A. Yes, sir, they first lighted the lamps, but as the light was not sufficient, he asked for more light.
"Q. Do you remember very well that he asked for light?
"A. Yes, sir." (S. R., p. 93.)
A clear preponderance of the evidence exists in favor of the testimony of Vicente Legarda, corroborated as it
is by other witnesses of the highest standing in the community. The only explanation we can over relative to
the testimony of Doctor Bonoan. is that possibly he may have arrived earlier than the others with the
exception of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and that Luz Lopez de Bueno may have made some sort of an effort to
influence Tomas Rodriguez. There is, however, no possible explanation of the statement of Doctor Bonoan to
the effect that no one read the will to Rodriguez, when at least five other persons recollect that Vicente
Legarda read it to him and recall the details connected with the reading.
There is one curious occurrence which transpired shortly after the making of the will which should here be
mentioned. It is that on January 7, 1923 (1924), Luz Lopez de Bueno signed a document in favor of Doctor
Bonoan in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000). This paper reads as follows:
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"Be it known by these presents:

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"That I, Luz Lopez de Bueno, in consideration of the services which at my instance were, and will when
necessary be, rendered by Dr. Elias Bonoan in connection with the execution of the will oF my uncle, Don

Tomas Rodriguez, and the due probate thereof, do hereby agree to pay said doctor, by way of remuneratory
donation, the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000), Philippine currency, as soon as said services shall have
been fully rendered and I shall be in possession of the inheritance which in said will is given to me.
"In witness whereof, I sign this document which was freely and spontaneously executed by me in Manila,
this January 7, 1923.
(Sgd.) "LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO"
(Exhibit 1)
There is a sharp conflict of testimony, as is natural, between Doctor Bonoan and Luz Lopez de Bueno relative
to the execution of the above document. We shall not attempt to settle these differences, as in the final
analysis it will not affect the decision one way or the other. The most reasonable supposition is that Luz
Lopez de Bueno imprudently endeavored to bring over Doctor Bonoan to her side of the case by signing and
giving to him Exhibit 1. But the event cannot easily be explained away.
Tomas Rodriguez passed away in the Philippine General Hospital, as we have said, on February 25, 1924.
But even prior to his demise, the two factions in the Lopez family had prepared themselves for a fight over
the estate. The Luz Lopez faction had secured the services of Doctor Domingo, the physician in charge of the
Department of Insane of the San Lazaro Hospital and Assistant Professor of Nervous and Mental Diseases in
the University of the Philippines, as attending physician; had associated with him for purposes of
investigation Dr. Fernando Calderon, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital, and Dr. Florentino
Herrera, a physician in active practice in the City of Manila; and had arranged to have two members of the
medical fraternity, Doctors De Asis and Bonoan, as attesting witnesses. The Margarita Lopez faction had
taken equal precautions by calling as witnesses in the guardianship proceedings Dr. Sixto de los Angeles,
Professor and Chief of the Department of Legal Medicine in the University of the Philippines, and Dr. Samuel
Tietze, with long experience in mental diseases; thereafter by continuing Doctors De los Angeles and Tietze
to examine Tomas Rodriguez, and by associating with them Dr. William Burke, a well-known physician of the
City of Manila. Skilled lawyers were available to aid and abet the medical experts. Out of such situations, do
will contests arise.
An examination of the certificates made by the two sets of physicians and of their oral testimony shows that
on most facts they concur. Their deductions from these facts disclose a substantial divergence of opinion. It
is a hopeless task to try to reconcile the views of these distinguished gentlemen who honestly arrived at
definite but contradictory conclusions. The best that we can do under the circumstances is to set forth the
findings of the Calderon committee on the one hand and of the De los Angeles committee on the other.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez individually and jointly before the date
when the will was executed. All of them, as we have noticed, were present at the signing of the will to note
the reactions of the testator. On the same day that the will was accomplished, the three doctors signed the
following certificate:
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"The undersigned, Drs. of Medicine, with offices in the City of Manila, and engaged in the practice of their
profession, do hereby certify:
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"That they have jointly examined Mr. Tomas Rodriguez, confined in the General Hospital, floor No. 3, room
No. 361, on three different occasions and on different days, and have found that said patient is suffering
from anaemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dyspepsia, and senility.
"As to his mental state, the result of the different tests to which this patient was submitted is that his
intellectual faculties are sound, except that his memory is weak, which is almost a loss for recent facts, or
events which have recently occurred, due to his physical condition and old age.
"They also certify that they were present at the time he signed his will on January 3, 1924, at 3.25 p. m.,
and have found his mental state in the same condition as was found by the undersigned in their former
examinations, and that in executing said will the testator had full understanding of the act he was
performing, and full knowledge of the contents thereof.
"In testimony whereof, we sign in Manila this January 3, 1924.
(Sgd.) "FLORENTINO HERRERA
"Tuberias 1264
"Quiapo
(Sgd.) "Dr. FERNANDO CALDERON
"General Hospital
"Manila
(Sgd.) "Dr. ELIAS DOMINGO

"613 Remedios
"Malate"
(Exhibit E in relation with Exhibits C and D.)
Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a definite opinion as to the mentality of Tomas
Rodriguez. What follows is possibly the most significant of the doctors statements:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Dr. CALDERON testifying after interruption:

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"A. I was naturally interested in finding out the true mental state of Tomas Rodriguez, and that was the chief
reason why I accepted and gave my cooperation to Messrs. Elias Domingo and Florentino Herrera because
had I found that Tomas Rodriguez was really insane, I should have ordered his transfer to the San Lazaro
Hospital or to other places, and would not have left him. in the General Hospital. Pursuant to my desire, I
saw Tomas Rodriguez in his room alone twice to have interviews with him, he being a person whom I knew
since several years ago; at the end of the interviews I became convinced that there was nothing wrong with
him; I had not seen anything indicating that he was insane and for this reason I accepted the request of my
companions and joined them; we have been on five different occasions examining Tomas Rodriguez jointly
from the physical standpoint, but chiefly from the standpoint of his mental state; I have been there with
Messrs. Herrera and Elias Domingo, examining Tomas Rodriguez and submitting him to a mental test on the
28, 29, 30 and 31 of December and the 2d of January, 1924 five consecutive days in which we have been
together besides my particular visits.
"Q. Will you please state the result of the observation you made alone before those made by the three of
you jointly?
"A. I asked Tomas Rodriguez some questions when I went alone there, I asked him where he was living
formerly and he well remembered that in Intramuros, Calle Real; I asked him whether he remembered one
Calderon who was living in the upper floor of the house, and then he told me yes; then I asked him about
his tenant by the name of Antonio Jimenez and he told me yes, now I remember that he had two
daughters, Matilde and Paz. Then I told him that I had been living in the house of that gentleman, Antonio
Jimenez, already dead in the upper story of the house which belonged to Tomas Rodriguez; I told him
that Antonio Jimenez was his tenant of the upper story, that is, that he was living on the ground floor and
Antonio Jimenez upstairs, and he remembered all of this; I also began to talk of my brother, Felipe Calderon,
whom he said of course that he knew; he remembered him because he was his companion and was a
successful attorney. This was when I had an interview with him. Then in order to observe better and to be
sure of my judgment or opinion about the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez, I saw him again and we began
to speak of something which I dont remember now. In fine, we talked of things of interest and as I had
finally accepted the request of Drs. Elias Domingo and Florentino Herrera to join them, the first and second
time that Herrera, Domingo and myself went there, no stenographic notes were taken of what happened
there.
"Q. So that before joining Doctors Herrera and Domingo you had already paid two visits to the patient?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. From the result of the conversation you had with Tomas Rodriguez on those two visits, what is your
opinion as to his mental capacity?
"A. That he was sick; that he was weak, but I have found absolutely no .incoherence in his ideas; he
answered my questions well, and as I was observing him, there were times when he did not remember
things of the present because this must be admitted but on the other hand he had a wonderful
memory for past events; in talking with him, you would not notice in the conversation any alteration in his
mind nor that that man had lost the reasoning power or logic.
"Q. Did you notice any loss of memory, or that his memory was weakening about things of the past?
"A. About things of the past, I mean that you talk to him now about specific matters, and after about five or
ten minutes he no longer remembers what had been talked of.
x

"Q. Do you remember the conversation you had with him for the first time when the three of you paid a visit
to the patient?
"A. I dont remember the details, but I do remember the questions I put to him. I asked D. Tomas
Rodriguez: You are an old man, aged, sick, why dont you think of making your will? and he said: Yes, I
am thinking to make a will. But why dont you decide? There is no hurry, there is time to make a will, he
said.Then in case you decide to make a will, to whom are you going to leave your property? Dont you have
any relatives? I have a relative, Vicente Lopez, my first cousin, and Margarita Lopez, my first cousin, they
are brothers. In that case, to whom do you want to leave your property? Why, I dont have much, very
little, but I am decided to leave it to my cousin, Vicente Lopez, and his daughter Luz Lopez. Why would you
not give anything to Margarita Lopez? No because her husband is very bad, to use his exact language, is
very bad.

"Q. Did you talk with him on that occasion about his estate?
"A. Yes, sir, he told me that he had three estates, one on Calle Magallanes, another on Calle Cabildo, and
the third on Calle Juan Luna, and besides he had money in the Monte de Piedad and Hogar Filipino.
x

"Q. From the questions made by you and the answers given by Mr. Tomas Rodriguez on that occasion, what
is your opinion as to his mental capacity.
"A. The following: That the memory of Tomas Rodriguez somewhat failed as to things of the present, but is
all right with regard to matters or facts of the past; that his ideas were coherent; that he thought with logic,
argued even with power, and generally in some of the interviews I have arrived at the conclusion that Tomas
Rodriguez had an initiative of his own, did not need that anybody should make him any suggestion, because
he answered in such a way that if you permit me now to show you my stenographic notes, they will prove to
you conclusively that he had an initiative of his own and had no need of anybody making him any question."
(S. R. p. 72.)
Doctor Elias Domingo, who was the attending physician for Tomas Rodriguez throughout all the time that
Rodriguez was in the hospital and who even prior to the placing of Rodriguez in the hospital had examined
him, was likewise certain that Rodriguez possessed sufficient mentality to make a will. Among other things,
Doctor Domingo testified:
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"ARANETA:

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"Q. Have you known D. Tomas Rodriguez?

"Dr. DOMINGO:

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"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Did you attend D. Tomas Rodriguez as physician?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When did you begin to attend him as physician?
"A. On November 28, 1923, until his death.
"Q. Where did you attend him?
"A. In the General Hospital.
"Q. On November 28 or October 28, 1923, do you remember?
"A. I had been attending him as physician from November 28th although it is true that I had had opportunity
to see and examine him during the months of October and November.
"Q. What was the object of your visits or attendance during the months of October and November?
"A. It was for the purpose of observing his mental state.
"Q. Did you really examine his mental condition or capacity during the months of October and November?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How many times did you visit him?
"A. I dont remember exactly but I visited him about five or six times.
x

"Q. Please tell us the result of your examination during those months of October and November?
"A. I examined him physically and mentally; I am not going to tell here the physical result but the result of
the mental examination, and that is: General Conduct: In most of the times that I have seen him, I found
him Lying on his bed, smoking a cigarette and asked for a bottle of lemonade from time to time; I also
observed that he was very careful when throwing the ash of the cigarette, seeing to it that it did not fall on
the blankets; he also was careful not to throw the stub of the cigarette in any place to avoid fire; I made
more observations as to his general conduct and I found that sometimes Don Tomas could move within the
place although with certain difficulty. On two occasions I found him seated, once seated at the table, seated
on the chair, and the other on a rocking-chair. I also examined his manner of talking and to all questions
that I put to him he answered with a fair coherence and in a relevant manner, although sometimes he

showed meagerness and certain delay. I based these points of my declarations on the questions which are
usually asked when making a mental examination, for instance I asked him, What is your name, and he
correctly answered Tomas Rodriguez; I asked him if he was married and he answered No; I asked him his
profession and he answered that formerly he was an attorney but that at the time I was making the
examination he was not practicing the profession; I asked him with what he supported himself and he said
that he lived upon his income, he said verbatim, I live on my income. I also asked him what the amount of
his income was and he answered that it was about P900; I asked him what the source of this income was
and he said that it came from his property.
"Q. Did you ask him about his property?
"A. No, at that time.
"Q. Proceed.
"A. I also observed his emotional status and affectivity. I found it rather superficial, and he oftentimes got
angry due to his physical disease; I asked him if he had any relatives and he answered correctly saying that
he had. He mentioned Vicente Lopez, Margarita Lopez, and Luz Lopez. As to his memory. His memory for
the past. He very easily remembered past events and when he described them he did it with such pleasure
that he used to smile afterwards if it was a fact upon which one must smile. His memory for recent facts
was very much lessened. I say this because on various occasions and not having known me when he had a
better memory, after I had seen him thrice he remembered my name and he recognized me. Insight and
judgment. I arrived at the conclusion that he had fair knowledge of himself because he knew that he was
sick and could not be moving with ease, but he believed that he could perform with sufficient ease mental
acts; his judgment was also all right because I asked him this question: Supposing that you should find a
bill of P5 in the vestibule of a hotel, what would you do with it? He told me that he would take the bill and
give it to the manager in order that the latter may look for the owner if possible. His reasoning. I found that
he showed a moderate retardation in the flow of his thought, especially with regard to recent events, but
was quite all right as to past events. His capacity. He believed that he was capable of thinking properly
although what did not permit him to do so was his physical decrepit condition. The conclusion is that his
memory is lost for recent events tho not totally and diminution of his intellectual vigor. This is in few words
the result of my examination." (S. R., p. 345.)
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke. Doctor De
los Angeles had been a witness in the guardianship proceedings and had seen the patient on November 6
and 7, 1923. Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in the guardianship case and had visited the patient on
November 9 and 12, 1923, and on January 15, 1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke together examined
Rodriguez on January 17, 20, and 24, 1924. The three physicians conducted a joint examination on January
27 and 28, and February 10, 1924. As a result, on March 15, 1924, they prepared and signed the
following:
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"MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
"In the Matter of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez, male, 76 years of age, single and residing or being confined in
the Philippine General Hospital.
"We, the undersigned Doctors, Sixto de los Angeles, W. B. Burke, and Samuel Tietze, do hereby certify as
follows:
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"1. That we are physicians, duly registered under the Medical Act, and are in the actual practice of the
medical profession in the Philippines.
"2. That on January 27th and 28th and February 10th, 1924, at the Philippine General Hospital, we three
have with care and diligence jointly and personally examined the person of said Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez;
and previous to these dates, we have separately and partly jointly observed and examined said patient on
various occasions; Dr. Sixto de los Angeles, at the patients home, 246 Magallanes St., Manila, on November
6th and 7th, 1923; Dr. Samuel Tietze, at the patients home on November 9th and 12th, 1923, all at the
Philippine General Hospital on January 15th, 1924; and Dr. W. B. Burke together with Dr. Samuel Tietze at
the Philippine General Hospital on January 17th, 20th, and 24th, 1924; and as a result of the medical
examinations and the history of the case we found and hereby certify to the following conclusions:
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"(a) That he was of unsound mind suffering from senile dementia, or of mental impairment exceeding to a
pathologic extent the usual conditions and changes found to occur in the involutional period of life.
"(b) That he was under the influence of the above condition continuously, at least from November, 1923, till
the date of our joint reexamination, January 27th and 28th, and February 10th, 1924; and that he would
naturally have continued without improvement, as these cases of insanity are due to organic pathological
changes of the brain. This form of mental disease is progressive in its pathological tendency, going on to
progressive atrophy and degeneration Of the brain, the mental symptoms, of course, running parallel with
such pathological basis.
"(c) That on account of such disease and conditions, his mind and memory were so greatly impaired as to
make him unable to know or to appreciate sufficiently the nature, effect, and consequences of the business
he was engaged in; to understand and comprehend the extent and conditions of his properties; to collect
and to hold in his mind the particulars and details of his business transactions and his relations to the
persons who were or might have been the objects of his bounty; and to free himself from the influences of

importunities, threats, and ingenuities, so that with a relatively less resistance, he might had been induced
to do what others would not have done.
"3. We have diagnosed this case as senile dementia of the simple type, approaching the deteriorated stage
upon the following detailed mental examinations:
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"(a) Disorder of memory. There was almost an absolute loss of memory for recent events, to the extent
that things and occurrences seen or observed only a few minutes previously were completely forgotten.
Faces and names of persons introduced to him were not remembered after a short moment even without
leaving his bedside. He showed no comprehension of the elemental routine required in the management of
his properties, i. e. : who were the lessees of his houses, what rents they were paying, who was the
administrator of his properties, in what banks he deposited his money or the amount of money deposited in
such banks. Regarding his personal relations, he forgot that Mr. Antonio Ventura is the husband of his
nearest woman cousin; that Mrs. Margarita Lopez was married, saying that the latter was single or spinster,
in spite of the fact that formerly, during the past twenty-five years, he was aware of their marriage life. He
did not know the names of the sons and daughters of Mr. Vicente Lopez, one of his nearest relatives, even
failing to name Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno, a daughter of said Vicente Lopez, and who now appears to be the
only living beneficiary of his will. He also stated that Mr. Vicente Lopez frequently visited him in the hospital,
though the latter died on January 7th, 1924. He did not recognize and remember the name and face of
Doctor Domingo, his own physician. However, the memory for remote events was generally good, which is a
characteristic symptom of senile dementia.
"(b) Disorientation of time, place, and persons. He could not name the date when asked (day or month);
could not name the hospital wherein he was confined; and failed to recognize the fact that Doctor Domingo
was his physician.
"(c) Disorders of perception. He was almost completely indifferent to what was going on about him. He
also failed to recognize the true valle of objects shown him, that is, he failed to recognize the Saturday
Evening Post nor would he deny that it was a will when presented as such. He also failed to show normal
intellectual perception, making no effort to correlate facts or to understand matters discussed in their proper
light.
"(d) Emotional deterioration. The patient was not known during his time of physical incapacity to express
in any way or lament the fact that he was unable to enjoy the happiness that was due him with his wealth.
As a matter of fact, he showed complete indifference. He showed loss of emotional control by furious
outbreaks over trifling matters and actually behaved like a child; for example, if his food did not arrive
immediately or when his cigar was not lit soon, he would become abusive in his language and show marked
emotional outburst. If the servants did not immediately answer his call, he would break down and cry as a
child.
"(e) Symptoms of decreased intellectual capacity. There was a laxity of the internal connection of ideas.
The patient has shown no insight regarding his own condition. He did not appreciate the attitude of the
parties concerned in his case; he would on several occasions become suspicious and fail to comprehend the
purpose of our examination. He was inconsistent in his ideas and failed to grasp the meaning of his own
statements. When questioned whether he would make 1 will, he stated to Doctor Tietze that he intended to
bequeath his money to San Juan de Dios Hospital and Hospicio de San Jose. When he was informed,
however, that he had made a will on January 3d, 1924, he denied the latter statement, and failed to explain
the former. Although for a long time confined to bed and seriously ill for a long period, he expressed himself
as sound physically and mentally, and in the false belief that he was fully able to administer his business
personally.
"His impairment of the intellectual field was further shown by his inability, despite his knowledge of world
affairs, to appreciate the relative value of the statement made by Doctor Tietze as follows: We have here a
cheque of P2,000 from the King of Africa payable to you so that you may deposit it in the bank. Do you want
to accept the cheque? His answer was as follows: Now I cannot give my answer. It may be a surprise. Such
answer given by a man after long experience in business life, who had handled real estate property, well
versed in the transaction of cheques, certainly shows a breaking down of the above field. No proper
questions were asked why the cheque was given by the King who the King was, why he was selected by the
King of Africa, or if there is a King of Africa at present. He further shows doubt in his mental capability by
the following questions and answers:
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"MARCAIDA:

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"P. Tiene ustedactualmente algun asunto en los tribunales de justicia de Manila?

"R. No recuerdo en este momento.
"P. De tener usted algun aslnto propio en los tribunales de justicia de Manila, a que abogado confiaria usted
la defensa del mismo? R. Al Sr. Marcaida, como conocido antiguo.
"P. Ha hablado usted y colferenciado alguna vez o varias veces en estos dias, o sea desde el 25 de octubre
de 1923 hasta hoy, con algun abagado para que le defendiera algun asunto ante el Juzgado le Primera
Instancia de Manila?
"R. Con ninguno, porque en caso de nombrar, nombraria al Sr. Marcaida. (p. e, deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)

"ARANETA: P. No recuerda usted que usted me ha encomendado como abogado para que me oponga a
que le declaren a usted loco o incapacitado? R. Si, senor, quien ha solidtado? (P. 9, deposition, Nov. 19,
1923.)
"Dr. DOMINGO:

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"P. Don Tomas, me conoce usted? Se acuerda usted que soy el Doctor Domingo?
"R. Si. (P. 7, sten n., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. Quien soy, Don Tomas, usted me conoce?
"R. No se. (P. 6, sten. n., Feb. 10, 1924.)
"Dr. ANGELES:

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"P. Me conoce usted, D. Tomas?

"R. Le conozco de vista. (P. 6, sten. n., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. Nos vamos a despedir ya, Don Tomas, de usted. Yo soy el Doctor Angeles, me conoce usted?
"R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, le conoce usted?
"R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Domingo, le conoce usted?
"R. De vista.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, recuerda usted su nombre?
"R. No. (P. 10, sten. n., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. Usted conoce a este Doctor? (Senalando al Doctor Burke).
"R. De vista; su nombre ya lo he olvidado, ya no me acuerdo.
"P. Usted nos ve a los tres? (Doctores Angeles, Burke y Tietze).
"R. Ya lo creo.
"Dr. BURKE:

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"P. Que profesion tenemos? (Senalando a los Sres. Angeles, Burke y Tietze).
"R. Yo creo que son doctores.
"P. Y los dos? (Senalando a los Doctores ~ngeles y Tietze).
"R. No. se.
"P. Y este senor? (Senalando al Doctor Angeles).
"R. No me acuerdo en este momento. (Pp. 4 and 5, sten. n., Feb. 10, 1924.)
"(f) Other facts bearing upon the history of the case obtained by investegation of Doctor Angeles:

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"I. Family history. His parents were noted to be of nervous temper and irritable.
"II. Personal history. He was a lawyer, but did not pursue his practice, devoting the greater part of his life
to collecting antiquities. He was generally regarded by his neighbors as miserly and erratic in the ordinary
habits of life. He lead a very unhygienic life, making no attempt to clean the filth or dirt that was around
him. He was neglectful in personal habits. On April, 1921, he suffered an injury to his forehead, from which
he became temporarily unconscious, and was confined in the Philippine General Hospital for treatment. He
frequently complained of attacks of dizziness and headache, following this injury; suffered from a large
hernia; and about two years ago, he was fined for failure in filing his income tax, from which incident, we
have reason to believe, the onset of his mental condition took place. This incident itself can most probably
be considered as a failure of memory. His condition became progressively worse up to his death.
"4. The undersigned have stated all the above facts contained in this certificate to the best of our knowledge
and belief.
"Manila, P. I., March 15, 1924.

(Sgd.) "SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES

"W. B. BURKE, M. D.
"SAMUEL TIETZE"
(Exhibit 33 in relation with Exhibits 28 and 29.)
Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is disclosed by the treatment
record kept daily by the nurses, in which appear the nurses remarks. (Exhibits 8-A, 8-B, and 8-C.) In this
connection, the testimony of the nurses is that Rodriguez was in the habit for no reason at all of calling
"Maria, where are my 50 centavos, where is my key." In explanation of the observations made by the
nurses, the nurse Apolonio Floreza testified:
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"Direct questions of Attorney OCAMPO:

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"Q. Among your observations on the 1st of January, 1924, you say with pains all over the body, and uttered
some incoherent words of the same topics whenever is awakened. How could you observe that he had pains
all over the body?
"APOLONIO FLOREZA, nurse:

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"A. I observed that by the fact that whenever I touched the body of the patient he complained of some
pain.
"Q. On what part of the body did you touch him?
"A. On all the parts of his body.
"Q. How did you touch him, strongly or not?
"A. Slightly.
"Q. When you touched him slightly, what did he do?
"A. He said that it was aching.
"Q. What words did he say when, according to your note, he uttered incoherent words whenever he awakes?
"A. As for instance, Maria, repeating it Where are my 50 centavos, where is my key?
"Q. Did you hear him talk of Maria?
"A. Only the word Maria.
"Q. How long approximately was he talking, uttering the name of Maria, Where are my 50 centavos, and
where is my key?
"A. For two or three minutes.
"Q. Can you tell the court whether on those occasions when he said the name of Maria he said other words
and was talking with somebody?
"A. He was talking to himself.
"Q. This remark on Exhibit 8-B, when was it written by you?
"A. On January 2, 1924.
"Q. In the observation corresponding to January 2, 1924, you also say, With pains all over the body, and
later on, talked too much whenever patient is awakened. How did you happen to know the pain which you
have noted here?
"A. The pains all over the body, I have observed them when giving him baths.
"Q. Besides saying that it ached when .you touched the body, do you know whether he did any extraordinary
thing?
"A. You mean to say acts?
"Q. Acts or words?
"A. Yes, sir, like those words which I have already said which he used to say Maria, the key, 50 centavos.
"Q. You say that he called Maria. What did he say about Maria on that date, January 2, 1924?

"A. He used to say, Maria, where is Maria?

"Q. On that date January 2j 1924, did you answer him when he said Maria?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. In this observation of yours appearing on page 8-C, you say, among other things, with pains all over the
body and shouted whenever he is given injection. Did you really observe this in the patient?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How did he shout?
"ARANETA: Objection as being immaterial.
"COURT: Overruled.
"ARANETA: Exception.
"A. In a loud voice.
"Q. Besides shouting, do you remember whether he said anything?
"A. He repeated the same words I have said before Maria, the 50 centavos, the key.
"Q. When did this observation occur which appears on page 8-C?
"A. On January 3, 1924." (S. R., p. 595.)
On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez, there is no dispute. On January 3, 1924,
Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He was suffering from anaemia, hernia inguinal,
chronic dyspepsia, and senility. Physically he was a wreck.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera
admit that he was senile. They, together with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke, further declare that
his memory was almost an absolute loss for recent events. His memory, however, for remote events was
generally good. He was given to irrational exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.
While, however, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties of the patient
are "sound, except that his memory is weak," and that in executing the will the "testator had full
understanding of the act he was performing, and full knowledge of the contents thereof," Doctors De los
Angeles, Tietze, and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez "was of unsound mind" and that they "diagnosed
his case as senile dementia of the simple type, approaching the deteriorated stage." Without attempting at
this stage to pass in judgment on the antagonistic conclusions of the medical witnesses, or on other
disputed points, insofar as the facts are concerned, a resolution of the case comes down to this: Did Tomas
Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will, or had he passed so far along in
senile dementia as to require the court to find him of unsound mind? We leave the facts in this situation to
pass on to a discussion of the legal phases of the case.
B. Law. The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a will that the testator be
of "sound mind" (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 614). A "sound mind" is a "disposing mind." One of the
grounds for disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution
of such an instrument at the time of its execution." (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634 [2].) Predicated on
these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition of testamentary capacity:"
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend me nature of the transaction in which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty." (Bugnao v. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163, followed in
Bagtas v. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227, and Jocson v. Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701.) The mental capacity of
the testator is determined as of the date of the execution of his will (Civil Code, art. 666).
Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only later to be rejected as
incomplete. Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind,
weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to
show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.
There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of some practical utility. This rule
concerns the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will simple or complicated? Is it natural or unnatural?
The mere exclusion of heirs will not, however, in itself indicate that the will was the offspring of an unsound
mind.
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a wide range in order that
all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The testimony of subscribing
witnesses to a will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are
truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of the will and of the attending

physician is also to be relied upon. (Alexander on Wills, vol. I, pp. 433, 484; Wharton & Stilles Medical
Jurisprudence, vol. I, pp. 100 et seq.)
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly
established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary
document. (Hernaez v. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas v. Paguio, supra.)
Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship at the time he made his will.
Citing section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they insist that the effect of the
judgment is conclusive with respect to the condition of the person. To this statement we cannot write down
our conformity. The provisions of the cited section were taken from California, and there the Supreme Court
has never held what is now urged upon us by the appellee. The rule announced that in some states, by force
of statute, the linding of insanity is conclusive as to the existence of insanity during the continuance of
adjudication, is found to rest on local statutes, of which no counterpart is found in the Philippines. (32 C. J.,
647; Gridley v. Boggs [1882], 62 Cal., 190; In the matter of the Estate of Johnson [1881], 57 Cal., 529.)
Even where the question of insanity is put in issue in the guardianship proceedings, the most that can be
said for the finding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity to make a will but does not invalidate the
testament if competency can be shown. The burden of proving sanity in such case is cast upon the
proponents.
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of senile dementia. This is the
form of mental decay of the aged upon which wills are most often contested. A Newton, a Paschal, a Cooley
suffering under "the variable weather of the mind, the flying vapors of incipient lunacy," would have proved
historic subjects for expert dispute. Had Shakespeares King Lear made a will, without any question, it would
have invited litigation and doubt.
Senile dementia, usually called childishness, has various forms and stages. To constitute complete senile
dementia, there must be such failure of the mind as to deprive the testator of intelligent action. In the first
stages of the disease, a person may possess reason and have will power. (27 L. R. A., N. S. [1~310], p. 89;
Wharton & Stilles Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I, pp. 791 et seq.; Schouler on Wills, vol. I, pp. 145 et seq.)
It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all the leading cases which have gone forth from this court,
relating to the testator having a sound and disposing mind, and which have been brought to our notice by
counsel, every one of them has allowed the will, even when it was necessary to reverse the judgment of the
trial court. A study of these cases discloses a consistent tendency to protect the wishes of the deceased
whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also show great tenderness on the part of the court towards
the last will and testament of the aged. (See Hernaez v. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689, per Arellano, C.J. ; In
the matter of the will of Butalid [1908], 10 Phil., 27, per Arellano, C.J. ; Bugnao v. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil.,
163, per Carson, J., Macapinlac v. Alimurong [1910], 16 Phil., 41, per Arellano, C.J. ; Bagtas v. Paguio
[1912], 22 Phil., 227, per Trent, J., Galvez v. Galvez [1913], 26 Phil., 243, per Torres, J., Samson v. Corrales
Tan Quintin [1923], 44 Phil., 573, per Ostrand, J., and Jocson v. Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701, per Villamor,
J.) Because of their peculiar applicability, we propose to make particular mention of four of the earlier cases
of this court.
In the case of Hernaez v. Hernaez, supra, the subject of the action was the will executed by Doa Juana
Espinosa. The annulment of the will was sought, first, upon the ground of the incapacity of the testatrix. She
was over 80 years of age, so ill that three days before she executed the will she received the sacraments
and extreme unction, and two days afterwards she died. Prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude, and
gave contradictory orders, "as a result of her senile debility." The Chief Justice reached the conclusion that
neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the documents presented "can the conclusion be
reached that the testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties." The will was held valid and efficacious.
In the case of In the matter of the will of Butalid, supra, the will was contested for the reason that Dominga
Butalid at the date of the execution of the document was not in the free use of her intellectual powers, she
being over 90 years of age, lying in bed seriously ill, senseless, and unable to utter a single word, so that
she did not know what she was doing when she executed the will, while the document was claimed to have
been executed under the influence and by the direction of one of the heirs designated in the will. Yet after
an examination of the evidence, the Chief Justice rendered judgment reversing the judgment appealed from
and declaring the will presented for legalization to be valid and sufficient.
In the case of Bugnao v. Ubag, supra, the court gave credence to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses
who swore positively that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was of sound mind and
memory. Based on these and other facts, Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for the court, laid down the following
legal principles:
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"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are
numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held that mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable
of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and
memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his
property (Lodge v. Lodge, 2 Houst. [Del. ], 418); that, To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise (Sloan v.
Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that It has not been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of
sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree . . . Few indeed would be the wills confirmed,
if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity, would, according to its violence or

duration in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement
must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man (Den. v. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L., 680);
and, that Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of
degree (Boughton v. Knight, L. R., 3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound
mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great bodily infirmities
or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator in capable of making a valid will,
providing such weakness really disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or
consequences of the act she is engaged in (Manatt v. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302)."
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In the case of Bagtas v. Paguio, supra, the record shows that the testator for some fourteen or fifteen years
prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body, that a few years prior to
his death, his hearing became impaired, and that he had lost the power of speech. However, he retained the
use of his sight hand and could write fairly well. Through the medium of signs, he was able to indicate his
wishes to his family. The will was attacked on the ground that the testator lacked mental capacity at the
time of its execution. The will was nevertheless admitted to probate. Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for the
court, announced the following pertinent legal doctrines:
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". . . There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held
that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of
making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will If such were the legal standard, few
indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both
medical and legal, are universal in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and
that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
"The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which a person
may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and
conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, page 70,
of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
"Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary
capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still
be capable in law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this
statement.)
"The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and quoted with
approval in Campbell v. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
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"To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of
his reasoning faculties.
"In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:

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"The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory possessed by the testator, as, had he a
disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he was about to bequeath, the manner of
distributing it, and the objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to
enable him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged at the time when he executed his
will. (See authorities there cited.)
"In Wilson v. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case: The testator
died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About
seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory were
much enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was
affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although
formerly he was observant of the proprieties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
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"Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will,
if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be
total, or extend to his immediate family or property . . .
x

"Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his physical and
mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his
life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful of recent events,
especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused from sleep or
slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he was
remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that he was
incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational expression.
"In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was
pictured by the court in the case just quoted . . ."
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The particular differences between all of the Philippine cases which are cited and the case at bar are that in
none of the Philippine cases was there any declaration of incompetency and in none of them were the facts
quite as complicated as they are here. A case in point where the will was contested, because the testator
was not of sound and disposing mind and memory and because at the time of the making of the will he was
acting under the undue influence of his brothers, and where he had a guardian when he executed his will, is
Ames Will ([1902] 40 Ore., 495). Mr. Justice Moore, delivering the opinion of the court, in part said:
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"It is contended by contestants counsel that, on the day said pretended -will purports to have been
executed, Lowell was declared incompetent by a court which had jurisdiction of the person and subjectmatter, and that the decree therein appointing a guardian of his person and estate raises the disputable
presumption that he did not possess sufficient testamentary capacity at that time, to overcome which
required evidence so strong as to leave no reasonable doubt as to his capacity to make a valid will, and, the
testimony introduced by the proponent being insufficient for that purpose, the court erred in admitting it to
probate . . .
"The appointment of a guardian of a person alleged to be non compos mentis, by a court having jurisdiction,
must necessarily create a presumption of the mental infirmity of the ward; but such decree does not
conclusively show that the testamentary capacity of the person under guardianship is entirely destroyed,
and the presumption thus created may be overcome by evidence proving that such person at the time he
executed a will was in fact of sound and disposing mind and memory: Stone v. Damon, 12 Mass., 487;
Breed v. Pratt, 18 Pick., 115; In re Slingers Will, 72 Wis., 22 (37 N. W., 236). . . .
". . . The testimony shows that the testator retained a vivid recollection of the contents of the books he had
read and studied when he was young, but that he could not readily recall to his mind the ordinary incidents
of his later life. The depth and intensity of mental impressions always depend upon, and are measured by,
the degree of attention given to the perception of facts, which requires observation, or to the conception of
truths, which demands reflection; and hence the inability of a person to recollect events occurring recently is
evidence of mental decay, because it manifests a want of power of concentration of the mind. The aged live
in the past, and the impressions retained in their minds are those that were made in their younger days,
because at that period of their lives they were able to exercise will power by giving attention. While the
inability of a person of advanced years to remember recent events distinctly undoubtedly indicates a decay
of the human faculties, it does not conclusively establish senile dementia, which is something more than a
mere loss of mental power, resulting from old age, and is not only a feeble condition of the mind, but a
derangement thereof. . . The rule is settled in this state that if a testator at the time he executes his will
understands the business in which he is engaged, and has a knowledge of his property, and how he wishes
to dispose of it among those entitled to his bounty, he possesses sufficient testamentary capacity,
notwithstanding his old age, sickness, debility of body, or extreme distress.
x

"It is contended by contestants counsel that if Lowell, at the time he executed the pretended will, was not
wholly lacking in testamentary capacity, he was, in consequence of age, ill health, debility of body, and
infirmity of will power, susceptible to persuasion by his friends, and that his brothers, Andrew and Joseph,
having knowledge thereof, took advantage of his physical and mental condition, and unduly influenced him
to devise and bequeath his property in the manner indicated, attempting thereby to deprive the contestant
of all interest therein except such as was given her by statute. . . Assuming that he was easily persuaded,
and that his brothers and the persons employed by them to care for him took advantage of his enfeebled
condition and prejudiced his mind against the contestant, did such undue influence render the will
theretofore executed void? . . . When a will has been properly executed, it is the duty of the courts to uphold
it, if the testator possessed a sound and disposing mind and memory, and was free from restraint and not
acting under undue influence, notwithstanding sympathy for persons legally entitled to the testators bounty
and a sense of innate justice might suggest a different testamentary disposition.
"Believing, as we do, that the findings of the circuit court are supported by the weight of the testimony, its
decree is affirmed."
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Insofar as the law on testamentary capacity to make a will is concerned, and carrying alone one step further
the question suggested at the end of the presentation of the facts on the same subject, a resolution of the
case comes down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a
will which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity, and have the proponents of the will
carried successfully the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?
II. UNDUE INFLUENCE
A. Facts. The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence exercised by the persons
benefited in the will in collaboration with others. The trial judge found this allegation to have been
established and made it one of the bases of his decision. It is now for us to say if the facts justify this
finding.
Tomas Rodriguez voluntarily named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The latter subsequently became
his guardian. There is every indication that of all his relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed the most confidence
in Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez who, on the
suggestion of Rodriguez, secured Maximino Mina to prepare the will, and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno who
appears to have gathered the witnesses and physicians for the execution of the will. This faction of the

Lopez family was also shown a favor through the orders of Doctor Domingo as to who could be admitted to
see the patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed "a preconceived plan on the part of the persons
who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez" to secure his signature to the testament. The trial judge may be correct
in this supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that men of the standing of Judge Mina, Doctors Calderon,
Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis, and Mr. Legarda would so demean themselves and so sully their characters
and reputations as to participate in a scheme having for its purpose to delude and to betray an old man in
his dotage. Rather do we entertain the opinion that each of the gentlemen named was acting according to
the best of his ability to assist in a legitimate act in a legitimate manner. Moreover, considering the attitude
of Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her husband and his apparent enmity toward them, it
seems fairly evident that even if the will had been made in previous years when Rodriguez was more nearly
in his prime, he would have prepared somewhat a similar document.
B. Law. One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other person for his benefit (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 634[4]). Undue influence, as here mentioned in connection with the law of wills, and as further
mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be defined as that which compels the testator to do that which
is against the will from fear, the desire of peace, or from other feeling which he is unable to resist.
The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.
III. JUDGMENT
To restate the combined issue of fact and law in this case pertaining to testamentary capacity: Did Tomas
Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test
regarding testamentary capacity, and have the proponents of the will carried successfully the burden of
proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?
Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician, testified clearly to the regular manner in which
the will was executed and to the testators mental condition. The other subscribing witness, also a physician,
on the contrary testified to a fact which, if substantiated, would require the court to disallow the will. The
attending physician and three other eminent members of the medical fraternity, who were present at the
execution of the will, expressed opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we
have the professional speculations of three other equally eminent members of the medical profession who,
however, were not included among those present when the will was executed. The advantage on these facts
is all with those who offer the will for probate.
The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical distress. It was reasonable, that is,
it was reasonable if we take into account the evident prejudice of the testator against the husband of
Margarita Lopez.
With special reference to the definition of testamentary capacity, we may say this: On January 3, 1924,
Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion, comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he was engaged. He
had had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The will was
read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the proper places at the bottom and on
the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him. While for some months prior to the making of the will
he had not managed his property, he seems to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and
of his income. Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he
knew who they were. He seemed to entertain a predeliction towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural
since Lopez was nearest to his own age. The testator comprehended the manner in which the instrument
distributed the property among the objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed an
insistence on giving all of his property to the two persons whom he specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been physically
decrepit, may have been weak of intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian,
and may have been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of life, that strength
of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the
law terms "testamentary capacity." That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an exhaustive
and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing the evidence carefully and conceding all good faith
to the witnesses for the oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious consideration which it deserves.
The judgment of the trial court will be set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez will be admitted to
probate, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Villamor,. Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
STREET and OSTRAND, JJ., dissenting:

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We are of the opinion that the judgment which is the subject of appeal in this case is in all respects correct
and should be affirmed. The testator was clearly suffering from senile dementia and lacked the "disposing
mind and memory" the possession of which is a condition precedent to the exercise of testamentary power.

G.R. No. L-24665 October 13, 1926

Estate of the deceased Isidra Abquilan. ATANASIO
ABQUILAN, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. FELICIANA
ABQUILAN, opponent-appellee.
Simeon Bitanga and Vicente Sotto for appellant.
R. Nolan and Feria and La O for appellee.
STREET, J.:
Naa ni digest (-Final-Case-Digest-in-Succession)
This appeal has been brought to reverse an order of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Occidental Negros, refusing to
legalize an instrument (Exhibit A) purporting to be the last will and
testament of Isidra Abquilan, deceased. It appears that the
deceased left no forced heirs, and her only heirs, in case of
intestacy, are her brother, Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the
will, and Feliciana Abquilan, a sister, who is the opponents.
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Upon hearing the cause the trial court found that the document
propounded as the will of the deceased is apocryphal, that the
purported signatures of the deceased to the supposed will are
forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not executed by
the deceased. He therefore denied probate, and the proponent
appealed.
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We have carefully examined the evidence, and upon repeated

perusal of the appealed decision, we find that the conclusions of fact
stated therein are so completely in harmony with our own view of

the case, that no new exposition of the facts is necessary. A clear

preponderance of the evidence shows that on November 6, 1924,
the date when the will purports to have been executed, the
supposed testatrix was not in a condition such as to enable her to
have participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering
from paralysis to celebral hemorrhage in such degree as completely
to discapacitate her for intelligent participation in the act of making
a will. A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as signed in
two places to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures
leads to the conclusion that the signatures to the supposed will were
made by some other person. Furthermore, the combined testimony
of Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely demonstrate in our
opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the date
attributed to the questioned document, and that, instead an
attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate another will,
which failed of completion because of the refusal of Alejandro
Genito to be party to the making of a will in which the testatrix took
no part. The instrument before us was undoubtedly fabricated later,
probably on November 7, at a time when the condition of the
deceased was such as to make rational participation on her part in
the act of making a will impossible.
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The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered,

with costs against the appellant.

[G.R. No. 33592. March 31, 1931.]

Estate of the deceased Victorina Villaranda. EUSEBIA LIM, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JULIANA
CHINCO, Oppositor-Appellee.
Perfecto Gabriel and Eusebio Orense for Appellant.
Camus & Delgado for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; LACK OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; COMA RESULTING FROM CEREBRAL HEMORRHAGE. The
alleged testatrix, a woman of about 80 years of age, was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral
hemorrhage, and was kept prostrate in bed, in a state of coma, for three days, at the end of which she was
removed to a hospital where she died four days later. Just before her removal to the hospital a will was
made for her by an attorney, who also signed her name thereto, purportedly at her request. At the time the
will was made the proof showed that the testatrix was in a comatose condition and devoid of the power of
articulate speech. Held, that testamentary capacity was lacking and that the purported will was not valid.

DECISION

STREET, J.:

This is a contest over the probable of a paper writing purporting to be the will of Victorina Villaranda y Diaz,
a former resident of the municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, who died in the Hospital of San
Juan de Dios, in the City of Manila, on June 9, 1929. The deceased left no descendants or ascendants, and
the document produced as her will purports to leave her estate, consisting of properties valued at P50,000,
more or less, chiefly to three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of the surname of Lim. This
instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the instrument as executrix. Opposition was
made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the deceased. Upon hearing the cause the trial court sustained the
opposition and disallowed the will on the ground that the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the
time the instrument purports to have been executed by her. From this judgment the proponent of the will
appealed.
The deceased was a resident of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, and was about 80 years of age at the

time of her death. On the morning of June 2, 1929, she was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral
hemorrhage, and was taken in an unconscious condition, seated in a chair, to her room. Doctor Geronimo Z.
Gaanan, a local physician of Meycauayan, visited the old lady, with whom he was well acquainted, three or
four times, the first visit having occurred between 6 and 7 p.m. of June 3d. Upon examining the patient, he
found her insensible and incapable of talking or controlling her movements. On the same day the parish
priest called for the purpose of administering the last rites of the church, and being unable to take her
confession, he limited himself to performing the office of extreme unction. Doctor Isidoro Lim, of Manila, was
also called upon to visit the patient and he came to see her two or three times. With his approval, it was
decided to take the woman to the hospital of San Juan de Dios in Manila, and on the morning of June 5,
1929, the ambulance from this hospital arrived, in charge of Doctor Guillermo Lopez del Castillo, a resident
physician of the hospital. At about 11 oclock a.m. on that day she was embarked on the ambulance and
taken to the hospital, where she died four days later.
The purported will, which is the subject of this proceeding, was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a practicing
attorney of Manila, whose wife appears to be related to the chief beneficiaries named in the will. This
gentleman arrived upon the scene at 9 or 10 oclock on the forenoon of June 5, 1929. After informing
himself of the condition of the testatrix, he went into a room adjacent to that occupied by the patient and,
taking a sheet from an exercise book, wrote the instrument in question. He then took it into the sick room
for execution. With this end in view Gabriel suggested to Doctor Lopez del Castillo that he would be pleased
to have Doctor Castillo sign as a witness, but the latter excused himself for the reason that he considered
the old lady to be lacking in testamentary capacity. Another person present was Marcos Ira, a first cousin of
the deceased and attorney Gabriel asked him also whether or not he was willing to sign as one of the
witnesses. Ira replied in a discouraging tone, and the attorney turned away without pressing the matter. In
the end three persons served as witnesses, and two relatives of his wife. The intended testatrix was not able
to affix her signature to the document, and it was signed for her by the attorney.
The vital question in the case is whether the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time the
paper referred to was signed. Upon this point we are of the opinion, as was the trial judge, that she had not.
The proof shows by a marked preponderance that the deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a
comatose condition and incapable of performing any conscious and valid act. The testimony of Doctor
Gaanan and Doctor Lopez del Castillo is sufficient upon this point, and this testimony is well corroborated by
Paciana Diaz and Irene Ahorro. The first of these witnesses was the one who chiefly cared for the deceased
during her last illness in Meycauayan until she was carried away to the hospital in Manila; and the second
was a neighbor, who was called in when the stroke of apoplexy first occurred and who visited the patient
daily until she was removed from Meycauayan.
The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect that the patient was in a continuous state of
coma during the entire period of her stay in Meycauayan, subsequent to the attack, and that on the
forenoon of June 5, 1929, she did not have sufficient command of her faculties to enable her to do any valid
act. Doctor Lim, the physician from Manila, testified for the proponent of the will. His testimony tends to
show that the patient was not suffering from cerebral hemorrhage but from uraemic trouble, and that, after
the first attack, the patient was much relieved and her mind so far cleared up that she might have made a
will on the morning of June 5th. The attorney testified that he was able to communicate with the deceased
when the will was made, and that he read the instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her
whether it expressed her wishes. He says that she made signs that enabled him to understand that she
concurred in what was written. But it is clear, even upon the statement of this witness, that the patient was
unable to utter intelligent speech. Upon the authority of Perry v. Elio (29 Phil., 134), the paper offered for
probate was properly disallowed.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against
theAppellant.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Malcolm and Johns, JJ., concurred, but being absent at the date of the promulgation of the opinion, their
names do not appear signed thereto. AVANCEA, C.J.
Separate Opinions
ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting:

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I am of opinion that the will in question is genuine and that it was drawn up and signed with all the legal
requisites; therefore, I vote for its allowance, and the consequent reversal of the judgment appealed from.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6322 February 21, 1912
DOLORES AVELINO, as administratrix of the estate of Pascual
de la Cruz, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. VICTORIANA DE LA
CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Buencamino, Diokno, Mapa, Buencamino, Jr. Platon & Lontoc for
appellant.
Alfonso Mendoza for appellee.
JOHNSON, J. :

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The present is an appeal from an order of the Honorable George N.

Hurd, judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, in
which he had legalized the will of the said Pascual de la Cruz,
deceased.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

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The contention of the opponent is that at the time of the making of

the will the said Pascual de la Cruz was blind and had been for a

number of years, and was incompetent to make the will in

question.
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Against this contention of the opponent, all of the witnesses who

signed the will were called as witnesses, and each declared that the
deceased was of sound mind at the time said will was made and
fully understood its contents and signed the same in their presence
and that they each signed the will in the presence of each other, as
well as in the presence of the deceased.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

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The appellant attempted to show that the deceased was

incompetent to make his will because he was blind at the time the
same was executed and had been for several years theretofore.
There is absolutely no proof to show that the deceased was
incapacitated at the time he executed his will. No presumption of
incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The only
requirement of the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the
person shall be of age and of sound mind and memory. (Sec. 614,
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.) Section 620 of the same code
prohibits blind persons from acting as witnesses in the execution of
wills, but no limitation is placed upon the testamentary capacity,
except age and soundness of mind.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

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In our opinion the record contains nothing which justifies the

modification of the order made legalizing the will in the present
case. The order of the lower court admitting to probate and
legalizing the will in question is therefore hereby affirmed with
costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 23483. December 18, 1926. ]

In re will of Pedro Tablizo, deceased. ANTONIO AMATA and FELIPE ALMOJUELA, PetitionersAppellants, v. JUANA TABLIZO, ET AL., objectors-appellees.
Gregorio Perfecto for Appellants.
Domingo Imperial for Appellees.
SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL; EVIDENCE. Where it appears that a few hours and days
after the execution of the will, the testator was intelligently and intelligibly conversing with other persons,
making a clear and coherent narration of facts, although lying down on his bed and unable to move or stand
up unassisted, and could still effect the sale of a property belonging to him, these circumstances show that
at the time of the execution of the will, the testator was in perfectly sound mental condition.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. Where the opponents and their witnesses testified falsely
on an essential point, they cannot be given credit upon the other essential points of their testimony, unless
corroborated by other witnesses whose credibility is beyond suspicion, and their testimony cannot prevail
over the natural, clear, positive and consistent testimony of the adverse parties and their witnesses.
3. ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF WILLS. Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither
old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had had to guide his hand in order that he could sign, is
sufficient to invalidate his will. (28 R. C. L., pars. 44 and 68; [1915 D], L. R. A., 906; 35 L. R. A., 102.)

DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J. :

This is a proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay by a petition filed by Antonio Amata
and Felipe Almojuela, praying for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Pedro Tablizo,
and the issuance of letters of administration to the petitioners.
Juana Tablizo and others opposed the probate of the will applied for on the following grounds:" (1) That it
was not signed by the witnesses, nor executed by the deceased Pedro Tablizo, as prescribed by the Code of
Civil Procedure; (2) that the deceased Pedro Tablizo was not habitually of sound mind, but on the contrary,
was unconscious at the time of the execution of said document; (3) that said document was not signed by
the testator freely and voluntarily, nor did he intend it to be his will on the date when it was executed; and
(4) that said document was maliciously and fraudulently prepared by the two beneficiaries Antonio Amata
and Felipe Almojuela, causing a date to appear thereon which is not the true date of its execution." And they
prayed that the petition be denied, and it be held that Pedro Tablizo died intestate, and Tomas Tablizo be
appointed special administrator of the estate left by said deceased.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by the petitioners, as well as the opponents, the court below
entered an order declaring that the deceased Pedro Tablizo was unconscious when the document Exhibit A
was executed, and that said document did not contain the last will of the testator, and denying the probate
thereof as the last will and testament of said deceased; and declaring, further, that Pedro Tablizo died
intestate. From this order the petitioners took an appeal in due time and form, assigning the following
supposed errors as committed by the trial court, to wit: (1) Its declaration that it entertains a reasonable
suspicion that the document Exhibit A, the testament of the deceased Pedro Tablizo, does not contain the
will of the testator: (2) its refusal to admit the will Exhibit A to probate and its finding that Pedro Tablizo died
intestate; and (3) its failure to render judgment against the opponents for the costs of the action.
The petitioners attempted to prove that the deceased Pedro Tablizo was 82 years old and was near-sighted.
Beginning May 4, 1924, he was confined to his bed by reason of senile weakness and could not stand up. On
June 2 and 3, 1924, he sent for one Juan Agunday to tell him to draw his will, but the latter excused himself,
saying that it was a delicate and hard task. On the evening of June 3, 1924, Pedro Tablizo caused one to
look for Alipio Arcilla, but the latter could not be found, having gone to Dato. In view thereof, he ordered
that Felipe Almojuela be called. As soon as the latter arrived, which took place at about 3 oclock in the
evening, Pedro Tablizo asked Antonio Amata to bring him the list of his real-properties, and to read one by
one the items therein for the purpose of separating the paraphernal property of his wife from his and the
conjugal property. Antonio Amata read them one by one in the presence of Mariano Arcilla husband of Juana
Tablizo, of Felipe Almojuela and of Pedro Tablizo, giving their boundaries, kinds, areas and values. As Antonio
Amata was mentioning each parcel, Pedro Tablizo was telling him to whom it must be allotted. When he said,
"that is Incays" (wife of Pedro Tablizo), he marked the item with the word "Incay," and so on, with the
words "Pedro," if he said it was his; "conjugal" if he said it was conjugal; and "own cultivation" if he said it
was cultivated by him exclusively, that is, land acquired by cultivation and occupied by him. There arose
certain doubts as to the boundaries of one of the lands and his brother-in-law Mariano Arcilla made them
clear. At 6 oclock in the evening, the reading of the light was finished, and Pedro Tablizo asked Antonio
Amata is bother-in-law, Mariano Arcilla, as to what they thought about the will being drawn by Felipe
Almojuela. Mariano Arcilla answered that he agreed that it be written by Felipe Almojuela, since no one else
could do it and Alipio Arcilla was not in the town. At 6 :30 Pedro Tablizo began to dictate his will to Felipe
Almojuela, in the presence of his wife, of Mariano Arcilla and Antonio Amata, having finished the same at
about 8 oclock in the evening. While Felipe Almojuela was writing a clean copy of the rough draft in his
house, the testator told Antonio Amata to look for Vicente Arcilla and Gregorio Sarmiento who were to act as
witnesses to the will, together with Gregorio Sarmiento who was already in the house. Felipe Almojuela
finished typewriting the will at 12 oclock in that night and took it to the house of the testator, who, in the
presence of Mariano Dominguez, Vicente Arcilla, Gregorio Sarmiento, Cipriano Suscito, Felipe Almojuela,
Francisco Gianan, Eufrosina Tablizo and Antonio Amata, had Mariano Dominguez read it paragraph by
paragraph. Cipriano Suscito and Mariano Arcilla followed with their eyes what Mariano Dominguez was
reading. Before the reading of the will, the testator, in a stroke of good humor said to Mariano Dominguez,
"Alas! Nitoy, I will no longer be able to help you in the next election." Upon the termination of the reading of

the will, and after stating that it was his last will, Pedro Tablizo asked for it in order to sign the same. It was
1 oclock in the morning of June 4, 1924. Gregorio Sarmiento seated Pedro Tablizo upon the bed and has
been holding him, while Antonio Amata was taking a book of music, placing the will Exhibit A upon it, and
presenting it to the testator for his signature As the latter could no longer see, Eufrosina Tablizo, niece of the
testator and wife of Antonio Amata, placed the pen between his fingers, held his hand and put the point of
the pen on the place where he had to write his signature. The testator signed unaided on the left margin of
each of the pages and at the bottom of the will in the presence of all the witnesses, who did the same in the
presence of each other and of the testator. At 10 oclock approximately in the evening of June 4, 1924,
Pedro Tablizo sent for Father Cecilio Penilla and confessed. Before the confession, he had been talking with
said priest. On the 9th day of June, 1924, Serapia Torcelino and her husband went to the house of the
deceased looking for a carabao to purchase, and Pedro Tablizo ordered that the carabao called Tilbayong be
sold On the 10th day of the same month and year, Fathers Andres Tablizo and Mariano Surtida, paid a visit
to the testator and the latter talked with them. On the 12th day of the same month and year, Father Cecilio
Penilla saw him for the last time, and on said date, as on June 4, he found him lying down on his bed, being
unable to move, but he could speak, and prayed correctly, first in an audible voice and then in a low voice.
In his two confessions, he related his spiritual life coherently and without confusion. Antonio Amata has been
living with his wife in the house of the testator, taking care of him and helping him manage his estate. It was
he who attended to the payment of the land tax. Felipe Almojuela was reared by Pedro Tablizo since he was
a child, having taken him from the possession of his parents and kept him in his house until he married.
Pedro Tablizo died on June 20, 1924.
The opponents, who are all brothers and sisters and children of brothers and sisters of the testator,
attempted to prove that the will was clandestinely prepared by Antonio Amata and Felipe Almojuela and
signed on the midnight of June 19, 1924, Pedro Tablizo then Lying down on his bed, weakened by old age
and his sickness, lying down with his mouth upward and open, the eyes closed and the feet and arms
extended, being unable to move, see, speak or know those surrounding him, it being necessary that Antonio
Amata should, as he did, place the pen in his fingers, hold him by the arm and guide him while signing the
will upon a pillow.
The only questions to be decided in this appeal are: (1) hen was the will made and signed?; (2) who drew
and signed it?; and (3) was the mind of the testator perfectly sound when he made and signed the will?
As to the first question, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the testator dictated to Felipe
Almojuela the rough draft of his will, the latter having typewritten it clean, and finished the drawing thereof
at midnight. Notwithstanding the distrust with which the trial judge received the testimony of the
petitioners, as they had intervened in the preparation of the will, and are the ones most benefited, he could
not help giving credit to their testimony and that of their witnesses upon the date when the will was made
and signed, that is, from 3 oclock in the evening of the third day up to 1 oclock in the morning of the 4th of
June, 1924. In view of the fact that the testator did not die until June 20, 1924, it was to the interest of the
opponents to fix it at June 19, 1924, in order to make credible the theory that the testator was unconscious
when his will was executed and signed.
Turning now to the second question, the very witness for the opponents, Father Cecilio Penilla, testified that
at 10 oclock approximately in the night of June 4, 1924, the date when the will was signed, and on the 12th
day of the same month and year, the testator had sent for him in order to confess and on both occasions he
intelligently and intelligibly talked with him, relating his spiritual life coherently and clearly although he was
lying down on his bed and could not move or stand up without assistance It is a fact also uncontroverted
that on .June 9, 1924, he ordered a carabao sold, designating it by its name Tilbayong. On the 10th day of
the same month, he received the visit of Fathers Andres Tablizo and Mariano Surtida with whom he has been
conversing. All these prior, coetaneous and subsequent circumstances show that Pedro Tablizo was perfectly
of sound mind at the time of making his last will.
With regard to the third question, we have already seen that the will was made on June 8, 1924, and signed
immediately thereafter at an early hour in the morning of the 4th day of the same month and year. The date
of the execution of the will is important in the determination of the mental condition of the testator. If the
opponents and their witnesses testified falsely upon this essential point, under the rule falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus, they are not entitled to any credit upon the other essential points of their testimony, unless
corroborated by other witnesses whose credibility is beyond suspicion. On the other hand, the testimony of
the petitioners and their witnesses upon the making of the will is so clear, positive and consistent, and the
succession of facts upon which they testified and their incidents is so natural, that it cannot but convince any
one who should read it without bias. If, as above stated, the petitioners and their witnesses are entitled to a
greater credit than the opponents and their witnesses, and if, as above seen, the testator was in perfectly
sound mental condition, there can be no doubt that it was the testator who signed his signature on the will
placed upon a book of music. The testimony of the opponents and their witnesses is improbable that the will
was signed upon a pillow. A pillow being soft, as it is, cannot serve as a support for writing purposes.
Where the testator is in perfectly sound mental condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that
somebody had had to guide his hand in order that he could sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will. (28 R. C.
L., pars. 44 and 68; L. R. A. [1915 D], page 906; 35 L. R. A., 102.)
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the order appealed from must be, as is hereby,
revoked with the costs against the appellees, and it is ordered that the will of Pedro Tablizo be admitted to
probate. So ordered.

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, G.R. No. 157451

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales, and ' Garcia, JJ
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Promulgated:
' Respondent.
December 16, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

he law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests
the burden of showing why it should not be allowed. In the present
case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. For
this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the
part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the March 7, 2003 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from

is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered
approving and allowing probate to the said last will and testament of
Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of letters testamentary to
the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the
court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings.

[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:

x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a
long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In
1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived
in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village,
Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte
and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival
from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was
then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio,
Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded
bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR
PULMONALE.

Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English

and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but
acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the
entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause,
and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and
on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The
second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of
the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. It provides in
the body that:

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN

THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:

I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina

Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200 Catmon
Street, Makati, Metro , 83 years of age and being of
sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby
declare this to be my last will and testament:

1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery,

under the auspices of the Catholic Church in accordance
with the rites and said Church and that a suitable
monument to be erected and provided my by executrix

(wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my

family and friends;

2.

I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife,

JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the

follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [coowner]:

a.

Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro ,
described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of
the

Register

registered
deceased

of

Deeds

jointly
sister

as

of

Pasig,

co-owners

(Ciriaca

Metro-

with

Valmonte),

my

having

share and share alike;

b.

2-storey

building

standing

on

the

above-

described property, made of strong and mixed

materials used as my residence and my wife
and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati,
Metro also covered by Tax Declaration No. A025-00482, Makati, Metro-, jointly in the name
of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and
myself as co-owners, share and share alike or
equal co-owners thereof;

3.

All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and

personal properties, including my savings account bank

book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew,
and all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give,
devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C.
Valmonte;

4.

I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as

sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my

will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this

15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines.

The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the

grounds that:

1.

Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the

testator, especially those found in the USA;

2.

Petitioner failed to state the names, ages,

and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give
them proper notice pursuant to law;

3.

Will was not executed and attested as required by

law and legal solemnities and formalities were not
complied with;

4.

Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the

time of the alleged execution he being in an advance
sate of senility;

5.

Will was executed under duress, or the influence of

fear or threats;

6.

Will was procured by undue and improper influence

and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her
agents and/or assistants; and/or

7.

Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick,

and he did not intend that the instrument should be
his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging

her want of understanding and integrity.

At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses

the notary public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized
the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr.
and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor
Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.

According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in
her parents house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to
every month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the
said Makati residence. There were times though when to shave off on
expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his
travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will
was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were
their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no
knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her
husband, but just serendipitously found it in his attache case after his
death. It was only then that she learned that the testator bequeathed
to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the said will.
To her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by
the testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too
that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because despite his
old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers
from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she
could not accompany him, even traveled to alone to claim his monthly
pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good health and
that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually
resulted in his death.

Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the
testator's will, testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when
the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his
house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and
testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and
dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come
back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had
prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in
his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed
date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by
his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before
the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary
public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a
dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained
that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his
witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been
executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was
actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed
the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the
document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his
observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the
time he affixed his signature on the will.

The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the

notary public, and testified that the testator went alone to the house of
spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and
requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro
Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his
instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June
15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the
will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983 because
of the absence of the notary public; that the testator executed the will
in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind
and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the
will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog
dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in

the presence of the testator and of each other. And that during the
execution, the testator's wife, Josefina was not with them.

The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone
because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of
Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the
mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the
execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and
was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in
1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia's family to
live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the
testator's

physical

and

mental

condition

showed

deterioration,

aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary

Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.

Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t] he evidence
adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:

1.

Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in

the execution and attestation of the will; and

2.

Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the

execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of
senility

'It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly
disallowed probate.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate.
The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had
acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his 'sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways' [6] did not make him a person of unsound mind.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I.

Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great
respect.

II.

Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will

was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never
intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.

III.

Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the

time he allegedly executed the subject will.[8]

In short, petitioner assails the CA's allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

This Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented
during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the
instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.[9]
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will
presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that
must be satisfied for the probate of a will.[10] Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the
instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1)

If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2)

If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of

making a will, at the time of its execution;

(3)

If it was executed through force or under duress, or the

influence of fear, or threats;

(4)

If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and

influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5)

If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6)

If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the

instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his

signature thereto.

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmonte's will by imputing fraud in
its execution and challenging the testator's state of mind at the time.

Existence of Fraud in the

Execution of a Will

Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but
maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud.
Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testator's wife and sole beneficiary, conspired
with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is
allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was 'highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to]
almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who
happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado,[11] thus casting doubt on the intention of
respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly 'defies human reason,
logic and common experience[12] for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have
willingly signed a last will and testament.

We are not convinced. Fraud 'is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact,
in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for the fraud, he would not have made.[13]

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at
the time of its execution.[14] The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will
only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.[15] Unfortunately in this case, other than the
self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will.[16] That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact
that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken 'the cudgels of taking care
of [the testator] in his twilight years.[17]

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on
the will does not invalidate the document, 'because the law does not even require that a [notarial]
will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.[18] More important, the will
must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also
attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.[19] Furthermore, the testator and the

witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.[20] In any event, we agree with the
CA that 'the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.[21]

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985,
October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as
follows:

Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when
the testator and his witnesses were supposed to be in your
office?
A Yes sir.

Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your
house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.

xxxxxxxxx

Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per

acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual date
when the document was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.

Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses
affixed their respective signature on the first and second pages
of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date
appearing on the body of the document as well as the
attestation clause?

A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it

in

my

own

handwriting

August

9,

1983

on

the

acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)

Eugenio Gomez:

Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15,
1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is dated August 9,
1983, will you look at this document and tell us this discrepancy
in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the
two witnesses; that was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento
told us to return on the 15 th of June but when we returned, Atty.
Sarmiento was not there.

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you
again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.

Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed,
who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25,
1985, pp. 7-8)

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:

Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three
times?

xxxxxxxxx

A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of
June was out first time. We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento
and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament. After
that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament,
what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15 th of

June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not

there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the
third time we went there on August 9 and that was the time we
affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)

Josie Collado:

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15,
1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9,
1983.

Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty.

Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.

Q For what purpose?

A Our purpose is just to sign the will.

Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?

A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a 'grand conspiracy in the commission of a
fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit
from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary
are credible evidence of its due execution.[23] Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it
was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed,absent any
showing of ill motives.[24]

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines:

Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be

of sound mind at the time of its execution.

Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator

be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other
cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the
will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in
the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the
time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the
probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval.

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the
proper objects of the testator's bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this
test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds
of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the
proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As
we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, [25] which held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which

unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that
degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy,
there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and
while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or
partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a
person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to
whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held
that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a
person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."[26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED , and the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED . Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 174489 : April 07, 2012]

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M.

MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., AND RAFAEL TITCO, PETITIONERS, VS.
LORENZO LAXA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of
sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to
give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long
as it is legally tenable.[1]
cralaw

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, 2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted
the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC.
NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition
for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution [6] which denied the Motion for Reconsideration
thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which
disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o
Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will,
executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice.
After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last
will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 [8] and
then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.[9]
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and
Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures
below its attestation clause[10] and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,[11] in the presence of
Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo
R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross
Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses
LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties
enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children,
LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of
legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA
LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would
decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this last
will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon
F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul
and that of D[]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond
situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance
with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x [12]
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom
she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.[13]
Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for
Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for
the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on
January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition [14]with the
RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13,
2000[15] allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she
was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on
September 13, 1981.[16] The Will was executed in her fathers (Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence
and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.[17] Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.[18] She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing
thereon.[19] Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin
testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.[20] The judge can walk but
can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no
longer testify in court.[21]
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition [22] to
Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda Regala
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. [23]
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio
Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L.
Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition[24] contending that Paciencias Will was null and void because
ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to
Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.[25] Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of
Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a
citizen and resident of the USA. [26] Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in
favor of Antonio.[27]
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition [28] asking the RTC to deny the
probate of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its
execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by
some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the
signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the
document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation [29] reiterating
their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the
appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order [30] denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be
appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latters claim as a coowner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for
cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter
notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will;
and the lack of photographs when the event took place. [31]
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of
Faustino, testified on his fathers condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express
himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to support this allegation. [32]
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in
Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived
with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like
that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son;
Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias death,
she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will
was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino; and
he was already residing in the USA when the Will was executed. [33] Lorenzo positively identified the
signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with
Paciencias signature because he accompanied her in her transactions. [34] Further, Lorenzo belied and denied
having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was
not in the Philippines when the same was executed.[35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia
informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after
her death.[36]
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. [37] She claimed to have
helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning
until evening and that during the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzos wife and his children
were staying in the same house.[38] She served in the said household from 1980 until Paciencias departure
for the USA on September 19, 1981.[39]

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring something for Paciencia to sign at the
latters house.[40] Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that something was as same was
placed inside an envelope.[41] However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for
money before she signs them.[42] A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house
of Antonios mother and brought with her the said envelope. [43] Upon going home, however, the envelope
was no longer with Paciencia.[44] Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or
forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments
later.[45] On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her
conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal assessment,[46] and that it was Antonio
who requested her to testify in court.[47]
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. [48] He identified the Will and testified
that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought the same to his mothers house and
showed it to him along with another document on September 16, 1981. [49] Antonio alleged that when the
documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned. [50] According to him, Paciencia thought that
the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands, [51] and it was he who explained that the
documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties
upon her departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family
upon her death.[52] Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: Why will I never
[return], why will I sell all my properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other
relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die already?[53] Thereafter, Antonio
advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied,
I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them.[54] After
which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981. [55]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision [56] denying the petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized
will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.[57]
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia
signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary
capacity.[58]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate
court did not agree with the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the
Will. It ratiocinated that the state of being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to
render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will.[59] Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were
not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete
circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing
the Will.[60]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration[61] but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution[62]dated
August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the
following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIAS
WILL DESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF
COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE
THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED [63]
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down
by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
which states:
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall pass either real or personal
estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of
the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[65] These formalities are enshrined in
Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of
Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down
by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that
the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the
witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact,
even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they
question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on
the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was magulyan or forgetful so much so that it
effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for
Reconsideration[66] filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only magulyan but was actually suffering from
paranoia.[67]
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person
mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. [68] Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or

other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no substantial
evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the
soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily executed the
Will. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled
to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.[69] More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of
sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.
Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the
person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will
was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the
testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the
making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the
shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them
to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She
specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how
she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife
CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not
included therein as devisee.[70]
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear
or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as
basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the
document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that
Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of
the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other
persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencias signature to be genuine, it was obtained through
fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on
September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and
that love even extended to Lorenzos wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact
not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and
treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in
many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who
stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his family
is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and
lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married and already has children,
highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the
devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress,
influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from
being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is
worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial
evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations. [71] Furthermore, a purported will is
not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it
will be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the
deceased].[72]
Court should be convinced by the evidence
presented before it that the Will was duly
executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. If the will is
contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of
the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death,
absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such
witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not
remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be
allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented
that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the
handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all
but one witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was
satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart
attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove
this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that
her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge
Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated
that given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite
ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor
challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able
to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public
to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra.
Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her
handwriting. It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting
witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all
the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by
evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was
or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.[73]
Moreover, it bears stressing that [i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the
authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the
evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling.[74] The very
existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate
be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable,
such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby.[75] This, coupled
with Lorenzos established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested
witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving
testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for
probate.
cralaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August
31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.