PADILLA, J.:
Facts:
While boarding an Alatco Transportation Company bus, Jose Pilapil, a paying
passenger, was hit by a stone thrown by a bystander in the highway. Despite
a series of treatment, Jose lost his left eye vision. Consequently, he filed
before the CFI of Camarines an action for damages against Alatco. The trial
court ruled in favour of Pilapil. On appeal by the company, the lower court
decision was reversed.
Issue: Whether Alatco should be held liable to Pilapil due to the throwing
incident by a mere bystander.
Ruling: No. While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from
common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a
presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the
carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney owned by Maranaos.
Upon investigation, it was found out that certain Maranaos are planning to
take revenge against petitioner. A year later, a bus of petitioner was
ambushed by three armed Maranaos. The passengers were taken out of the
vehicle to proceed with the Maranaos plan of burning the same with its
driver, however, Atty. Caorong, one of the passengers, returned to retrieve
something from the overhead rack. Seeing the shot driver, Atty. Caorong
pleaded that the driver be released. The Maranaos were adamant and in that
heated argument, Atty. Caorong was shot and subsequently died. The heirs
of Atty. Caorong brought an action for damages before the RTC of Iligan. The
lower court ruled in favour of private respondents. On appeal, the decision of
the RTC was reversed.
Issue: Whether the bus company should be held liable to the death of Atty.
Caorong.
Ruling: Yes. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts
of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have
prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In
the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioners
employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made
possible.
Inasmuch as the neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a
specific prescriptive period on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA)--which provides for a one-year period of limitation on claims for loss
of, or damage to, cargoes sustained during transit--may be applied
suppletorily to the case at bar.
In the present case, the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, while the
Complaint[51] was filed by respondent on July 25, 1991, within the one-year
prescriptive period.
Third Issue:
Package Limitation
Assuming arguendo they are liable for respondents claims, petitioners
contend that their liability should be limited to US$500 per package as
provided in the Bill of Lading and by Section 4(5)[52] of COGSA.[53]
On the other hand, respondent argues that Section 4(5) of COGSA is
inapplicable, because the value of the subject shipment was declared by
petitioners beforehand, as evidenced by the reference to and the insertion of
the Letter of Credit or L/C No. 90/02447 in the said Bill of Lading.[54]
A bill of lading serves two functions. First, it is a receipt for the goods
shipped.[55] Second, it is a contract by which three parties -- namely, the
shipper, the carrier, and the consignee -- undertake specific responsibilities
and assume stipulated obligations.[56] In a nutshell, the acceptance of the bill
of lading by the shipper and the consignee, with full knowledge of its
contents, gives rise to the presumption that it constituted a perfected and
binding contract.[57]
Further, a stipulation in the bill of lading limiting to a certain sum the
common carriers liability for loss or destruction of a cargo -- unless the
shipper or owner declares a greater value[58] -- is sanctioned by law.[59] There
are, however, two conditions to be satisfied: (1) the contract is reasonable
and just under the circumstances, and (2) it has been fairly and freely agreed
upon by the parties.[60] The rationale for, this rule is to bind the shippers by
their agreement to the value (maximum valuation) of their goods.[61]
It is to be noted, however, that the Civil Code does not limit the liability of
the common carrier to a fixed amount per package. [62] In all matters not
regulated by the Civil Code, the right and the obligations of common carriers
shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws. [63] Thus, the
COGSA, which is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code, supplements
the latter by establishing a statutory provision limiting the carriers liability in
the absence of a shippers declaration of a higher value in the bill of lading.
[64]
The provisions on limited liability are as much a part of the bill of lading as
number of units, as well as the nature of the steel sheets, the four damaged
coils should be considered as the shipping unit subject to the US$500
limitation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partly granted and the assailed
Decision MODIFIED. Petitioners liability is reduced to US$2,000 plus interest
at the legal rate of six percent from the time of the filing of the Complaint on
July 25, 1991 until the finality of this Decision, and 12 percent thereafter until
fully paid. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container
Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), a sole proprietorship customs broker.
Petitioner entered into a contract with SMC for the transfer of reels from
Manila Port to SMC warehouse. The goods were insured by UCPB. SMC
however received damaged reels. SMC thereafter claimed from UCPB. In turn
UCPB was subrogated to the rights of SMC, who then filed a complaint to
recover the damage. The trial court and CA found petitioner liable to
respondent.
Issue: Whether petitioner is a common carrier that must observe
extraordinary diligence in its carriage.
Ruling: Yes.
Issue: Whether defendant-carrier is liable for the loss or shortage of the rice
shipped.
Philippine Charter Insurance Corp vs. Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V
National Honor, National Shipping Corp of the Philippines and
International Container Services, Inc.
[G.R. No. 161833. July 8, 2005]
inspected the hatches, checked the cargo and found it in apparent good
condition. Claudio Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling
cables on each end of Crate No. 1. No sling cable was fastened on the midportion of the crate. In Dauzs experience, this was a normal procedure. As
the crate was being hoisted from the vessels hatch, the mid-portion of the
wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air resulting in extensive damage
to the shipment. PCIC paid the damage, and as subrogee, filed a case
against M/V National Honor, NSCP and ICTSI. Both RTC and CA dismissed the
complaint.
Issue:
Whether
defendants
must
be
held
liable.
Ruling: Yes. The common carriers duty to observe the requisite diligence in
the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for
transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for
their acceptance, by the person entitled to receive them. When the goods
shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises
against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not
be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable. To overcome the
presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of
the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary
diligence. Nevertheless, the presumption of negligence does not apply to the
circumstances enumerated in Art. 1734. Evidences showed that defendants
were negligent in their duties over the shipment. They failed to rebut the
presumption
of
negligence.
the plane, the battle between the military and the hijackers commenced
causing the death of de Guzman and injuries to the spouses. Hence, plaintiffs
instituted a complaint for damages against PAL. In dismissing the complaint,
the trial court ruled that the incident is a force majeure.
Issue: Whether hijacking or air piracy during martial law and under the
circumstances, is a caso fortuito or force majeure which would exempt an
aircraft from payment of damages to its passengers whose lives were put in
jeopardy and whose personal belongings were lost during the incident.
Ruling: No. In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would
exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that the following elements
must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the
event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the. Applying the above guidelines to the case at
bar, the failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due
to the skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all
members of the MNLF, without any connection with private respondent,
hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers. Under
normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident
which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of
passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But
the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a
military take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and
the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and
international flights.
rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Plaintiff sustained
injuries and even lost his watch because of the incident. This prompted
plaintiff to file a complaint for breach of contract with damages. On appeal to
the CFI of Cebu, the defendants were exonerated from their liabilities.
Issue: Whether the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event.
Ruling: Yes. Generally, a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless
the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. While it may
be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the
tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a
fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was
due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the
jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.
The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air
pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was
overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.