C

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LIST OF CASES IN CONFLICT LAWS

(Torts and Crimes)

1.) G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of
the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as ExecutiveSecretary,
respondents.

G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN
RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as
members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE
UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
PROPERTIES INJAPAN, respondents

JASPER
Facts:


These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin
respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with
the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306
Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on
February 21, 1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4)
properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under
the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9,
1956, and is part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for
their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War
II.
As intended, the subject property became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on
July 22, 1976. Due to the failure of our government to provide
necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped
since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C.
Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez,
to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a
Japanese firm where, at the end of the lease period, all the three
leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine
government. On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order
No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
reparations capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi
were specifically mentioned in the first Whereas clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive
branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its
decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a
minimum floor price at $225 million.

Issues:

The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following
issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by
the Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the
authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?

In G.R. NO. 92047, apart from questioning the authority
of the government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296,

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the petitioner also questions the bidding procedures of the
Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine
Government Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against
Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them the
right to be informed about the bidding requirements.

Held:

The petition is granted. As property of public dominion,
the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general
use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective
needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve
the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropriation. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino,
Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition,
Vol. II, p. 26).
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under
paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to
the State and intended for some public service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a
long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert
it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property
under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment
cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use
was attributable not to the governments own deliberate and
indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazarao, 166
SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act
based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai
in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi propertys original
purpose.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an
authority to sell, does not have a provision in this text expressly
authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for
the government sector. It merely intends to make the properties
available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale,
lease or other disposition.
Rep Act No. 6657, does not authorize the Executive
Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates
possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when
needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order
No. 299.
Moreover, President Aquinos approval of the
recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the
Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned
on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property.
It does not have the force and effect of law since the President
already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already
convened for more than a year. Assuming that the Roppongi
property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle
to its sale by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its
conveyance, and thus, the Court sees no compelling reason to tackle
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner Ojeda. /Jasper Pelayo/

2.) G.R. No. L-28882 May 31, 1971 TIME, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, ELISEO S. ZARI, as Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.

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Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction,

to annul certain orders of the respondent Court of First Instance of
Rizal, issued in its Civil Case No. 10403, entitled "Antonio J. Villegas
and Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Time, Inc., and Time-Life International,
Publisher of 'Time' Magazine (Asia Edition)", and to prohibit the said
court from further proceeding with the said civil case.

Held:

Facts:

'ART. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish,

exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The petition alleges that petitioner Time, Inc., is an

American corporation with principal offices at Rocketfeller Center,
New York City, N. Y., and is the publisher of "Time", a weekly news
magazine; the petition, however, does not allege the petitioner's
2
legal capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippine.
In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 10403, therein plaintiffs
(herein respondents) Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile seek
to recover from the herein petitioner damages upon an alleged libel
arising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine, in its
issue of 18 August 1967, of an essay, entitled "Corruption in Asia",
which, in part, reads, as follows:
The problem of Manila's mayor, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, is a
case in point. When it was discovered last year that the mayor's
coffers contained far more pesos than seemed reasonable in the
light of his income, an investigation was launched. Witnesses who
had helped him out under curious circumstance were asked to
explain in court. One government official admitted lending Villegas
P30,000 pesos ($7,700) without interest because he was the
mayor's compadre
On motion of the respondents-plaintiffs, the respondent
judge, on 25 November 1967, granted them leave to take the
depositions "of Mr. Anthony Gonzales, Time-Life international", and
"Mr. Cesar B. Enriquez, Muller & Phipps (Manila) Ltd.", in
connection with the activities and operations in the Philippines of
the petitioner, and, on 27 November 1967, issued a writ of
attachment on the real and personal estate of Time, Inc.
Petitioner received the summons and a copy of the
complaint at its offices in New York on 13 December 1967 and, on
27 December 1967, it filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, relying upon the provisions
of Republic Act 4363
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the deferment
private respondents again opposed.
Failing in its efforts to discontinue the taking of the
depositions, previously adverted to, and to have action taken,
before trial, on its motion to dismiss, petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition
Issues:
1. Whether or not, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 4363 the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for damages arising
from an allegedly libelous publication, considering that the action
was instituted by public officers whose offices were in the City of
Manila at the time of the publication; if it has no jurisdiction,
whether or not its erroneous assumption of jurisdiction may be
challenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari or
prohibition; and
2. Whether or not Republic Act 4363 is applicable to
action against a foreign corporation or non-resident defendant

1.

Section 1. Article three hundred sixty of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Numbered
Twelve hundred and eighty-nine, is further amended to
read as follows:

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor

or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense; Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is
in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed
and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is
printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is
a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is
printed and first published; Provided, further, That the civil action
shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and
vice versa; Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal
action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts; And provided finally,
That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written
defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions which have been filed
in court at the time of the effectivity of the law
Under the first proviso in section 1, the venue of a civil
action for damages in cases of written defamations is localized upon
the basis of, first, whether the offended party or plaintiff is a public
officer or a private individual; and second, if he is a public officer,
whether his office is in Manila or not in Manila, at the time of the
commission of the offense. If the offended party is a public officer in
the office in the City of Manila, the proviso limits him to two (2)
choices of venue, namely, in the Court of First instance of the City of
Manila or in the city or province where the libelous article is printed
and first published ..."
The complaint lodged in the court of Rizal by
respondents does not allege that the libelous article was printed
and first published in the province of Rizal and, since the
respondents-plaintiffs are public officers with offices in Manila at
the time of the commission of the alleged offense, it is clear that the
only place left for them wherein to file their action, is the Court of
First Instance of Manila
The intent, of the law is clear: a libeled public official might sue
in the court of the locality where he holds office, in order that the
prosecution of the action should interfere as little as possible with
the discharge of his official duties and labors. The only alternative
allowed him by law is to prosecute those responsible for the libel in
the place where the offending article was printed and first
published. Here, the law tolerates the interference with the libeled
officer's duties only for the sake of avoiding unnecessary

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harassment of the accused. Since the offending publication was not

printed in the Philippines, the alternative venue was not open to
respondent Mayor Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance
Enrile, who were the offended parties.
2.

The dismissal of the present petition is asked on the

ground that the petitioner foreign corporation failed to
allege its capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippines.
Respondents rely on section 69 of the Corporation law,
which provides:

SEC. 69. No foreign corporation or corporations formed,

organized, or existing under any laws other than those of the
Philippines shall be permitted to ... maintain by itself or assignee any
suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless
it shall have the license prescribed in the section immediately
preceding. ..." ...;They also invoke the ruling in Marshall-Wells Co.
7
vs. Elser & Co., Inc. that no foreign corporation may be permitted
to maintain any suit in the local courts unless it shall have the
license required by the law, and the ruling in Atlantic Mutual Ins.
8
Co., Inc. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. that "where ... the law denies
to a foreign corporation the right to maintain suit unless it has
previously complied with a certain requirement, then such
compliance or the fact that the suing corporation is exempt
therefrom, becomes a necessary averment in the complaint." We
fail to see how these doctrines can be a propos in the case at bar,
since the petitioner is not "maintaining any suit" but is merely
defending one against itself; it did not file any complaint but only a
corollary defensive petition to prohibit the lower court from further
proceeding with a suit that it had no jurisdiction to entertain
Summing up, We hold:
(1) The under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4363, actions for damages by public
officials for libelous publications against them can only be filed in
the courts of first instance ofthe city or province where the
offended functionary held office at the time ofthe commission of
the offense, in case the libelous article was first printed or published
outside the Philippines.
(2) That the action of a court in refusing to rule, or
deferring its ruling, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or for improper venue, is in excess of
jurisdiction and correctable by writ of prohibition or certiorari sued
out in the appellate Court, even before trial on the merits is had.
WHEREFORE, the writs applied for are granted: the
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal is declared without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case No. 10403; and its
orders issued in connection therewith are hereby annulled and set
aside,. Respondent court is further commanded to desist from
further proceedings in Civil case. /Arnold Gonzalodo/

3.) SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Respondents.
Facts:

Plaintiff Morada is a flight attendant for defendant
SAUDIAs airlines based in Jeddah. On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-
over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada became a victim of attempted
rape by fellow crewmembers, Thamer and Allah, who are both Saudi
nationals. The two were eventually arrested and deported back to
Saudi Arabia while Morada was transferred to Manila. On various

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dates after the incident, Morada was summoned to Jeddah by her
employer in order to sign documents, purporting to be statements
dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. However, it turned out
that a case was in fact filed against her before the Saudi court,
which later found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and
(3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition.
Hence, Morada filed this complaint for damages based
on Article 21 of the New Civil Code against SAUDIA and its country
manager.
SAUDIA in a motion for recon raised lack of jurisdiction as
its cause of action. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction
to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code,
since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia.

Issues:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the
case
Whether the proper law applicable is Philippine law or
the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Whether or not the case involves a conficts problem

Held:

Is there a conflicts case?

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is
affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain
a foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable
since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are
rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are
many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one
of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or
that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may
assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the
fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the
petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during
her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly
from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa,
that caused a conflicts situation to arise.

Choice-of-law Problem

Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important
questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation
where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to
determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall.
This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of
qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts
relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. The
purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the
proper law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation,
but a factual situation, event or operative fact. An essential element
of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting factor or
point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of factual
relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contract, such as the situs of the res,
the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.

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Note that one or more circumstances may be present to

serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable
law. These test factors or points of contact or connecting
factors could be any of the following:
1.
The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence,
his place of sojourn, or his origin;
2.
The seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a
corporation;
3.
The situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or
is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;
4.
The place where an act has been done, the locus actus,
such as the place where a contract has been made, a
marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.
The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts
and torts;
5.
The place where an act is intended to come into effect,
e.g. the place of performance of contractual duties, or
the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
6.
The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that
should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
7.
The place where judicial or administrative proceedings
are instituted or done. The lex fori the law of the forum
is particularly important because, as we have seen
earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance
of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the
lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a
given case for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
8.
The flag of the ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also covers contractual
relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving
torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the
place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is
in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of
its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give
her her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where
the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person,
reputation, social standing and human rights of the complainant,
had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the
traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and
rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the
modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply
the State of the most significant relationship rule, which in our
view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context
of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which
has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to
be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where
the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Over-all injury occurred in the Philippines

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There is likewise no question that private respondent is a
resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international air
carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered
here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on
mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against
defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established. /Jasper Pelayo/


4.)Wild Valley Shipping Co. vs. CA
342 SCRA 213

Facts:
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel
owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent
herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon
the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to
leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of
Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto
Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River.
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain
Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez),
the vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman
[4]
when the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12,
[5]
1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under
[6]
way.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it
[7]
entered the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded
on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the
[8]
vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel.
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced
[9]
[10]
some vibrations. These occurred at 4:12 a.m. It was then that
[11]
the watch officer called the master to the bridge.
The master (captain) checked the position of the
[12]
[13]
vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. He
then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the
[14]
chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the
[15]
President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks.
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the
[16]
Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned
by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable
to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine
President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the
underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of
unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US
$400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of
litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was
[17]
dismissed in an Order dated November 7, 1988.
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in
favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd.
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-
award of interest with the private respondent questioning the
decision on the merits of the case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of respondent reversing th earlier ruling of
the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case
at bar.

Held:

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial

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notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
[24]
proved.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a
written and an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of
which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be
proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is
admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be
[25]
commonly admitted in such courts.
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
(Underscoring supplied)

The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to
include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove
the existence of a written foreign law.

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stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate
could be found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is
objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign
statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved
[37]
by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan
law was not pleaded before the lower court. A foreign law is
considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading
about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
[38]
consequence on the event or transaction in issue.
[39]
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never
alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V
Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of
Venezuela. We reiterate that under the rules of private international
law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In
the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or
state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic
[40]
law and this is known as processual presumption. /Reeld Holly
Rosas/


5.) NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC
SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO,
OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA
C. ABORDO, respondents.

We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon

Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto
[28]
Facts:
Ordaz, Venezuela, to testify on the existence of the Reglamento
[29]
General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and
o
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private
the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje N 1 del Orinoco (rules
respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T.
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has
[30]
"Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course
held the aforementioned posts for eight years. As such he is in
of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT
charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering and navigating the
COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean
Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into
[31]
Registry.
the office of the harbour masters.
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not
The deceased, husband of complainant herein, was
proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the
employed as a Second Engineer by respondents and served as such
Rules of Court.
in the vessel "M.T. Cherry Earl" until that fatal day in May 1978
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published
[32]
when, while at sea, he suffered an apoplectic stroke and died four
in the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of
days later.
the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official
publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
o
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits,
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje N 1 del Orinoco is
accrued leave pay and time-off allowances, funeral expenses,
published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
[33]
attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection
Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise
with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National
presented as evidence.
Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount of
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine
compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co.
jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written
(PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent,
official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
[34]
respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.
registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the
Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National
following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the
Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's
officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2)
Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay
It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
death benefits based on the Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25
consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his
[35]
which they claim should apply in this case; benefits under
office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is
Singaporean law were greater. The respondent Board decided in
intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
[36]
favor of the respondent Abordo On appeal, the Ministry of Labor
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
affirmed the decision. Petitioner company came to this Court on
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published
certiorari praying that the decision of the Seamen Board, affirmed
by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented
by the Ministry of Labor, he nullified for basing been rendered
as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
without jurisdiction and for making an award beyond the maximum
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
allowable. The records show, however, that the "Employment
Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who
Agreement" between Abordo's husband and petitioner company
had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the
provides that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular
the law of the registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater.
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines


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Abordo argued that the amount of compensation due

her should be based on the law where the vessel is registered,
which is Singapore law.
Respondents strongly argue that the law of Singapore
should not be applied in the case considering that their
responsibility was not alleged in the complaint that no proof of the
existence of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore was ever
presented and that the Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they
offered to pay complainant the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as death benefits based on this Board's Memorandum
Circular No. 25 which, they maintained, should apply in this case.
whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied
in this case.
Ruling:
For lack of merit, this petition is DENIED.
"Employment Agreement" between Norse Management
Co. (PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo clear that compensation
shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of
petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater.
Private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered
P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly
applied in this case
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental
Complaint of Restituta C. Abordo and, therefore, it forms part
thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore Law, the National Seamen
Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law.

Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines,
provides that the National Seamen Board has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims,
involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas
employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar
with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's
compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial
notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of
procedure particularly of evidence applied in judicial trials, do
not strictly apply."

Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor
of labor.

Note by the stomach: Di ba as a general rule, our courts cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law, hence it must be alleged and proved,
however, it is not without an exception (or exceptions). Like in this
case, SC upheld and justified the ruling of the NSB in taking judicial
notice of and applying the Singaporean law because it is familiar
with that law, and also technical rules of procedure do not strictly
apply to administratve proceedings. /Ryan Jade Lim/


6.) G.R. Nos. L-57999, 58143-53 August 15, 1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO
MENDOZA, ANTONIO TANEDO, AMORSOLO CABRERA,
DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA, RAMON DE BELEN,
ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and
VITALIANO PANGUE, petitioners,
vs. THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO and MAGSAYSAY
LINES, INC., respondents.

Facts:

Case Digests FINALS

The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who
were declared by the defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of
breaching their employment contracts with the private respondent
because they demanded, upon the intervention and assistance of a
third party, the International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF),
the payment of wages over and above their contracted rates
without the approval of the NSB. The petitioners were ordered to
reimburse the total amount of US$91,348.44 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency representing the said over-payments and to be
suspended from the NSB registry for a period of three years.

In a corollary development, the private respondent, for
failure of the petitioners to return the overpayments made to them
upon demand by the former, filed estafa charges against some of
the petitioners. The criminal cases were eventually consolidated in
the sala of then respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo. Hence, these
consolidated petitions, G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and
58143-53, which respectively pray for the nullification of the
decisions of the NLRC and the NSB, and the dismissal of the criminal
cases against the petitioners.

*** There are two issues on the case.
*** ITF - global union federation of transport workers' trade unions
ni siya

------ BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT / OVERPAYMENT OF
WAGES / REIMBURESEMENT -----

Respondents contention:
Petitioners breached their employment contracts when
they, acting in concert and with the active participations of the ITF
while the vessel was in Vancouver, staged an illegal strike and by
means of threats, coercion and intimidation compelled the owners
of the vessel to pay to them various sums totaling US$104,244.35;
that the respondent entered into the "Special Agreement" to pay
the petitioners' wage differentials because it was under duress as
the vessel would not be allowed to leave Vancouver unless the said
agreement was signed, and to prevent the ship-owner from
incurring further delay in the shipment of goods; and that in view of
petitioners' breach of contract.

Petitioners contention:
While the vessel was docked at Nagoya, Japan, a certain
Atty. Oscar Torres of the NSB Legal Department boarded the vessel
and called a meeting of the seamen including the petitioners, telling
them that for their own good and safety they should sign an
agreement prepared by him on board the vessel and that if they do,
the cases filed against them with NSB on November 17, 1978 would
be dismissed. Thus, the petitioners signed the. "Agreement" dated
December 5, 1978. However, when they were later furnished xerox
copies of what they had signed, they noticed that the line "which
amount(s) was/were received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust
for SHIPOWNERS" was inserted therein, thereby making it appear
that the amounts given to the petitioners representing the increase
in their wages based on ITF rates were only received by them in
trust for the private respondent. When the vessel reached Manila,
the private respondent demanded from the petitioners the
"overpayments" made to them in Canada. As the petitioners refused
to give back the said amounts, charges were filed against some of
them, including estafa.
Petitioners claimed before the NSB that contrary to the
private respondent's allegations, they did not commit any illegal act
nor stage a strike while they were on board the vessel; that the
"Special Agreement" entered into in Vancouver to pay their salary
differentials is valid, having been executed after peaceful
negotiations.

NSB Ruling:
Petitioners were guilty of breach of contract because
despite subsisting and valid NSB-approved employment contracts,
the petitioners sought the assistance of a third party (ITF) to

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demand from the private respondent wages in accordance with the

ITF rates, which rates are over and above their rates of pay as
appearing in their NSB-approved contracts.

While the Board recognizes the rights of the respondents to demand
for higher wages, provided the means are peaceful and legal, it
could not, however, sanction the same if the means employed are
violent and illegal. In the case at bar, the means employed are
violent and illegal for in demanding higher wages the respondents
sought the aid of a third party and in turn the latter intervened in
their behalf and prohibited the vessel from sailing unless the owner
and/or operator of the vessel acceded to respondents' demand for
higher wages.

NLRC Ruling:
Affirmed the findings of NBS.


------ ESTAFA CASE -----

Petitioners contention:
Moved to quash the criminal cases of estafa filed against them on
the ground that the alleged crimes were committed, if at all, in
Vancouver, Canada and, therefore, Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction.

RTC decision: (Hon. Benipayo)
Denied the motion.

Issues:
1. WON the petitioners are entitled to the amounts they
received from the private respondents representing
additional wages.
2. WON the case of estafa should be dismissed.

Held:
1. YES.
There is nothing in the public and private respondents'
pleadings, to support the allegations that the petitioners used force
and violence to secure the special agreement signed in Vancouver,
British Columbia. The fact that the petitioners placed placards on
the gangway of their ship to show support for ITF's demands for
wage differentials for their own benefit and the resulting ITF's
threatened interdiction do not constitute violence. The petitioners
were exercising their freedom of speech and expressing sentiments
in their hearts when they placed the placard We Want ITF Rates.
There was also no need for any form of intimidation coming from
the Filipino seamen because the Canadian Brotherhood of Railways
and Transport Workers (CBRT), a strong Canadian labor union,
backed by an international labor federation was actually doing all
the influencing not only on the ship-owners and employers but also
against third world seamen themselves who, by receiving lower
wages and cheaper accommodations, were threatening the
employment and livelihood of seamen from developed nations.

The bases used by the respondent NSB to support its
decision do not prove that the petitioners initiated a conspiracy with
the ITF or deliberately sought its assistance in order to receive
higher wages. When ITF acted in petitioners' behalf for an increase
in wages, the latter manifested their support. This would be a logical
and natural reaction for any worker in whose benefit the ITF or any
other labor group had intervened. The petitioners admit that while
they expressed their conformity to and their sentiments for higher
wages by means of placards, they, nevertheless, continued working
and going about their usual chores. The ITF people, in turn, did not
employ any violent means to force the private respondent to accede
to their demands. Instead, they simply applied effective pressure
when they intimated the possibility of interdiction should the ship-
owner fail to heed the call for an upward adjustment of the rates of
the Filipino seamen.

The ITF was militant worldwide especially in Canada,
Australia, Scandinavia, and various European countries, interdicting

Case Digests FINALS

foreign vessels and demanding wage increases for third world
seamen. There was no need for Filipino or other seamen to seek ITF
intervention. The ITF was waiting on its own volition in all Canadian
ports, not particularly for the petitioners' vessel but for all ships
similarly situated. As earlier stated, the ITF was not really acting for
the petitioners out of pure altruism. The ITF was merely protecting
the interests of its own members. The petitioners happened to be
pawns in a higher and broader struggle between the ITF on one
hand and ship-owners and third world seamen, on the other. The
Court took judicial notice of the worldwide militancy of the ITF in
interdicting foreign vessels and in demanding wage increases for
third world seamen. Interdiction is nothing more than a refusal of
ITF members to render service for the ship, such as to load or
unload its cargo, to provision it or to perform such other chores
ordinarily incident to the docking of the ship at a certain point
The public respondents' (NSB, NLRC) conclusions that the
acts of the petitioners in demanding and receiving wages over and
above the rates appearing in their NSB-approved contracts is in
effect an alteration of their valid and subsisting contracts because
the same were not obtained through mutual consent and without
the prior approval of the NSB is without basis - not only because the
private respondent's consent to pay additional wages was not
vitiated by any violence or intimidation on the part of the
petitioners but because the said NSB-approved form contracts are
not unalterable contracts that can have no room for improvement
during their effectivity or which ban any amendments during their
term. It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught
in the middle of a labor struggle between the ITF and owners of
ocean going vessels halfway around the world in Vancouver, British
Columbia to first secure the approval of the NSB in Manila before
signing an agreement which the employer was willing to sign. It is
also totally unrealistic to expect the petitioners while in Canada to
exhibit the will and strength to oppose the ITF's demand for an
increase in their wages, assuming they were so minded.

It is noteworthy to emphasize that while the International
Labor Organization (ILO) set the minimum basic wage of able
seamen at US$187.00 as early as October 1976, it was only in 1979
that the respondent NSB issued Memo Circular No. 45, enjoining all
shipping companies to adopt the said minimum basic wage. It was
correct for the respondent NSB to state in its decision that when the
petitioners entered into separate contracts between 1977-1978, the
monthly minimum basic wage for able seamen ordered by NSB was
still fixed at US$130.00. However, it is not the fault of the
petitioners that the NSB not only violated the Labor Code which
created it and the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code but also seeks to punish the seamen for a shortcoming of NSB
itself.


2. YES.
It should be dismissed. Since petitioners are entitled to the amounts
they received from the respondents, it follows as a consequence
that the amounts received by the petitioners belong to them and
not to the private respondents. No further discussions on
jurisdiction or whatsoever. /Ileen Mae Verana/

7.) [G.R. No. 71604. August 11, 1989.] JOSE B. ATIENZA, petitioner,
vs. PHILIMARE SHIPPING AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, TRANS OCEAN
LINER (Pte.) LTD., PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
Facts:
Joseph B. Atienza was engaged by Philimare Shipping and
Equipment Supply, as agent for Trans Ocean Liner Etc. Ltd. of
Germany, based on Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board the
MV Tibati for the stipulated compensation of US$850.00 a month

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from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1982. The Crew Agreement
signed by the parties provided for insurance benefits "as per NSB
Standard Format" and was validated and approved by the National
Seamen Board.
Atienza died as a result of an accident which befell him
while working on the vessel in Bombay, India. In due time, his
father, the herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits
computed at the rate of 36 months times the seaman's monthly
salary plus ten per cent thereof in accordance with the Workmen's
Compensation Law of Singapore, for a total of $30,600.00.
The private respondents, while admitting liability,
contended that this was limited to only P40,000.00 under Section
D(1) of the NSB Standard Format.
POEA: held that the applicable law was Philippine law.
NLRC: On appeal, the decision was affirmed except that it increased
the award to P75,000.00 pursuant to NSB Memorandum
Circular No. 71, Series of 1981.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.

WON Norse Ruling Applies

WON NSB Memorandum Cir be given retroactive
What law is applicable on death compensation for
seaman

CONTENTIONS:
ATIENZA (petitioner): Singaporean law should have been
applied in line with our ruling in Norse Management Co.
v. National Seamen Board, where the foreign law was
held controlling because it provided for greater benefits
for the claimant.
PHILIMARE SHIPPING (private respondents): questions
the application of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71,
Series of 1981, which they say became effective alter the
seaman's death. 7

Case Digests FINALS

apparently laboring under the belief that Memorandum Circular No.
71 was already effective at the time of the seaman's death on May
12, 1981, increased the death benefits to P75,000.00 as provided
thereunder. The fact, though, is that the new rule became effective
only in December 1981, as certified by the POEA itself, or seven
months after Atienza's fatal accident.
3. LAW APPLICABLE ON DEATH COMPENSATION FOR
SEAMAN; CASE OF STA. RITA AND WELL RUN MARITIME SA LTD. V.
NLRC REITERATED. On the petitioner's claim that the award
should be adjusted in view of the decrease in the purchasing power
of the Philippine peso, it Suffices to cite the following relevant ruling
of the Court in Sta. Rite and Well Run Maritime SA Ltd. NLRC:
Regarding the third contention of the petitioners the records show
that when Sta. Rita died on September 14, 1981, NSB Memorandum
Circular No. 46 (Series of 1979) was the applicable law. Pursuant to
this circular in case of a seaman's death during the terms of his
contract, the company shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of
P30,000.00. On November 18,1981 or more than one month after
Sta. Rita's death the administrative regulations were amended to
increase death compensation for seamen to P50,000.00, effective
December 1, 1981.
Considering that the applicable law governing death
compensation for seamen at the time of Sta Rita's death was
Memorandum Circular No. 46, Series of 1979, the petitioner's
liability should be limited to P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning
agents or shipping corporations secure employer's insurance to
cover their liabilities for death, total disability and sickness of
officers and ratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent of the
coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It would be
unjust to compel them to pay benefits based on a law not yet in
effect at the time the contingency occurs.
DECISION:
NLRC decision SET ASIDE. POEA is REINSTATED. /Robnette Delos
Santos/
8.)MITSUI O.S.K. LINES LTD., represented by
MAGSAYSAY AGENCIES, INC., vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and LAVINE LOUNGEWEAR MFG. CORP.
FACTS:

Held:
1. LABOR LAWS; EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION; DEATH
BENEFITS; RULING IN NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. V. NATIONAL
SEAMAN BOARD (117 SCRA 486) NOT APPLICABLE; IN CASE AT
BAR. Norse is not applicable to the present petition. In that case,
it was specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement
that "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with
and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act
of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the registry of
the vessel, whichever is greater." That was why the higher benefits
prescribed by the foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such
stipulation appears in the Crew Agreement now under
consideration. Instead, it is dearly stated therein that the insurance
benefits shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of
death of the seaman during the term of his contract, over and above
the benefits for which the Philippine Government is liable under
Philippine law."
2. NSB MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 71, AMENDING
NSB MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 46 NOT GIVEN RETROACTIVE
EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. The effectivity of NSB Memorandum
Circular No. 71, which appears to have been retroactively applied by
the NLRC in increasing the compensation from P40,000.O0 The
amended award was based by the POEA on NSB Memorandum
Circular No. 46, which became effective in 1979. The NLRC,

Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign

corporation represented in the Philippines by its agent,
Magsaysay Agencies. It entered into a contract of carriage
through an international freight forwarder, with private
respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Corporation to
transport goods of the latter from Manila to Le Havre, France.
Mitsui undertook to deliver the goods to France 28 days from
initial loading.
On July 24, 1991, Mitsuis vessel loaded private
respondent's container van for carriage at the said port of origin.
However, in Kaoshiung, Taiwan the goods were not transshipped
immediately, with the result that the shipment arrived in Le
Havre only on November 14, 1991.
The consignee allegedly paid only half the value of the
said goods because they did not arrive in France until the "off
season" in that country. The remaining half was allegedly
charged to the account of Lavine which in turn demanded
payment from Mitsui through its agent.
Mitsui denied Lavines claim. The latter filed a case in
the RTC. On May 20, 1993, it amended its complaint by
impleading petitioner as defendant in lieu of its agent. Mitsui

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filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the claim against it had

prescribed under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).
The RTC denied petitioner's motion as well as its
subsequent motion for reconsideration. On petition for
certiorari, the CA sustained the RTCs orders.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent's action is for "loss or
damage" to goods shipped, within the meaning of 3(6) of the
COGSA, hence the action has prescribed.

Case Digests FINALS

governed by the Civil Code, the Code of Commerce and
COGSA, for the breach of its contract of carriage with private
respondent.
We conclude by holding that as the suit below is not
for "loss or damage" to goods contemplated in 3(6), the
question of prescription of action is governed not by the COGSA
but by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code which provides for a
prescriptive period of ten years.
The decision of the CA is affirmed./Riza May Duran-Ybanez/

RULING:
No, it is not for loss or damage to goods shipped under
COGSA. The action has not prescribed.
In Ang v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., the
question was whether an action for the value of goods which had
been delivered to a party other than the consignee is for "loss or
damage" within the meaning of 3(6) of the COGSA. It was held
that there was no loss because the goods had simply been
misdelivered. "Loss" refers to the deterioration or
disappearance of goods. As defined in the Civil Code and as
applied to Section 3(6), paragraph 4 of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, "loss" contemplates merely a situation where no
delivery at all was made by the shipper of the goods because
the same had perished, gone out of commerce, or
disappeared in such a way that their existence is unknown
or they cannot be recovered.
Conformably with this concept of what constitutes
"loss" or "damage," this Court held in another case that the
deterioration of goods due to delay in their transportation
constitutes "loss" or "damage" within the meaning of 3(6), so
that as suit was not brought within one year the action was
barred. As long as it is claimed, therefore, as it is done here, that
the losses or damages suffered by the shipper or consignee
were due to the arrival of the goods in damaged or
deteriorated condition, the action is still basically one for
damage to the goods, and must be filed within the period of one
year from delivery or receipt, under the above-quoted provision
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
But the Court allowed that
There would be some merit in appellant's
insistence that the damages suffered by
him as a result of the delay in the
shipment of his cargo are not covered
by the prescriptive provision of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act above
referred to, if such damages were due,
not to the deterioration and decay of
the goods while in transit, but to other
causes independent of the condition of
the cargo upon arrival, like a drop in
their market value . . . .
In the case at bar, there is neither deterioration nor
disappearance nor destruction of goods caused by the carrier's
breach of contract. Whatever reduction there may have been
in the value of the goods is not due to their deterioration or
disappearance because they had been damaged in transit.

9.) The People of the Philippine Islands

Vs. Wong Cheng






Facts:

Wong Cheng is accused of having smoked opium
aboard the merchant vessel Changsa while it was anchored in
Manila Bay, two and a half miles away from the shores of the city.
The vessel is of English nationality.
Wong Cheng filed a demurrer claiming that the lower
court lacked jurisdiction. The lower court granted the demurrer
prompting the Attorney General to file this appeal before the
Supreme Court praying for the revocation of the lower courts
order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over crimes, like
the one herein involved, committed in merchant vessels
anchored in waters within the jurisdiction of the Philippines.


Held:

There are two fundamental rules on this particular
matter in connection with International Law:

The French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial
jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English
rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United
States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country
within territory they were committed.

Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

In certain cases, however, the comity of nations is
observed as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common
Jail where it was held that disorder which disturb only the peace
of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by
the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb
the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the
offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local
jurisdiction.

This decision, brought about the decision in United
States vs. Look Chaw holding that the mere possession of an
article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general

Precisely, the question before the trial court is not the

particular sense of "damages" as it refers to the physical loss or
damage of a shipper's goods as specifically covered by 3(6) of
COGSA but petitioner's potential liability for the damages it
has caused in the general sense and, as such, the matter is


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rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such

vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality.


On the issue of actually smoking opium on board merchant
vessels within the territory of the Philippines, the Supreme Court
had this to say:


We have seen that the mere possession of opium
aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable by or courts, because it being the primary
object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of
the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by
the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship,
without being used in our territory, does not being
about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is
not considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even
though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the
aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-
General aptly observes: the idea of a person smoking
opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in
the port of Manila in open defiance of the local
authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is
simply subversive of public order. It requires no
unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a
foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow
or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board

Order of the lower court is revoked. Case is
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
in accordance with law. /Jared Limquaico/



10.) NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs CA
G.R. No. L-49407 August 19, 1988

Facts:

In accordance with a MOA entered into
between National Development Corporation( NDC) and Maritime
Company of the Philippines (MCP), NDC, as the first preferred
mortgagee of three ocean going vessels including one with the
name 'Dona Nati' appointed defendant MCP as its agent to
manage and operate said vessel for and in its behalf and account.

Thus, the E. Philipp Corporation of New York loaded
on board the vessel at San Francisco, California, 1,200 bales of
American raw cotton. Also loaded on the same vessel at Tokyo,
Japan, were the cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd consisting of
200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and 10 cases of aluminum
foil.
En route to Manila the vessel figured in a collision with a
Japanese vessel SS Yasushuma Maru as a result of which 550
bales of aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton as well as the
cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd were lost and/or destroyed.

Development Insurance & Surety Corp. (DISC) paid the
insurance and filed an action for recoveryof money against NDC
and MC. Hence, plaintiff filed this complaint to recover said
amount from the defendants-NDC and MCP as owner and ship
agent respectively, of the said 'Dofia Nati' vessel.

The main thrust of NDC's argument is to the effect that
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) should apply to the
case at bar which provides that the carrier is not responsible for
the loss or damage resulting from the "act, neglect or default of
the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier in the
navigation or in the management of the ship." Thus, NDC insists
that based on the findings of the trial court which were adopted

Case Digests FINALS

by the Court of Appeals, both pilots of the colliding vessels were
at fault and negligent, NDC would have been relieved of liability
under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

Issue:
Which laws govern loss or destruction of goods due to
collision of vessels outside Philippine waters, and what is the
extent of liability provided thereunder.

Held:
The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case
of their loss, destruction or deterioration (Art. 1753). Since the
goods in question are transported from San Francisco, California
and Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that they were lost or
due to a collision which was found to have been caused by the
negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels the
laws of the Philippines will apply and it is immaterial that the
collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise Bay,
Japan.

Article 826 of the Code of Commerce provides that
where collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel, the
owner of the vessel at fault, shall indemnify the losses and
damages incurred after an expert appraisal. But more in point to
the instant case is Article 827 of the same Code, which provides
that if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall
suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily responsible
for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes.

Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of
Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the shipowner or
carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from
collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain. Primary
liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of
the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain
is merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or
constructive control over the conduct of the voyage.

As found by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals,
MOA shows that NDC appointed MCP as Agent, in fact, MCP was
even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel,
including the power to contract in the name of the NDC. It is well
settled that both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are
liable for the damage done where both are impleaded; that in
case of collision, both the owner and the agent are civilly
responsible for the acts of the captain., Consequently, under the
circumstances, MCP cannot escape liability. /Angge Espina-
Abellana/



11.) Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:
Sometime in or prior to June 1977, the M/S Asiatica, a ve
ssel operated by Eastern Shipping Lines Inc., loaded at Kobe, Japan
for transportation to Manila loaded 5,000 pieces of calorized pipes
valued at P256,039.00 which was consigned to Philippine
Blooming Mills Co, Inc. and 7 cases of spare parts valued at P92,
361.75 consigned to Central Textile Mills. Both sets of goods were
inured against marine risk for their stated value with respondent
Development Insurance and Surety Corp. In the same vessel, 2
containers of garment fabrics were also loaded which was
consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corp worth $46,583. The said
cargoes
were
consigned to
Nisshin
Fire
and
Marine Insurance. Another cargo loaded to the vessel was the
surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and General
Merchandise and insured against respondent Dowa Fire & Marine
Insurance for $1,385.00
On the way to Manila, M/S Asiatica caught fire
and sank. This resulted to the loss of the ship and its cargoes. The
respective insurers paid the corresponding marine insurance values
and were thus subrogated to the rights of the insured. The insurers
filed a suit against the Eastern Shipping for recovery of the amounts

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paid to the insured. However, Eastern Shipping contends that it is

not liable on the ground that the loss was due to an extraordinary
fortuitous event.

Issue:

WON the Civil Code provisions on Common Carriers or
the Carriage of the Goods by Sea Act will govern the case

Held:

1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of
their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the cargoes in question
were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of
Eastern Shipping is governed primarily by the Civil Code. However,
in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations
of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and
by special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special
law, is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.
(2) Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods,
according to all the circumstances of each case. Common carriers
are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1)
Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or
calamity;
Eastern Shipping claims that the loss of the vessel by fire
exempts it from liability under the phrase "natural disaster or
calamity. However, the Court said that fire may not be considered
a natural disaster or calamity. This must be so as it arises almost
invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does not fall
within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by
other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by the
actual fault or privity of the carrier.
As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the
exception in Article 1734, supra, Article 1735 of the Civil Code
provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734, the
common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law.
And even if fire were to be considered a "natural
disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the Civil Code, it is
required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural
disaster" must have been the "proximate and only cause of the
loss," and that the carrier has "exercised due diligence to prevent or
minimize the loss before, during or after the occurrence of the
disaster. This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish
satisfactorily. /Sarah Jane Nengasca/


12.) THE UNITED STATES, vs. H. N. BULL

Facts:

H. N. Bull was convicted of a violation of section 1 of Act
No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. He was a master of
a Standard, a Norwegian vessel which transported cattle and
carabaos from the port of Formosa and Manila without providing
suitable means for securing said animals while in transit. They failed
to provide stalls for said animals which caused some of said animals
to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses. The animals
were wounded, bruised, and killed.

Issue:

WON the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof,
when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters
of the United States.

Case Digests FINALS

Held:

It is contended that the information is insufficient
because it does not state that the court was sitting at a port where
the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on
board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the
Philippine Islands.

No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the
territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3
miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new
set of principles became applicable. The ship and her crew were
then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject
through the proper political agency. This offense was committed
within territorial waters. From the line which determines these
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she
came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the
statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is
concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have
existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming
that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a
continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed
during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed
forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense
and the person of the offender.

The United States has adhered consistently to the view
that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the
jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has
by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented
to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.

Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local
courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and
navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of
July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular
agents of each country The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in
such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the
vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to
their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless
the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order
or tranquility of the country. This exception applies to
controversies between the members of the ships company, and
particularly to disputes regarding wages.

The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so
with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a
violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into
whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the
nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense,
or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law,
are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over
the offense charged in the information in this case. /Felice Suzanne
Soria/


13.) PEOPLE VS TULIN 364 SCRA 10 (2001)

Facts:
"M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of
kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of
diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the
coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island .
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including
Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and
Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an
aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio
Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco armed
with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos.

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They detained the crew and took complete control of the

vessel -Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using
black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear
portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of
the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee,"
with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras.
They were forced to sail to Singapore, all the while
sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel,
reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast
Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the
Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results
The ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised
around the area presumably to await another vessel which,
however, failed to arrive
-the pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines
The "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about
10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another
vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco
ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo
to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong
supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo.
The members of the crew were released in three batches
with the stern warning not to report the incident to government
authorities for a period of two days
The Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the
crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to
report the incident
A case for qualified piracy or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting
accused-appellants of the crime charged
Arguments of accused-appellants

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and
Cecilio O. Changco
-assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to
adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were
being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer,
thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to
procedural due process
-argue that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they
committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that
the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled
22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so
these accused-appellants conclude, could have
overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong
-trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and
territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence
-explains that he was charged under the information
with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine
waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was
convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or
territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the
act must have been committed within its territory.

Held:
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
Can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as
accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside
Philippine waters and territory?

Case Digests FINALS

As regards the contention that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong
since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it
to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was
off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential
Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel
and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by
the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act
of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised
Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in
criminal law.
It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
/Valerie Gayle Patac/

FACTS:

14.) HILAO VS. ESTATE OF MARCOS

A class of Philippine nationals (hereinafter collectively

referred to as Hilao), victims of torture, disappearance, or
summary execution under the regime of Ferdinand E. Marcos, filed
an action against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.

Sison, a leading opponent of the Marcos regime, was
arrested in 1977 and was subjected to torture. He spent more than
eight years in detention.
Piopongco, a politically active owner of a radio station,
had his home searched and his radio station closed immediately
after the declaration of martial law in 1972. He was imprisoned and
remained under armed surveillance at home for over four years,
until he managed to escape to the U.S.
Sison and Piopongco, among others, filed suit against
Marcos in 1986 when the latter fled to Hawaii.

JURISDICTION ISSUE AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL:

The trial delved into the issue of liability, exemplary-
damage, and compensatory-damage phases. District Court based its
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act. With Pipongco, the DC
claims jurisdiction since Piopongco is a U.S. citizen and a resident of
California and Ferdinand Marcos was a Philippine citizen and was
resident in Hawaii.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.

Is Sison entitled to Damages?

Does the court have jurisdiction over the claims of
Pipongco?
Can the court take cognizance on Sison and Pipongcos
claim for cruel, inhuman, degrading, treatment?

HELD:

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SISONS COMPENSATORY DAMAGES CLAIM

Sison and his wife had testified by videotaped deposition
and briefly outlined the facts of Sison's torture. Sisons counsel
moved that the damage entitlement be based on the liability phase
of the trial.
DC: Insisted that the jury's finding in the liability phase
was relevant only to liability and not damages and therefore, should
not include such evidence.
CA: Evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding of
the Estate's liability for torture constitutes evidence sufficient to

support an award of damages for pain and suffering to Sison. The
jury was entitled to consider the evidence admitted at the liability
phase in reaching its compensatory-damage verdicts. The claim for
compensatory damages was remand for further proceedings.

PIOPONGCOS STATE LAW CLAIMS
After presentation of the evidence in the liability phase
of the trial, the district court refused Piopongco's proposed jury
instructions on: assault and battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and intentional destruction of business property.
DC: Rejected the claims because they were not covered
by international law. More particularly, lacks jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the case since the crimes were committed in the
Philippines.
CA: Law provides for jurisdiction over suits between
citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.
Piopongco is a U.S. citizen and a California resident; Marcos was a
Philippine citizen and was resident in Hawaii at the time of the suit.

CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
Sison's and Piopongco's claims for cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. The Alien Tort Claims Act grants jurisdiction
over torts in violation of international law if it is specific, universal,
and obligatory. The content of international law is determined by
reference to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators.
DC: Refused to take cognizance because the standard for
such a claim was too vague. It dismissed on the ground on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. District court said that cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment is not sufficiently specific such
that violations of that norm are actionable. DC rather held that the
estate could be liable for torture and arbitrary detention because
this comprises all the conduct alleged by Sison and Piopongco.
CA:
Sison:
a.

Prolonged arbitrary detentionyears in solitary

confinement
Piopongco:
a.
Tortureacts committed against him during his
detention in 1972
b. Prolonged arbitrary detention--several years of house
arrest with no charges ever filed against him/Arrabelle
Anne Carlene Balahadia/
15.) Liang vs People of the Philippines G.R. No.125865 (2000)

Case Digests FINALS

Facts:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian

Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of
oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released
him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the
MeTC judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under
section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is
immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion
for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its
motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest
it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and
that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with
immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Govt.
2. Whether or not the conduct of preliminary
investigation was imperative.

Held:

1. NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from
the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution.
Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in
official capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow
the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.

2. NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in
cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a
statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear
that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition. /Jasper Pelayo/

16.)United States vs. Fowler December 31, 1902 (1 Phil 614)
Facts:
The two defendants and appellees, Fowler et al, have been
accused of the theft of sixteen (16) bottles of champagne of the
value of $20 on August 12, 1901 while on board the transport
Lawton. Lawton was then navigating the high seas. The said
champagne bottles are part of the cargo and are owned by Julian
Lindsay. The said champagne bottles were taken lucri causa, without
violence or intimidation and without the consent of the owner.

Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang

Respondent: People of the Philippines

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Case Digests FINALS

The accused claim that the CFI of Manila has no jurisdiction

over the case as the crime was committed on high seas and not in
the city of Manila or within the territory comprising the Bay of
Manila or upon the 3-mile limit which the jurisdiction extends.
The prosecution contends that the Military General and Civil
Commission admiralty has jurisdiction over all vessels flying the flag
of the United States and the same was vested in the CFI of Manila.
CFI held that it has no jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the appeal
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas on board of a
transport not registered in the Philippines.
Held:
No. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of
theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not registered or
licensed in the Philippines.
Act. No. 400 reads:
xxxx
Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or
beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of
the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on
board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the
laws thereof.
The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the
courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on
board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands.
The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our
courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime
committed on board the same. /Jinky Lesigues/

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