REPRODUCED AT'GOVERfItNT EXPEFS4

75/

CSI BATTLEBOOK

"CST BATTLEBOOK 3-A

OPERATION TORCH
Combat Studies Institute

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Kansas

Fort Leavenworth,

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CSI BATTLEBOOKS contain information compiled by CGSC student officers as a requirement of the
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views expressed in CSI BATTLEBOOKS are those of the authors and not necessarily those of CSI,
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CSI BATTLEBOOK 3-A

OPERATION TORCH
Combat Studies Institute
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MAR 2 1 fJU,5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (W"n Data Entered)

SREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

I. REPORT NUMBER

4. TITLE (ad

READCOMPLETING
INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE
FORM

GOVT ACCESSION NO.

SubTr'aOPERATION TORCH9
north Africa
-
/Student
CampaignS
SNoveifber 1942: Offensive

Defiberate Assault, Opiphihious.

COL Tavares, LTC Kahn, MAJ
Arnold, MAJ Bird, 1IJ Dunham, MAJ French, MAJ Gay,
MAJ Kogle, MAJ Olsen, MAJ Wright, CPT Owens

7.

AUTVOR(oI*

MAJ Gray,

RECPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVEREO

Paper

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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

A battlebook prepared by students of the US Army Command and General Staff

College under the supervision of Combat Studies Institute as part of the
Battle Analysis program.
.I

-S

1S.

KEY WORDS (Co.nu..e on ,ev.re

aide

-1lneceayand Identify by block numb.,)

History, Case Studies, Military Operations, Tactical Analysis, Battles, Tactical

Warfare, Antitank Warfare, Military Tactics, Amphibious Warfare, Armor, Infantry
Artillery, Tanks Strategy, Desert Warfare, Command & Control. FREE TERMS: World
War II, Vichy France, Morocco, Port Lyautey, Safi Casablanca, North Africa
S

ASSTNRACT ('Cratuue -am

wlfa

If neoee

mad ideaiy by block numb.,)

e 3rd Infantry Division reinforced with additional armor, AAA, and engineer
units, conducted an amphibious assialt to capture the city of Casablanca, Morocco, on 8 November 1942. This action was part of a larger campaign involving
allied forces directed to secure strategic port and airfield facilities in Moroc o
and Tunisia which would serve as bases for further operations against Rommel's
Afrika Korps and subsequent assault into Southern Europe. The division's concepi
of operations called for landing three regimental combat teams in the vicinity
of Fedella, located sixteen miles nor.theast of Casablanca. "seize Fedella as a

DI)

1473

EDITION OF I NOV 6$ IS OBSOLETE

S ECURITY' CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PASE ('

Date Entered)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGoWs, D*a Etor*Q

temporary base of operations" and attack towards Casablanca.

Operation TORCH represented the first major US effort against Axis forces outMost of the new amphibious craft used
side the Pacific Theater of Operations.
or produced, even though Casablanca
developed
to
be
yet
had
in later operations
point out, "That is why the
historians
division's
the
as
was captured. But,
landing at Fedala was so important . . . The revelation of the great number of
mistakes made by an organization in its first action, and overcoming all difficulties to attain its final objective wns prophetic ..

Accesston For.

wrsP4&lo

DTIC TA".I
Unr~a 1I'v~

Avey i *:,Aty

DiAT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE~ften Date Entorod)

OPERATION TORCH
(North Africa Campaign)

Offensive,

TYPE OPERATION
Deliberate Assault, Amphibious

UNITS CONDUCTING OPERATION

Allied: 3d Infantry Division (Reinforced)
French: (Vichy) Casablanca Division

DATE OF OPERATION
8 November 1942

eP

d by: Staff Group 3A

Ji41l T. hRAY

SSRO H. C.
RES
6TPMIPAMA
MAJK
AN
M: A6106hes V. ARNOLD, III
MoJOli
"S. JIRD, JR.
MAJ JIMMY D. DUNHAM
MAJ RICHARD 8. FRENCH

MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
CPT

MARK P. GAY
MARK L. KOGLE
PHILIP A. OLSON, JR.
STEVEN J. WRIGHT
CHARLES D. OWENS

Submitted to the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, in fulfillment of
the requirements for subcourse P651, Battle Analysis
Fort Leavenworth
May 1984

3#

I NDEX
PA13E

4~.U

1.

SECTION 1:

Introduction to Operation TORCH

2.

SECTION 2:

Strategic Setting

3.

SECTION 3:

Reviewing the Tactical

4.

SECTION 4:

Describing the Action

49

5.

SECTION 5.

Assessment of the Significance o+ the

Act ion

98

6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

7.

ANNEXES

Situation

21

118

A:

Organization of Operation Torch Assault Force

120

Bt

Enemy Order of Battle

122

C:

Operation Torch Map

123

Di

Task Organization,

E:

Friendly Forces Order of Battle

127

F:

3D Infantry Division Operation Map

128

Sub-Task Force BRUSHWOOD

125

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATION TORCH

SECTION I.

On

December

conducted

United

States

Congress

Ailied

Forces

against

Japan,

and Italy.

aligned
the

Naval

Forces in
of

declaration

resulting

The

Navy

Japanese ,Imperial

the

a surprise attack against U.S.

Ocean.

Pacific

1941,

the

war by the

the United States with the

major

Axis

powers of Germany,

Previously agreed upon Allied strategical

objectives

between

implemented

as the basis for planning of future operations.

On

November

attack,
units,
in

1942,

conducted

Algeria

Atlantic
victory

the

Great

Britain

were

year from the Japanese

force,

augmented with British

largest amphibious assault ever known

Operation Torch,

first

that

offensive

would

into Morocco

operation

in

the

eventually lead to an Allied

in World War I1.

Torch

Annex

A).

Safi,

Casablanca,

landings

Western

consisted of
Task

and

Force

threro

Eastern

Task

C.

The

Task

Western
S.

in Morocco at

Port Lyautey; Center Task Force with

Force

Genuch,

Patton,

assault forces (see

with landings

in Algeria at Les Aandalouses,

Castiglione,

George

U.S.

the

campagin

and

than

The assault,

was

Operation

Arzeu;

U.S.

less

predominately

North Africa.

and

the

Force,

with

Algiers,

Oran,

landings
C.

Matifou,

C.
in

Figalo,

and

Algeria

at

and Ain Taya.

under the command of Major General

deployed

from

the United States across

3,000

miles of German submarine

and

Eastern

Task

and

British

units,

Force,

the latter

deployed

spite

of

the

many

faced

by

the

combined-staff

Allied
for
of

operation,

future
this

infested waters.

The Ce*nter

being a mixture of U.S.

from

the United Kincdom.

administrative

and logistical

planners

in

In

problems

developing

the

Operation Torch established the framework

combined-staff

operations of

Battle Analysis will

the war.

The focus

be on the 3d Infantry Division

as part of the Western Task Force.I

The
North

decision

Africa was made

U.S.

by

British

resulted
assist
the

to cvnduct offensive operations in

from

in

July 1942,

Prime

the

following a visit

Minister Churchill.

British loses

French
to the

The Allied plan

in North Africa,

a need to

the Russians by conducting a diversionary attack,

and

inability of the Allied forces to logistically support a

major

cross-channel

continent.
Commander
given

Lieutenant
in

Chief

the

operations

amphibious

of

mission
against

the

East

D.

the

European
as

the Allied Expeditionary Force,

was

August

French

objectives

Dwight

on

Eisenhower,

in

strategical
Middle

General

attack

in

1942

North

to

Africa

direct

military

to achieve Allied

conjunction with Allied forces in

to secure control

of North Africa from the

Atlantic to the Red Sea.2

The
French
in

opposing
who

the

occupation
the

same'

forces

consisted

mostly

of

pro-Vichy

believed that collaboration with the Germans was

best
of

interest
France.

of
The

their

country

German

pro-Vichy French did not share

eelings of resentment for the

after

8Boche"

as did their

fellow
the

countrymen

Allied

French

located

forces

in

France and England; however,

hoped for only a token resistance by the

while establishing a lodgement area

in Morocco.

(See

Annex B, Enemy Order o4 Battle)U

The
for

final

plan,

major
4

Aigiers.

the

assaults

(See

Infantry

Annex

command

as

with

(See

other

and

maintain

Casablanca

and

Oran,

at

0515 hours,

47th

RCT,

RCT,

9th

3rd

operations
rather
French

Div
Port

began

Division

Division,
(See

attacked

by
Port

its

communications
to repel

between

a German attack

continued

F,

All

and

three
Safi

"irst
Fedala

until

and the

amphibious
was captured

day; however,
offered

the

greater

Fedo.la had fallen and the 3d Inf

toward Casablanca.

the first

The 60th

3d Infantry Uivision

surprise.

1015 hours on the

Lyautey

attacked Safi.

attacked Port Lyautey,

Annex

tactical

movement

thereafter,

2d Armored Division and the

Fedala.

By 1500 hours,

Lyautey

Shortly

Infantry

achieved

resistance.

prepared

CCB,

Map)

at

of

and occupy Spanish Morocco.

Division

easily

lines

Task Force was to

Task Force commenced amphib!ous operations

Infantry

Operations

to form Task Force

Western

8 November.

9th

Infantry

the

through pro-Axis Spain,

units

combined

Friendly Forces Order of Battle).

Casablanca,

Western

and

The 3d

Jonathon Anderson,

U.S.

E,

establish

The

Oran,

Casablanca,

General

Annex

securing

provided

part of the Western Task Force under

Major

forces

Brushwood.
After

of

on

C, Operation Torch Map)$

Division,

landing

issued on 20 September 1942,

1100

The fighting at

hours on 10 November.

American planes began landing

at the Port Lvautey airfield.

As
the

the

3d

southeast

responding

to

Inf
at

Div prepared to attack Casablanca from

0730

hours,

11

orders from Admiral

November,
Darlan,

highly

successful

French

North Africa into Allied hands.

missing

lessons

!4

and

1110

wounded.

that would serve it

World War 11.

-'4

operation

French,

surrendered.

placed almost all

Within

The
of

three days of

the Allied casualties totaled 1010 soldiers killed

fighting,
or

combined

the

well

The 3d Inf Div learned many

throughout

the remainder of

END NOTES

The War in North Africa , Part 2

1.
U.S. Military Academy,
of Military Art and Engineering,
Point,
Department
(West
United States Military Academy, 1948), p. 6.
2.

Ibid.

3.
The
Armored
School,
Armor
in
the Invasion of North
,
(Fort Knox, Committee 25,
(2d Armored Division)
Africa
Officer Advanced Course 1949-50, 1950) p. 1 - 6-8.

"t.

.5o

4.

U.S. Military Academy,

p.

5.

The Armored School,

66.

6.

U.S.

7.

Ibid.,

p.

Military Academy,
p.

13.

p.

7.

9-10.

SECTION II.

A.

STRATEGIC SETTING

Prii-cipal Antagonists (1942):

I.

Unite

The
The

United

and

the

United

United States entered the war in December,

States

had been logistically supporting England

Russian war effort against the Nazis.

was

States

offensive

anxious

Roosevelt

election

wanted

to

fight

strong

the

ground

for

Western

cross-channel
accomplished

move
in

powers.

action

of

into

With

President

prior to the

entered World War 11 with a plan

war

in

the

war in Western Europe.

Chiefs

American

first

of th. American public.'

naval

Joint

strategy

Axis

offensive

States

defensive

offensive
and

United

the

the

In 1942l the

scheduled in November 1942,

election to boost the morale

The

launch

to

against

campaign

Presidential

1941.

Pacific

and an

Preosdent Roosevelt

Staff did not agree on offensive

Europe.
Western

The

military

favored

Europe which could not be

1942 due to lack of seaworthy landing craft

capable

of

leaders

favored building a large logistics and training base

in

England

1943.2

The

making the cross-channel

in

1942

and

then

move

President was afraid if

crossing.

on

the

The military

offensive

Russia fell

before

in

our

first

the

Western

offensive,

Germany
oil

Front

it

would free German forces to move to

and

prolong the war.

Loss of Russia to

would also bolster German supply of war material

and

resources.
President

the

Roosevelt

Mediterranean.

Gibraltar

and

and

block

southern
control

2.

all

shipping

could

shipping
of

1ip

then move
in

move

in

the

the Mediterranean.

Atlantic route around the

Germany

Africa.

into Spain a.od

down the coast of Africa

would

access to Middle East oil.

then

be

able to

Great Britain

The

United

Great

time,
the

could

Germany

all

all

Germany

block

Additionally,

did not want Germany to control

large

States entered the war

Britain
industrial

In 1941.

At

that

felt

the war would soon be over due to

base

in

the United States;

it

was just

a question of time.4
Great
from
to

the
our

land

United
arrival

forces

Western

next.

North

In the war.

from

to

the

Russians

support

France

The British had withdrawn

during the German

countries.

When

invasion of the

Germany

East and attacked Russia,

their

turned

its

England kneow it

Great Britain was also fighting German forces in

Africa.

second

had been receiving logistical

States and had been fighting Germany prior

European

attention
was

Britain

front
and

They
early
prolong

wanted
in

the

1942
the

to

United

States

to open a

relieve pressure from the

campaign

to drain Germany of war

supplies.

In addition,

offensive

in

morale of

Western

Parliamentary

Tobruk

in

successful

Africa.

Even

the

though

Churchill

knew

he
he

fall
won

of
the

needed

bolster English support of the war

himself.

He,

therefore,

favored early offensive

the Axis in North Africa.I

1941,

and

sustain

Russia
on

its

were

their

in

was

fighting

home
sight

defense,

the United States.

large

soil.
of

defensively for

its

German forces invaded

their major objectives.

Russia

To

had been receiving supplies

Russia was effectively Otying up" a

portion of the German Army and denying Hitler critical

reserves

interest
against

of

and
the

Molotov)
front

mineral

resources.

Americans

to

It

was in the best

sustain Russia's war effort

the Nazis.7
Russia

to

(Soviet

desperately
reduce

Molotov

pressured

Britain

(Churchill)

would

after

to

existence

Russia

oil

Coofidence"

had undergone

Russia

In

from

of

procedure,

action against

very

"Vote

Minister Churchill

offensive

and

3.

Prime

North

Parliamentary

effort

Europe or North Africa to bolster the

the British people.'

Politically,
a

the British wanted an early American

bolster

Commissar

wanted

German
the

the

pressure
United

of

Foreign

Allies
on

to

the

the spirit

open a second
Russian Front.

States (Roosevelt)

to launch a second front

Affairs,

in

and Great
1942.

of the Soviet people and give

This
them

hope to continue fighting. 8

4.

France

had

France

two

in Francet

governments

the

with

The

controlled

large

Africa

and

Navy

wanted

to

and

the

the
see

as

restored

overthrow

governed

that ccoperation

felt

French

French resisted the Nazis

Free
portions

in

of the French Army in North

The Free French

the Mediterranean.

and the borders of France

defeated

Germany

they were prior

They needed

to the war.''

assist in munitions and personnel

to

States

United

which

The

was the best manner to insure the safety of

Nazis

country.'

their

Germany and had

There were actually

Government,

Vichy

The

France.

occupied

Nazi

Free French and Vichy.$

Vichy

the

recognized

Germans

by

to Germany.

government

the

surrendered

over-run

been

to

French North Africa and France

German

Forces

in

Free

French

occupied

proper.
The
desperately
the

French

England

did

not

support
France

invaded
break
to
back

had
and

had

in

the

to

given

Germany.''

The

word to their forces in

invasion by any force.

broken diplomatic ties with France when
France surrendered.

diplomatic

invade

military honor of France after

surrender

leadership

North Afr'ica to repel

Germany

the

restore

Government's

Vichy

Free

to

Africa and wanted

North

ties

North

Africa.

war

against

The United States

and needed the Free French

The

Allies also needed

the Axis powers.

France

had

still

naval

sizeable

the Mediterranean

in

force

and

more than 100,000 French troops in North Africa.I1

Germany

5.

European

several

was

wanted

Germany

to

defeat

Poland,

Germany did not want to fight a two-front war.

Germany
campaigns
to

and

forces

conducting

then

launch

Its

successful
They wanted

a land-based offensive
into the Middle East

the oil rich Caucasus

through

campaign

turn

14

the British in North Africa.

Russia

defeat

had

also

against

homeland.

and then

first

Russia

her

into

Holland,

invaded Russia

Germany then
deep

invaded

to defeat the Allies in Western Europe.

the West

to

forces

striking

Germany

occupied

and

countries

offensively

power,

into

and France by mid-1940.

Belgium,
and

came

Hitler.

After

to link up with German forces fighting

in North Africa.

8.

Defeat Germany First.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DECISIONi

America

entered

Europe

and

attack

on

plan,

to

decision

The

Treaty,

Germany
II.

first

Axis

threatened the world.

Asia,
pearl

World

War

World

was made before

aggression,

in

both

Before thip Japanese

the Defense Department developed a

Harbor,

Rainbow Five,

After

defeat

to fight this aggression.15

War

and

the

signing of the Versailles

the prospect of any future European World War seemed

10

remote.

Of all

the European powers, only Britain had enough

military

force

to go to war with the United States.

not

seem

It

did

likely thoat Britain and the United States would go

to war against each other.

In

the

United

Far

States

Japanese

aggression
The

toward

iighting

formed

war

scene

with

also.

in

1919-1938

American

againit

power

realized

thought

4-cused on

interests in the Far

United States geared all war plans, Plan Urange,

International
to

Japan seemed our most likely enemy.

strategi:

East.

came

East,

In

Nazi

might

In

Germany.

Italy,

have

Britain

Gr~at

with

changectdI

Germany,

it

solely

to
and

Japan;

however,

the

late 1937, Hitler

The

Axis Pact was soon

and Japan.

The United States

get involved in a European war

Ftance

were

suffering through

economic pmoblems and could not s,:Aain a long war effot.

From

1938

through

Europe

as

the

shaped

up

as

1940,

strategic attention shifted to

site of the next war.

Axis

Powers

Principal antagonists

versus thw Uinited States, Great

Britain, and France.

The
up

with

each

the

based

assumed
Aliies
Eastern
stated
States,
Italy,

United States realized we would have 4llies and came

the
with

Rainbow Plans in June 1939, five olans in all,

on

different

United

Great

Britain,

and. France as

and to Africa and/or Europe.

broad

allied
and

States,

Rainbow Five

early projection of United States forc-,,, to the

Atlantic
the

situations.'?

objectives

with

Japan.

Britain

and

missions

and

France

Rainb.,, Five
of

the

,,ited

against Germrwv,

The plan called for offensive operations

11

first

with

Germany

operations

then

focus

ATlantic

our

most

defensive

planning

Atlantic.

Japan.

The

Pearl

would
Five

War

be

Plan

the

defeat

However,

in mid - 1941 was

was

made

the

came

to

conduct

and then
to

actual

with the Japanese

United States entered the war

attacked

United

first

closest

therefore,

III

Harbor

unexpectedly

Pacific,

the Pacific.

defeated

the Rainbow Five War Plan as its

Japan

war with Germany in

enemy

decision

There was

in the Pacific and offensive planning in

World

attack

on

the

Rainbow

of

in

dangerous

Germany

conditions

with

and

defensive

be shifted to Japan.

with Japan

Therefore,

concurrent

4o-ocean war --

war

pressing

Germany.

the

and

with

After Germany and Italy were

would

discussion about a

the

to

Italy

against Japan.'

defeated,
much

and

the

strategy.
United

Even though

States

in

the

States stood behind the strategic plan

Germany first

and then

turn its

attention and war

"making machine against the Japanese.ls Germany and Italy

would

be

dealt

was whether

C.

and the only question remaining

JOINT STRATEGIC DECISION:

States

the

first

to land in Africa and/or Europe first.

Rainbow

in

with

Five

the

entered the war.

Europe,

strategy

Five

against Japan.
was

with

which the United

The plan called for offensive

defeating Germany first,

Pacific

Rainbow

was

Land in North Africa First

where

we

12

action

with defensive action

in

The only question unanswered by

would make the first

invasion,

Africa or Europe.
President
invade

Roosevelt

North

military
first

advisors.
were

Operation
attempt
North

Africa

Torch,

were

India

it

provided

It

sought

the

the

decision

advice

in

nature

invasion

as

of

much

of

his

Nortn

military.

-,s

Africa,

was

a beachhead and then a lodyement

Gibraltar,

and

to

The reasons to invade North Africa

and Malta.

purposes.

Egypt,

If lost,

an

in French

to allied shipping.

key positions In North Africa:

Syria,

year

against

opened the Mediterranean

to

made

This lodgement would serve several

several

Canal,

20

the

gain

Afri:a.
it

first,

political

to

First,

eventually

There

the Suez

the sea lanes

the Far East became vulnerable.''

Second,

early offensive action against the Axis Powers.

to

gain

initiative against Germany less than one

after the attack on Pearl Harbor and our Declaration of

War against the Axis.

The

strategy was to hit

main blow on Western Europe where

him

before

the

enemy would be defeated. tTHm

LEADERS
FRONT

striking

NORTH

IN

AND

REQUIRED

AND WOULD

TAKE

THE

"WOULD

BRIN4ING

TO THE

VALUE

THEY

THE

OF OPENING

FAVORED

WAR TO

BUILD-UP OF

STATES MILITARY

UNITE0

FAVORED

GIVE

FEELING

IN EUROPE

HEARTLAND)

SUPPLIES

AND

WAY

THE

THE
TO

NORTH

CARRY

AHERICAN

AFRICAN

IN

THE

WAR TO

PU*LIC

AND

INVASION
THE

THIS

ENGLANO

OF BEING

AT

WAR

13

WITH

ERMANY)

SINCE

GERMANS)

AMERICAN

I'

EARLY

OFFENSIVE

LANDIN4

49RNANY7S

FORCES

AN

TIME)

EARLIEST

ALSO

AS

AFRZCA)

LAPGI

ROOSEVELT
WAS

the

DOUBTS

HAD

"INITIALLY

the enemy in his flank to weaken

INDUSTRY

IT
HIS
AN

Additionally,
prevent
fields
If

there was a need to open a second front to

Nazi
Germany
from
taking
Russia and her oil rich
in the Caucasus And the raw materials in the Ukraine.

this

happened,

the

war would be extended since Germany

would

become

stronger.

Also,

shift

twenty

divisions

to

question

was

whether

being
of

Bolero,

written

Europe

several
Europe
be

Europe

across

This

in

1942 or to

forces in England,

in

was

the Invasion

1943.

This offered

was the shortest route

the

to

Air superiority could

Channel.

United States
The

would shift German focus away

would

plan

called for the

force

Germany

to

invasion

fight

in

on two

the Spring of

also help maintain the Soviet Union as a

would

from

Germany

of

It

across

Channel

for

British

Germany.

The main

England alone with British forces.

the

force

Germany

up

This

This

fighting

build

the heart of Germany.

in

Russia.

1943.

Front.

invade North Africa

advantages.

could mass in

fronts.

Western

Germany could

concurrently with Plan Round-Up,

to

gained

from

the

military

Invasion

the

across the English Channel

and

forces

Russia fell,

in 1943.24

invade Europe
Plan

to

if

eventual

and

United

offensive
States

action

forces

against

would

push

the West and Russia would push from the East.

would

be

caught

in

vice

and

defeated

in

detail. 2
This

plan

seaworthy
design
delayed

required

enough

of
the

craft

mass

production

of

landing craft

for Channel

operations.

to

the winter seas in

program.

handle

Problems with the

Other requirements for

14

the Channel

landing craft

also

arose.

Pacific

Military

further

defeats

reduced

and

the

naval

number

disasters in the

of

landing

craft

avai able. 26

Washington
invasion

of

(Roosevelt)
Western

favored

waiting

landing

craft.

invasion

of

sacrificial
lessen

Europe

due

to

With
Europe

lamb

on

Rommel's
of

the

favored

1942.
of

the

England

sufficient

early

initially

and

capable

lack

of adequate landing crafts,

was

felt

by

only

Russia.

rapid

Suez

in

lack

the

also shared this view.2

Russia

and

pressure

and

the

British

to

be

accomplishment would be to

United States military leaders

successes in Egypt and the possible loss

Canal

influenced

leaders and

arguments

1943

to

cross

Army

was suffering defeats in Libya and had its back against

wall

the

U.S.

political

weakened

the

of

the

Channel

in Egypt.

Logistically,

the

The British

now pushed for early

Allies

had only enough landing craft

transport four thousand men across the Channel.

landing

impossible.$

The

President

opinion,

the

iacK
naval

earliest

decisive

faced several

possible

allegiance,
since

A lag in

craft construction made an early invasion across the

Channel

tte

to Western Europe.

England (Churchill)

invasion of North Africa.

to

military leaders to wait until

intangible factors:

collapse of Russia,
of

offensive

fleet

importance of British

capability

in

the Pacific

had to be rebuilt. Roosevelt seized

opportunity

effort.I0

public

to

go

Roosevelt

15

on
also

the

offensive with a

wanted

to

gain

assistance
Africa

from

the

the

Free

and

Mediterranean.
Free
4

the

French

Roosevelt

France

defeat

Free French Resistance

would

hoped

also

Axis.

Navy

operated

in the

by going into North Africa,

become

Control

which

Forces in North

an

Allied

power and help

of the Mediterranean

and Middle

East would be denied to Germany.

If
in

offensive

North

will

Africa.

of

D.

the

Roosevelt

invasion

made'

of

to occur no later

question

favored

landing

north

to

access

conservative

This

plan

Weather,
inside

outside

the

The President

North Africa,

Operation

to land in North Africa,

Mediterranean

base,

in

French

forces could

secure the Straits of Gibraltar and solidify

to

the

Mediterranean

British,

the

however,

the

the

The

beach,

had to be

American military planners

establishing

encompassed

Gibraltarl

where.

and

within

it

Main Effort of Torch

approach

communication.
crossing

was

After

MOrocco.12

allied

1942,

than the Fall of 1942..1t

the decision had been made

main

move

in

the decision against

French

JOINT STRATEGIC DECISION:

Once
the

was to occur

the American Joints Chiefs of Staff.

specified
Torch,

action

and

would

insure

on

bold

the

plan

tidal

Mediterranean

16

This

secure

was

lines

the other hand,

Mediterranean
a

Sea.

a
of

favored a

Sea at Tunisia.II

move

through the Straits of

had

conditions

several

advantages.

were more favorable

Basin as opposed to outside on the

Atlantic

of

Coast

would hasten future operations

Other
both

American

inside

Unexpected
Britain
out

heavy

in Libya and Egypt.

favored

outside
naval

the

simultaneous

Mediterranean

losses by both

landings
Basin.

the United States and

(coupled with a shortage of assault shipping),

simultaneous

initially

made

Algeria

shipping,
was

landings.'

to

inside

established

it

planners

and

forward bases at Tunisia

Also,

Morocco.

make

the

as

The

and

decision

was

landing at the softer coast of

Mediterranean.

equipment,
still

one

October

ruled

and

D-Day

was

initially

planning commenced.

Severe

training deficiencies existed and

unclear as to whether or not the invasion date

could be maintained.
Americans

In fact,

favored

it

using

was not.8'

an

all-American assault force

in the build-up phase.' 3

with

British

This

view was mainly due to bad feelings among the people of

North

Africa

feeling

held
of

destruction

following

against

was

evacuation

the

forces

the

by

the French

British

of

anti-British

British.

troops

portion
sentiment

at

A strong anti-British

in North Africa due to the

Dunkirk

and the British

of the French Navy.

was

Also fueling

the unsuccessful

attack at

Dakar by English backed French de Gaulle forces.."

The

British

anti-British
Churchill

Roosevelt

would
In

not necessarily agree to the amount of

feelings
agreed

Roosevelt
sites.

did

an

In

to

reconsidered

17

North

all-American

consider
effort

French

three

to make an
and

as

Africal

assault

landings

if

opposed to two landing

invasion feasible

proposed

however,

three

in

1942,

landing sitest

Casablanca
Algiers

(inside

forces
sites

(outside

the

the

Mediterranean

Mediterranean

Basin).

All

and back up forces would be American at

and

the

third,

Algiers,

Oran,

Basin),

would

and

assault

the first

two

consist of American

assault forces and British back up forces.30

The
having

Allied

overcome

November

1942.

consisted

of

landings
*

first

landing

at
at

offensive operation against

significant

three
three

The

planning obstacles,

offensive

assault

forces

landing

Casablanca;

sites,

the

Center

plan,

the Axis,
began on 8

Operation

conducting

amphibious

the Western Task Force

Task

Force

landing at

Oran; and the Eastern Task Force landing at Algiers."9

18

Torch,

END NOTES
Leo J.,
"The
Decision to Invade North Africa
1.
Meyer,
(Torch)"
(Essay #7 in
Command Decisions ).
Ofice of
the Chief of Military History, US Army.
Washington,
D.C., 1971, page 175.
2.

Ibid,

page 177.

3.
Funk,
Arthur L,,
University Press of Kansas,
4.

Ibid.,

pages 29-31.

5.

Meyer,

pages 178-179.

6.

IbId.,

pages 181-182.

7.

Funk,

S.

Ibid.,

The

Politics
1974,

of Torch
pages 78-79.

The

pages 78-79.
pages 65-66.

9.
Department of Military Art & Engineering, US Military
Academy,
The War
in
North Africa
Parts I & 2 p US
Military Academy West
Point,
N.Y.,
1948,
Part 2,
page 4.
10.
Ibid., Part 2, page S.
11.

Ibid.,

Part 2,

page 4.

12.

Ibid.,

Part 2,

page 5.

13.

Ibid.,

Part 2,

page 3.

"14.

Funk,

page

17.

15.
Morton,
Louis,
"Germany
First: The Basic Concept of
Allied Strategy
in
World War
110
(Essay #1 in
Command Decisions
), Office of the Chief 0f
Military
History, US Army, Washington D.C., 1971, page 1.
16.

Ibid.,

page 15.

17.

Ibid.,

page 24.

18.

Ibid.,

page 25.

19.

Ibid.,

page 47.

20.

Meyer,

page 174.

S19

21.

Funk,

22.

Ibid.,

pages 81-84.

23.

Ibid.,

page 75.

24.

Ibid.,

page 69.

25.

Ibid.,

pages 41-42.

26.

Ibid.,

page 78,

'7.

Meyer,

page 181.

28.

Ibid.,

page 184.

29.

Funk,

pages 66-67.

30.

Meyer,

page 174.

31.

Funk,

pages 85-86.

32.

Moyer) , page 188.

33.

Ibid.,

page 189.

34.

Funk,

pages 40-41.

35.

Meyer,

page 191.

36.

Ibid.,

page 1.94.

37.

Funk,

38.

Ibid.,

pages 110-i1l.

39.

IbId.,

pages 8-11.

page 27.

pages 4-5, 23.

p.

20

SECTION III.

REVIEWING THE TACTICAL SITUATION

Morocco is the only North African country

both the

Atlantic

Ocean

and

country has historicallw

the

been

miles seParate the continents

Mediterranean

imPortant

because

Africa

of

Peninsula) and EuroPe (the Iberian

which

borders

Sea.

The

onlv

nine

(Morocco's

Peninsula).

Tangier

Forming

the

southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar, Morocco stands

a gatewaw to one of

the

world's

most

imPortant

as

waterwavs.

Throughout history Morocco has served as an African outPost to

the gates of EuroPe.

Additionallw,

the countrw has served

as

the bridge between the African and EuroPean civilizations

the Muslim

and

Christian

religions.

strategic imPortance has resulted

controlled bv

numerous

in

nations

for

landing sites for invading forces.

Such

a. Position

Moroccan

shores

use

as

because of the imPressive Atlas Mountain

and

Africa,

ranges

The highest range,

the

High

Rtlaso

feet above sea level and

have

for

centuries

major barrier seParating the northern

and

western

Morocco from the south and southeast.

The

High

18P880

being

launching

run from southwest to northeast in the south central

the country.

of

Morocco is the most mountainous country in North

largelb

and

that

Part
lie

of
over

been
Parts

Atlas

a
of

lower

near the Atlantic coast,

where theq abruPtly terminate in

2
steep cliffs near Agadir.
South of the High Atlas are the
Anti-Atlas, which are seParated along the
the triangular-shaPed Souss DePression.
21

Atlantic

coast

The Wadi Souss

bv

flows

through this depression and reaches the Atlantic Just south of

Agadir.

Wadi fra, which dries up before reaching

western boundarg of
Moulowia flows

on

triangular

its

to

wav

the

the

of

The

Atlantic.
Atlas..

through

Plain

forms

a
the

which

Mediterranean

east

true

central

mountain

and

renders

of

The High and Middle Atlas form a

block,

the
High

Middle Atlas. a northern branch of the

Medilla.

vallev

South of the Anti-Atlas is the broad

which

difficult

is

to

Penetrate

communication between regions difficuIt. 4 The Ri f Atlas,

-extended bv the Beni Swassen

northern Atlas branc'

to the east of

Muluva--run

along

Mountains

Mediterranean

the

the

coast,

forming steep coastal cliffs before curving northwards towards

the Straits of Oibraltar. 5

The Rif Atlas

is

separated

the Middle Atlas bg a broad corridor connecting

Plain and the Rharb depression.

from

Moulouia

the

depression

Through the Rharb

flows the Wadi Sebou, which empties into the Atlantic at

Lvautev.

Part

The town of Fez lies in the narrowest

Port

of

the

corridor between the Rharb and the Moulouva Plain, astride the
main communications route between Morocco and Algeria.
Rising I100

feet above sea level,

the

bordered in

north

bw the Rharb and the High and Middle Atlas in the east, is the
Across the Mesata flows the Oum er Rbia

Moroccan Musata.

the Tensift, which restrict movement due to deeP.

steep-sided wadis.
runs from

the

narrow,

A corridor) the

Atlantic

Coastal

the

Atlantic

Ocean

Rharb

between

Moroccan Mesata until it

is

terminated
22

bg

the

and
and

Plain.
and

High

the
Atlas

Atlantic

coastal

SenerallU rockv,

cliffs

Agadir.

of

The

coast

is

with few sheltered bags to Protect ships from

the strong Atlantic

swells;

Partiallg bg sand bars.

Chaouia,

north

the

This

river

mouths

Atlantic

is up to thirtg miles wide.

cities of Morocco: Rabat, Mehres,

are

coastal

Along it

Casablanca,

blocked

Plain,

the

lie

the

and

Marrakech.

great

Thus, the major road and the PrinciPal railroad connecting the
cities

Parallel

the

Stlantic

through Casablanca to Rabat.

coast

Marrakesh

Entering the Rharb, the railroad

turns east through the citv of Fez

Rlgiers and Tunis.

from

north

Historicallv,

to

UJada

this

major route linking Morocco to the east.

and

route

beyond

to

been

the

has

Morocco's Position in the warm latitudes on

the

western

side of the Eurafrican land mass results in a sub-troPical

Mediterranean climate.

The climate is influenced through

or
the

seasonal alternation between westerlg winds--with accompanying

depressions that move eastward from the
winter months--, and the

northerlv

trade

Winters are 9enerallv rains and

summers

climate is

bv

greatl.

influenced

Atlantic

the

winds
drv.

Atlantic

Morocco (37

Ocean

and

the

N latitude) has a

N latitude).

the

Moroccan
in

the
of

Northern

rainfall

Portions

the

summer.

effects

Sea.

annual

lower average temPerature than the southern

countrg (27

The

Mediterranean
greater

of

differences

countrv's latitude, elevation variances, and

the

during

of

and
the

The Atlas Mountain zone is markedlv

cooler, and generallg receives the greater amount of rainfall.

The cool Canaries

Current,

which

?3

mlows

southward

off

the

Moroccan coast, lowers the coastal striP temperatures.

The
decrease

combination
in

rainfall

Mediterranean
Atlantic.

towards

of

all

as

these

one

the

Summer is drq

factors

moves

desert)

southward
and

everywhere,

total PreciPitation occurs.

the

In

from

the

Per

the
Atlas

elevation.

cent

winter,

a
the

in the

to

80

in

from

eastward

except

Mountains, where some rainfall occurs due

During the winter season aPProximatelv

results

the

of

bitterlw

cold

winds sweep over much of Morocco from the north, bringing with
them below-freezing temPeratures and snow in the
During the sPring and earlw summer),

fiercelw

hot

cities of Oran and Algiers on

Casablanca on the

the

Atlantic

as

decision

to

Mediterranean
the

Primarw

winds

drw

(sirocco) carrwing sand Particles occasionallv blow

9 1
Sahara.
The Allied Force Headquarters

Atlas.

High

from

the

caPture

the

coasto

and

objectives

of

OPeration TORCH acknowledged the imPortance of those cities as

centers of French Political control in North Africa.

Further,

those locales were ke" Points of the French railo highwag,

and

I0

air communication swstems.

substantial

French North Africa contained

administrative

installations,

workshoPs,

comPlex
or

of

dePots,

well-develoPed

no

storage

communications

swstems to serve the forward troops should thog becomp ?n9a9ed

in modern battles.

Accordinglq, Allied Planners would have to

consider those deficiencies and make Provisions

for

bringing

the requisite SuPport ashore.

The beaches on the Atlantic coast were
24

exPosed

to

verg

.urf

high

.-rd

cliff-lined.

the

Mediterranean

Thus., it

coast

was

rocks

seize

was crucial that OPeration TORCH

Ports at the beginning,

as it

would be imPossible to build

and suPPort lurther oPerations from the beaches.

staff consequently decided uPon
coast, and Oran and

and

Algiers

three cities were to be

Casablanca

alon9

caPtured

the
bi

Allied

The

on

uP

Atlantic

the

Mediterranean.

seParate

Algiers bw the Eastern Task Force; Oran bw

The

forces:

task

Central

the

Task

Force; a&)d Casablanca bi the Western Task Force.12

The Moroccan Atlantic coast is exPosed to the
and swell,
The

excePt in harbors Protected

Ports

near

Casablanca

inadequate to handle the

Force.

were

large

bv

too

man-made

small,

shiPs

the

of

Of the three adequate Ports along

the

hundred

the

reinforcements

Casablanca.
Rabat,

Fiftv-three miles

capital

further north

stationed

of
was

French

at

Western

Task

coastal

roads

awav,

while

northeast

Morocco,

Mehdia.

airfields

OPeration TORCH.
The

from

Thus,
to

the

Prevent
reaching

Casablanca

twentv-five

Mehdia-Port

Lwautev
concrete

was
miles

offered
runway

a
and

and could Probablv be caPtured more easily.

Thus, Mehdia-Port L.autew was to be used

Lautev

of

and

better Port than Rabat, would Provide a

excellent beaches,

and

Marrakech

Jetties.
and

miles.

harbor of Safi was to be used to land armor,

surf

shallow)

southwest of Casablanca, Safi was onlv 140 miles

Agadir and Mogador were over two

high

and

to

Protect

to

the

seize

the

Port

flank

of

characterized

northern

13

coastline

around

Casablanca
95

is

shallow beaches with difficult exits (due to high bluffs

near

the shore)o excePt for the small fishing and Petroleum storage
Port of Fedala.

The beaches on the Baie do

miles north of Casablanca,

Fedala,

were large enough to accomodate the

bulk of the invading force.

To the east. extending inland for

about a miles was a broad shelf dotted with

hills.

few

The shelf, located between two rivers

rounded sloPes

to

eighteen

two-hundred-foot

low

then

Plateau.

sand

rose
The

beach

offered not onlv a wide landing front and maneuver space,

also a small Port to exPedite the landing of heavv
Accordingly,

less tanks.

bv

but

equipment,

the Allied landing at Fedala was

to

initiate oPerations for the caPture of Casablanca. 14

The town of Fedala, with a PoPulation of 16,08S,
a shallow bay,
Casablanca.

Bale de Fedalao

miles

fourteen

The town and bav lie betweeon the

lies

on

northeast

of

Nefifikh

River

and Cherqui Point, three miles northeast, and the Mellah River
to the southwest.

The Fedala harbor is at the western end

the bay.. inside the

CaP

do

Fedala,

Perpendicular man-made Jetties.

southeast from the
extends north

CaP

from

the

do

One

entrance to the Port is through a

Protected

800-foot

Fedala,

southern

and

and
shore

dredged

100-yard-wide opening between the tiPs

of

extends

1600-foot

of

the

channel
the

two

two

by

Jetty

of

Jetty

bay.
within

The
a

Jetties.

Between the Jetties and the Cherqui Point is a

of sandq beaches,

crescent line
15
occasionallv broken by rockv outcrops.

The beaches were designated Beach Red, Red 2, Red 3, Blue

and Blue 2.

All were exPosed to the heavv Atlantic swell

Z6

and

high surf,

excePt for Beach Red--Protected somewhat bg the CaP

16

de Fedala.

Beach Red lag directlg beneath the

coastal

of CaP de Fedala, and Red 2 law between the Port Jettg

rockg reef 1800 vards to the east.

9uns
and

The water leading to those

two firm sandq beaches was shallow for a considerable distance

offshore, and the beaches were seParated bv a small,
rockg reef two hundred

wards

between 30 to 60 wards wide,

offshore.

Both

with Beach Red

covered,

beaches

about

were

800

wards

long and Beach Red 2 aProximatelv 500 wards in length.

Beach

Red opened directlw into the steets of Fedala; about 250 wards
east of the Jettv was a larger
gardens.

wooden

casino

surrounded

Extending the comPlete length of Beach Red,

between

the town and the beach, was a 1l-foot-high seawall with

or four openings.
and sParse~l

three

Beach Red 2 exited through cultivated Plots

built-uP town blocks.17

AdJacent to Beach Red 2, and separated bw

reef, was a continuous 600-vard
Red 3 and Blue Beach.

bw

This

beachlineo

long,

long

rockv

designated

Beach

continuous

beachlin.

was

seParated 400 yards offshore bv a half-fathom sand bar.

Both

beaches were 400 to 500 feet deeP,

and

sand

dunes into flat, cultivated fields

to

wards inland.

exited
the

Fedala

road

bau

through

The Nefifikh River entered t'

deeP wadi which extended for over a milet

through

&

"the head of a small cove near the mouth-

of the bag.

half tide the beach was

about

.27

600

gards

sand
long.

a
At

Nefifikh,

Aadi

between Blue Beach and Cherqui Point, was Blue Beach

cove entrance contained a one fathom-deeP

400

2.

bar,
The

The

and

at

beach

qI

exi'r.ed t,-, b'Lu.ftf'.

the eas.t
O,

F.i.'.

Iu f'' b

1.L
I.. 1ia

the Wj.,J:..

Hef if'ikh a'rid ,:,,er 1,:,k .

the cast.al gu1.s of PoFnt Blor'idin.

hu.'r-e, -.ards t.-:1 t.he south was the Fedala road, which

crossed the

14adi Nef'if ikh

half" inlai.id fr':r'

the railroad.

b-' the B:Londiri bridge.,

the beach was the Ca..blanca-R.abat

road

Beach Blue 3 was located three miles

of Cher-qui Point;

it

a,',d
.
.5

19ile

northeast

too was situated at the head of

cove -- this one at the mouth of the Wadi Armenia.

The

side of the cove contained a small

bv

beach

fronted

The beach exited through 9raduallU uPward-sloPing,

fields to the Fedala road,

100 'iards from the

2300 vards was the Casablanca-Rabat road. 19

"Fedala, at the base of the CaP de Fedala.

the Wadi Mel lah

was

a smrall1

"Pla'nners as Beach Yellow.

beach,

rocks.

of

Inland

meandering

the

On the west side of

Al lied

bv

lardings

forces

auxiliarv

battalion

bv

Blue

21

Casablanca, with

PoPulation

of

257?.,430,

la9

Si:-miole :oastal bulge between Table d"' Oukacha

on

"'nd El Ha'k on the west.

the

An artificial harbor..

"the Morocc',an Atlantic coast,

4*

on

landing

teams would utilize Beaches Red, Red 2, Red 3, Blue, and

2.

de

Baie

Beach Yellow and Blue Beach 3. due

main

The

south

cove.

desi~inated

to their small si&es, could handle onlb

sPe.:ial missions.

.=.reall

cultivated

The Mellah River entered the Atlantic along a

course through marshes and tidal flats west

'rnd

~co.,ered sto..r ge.,

if'i

lav

rfi, devices,..

east
*

of

::. iliarv

.;-rid dePt h of the harbor m.,,de the harbort.

=...

the

the

bulge.

.,-

for a.

east

best

eqiLki.F' en't,
.t

on

on
Th,

at',r...-3,

successfuIl

North

African

Fedala and

Casablanca

camPaign.

was

The

characterized

terrain
a

flat

shelf

coast.

The

shelf

and

hills

b9

extendin9 aPProximatelv one mile from the

9raduallo to a Plateau eroded into low ridges

Srose

farmso and clumPs of trees.

dotted with small vinevards,

The

major

routes

between

to

Fedala-Casablanca road) the

Casablanca

were

Casablanca-Rabat railroad.23 These three

along

road.

Casablanca-Rabat

22

the

and

the

at

the

intersected

eastern Casablanca suburb of Sebaa, about three miles from the

"Casablanca harbor.

The Casablanca-Rabat roz i, and a

sPur

of

the railroad, Passed through the Casablanca industrial section

south of Roches Noires to the Port, with the
southwest along the coast.

24

The Casablanca-Fedala road became

the Route De Grande Centure where it

rim of a

wheel

four

continuing

road

from

miles

Casablanca and intersected the

turned south) formin9 the

the

major

Port
road

as

it

sPokes

circled
from

citv: Casablanca-Kasba road) the Casablanca-Marrakecho

Cisablanca-Safi,

among others.

Passed bv the Cazes airfield as it

intersect the main

*i

de

The Route

Orande

turned due

Casablanca-Rabat

road

west

on

the

the

then Proceeded southwest towards Safi,

Mogador,

Between the Route de Grande Centure

area

of

Casablanca,

the

level

and
and

the

and the
Centure
to

again

coast
The

Port.

aPProximatelv three miles southwest of

ano

main

9entlv-sloPed

the

-road

Agadir.
PoPulated
terrain

contained small residential sections, Parks, and cemetaries.25

The Western Task Force, of

which
29

So-

the

3d

Infantrq

Division

nearl

35,g00

Oeorge S.

9round

Predominant

the

constituted

soldiers under

the

command

Besides

the

3d

Patton.

consisted

element,
of

of

General

Major

(Reinforced),

Division

Patton's force comPrised a CCB Plus one armored battalion from

the 2d Armored Division, and both the 47th and 60th Regimental
Combat Teams (RCT)

Task

of the 9th Infantrv Division. 26Naval

Force 34, commanded bv Rear Admiral Henry K.

Provide escort for the 29

To

shiPs.

trooP

was

Hewitt,

to
his

accomPlish

Primarv task, Hewitt had three battleshiPso five cruisers)

an

aircraft carrier and three auxiliarg carriers) an antiaircraft

The

cruiser, and thirty-four destroyers.

assigned

mission

the overall Task Force) as outlined Previouslv) was

to

seize

and secure French Northwest Africa (and Particularlv the Port

of Casablanca) with a view to further offensive oPerations.
Naval air would suPPort each of the three sub-task forces
oPerations,

of

area

the

bv eliminating enemq air forces in

executing

furnishing close suPPort to landing Parties, and bq

reconn&issance.

barrage

batteries)

from

enemw

shore

against

beach

defense,

oPPosition

oPPortunity.

naval gunfire was to

Simultaneouslv,

the

Air Force P4C's, aboard

were to reinforce the naval fighter force)

oPerate from caPtured enemg airfields.
Sub-Task Force BRUSHWOOD,
J.W.

Anderson's 3d

Division,

shore, caPture and secure Fedala,

on

targets

carrier

SHENANGO,

and

land

to

to

bg

Major

and

itself

on

oPerations

to

establish

and initiate

General

the southwest to caPture Casablanca from the rear (east).

30

of

29

sPearheaded
was

covering

Provide

fire

and

destrov

The

Headquarters
designated

and

Headquarters

headquarters

ComPany,
for

also

Division,

3d

the

was
force.

sub-task

Including its normallg attached tank units, the 3d's

maneuver

elements comPrised three intantr9 brigades--the 7th,

15th, and

30th--and two tank comPanies from the

Additionallo,

reinforced

reconnaissance

Tank

Battalion.

the 2d Armored Division suPPortrd the task force

with its Ist Battalion, 67th Armored

C),

756th

armored

Platoon.

or9.anization at Annex D.)

Regiment

infantrw

(See

(less

company,

detailed

and

sub-task

BRUSHWOOD

in

the

Armv whose will to fight

could

forces included a comPang

of

the 2d Battalion 6th

6th

Regiment

be

not
the

Ist

Regiment

Regiment)

Marocains)

and

Tirailleurs

while

of

Moroccan

ascertained.

cavalrg was exPected to consist of the 2d

3d Regiment SPahis

force

vicinitv

Fedala were an estimated 2680 soldiers of the French

comPanv of the

30

OPPosing Sub-Task Force

Marocains,

Companv

These

Tirailleurs
a

reinforced

Sengalais.

Enemg

Mechanized

artillerv

TrooPs,

suPPort

was

anticiPated ffrom mixed 75-mm and 13.2 mm machine guns of

31
Ist Battalion, Defense Artillerie du Territoire (DAT).

the

Further south, at Casablancao the enemv was estimated

have

concentrated

three

additional

(aPProximatelw 865 soldiers each),

infantrg

battalions

a mechanized cavalrv trooP,

and a reinforced horse cavalrq squadron.

Coloniale du Maroc had been identified

The Re9t
near

Artillerie

Casablanca,

was suspected to have available uP to twentg-four 75 mm

Although not confirmed bg intelligence reports,

31

to

the

and
guns.

Presence

of the ist Battalion 64th Re9t d-' Artillerie

anticiPated also.

d" Afrique

was

RePorts varied as to whether that battalion

was armed with 75s, 15s, or

Anti-aircraft

155s.

artillerv

from the 410th Defense Contre Avions (D.C.A), emPloqoi n9 ten 75

mm Suns and two
suPPorted the
analvsts

13.2
enemw

further

mm

9uns

amon9

contingent,

susPected

the

its

and

three

friendlu

Presence

batteries,
intelligence

two

of

engineer

detachments (from the 33rd and 41st Engineer Battalions).

Mediouna,

about twentv miles inland from Casablanca,

the

Infantrv Battalion of the 64th Regiment Tirailleurs

Promised additional 9round forces to
defense during D-Daw. 32

be

brought

For coastal defense, the oPPosing forces

At
1st

Marocains
forward

had

in

Positioned

an estimated batterv of four 138.6 mm guns, known as "Batterie

du Pont Blondin." about three miles east

With an aPProximate ran%* of 18,088 meters,

Protected bg a searchlight and one

the

of

lighthouse.

those

9uns

were

33

13.2

mm

batterv of two uncamouflaged 75 mm guns on

Fedala were reinforced further bv the

Another

ARMO.
the

tiP

"Batterie

with four 100 mm guns, near the signal station

de
on

CaPe

of

Fedala,"'
the

Cape.

Yet another three or four large-caliber guns had been rePorted

about 1600 gards southwest of Mansouria
Fedala.

Inlet,

northeast

of

For additional antiaircraft suPPort, the French Moroccans

counted twelve twin-barreled 13.2 mm AAMGs within range of the
coastal defense Suns, an estimated battery of four
9uns near the golf course, and an additional
32

two

75

mm

AR

105

mm

AR

guns--together with two

searchli9hts

finderA

range

soundranging equipment--at the batterv Position.

six 37 mm AR guns were sited on the
river to the

southwest

of

town,

golf
and

Yet

course

another

across

AR

three

and

the

guns--with

searchlight--had been rePorted a mile and a half west of

Bou Lanouar,

Sidi

southwest of Fedala. 35

Analvsts thought it

Probable that the enemy would

a trench systtmo with weaPon Pitso along the coast

emPlov

from

CaPe

Fedala to the mouth of the Mellah Rivers and also along a belt
across the neck of the Peninsula which ended in
There

were

numerous

short

antiaircraft Passive Jefense,

trenches,

CaPe

Fedala.

aPParentlv

in and about

the

for

town.

There

were no rePorts of underwater obstacles on anv of the

beaches

targeted for amPhibious assault.3

In summarv, each

of

the

identified

units

assumed as Present for the defense against a

had

hostile

at Fedala, though the level of exPected resistance

be assessed Precisely.

to

be

landing

could

not

In ad'ition, the Allied sub-tAsk force

Planners had to entertain the Possibilitv

that

guns

of

the

battleshiP JEAN BRRTp secured in Casablanca Harbor) might bear

on

the

amPhibious

assaulto

albeit

at

maximum

ranges

Discounting those forces of the enemw likelv to be diverted to

defend against landings

at

northern ("Goal Post") and

Port

Lvautew

southern

and

Safi

("Blackstone")

bw

sub-task

forces, the division G-21s estimate of Probable oPPosition

a landing at Fedala was:

33

the

to

Inf Mecz

Additional
On D-Daq

On
D+1

3Trs

ISq

3 Trs
4 Bns

2 Bns

Bs1D

Mecz Cav
H Cav

Artq

The

Consi dered
Present

enemw

air

arm

consisted

of

TOTAL

74

3 $qS
3 Trs
6 Ens

fighters,

13

37
Initially,

reconnaissance Planes, and 81 long-range bombers.

Planners thought that those

forces

would

oPerate

coastal airdromes against the BRUSHWOOD convow,

the

airdromes

at

Marrakecho

oPerations commenced.

Meknes,
Division

3d

The

and

suPPort bv long-range German bombers,

the

withdrawing to

Fez

as

landing
air

thought

staff

operating

and SPanish airfields, a distinct Possibility;

from

from

French

however,

they

did not anticipate reinforcements of the French air forces

French Morocco,

unless a market

fuel

of

increase in suPPlies

in

and bombs was detected Prior to D-Dav.

identified

Along with the JEAN BART, French naval forces

at Casablanca

included

two

light

cruisers,

eight

to

ten

destrovers, ten to twelve submarines, two motor torPedo boats,

36
and twelve navv fighter aircraft.
Submarines based at
Casablanca were believed to be Patrolling the coastal

waters,

and the oPPosition was

coastal

known

shiPPing with destroyers.

to

be

Rccordinglv,

convoving
it

its

aPPeared

Probable

that the French would use their submarine a-d u-strover forces
to intercePt anv Allied convog aPProaching the Moroccan coast.
Rsbessin9 the action at Dakar, analysts had concluded that the
cruisers would not leave Port, and that the

JEAN

BART

would

serve merelq as a floating fortress.3 9

;:_.>
>I: " ...... .. ,

,,,','.../

. 2

.. :..:

.. -.-.

... ..,-..4,

From a study of the total forces available to the

for

the

defense

of

that

French

concluded

initial air and

intel igence

Morocco,

'n,al

defense
attacks

would

officers

Probably

against

the

and

Agadir.

Meknes-Fez and Marrakech,

consist

of

convovs,

Port

Lvautev,

The

mobile

could reinforce those Ports quickly with

had

trooP

followed bv a stubborn defense of the Ports of

Rabat-Fedala-Casablanca,

French

oPPosition
reserves

at

with a final defense near Casablanca

north of the Oued-Oum-Rbia.40

A final comment on the organization
French forces

in

Morocco

is

and

Available

warranted.

forces had been restricted uander the

disPosition

terms

an

of

were known to

include

12MS88

50,000 in Rleriacand 15,000

in

troops:

Allied oPerational Planning in London. 4 2

in

55,OSS
at

Tunisia

French

armistice
forces

those

between France and Germans in 1940.41 Bv, 1942)

the

The twelve

of

Morocco;
outset

of

units

of

motorized field artillerv allowed included neither medium

Quns.

heavr

The mechanized cavalrv could muster

nor

between

120

Morocco,

and

.9

"and 160 obsolete tanks and 80 armored

in

cars

antiaircraft artillerv for the entire colons

single

disPersed

regiment.

Rt

the

consisted
Ports..

of

howeverp

suPPlemoentarv batteries were manned bw naval Personnel.

Of the combat Planes known to be staged at
airdromes) almost half

were

thought

to

be

fighters, low-wing.all-metal monoPlanes with a

the

Moroccan
520

Dervoitine
reputed

range

of 500 miles, a sPeed of 340 miles Per hour) and a ceilin9

of

32,500 feet.

to

Thus, theq were suPerior in

maneuverabilit)

the carrier-borne fighters of the Allied ,av9. 43 The remainin9

half were thought to be twin-engined bombers.,

all

manned

bv

caPable French Pilots.

It was uncertain as to whether the German fighters
also

respond

to

earlU

warnings

issued

would

submarine

from

intercepts or from air Patrols as the convoys aPProached.

the Germans opted to use
airdromes

for

their

the

SPanish

concentrations,

and

SPanish

Moroccan

th"

might

achieve

overwhelming air suPerioritw during the initial Phases of

amphibious

assault;

however)

such

If

suPerioritw

would

the
be

constrained--as Pointed out Previousl$--bv available stocks of

aviation fuel and bombs.

44

The 3d Infantry had remained on the

west

coast

United States until Just before the final Phases of

throughout

the

summer

and

Participating elements from

fall
the

of

1942.

Armored

2d

The

Pickett) Virginia,

cooPeration,

Division

finallw

in mid-SePtembero onlv a

scheduled rehearsal.
Consequentlv,

3d

Meanwhile,
with

elsewhere

arived
few

at

davs

troop training,

esPeciallV

The U.S.

in the accomPanying Pressures of rapid

Camp
before

in

air/ground

Armv Air CorPs,

expansion)

caught

could

afford the aircraft and Personnel for effective training

between

air

Moreover,
and

on

45

was inadequate.

ground troops.

the

training,

Division)

supporting units, had trained at Fort Brags and

the east coast.

of

ground

considerable
components
36

disagreement
in

their

not
with

existed

concepts

of

batft.l.fi,'id suPPort--the

bei ng

PFref erent-iaI

to

tr.;.t.e 9i c bob i ri'. 46

he.'," concentrat i o'n o'n

o't?

f orc
c

airr

Available t.ransPort

governeyd the PreParat. ion

rneuer., a'd trai'ni'n

oib iectives

focused u.Pon simulation

ashore at Fedala.

of

the

of,

actual

aeneral
Patton's headq.

the

with

force

cond it i onris

e>::P ec:ted

rters had

directed

conducted

The PurPose of the

was to organize the sub-task force

schee

siub-task

that a landing exercise--code-named "UIJICK"--be

Solomop Isla-d from 3-8 October.

of

shiPs

on

exercise

assigned.

to

formulate a master boat emPlowment Plan; and to train units in

loading.

shiP-to-shore

movement,

Joint

communications,

tactical oPerations ashore, and handling of suPplies.

The

training

incessant

drain

Program
of

was

manpower

hamPered
fill

to

further

bv

for

qUotas

the

officer

candidate school or to cadres of newli-activating units.

succession

of

individual

Precluded

from

receivin9

advocated

so

widelv

"filler

rePlacements"--whom

unit

the

The

"integration"

nowadavs--resulted

imbalanced training levels of Proficiencv.

time

traini n9

units

in

with

As the target date

for the invasion neared and PreParations came to a close.,

Prevalent atmosPhere
unavoidable

in

was

one

of

imProvisation

view

of the ambitious
47
undertaken with limited resources.
From its traini ng ex$eriences,
had co'ncluded that 1,it i ntperity

and

oPeration

the 3d Division's
and

PrOmPt

the

haste)
to

be

commarnd

reorganization

rPorn landing ashore could best be accomPlished by asserbliris

all assault and reserve BLTs afloat in laxrding craft Prior

to

aPProaching the landin9 beach.

as

quirklv as Possible.

All would

At Fedala, each

given a unique landing

schedule

be

Put

assault

adaPted

to

ashore

battalion
the

was

Particular
48

characteristics of

its

beach

and

its

mission.

Planners

anticipated that the actual landings would require from one to

three hours; for that PurPose,

each

of

four

the

BLTs

was

assigned uP to fortw-five Personnel landing craft and as

manv

as nine tank lighters.

more

Since no transport

than thirty-four landing craft, boats

transports were

"loaned"

and

temPorarily.

could

carrg

crews

from

When

other

combined)

the

detailed boat emPloyment Plan called for Putting assault units

ashore

before

daylight,

with follow-on
49
morning.
the
during
quicklv
debarking
The complicated logistical Problem

suPport

of

American

composition

Western Task Force.

on 28 SePtember in
Patton, Wilson,

ground

of

Allied

suPPlying

soldiers from different countries was lessened bw

total

elements

the

elements

nearlv

among

A command decision made by General

Washington--in

conference

with

the
Clark

Generals

and Lutes--had fixed the level of suPPlies for

the entire Western Task Force at fortg-five daws and ten units
of fire.

FurtherA organic equipment was Pared to

Per cent of

the

normal

ship

tonnage

required.

requirements dictated that the Western Task Force

onlw
50

was

fifty

Pressing
to

be

short of equipment and service trooPs for a minimum Period

of

three months.
Each Primarg task force was directed to organize its

own

s.ervice of su.PPlv,

includin9 suppor-t bases to become operative

at the Port sites

once

lodement

areas

had

General Wilson was to command SOS,

Western

Task

eventual..1,

Section

at

the

Atlantic

Base

secured.

been

Force

Casablanca).

Planners recognized that the necessarg housekeeP'in,

Providin9

adequate

requ i sit ion i'ng

i nventorg

of

the

conti'ngent

suPPort

bases.

chores

of

establishing
uP on

rap id

Accordim'l,

IV, and V items were based upon the

PeP lenishment of Class II,

"Push" system, with automatic resuPPUv

during the first

and

were

Procedures

establishment

controls

(and,

two months.

of

those

commodities

The Western Task Force was to be

suPplied directlv from the United

Stateso

with

requisitions

bein9 forwarded to the New York Port of Embarkation.

BRUSHWOOD Planners had directed,
Western Task Force order,

in accordance

that individual soldiers

sufficient "K" rations for onlw the first

davs following debarkation ashore.

one

from

embarkation.

Beach reserves were to

dags

while a sixtw-daw

su.PP19,

rations

and

thirtv

dag

on

level

"floatin9

"C,"

tvPe

were

"0,"

Prior

another

of

issued

one-third

vehicles

stock

the

units

Organizational

Placed

stores

be

and

to maintain an additional four davs" rations (1

and 2 tMPe "K")

with

to

thirteen

"B"

landing

reserve"--with

flour

comPonent--were to be established also.

Thirtg-dag levels
classes II,

of

suPP19

were

IV) and VII (with a ninetq-da'

also

the

norm

for

floating reserve of

engineer material and equipment, the availabilits of which was

"to be

announced.") 51 Fuel

on

and

lubrica nts

were

restricted

with an

generallo to a fifteen-dag initial suPP I,

on D+5.
fifteen dag suFP l to be available

additional

Ammunition "units of fire" were allocated as follows:

Ground Troops

(1) 2 1/2 units for vehicular) individualo

automatic weaPons,

and

non-vehicular

with an additional 2 1/2 units cargo-loaded

on shiPs, marked for the Particular troops on those ships.

(2) Ten units of fire--all tvPes--marked for each force, to be
loaded as far as Practicable on the same ships as the weapons.
Another 5 units, all twPes$ Plus anw

Part

of

the

first

15

units that could not be loaded) were to be carrled in floating

53
Establishment of ammunition supPlv Points were the
reserve.
resPonsibilitg of each force commander) assisted

ordnance

bg

Personnel.

Water--a commoditv of serious concern to Planners--was to

be furnished bv naval vessels in suPPort

of

until adequate shore

developed.

sources

could

be

the

task

force
Assault

troops were ordered to debark with two filled canteens aPiece.

Commanding
compliance

officers
with

were

conservationo

Purification Procedures.
Per

instructed

A minimum of two

strict

emphasize

sanitation,

water

and

gallons

of

water

,n Per dag for drinking PurPoses was to be the norm.

BRUSHWOOD

was

to BO CamPbell aboard

the

Succession of command for Sub-task

from MG Anderson, embarked on TRUE,
DIRK,

to

Force

next to BG Ea9les--also embarked on TRUE--,

4o

and

finallv

to Colonel Momor on GLUE.

stiPulatedf 56

Six

command

Posts

"afloat"

Sub-Task Force BRUSHWOOD

TRUE

RLG-7

ETCH

RLG-30

LOAF

RLG-15

GLUE

CT 2d RD

SPUR

2d Bn 20th Engrs

SORT

3d RCN TR (until H-2)

JUGS

Communications

were

Planned

generall1

doctrine develoPed bv the AmPhibious

according

Force.57

Tactical

were to function as normalo to facilitate Passage

and control ashore.

whose

Provide

the

radio

of

to
nets

command

Each assaulting BLT was to be accomPanied

bg a Joint Communications Section,

communications

to

Assignment
highest

was

to the headquarters shiP, and establish

voice

traffic control boats standing off the beaches.

the sections wo'ere to maintain a signal lamP

channel

net
to

Additionally,

station,

wire communications to adjacent beaches, and a

to

headquarters

ashore, maintain a naval circuit to the shiPs and an armv

center.

were

beach

lateral
message

Both armg and ravw Personnel were directed to man the

58

"sections.

Two radio circuits were

Force HQ and the three
aboard ship initiallU,
14

Planned

sectors.

to

These

work
were

between
to

be

with movement ashore swnchronized

Task
manned
with

would

One circuit

the Progress of the t.anding force.

Plannin9

to

made

wAS

effort

concerted

with

forward

at the beachhead site with the other colocated

the tactical command Posts.
During

remain

coordinate the use of ciPhers, esPeciallg those common to both

In

services.

warfare code and sPecial

units, down to

cipher

striP
levelo

battalion

U.S.

of

sPecial issue

Publications.

British

detail

efforts

convoy

to

emphasize

Atlantico

the

transited

the

messengers and oPerators with the shiP.

force,

drill

familiarizing

As much as

communications

the

made
Signal

Possible,

subordinate Personnel received instruction Pertainin9

mission of the

two

leaders

and

decodingo

assigned

handling

Personnel sPent Periods of "general quarters"

and

of

training.

communications

traffics routing, encoding

action

maintained

British officers and twelve signal ratings had been

60
to the flagshiPs for radio And croPtograPhic work.
As

Force.

Joint

shiPs

most

navies)

all

to

AmPhibious

the

bg

issued

were

Because the overall oPeration involved Possible

bg the British and

amPhibious

sPecially-develoPed

additiono

and

Plans

the

to

their

respective roles in those Plans. 61

The French Moroccans) on the other
uPon

submarine

supplement

tactical

relq

cable)

together

magneto-tuPe switchboards.

U.

manv
with

of

the
small

able

telePhone

and

to
to

Available

smaller

towns

had

common

battery

or

miles

of

The aPProximatel

42

were

ashore.

communications

information indicated that

telePhone service,

telegraph,

hand,

4,000

telegraP.h lines in French Morocco

were

thought

to

most of the railroads a-nd mai'n-traveled highwa..s,

ou.t Previou.slq.

Existing radio facilities at

include the Air

Ministr.

Station..

Paral lel

as

Pointed

Casablanca.

had

been

the

caPabilitv

P inpointed

to
bq

Allied anal9sts.
The enemg was thought to
transmit

false

have

messages,

intercePt.,

crwPtanal'isis. 62 Accordingl~o

the

and

to

Division

3d

to

Jam,

Perform

Field

Order

stiPulated that no ra.dio set would be allowed to oPerate while

the amphibious convow was
maintain radio

Armq

enroute.

circuits

were

to

the

assault

Phase, one of the PrinciPal channels of communication

between

silence

until

H-hour.

During

the teaches and seaward was to be visual signalling bq lamP or

flag. 63

Task Force BRUSHWOOD-s general scheme of maneuver

called

for initiation of landing operations during the ebbing tide of

the earlq morning hours, with the main landings at
21 Red 3, BlueA and Blue 2.

Follow-uP landings would be

attemPted at Beach Red when the area

friendlq

control.

Red

Smaller unit landings would occur

at Beach Yellow and Beach Blue 3.

under

Beach

The

aPProximately five miles deeP,

was

initial

firmlv

established

beachhead

would

be

between the western bank of the

Mellah. River and the eastern bank of the Nefifikh River.

BLT 1, RLT 7) was to land at H-hour on Beach Red 2. enter
Fedala from the east., a'nd Proceed along the Boulevard
Ruede Fez,

]'3

Avenue

de

la

Kasba.,

Road

Point

Moula!,

Pertain,

a'nd

Boulevard Foch.

After seizing keg areas in the town, BLT

defense

was to continue its attack to silence the two coastal

gun batteries on the CaPe.
Rafael L.

Salzmann,

regimental

zone

b'

would attack from Beach Red

south

Hellah

Wadi

the

over

control of bridges

BLT 2-7, commanded

and

west

of

the

1-7

Lt.
3

Col.

to

and

to

town.

64

seize
a

clear
The

7th
at

regiment's third BLT was ordered to land one rifle comPang

Beach Yellow at H+I.

Advancing inlando the reinforced comPanv

was to seize the crossing of the Mediouna-Fedala Highwag

over,

the Wadi Metlah, and the railroad crossing aPProximatel

1100

yards to the south.

UPon seizure of

the

Wadi

Mellah

line,

RLG-? would continue the advance to the BRUSHWOOD objective.

RLO-30 was similarlw directed to land two BLTs at H-hour,
with BLT 1-30 advancing four miles inland from Beach Blue to a
long ridge well

beyond

Commanded bw Lt.

Col.

the

main

Fred W.

Casablanca-Rabat

Slatteno

Jr...

Highway.

the

BLT

ordered to assist the advance of RLO-7 as well.BLT 2

would land at Beach Blue,

advance

Powerful coastal guns of

Batterie

Cherqui headland.

inland,
du

and

Pont

BLT 2-30 would seize and

RLG-30,

caPture

Blondin
hold

was

on

the

the
the

Fedala

road, Casablanca-Rabat railroad, and the Casablanca-Rabat road

crossings over the Wadi Nefifikh.

BLT 3-30,

in reserve, would

land a reinforced rifle comPany that would advance

coast in the

V%

direction

of

Wadi

Nefifikh,

along

caPture

hostile

defensive Positions east of BLT 2's objective, and assist

2 in the capture of the

enemy's

Beach Blue 2. 65
44

coastal

defenses

the

north

BLT
of

The entire 15th Regiment would constitute the Task

BRUSHWOOD reserve.

Force

RLO-15 would land on BRUSHWOOD order after

H+2 at a beach to be designated, move inland

to

an

assemblv

area in the zone of RLG-7, and begin reconnaissance of

routes

to and crossing over the Wadi Mellah--in PreParation for the

66
advance on Casablanca on the left of RLO-7.
The combat team
from 2d Armored Division would also land "on order" after H+3,
assemble south of Fedala, and PrePare to cross the Wadi Mellah
and attack hostile formations advancing from the direction
Casablanca.

SimilarlU

the 2d Battalion 20th

would land on order after H+3,

Engineers

move to Fedala, and PrePare

relieve elements of RLO-7 in Fedala.

of
also
to

The engineers would then

moP uP hostile resistance in Fedala and

Fedala

Harbor

with

67
the intent to Preclude damage to the harbor and Port.

45
i-

-.-

- ..

- -

END NOTES

Nevill Barbour, A Surv"

1962), P.76.

of North

West

Africa

* H.R. Jarrett, An Outline OeograPh

of Africa
Metheun & Co, Ltd., 1962). P.79.
3
H.R. Jarrett, Africa (London' 1966)o P.96.

(London:
(London

Barbour, P.78.
5 Ibid.,
P.77.
6

Jarrett, Africa, P.98.

Ibid., P.108.
Barbour, P.78.

Jarrett, Africa, PP.102-104.

10 DePartment of Militarg Art and Ebgineering, United States
Militarv Academv, The War in North Africa Part 1-2 (OPerations
in EgwPt and Libwa), (West Point, NY: 1951),P.7.
n John Strawson, The Battle for North Africa
(Hew York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), P.155.
12 Charles Messenger,
The Tunisian CamPaign (Ian Allen,
Ltd.), PP.7-8.

13

Oeorge F.
Howe,
U.S.
Armr
in
World
War
II,
Mediterranean Theater of OP*eration Northwest Africa: Seizing
the Initiative in the West (Washington: Office of the Chief of
Militarv History, DePartment of the Rrrw, 1957), P.41.
Ibid., P.116.
15 Ibid.
Ibid., P.117.
17 Headquarters ARPhibious CorPs
Pickett, Virginia, SePt 12,
18 Ibid.

1942.

19

Ibid.
20 Ibid.

46

**

Atlantic,

ACofS,GQ,

CamP

21 Howe, P.11,.
22 Ibid... P.119.
23 Ibid.
24 HO AmPhibio's CorPs Atlantic.
25 Howe, P.119.
SLeo J.
Meyer, "The Decision to Invade North Africao,"
Command Decisions (Washington: Of`f'ice of the Chief of Militarw
History. U.S.
Armv, 1960), P.53.
27 Ibid.
28 "Final RePort of Western Task Force on Operation TORCH,"
Volume I., War DePartment microfilms Reel No.79 ("Summarw
of
Plans and OPerations"), P.2.
Ibid.
30 Ibid.,

"Troop List, Western Task Force," PP.2-3.

U Ibid.,

"Field Order No.

1, HO Western Task Force."

32 "Casablanca and Fedala and Vicinity," Enclosure No.
I to
Annex No. 2 (Intelligence) to Field Order #I, HQ 3d Division,
Camp Pickett, VA, Office of the ACofS,02, October 1942.
33 Ibid., "Estimate of Potential OPPosition to a Landin9 at
Feda la, "P. 5.
34 Ibid.

Ibid.,
36 Ibid.,

P.S4a.
P. 1.

t37 Ibid*.,

"Intelligence

Estimate-Fronch Morocco,
3 Ibid.

39

40

Ibid.,

Annex

and

Estimate,

02

Combat

22 Sept 19421 P.2.

P.3.

Ibid.
41

Howe, P.21.

42 Ibid.
43

Ibid.
Ibid.'\~2Yq

-4

..,,.:

.2 ,o,,

-. ,

_,;L , ,-

. _

- -

- -.

__

.:

,.

''2:_,_-

.,",-:-

>,

k-k'-

44

45

Ibi d.
Donald 0.

Tag9art (ed.), Historv of the Third

Division in World War II (Washington: 1947)) PP.7-8.
46 Howej, P.61.

48

Ibid.)

P.62.

Ibid...

P.124.

Infantry

Ibid.

51

Ibid.. P.66.
"Administrative Order No.

V"to AccomPanm

No.
1)" P.2.
52 "Amex #1 to Administrative Order No.
53 "Admitistrative Order No.
Ibid.

Field Order No.

1"

P.3.

1ol" P.1.

P.5.

"57 "Suparv of Signal Communications

at Casablanca."

se
69

Ib d
Ibid.

Ibid.
60Ibid.) P.3.

61 Ibid.
G2

"Amnex #5 to Field Order

63 Ibid..
64

65

lol" P.I.

.H!ioe, P. 121.

"Field Order No.

67 Ibid.
"

M1ol P.2.

P.4.

"Field Order No.

Order

1" P.3.

"55 "Atnex #3 to Administrative Order

No.

56

l.,"

"Field

1, P.2.

48

P.2.

SECTION IV:

The

3d

beaches
4k

DESCRIBING THE ACTION

Infantry

in

tempcrar>

the
base

sixteen

miles

Western

Task

southwest
loading
of

Division

vicinki

of

Fedala;

of operations;
to

the

Force

conducted

and

Casablanca,

seize

Other

landings

land on

Fedala

elements
at

which had a harbor

at Port Lyautey,

which

directed:

as a

and attack toward Casablanca,

southwest.

of Casablanca,
armor,

mission

had an airfield

of

the

120 milis

sari,

suitable for off

eighty miles northeast

from which the attack

on Casablanca could be supported.'

To

accomplish

reinforced
organized
7th

C.

Rogers).
Teams

fire

(Col.

9th,

10th

and

RLG

"(shore party),
companies
Landing

and

of
Team

the

67th

three

a battalion of

support

parties,

detachments.

39th,

Engineer

infantry,

a platoon

guns,

medical,

shore

signal,

Supporting arms came from

and 41st Field Artillery Battalions,

Battalion,

36th

443d Coast Artillery (AA)

Engineer
Battalion,

the 756th Tank Battalion (light).

from

Arthur H.

Battalion Landing

self-propelled antiaircraft

air

the

the 15th Infantry (Col.

30th Infantry (Col.

of

Armored Regiment,

Landing Groups (RLGs),

Macon),

consisted

other

the 3d Infantry Division

Regimental

comprising

10th,

Combat

Battalion,

and

combat engineers,
control

1st

Robert

Monroe),

(BLTs)

mission

three

Each

service,
the

the

into

Infantry

Thomas

of

by

the

the

67th

49

Armored

Regiment
and two

The Armored

Regiment

included

elements
Field
and

of the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment,

Artillery
82d

Battalion,

Reconnaissance

Division.

Major

Task

Force

With

all

officers

Brushwood
attachments

and

men.

17th Armored Engineer Battalion,

Battalion,

General

78th Armored

all

from the 2d Armored

Jonathon W. Anderson commanded Sub

(3d

Infantry

the force

Division reinforced).

totaled approximately

19,500

Annex D provides the detailed troop

list.
Opposing
Moroccan

Spahis

Information
the

attitude

while

(cavalry>,

of

Many

by

of

Vichy

the War Department

the

French

armed

Accordingly,

reports

of

in Fedala,

Infantry
a

coastal

artillery

four

gun

battery
area.

In

defensive

forces

highly

was

locations and the extent

The
batteries

approach

battery

on

Cape

Fedala,

and a field

and two troops of Moroccan Spahis also in

intelligence

battalions,

four

plan

identified

troops

of

three or

Spahis

(one

battalions.5

called for destruction of the enemy

on Cape Fedala and the Batterie du Pont Blondin on

Cherqui

these

two or three antiaircraft batteries,

and four artillery

tactical

estimated.

did place about a battalion and a half

Casablanca

infantry

mechanized),

the

Indicated that

French officers supported the Allied cause,

Intelligence

the

units,

and some Senegalese units.U

enemy resistance could not be accurately

and

French

other staunchly supported Vichy control or favored the

pro-Axis.

consisted

furnished

uncertain.

of

forces

Headland

batteries
shore,

were

three

miles to the northeast.

silenced,

no

craft

could

Until
safely

nor could the Port of Fedala be used to off

50

load

follow-on

capture
The

the

30th

Pont

troops and supplies.

town

Infantry

Blondin

division.
reserve

and

protect

15th

regiment,

Infantry,

Cape Fedala,

neutralizing

the guns.

was to attack and reduce the Batterie du

and

The

The 7th Infantry was to

rear

and

Infantry,

left

landing

was to pass inland on

and in conjunction with

flank

as

the

of

the

division

the left of

the 7th

the 7th Infantry conduct a

coordinated attack on Casablanca.'

A.

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

The
Force

3d

Infantry

Brushwood

Western
Force

Task

part

Force.

convoy,

battleships,

was

Division

On

consisting

cruiser,

twenty-nine

transports,'

task

course

groups

laid

known

of

one

the Western Task

aircraft

three

as Sub-Task

Task Group of the

the Central

7 November 1942,

cruisers,

five

antiaircraft

deceptive

of

convoy,

carrier,

three

auxiliary carriers,

thirty-four
turned

destroyers,

northeast

from

one
and

toward Dakar and began deploying the

to their respective

transport areas just before

dark.$
Due

to

Brushwood
planned
and

2300.$

Roosevelt

Further,

r5

squalls,

Sub

Task

arrived off Fedala at 2340 on 7 November,

Shortly

Casablanca

people

rain

intermittent

of

and

went
the

North
should

afterward

out.

At

Allied
Africa

that the

they desire

vice

the

the lights in Fedala

0100

High

Force

Command

November President
broadcast

to the

landing was forthcoming.

to cooperate,

they should stick

arms

broadcast

may

Casablanca,
four

have

but

columns

not

with

Jefferson

(BLT

Joseph

Dickman

T.

shore,

in

Fedala.

the

2-7),

commander

carried

the

correct

turns.
result
some

of

(BLT

2-30)

discovered

the

Wood

(BLT

in

1-30),

control

into

ThomAs
and the

the column nearest the

destination,

the naval

task

that an unexpected current had

the transports conducted two 45-degree

vessels

misinterpreted

the

signals.

the convoy formation became deranged.

positions.

1-7),

(BLT

in

a few miles from the desired position.

the error,

transports

defenses

The transports formed

Charles Carroll

convoy

Some

some

Leonard

As the convoy neared its

force

To

alerted

This

into the sky.IO

point their searchlights

and

As

Radar revealed

at least 10,000 yards from their designated

Ships continued movement

vessel,

in

order

to

in

darkness,

reestablish

aided by a

their

planned

formation six to eight miles off shore.''

Captain
described
two

the

reasoned

(BLTs

1-7,

assigned
the

Emmett,
situation

2-7,

positions

one

Three

scout

boats

slowness
boat

of

of

to be in

moved

position,

assault BLTs
toward

the

Leonard Wood

In

fact,

one of

carried a reserve

was one hour away.

shore

to

mark

the

reported a lagging rate

vehicles and heavy equipment as well

plan

The

assault Battalion Landing Teams

for the assembly of the

employment

commander,

and 2-?J) were near enough to their

the

At 0215 the

unloading

force

to make the 0400 H-hour.

thought

while

task

to General Anderason 4t 0130.

1-30,

unit,

for

naval

that the four

four ships,

beaches.

the

landing craft.

as a

The detailed

tasked landing craft from ships other

52'

than

assault

Shortage

ships

of

to

landing

carry

craft

assault units to the beach.

deemed

such action necessary.

More

modern

landing vehicles such as LSTs,

were

still

on the drawing boards.12

ships

had

lost

difficulty
Emmett

formation,

locating

these

their

Because
small

assigned

in consonance with General

LCIs,

and "ducks"

the assault

craft

ships.''

had

great

Captain

Anderson delayed H-hour to

0430,

and

craft

to disembark as large a proportion of the assault BLTs

as

directed

positions.'

disregarded
Great

the

dark

In

effect,

their own

landing

resulted.

'Is

?"

the

for ship to shore movement.

Boat crews drifted aimlessly in

to transport

this the

could

Biddle

in

Sub Task Force Brushwood

plans

from transport

A
the

loading

confusion

the
on

to use

possible without waiting for boats from transports

outer

the

the transports

megraphoning 'Is this

LtonArd Wood ?" The navigator

not

locate

the

Bills

which was

entirely out of position.'1

Troops,
longer

than

control

at

planned

load

which
0415

wave

that

to

Wilks

the

combersome

packs,

landing craft.

Jgj

Swanson

were located 4000 yards off shore,

some

of

Accordingly,

General

delayed H-hour another fifteen minutes until

0445.01

to
left

be

assault
six

their

silence

by

miles

ships

the

Allen

out when

transports.
Navy.

took

The four
,

and

reported

the assault battalions had only one

present for the assault.

Two

with heavy,

destroyers

Mu,

"5

overburened

and

the first

Anthony

Anderson

were believed

waves of landing craft

This led to the breaking of radio

Then,

53

while loading of landing craft

continued,
passed

five

French

through

the

commercial

Center

Task

ships

with

Group.

lights

on

One of the ships

flashed "Caution ashore ..... alerted for 5 A.M.."17

The
toward
the

leading
the

waves

beaches

of

Task

Force

Brushwood

from the line of departure at 0445 with

follow on waves three minutes late.

The scout boats had

difficulties

identifying

energetically

as the lead waves approached

sign
on

of
8

beaches
majority
the

1942,

land.

the first

of

the

French

motors

of

the

shot

They

signalled

the beach,

but no

Between 0500 and 0505

wave started landing on the

Because

specified

vertical

nonresistance,
immediately

troops slept in

the barracks.

landing

were

skyward

aircraft.

craft

from

the

Cape

Allied

as

a brief moment o.4 hope glimmered.

the

lights

came

boatloads of troops.

.50

caliber

machine

down

heard,

looking

Command

beams

The
When

first

Fedala

High

searchlight

the

for

broadcast
signal

of

But almost

to the sea approaches on

An escorting patrol

gun to put out

boat fired its

the lights as the first

leaped ashore.''
Although

for

beaches.

under cover of darkness and without opposition.

searchlights

man

the

action was observed on

November

started

all

the

surf

never

of D-day,

the

specific

beaches

and

impaired

an orderly landing.

landing

with

the

attained more than four feet

inability of the scout boats to locate

the

30th

cross

currents

Correspondent

Infantry,

painted

in

the surf zone

Harold V.

Boyle,

the scene

n an

Associated Press relsase.

i~

J*~

**

..

~-54.

"Our

section

of

the

convoy

reached

its

journey's end
in a light rain. Darkest Africa was
only a dim glow as we
pulled away
from
the
transport and circled toward our rendezvous point.
Phosphorescent
flecks gleamed
briefly
in
the water and were gone
like drawing fireflies
when
the boats assembled.
We
turned suddenly
toward shore at full speed with motors roaring.
We were
in
the
third assault wave.
The
first
two waves, which preceded us by a matter of
moments,
landed safely on a four-mile stretch of
beach
between
Cape Fedala and the Pont du Blondin
area known as the Riviera of French Morocco.
They had reached
shore
in
the darkness,
completely
surprising French batteries at each end
beach.
As we neared
the coastiine,
of
the
however,
a bright searchlight stabbed the skies at
Pont
du Blondin
and then swept seaward, catching
our assault wave.
In
a
bright
glare
that
dazzled
the
we
ducked to the bottom of the boat.
coxswains,
Machine
gun bullets ripped across the water at us.
A naval support boat on our left flank opened fire
at the searchlights with .50 caliber machine guns.
We
could clearly see in quick glimpses, the
red path
of
the
tracer
bullets striking above,
below, and to the right of the shining target.
Then came
a grinding crash as our landing
boat
smashed full
speed
into a coral reef which
has
helped
to win
this shore
the name of Iron
Coast.
The craft
climbed futilely, then fell back
in the water.
From
its
ripped front
ramp
the water
climber to our shoetops, then surged to our knees.
said
the
boat
"Everyman
overboard,"
commander.
We plunged from the sides of the settling
craft
up
to our armpits In the surf and struggled
to
the
reef.
Waves washed over our
heads,
with
packs
60-pound
our
of
weight
the
doubling
water,
but
sweeping
us nearer safety. I grabbed
an outcropping of coral.
A
soldier
there
before me,
lay on
it
He was unable to move and
exhausted.
completely
was blocking me.
Twice the surf pulled me loose
and twice it returned me.
My
strength was ebbing fast when another
soldier
pulled up the man before me and lent me a
"wet hand to safety.
When
I
could stand again, I saw the scores
and
legs weary
their
soldiers,
of
dripping
wide-braced.
Staff
Sergeant
John Anspacher,
my public
and I discarded our lifebelts
escort,
relations
shore.
We had to clamber
turned
toward the
and

55

across a 100-yard patch of spike-sharp coral reef

and wade to the shore.
The way those
soaked men,
a few moments
before
so weary they could not stand, forgot their
fatigue
on
seeing
their
objectives
is
a
never-to-be-forgotten
example
of
soldierly
fortitude.
Forlorn
on a hostile
coast, with much of
their
heavy
equipment
fathoms
under
the
salt
water,
they quickly organized and turned to their
tasks when we had crossed the beach and
assigned
flung ourselves beneath a covering grove of pepper
trees.
I
found I
had a two-inch gash on my right
of cuts on both hands to
thumb and a lace work
remember our soggy trek through the coral.
We
dangerous.
became
grove
quickly
Our
were
caught between our own fire and the batteries
one shell
us.
After
Blondin
above
of PontdA
showered dirt only a few yards behind us, we split
away
from
the beach
and
turned
toward Cape
Fedala...."Is

BLT
Red

2,

Red

instead
hit

of

the

company

out

Twenty-one
overburdened

actual

the

of control,
force

reserve

BLT

0930.

that

the
by

took

confusion.

one

equipped

poorly

succeeded.

The

they

could

of

surf swept many

capsized

boats
not

were

swim

or smashed.

lost.

Troops,

and drowned.

the

planned
The

landing craft.

Company L,

landing

Senegalese

The

2-7 to beach Blue 2 and points

BLT

instead

either

commenced about 0600.

less

However,

throwing them against rocks with such

her thirty-one

The

Artillery and machine gun fire

considerable

thirty-one

packs

landings
of

of

landing

northeast

sixteen

at

causing

consisted

of

landed on beaches Red,

and the rocky shore between Red2 and Red 3,

Jefferson

further

Leonard Wood

Red 2 as planned.

and

destructive

Thomas

3,

beaches

opposition

boats

from the

1-7

20

Red

3.

Their

Jefferson
BLT 3-7,

lost

the

began landing over beach Red 3

lasted longer than scheduled due

56

to

the shortage of landing craft. 2'

The

Carroll

planned,

but

casualties
rocks
the

landed BLT 1-30 on Blue Beach at 0510 as

severe

resulted

from

by

0535.

the

Carroll

more

on the second,
2-30

the

even

Of

Last

greater

BLT

2-30

daybreak.

The

started
and
area)
artillery

on

its

0900.

the

concentrated
protecting

on
the

assigned
crews

these

from the

(RLG-30)

the

beach
lost

Initial

Cherqui
It

fire

confusion

five

22

in service.

However,

Dickman

Blue
only

by

two

of

landings.

reserve,

(Batterie

suffered

some

strafing aircraft.

division reserve,

strafing

landing,

The

BLT

3-30

assigned beach Blue 2 and the rocks

of

and occasional

RLG-15,

its

Group-30

northeast

about

landing craft from

assignments created an

uncertainty.

during

Landing

reefs

team

boat

craft

landing

loading

boat

to

troop

The second and third waves hit

similar

of

and

Many boats crashed on

and only two continued

transported

Regimental

surf.

craft

the twenty-five

minute

air

twenty-seven

landing

eighteen wrecked on the first

experienced

transport.

under

of

bordering the beaches.

beach

BLT

losses

from

gaining
transports

from

casualties
2

from

began landing about 1100

French

general

du Pont Blondin

aircraft.

Naval

air

air superiority as well

surface

attack,

as

thereby

limiting the number of combat air patrols available. 24

Company
2,

landed

later

BLT

instead

joined

scheduled

L,

BLT

3-7,
some

3-7.

scheduled

to land on beach Yellow

five miles northeast of Fedala and

The

3d Reconnaissance Troop,

to land on beach Yellow 2,

.57

did not

land until

also
late

morning

and

units

to

the

then

land

Cape

Fedala

2!

The

1800

on

D-Day.

were

lost,
Due

Red

batteries

67th

slowly.

The failure of these

in a delay in reducing

and increased casualties on the

By this time nearly half

so

only

to

the

Most

of

one

the landing craft

platoon from Company A got on Red

of

swell
the

the

the

sea

Arcturus

remaining

and

and

vehicles

on

1-7

beach

headquarters

Red

detachment,

Company

A,

land
on

at

company,

medical

and

0815.

cannon

platoons

756th

Battalion,

(forward echelon)

RLG-7

Tank

The

company,
of

Company
1-36

Battalion,

Battery

A,

lack

Biddle

Battalion came ashore by 1900 on 9 November,

Headquarters

two

Armored Battalion started landing at

unloading of

4lighters,

Beach.

as scheduled resulted

beach.

Beach.

on

D+1.26
landed behind BLT

antitank

company,

service

company,

A,

443d CA (AA),

Engineer,

10th FA

continued to

throughout D-Day and D+1.27 General Anderson

beach Blue 2 at 0945 D-Day.

proceeded

of 67th Armored

FA Battalion

9th

of tank

landed

Sub Task Force Brushwood now

had the assault elements ashore.

General
Fedala

beachhead

prepared

at

0800

to

on

loaded

in

But,

before

the craft was lowered,

missions

landing

and

Harbor.

General

destroyed,

but

did

prior

to

hours.

Finally,

the

Aucusta

for the

His personal

effects

craft swinging from the davits.

the

Augusta

engaged

in

maneuvers against French warships from

Casablanca

he

leave

D-Day.

were

firing

"

Patton

blast.

Patton's

retrieve
The

General

his

Aucusta

personal

effects were

prize revolvers just

battled for over three

Patton reached Fedala at 1320.28

58
-.--.

'/

"-"

"

-.

. .

"'

,..-",

"'

"- "'

,"',""""'. -...-- '''.--*-.""

. ''

,:.

..

',-".

.. ,,..''.

An

extract

from

the

Regimental

Diary

of

the

36th

Engineers recounted:

"The
surf became very heavy during the day
causing
the wrecking
of many landing craft which
strewed
the
beaches.
The weather was fine, warm,
and clear
and high morale maintained.
Lieutenant
Barili,
Company A, braved the surf and strafing to
release
a stunned driver from an amphibian tractor
and was able
to salvage
most of
the supplies
aboard the tractorV2 $

Beginning
beachmaster,
Harbor
boat

at noon on D-Day,
concentrated

and beach Red 2,

traffic

change

Patton

on areas In Fedala

in order to better control

and

of

the

assault

commanders

unit

criticism toward the beachmaster.

Commander

Jamison

his

was

vindicated.

courageous efforts

the
they

landings began during ebb tide.

it

difficult

follow-up
not

be

retraction
vehicles
start.

came in

General

30

The following tide

for craft to get back out.

waves

In

in a diary entry,

"Red Jamison saved the whole Goddamned operation."

made

the small

plans

recognized

The

the

The

considerable

retrospect,

landings

USN,

and conserve the dwindling landing craft.

upset

directed

the

Commander Jamison,

Additionally,

so closely that not only could

warned away from obstacles,

but

they prevented

operations of previous boat waves.

Lighters with

aboard

held at water's edge because motors did not

Consequently vehicles had to be pulled ashore.''

Additional

time

under

air

strafing

boats

either

was

wrecked

lost by temporary abandonment of boats

and

artillery

or

.59

br'oached

fire.
on

These abandened
the

beaches by the

tide.3

incoming

only

two

enemy

three

or

This

fire.31

the

helped instead of conducting salvage

of

All

oostacles.

together

of direct hits by

the rsult

these

high loss of landing craft on D-Day

Nevertheless,

operation.

entire

39 percent of all

and men,

officers

by 1700 on D-Day,
troops,

Including
Yet only

90

percent

of the assault battalions came ashore.

16

percent

of

on

arrived

Naval

inhibited the buildup of troops an supplies ashore

seriously

7,750

too slow.

were

crews

and 160 of the 347 landing craft were expended,

150

between

boat

and marking hydrographic

operations

for

personnel

party

of shore party troops delayed

Failure

Unassisted

retraction.
beach

the vehicles and 1.1 percent of the supplies

beach."4

the

This

shortage

vehicles

of

systematic resupply of forward elements and,

precluded
caused

General

Colonel

Harry

to

Anderson
McK

Roper,

restrain
observer

thus,

their advance.iS
the

from

Army ground

forces concluded:

crews

"Boat

must

be

trained

thoroughly.

The

should be a man of
boat
a smnll
coxswain of
initiative.
and
good Judgement,
intelligence,
their
small
boats should remove
Personnel
in
for life preservers, or at least
except
equipment
be ready to be Jettisloned. Equipment should be
stripped to the minimum' 1 6

The
most

craft

Police Company suffered one of the

Military

disasters

tragic

landing
9

204th

o.

th-

ship to shore movement.

with 113 o-ficers and men disembarked at 0200

November to land at Yellow Beach.

Casablanca

Four

Instead they entered the

harbor over fifteen miles away.

Second Lieutenant

60
.- ..- .. ..- .... . . ........ .....
.. . .. . ..... .. ... ... .. . . . ..... . . . . . ... .. .

... .. ....

Edward W. Wellman recalls the

incident:

"We
were
suppose to land on the beaches of
Fedala,
but
through
error,
the
assault
boats
headed
toward Casablanca fifteen miles away, where
the French
fleet was quartered.
It was not until
we were in Casablanca harbor that we realized that
the fire
toward which we were headed was not from
oil
tanks on Cape Fedala, but a French ship hit by
our naval fire.
Two of our boats drew back. The other two
had drawn near the vessel, which, in the darkness,
they thought was a United States destroyer.
I was
in
one.
When
the men
in
the other hailed the
vessel,
a foreign
voice
answered.
They shouted
back,
'We
are American.'
A burst of machine-gun
fire came
from the
destroyer, then only fifteen
yards
away,
and the first
burst fatally wounded
the
Captain
(Capt.
William
H.
Sutton,
the
Commanding Officer).
Realizing
that
resistance
was useless
against
a destroyer, the men stood up and threw up
their
hands
some even
tearing
off
their
undershirts
and
waved
them.
The
destroyer,
perhaps
thinking
they
were
up
to a trick
immediately opened fire with 3-inch shells.
Some
men
in
the boat were
killed by the shells and
machine-gun bullets.
Then Sgt. Claude Cunningham,
of Memphis,
Tenn.,
sent
the survivors over the
side
into the water.
The French kept on pumping
shells
Into
the
boat until
it
sank.
Under
international
law,
they could do this, since it
was an assault vessel,
I was
in
the
second boat,
only twenty
yards behind
the first,
and we shouted to the
third and fourth boats to get away.
Then we too
turned and tried to escape
by zigzagging.
The
destroyer was pouring 3-inch
shells our way.
A
splinter
took away
the
front of one of my shoes
splitting
two toes.
Another shell blew a leg off
the coxswain.
The air
was full
of metal.
A
second
lieutenant
jumped up to take the wheel.
A
moment
later he got a machine-gun slug through the
thigh.
As I started
to climb up for the wheel a
shell
crossed my lap and blew up
the motor.
Burning gasoline
spread over
the boat so I gave
the order
for
the men
to go over the side.
A
destroyer
picked us up.
The men in the first
boat
swam for
the shore.
Hundreds of French civilians
waded
out of drag
them
to safety.
They chased
away
the Moroccan
police
and took off their own
coats to wrap our dripping soldiers.

61

A French
officer grabbed me and asked how
many boats there were in the attack group.
I told
him I
could
tell
nothing but my name, rank, and
number.
The
officer
ran excitedly to the bridge.
They apparently
thought
the whole
invasion was
being centered
at Casablanca, instead of Fedala,
and
steauned back
to port.
There were no doctors
on
the destroyer
but our six wounded didn't let
out
a whimper.....
We were
taken
to a French
military
hospital
jammed
with
their
own
wounded '17

According

to Colonel McK Roper,

"several

members were killed

while 45 more taken prisoner.10

On
limited
Tnt

logistic elements succeeded in

D-Day

amounts of ammunition,

substantial

emergency

gasoline,

waves,

interfered

ships'

holds.1I

hampered

of

logistical

available

safety.

However,

Anderson

that was lost in

the

initial

with the orderly removal of supplies from

Loss

became

unloading

and rations.

adequate radio sets preventid

ship to shore party communication and fericusly

the

unsuitable

water,

loss of landing craft coupled with uwolanned

requests for materiel

satisfactory

providing only

for

landing

scarce

;and

and

rail

desi-ed.
stopped

buildup.

road

At 1800 on D-Day the port

supplies

terminals

advance

supporting

weapons

communications

equipment

and

in

transportation combined with

As a result,

the

directly

on

prevented

the

rapid

on 9 November General
Casablanca

(artillery),

until

enough

transportation,

and other support could be brought

forward from the beach.''

Unloading
transports
the

improved

again

on

moved

November

inshore.

The

(0+I).
Arcturus

At 1100 the
moored at

tanker's dock and completed off-loading the 67th Armorrd

62

Regiment.*2
At

1600

established

1600

still
on

remained

submarines

Bliss

and

transports

side

the

decks.

8.

and

Casablanca

When

(D+5)

elements

the

most

The

locations however.
the

sunk

Hewes .

the

harbor

second

of

convoy

On 12

Rutledge

and

completed

arrived

on 13

the ships had to be docked side by

piers due to the tremendous piles of stores on

The

last

of

the

troops stepped ashore on 21

thirteen days after the landing.

November,

party

On 13 November the remainder of the

entered

November

the

shore

in dangerous

torpedoed

Scott

off-loading.*3

at

the

November a torpedo sunk

11

November
,

November

satisfactory communications with the ships.

transports
At

on

44

SURFACE AND AIR BATTLE.

Naval
consisted
warding
ships

gunfire
of

off
in

Brooklyn

support

silencing
attacks

of

the

Fedala-Casablanca area

enemy coastal

by

the

transport

and

the

French
area.

destroyers

forces against

The cruisers

Wilkes

anson

shortly

after

daylight

was

and

Batterie

beaches

the

assault

breaking,
du

landings.
waves

coastal
Blondin

Pont

and landing craft.

63

twelve

and

craft equipped with barrage rockets and machine guns

the

Also,

support

for

landings.

and

supported

support

beach

light naval

batteries and

provided

the

defense

light

About 0615, on D-Day

had

landed

and just as

batteries from Cape Fedala

(Cherqui)

opened fire on the

The destroyers and the

Brooklyn

replied

and

range

due

The

Fedala.

the

Augusta

moved into

5 Despite precarious

of petroleum tanks,

proximity

silenced

Auajjj

which

as awareness of a safe

as well

undamaged,

line,

gun-target

Cape

the

to
left

be

to

on

fired

targeting
were

counterbattery fire.

with

Cape Fedala

the

batteries fifteen minutes later. 4'

Brooklyn

The
fired

the

Pont

on

the

control

Another

Cherqui

hit

of

action,

out

its

and

Srooklyn

it

useless.

rendered

putting the

the gun emplacements,

one of

and creating many

igniting powder bags,

final

at 0622

the

8LT 2-30

Once the bombardment ceased about 0715,

casualties.
launched

Shortly,

Point.

apparatus

shell

and,

a spotter plane,

up

of 6-inch shells toward Batterie du

salvo

first

Blondin

struck

gun

sent

received tho surrender at

and

assault

0730.47
The

of

Massachusetts

the

Suwanoe

and

10,000

feet

ready

leave

port

as well

.might

fire.

The

position
while

spotter

launched

Ranger

and dive bombers

planes

The dive bombers circled

attack any submarines that might

to

as blast any antiaircraft

batteries

that

squadron of fighters in

had

the airdrome at Rabat and Cazes airfield,

to attack

from the

planes

consisting

Wichita ,Tuscaloos,

the last hours of darkness.

during
at

and Air Groups off Casablanca,

Covering

Suwanot

protected vessels of Fedala

from submarine attack.4"

Just
harbor
fighters

to

0700

fire

on

prior
opened

launched

observation

the

in

guns

antiaircraft

planes.

" .-

.'..

.r.

..

-.-

French

started driving other spotter planes

and

64
,;' : ':_,
''.'.,'.'/
._'

Casablanca

.-

....

...

.-

..-

.-

..

r.

out

to sea.

Two French submarines began to leave port and a

few

minutes

later

Jean

Bart

the great guns of the French battleship

and Batterie El Hank opened fire on the cruisers

of

the Covering Group.

In

twenty

silence'.
coastal
Hank.

minutes
Other

the

Jean

salvos

defense
The

The U.S.

guns

salvos

main

Bart's

fell

at

ships replied immediately.

on

Table

battery

submarine
d'Oukacha

pens

was

and the

and Batter!e

El

drove the crews away but a lack of direct

hits failed to disable the guns."5

While

exchanging

fire

coastal

batteries,

the

evasive

maneuvers

which

French

seized

Casablanca
sixte~n

destroyers
and

half

away.

fire

They

retire

took

attack

At

0827

on

hit

the

well

to the west.

The

the transports off Fedala,

a

French

the

Ludlw
Ludlow

the

cruisers

hour

the

French

protection

offered

by

Wilkes

and

Group,

Massachusette*

destroyers

and the

Bart

the Covering Group began

them

to

toward
an

of

cruiser and seven

left the port at Casablanca behind a smoke screen

opened

craft.

ships

the

the opportunity to send their warships out of

northeast

miles

with

Swanson

returned,

the

Wilkes

and landing

and forced the

and

Ajj
vessels

Wilkes

Brooklyn

worked to penetrate

cruisers

and

the

to
For
the

destroyers

.50 When the ships of the Covering

,

Wichita

Tuscaloosa

and the

the French ships disengaged and retired

to Casablanca.''
At
maneuver.

0935
three
Again
the

Swanson

aided

by

the

French
destroyers
tried a similar
Augusta ,
Brooklyn , Wflkes , and
Bristol

65

intercepted

and frustrated

at

to

1015

after 1100 when three of the attacking ships

until

continued

the transports before being driven

within five miles of

came

surface action

The

destroyers.

the

support

left Casablanca

Primauquet

The French cruiser

effort.

the

off . 2

The

destroyer-leader

French

Noires

and

burned

furiously.

about

noon.

The

Priaugz

the

outside

to

badly

anchored Just

hit,

B.nooc

attacked

and forced her

fires

uncontrollable

starting

to port

limped back

Both

A nearby destroyer had the same experience.

beach.

ships

Others

But aircraft from the

port.

relentlessly,

beached off Rockes

Milan

smoulderea

all

while

night,

the

Primauguou's

magazine explosions continued for another day.1I

air

Naval

clear

became
runs

and

targets as soon as it

the French were hostile.

Strafing and bombing

attacked

dogfights with French aircraft won air

successful

to

French

The

quickly.

superiority
reduced

their

units

strafing

irregular

Force

Air

over

runs

was
the

quickly
Fedala

beachhead.54
Naval
French
and

air

also

participated

units at Casablanca.

naval

destroyers

out

moved

squadron

decided to strafe

aircraft

made

Casablanca.

one

Repeated
condition.

battered

pass

toward

in

the

When

passes
Then

of

the French cruisers

the transports,

the destroyers.
and

destruction

the VF-9

A total of eight

turned the destroyers back

to

destroyers

in

left
the

the
squadron

four

strafed

the

two

cruisers.95
The

naval

surface

and

air

combat

off Casablanca on

D-Day
to

eliminated

the

threat by French air and surface units

the landing force.

to silence
The

mid

air

on

launched

racetrack
route

came

by antiaircraft

9 November

from

for

the

artillery

too

antiaircraft

aircraft

was

shot

landed safely,

Causes

of

use

to

gunnery personnel.

the

to

land

at the Fedala

Apparently their flight

Center

Attack

Group,

transports fired on

severely

The

them.

Then

injuring the pilot,

One
The

but received no fire control missions.

problem

weret

(1)

failure

friendly forces from proper sectors,

recognition

In

batteries on shore fired as well.

down

others

this

Ranger

and some

friendly

approach

failed

three cub observation aircraft

support.

close

(cruiser)

Brooklyn

bombardment

community noted the problem of friendly

recognition

afternoon

plans

the naval

the Batterie El Hank at Casablanca.s'

naval

aircraft

However,

signals,

and

(3)

of

planes t,

(2) failure

inability

to

to

identify,

planes under condition of poor visibility.s7

V.,

In

all

determined
Press

'-SI

the
fight.

descriaed

iA.oujiA

French
John
the

naval
A

naval

forces

Moraso,

III

put

up

dogged,

of the Associated

action from his view aboard the

in a dispatch dated 8 November:

"The

audacious
and
well-trained Vich>
French
naval
force
today
staged
a furious,
reckless
and soulsearing
battle against Americ&n
ships attempting
to land troops at Fedala, Fren,:h
Morocco.
The Amer i can
force,
the greatest of its
kind
in history, had crossed the Atlantic without
casualty.
With more than 100 ships and thousi.nds
of men determined to open the long-awaited sec:ond
front we waded through Axis submarines.
"Here is
the battle
as I logged it un~til

67

.,,

i
I-

the order to cease fire reached the crew:

11:25 p.m. - We arrived at the designated
area for
operations
in Stygian
darkness
and a
slight
rain
squall.
We are
surprised that all
navigation lights are on.
11:45 p.m. - At Casablanca and Fedala the
lights go out suddenly and village blacks out.
We
are
six miles offshore and we make several whistle
signals.
They know something is wrong.
12:05 a.m.
Our first
motorboat leaves
the
transport
and we
start
loading troops into
landing barges.
"4:45 a.m.
- Destroyers go almost to the
beach
to help barges land. The swell is heavy and
some
boasts are
damaged.
Overhead
the big and
little
dipper
and Orion stand out brilliantly
as
the Rev.
Father O'Leary of Boston offers prayer.
Lt.
Comdr.
George
K.
Willims of Salt Lake City
gives last minute instructions.
Our
troops machine-gun a
4:55 a.m.
searchlight
that appears on the beach.
Red tracer
bullets scream
through
the night
air.
Minutes
later
a destroyer machine-guns and then shells the
French
tanker JLgP.J.
which disobeyed a command
to stop.
The Lorraine fires
back and then gives
up
to a boarding party.
Hell starts
popping off
in the dark.
5:47 a.m.
The captain
asks for the
range on the powerful Cherqui battery.
6:00
a~m.
Heavy firing is heard dead
ahead.
16:12
a.m.
Cherqui
opens with
a
terrific
cannonading
and
our
ships
reply
instantly.
The sky fills
with flame and smoke.
6:20 a.m. - A destroyer says Cherqui has
his range and will need help.
We give him plenty
after closing to 11,500 yards.
6:35 a.m.
- We give Cherqui rapid fire
that obliterated our target in smoke and dust.
6:45 a.m.
- We give Cherqui a round of
drum-firing.
An oil storage tank and two buildings
break
into fire,
our
plane spotter
tells
us.
Three
of
four guns have
been knocked
out.
Suddenly
I
note
that
our
landing boats, loaded
are making their way ashore in the
soldiers,
with
midst of this inferno.
6:53 a.m. - Our plane reports the fourth
gun
smashed.
Three minutes
later
two of their
guns reopen
fire.
The Army reports no resistance
was offered to landing.
a.m.
- Cherqui is
silent again and
7:01
fifteen knots.
making
to 10,000yards
we
close
one
gun puts a shell 400 yards from us and
Later,
water cascades skyward.
7:08 a.m.
Seventeen
American planes
approach us.

68

- Scores of landing boats are

7:10 a.m.
We fire
shoreward.
heading
in
the water,
rounds in five minutes.
- Eleven friendly planes zoom
7:18 a.m.
We need them because shells are coming
us.
over
closer and submarines have been detected.
a.m.
- A tremendous salvo shatters
7:21
the glass on our bridge.
7:25 a.m. - Cherqui has been silent five
Bertram, senior aviator from
Lt.
Eugene
minutes,
Spokane, Wash., reports.
Our planes are bombing and
a.m.
7:30
Uni ted
Grummans,
Thirteen
Cherqui.
strafing
States Navy fighter planes join them.
J
- The French Battleship
7:32 a.m.
duel
with one of our
long-range
begins
a
JX
1
spring up and the
Huge flashes
battle wagons.
shots at us from a
takes a few pot
Jean Bart
twelve
miles. More glass shatters on
of
distance
the bridge.
- My head is reeling from the
7:36 a.m.
blast.
- They have fixed the gun at
7:39 a.m.
We pound
shooting at us again.
and are
Cherqui
two minutes score a direct
and
in
them brutally
hit.
- These Frenchmen are tough.
a.m.
7:41
are going and we silence
guns
Cherquils
Two of
them with a round of rapid fire.
- One of our destroyers fires
7:58 a.m.
at one of our planes and we warn him.
5-inch
starboard
Our
aam.
7:59
planes strafing
away
at French
batteries blast
soldiers on the beach and men in small boats.
attacking
Planes begin
8:00
a.m.
Right in
breaks loose.
hell
and all
transports
of
this, those obstinate Frenchmen at
the middle
Cherqui get another gun going.
8105 a.m.
We put up two more planes
for spotting.
is
Cherqui
They report
a.m.
8:10
now
fifty

silenced.
tell
us the
planes
The
8:14 a.m.
the French antiaircraft guns ashore.
of
location
We blaze away at them.
8:19 a.m. - The French ships escape from
We are ordered
a smoke screen.
under
Casablanca
our
way and steam
coming
two cruisers
to destroy
away at twenty-five knots.
8:28 a.m. - Our destroyer screen reports
Most of us are
are firing on them.
the cruisers
scared as hell, but we all try to hide it.
8:35 a.m. - We fire two batteries at the
French ships have
that
some
We hear
cruisers.
headed for the open sea.
contact with the
- We make
8:50 a.m.

69

Shells begin to fall all around

cruisers.
French
us and we and oJr flagship give them plenty.
The
cruiser
lookouts report one French cruiser is hit
and possibly the other.
8:59 a.m.
- After a furious action, the
Frenchman
reverses his course toward Casablanca.
We speed
up to thirty knots to chase them.
Right
in
the middle
of
this
the Army sends us this
message:
"Admiral
refused to see me.
I delivered
the message
to him at
Casablanca.
French army
does not wish
to fight.
Citizens welcome us and
hold us
in
high esteem."
We learned later that
only
the
French navy wants to continue the battle
and they
fight like mad dogs. A shell plunks into
the water twenty feet from me.
9:05 a.m.
- We fire away with renewed
energy
and our lookout reports we have twenty-tree
hits
on
one
cruiser.
She
is
smoking,
but
continues
to fire at us.
She is doing a fine job.
We
hear
later
that both cruisers we have engaged
are beached, but this is not confirmed.
9:30
a.m.
- A submarine is spotted off
our starboard
bow,
but
the captain tells
us to
ignore
him. We *re zigzagging at thirty-two knots,
A few
too fast
for him to hit us - we hope.
minutes
later
another
submarine
is
sighted
to
port.
9:35 a.m. - We are ordered to return to
Fedala
to protect
our
transports. This makes us
mad as hell.
9149
a~m,
We
are
told French
Our
are coming out
of Casablanca.
destroyers
orders
told us to destroy them.
Our battleship
smacked a French cruiser, setting her ablaze.
10:01
a.m. - We are doing a wonderful
job, radio message says.
10:09 a.m. - Shells appear from nowhere.
Their
bursts are a particular magenta color.
I
think we are gone this time.
Shells whistle over
my head.
They are
shortening range now.
They
have
us.
That last one hit about twenty feet away
to port.
We
turn.
Their range is short by 400
yards.
We open with rapid fire and straddle a
destroyer
behind a smoke
screen.
These
cagey
Frenchmen
are hiding in the sun and all we have to
fire at is flashes.
They are giving us fits.
10:20
a.m.
Their subs are in on us,
firing
torpedoes.
We hit a destroyer as a torpedo
goes by our port side.
- Two French submarines have
10:25 a.m.
periscopes
up.
Five
torpedoes
head at
us.
Watching
their wakes,
we reel into a zigzag and
luckily go in between them.
10:29 a.m. - They straddled us again and
we can't see them.
We go into furious rapid fire.
Our ship
is
reeling
from our own
gunfire.
I

70

suddenly notice
a number of birds swimming in the
water.
They are
totally unaware of the battle.
How I envy them.
10:47 a.m.
- Lookout reports periscopes
to port.
Boy, how we could use some planes.
They
must
be
somewhere
else.
Somebody
reports a
torpedo
wake,
but we
are
too busy with
the
destroyers to watch it.
10:57 a.m.
A battleship is coming to
help us.
We are going to box in those destroyers
and
let
them have
it
from all sides.
Our guns
thunder steadily and my head is a mass of pain.
11:30
a.m.
- The French ships appear to
be
running away.
Thank
God we are returning to
Fedala to guard transports.
11:40
a.m.
- From ashore the Army sends
word our officers
are conferring with the French
on whether
naval
gunfire must
cease
during an
armistice.
I
run down
to the captain's cabin where
I
am living.
I
find blood all
about.
However,
our
four wounded
are not
in critical
shape.
12:17 p.m.
- We
scatter from general
quarters.
We
had been firing
since six oclock
this morning,
and have
had no food.
Our fliers
return
and
tell
us how we pounded the Cherqui
battery to pieces.
12:55 p.m. -- The French navy is ignoring
the
armistice
at Fedala.
Two cruisers
and two

destroyers

Just

left

Casablanca

and are heading

for
us.
In addition a French bomber attacked the
beach during the armistice.
1:08
p.m.
- We contact
the French
and blaze
away.
It
turns back toward
squadron
Casablanca
and
lets us have it.
Our flagship
falls
back and we find ourselves fighting all four
ships.
The bursts are coming nearer and nearer.
1:30
p.m.
Our flagship gets in the
battle,
Our planes depth-charge a submarine off
our
port bow.
The French
are using submarines
with
their surface
ships,
but
they have had no
luck.
Some Navy dive-bombers appear and we shout
with
joy.
One of
the
French destroyers
is
reported
dead in the water.
Our dive-bombers roar
in
on
the French ships and one of the destroyers
is hit.
that
the
2:03 p.m.
Planes report
French
cruiser
is
being towed toward Casablanca
and fifteen minutes
later
the planes tell us a
French
destroyer
has been
beached
inside
the
harbor.
We believe we hit at least three ships.
us Fedala
The Army tells
2:26 p.m.
"has been
taken
and
that minesweepers have been
ordered
to clear
out the French minefields.
The
officers
and
I
limp
below
for
coffee
and
sandwiches.

7t
.,

"

..

'

'

.--

-----

-____

3:20 p.m.
French bombers attack our
soldiers on the beach.
4:27
p.m.
- We don't even get up when
planes drop
depth charges o++ the starboard bow.
We want
to rest
and eat.
We expect
a night
riddled with
submarine
attacks and French planes
at dawn."'B

72

C. ACTION ASHORE

(1)

REGIMENTAL LANDING GROUP - 7

The
on

7th

beaches

Regimental

in

the vicinity of Fedala.

was

to land on Beach

Red

31

and

Regimental

BLT

to

3-7

(MAJ

was to land

BLT 1-7 (LTC Moore)

on Beach

Cloud) minus Company L was the

reserve.

land

(RLG)

Red 2; BLT 2-7 (LTC Salzmann)

floating

scheduled

Landing Group

Co',.)any

L,

7th Infantry was

on Beach Yellow and support BLT 2-7 from

the

western

was

charged with taking the town of Fedala and continuing on

to

the

bank

cape

to

Reconnaissance
was

to

of

next

the

highway
could

the

railway

destroyed,

batteries there.

The 3rd

landing on Beach Yellow

installations

in

the

then after crossing the

and

positions on Cape Fedala from the

objective
bridges

was

over

the
the

control

The

of

the

Mellah before

they

or used by French troops for retreat

reinforcement.

BLT

2-7

bridges

the

east

from

BLT 1-7 (LTC Moore)

western side ot BLT 1-7 (LTC Moore).

pressuring

be

course

attack

the

and

two

antiaircraft

golf

to

on

most

the

Troop (CPT CrandallB,

River,

southwest

the Mellah River.

seize

destroy

vicinity
Mellah

of

(LTC

Salzmann)

while

Company

was to seize
L,

7th

or

these

Infantry

supported from the west. 1 s

BLT
started

1-7,

toward

the
the

first

elements

beaches

73

from

of

Force Brushwood,

the line of departure at

about

and

on

Beach

landed

the

swept
BLT

landed

0445

landing

The BLT 2-7

Elements of BLT 1-7 (LTC

Moore)

island edge of Red 2 without opposition and

assembled

at

the

proceeded

toward

Fedala.

Infantry

Regiment,

the

quickly

surprised

One company of the 6th Senegalese

only

and

in garrison was

infantry unit

captured.

Ten

Armistice

German

from their headquarters were caught.

fleeing

Commissioners

the force

throwing them against rocks.

instead of Red 3.

0600.

about

Some of

of Red 2 because the surf

instead

to Beach Blue

began

0500.

about

boats out of control

went

2-7

Red

at

By 0600 BLT 1-7 had Fedala under control.'0

BLT

part

of

town,

guns

100mm

of

fire

control

guns.

The
by

seizure

at

landing

Li

mission

of

occupying

Fedala,

the southwest

in

and

attacking along the cape

to capture

the

the

Batterer du Port plus a 75mm battery,

station and some emplaced antiaircraft machine

heavy
a

Reconnaissance
boats

the

heavy antiaircraft batteries

the

attacking

had

1-7

surprise

assault

after

Troop

Beach

battery

antiaircraft

a
A

Yellow.

in

darkness

l&nling
series

was

by

the

3rd

from rubber assault

of mishaps delayed the

the mission was abandoned.

so long that

scheduled for

The battery

thus

was able to pin down C/I-7 Infantry by direct fire when

they

approached

Cape

actually

surrender

American

naval

to

Moore's request

The

naval
was

BLT

1-7

the town and it

until

about

did not

1100 hours.

gunfire also deterred the attacking BLT 1-7.

LTC

which

from

Fedala

fires

to terminate

were

required

the bombardment was denied.

in

support of the 30th RLG

under fire from the French guns on

74
7.

the ape.

The

BLT
that

along the cape was delayed until

attack

1-7
time

the

unsuccessful

superseded

was

by

supported

Infantry
surrender

of

at

about

noon.

at

1500

station and the 100mm battery

The 75mm guns and machine guns surrendered

mortar

receiving

and

begun

accomplished

the

in

and

Fedala,

from

three

Its

capturing

missions:

enemy

the

BLT

morning.

capturing the heavy antlaircaft weapons

Fedala,

fire

howitzer

the enemy guns brought an end to

of

ad

which

successfully

A/I-7

Tank Battalion obtained the

A/756th

Neutralization

fires

seize them by means of a

to

the fire control

after

Fedala.
the

by

At

the guns

supported by field artillery.

assault,

tank-infantry

attempt to neutralize

effort

an

1140.

1-7

occupying
in southwest

weapons

on

Cape

Fedal a.Ii
BLT
2

and

BLT

with

one

Cherqui
their

on

the
of

instead
assigned

BLT

2-7

the

enemy

the

beaches,

the

shore.

with

the

organized

out

the

Red

Beach

the

emplacements.

These

beaches northeast of

and could not proceed on

to- attack the Batterie du Pont Blondin,

four

0610

coastal

destroyers were exchanging fire

Naval

artillery.

fire

control

gun fire knocked

and

system

the

hit

gun
enemy

the

surrounded

troops

ground

The

light and began firing on

and the control vessels near

approaches,

enemy

platoons.

While the BLT 2-30 and elements of

took advantage of first

enemy

so the battalion

Red 3,

and small

reefs

mission.

By

of

of mortars and four rifle

section

landed

units

instead

the capture of Batterle du Pont Blondin

in

2-30

was put ashore at Beach Blue

Salzmann)

Cherqui

beyond

aided

(LTC

2-7

75

d %-, '.... .% ".. .-.

,,_"

.'

"

-_

"

. L

'

"

_.

'.

" ____
,

'

'_

"

'_

"-

.'-

,,

and

battery

to

surrendered

enemy

the

0730

mortars at the target.

fired

Salzmann

acted as interpreter.

elements

of

near

area

to

River and clearing a zone south and west of Fedala.4

on

Beach

Red

landing

craft.

assembly

a,';t

main

The

body of the OLT 3-7

)c into an

of Fedala near the 7th RLG command

southwest

The

daylight.
beaches

the remainder

join

By
RLG
the

vehicles
artillery,

went

company

unrelated

assault

its

made

Delays

prevented

was

Brushwood

Force

mission.

of

took

The operatior

0930 hours.

about

at

began landing

L/3-7 Infantry scheduled to land on the western flank

post.

7th

(less Company L)

than scheduled because of the shortage of serviceable

longer

of

Cloud)

(MAJ

3-7

BLT

its

controlling the bridges over the Mellah

of

mission

primary

BLT 2-7 successfully completed

objective,

days

the

Enroute

part of the afternoon.

the latter

during

completed

they

The unit marched about seven miles which

river.

Mellah

to an assembly

road to the western bank of the

along the coastal

moved

nd

the

the entire BLT 2-7 joined up

Here

3.

Red

LTC

taking the battery

BLT 2-7 crossed the Pont Blondin

Beach

and

Infantry

H/2-30
After

At approximately

ashore

original

to

its

of

BLT 3-7."5

from

accomplishing

impossible

its

because of

during the morning on

mission and marched to

1700 or D-Day approximately ninety percent of ttwere ashore,

personnel
vehicles

and

prevknted

supplies
the

sel#-propelled

but only a small percentage

were

1esupply.
105s

76

landed.

The lack of

Additionally

light

and heavy support equipment

for

the artillery

and

combat

troops
beaches

the

were

division
a

support

to

assets

prepared

about

to

though troops at
the

through

night.

west of the Mellah River,

miles

miles

three

work

of ground
the
The

directed the 7th and 15th RLG to stop at

two

about

the advance

prevented

objectives even

initial

commander

line

Lack of supplies

was not landed on D-Day.

short

a limit

original

of

the

the

attack

D-Day

objective.14
The
objective
D+1.

outline
directed

For

the

for

2nd

remainder

D-Day

by

and

on

the

D-Day
next

the

Engineer

RLO

took up

days advance.

Losses

the

7th

Regiment landed

5 The

In Fedala on

the mission of police and local

assumed
town.

final

toward Casablanca at 0700 on

were 9 killed and 38 wounded.

D+1
the

of

security

of

for

20th

Battalion,

D-Day

for

the advance

preparatory

positions
reported

plan

This allowed BLT 1-? to become

the

the force began

the

7th RLG reserve.ds

At

0700

seriously
a

right
From
2-7
up

November

1942,

toward Casablanca unsupported by land-based air and

movement

had

D+0,

four

batcalion

(north)
north

by logistical

hamppr-:

and

front

the

difficulties.

The advance

with 7th Infantry zone on the

15th Infantry on the left (south).

to south the four BLTs were BLT 3-7 (MAJ Cloud),

2-15 and 1-15.

(LTC Salzmann),

BLT 1-7 (LTC Moore)

behind 2-7 and assumed the mission as regimental

Companies

A and

7th RLG and were

The

moved

reserve.

',

756th Tank Battalion were attached to the

in

the main attack."7

movement

toward Casablanca was lightly resisted

?7

with

occasional

French

strafing

reconnaissance

morning.
thirty

by

naval

caused

addition

the

supporting

off

during

the

because
by

weapons

and

was fairly well

Field

lost

or damaged

of

extremely
of

because

transportation

RLG

communications

had

Battalion

In

insufficient

equipment.

equipment

at

supply

transportation.$S

battalions

in landing.

7th

critical

off except for radios for

Artillery

continue

intersection was

progress

of

lack

road

The 3rd Infantry Division

the

assaulting

10th

"the 7th

the supporting
which were lost

The 15th RLO however was unable

of insufficient
support.

artillery,

air defense

Advance was resumed at 0001 on

November with transportation furnished to the 15th RLO by

the

30th

the

3rd

of

driven

attack.

halted

1400

situation

10

air

General

approximately

and

was

vehicles at the Fedala-Boulhant

Commanding

to

patrol

In the afternoon an armored force of approximately

dispersed

RLG

by low-flying French aircraft.

RLG.

The length of the halt was minimized because

Infantry

surprise

or

Division did not want

lose

momentum

in

its

to lose

the element

mission

to capture

Casablanca.60
Shelling
Casablanca
on

10

increased

November

Brushwood.
supporting
its

from

guns

in

the

as the 7th RLG advanced.

the

hottest

outskirts

of

The fighting

experienced

by

Force

The regiment was halted twice on D+2 to wait for

arms

advance

to be brought forward.

at

coordinated
positioned

was

field

midnight

attack
in

to

to
begin

north-south

78

get
at
line

into
0700
of

The element resumed

position
on

D+3.

departure

for
RLG
east

the
7
of

Casablanca
south,

with

BLT

3-7 still

BLT

1-7

to

and

straddli ng

the

Casablanca

after

Artillery

and

captured
the

rest

in tne north,

the

coastal

rear

road,

daybreak

small

arms.

the

communications

the

was

2-7.
the

stopped

Companies

and

BLT 3-7

suburbs
by

of

French

K of BLT 3-7

battery during the morning but

battalion

with

BLT

reached

and

90mm antiaircraft
of

of

BLT 2-7 to its

was

immobilized

and

out

of

regiment for some hours during the

morning of D+2.70
BLT
attack

arrived

fire

battalion

battalion
the

on

deployed

casualties

and

the

the

commander

line of departure for the

battalion

remained

day

capturing an artillery
element

of

of

defense

Battalion.
including

was

1-7

support.

The

previous

BLT

barracks

east

The

split

into three parts.

The

to high ground

Leading elements

in contact with enemy throughout the

piece and killing the crew.?'

the

battalion withdrew and organized a

10th Field Artillery suffered 10 casualties

battalion commander when

1045
began

advance.

two company commanders were

the enemy enroute.

infantry and counterbattery

At

the

arms and

around the supporting 10th Field Artillery

The
the

stopped

Small

led the bulk of battalion

the

Another

area

BLT

clearing

BLT

its

In confusion,

south

line

at

one half hour before daylight on D+2.

artillery

to

2-7

it

encountered enemy

fire.:2

(after the BLT 2-7 situation was clarified)

moving

to

attack

regimental
2-7
of

zone

order
of

was

to

tank and artillery

pass

through the

action and capture

the military

Casablanca.

79

with

BLT

1-7 made good progress

of

east

night

the

for

when

1700,

fire until

artillery

persistent

under

it

stopped

objective and about one and one

its

half miles ahead of BLT 2-7.73

RLG
at

7
of

cost

French prisoners

killed and 72 wounded.

27

they received orders to fall

that

reported

the edge of Casablanca on 10 November

reached

back and that an

armistice was imminent.7*

The
order

preparation fires

and

artillery

at

amounted

they

regiments;
an

entered

G/BLT

0+3

from

the

armistice.

calling

artillery

they

stated

2-30

off

prisoners

night

area

had
0230

At

armistice.

pending

an

exclusive of the

to no more than 3,600 infantry,

the

seek

north and still

about

and miscellaneous units.?$

SDuring

authority

the

sector

defense batteries which were still

the coastal

ooerational,
90 guns,

the water front,

the southeast

enemy French ground elements,

The
personnel

in

still

preparation by

the 10th Field Artillery Battalion for the D+3

by

supported

was

RLG-7

for

and field artillery.

targets were EL Hank,

guns in

time

Ground advance was

Initial

based planes,

and antiaircraft

Casablanca.

Sattack.

after an

D+3

carrier

The

of

*!

on

0730

gunfire,

naval

at

begin

on D+2.

darkness

in

attack

November

11

before

reconnaissance
to

D+3,

the

for

notified the 7th RLG of the

General

Commanding

and

orders
D+3

stated

Commanding General
General

Patton

were

two
that

fires

80

the

to

by

the

ceast firing

French officers
they

had

the

in French Morocco to

issued orders at 0655 on

the attack on Casablanca.

registration

taken

Other

than some

7th RLG did not fight in

Casablanca. 7

(2)

REGIMENTAL LANDING GROUP - 30

The
Group

general

was

protect

mission

of the 30th Regimental

Landing

to attack and reduce Batterie du Pont Blondin and

the

rear

and

left

flank

of

the

Division.

The

mission
of the 30th RLG (COL. Author H. Rogers) was in three
parts
to each of the Battalion Landing Teams that comprised
the

RLG.

four

BLT

miles

1-30

to

that

in
a

the

River,

stream

direction

Jr.) was to push

to

a long ridge well

beyond the main

highway.

occupy

Nefifikk

Fred W. Sladen,

southward

Casablanca-Rabat
was

(LTC.

Cherqui

and

Rabat.

floating reserve.
mission

to

2-30 (LTC.

headland,

defense

against

of

BLT

Lyle W. Bernard)

the bridges over the

line on the eastern bank of

possible

reinforcements

BLT 3-30 (MAJ.

Charles E.

from

Johnson)

the
was

BLT 3-30 was minus Company L which had

follow

the

landing

team

and assist

in the

capture of Batterie du Pont Blondin.

On
back

D-Day

scheduled

by 45 minutes to insure

teams

would

have

interruption.
attacking
2

the

With

from

time

to

H-Hour had to be set

that the four battalion landing

get

Company

the rear,

0400

four

waves ashore without

landing on Beach Blue 3 a-,d

BLT 2-30 was to land on Beach Blue

and assault Batterie du Pont Blondin from the direction of

Fedala.
coastal
inland

This

was

batteries.
and

secure

the
BLT

most
2-30

important
on

Beach

task

Blue

the rest of the Beachhead.

81

to silence the
1 was to go
The adjacent

unit

RLG-7

instead

had

of

one

of

landing

its

BLTs land out of position,

on Red 3 as planned,

it

and

landed on Beach

Blue 2 with BLT 2-30.

The
to

the

The

east

out of position where his unit was to attack.

coastal

U.S.

guns at Batterie d^ Pont Blondin were firing at

troops

near

landing.

The

suspended

their

French

fell

Blondin
30th

across the bay where BLT 2-30 was

began

to

firing.

very

were

RLO

Cherqui

Navy

American

the

Officer of BLT 2-30 was also carried

Commanding

return

Some

close

and the French

the rounds fired by the

to friendly troops and slowed down

attack.

Portions

captured

by

because of

of

fire

of

elements

Batterie

the
of

du Pont

the 7th RLG and the

initiative and mission understanding of

r
company commanders.
As
landed

to

the Commanding Officer of 9LT 2-30

a couple of miles east of Beach Blue

began
into

stated before,

the

attack.

position

and

assault

from

from

the

fire

The

heavy

weapons company got mortars

with some units of rifle

the

right

(West).

coastal

suppressed that fire.

Navy,

ground troops surrounded

the

enemy

Company

H,

Commanding
company

in

of

BLT

and

the

setting

surrendered
30th
BLT

however

the battery,

reached

the

position,

in seizing the crossing over

defenses

Navy

from the

and by 0730
Commander of

Not long afterwards LTC Bernard,

charge and sent other elements

up

four

With fire support

to Captain M. E. Porter,

Infantry.
2-30,

companies began

They encountered some

batteries,

destroyers
the

2 where his unit

against

82

put

a rifle

to join the rest

the Nefifikk River

counter attacks from the

northeast.77
BLT

1-30

companies.

landed

The

southward

BLT

on Beach Blue with

organized

its

three rifle

after the landing and moved

to gain control of the high ground which

it

was to

hold.

There

were some 75 enemy members of the armed forces aboard;

train

bound

for

Rabat was stopped and searched.

they

were removed and held as prisoners.

some

artillery

and

objective

without

positions.

"BLT

arrive

Beach

at

casualties
moved

attacks,

fight

3-30

by

which

but BLT 1-30 reached

1600

and

had been

in

artillery
to

an

and
area

reserve started to

strafing

west

of

its

set up defensive

Blue 2 about 0900 hours.

from

inland

air

BLT 1-30 received

It

suffered some

air

planes as it

Nefifikk

during

tVv

remainder of the morning."47

"D+l,
Infantry
its

and

the

objectives

missions."7"
wounded

in

enlarged

1BLT

westward

D-Day,
30th

was

on

Coast

lightly
and

the 30th RLG was to stay on

Nov

42,

and

perform

local

On D+l

the bridgehead was

BLT 1-30 was on the southeast and

the east and northeast along with the 41st

Battalion.

"BLT

Artillery

(AA)

3-30,

with one platoon of

attached,

prepared to move

from a point near Beach Red 3 during the morning to

The

of

RLO on D-Day had 8 killed and 23

a new assembly area nearer

was

the Division Reserve was 3-30

the action of the day.

Artillery
443

remainder

of

The

42

by the 30th RLG.

2-30

Field
the

November

15,

movement

the front."'O

toward

Casablanca by the 3rd Division

resisted by artillery
and BLT 3-30).

and French aircraft,

(RLG

The Bridgehead manned by BLTs 1-30

83

and

2-30

was

all

that

come

off.

under

(3)

Patton

issued

orders

REGIMENTAL LANDING GROUP -

operation

15th Regimental
as

the

reserve,

the

initial

was

to

pass

the
it

Due
the

in

the

left of the

to the

its

D-Day.04
15th

on

Thomas

naval

of

7th RLG,

concert with

and then

in

inland,

to Casablanca.0l

confusion surrounding the

the

landing

15th RLO was not ordered to

until

H.

boats

coxswains

several

approximately

Monrow,

the commander

1100

on

of the

on

remainder

BLT 1-15 was served by a

and because of the unfamiliarity of

with

the shore line,

it

was put ashore

different beaches.*? Once ashore BLT 1-15 was

to

Mellah

Its mission once ashore

was ordered to land his forces on Beach Red I and

number

directed

move

2 as rapidly as possible.*'

small

As

zone of the 7th RLG,

Fedala,

landing

COL.

RLG,

Red

initial

fighting in

commence

began the

was to be prepared to land two hours after

assault battalion.0

the

15

Landing Group (RLG-15)

the 7th RLG drive southwestward

and

about 0700 cancelling

3rd Division's reserve regiment.*'

assemble

to

patrol which was driven

and announcing an armistice.

The

the

threats of counterattacks but

was a reconnaissance

General

the attack

constant

move
the

of

the

to
main

and

seize

the

Rabat-Casablanca

Regimental

Landing

bridge over the Wedi

highway
Group

while

continued

the
its

movement ashore.**
BLT

1-15,

maintaining

84

contact

with the 7th RLG on

its

right

just

prior

bridge

organize

1-15

assembly

assembly area east of

It

the bridge

sent elements across the

defensive positions on

with

area

northward,
1-15.31

assembled

west

wa.

of

dark.$'

and

During

moved

the western bank

objective

the next day.9

arrived
the

in the unit

evening

the

the beaches from Fedala

to assembly areas near BLT

ordered to halt

its

advance

about 2

which was three miles short

so that necessary support could be

forward to astist

At

weapons

the Mellah River,

D-Day

brought

heavy

the 15th RLG landed on

RLG-15

its

its

after

"remainder of

of

an

units prepared their night position."0 Company D

BLT

miles

into

darkness.e 9

to

to

all

aid
of

moved

with the 0700 advance

schedule for

0700

on

the 3rd Division began

D+1

its

advance

"southwest
and
on
as

Casablanca

toward

the 15th RLO on the left.

the right,
the

without
1100.

at

division

critical

extremely
adequate

The

opposition

RLG-15
until

advance

The

and BLT 3-15 in

its

continued

ordered

was

the rear

halted

to

halt

by

to

the

due

supply situation brought on by a lack of

and

was- deemed ill

it

advised to

the supply lines.$$

support

the

15th

the

self-propelled

Battalion;

RLO-15 advanced with BLT 2-15

reserve.9

transportation

over-extend

the 7th RLO on the right

BLT 1-15 on the left,

regimental

movement

443d

with

RLG.

the

It

situation

was

especially critical

lacked the weapons of

lOSs

its

Cannon Company;

of Battery 8, 9th Field Artillery

self-propelled 37mm antiaircraft

Coast Artillery (AA);

for

and all

85

guns of the

the transportation

of the

39th

Field

need

of

additional

transport

of

vehicles.9
with
15

the

The 15th RLG was also in

Battalion.

Artillery

transportation
entire

unit

as of 1000 the total

consisted

of 5 quarter-ton

The advance was able to resume at 2400 hours

transDortation
RLGs:

furnished by the 30th RLG for moving the

39th Field Artillery Battalion

and for resupply of

ammunition.9'
The
2400
its

in

resumed

its

advance at approximately

immediately encountered enemy patrols south

positions

and an enemy position of unknown strength

village north of the Tit Mellil

informed

Division

significant
a

RLG

almost

and

of

15th

advance against

he

was

Monroe

encountering

dawn

this organized defense

would be

The 15th RLG was ordered to hold

dif'4cult.9*

extremely

that

COL.

opposition to include automatic weapons and that

continued

until

Headquarters

crossroad.

and preparations were made for an early daylight

attack."
It

was

squadron
Tit

of

Mellil

buildings
that

cavalry

for

their

battery
forward

of

Ji

S7mm

The enemy used some of the concrete

positions
the

use

front.1

had occupied a village near the

and
of

00

To

developed
interlocking
support

the

an indepth defense
machine
attack,

gun fire
one

the 39th Field Artillery Battalion was displaced

using

Unfortunately'
Company

which

crossroads.

included

across

estimated that the 15th RLG was opposed by a

jeep

both

the

and

Cannon

of RLG-15 were still

antitanK

guns

a French civilian
Company

and

truck.101
the

aboard the transports,

Antitank
but some

were available for use as assault guns,

86

and

the

machine

heavy

and 81mm mortars of all

guns

three

battalions were effectively employed.

BLT

1-15

and

machine

Under

their

fire,

the

south

to

but

machine

on

horses

which had been

their positions.101 The enemy

of

fire

gun
04

After

long

37mm antitank fire using high

and

withdrew

ca-alry

enemy

the enemy

this attempt was defeated by accurate

shells.'

explosive

to envelop

establish a defensive position on the ridge at

to

Refifida

range

Mellil

Tit

The enemy force withdrew to the

flanks.

rear

the

able

machine gun

and

mortar,

were

BLTs

of

waiting defenders.1

the

artillery,

both

west

attempted

from

fire

covering

from

secured

Er

gun

attacking

and

encountered strong rifle

BLT 2-15 immediately

and

position

on D+2 the 15th RLG initiated the attack.

dawn

At

last

this

back

the

encounter,

toward Casablanca and contact

was lost.I0E
The
past

pushed
attached
their
from

to

BLT

1-15

the

they

planned

to

However,

just

minute

artillery

30
center

the

approximately

500

spend the night

reached
suffered

its

attack

of

advance

and by 1300 had

at 1400 and by 1700 the BLTs were

astride

which

its

A platoon of light tanks was

objectives

received

to

continued

Tit Mellil.10

Casablanca.'07

in

RLG

15th

Casablanca-Marrakech
launch

to

prior

attack

main
1700.

highway
on

BLT 2-15

barrage fired from a point

BLT

Casablanca.
fro.m the

meters

the

on

2-15

withdrew

impact area and prepared

in that position.10e The 15th RLG had

p$sitions

very light casualties.

87

south

of

Casablanca having

Only 11 members of the

15th

RLG had been wounded.109

During
assault
The

the

attack

carrier-based
RLG-15

of

the

15th

RLG

prepared for

its

on Casablanca which was to commence at 0730 on D+3.

ground

39th

night,

in

the

east,

were

to

toward

attack

D+3

French

requesting
definite

Battalion
67th

However,

an
word

supported by naval

and artillery.

Battalion,

lines."ii0
the

be

"RLG-7

gunfire,

in the north,

supported respectively by the 10th and

Artillery

Ist

sector

to

aircraft,

the

Field

was

early morning hours of

emissaries
When

of the truce,

in Rlg-15's

the harbor along converging

the

armistice.

and the tanks

Armored Regiment,

during
sent

(reinforced),

he

to

the

General

3rd

Division

Patton

received

issued orders cancelling the

attack. ' 'I

For

the entire Fedala-Casablanca operation,

casualties

totaled

770

killed

or

missing

American

and

1,050

wounded., 1 1

D.

FRENCH REACTION ASHORE

French
that

the

minor

resistance

Fedala-Casablanca

attack.

Bethouart

offshore

and

Michelier
and

that

that

discounted
a

General

to take command

planned

operation

The commander,

General

planned

reflected the commander's assessment

large
Giraud,

in all

General

defense

Admiral

Michelier

American

only

force

aided by American

Bethouart's

letter

a minor attack.'''

disbelieved

French North Africa.

against

88

represented

waited
troops
Admiral

as a hoax
The

orders for defense of Casablanca became effective.

standing

forces for action,

while

Admiral

Michelier alerted the naval

General

Lahoulle reluctantly sent his air units into action.

Admiral

Michelier

see
of

Patton's

General

When

General

afternoon,

to

Casablanca

no

longer

to

under

to
a

escorted

Again,

Fedala

in

received

Michelier

as

the French commandant

since the French army

Gay

then

to persuade

the

rode

to

the French to

toward

attack

for

armistice

by General Nogues.

Lyautey

?ort

envoys be sent

0655 on It November when General

request

directed

and
at

until

the early

Admiral Michelier refused to see

Accordingly,

continued

Casablanca

the action.''

Colonel

fight.

flag of truce

emissary. II

landings

at

demand a surrender,

hostilities.

Safi

landed

on the morning

Colonel Wilbur could not

to cease

Anderson

desired

Casablanca

Patton

Colonel Wilbur,

The commandant urged that additional

him.

at

Patton

General

to

the

envoy,

the desired armistice

arrange

twice refused to

his decision made,

Despite his persistence

D-Day.

cease

with

completed

Oran and Algiers,

from

Admiral

With the landings

and

the news of the

General Nogues recognized the

weight of the allied attack.

E.

THE FINAL OUTCOME

Sub
tactical
First,
strategic

Task Force Brushwood attained a clear-cut,

victory.
on

Many factors contributed to its

broad

surprise.''

scope,

the

Allied

thrust

decisive
success.
achieved

Not only did the assault on North

89

Africa

open

itself

second front

consisted

Further,

the

of

in

three

Western

the war,
widely

gathering

craft.

Once

toward

Dakar,

south

the

deception.

order

to

change
ship

sustain

until
to

the

overcame

movement began,
less

of

the

deception,

at

Port

Lyautey,

minor

attacks.

Brushwood

Fedala,

amphibious

intended landings in

This

bearing

did not

on D-1.117 Once the

the landing

organized resistance.
thought

Because

the landings

Casablanca represented only

the rapidity with which Sub Task Force

enabled

reinforcement

joint
8

troops,
0

the convoy charted

the

Allies

to

sever

plans of the Vichy French

outcome.''

vessels.''

landings.

the swiftness of

and

inland

and

Effective

100,000

of the

intelligence

French

But

communications

the

than well

moved

resistance.'

in African waters

Just prior to nightfall

shore

separated

submarines and intelligence

German

avoid

course

but Operation Torch

Task Force carefully zigzagged across

to

Atlantic

the

Such

planning

contributed significantly

to

The plan for Operation Torch called for

hundreds
a

of

planes,

groupment

operation

the

and 258 ships and war

represented

the largest

world had seen.'t" To plan an

operation

of this magnitude and embark over 3,000 miles away

from

landing

the

parallel

planning

Department
in

and

execution,

troops.12

Yet,

sites,

required detailed,

between

the

the Services.
but

that

concurrent,

highest echelons of

and

the War

Some errors were encountered

was

expected

from

untested

the precise planning overcame execution

errors and Sub Task Force Brushwood succeeded rather easily.

90

The

lack

operation's
of

Vichy

via

Moroccan

Michelier

The

Bethouart

air

elements

at

immediately

when

to the

and

Air Force

and Senegalese.

General

Bethouart's

Admiral

letter

as

the Army did not want to resist,

fought

poorly

units,

to oppose the landing.

General

Navy

The

Navy

forces,

not

Consequently,

the

attributed

deliver a message to Admiral Michelier

disregarded

24

fight.

units,

defense
to

resistance

The resistance forces consisted

Army

attempted

while

2'

success.'

General

hoax.'

organized

French

elements,
Giraud

of

determinedly
Casablanca

trained

the

to repel

reluctantly

of

invaders.

took

to the

of Senegalese gave up

company

numbers

the

invading

troops

became

known.
The
two

to

Allied
one

The

greater

quantities

of

obtained

aircro~t.
the

air superiority

This

dictated the

Allies

overcame

the

effort

put

forth by the Vichy Navy and the coastal

The

that

These

ai

did

effort
venture

numbers

drained

Conversely,

determined

forth

the Navy in
to

check.

disrupt

superior U.S. Navy fighting

superior

rapidly

forces.

kept

the

Those
landing

tremendous assault from Allied dive bombers as well

as the numerical

Torch

quickly

superiority

received

ships

Allies

air

batteries.
vessels

than a

With

success.
valiant

strength advantage of more

ratio contributed to the disorganization of the

resistance.
with

overall

national

represented

the

personnel,

aircraft,

political will of

and

the defending

the Allied forces maintained a strong,

will

of

ships.

to defeat

major

91

step

the Germans.

toward

that

Operation
end.

That

national
the surf

will

carried over

to the troops struggling through

to land at Fedala.

Finally,

luck

played

factor

in

the success of Sub

Task

Force Brushwood.

The surf off Fedala never reached more

than

four

all

eight
the

feet

feet

craft

to

present
been

on

encountered

through

may

may

ship

present.

dominant

will

loss of landing

feet of surf had been

movement.
the

outcome

the
tooops
to

anxious moments and tenuous

resistance forces to harden

had

superiority

in

carried

Task

weapon

and

lack

personnel
Force

the

higher

surf

One
been

Allies clearly retained superiority

succeed.

planning,

Such action by the

outcome may have been different.

the

coordinated

Sub

the

the Allies to withdraw r'd way

shore

The final

of

more

prompted

However,

numbers

lociting

good fortune asmisted the

eight

caused

to

predict

Considering

may more lives and landing craft may have

have

have

will.
not

If

Additionally,

the

Allies

movement.

in

percent

sea conditions,

D-Day,

situations

in

on the Fedala beaches.

difficulty

of

shore

lost.

their

D-Day.123 Normally six to

beaches and the nearly fifty

because

ship

of

of surf spill

considerable

correct

can

for

and

systems,

The
of

as well

strategic
organized

weapon

systems,

as the

surprise,
resistance,
and

luck

Brushwood to victory at Fedala and

Casablanca.

92

END NOTES
1.
Donald 0. Taggart,
Hiltory
I
.
In
World War
Division
Washington D.C., 1947) p. 14.

of
the Third I, 4 fantry
Press,
(Infantry
Journal

2.
George
F.
Howe.,
U.S. Army
in Wor
War
11
Mediterranean
Theater
of
Operations.
Northwest
Africa:
Seizino the
Initiative
in
the West
,
(U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 121.
3.

Taggart,

4.

Ibid.

5.

Ibid.

6.

Ibid.

p.

14.

7.
Department
of Military Art
and
Engineering, United
States Military Academy,
Thl
War in North Africa Part 11
(The Allied Invasion) ,
(West
Point, New York, 1950), p.
I-I.
S.
9.

Ibid,

p.

Field

Morocco.

15.
Order

HQ. 7th Infantry.

19 Nov 1942 ,

10.

Taggart,

p.

11.

Howe,

123.

12.

Taggart,

13.

#I.

p.

p.

Casablanca.

"Resume of Action.* p.

French

3.

15.

13.

Field Order #1

p.

4.

14.
Colonel
Harry McK Roper FA,
Report
of Action
Observer From HG Army Ground Forces, 22 Dec 1942, p. 4.

as

15.
LTC Jack F. Wilhm and others,
Armor in the Invasion of
North Africa
(The
Armored School,
Fort Knox, Kentucky,
1950), p.73.
16.

Howe,

17.

Fielo Order #1 , p.

18.

Howe,

19.

Taggart,

p.

20.

Howe.

125.

p.

p.

p.

124.
6.

17.
17.

93

21.

Ibid.,

p.

131.

22.

Ibid.,

p.

126.

23.

Ibid.,

p.

131.

24.

Wilhm,

p.

74.

25.

Ibid.

26.

Ibid.,

p.

77.

27.

Field Order #1 , p.

28.

Howe,

29.

Field Order #1 ,

3V.

Wilhm,

31.

Howe,

32.

Wilhm,

33.

Ibid.

34.

Hows, p.

35.

Ibid.

36.

McK Roper,

37.

Taggart,

38.

McK Roper,

39.

Howe,

40.

McK Roper,

41.

Howe,

42.

Ibid.,

43.

Mc"% Roper,

44.

Ibid.,

p.

13i.

p.

1.

126.

p.

75.

136.

p.

p.

p.

6.

32.
p.

6.

139.
p.

8.

139.

p.

p.

p.

75.

p.

p.

1.

140.
p.

8.

10.

45.
U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Subj.: TORCH Operation,
and Recommendations, 22 Dec, 1942, p. 2.
46.

Howe,

47.

Ibid.,

p.

130.

48.

Ibid.,

p.

133.

p.

127.

94

Comments

49.

Ibid.

50.

Ibi d.

51.

U.S. Atlantic Fleet,

52.

Howe,

53.

Ibid.

54.

Ibid.,

p.

p.

2.

134.

p.'133.

55.
Excerpts
from
Interviews
of LtCmdr
Booth and Lt
Wordell,
Commanding
Officer and Executive Officer of VF-41,
4 December 1942, p. 2.
56.

Howe,

57.

U.S.

58.

Taggart,

59.

Howe,

60.

Ibid.,

pp.

125-127.

61.

Ibid.,

pp.

128-129.

62.

Ibid.,

pp.

129-130.

63.

Ibid.,

p.

130.

64.

Ibid.,

p.

136.

65.

Ibid.

66.

Taggart,

67,

Howe,

68.

Taggart,

69.

Ho*e,

70.

foid.,

71.

Taggart,

p.

72.

Howe,

143.

73.

Ibid.,

pp.

74.

Ibid.,

p,

144.

"75.

Ibid.,

p.

145.

p.

134.

Atlantic Fleet,
pp.

pp.

22.

25-27.

124-125.

p. 32.

pp.

137-138.
p.

pp.

28.
139-140.

p.

p.

p.

142.
142.

143-144.

95

76.

Taggart,

p.

77.

Howe,

130.

78.

Ibid.,

79.

Taggart,

p.

80.

Howe,

139.

81.

Taggart,

p.

82.

Howe,

121.

83.

Taggart,

84.

Ibid.,

85.

Ibid.

86.

Howe,

87.

Ibid.

88.

Taggart,

89.

Ibid.

90.

Howe,

91.

Ibid.

92.

Taggart,

p.

93.

Howe,

136.

94.

Ibid.,

95.

Taggart,

p.

96.

Howe,

139.

97.

Ibid.,

98.

Taggart,

p.

99.

Howe,

144.

100.

Taggart,

p.

101.

Howe,

144.

102.

Ibid.

103.

Taggart,

p.
p.

p.

p.

p.

p.

p.

p.
p.

p.

131.

p.

28.

14.

p.

14.

25.

131.

p.

25.

121.

25.

138.

p.

p.

30.

28.

140.

p.

28.

29.

29.

96

p.

144.

104.

Howe,

105.

Taggart,

106.

Ibid.

107.

Howe,

108.

Taggart,

p.

109.

Howe,

144.

110.

Ibid.,

111.

Taggart,

112.

Deoartment of Military Art and Engineering,

113.

Howe,

114.

Ibid.,

115.

Ibid.

116.

Department of Military Art and Engineering,

117.

Ibid.,

118.

Howe, p.

119.

Department of Military Art and Engineering,

120.

Ibid.,

p.

p.

144.

p.
p.

p.

29.

29.

145.
p.

30.
p.

13.

p.

14.

p.

14.

93.

p.

p.

p.

132.

15.
132.

13.

121.
Arthur L.
Press of Kansas,

Funk,
The Politics of Torch
Lawrence, KS.), p. 112.

122.

Department of Military Art and Engineering,

123.

Ibid.

124.

Howe, p.

125.

McK Roper,

93.
p.

5.

97

(University

p.

14.

SECTION V:

ASSESSMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION

Although
Operation

the

Torch

3d
was

Infantry
of

short

difficulties

and

:.rifications

for the division,

whole.
was
of

On

able

the

mistakes,

operationil

forces

in

North

completed

Africa

from

Axis

Allied

shipping,

operations

had

fraught with

significant

positive

the Allies, and the war as a

level,

the 3d Infantry Division

and

against

War

I1

Africa.

the

control,

first

step

providing

to

the

Indeed,

its

removing North

Mediterranean

the

as

positive

on the Allied war effort.

in

Torch

to

a base for later offensive

classification

due

Strategically

opening

Europe.

warrants

certainly

impact

it

and

the subsequent Allied campaign against the

successfully

World

duration

in

to seize the port of Casablanca and provide a base

operations for

Axis

Division's participation

Torch

a decisive

operation
battle

in

immediate and long term

A detailed analysis of the

results of this operation will now be undertaken.

A.

Immediate Outcomes.
For

Casablanca
objective
on

the

ground,

the

Allies

successfully

the
attained

seizure
the

of

immediate

of establishing a firm lodgement

Atlantic

to

the

port

at

tactical

in French Morocco

support continued and intensified air,

and sea operations

in North Africa.'

98

Torch later

proved

to

be

annihilate

the critical
Axis

the

accomplishment
to

the

in

first

Africa

of thi'.; goal

Allies.

step

in

the Allied plan

by May of 1943.

pro ided many strategic

Spec:fically,

these

to

The
benefits

advantages

were

as

ffol lows:

I.

The

better

events
in

of

The

November,

Allied

Montgomery

pursuing

Libya,

U.S.

the

the

initiation

passed

finally

point,

the

situation
Rommel's

of
onto

the
had

subsequently

lift

to

and

It

As such,

it

to

By

mastering
many

war.

For

move

the

action

Africa

Egypt

in Tunisia,

and
and

the Allies
Up to this
defensive

The

victory at

as a whole was the

hat the Allies had been able

marked an important

turning point

in

definitely provided a much needed

was

the war effort.

the

instance,

North

Airican

in

shores

middle

Allies

in tto future conduct of

now able

the central Mediterranean.5 Allied

of

th.

need

to make the long haul

the Cape of South Africa.4 Furthermore,

to

the

Allied surface vassels were

relieved

Mediterranean

access

in

strategic advantages

securely

shipping
around

successfully.

With

the morale of the Al'ies and the will of the Allied

achieved
the

always

offensive

nations to support
2.

across

In strictly

and

war. 4

remnants

bien involved

Casablanca

the

wlole.U

offensive.

not

undertake,

strategic

and

to

as

the Russian winter offensive,

Allies

joint

marked a change for the

and the British advancing

operations

first

1943,

lines

of

securing

communication helped guarantee

eastern oil reserves and continued Allied

99

route.

supply

permitted

at

Allied

solidarity.
divided

of

French

Casablanca,

Hitler moved Into France causing

at Toulon.$

fleet

their

French were alienated by the occupation

on

into a unified and

France was welded

and

advance

subsequent

When

war.

the

scuttle

to

ally

cooperative,
V

the

France,

Vichy

to

the French

Torch,

Operation

to

in

pro-Axis

the

contribution

important

fxvored

navy

French

Thus,

the Vichy French

In their loyalties as various factioni

at

surrendered
the

Prior

affiliations

differing

an

made

Casablanca

forces

were

over the Atlantic to counter

defeat and subsequent surrender of

The

bases

:ampaign.*

the enemy submarine

3.

into the

long-range reconnaissance

flights

for

established

were

bombing missions deep

Also,

continent.

European

range

ilong the coast

airfielis

valuable

long

in North Africa

the success

In addition,

strategically

provided
which

Russian war effort through the Persian Gulf

the

of

support

our

side.1

the

assisted

They

on Tunisia and provider! valuable support

for future operations against the Axis in North Africa.

4.

result

experiences

experience

in

Operation

"invaluable

in

the

Forces

and

Torch

which

was

the

operation

and

and

efficient

joint staff.''

later

was

combat
to prove

Eisenhower's Allied

the
in

Operation

gained

levels

all

survived

recriminations

during

gained

invasion of Europe.

Headquarters

frtistrations,

they
at

soldiesi

Allied

Torch.

the

of

matured as a fighting force as a

personnel

Allied

The

the

disappointments,
initial

phases of

eventually molded into an effective

Commanders were

100

tested and

developed
Africa.
they

the

This

first

gained

future

weapon

on

and skills

which would lead to many

battlefield.12

the

provided

it

was

here

In this manner

workshop

"the

trial

invasion was forged and the

proved;

in North

of combat seasoned the troops as

taste

operation

of

was

amphibious and ground operations

confidence

successes

Torch

the

it

by

that

in which the

ground on which

the highest commanders

leIarned their business.....'1

5.

unwanted
his

at this point

difficulties

in

was

capable of

campaign.

With the Western flank of

Afrika Corps thus threatened,

Hitler was confronted with

two

option

reinforcing
Cermany's
many

giving

the

Afrika

Corps with assets vitally needed on

His eventual

decision to send as

15#000 troops to Tunis detracted significantly

as

the

execution

of the camnpaign

the

strategic

Allied

B.

from

Russia.14 As a result,

in

of relieving the pressure on the

aim

Soviet Union to some degree was achieved.'

Long Term Outcomes.

As

oeen discussed,

has

the success in North Africa

the turning of the tide of the war

signalled
Allies.

immediately

either

front.

Africa

or

of

eastern

up

not

had

front

the

the

Rommel

Montgomery

full

and

the war.

with

hands

fighting
the

the Allied entry into North Africa created

the Axis,

For

As

the Allies were gaining momentum,

initiative

and

Henceforth,

Hitler

except

local

for

passed
was

onto

not

operations.'

I01

the Axis lost

the strategic

able
1

in favop of the

to regain the

In addition,

defensive.
initiati"'e

the threat

in

Africa

and

Italy.'7

put

a strain on the relationship

the Eastern Front,

of

reinforcements

from

the
Sicily,

in

As

Howe

of

on

the

tc

undermine

the
a

the

"

....

in Africa the Allies had not only won

worth but had inflicted such losses

powers as to weaken their ability,

their

marked

Henceforth,

the

resources

to

will,

Axis

was

supplies

and

and

base

and of

itself

Lurning
over

point

to

the

the

in

the

defensive

war.
as the

strangling grip of the

the long term strategic picture for the

task

the

much

easier. =2

brightened

by the events in North

had denied to the Axis an important source of

a

made

facilitate

although

was certainly a decisive event

within

considerably

They

into

and perhaps

increasingly more scarce.

Africa.

sea

it

went

war

Conversely,
Allies

Thus,

to fight.I0O

decisive

wage

Allies became

off

Italy was not destined to remain

mortal blow to the Axis,

which

and the Dodecanese

Crete,

entry into Nor h Africa was not in

Allied

to attack

Italy vulnerable

Balkans,

strategic

Axis

The

the Axis war effort for much longer.'s

in

stated,

territory

to provide the bulk

as the Allies now threatened Axis positions

Italy,

participant

left

Africa

As a result,

Islands.i*
a

in

south

Italy was required

to Africa which they were wont to do.

defeat

eventual

Hitler continued to give priority

Because

to

between Germany

Italy
the

possible

submarine

of operations

base.'1 With an air

in North Africa,

eventually gaining

of
The

Allies were now

where

invasion

decisive
of

102

the Allies had

a foothold in

in position
victory

France.

2'

Europe

to step

would
With

greatly
tne

to threaten

Hitler

possible invasion route

the south thus creating another

from

in the

lines of communication

Allies were prepared

the

Mediterranean,

sea

secure

of

establishment

into the continent.

Military Lessons Learned From "Torch"

C.

were as many lessons learned during Operation

There
as

Torch

of

of conducting a live

the enemy,

but the success

interest

employed

successfully

was

in

equipment much of

and

doctrine

amphibious

of

development
which

3d Infantry Division

reports that resulted prompted a renewed

learned

without

and the flood of after action and lessons

operation

the

Torch

not only did the forces

So,

against

assault

amphibious

fire

the

of

experience

the

from

profit

involved

process.

learning

the

during

effectiveness

the

destroying

identified

were

problems

operational

amphibious

the

number of

tremendous

because

important

especially

was

in

involved

personnel

the standpoint of' the United States,

From

operation.

Allied

were

there

landings

the

during

at

Normandy.
Because
into
the

phases
crossing

lessons
to

amphibious operations are naturally divided

as the planning phase,

such

the

phase,
are

phase

to

subparagraphs
sequence
substantial

in

which

they

relate.

phases

deal

with

the

which

they

occurred.

amount

phase,

and

so

on,

the

most conveniently summarized according

learned

the

assault

the loading phase,

in

following

The
roughly

Naturally,

the

there

time
ii a

of overlap between some of the phases of

103

the

and

operation,
to

times

are

included

lessons

areas were critical

1.

the

both

with

operations

apply

which

to

Force

Air

to the success

Also

most part.

the

for

phases

the

delineate

and stop

no clear cut start

are

there

and

communications
and Navy since

these

jf the operation.

AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING:
The planning of Operation Torch was understood to be

a,

to

critical
involved.

LTG

Eisenhower

operation

and

he

the

operation.

the

staff

1 4

was

insisted
His

chosen

dealt

all

by

operation

the

those

to lead the combined

on a fully Integrated staff for

insistence on full

integration of

attitude with which

led to a maturing of the

officers

staff

of

success

the

services and the

the other U.S.

with

th2

All es.

and

British

combat

operation,

the

of

conduct

operating methods and vocabularies

in

differences
that

the

During

b.

operations without extensive joint

training to Insure

that the differences would not lead to tragic errors.

lack

The

c.

caused

embarkation
stowage

ships.25

transport
all

units

is

Unit

force

just prior to

problems with load planning and

loaded aboard the

when the units were

Complete and accurate

absolutely essential

and organization
d.

assault

the

serious

equipment

of

,2

information for the non-organic units

to

attached

were

which

of

indicated

be mixed in

not

should

units

American

the

information on

to the efficient planning

of any amphioious operation.

replacement

personnel

104

should .join the unit at

least

two

for

them

months
to

prior

learn

to the start

the

of operations in order

procedures

of

establish

themselves as part of the unit

join

unit

the

contributo

at

and

the

unit

and

team.Z7 If

to

they

the last minute they will not be able to

may even detract from the performance

of the

unit as a whole.

2.

EMBARKATION.

a.

Stowage

controlled

of equipment must be carefully and properly

to prevent damage by handling and the environment

during - transport
addition,

because

combat

loaded,

while

the

should

be

to

the

area

not

all

of

there

problems
loaded

were

the

inverse

the debarkation point

order

on shore at the assault

equipment

has

be shifted in

In

equipment was properly

corrected.29

equipment

to

operations.20

delays at

were

in

of

The

of

the

equipment
need for the

location.30 Otherwise,
the hold of the ship to set

up the assault loads.

b.
the

Ships

same

assault
on

ship

must
as

be

combat

the

troops

operations.

one

ship

loaded with the equipment on

who

will use it

The British system of

and

men

on

another

during the

loading equipment
was

found

unsatisfactory

for

equipment

be given sufficient priority so that

must

ashore with
c.

assault

landings.

In

to

addition,
it

be
the
gets

the troops who will use it.&'

Poor

port

required

what

it

was

marking
that
and

of
the

to

crated equipment delivered to the

equipment be unpacked to determine

insure

105

that

it

was loaded

in proper

sequence.

Better

symbols

were

information

In

needed.
on

completely

methods

marking

using

addition,
was

equipment

codes

color

or

and

weight

cibe

incorrect

sometimes

or

This led to significant problems during

missing.

stowage of the equipment aboard the ships."

3.

TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS:

a.
to

Navy

personnel

troops

ground

on shipboard living."3 Commanders Of

personnel

Army

of

informed
personnel

must
how

ship

that

insure

to

live

their

aboard ships.

personnel
In

minimize

to

loss

of life

are well

addition,

detailed training from Naval

require

abandoning

did not provide sufficient guidance

if

Army

personnel

on

the ship is

sunk|32

The time spent aboard ship enroute to the amphibious

b.

site

landing

and

operation,
night

with

control.

is

very

training

Also

exercise

as

rigors

of

should

on

emphasis

valuable

night

to
be

success

of

the

conducted both day and

maneuvers

enroute,

while

the

the

and
troops

command and
should

as possible so they will be ready for the

much
the

amphibious

assault

and

subsequent

operations.36

4.

ASSAULT OPERATIONS:
All

a.
much

detail

The

infantry

engineers

amphibious assaults should be practiced with as

need

conditions as possible.37

as realistic

and

needs
to

to
train

train
for

106

for

night

attacks

and the

mine location and removal

at

night.'

app,4 oach to the assault

initial

The

enemy defensive positions.39

to reduce

fire and maneuver

b.

must train for and use aggressive

units

Small

be

done under cover of darkness,

of

command

positioned

properiy

beach. 4 '

the

go

don't

teams

coxswain

should

their

loads of men

were lost because

craft

unbeach

didn't

or

the

them."2

should have a magnetic compass "

boat

each

Additionally,

over

on

they are able to unbeach

landing

couldn't

coxswains

the

the Assault

that

the ships +(r additional

Many

equipment.

and

insure

ir,:rements or scattered all

to Insure
to

retur.i

and

to

to make sure that the combat

and
in

operations

amphibious

Navy coxswains must" be properly trained

operations

landing
boats

ashore

the problems

T-'ansport ships must be

H-Hour

at

implemented

be

can

plan

but because of

night,

conducted at daMn. 4 0

be

should

at

control

and

location should

a ma,,nettc oearing to their

given

be

beach point and a retupn bearing to the u.-nIp.4'

To

avoid damage
quick

after

unloading
-

Boat

heavy
LCP(L),

unacceptable

of the landing craft are critical.

operations

Surf

c.

to the landing craft,

unloading are essential.

Improvcd methods of

were required.44 The riiggins

equipment

large - ws simply

landing craft personnel,

for amphibious assault operations.

wrecked

on

beaches,

assault

troops

to

get

landing

craft

rocks,

rapid closing of ramps

were

and

out.4"

required

made

it

In general,

difficult

It

holed on
f",r the

better buill

to reduce losses to reefs arl

surf .46
d.

Assaulting

troops were overburdened with equipment.

107

In

general,

needed.-4
should

lighter

During
wear

jettison

their

accident.

landing
feet

ship

their

to

shore

life

equipment
number

less

and

of

bulky
operations,

preservers

and

if

into

thrown

tr.ops

equipment

were

was

personnel

be

prepared

to

the water by an

drowned

when

their

craft overturned or when they were knocked off their

by

wave.

The equipment they were carrying was too

heavy and too bulky for amphibious operations. 4 S

e.

Artillery

possible

time

artillery
tanks.5

used

at

firepower
the

faster

the

required

Torch

was

be

of

the

phase.

not

earliest
$

effective

Included

in

The
against

amphibious

early stage to exploit their mobility ad

operations

land

at

assault

expand fhe beachhead.

area

facilitate

support

should
an

to

during

Tanks

operations

in

to

support

In addition,

should

be

an airfield

secured

early

to

based air support for air superiority and a

system

for

acquiring

air

support

should

be

developed.$'

5.

SHORE OPERATIONSi
a.

Movement

during

of supplies was a very significant problem

Operation

vehicles

Bul-ldozers

and

other

tracked

are needed on the beach ea:ly for moving supplies.

Supplies

which

portability.
early.''

Torch.

Balanced

Woven

party

to

loose

sand

can,

should
packs

of

be

packed

supplies

for

one

man

should be landed

nets or mats should be used by the shore

provide

to

traction

of the beach.'

vehicles

as they cross the

Light vehicles should be off

108

"loaded quickiy to prouide for reconnaissance,

landing

During

Torch,

equipment

lack

and

the

around

equipment

and

personnel

of transportation

supplies

of the
of

transpor ,tion

and

areas,

unloading

and

control

landing

w.,rea.5

caused large dumps of

around the unloading

to

build

up

service

units

are needed fo,' any large

points. 55
Additional

b.

mnphibious
the

flow

of suppl its ashore.

scheduled
used

to set up distribution points, and manage

landing

for

to

early

recover

landing."1 Salvage crews should be

stranded

discarded

equipment.5

carefully

designed

during

These service units should be

landing

craft

shore

parties

The

and

the shore.50 Traffic

to

keeping

the

damaged

or

should have

made beach lights and markers early

the landing operation

on

and

to assist with movement control

and straggler control

beachhead

organized

is the key

and for facilitating

future operations.$$
c.

Shore

counter

parties should dig in

attacks

antiaircraft

weapons

mobility

so

airfields,

ports,

6.

and

they

enemy

air

to defend against enemy

attacks.

6 0

Automatic

should be landed early with sufficient

can

move

inland

to

protect

captured

and the beachhead.$'

SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS:
a.

Water

is

needed immediately on shore and should be

provided with the kitchens when they come ashore.' 2

b.
ashore

Medical
sufficient

personnel

involved

supplies

109

or

in Torch did not bring

equipment.

Heavy equipment

such

as

initial

is

lodgement

c.
the

organizational

All

maintenance

parts.

14

d.

always

be carried by the mechanics and

should

tools should accompany the units.

level

loaded

be

and ammunition

spare parts,

lubricants,

to which

the equipment

with

spare

additional

bring

should

units

Accessories,

brought ashore after the

be

secure.6

tools

Hand

should

should

refrigerators

they

pertain.*m

be

the convoy so the loss

the vessels in

among

distributed

in follow-up convoys should

equipment

Organizational

o.

of a ship doesn't cripple the capability of a unit.II

f.

be

must

bodies

with

left

dog

both

specify that

must

procedures

Registration

Graves

tags

if

buried

temporarily."7
Award of the purple heart

g.

units

their

rejoining

to wounded troops who wera

found

was

to be very good for unit

morale#.$
Plans

h.

administrators,

currency

controls,

quarters

forces,

In

utilities.

available.7

war.

provide

up

adequate

for

rates,

exchange
for

addition,

combat
guidance

area

rear

troops,
must

interpreters

Sufficient

110

trained

establish price

curfew regulations,

and
Ie

hostile elements of the population

of
6

of

set

of the civil population must be

control
must

They

detailed.

control

for

security

control
provided

of
for

and prisoners
must

be

7.

COMMUNICATIONS:
a.

and

Commanders

much

too

encryption,

improper

classification

of

delivery of the

information

caused

delays in

long

to the addressees.72

Command radio nets should not have their net control

b.

on a fighting ship since

located

station

the ship

when

traffic and over

encrypted

traffic

message

in

trained

During Torch,

message preparation.71

and

communications

be

must

staffs

is

they can't operate

engaged and the shocks from the guns damage

the radios. 7 1
Adequate

c.
shore

are

of

essential

Torch,

During

are vital
d.

successful

communications
the

during

and

parts

to

the ships and the

between

amphibious operations.

ship-to-shore communications were poor because

incomplete

"got wet

communications

water

assault

proofing

equipment

and equipment

communications

must

be

for all communications equipment

well

links.

trained and experienced

During Torch,

procedures.

Spare

and failed to operate.

to maintaining the ship-to-shore

Operators

important

day there was recorded a

the first
of
"At 2045Z
language message, in French, describing much
plain
done by our force in the harbor at
damage
the
of
shore
of
the action
and some of
Casablanca,
was apparently a
It
day.
the
during
batteries
the French
from
headquarters
to higher
report
did not
operator
The
i Casablanca.
Admiralty
the unusu.l interception, and this valuable
report
until after the
informantio* was not discovered
armi st ice.' 75

NAVY SUPPORT.

I111

in

traffic

was lost as a result of untrained operators.

8.

that

a.
be

Naval

gunfire

practiced

support of landing operations should

as a joint training exercise with the Army and

Air Force elements that will be involved.76

b.

to protect the landing troops from observed fire,

batteries,
and

should be used to screen the ships from shore

Smoke

to

prevent precision bombing of vital

enemy

aircraft.

Smoke

should

be

targets ashore by

used

both

day

and

night.7'

c.

Fire

support
areas

maneuvering

from

ships

should

allow

for large

sea to permit long firing runs and to

at

minimize maneuvering turns while delivering fire.70

d.

Radar

is

providing

for
Torch

firing

the equipment used during

but

control

fire

too

was

for maneuvering % .e ships and

invaluable

shock

to

susceptible

damage from the

and

of the heavy ship guns."8

e.

Spotting

were

planes

the

most

effective

way of

accurate naval gunfire but they required fighter

controlling

aircraft protection.* 0

9.

AIR FORCE SUPPORT.

a.

Amphibious

cooperation,

operations

especially

aerial

photography.*'

between

air

effective

uso

and

in

of

the

of

units
air

close

air-ground

the areas of reconnaissance and

Lack

ground

require

good

communications

involved in Torch prevented

assets

in

the

close

support

role.81

b.
machine

Strafing
gun

of enemy positions and ships with .50

fire

was

1i2

very

effective

throughout

cal.
the

operation.*8

conceal

targets

targets

which

and

Very

for

essential

not to drop additional

aircvaft

8 4

training of Allied

identification

visual

to be shot down

a number of friendly aircraft

identification

Good

troops.

friendly

by

targets.

poor

caused

troops

some

to

impression of badly damaged

the

gave

caused

ordinance on the
d.

,used effectively against our aircraft

was

Smoke

c.

training

is

in

all

effective close air support operations

assault operations.e1

D.

SUMMARY.

The

in

offensive

war

experience

battlefield

of

the

the

tactical

Strategically,

Torch

campaign

would

Africa
of

North

war.
Africa,

beginning

Eisenhower's

on

of

As

the

end.

and

staff

greater

scale.
of

eventually destroy the Axis forces

in

provided

Churchill

'This

Joint

to the future success

far

is

not

defensive for the rest

was to say about the events in

the end.

But it

beginning.uss

113

phase

initial

the

put them on the strategic

and

the

Torch provided the necessary

lessons essential

operations

amphibious

which

for

strategic

to carry the Allies to a

was

which

pivotal

its

the

of

beginning

invasion of Europe.

successful

taught

the

marked

Africa

North

in

The Allied foothold

In the events of World War I1.

position
in

of Operation Torch lies

significance

is,

This is

perhaps,

not even the

the end of the

END NOTES
1.
Norman,
Albert,
Service
Publishing Co.,
16.

2.

0oeration
Harrisburg,

Overlord
, The Military
Pennsylvania, 1952, page

Howe,

George
F.,
Northwest
Africa.
Seizing
the
in
the West
, Office of the Chief of Military
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., page 676.

Initiative
History,
3.
a I
USMA,

U.S.
Military Academy,
The War in North Africa. Part
West Point, Department of Military Art and Engineering,
1948, page 14.

4.

Strawson,

John,

The

Battle

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York,

5.

Howe,

6.

Strawson,

7.

Ibid.

8.

Howe,

9.

Strawson,

10.

U.S.

11.

Howe,

12.

Ibid.

13.

Strawson,

14.

Ibid,

for

New York,

North
1969,

Africa
page

157.

page 676.
page 153.

page 676.
page 163.

Military Academy,

page

13.

page 674.

page 213.

page 163.

15.
The Armored School,
Armor in the Invasion of North
Africa
(2d
Armored Division)
Fort Knox, Committee 25,
Officer Advanced Course 1949-50, 1950, page 2.
16.

Howe,

17.

Ibid.

18.

Ibid.

19.

Ibid.

20.

Ibid.

page 676.

21.
Morison,
Samuel
E.,
"Operations
in North
Waters",
History of United States Naval Operations

114

African
in World

War

II.

Vol.

II

Little,

Brown and Company,

Boston,

1947,

page 177.
22.

Strawson,

23.

Ibid,

24.

Strawson,

page 213.

page 214.
page 152-158.

25.
Schaefer,
LTC.
W.H.
& Gardner,
Observers Report (N6196), page 3b.
26.

Roper,

COL.

Harry McK,

28.
2.

Ibid,

Franklin

T.,

Report on Observations made as

observer with Task Force Brushwood (N6189),

27.

MAJ

page 2.

page 21.

Bledsoe,

MAJ.

Carl E.,

Observers Report (N6196),

29.

Roper,

30.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

31.

Ibid,

32.

Roper,

33.

Ibid,

page

page 3.

pages 15,

(N6024),

page 56.

24.

pages 2,

3.

page 3.

34.
Matthews,
(N6196), page 21.
35.

81edsoe,

36.

Roper,

37.

Bledsoe,

LTC

H.R.,

Report

of

Military

Observer

page 4.

page 22.
pages 3,4.

LTG.
George
S.,
Appendix
A Comments
to
38.
Patton,
Narrative
of Observer's Tour with the Western Task Force,
French Morocco (N6196), page 1.
39.
Lessons of Operation Torch, page 27.
40.

Funk,

page 213.

41.

Roper,

pages 4,

42.

Ibid,

43.
Torch
page 15.
44.

Ibid,

pages 5,

5.
6.

Operation,

pages 13,

Comments & Recommendations,

14.

115

(N6108),

45.

Morison,

46.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

47.

Ibid,

48.

Roper,

49.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

50.

Patton,

51.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

52.

Ibid,

page 17.

53.

Ibid,

page 52.

54.

Roper,

55.

Ibid, pages 8,

9.

56.

Ibid,

10.

57.

Ibid, page 7.

58.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

59.

Torch Operation,

60.

lbid,

61.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

62.

Ibid, page 19.

63.

Ibid,

pages 20,

21.

64.

Ibid,

pages 47,

48.

65.

lbid, page

64.

lbid, pages 19,20.

67.

Schaefer,

68.

Ibid,

69.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

70.

Ibid,

page 14.

71.

Ibid,

page 24.

page 29.
page 50.

page 36.
pages 6,

14.
pages 25,

26.

pages 15,

16,

page 1.
28.

page 15.

pages 9,

page 52.

Comments & Recommendations,

page 4.

page 2.
page 17.

17.

page 26.

page 26.
page 23.

72.
Unkown Author,
Summary
of Signal
Casablanca MN6038), pages 6, 10, 11, 12.

116

Communications

at

73.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

74.

Roper,

75.

Unknown,

76.

Torch Operation,

77.

Lessons of Operation Torch,

78.

Torch Operation,

79.

Ibid,

page 7.

80.

Ibid,

pages 4,

St.

Schaefer,

82.

Patton,

page 53.

pages 8, 16.
page 6.
Comments & Recommendations,
page 18.

Comments & Recommendations,

page 4.

6.

page 3b.

pages 2,

3,

Operation,

Torch
83.
10.
9,

page 4.

4.
Comments & Recommendations,

p-e 9.

84.

Ibid,

85.

Patton,

86.

Strawson,

page 3.
page

167.

117

pages 8,

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barbour,
1.
London, 1962.

Nevill.

Survey

of

Northwest

Africa

2.
Department
of
the Military Art and Engineering.
The
War
in North Africa Part I and II (Operations in Eoyot and
Libya)
.
United
States Military Academy, West Point, New
York, 1950.
3.
Excerpts
from
Interview of Lieutenant Commander Booth
and
Lieutenant Wardell,
Commanding Officer
and Executive
Officer of VF-41, 4 December 1942.
4.
Field Order
#1, Headquarters 7th Infantry, Casablanca,
Morocco, 19 November 1942, 'Resume of Action RLG-7."
5.
Funk,
Arthur
L.
The Politics of Torch
Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1974.
6.
Howe,
George
F.
U.S. Army
in
Mediterranean
Theater of
Operations.
Seizing
the
Initiative
in
the West
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1957.
7.

Jarrett,

H. R.

S.
Jarrett,
Methuen & Co.,
9.
McK
Observer
1942.

Africa . London,

H.
R.
An
Ltd., London,

Outline
1962.

University

World War
II.
The
Northwest
Africa:
.
U.S.
Government

1966.
Geooraohy

of Africa

Roper,
Reaort of Colonel Harry McK Roper. FA .
From Headquarters
Army Ground Forces, 22 December

10.
Messenger,
Ltd., 1982.

Charles.

The Tunisian Campaign

Ian Allan

I1.
Meyer,
Leo J.
"The
Decision
tz Invade North Africa
(Torch)m
(Essay
#7
in
Command Decisions ).
Office of the
Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. 1960.
12.Morison,
Samuel E.
*Operations in North African Waters",
History of United States NAval Operations in World War II.
Vol, I1 , Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1947.
13.
Morton,
Louis.
"Germany
Firsti
The Basic Concept of
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(Essay #1 in Command
of the Chief of Military History, U.S.
Office
).
Decision
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14.
Norman,
Albert.
Operation Overlord
.
The Mflitar',
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118

Strawson,
15.
Scribner & Sons,

John.
I969.

The

+or

North

Africa

Histor.'
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Infantry
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G.
16.
Taggart,
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U.S.
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F.
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18.
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The Armored School,

.at

"A

119

in the Invasion of North

armor
Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1950.

ANNEX A
ORGANIZATION OF OPERATION TORCH ASSAULT FORCE

WESTERN TASK FORCE

COMMANDER GROUND FORCES:
COMMANDER NAVAL ESCORT:
UNITS:
(US)

MG George S. Patton
Rear Admiral Henry K. Hewitt

3d Infantry Division (Reinforced)

CCB plus I Armored Battalion, 2d Armored Division
47th RCT, 9th Infantry Division
60th RCT, 9th Infantry Division
(35,000 men in 29 ships)

NAVAL ESCORT:
(US)

3
5
I
3
1
34

Battleships
Cruisers
Aircraft Carrier
Auxiliary Carriers
Antiaircraft Cruiser
Destroyers

CENTER TASK FORCE

COMMANDER GROUND FORCESi
COMMANDER NAVAL ESCORTi
UNITS:
(US)

MG Lloyd R.

Commodore Thomas H. Troubridge

1st Infantry Divsion

CCB, 1st Armored Division
1st Ranger Battalion
Corps Troops (I1 Corps)
(39,000 men in 47 ships)

NAVAL ESCORT:
(BRITISH)

1
2
I
2
2
13

Fredendall

Battleship
Cruisers
Aircraft Carrier
Auxiliary Carriers
Antiaircraft Ships
Destroyers

120

EASTERN TASK FORCE

COMMANDER GROUND FORCES: MG Charles W. Ryder
COMMANDER NAVAL. tSCORT: Vice Admiral Sir Harold M. Burrough
UNITS:

39th RCTp 9th Infantry Division (US)

168th RCT, 34th Infantry Division (US)
11th Brig Groupp British 78th Division
36th BrPig Group$ British 78th Division
1st Commanndo Battalion*
6th Commando Battal ion*
(33,000 men in 34 ships)

*Composite US and British

NAVAL ESCORT:

4
I
1
3
13

Cruisers
Aircraft Carrier
Auxilliary Carrier
Antiaircraft Ships
Destroyers

121.

ANNEX B
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
SAFI AREA
(1)

SAFI
Two
Two
Two
One
One
One
One
Det

Co's. 2d Foreign Legion Inf

Btry's, 2d Foreign Legion Arty (8-75mm How)
Ca's, 2d Moroccan Riflemen
Btry, 410th Arty Sn (155mm)
Plt, Light Tanks (3 Renault - type TF)
Naval Coast Defense Stry (4 - 138mm guns)
Naval Coast Defense Btry (2 - 75mm guns)
(0 men), 41st Engr Radio
Det (5 men-)-f-Air Warning Service - (2)

75mm guns
(3)

MARRAKECH
One Sn, 2d Moroccan Riflemen
One On, 2d Foreign Legion Inf
Group Chasseurs d'Afrigqe (no tanks)
Artillery -100 men with 8 - 37mm guns and 3
MAZAIN and AZRMMOUR
One On, 2d Morroccan Riflemen
One Co, Senegalese Inf

FEDALA AREA
Five Bns Inf
Two Bns Arty (24 - 75mm guns)
One Stry, 105mm How
Two Strys , 155mm guns
Five Btrys, 75mm AT guns (10 guns)
One Btry, Coast Defense Guns (4 - 138mm)
One Stry, Coast Defense Guns (4 - 90mm)
One Naval Coast Defense Btry (2 - 75mm guns)
Three (approx) Co's tanks (total of 20 light tanks)
PORT LYAUTEY AREA
Two Bns Moroccan Inf
One Stry 410 Arty Sn (155mm)
One Btry, Foreign Legion Arty
Naval Base Garrison (Strength unknown)
LTwenty (approx) light tanks

122

ANNEX C
OPERATION TORCH MAP

123

oS

~l

A.Y.

-Ir

I.It

IA

t #j

-co

41-I

*!

i-

4UA~

2...~14

4a

I'

419fs~

ANNEX o (TAsk Or9anization,

Sib-Task Force BRUSHWOOD)

3d Infantrv Division
HQ & HQ Co, 3d Inf Div (also BRUSHWOOD HQ)

7th Inf

15th Inf

30th Inf
Co R, 756th Tank Bn
Co CA 756th Tank Bn
10th FR Bn
39th FR Bn
41st FR Bn
Datterv 9, 9th FR Bn
Batterv B, 9th FR Bn
Batterw Co 9th FR Bn
3rd Recon Tr
10th Engineer Combat Bn
3rd Simial Co
3rd Medical Bn
Det. 3rd QM fn
.2nd Armored Division Units
lit Br) 67th Armd Regt (less Co C)
Dot# Maint Coo 67th Rrmd Regt
Dot) Med Bn, 67th Rrmd Reot
Co RA 41st Rrmd Inf
Ist Plt, Co It 41st Armd Inf
Batterv AP 78th Rrmd FR Bn
1st Plto Co C. 82nd Rrmd Recon Bn
2d Plto Co Do 17th Rrmd Enor Bn
lst Plt, Co C. 17th Rrmd Engr Bn
1st PltP Co Do 17th Rrmd Engr Bn
Det) 142-sd Armd Si9 Co
Air SuPPort Command Units (No Planes)
Adv Echo HQ XII RSO
Det, HO Sq. 7th Fighter Wing
16th Oban Sq
Dot 68th Obsn Sq
122nd Obsn Sq

Air SuPPort Control

Det,
Det,
Doto
Det.
Det,

HQ, XII Air Service Command

41st Service Group
HQ & HO & Serv Co, 21st Engr Rvn Regt
Co E. 21st Engr A%;n Re9t
562nd aig Bn (AWS)

Det, 927th Sig Bn

ASP's (from 3d Comm Sq)
Miscellaneous Units
36th Engr Combat Regt, less 2d Bn
436th CA Bn (AA) (AW)
1st, 2nd, & 3rd Plts, Btrv A) 443d
2nd, 3rd, & 4th Pits, Btrv B, 443d
2nd & 4th Pits, Btrv Co 443d CA Bn
2nd & 4th Plts, Btrv D, 443d CA Bn
204th MP Co
Dote 1st Armd Si9 Bn
Deto 122nd Si9 RI Co
Dote 163rd Sig Photo Co
Dot, 239th Sig OPn Co
Det, Co C) 829th Si9 Sorv Bn
Naval Air Liaison
Navv Shore Fire Control Parties
InterPreters
Prisoner of War Interrogators
Reserveo
Western Task Force HQO
(with Sub-Task Force BRUSHWOOD)

CA Bn (AR)
CA Bn (AA)
(AR) (AW)
(AR) (AW)

& Miscellaneous

(AW)
(AW)

Units

HQ & HQ Coo WESTERN Task Force

2nd Bn, 28th Engr Combat Re9t (Task Force Reserve)
CIC Personnel
Fort Rehabilitation Unit
Civil Government Personnel

126

ANNEX E
FRIENDLY FORCES ORDER OF BATTLE
HEADQUARTERSo TASK FORCE BRUSHWOOD
Elements
(1)
Landing Team)

of

Task

Force

BRUSHWOOD (less Armored

3d Infantry Division
Infantry Regt
Infantry Regt
Infantry Regt
Field Artillery Bn
Field Artillery On
Field Artillery Sn
Engineer Bn
Engineer On
Bn, 20th Engineer Regt
GM On
"MP Co
Two pits, 443d Sn CA (AA AW)
436th On CA (AA Aid)
7th
15th
30th
10th
39th
41st
10th
36th
2d
3rd

(2)

Armored Landing Team

Armor Regt
67thArmored
lot A,On,41st
Inf Regt
Co
Stry A, 28th Armored FA On
Two pits, 443d On CA (AA AW)
Maint Sec, 78th Armored Regt
Pit, 17th Armored Eng Sn

127

ANNEX F
3D INFANTRY DIVISION OPERATION MAP

128

zo

LALJ ON C-ALL

7.

fi

If

,t

-Pat.

't.

I AII AMC

.429

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