LA LLANA, Petitioners, v.

REBECCA BIONG, DOING BUSINESS UNDER

THE NAME AND STYLE OF PONGKAY TRADING, Respondent.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182356, December 04, 2013
DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA, Petitioners, v. REBECCA BIONG,
DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF
PONGKAY TRADING, Respondent.
DE CISION
BRION, J.
Every case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact
and questions of law. Questions of fact are for the parties and their
counsels to respond to, based on what supporting facts the legal
questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts
or evidence adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the
deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can only draw one
conclusion: that the case must fail for lack of evidentiary support.
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A. dela Llana
s
(petitioner) petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the February
11, 2008 decision2 and the March 31, 2008 resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was
driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon
City.4 His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger
seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.5 Juan stopped the
car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light
turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck
containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car
s rear end,
violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car
s rear
end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters
flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds,

Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible
physical injuries.6
The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the
truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly
imprudent in driving the truck.7 Joel later revealed that his employer
was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and
style of
Pongkay Tradingand was engaged in a gravel and sand
business.8
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to
moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain
became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more
severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer
move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda
Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition.
Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury
caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and
hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate
her condition.
Dra. dela Llana
s condition did not improve despite three months of
extensive physical therapy.9 She then consulted other doctors,
namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in
search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that
she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of
her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine
and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.10 The operation
released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela
Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the
surgery.11
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.12 Thus,
on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she
lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and
claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the
complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June

2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages
as well as attorney
s fees.13
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of
action against her as no reasonable relation existed between the
vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana
s injury. She pointed out that
Dra. dela Llana
s illness became manifest one month and one week
from the date of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she
demanded the payment of attorney
s fees and costs of the suit.14
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary
witness15 and Joel as a hostile witness.16 Dra. dela Llana reiterated
that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular
accident. To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated
a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla.
The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a
whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical
examinations.17Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car
because the truck
s brakes got stuck.18
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit
and strong when they met several days after the vehicular accident.
She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that
she required Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as
well as barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his employment.
She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he successfully
passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed
driver-mechanic.19
Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the
truck in the morning of March 30, 2000. He affirmed that the truck
was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident. He opined that
the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged compressor.
According to him, the absence of air inside the tank damaged the
compressor.20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate
cause of Dra. dela Llana
s whiplash injury to be Joel
s reckless

driving.21 It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the

sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out that the
massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was overspeeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace
because road visibility diminishes at night. He should have blown his
horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck and could have
prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It also
concluded that Joel was probably sleeping when the collision
occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that fateful day.
The RTC further declared that Joel
s negligence gave rise to the
presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in Joel
s selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca
was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she
personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision,
she ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muoz Market, Quezon
City. The Court concluded that the three elements necessary to
establish Rebecca
s liability were present: (1) that the employee was
chosen by the employer, personally or through another; (2) that the
services were to be rendered in accordance with orders which the
employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit
act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the
functions entrusted to him.
The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of P570,000.00
as actual damages, P250,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of
the suit.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
CA Ruling
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC
ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable
connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by
preponderance of evidence. CitingNutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of
Appeals,23 it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of
the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to
warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted that the
interval between the date of the collision and the date when Dra.
dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy.
It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether Joel
s

reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela
Llana
s injury.
It also declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana
did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal
injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to present expert
witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the
medical certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and
why the vehicular accident caused the
injury.24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court
that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present case. She stresses
that Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the
Civil Code, provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there
was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix that showed that poisonous
animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that case.
As opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts
that she has established by preponderance of evidence that Joel
s
negligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First,
pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She
posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the
massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla
categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana
suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular
accident caused the injury is credible because she was a surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has
probative value. Citing several cases, she posits that an
uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if
uncontroverted.25 She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary
if the opinion merely relates to matters of common knowledge. She
maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the
causation between Joel
s reckless driving and her whiplash injury.
Trial judges are aware of the fact that whiplash injuries are common
in vehicular collisions.

The Respondent
s Position
In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a
factual issue which is beyond the scope of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains that
the CA
s findings of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she
stresses that Dra. dela Llana
s arguments are not substantial to merit
this Court
s consideration.
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joel
s
reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana
s whiplash
injury.
Our Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for
review on certiorari when the findings of fact by the lower courts are
conflicting
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a
trier of facts. As a general rule, the CA
s findings of fact are final and
conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is not the
function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
We can only review the presented evidence, by way of exception,
when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA.27 We see
this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the
relevant evidence presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of
evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
[w]hoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if

there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a

quasi-delict.Under this provision, the elements necessary to
establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person
for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the
damages.28 These elements show that the source of obligation in a
quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that
civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from noncontractual relations of certain members of society to
others.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by
preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before
we determine Rebecca
s liability as Joel
s employer. She should show
the chain of causation between Joel
s reckless driving and her
whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the
presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel arise.30 Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation
are established, this Court can then proceed with the application and
the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.31 Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180,
an action predicated on an employee
s act
or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable
for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.
32 The
rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially
the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence.34The reason for this rule is that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short,
mere allegations are not evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation
between Joel
s negligence and Dra. dela Llana
s whiplash injury rests
on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence

that Joel
s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash
injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have
occurred. 36
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of
evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged car, (2) the medical
certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial
evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal
relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In
other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum
probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or
the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed
below.37ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A. The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of
the collision
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show
that the massive impact of the collision caused her whiplash injury.
We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that these
pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These
pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is
a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred
from these pictures.
B. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not
admitted in evidence
Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit
Hduring
trial, should not be considered in resolving this case for the reason
that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated
September 23, 2004.38 Thus, the CA erred in even considering this
documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule
that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly
considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition
of this case, the medical certificate has no probative value for being
hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary,

is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal

knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person
who is not on the witness stand.39 Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, cannot be given credence40 except in very
unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.41
During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:

Q:
Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why
you were feeling that pain in your left arm?
A:
Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated
that my condition was due to a compression of the nerve, which
supplied my left arm and my left hand.
Court:
By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?
Witness:
Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine
Specialist.
Atty. Yusingco:
You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a
medical certificate. What relation does this medical certificate,

marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate, you said was

made by Dra. Milla?
Witness:
This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.
Atty. Yusingco:
Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.
Atty. Yusingco:
What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a
result of that feeling, that pain that you felt in your left arm?
Witness:
Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a reevaluation of my condition after three months indicated that I needed
surgery.
Atty. Yusingco:
Did you undergo this surgery?
Witness:
So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.
Atty. Yusingco:
And, what was the result of that surgical operation?
Witness:
Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve,
which did not resolve by the extensive and prolonged physical
therapy that I underwent for more than three months.
42(emphasis
ours)

Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the

contents of the medical certificate. However, she was not presented
to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm the
contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the
accuracy and veracity of her findings.
We also point out in this respect that the medical certificate
nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between
Joel
s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana
s whiplash injury. It did not
categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the
vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it
only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering
from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to
substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana
s
whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate onlychronicled her
medical history and physical examinations.
C. Dra. dela Llana
s opinion that Joel
s negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela
Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the lone physicianwitness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary
witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in
her testimony that Joel
s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury.
Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even
assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight
to her opinion that Joel
s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury
without violating the rules on evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between
an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an
ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding: (a) the
identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a
handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the

emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.43 On the

other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in
evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he shown to possess.44
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an
admitted expert testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary
testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the
probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple
exposition of the expert
s opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the
assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and
the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana
s medical opinion cannot be
given probative value for the reason that she was not presented as
an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to
testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Furthermore, we
emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not
provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and
effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
The Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties
before the trial court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not present any
testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal
relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana
s injury.
Her claim that Joel
s negligence caused her whiplash injury was not
established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence
during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This
proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine.
Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on

the basis of the partiespieces of evidence and their corresponding

legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by
preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our
solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the
case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana
s favor. Her claim,
unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated
February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007

September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma
gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment
with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of
the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,
relying on the case ofPeople v Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal
should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by
the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel
invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v Castillo and
Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes
root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished
if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v Castillo, this issue was settled
in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus:
Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged
crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It

reads, in part:
Art. 89.
How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The
law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal
import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment
which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted
from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in
part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1.
Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento
no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia

firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las

definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos
al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon
puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in
the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una
verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to
Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni
responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan
well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment
whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise
exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco
holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd
ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in
the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes
final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when
the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall.
Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be
truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged
against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason.
For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action
is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover
"both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People

vs Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See

also: People vs Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure,
1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and
of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal
Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of
that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the
criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with
the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does
not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al vs Estrella, et al.,
CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted
by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines
v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et
al. 5 and People of the Philippines vSatorre 6 by dismissing the
appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said
cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in
view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of
the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art.
89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases
of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 andLamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the

former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability
of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim
therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to
final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting
from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for
damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action
for damages was to be considered instituted together with the
criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without
final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article
33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the

extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply

in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase
and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of
the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its
genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused
had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject
matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently,
while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal
liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability
of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability
due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the
court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims
against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred
that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the
name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case
as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were
solely based thereon, i., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et
al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In this

case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the

lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal
of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability.
His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action
already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the
court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction
despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final
judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total
sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation
in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil
action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la
Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule
87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment
had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs.
Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal
of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him,
thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of
the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to
inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of
the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said
heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as
the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17,
Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil
liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of
the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A reexamination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the
old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action
can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of
the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted

during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence

shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability ex delictowhen his death supervenes during
appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil
action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event
that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal
act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that
is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival
of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect
merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives
upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex
delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear
on this matter:
Art. 89.
How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx

xxx

xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed

intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with
the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This
had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent
on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and

separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the
filing of criminal proceedings. 12One would be hard put to pinpoint
the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in
mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce
to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but
to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action
due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the
final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to
the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action
is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of
the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal
proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is
contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the
institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a
criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it
allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a
summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said
civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply
Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it
was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for
which his estate would be liable. 13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of
his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in
the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as
basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference
that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of
money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if
defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate
liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment
had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken inSendaydiego cannot
be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx

xxx

xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in

both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together
with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment
of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the
Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal
liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been
followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as
being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application
in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as
part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an
ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims
against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of
Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include
even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule
86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed
against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last
illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts,
expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict
do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be
no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before

the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished

upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of
the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same
act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule
111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously
charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation
upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against
whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasidelict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1.
Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against
him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held
that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5,
Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely
personal obligations other than those which have their source in
delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises

from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a)

Law 20

b)

Contracts

c)

Quasi-contracts

d)

...

e)

Quasi-delicts

3.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.

4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death
of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i., rape. Consequently,
the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 82562

April 11, 1997

LYDIA VILLEGAS, MA TERESITA VILLEGAS, ANTONIO

VILLEGAS, JR., and ANTONIETTE VILLEGAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 82592

April 11, 1997

ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LYDIA A. VILLEGAS, ANTONIO
VILLEGAS, JR., MA. ANTONETTE VILLEGAS, MA. LYDIA
VILLEGAS and ESTATE OF ANTONIO J.
VILLEGAS, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman
Antonio V. Raquiza against then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas,
who allegedly publicly imputed to him acts constituting violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He did this on several
occasions in August 1968 through (a) a speech before the Lion's Club
of Malasiqui, Pangasinan on August 10; (b) public statements in
Manila on August 13 and in Davao on August 17, which was coupled
with a radio-TV interview; and (c) a public statement shortly prior to
his appearance before the Senate Committee on Public Works (the
Committee) on August 20 to formally submit a letter-complaint
implicating Raquiza, among other government officials.
The Committee, however, observed that all the allegations in the
complaint were based mainly on the uncorroborated testimony of a

certain Pedro U. Fernandez, whose credibility turned out to be highly

questionable. Villegas also failed to submit the original copies of his
documentary evidence. Thus, after thorough investigation, Raquiza
was cleared of all charges by the Committee. 1 All these acts of
political grandstanding received extensive media coverage.
On July 25, 1969, an information for libel was filed by the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila with the then Court of First Instance of
Manila against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing in the
1971 elections, Villegas left for the United States where he stayed
until his death on November 16, 1984. Nevertheless, trial proceeded
on absentiaby the time of his death the in 1984, the prosecution had
already rested its case Two months after notice of his death, the
court issued an order dismissing the crimal aspect of the case but
reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect. No memorandum was
ever filed in his behalf.
Judge Marcelo R. Obien 2 rendered judgment on March 7, 1985, the
dispositive portion of which was amended on March 26 to read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
The dismissal of the criminal case against Antonio J.
Vlllegas, on account of his death on November 16, 1984. is hereby
reiterated.
2.
Ordenng the estate of Antonio J. Villegas, represented herein
by his legal heirs, namely: Lydia A Villegas, Ma. Teresita Villegas,
Antonio Villegas, Jr., Ma. Anton(i)ette Villegas, and Ma. Lydia Villegas
(sic), to pay plaintiff Antonio V. Raquiza Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00), itemized as follows:
a)

One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P15000) as moral damages:

b)

Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P20000) as actual damages:

c)
Forty-nine Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P49,800,00000) as exemplary damages and

d)

The cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 3 (Amendments underscored)

The heirs of Villegas (the Heirs), through their father's counsel, Atty.
Norberto, Quisumbing appealed the decision on these three main
grounds:
1.
Whether the trial court, three months after notice of the
death of the accused and before his counsel could file a
memorandum in his behalf, could velidly render judgment in the case?
2.
Whether in the absence of formal substitution of parties, the
trial court could validly render judgment against the heirs and estate
of a deceased accused?
3
Whether, under the facts of the instant case, deceased
Villegas was liable for libel, and assuming he was, whether the
damages awarded by the trial court were just and reasonable?
On March 15, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming the trial court's judgment modified only with respect to the
award of damages which was reduced to P2 million representing P1.5
million, P300,000.00, and P200,000.00 in moral exemplary and actual
damages, respectively. Both parties elevated said decision to this
Court for review
In their petition (G.R. No. 82562), the Heirs once again raise the very
same issues brought before the Court of Appeals, albeit reworded.
On the other hand, petitioner Requiza (G.R. No. 82592) questions the
extensions of time to file appellant's brief granted by the appellate
court to the Heirs, as well as the drastic reduction in the award of
damages.
It is immediately apparent that the focal issue in these petitions is the
effect of the death of Villegas before the case was decided by the
trial court. Stated otherwise, did the death of the accused before final
judgment extinguish his civil liability?

Fortunately, this Court has already settled this issue with the
promulgation of the case of People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) on
September 2, 1994, 4 viz
It is thus evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo 5 to
Torrijos, 6 the rule established was thatthe survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were
solely based thereon, i., civil liability ex delicto
xxx

xxx

xxx

(I)n recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent

civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused (undet Sec. 1, Rule 87, infra.) and not against the estate
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to
those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,
express or implied. 7
xxx

xxx

xxx

From this lengthy dlsquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directlyarising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2
Corollarily the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a)

Law

b)

Contracts

c)

Quasi-contracts

d)

xxx

e)

Quasi-delicts

xxx

xxx

3.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended 8 This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
o(f) the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above
4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with (the) provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. (Emphasis supplied).
The source of Villegas' civil liability in the present case is the
felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet, this act could also
be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 9 in relation
to Article 1157 of the Civil Code. If the Court ruled in Bayotas that
the death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal
extinguishes not only his criminal but also his civil liability unless the
latter can be predicated on a source of obligation other than the act
or omission complained of, with more reason should it apply to the
case at bar where the accused died shortly after the prosecution had
rested its case and before he was able to submit his memorandum
and all this before any decision could even be reached by the trial
court.

The Bayotas ruling, however, makes the enforcement of a deceased

accused's civil liability dependent on two factors, namely, that it be
pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended. Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed
instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action
and no reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it
instituted prior to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of
the private offended party in a criminal case such as this which must
be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine, where the civil
action was impliedly instituted with it?
The answer is likewise provided in Bayatas, thus:
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil civil for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the crinimal
action still, since both proceedings were terminated without finals
adjudication the civil action of the offended party under Article 33
may yet be enforced separately 10(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, logically, the court a quo should have dismissed both actions
against Vilegas which dismissal will not, however, bar Raquiza as the
private offended party from pursuing his claim for damages against
the executor or administrator of the former's estate, notwitnstanding
the fact that he did not reserve the right to institute a civil separate
civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.
It cannot be argued either that to follow Bayotas would result in
further delay in this protracted litigation. This is because the
resolution of the civil aspect of the case after the dismissal of the
main criminal action by the trial court was technically defective There
was no proper substitution of parties, as correctly pointed out by the
Heirs and repeatedly put in issue by Atty. Quisumbing. What should
have been followed by the court a quo was the procedure laid down
in the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 17, Rule 3, in connection
with Section 1, Rule 87. The pertinent provisions state as follws:
Rule 3

Sec.17.
Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not
there extinguished, the court shall order upon proper notice the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time
as may begranted. . . . The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad
litem for the minor heirs.
Rule 87
Sec. 1.
Actions which may and which may not be brought
against or executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for
the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages
for an injury to person or property, real or personal may be
commenced against him.
Accordingly, the Court sees no more necessity in resolving the other
issues used by both parties in these petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82562 is GRANTED and the
petition in G.R. No. 82592 is DENIED. The decisions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 82186 dated March 15, 1988, and of the
Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, dated March 7, 1985, as
amended, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice
to the right of the private offended party Antonio V Raquiza, to file
the appropriate civil action for damages against the executor or
administrator of the estate or the heirs of the late Antonto J Villegas
in accordance with the foregoing procedure.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183204

January 13, 2014

THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST

COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
ANA GRACE ROSALES AND YO YUK TO, Respondents.
DE CISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Bank deposits, which are in the nature of a simple loan or
mutuum,1 must be paid upon demand by the depositor.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the April 2, 2008 Decision4 and the May 30, 2008
Resolution5 of he Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89086.

Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company is a domestic
banking corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines.6 Respondent Ana Grace Rosales (Rosales) is the
owner of China Golden Bridge Travel Services,7 a travel
agency.8 Respondent Yo Yuk To is the mother of respondent
Rosales.9
In 2000, respondents opened a Joint Peso Account10 with petitioner
s
Pritil-Tondo Branch.11 As of August 4, 2004, respondents
Joint Peso
Account showed a balance of P
In May 2002, respondent Rosales accompanied her client Liu Chiu
Fang, a Taiwanese National applying for a retiree
s visa from the
Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authority (PLRA), to petitioner
s
branch in Escolta to open a savings account, as required by the
PLRA.13 Since Liu Chiu Fang could speak only in Mandarin,
respondent Rosales acted as an interpreter for her.14
On March 3, 2003, respondents opened with petitioner
s Pritil-Tondo
Branch a Joint Dollar Account15 with an initial deposit of
US$14,000.00.16
On July 31, 2003, petitioner issued a "Hold Out" order against
respondents
accounts.17
On September 3, 2003, petitioner, through its Special Audit
Department Head Antonio Ivan Aguirre, filed before the Office of the
Prosecutor of Manila a criminal case for Estafa through False
Pretences, Misrepresentation, Deceit, and Use of Falsified Documents,
docketed as I.S. No. 03I-25014,18 against respondent
Rosales.19 Petitioner accused respondent Rosales and an unidentified
woman as the ones responsible for the unauthorized and fraudulent
withdrawal of US$75,000.00 from Liu Chiu Fang
s dollar account with
petitioner
s Escolta Branch.20Petitioner alleged that on February 5,
2003, its branch in Escolta received from the PLRA a Withdrawal
Clearance for the dollar account of Liu Chiu Fang;21 that in the
afternoon of the same day, respondent Rosales went to petitioner
s
Escolta Branch to inform its Branch Head, Celia A. Gutierrez

(Gutierrez), that Liu Chiu Fang was going to withdraw her dollar
deposits in cash;22 that Gutierrez told respondent Rosales to come
back the following day because the bank did not have enough
dollars;23 that on February 6, 2003, respondent Rosales
accompanied an unidentified impostor of Liu Chiu Fang to the
bank;24 that the impostor was able to withdraw Liu Chiu Fang
s
dollar deposit in the amount of US$75,000.00;25 that on March 3,
2003, respondents opened a dollar account with petitioner; and that
the bank later discovered that the serial numbers of the dollar notes
deposited by respondents in the amount of US$11,800.00 were the
same as those withdrawn by the impostor.26
Respondent Rosales, however, denied taking part in the fraudulent
and unauthorized withdrawal from the dollar account of Liu Chiu
Fang.27 Respondent Rosales claimed that she did not go to the bank
on February 5, 2003.28Neither did she inform Gutierrez that Liu Chiu
Fang was going to close her account.29 Respondent Rosales further
claimed that after Liu Chiu Fang opened an account with petitioner,
she lost track of her.30 Respondent Rosales
version of the events
that transpired thereafter is as follows:
On February 6, 2003, she received a call from Gutierrez informing her
that Liu Chiu Fang was at the bank to close her account.31 At noon
of the same day, respondent Rosales went to the bank to make a
transaction.32 While she was transacting with the teller, she caught a
glimpse of a woman seated at the desk of the Branch Operating
Officer, Melinda Perez (Perez).33 After completing her transaction,
respondent Rosales approached Perez who informed her that Liu Chiu
Fang had closed her account and had already left.34 Perez then gave
a copy of the Withdrawal Clearance issued by the PLRA to
respondent Rosales.35 On June 16, 2003, respondent Rosales
received a call from Liu Chiu Fang inquiring about the extension of
her PLRA Visa and her dollar account.36 It was only then that Liu
Chiu Fang found out that her account had been closed without her
knowledge.37 Respondent Rosales then went to the bank to inform
Gutierrez and Perez of the unauthorized withdrawal.38 On June 23,
2003, respondent Rosales and Liu Chiu Fang went to the PLRA Office,
where they were informed that the Withdrawal Clearance was issued
on the basis of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Liu
Chiu Fang in favor of a certain Richard So.39 Liu Chiu Fang, however,

denied executing the SPA.40 The following day, respondent Rosales,

Liu Chiu Fang, Gutierrez, and Perez met at the PLRA Office to discuss
the unauthorized withdrawal.41 During the conference, the bank
officers assured Liu Chiu Fang that the money would be returned to
her.42
On December 15, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
issued a Resolution dismissing the criminal case for lack of probable
cause.43 Unfazed, petitioner moved for reconsideration.
On September 10, 2004, respondents filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila a Complaint44 for Breach of Obligation and
Contract with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 04110895 and
raffled to Branch 21, against petitioner. Respondents alleged that
they attempted several times to withdraw their deposits but were
unable to because petitioner had placed their accounts under "Hold
Out" status.45 No explanation, however, was given by petitioner as
to why it issued the "Hold Out" order.46 Thus, they prayed that the
"Hold Out" order be lifted and that they be allowed to withdraw their
deposits.47 They likewise prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney
s fees.48
Petitioner alleged that respondents have no cause of action because
it has a valid reason for issuing the "Hold Out" order.49 It averred
that due to the fraudulent scheme of respondent Rosales, it was
compelled to reimburse Liu Chiu Fang the amount of
US$75,000.0050 and to file a criminal complaint for Estafa against
respondent Rosales.51
While the case for breach of contract was being tried, the City
Prosecutor of Manila issued a Resolution dated February 18, 2005,
reversing the dismissal of the criminal complaint.52 An Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-236103,53 was then filed charging
respondent Rosales with Estafa before Branch 14 of the RTC of
Manila.54
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 15, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision55 finding
petitioner liable for damages for breach of contract.56The RTC ruled

that it is the duty of petitioner to release the deposit to respondents

as the act of withdrawal of a bank deposit is an act of demand by the
creditor.57 The RTC also said that the recourse of petitioner is
against its negligent employees and not against respondents.58 The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering [petitioner] METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY to
allow [respondents] ANA GRACE ROSALES and YO YUK TO to
withdraw their Savings and Time Deposits with the agreed interest,
actual damages of P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00,
exemplary damages of P30,000.00 and 10%of the amount due
[respondents] as and for attorney
s fees plus the cost of suit.
The counterclaim of [petitioner] is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.59
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On April 2, 2008, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC but deleted
the award of actual damages because "the basis for [respondents
]
claim for such damages is the professional fee that they paid to their
legal counsel for [respondent] Rosales
defense against the criminal
complaint of [petitioner] for estafa before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and not this case."60 Thus, the CA disposed of
the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 15,
2007 of the RTC, Branch 21, Manila in Civil Case No. 04-110895 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages to
[respondents] Rosales and Yo Yuk To is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.61
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA
in its May 30, 2008 Resolution.62

Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioner raising the following issues:
A. THE [CA] ERRED IN RULING THAT THE "HOLD-OUT" PROVISION
IN THE APPLICATION AND AGREEMENT FOR DEPOSIT ACCOUNT
DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.
B. THE [CA] ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER
S
EMPLOYEES WERE NEGLIGENT IN RELEASING LIU CHIU FANG
S
FUNDS.
C. THE [CA] ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY
S FEES.63
Petitioner
s Arguments
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in not applying the "Hold Out"
clause stipulated in the Application and Agreement for Deposit
Account.64 It posits that the said clause applies to any and all kinds
of obligation as it does not distinguish between obligations arising ex
contractu or ex delictu.65 Petitioner also contends that the fraud
committed by respondent Rosales was clearly established by
evidence;66 thus, it was justified in issuing the "Hold-Out"
order.67 Petitioner likewise denies that its employees were negligent
in releasing the dollars.68 It claims that it was the deception
employed by respondent Rosales that caused petitioner
s employees
to release Liu Chiu Fang
s funds to the impostor.69
Lastly, petitioner puts in issue the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney
s fees. It insists that respondents failed to
prove that it acted in bad faith or in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
or malevolent manner.70
RespondentsArguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that there is no legal basis for
petitioner to withhold their deposits because they have no monetary
obligation to petitioner.71 They insist that petitioner miserably failed

to prove its accusations against respondent Rosales.72 In fact, no

documentary evidence was presented to show that respondent
Rosales participated in the unauthorized withdrawal.73 They also
question the fact that the list of the serial numbers of the dollar notes
fraudulently withdrawn on February 6, 2003, was not signed or
acknowledged by the alleged impostor.74 Respondents likewise
maintain that what was established during the trial was the
negligence of petitioner
s employees as they allowed the withdrawal
of the funds without properly verifying the identity of the
depositor.75 Furthermore, respondents contend that their deposits
are in the nature of a loan; thus, petitioner had the obligation to
return the deposits to them upon demand.76 Failing to do so makes
petitioner liable to pay respondents moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney
s fees.77
Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, the relevant issues in this case are (1) whether
petitioner breached its contract with respondents, and (2) if so,
whether it is liable for damages. The issue of whether petitioner
s
employees were negligent in allowing the withdrawal of Liu Chiu
Fang
s dollar deposits has no bearing in the resolution of this case.
Thus, we find no need to discuss the same.
The "Hold Out" clause does not apply
to the instant case.
Petitioner claims that it did not breach its contract with respondents
because it has a valid reason for issuing the "Hold Out" order.
Petitioner anchors its right to withhold respondentsdeposits on the
Application and Agreement for Deposit Account, which reads:
Authority to Withhold, Sell and/or Set Off:
The Bank is hereby authorized to withhold as security for any and all
obligations with the Bank, all monies, properties or securities of the
Depositor now in or which may hereafter come into the possession or

under the control of the Bank, whether left with the Bank for
safekeeping or otherwise, or coming into the hands of the Bank in
any way, for so much thereof as will be sufficient to pay any or all
obligations incurred by Depositor under the Account or by reason of
any other transactions between the same parties now existing or
hereafter contracted, to sell in any public or private sale any of such
properties or securities of Depositor, and to apply the proceeds to the
payment of any Depositor
s obligations heretofore mentioned.
xxxx
JOINT ACCOUNT
xxxx
The Bank may, at any time in its discretion and with or without notice
to all of the Depositors, assert a lien on any balance of the Account
and apply all or any part thereof against any indebtedness, matured
or unmatured, that may then be owing to the Bank by any or all of
the Depositors. It is understood that if said indebtedness is only
owing from any of the Depositors, then this provision constitutes the
consent by all of the depositors to have the Account answer for the
said indebtedness to the extent of the equal share of the debtor in
the amount credited to the Account.78
Petitioner
s reliance on the "Hold Out" clause in the Application and
Agreement for Deposit Account is misplaced.
The "Hold Out" clause applies only if there is a valid and existing
obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation enumerated in
Article 115779 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasicontracts, delict, and quasi-delict. In this case, petitioner failed to
show that respondents have an obligation to it under any law,
contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. And although a
criminal case was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosales, this
is not enough reason for petitioner to issue a "Hold Out" order as the
case is still pending and no final judgment of conviction has been
rendered against respondent Rosales. In fact, it is significant to note
that at the time petitioner issued the "Hold Out" order, the criminal
complaint had not yet been filed. Thus, considering that respondent

Rosales is not liable under any of the five sources of obligation, there
was no legal basis for petitioner to issue the "Hold Out" order.
Accordingly, we agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that
the "Hold Out" clause does not apply in the instant case.
In view of the foregoing, we find that petitioner is guilty of breach of
contract when it unjustifiably refused to release respondentsdeposit
despite demand. Having breached its contract with respondents,
petitioner is liable for damages.
Respondents are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages and attorney
s fees.1wphi1
In cases of breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered
only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith,80 or is "guilty
of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligations."81
In this case, a review of the circumstances surrounding the issuance
of the "Hold Out" order reveals that petitioner issued the "Hold Out"
order in bad faith. First of all, the order was issued without any legal
basis. Second, petitioner did not inform respondents of the reason for
the "Hold Out."82 Third, the order was issued prior to the filing of the
criminal complaint. Records show that the "Hold Out" order was
issued on July 31, 2003,83 while the criminal complaint was filed only
on September 3, 2003.84 All these taken together lead us to
conclude that petitioner acted in bad faith when it breached its
contract with respondents. As we see it then, respondents are
entitled to moral damages.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 222985 of the Civil
Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed "by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." They are awarded
only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.86
In this case, we find that petitioner indeed acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it
refused to release the deposits of respondents without any legal basis.

We need not belabor the fact that the banking industry is impressed
with public interest.87 As such, "the highest degree of diligence is
expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even
required of it."88 It must therefore "treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care and always to have in mind the
fiduciary nature of its relationship with them."89 For failing to do this,
an award of exemplary damages is justified to set an example.
The award of attorney's fees is likewise proper pursuant to paragraph
1, Article 220890 of the Civil Code.
In closing, it must be stressed that while we recognize that petitioner
has the right to protect itself from fraud or suspicions of fraud, the
exercise of his right should be done within the bounds of the law and
in accordance with due process, and not in bad faith or in a wanton
disregard of its contractual obligation to respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed April 2,
2008 Decision and the May 30, 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89086 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate JusticeJOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
AT TE STA TION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court
s Division.
ANTONIO T CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F IC A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court
s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice