Civil Procedure
*Nature of action of partition.
signatures of the supposed signatories ...." It was also alleged that
petitioner Concepcion Roque, far from being a co-owner of Lot No. 1549,
"occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance of the
[defendants]." Respondents also refused to honor the unnotarized
Kasulatan and, additionally, denied having had any participation in the
preparation of the Subchvision Plan.
III
On 27 June 1983, the trial court (now Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of
Malolos) rendered a Decision, 9 the dispositive portion of which read:
IV
The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the plaintiffappellee Concepcion Roque despite [its] gross inconsistencies. 10
1. Ordering the heirs of the late Victor Roque namely Filomena Osmunda
his spouse, his children, Cecilia Roque, Marcela Roque, Jose Roque and
Ruben Roque and their uncle and co-defendant Emesto Roque, to execute
a deed of confirmation of the sale made by Emesto and Victor Roque in
favor of plaintiff Concepcion Roque, entitled "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan,"
executed on November 27, 1961, Exh. E, over the 3/4 portion of the
subject property;
The lower court erred in deciding this case in favor of the plaintiff-appellee,
based on an unnotarized and forged signature of defendantappellant
Ernesto Roque.
The present Petition for Review was filed with this Court on 18 September
1986. In a resolution dated 27 July 1987, we gave due course to the
Petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.
1. On the matter of dismissal of petitioner's complaint, the Intermediate
Appellate Court stated in its decision:
While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition, the defendantz, after
denying plaintiff's assertion of co-ownership, asserted that they are the
exclusive and sole owners of the 314 portion of the parcel of land claimed
by the plaintiff.
Upon the issue thusjoined by the pleadings, it is obvious that the case has
become one ofownership of the disputed portion of the subject lot.
It is well settled that an action for partition will not prosper as such from
the moment an alleged co-owner asserts an adverse title. The action that
may be brought by an aggrieved co-owner is accion reivindicatoria or
action for recovery of title and possession (Jardin vs. Hallasgo, 11 7 SCRA
532, 536, 537; Paner vs. Gaspar, 3 CA Rep. 155, 158). (Emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of the facts of the present case, the Intermediate
Appellate Court's decision appears to imply that from the moment
respondents (defendants below) alleged absolute and exclusive ownership
of the whole of Lot No. 1549 in their Answer, the trial court should have
immediately ordered the dismissal of the action for partition and petitioner
Civil Procedure
*Nature of action of partition.
(plaintiff below), if she so desired, should have refiled the case but this
time as an accion reinvindicatoria. Taking this analysis a step further
should the reivindicatory action prosper i.e., a co-ownership relation is
found to have existed between the parties a second action for partition
would still have to be instituted in order to effect division of the property
among the co-owners.
We do not agree with the above view. An action for partition-which is
typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified
property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes
to be co-owners may be seen to present simultaneously two principal
issues. First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner
of the property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that the
plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of
how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) i.e.,
what portion should go to which co-owner.
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of
the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can forthwith proceed to the actual
partitioning of the property involved. In case the defendants assert in their
Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court
should not dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition but, on the contrary
and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of
whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial court find that the
plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the
defendants are or have become the sole and exclusive owners of the
property involved, the court will necessarily have to dismiss the action for
partition. This result would be reached, not because the wrong action was
commenced by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having been
unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring
the defendants to submit to partition the property at stake. If, upon the
other hand, the court after trial should find the eidstence of co-ownership
among the parties litigant, the court may and should order the partition of
the property in the same action. Judgment for one or the other party being
on the merits, the losing party (respondents in this case) may then appeal
the same. In either case, however, it is quite unnecessary to require the
plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that for
partition originally instituted. Functionally, an action for partition may be
seen to be at once an action for declaration of coownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence on the matter. 12 and is
sustained by the public policy which abhors multiplicity of actions.
Civil Procedure
*Nature of action of partition.
may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner [i.e., the heirs of Catalino and
Galo] is an accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and
possession. That action may be barred by prescription.
If the co-heir or co-owner having possession of the hereditary or
community property, holds the same in his own name, that is, under claim
of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by prescription if his
possession meets all the other requirements of the law, and after the
expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may lose their
right to demand partition, and their action may then be held to have
prescribed (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811).
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it will be seen that the underscored
portion of the Court's opinion in Jardin is actually obiter. For there, the
Court simply held the action for partition by the heirs of Catalino and Galo
had prescribed and did not require such heirs to start a new action (which
would have been quite pointless); on the other hand, the Court remanded
the case to the lower court for further proceedings in respect of the
recovery of a 350 square meter lot which the evidence showed was owned
by the plaintiffs but wrongfully included by Sixto in the cadastral survey of
his share of the adjoining lot.
In Jardin, the claim of co-ownership asserted by the heirs of Catalino and
Galo was effectively refuted by the heirs of Sixto, who not only claimed for
themselves absolute and exclusive ownership of the disputed properties
but were also in actual and adverse possesion thereof for a substantial
length of time. The Court found, further, that the action for partition
initially available to the heirs of Catalino and Galo had, as a result of the
preceding circumstance, already prescribed.
Civil Procedure
*Nature of action of partition.
M, but is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion which orders the dismissal
of the respondents'appeal in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248. The Decision of
Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos dated 27 June 1983 in Civil
Case No. 5236-M is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Civil Procedure
*Nature of action of partition.
In an Order dated July 22, 1994, the trial court denied the Motion to
Dismiss.[4] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also
denied on September 23, 1994.[5]
On October 25, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35536. On November 14, 1996, the
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision denying due course and
dismissing the petition for certiorari.[6] Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated April 21, 1997.[7]
The case is now before us on petition for review, based on the following
issues:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NEED NOT BE ACKNOWLEDGED AS HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED AMADO DAFFON.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BE THE REGISTERED
OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES CLAIMED IN THE ACTION FOR PARTITION.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
ANOTHER CASE PENDING IN ANOTHER COURT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT BASED ON FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IS
REVIEWABLE BY THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI.[8]
There is no merit in the petition.
It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a complaint fails
to state a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be
properly considered.[9] Moreover, a defendant who moves to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all
the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a
Civil Procedure
*Nature of action of partition.
The allegations contained therein are sufficient to establish respondents
right to the estate of Amado Daffon. By stating their relationship to the
deceased, they established their line of succession as the basis for their
claim. Their rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent.[15]
Contrary to petitioners contention, the fact that she repudiated the coownership between her and respondents did not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition. In a complaint for
partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the
subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.[16] As
the Court of Appeals correctly held, an action for partition is at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance
of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the defendant
asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not
be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff
is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should
dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but
because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition.
If, on the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of coownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition
of the properties in the same action.[17]
An action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for
partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and
whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch
or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by
the court, as the case may be. The first phase of a partition and/or
accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a coownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have
a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises
and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the
real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they
are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments
of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon.
[18]
Petitioner insists that in her testimony given in Civil Case No. 56336,
respondent Lourdes Daffon admitted that the land in Mandaluyong was the
Civil Procedure
*Nature of action of partition.
over the contested properties, she could have just allowed the case to be
fully tried, during which she should have proved her case with competent
proof. While litigants may utilize all available means to defend themselves,
the legal strategies they employ should not amount to machinations which
frustrate and prejudice the rights of others. Moreover, frivolous appeals,
such as the one filed in this case, are not countenanced in this jurisdiction.