Also available from Continuum hough, Alain Badiou (anslated by Olver Feltham and Justin Clemens) ‘Theoretical Writings, Alain Badlon (edited and translated by Alero Toscano and Ray Bresier) BEING AND EVENT Alain Badiou ‘Translated by Oliver Feltham1 Belonging and inclusion 2 The theorem of the point of excess 3 The void and the excess 4 One, count-as-one, unity, and forming nto 8 The State, or Metatrucute, an the Typology of Being (normality singularity, exctescence) 9 The State of the Hisworco-social Situation 10 spinoza art I Being: Nature and Infinity. Heidegger! Galileo 1 Nature: Poem or matheme? 12. The Ontological Schema of Natural Multiples and the Non-exstence of Nature 1 The concept of normality: tansiive sets 2 Natural multiple: ordinals 3 The play of presentation in natural multiples or ordinals 44 Uimate natura element (unique atom) ‘An ondial i the number of that of which ts the name 6 Nature docs not exist, 15 Infinity: the other. the rule and the Osher 14. The Ontological Decision: “There i some infinity In natural maple 1 Point of being and operator of passage 2 Succession and imit 3 The second existential seal 4 Infinity finally defined 5 The finite. in second place 15 Hegel 1 The Matheme of infinity revised 2 How can an infinity be ba? 3 The retun and the nomination 4 The arcana of quantity 5 Disjunetion at a "9 ” m 133 130 0 be be 19 M40 waz 150 131 154 156 136 161 168 165 er 169 part IV The Event: History and Uliracone 16 Bvental sites and Historical Situations 17 The Matheme ofthe Event 18 Beings Profibition ofthe Event 1 The ontologial schema of historicity and instability 2 The axiom of foundation 5 the axiom of foundation is a metaontoogical thesis of ontology 4 Nature and history 5 The event Belongs to that-which-is-not-being- ua-being 19 Mallarmé art V The Event: Intervention and Fidelity ascal/ Choice; HOlderlin/Deduction 20 The Intervention: egal choice of name for the event, logic ofthe 1wo, temporal foundation 21 Pascal 22 The Form-mltipe of intervention: there a being of coe? 23 Fadeliy, Connection 24 Deduction as Operator of Ontological Fidelity 1 The formal concept of deduction 2 Reasoning via hypothesis 5 Reasoning va the absurd 4 Tipe determination of deductive fidelity 25 wolderlin Part VI Quantity and Knowledge. The Discernible (or Constructibl): Leibniz/Gdel 26 The Concept of Quantity and the Impasse of Ontology 1 The quanthative comparison of infinite sets 2 Natural quantitative corelate of a multiple: ‘cardinality and cardinals 3. The problem of infinite cardinals ry v8 ee as 187 187 199 191 201 aia 22 240 242 Daa 27 252 255 265 267 269 m‘ngalypibedin enh ate oman © to Sel 1988 “he gh nguge laton © Case 2008 “book supe yh en My Foren Al ap of sh ne hae i eh ty SBN 0-8264-5831-9, ' ay of Congo Cag ation a 2 log re for th bak tna om he ay of ones ‘pes by ete Sees Li, oueer acd anda he USA 4 Contents Authors Preface ‘Transator’s Preface Introduction art I Being: Multiple and Void. Plato/Cantor ‘The One and the Multiple: prior conditions of, any possible ontology Pato ‘Theory of the Pare Multiple: paradoxes and ital decision ‘Technical Noe: the conventions of writing ‘The Void Proper name of being ‘The Mark 2 1 The same and the other: the axiom of extensionaty 2 The operations under condition: axioms ofthe powetset, of union, of separation and of replacement 3. The void, subtractive suture to being Part Ik Being: Excess, State of the Situation, Onel ‘Multiple, Whole/Pars, or €/. This necessary to prohibit paradoxical multiples, which i o say the ‘non-being whose ontological inconsistency has as sgn the ruin of the language. The axiom-system has cherefore 1 be such that what iv authorizes tobe considered asa set, thas everyting hat it speaks fof-sinc, to distinguish sets from anything else within this ‘every- thing’, to distinguish the mulple (which s) rom the one (which not), and finally to distinguish belng from non-being, a concept of the multiple would be requited, a criterion of the set which is ‘exduded—Is nor corteate to formulas such a8 ~f © «), formulas ‘Which induce incoerency. Benveen 1908 and 1940 this double task was taken in hand by Zermelo and completed by Fraenkel, von Neumann and Godel I was accomplished In the shape ofthe formal axiom-system, the system in which, it fs ‘order logic. the pure doctrine ofthe miles presented, such that it ca sill be used today 1 se out every branch of mathematics would insist on the fac tha, it being st theory at stake, axlomatizaton {snot an arte of exposition, but an iminsic necessity. Being-mulipe if ‘musted to natural language and to intuition, produces an undivided ‘seudo-presentaton of consistency and inconsistency. thus of being and ‘non-being, because it does no dearly separate isl from the presumption ‘ofthe being ofthe one. Yer the one and the mulhiple do not frm “unity of conraries since the fst isnot whist te second isthe ver form of any resentation of being. Axlomatzation is required such thatthe mule left the implicness of ts counting rl, be delivered without consp, that 55, withou implying the Being hee. 2°‘ng AND evENT ‘the axlomatization consists in fixing the usage of the relation of belonging, €- to which the entire lexicon of mathematics can finally be reduced fone considers that equality rather a logical symbol “The fist msjor characteristic of the Zeemelo-Fraenkel formal system {he ZF system) Is that its lexicon contains solely one relation, ¢, and therefore no unary predict, no propery in the strict sense In particu, this sytem exces any construction ofa symbol whose sense would Be to beast. The multiple implicily designated herein the form of fogic ‘tbelonging. that is, in & mode in which the ‘something = ain general resented according toa multiplicity This wil be inscribed a5. ¢ 8, ais herent off. What is counted as one snot the concept ofthe muti: here sno insertable thought of what oe-muliple is. The one s assigned. {onthe signe alone: that it the operator of denotation for the relation ‘between the something’ in general and the multiple. The sign, wnbeing ff any one, determines, in a uniform manner, the presentation of ‘something’ as indexed t the multiple. "The second major characteristic ofthe ZF system imately evokes it being, ely speaking. something’ which is thereby disposed acording to ts mulple presentation, Zermelo's axiom system contains one type of ‘rasable lone, one list of variables. When I writ‘ belongs toa 8 the ‘Sgn wand fare variables from the same Ist, and can thus be substituted for by specially indstingushable terms. If one admis, with 2 grain of sale Quine’ famous formula, be sto be the valu of variable’ one can ‘Conclude that the ZF system postulates that there s only one type of (resentation of being: the mille. The theory does not distinguish between ‘objects’ and groups of objec (as Cantor di), nor even bewween, ‘Rlements and ‘et That there i only one type of variable means all is ulpe, everyting is a set indeed, ce inscription without concept of thatwhich-s amounts to fixing i as what can be bound, by belonging. (0 the muldple, and if what can be thus bound cannot be ditingushed, in tens of the status of ts inscription, rom what tis bound toi. na € 8 only has the possibility of being an element ofthe set inasmuch as itis Stee same srptural type a thats ase ise—then that-which ss ‘uniformly pure moliplicy “The thenry thus posits that what it presents—its terms—within the “axiomatic articulation, and whose concept it doesnot delivers always of the type er that what belongs 8 mulipe is alas a multiple: and that being an ‘element is nota satus of being, an inrinsie quality, but the Shmple relation, to-be-lement-of through which a multiplicity can be “ preset ystems the aio of vis, Iho na wits ont es pf on ad ht a iar present, n the nplins es me ‘ml aly mi of mie what toy depoye The it apr cae of Ferme work nce te trace topo del th he pier hc ann he fowing pepe on em me ue he spon thatthe We akeaty 9 presed eZee Stores by ngage hese lr {atin fa tal mle The 0 spartn compen oo ab) rome fr tion pstedin thc dhe dr tg of hi axom thai pops an any sso of ene te al Pes tea tthe aed on ances el ean Inpho geo whith aematgs esse prt oF incnsen uli te whe etn on in exe the eabeny ofthe Imgg, One sl Ft of cones tha nc ee esc sna som ene hen tothe ion teens tm te sen sly ho Shed resnion ofthe on of se 1 sh 3 Som ofan inte mathematica mating to ths maps smn ton towiathe as cesed-dacs nov coste ny eer ose yds spine the even ftom operon a at ot pohing pes woh ae lane Ce om Shere beng a exes ot overs cones he ico langage eens athe ml ht ewe aly by he tes esa) wih nantes he sane? Tt oe San ron the bs a prey) cone commsins mange een lip ‘demonstrable is an element of this set: Seton ferwnihae) eh we a bod L 1 existence all language multiple ttENG AND EVENT ‘The essence of this thestr—wich alms to secure the multiple, without rulnous excess. within the grasp of language—i that it dively exiten {al for every formula A) the existence ofa multiple is automaticaly and “uniformly guaranteed: the mitiple which gathers vogether all the terms which validate the formula. Tassels paradox cuts the coherency ofthe language with a conta icon: in doingso. it undoes the exstence-mulipi-langusge triplet such {bi & insenbedunder the primacy of existence (of the existential “guantfe)—in the statement above. “ermelo proposes the same tpt but ted into a diferent knot ‘The axiom of separation says tat, given a multiple, or rather, for any _ultple supposed given (supposed presented or existent), there exists the ‘Sb-rmllpe of terms which possess the property expressed by the formula I) In other words, what i induced by a formula of the language isnot flvcely an existence, a presentation of multiplicity, but rather—on the ‘condition that theres already a presentation—the ‘separation’, within that presentation, and supported by i, of a subset constituted from the tems {thus the mullite, since every multiple is multiple of mulspls) ‘which validate the formu ‘At formal level it follows that the axiom of separation i contrast ro the preceding statement, not existential since i only infers an existence from its already-being-there in the form of some multiplicity whose preseason has been supposed. The axiom of separation says that fr any upposed given multpicty there exist dhe part (he sub-multipicty) fwhone elements validate 2) It dhereby reverses she order of the quant fer: s a universal statement, in which all supposed existence induces, fo the basis of language, an implied existence plod existence v (0) 8) (Wy) IIe a1 6 AHI we AIL 1 1 supposed existence language multiple 1m conitast to Frege’ statement which draws the existence of directly foom is) the axiom of separation, on its own, does not allow any ‘conclusion eonceming enstenc, The delaration made by is iypliative Stracture amounts to the following if there is an/a then there is a [p-ohich i « part of «whose elements validate the formula i). But is there an a? The axiom says nothing ofthis it fs only a mediation by language from (supposed) existence to (implied existence ‘what Zermelo proposes asthe language-mltiple-exisence Knot no tonger stipulates that on the basis of language the existence of a multiple sintered bt rather that langage separates out, within a supposed glven ‘existence (within some already presented multiple) the existence of sub- multiple Language cannot induce existence, solely a split within existence ‘Zermelo's axiom is therefore materialist in that it breaks with the figure of ideainguistery—sohose price is the paradox of exces+—in which the ‘existential presentation of the muiple is dicey inferred trom a well: ‘constructed language. The axlom re-stablshes that is solely within the ‘presupposition of existence that language operates—separates—and that twat i thereby induces in terms of consistent muliplicy is supported in is being. in an anticipatory manner, by a presentation Which Is already there, The existence-muluple anucpates what language retreactively| ‘separates out om It as implied exstence-mltple The power of language doesnot go so far aso institute the ‘there of, the ‘there i, I confines tel to posing that theee are some distinctions within the “there i. The prindples dilerentiated by Lacan may be remarked therein: that ofthe real there is) and that ofthe symbolic (there are some distinction). ‘The formal stigmata ofthe already ofa coun, inthe axiom of separation, isfound nthe universality ofthe inital quantifier (the frst count-as-one), ‘which subordinates the existential quantifier the separating count-25-one of language) Therelore, it isnot essentially the dimension o ses which Is resected by Zexmelo, bot rather the presentative pretensions of language. I said th Russell’ paradox could be interpreted as an exces ofthe mule over the capacity of language to present it without fling apart. One coud just a5 ellsay tha Its language which i excessive in that it sabe to pronounce properties such as —f¢ a)—it would be alittle forced to pretend tat these Droperties can inti a multiple presentation, Being inasmuch 25 is the pure multiple, subtracted from such forcing: in other words, the ruprue of langue shows that nothing can acede to consistent presenta- fon in such a manner. The axiom of separation takes a stand within ontology—its positon ean ‘be summarized quite simply: the theory ofthe multiple s general form of ”BEING AND EVENT presentation, cannot presume that Its on the bass of ts pure formal rule Slone—well-consucted properies—that the existence of a multiple (3 presentation) i inferred. Being musth sleady-there: some pure mulpe {multiple of multpes, must be presented in order forthe rate to thea Separate some consistent muliplicty, self pesented subsequently by the sesture of the inital presentation However. crucial question remains unanswered: within the frame- work of axiomatic presentation isnot on the basis of language that the fxistence ofthe multiple is ensured—that son the basis ofthe present tion thatthe theory pesents—then where isthe absolutly iil poi of being? Which inital multiple has its exstence ensured such thatthe separating function of language can operate therein? ‘This isthe whole problem of he subtractive sutute af set theory to being ‘qua being, isa problem hat langoage emnot avo, an to which i ead {us by foundering upon ts paradoxical dissolution, the result of its own, excess, Language—svhich provides for separations and compostions— anno, alone, insttate the existence ofthe pure multiple; it cannot ensure that what the theory presents is indeed presentation, Technical Not | the conventions of writing ‘The abbreviated or formal writing used in this book is based on what called Brst-order logic. Iti a question of being able to inseibe statements ofthe genre: forall terms, we have che folowing property, or there does ‘ot exist any term which has the following property’ or tis statement is true, then tis other statement i also trae,’ The fundamental principle fs that the formulations “for al’ and ‘there exists’ only aflect terms {individuals} and never properties In short the stricture i that properties are not capable, in tur, of pssesing properties (this would cary us into ‘second-order log ‘The graphic realization of these requisites is accomplished by the Mxation of five types of sign: variables (which inscribe individuals, logical co recor (negation, conjunction, disjunction, Implication and equivalence, (quantifrs (universal: "or alt, and existential “there exis’), properties oF selations (here wil only be two ofthese for us equality and belonging) and punctuatons (parentheses, braces, and square brackets) = The variables for indivkduals (or us, muples or ses) are the Greek levers fy. 8 rand, sometins, 3, We will also use indices if need be, 0 Inuwoduce more variables, such a8 as, ys et, These signs designate tas which Is spoken of that of whieh one afi this oF that. = The quantifiers ae the signs ¥ (universal quantifier) and 3 (exisen tial quantifier), They are always followed by a variable: (Vs) reads: “fo ll a’ 3a) reads "there exists= the togeal connectors ate the following ~ (negation), > mpi tion) oF (dgjunction),& (conjunction), equivalence) The telations ere = (equality) and € (belonging). They always ink fhwo variables: a= B which reads als equal to and « © B which reads‘ belongs 0B The punetaton is comprised of parentheses (), braces (1, and square brackets [ -Aformula san assemblage of signs which obeys rues of conection, These ‘ules can be stely defined, but they are irutve: it a matter ofthe formula being eadabl. For example: (7a) 38) € f) > ~@ «)] reads without a problem: ‘For all «there exists at least one such that i « belongs tof then # does not belong 1 ‘An indeterminate formula will often be noted by the letter One very important point i the following: ina formula, a variable fs cither quantified or no, Inthe formula above, the to variables « and 8 Sre quantified (universally, existential). A variable which js not ‘quantified is a free variable. Ler's consider, for example, the following formu (Wale =a) Gale 6 ve all te reads intuitively: Forall , the equality of 8 anda is equivalent 1 the {act tha there exss ay such that y belongs to and also belongs 0 Ihe formulae andy are quantified but ee. The formula in question xpress 3 property of Be namely the fat that being equivalent (0 86 Cuulvalent to such and such (3 what & expressed by the piece of the formula: ito € B) & fre ail. We wil often write A) fora formula in tehlch w is a free variable, Inuitvely, this means that the formula A Expresses a property ofthe variable . If there are 1wo free variables, one ‘artes 9). Which expresses a relation between the fre variables aand fh, ‘or example. the formula (¥)[6 € a) ot = Bi which reads ‘ally belong ‘ether tow oF to 9,0 to both of ther’ (he logical os not exclusive} ixes ' particule elation between « and. ‘We willallow ourselves, as we go along. to dfn supplementary slns on tne bans of primitive signs. For that it wil be necessary to fx via an equivalence, the possibilty of retansating these signs into formulas ‘which contain primitive signs alone. For example, the formule: Tepe (lb a) + © Al defines the relation of inclusion between ‘Cand is equivalent tothe complete formula: or all, ify belongs to ‘a then ybelongs tog is evident thatthe new writing a 86 merely an {bbrevition fora formula Aj) writen uniquely with primitive signs and in which «and 8 are ree variables, inthe body ofthe text the reading of the lormulas should not pose any problems, moreover, they wil always be introduced. Definions willbe Explained. The reader cn trust te intl sense ofthe written form.st MEDITATION FOUR The Void: Proper name of being Take any situation in particular. 1 has een sald that is structure—the regime ofthe cour-as-one—spits the multiple which i presented ther: “litt nto consistency (te competion of ones) and inconsistency the inert ofthe domain) However, incons’stency i not actually presented 35 such since all presentation fs under the law of the count. Inconsistency 35 pure mule I solely the presupposition thr prior the count the one fs not. Yet what i explicit in any situation is rather thatthe one is. In neta. a situation Is not such thatthe thess ‘the one 8 nor” can be presented therein, On the contrary, because the la is the count-as-ne, rothing i presented in a situation which is pot counted: the situation fenvelops existence with the one. Nothing Is presentable in a station ftherwise than under the elec of structure, that, under the form of the one and its composition in consistent multiplicities. The one is thereby not only the regime of stuctured presentation but also the regime ofthe pomible of presentation ie In a non-ontological (thus non-mathema teal) situation, the miles possible only insofar asitis explicitly ordered by the law according othe one ofthe count. Inside she station there no gtaspable inconsistency which would be subtracted fom the count and thus astructured. Any situation, seized in it immanence, thus reverses ‘the inaugural axiom of our entre procedure. It states that the one fs and that the pure mutiple—inconslstency—is not. This is eniely natura because an indeterminate situation, not being the presentation of presen- tation. necessarily ieniiies being wih what i presentable thus withthe possibly ofthe one {HE Yoo: PROPER NAME OF BEING tis therefore vert I wil ound the essential distinction between the tnue andthe veriical mich further on in Meditation 31) that, inside what {situation establishes as a form of knowledge, being is being in the possibilty ofthe one, I is Lebni’s thesis (What nota being i not a Doing) which Merally governs the immanence of a situation and is horizon of vert. 115 a thesis of the law. “This thesi exposes vs to the following dificuly: inthe immanence of, a situation, Is inconsistency doesnot comet light, nevertheless count {sone being an operation ie indicates thatthe one a result. Insofar as the one is 2 ret, by necessy Something’ of the multiple does not absolutely coneide with the result. To be sure there is no antecedence of, the multiple which would give rise to presentation because the later i alivaysalready-stuctured such that there is only oneness or consistent ‘lips. But this “here leaves 2 remainder: the lw im which iti ‘deployed is discernible as operation. And although there ts never anything fother—in a suaton—hon the result (everything, In the situation, i ‘outed, what thereby reslls marks out, before the operation, a must be-counted. tf the latter which causes the structured presentation 10 waver towards the phantom of inconsistency ‘f course, remains certain that this phantom—which, on the basis of the fac that beingone ress, suily unhings the one fom being inthe ‘very midst of the situational thess that only the one is—cannot in any manner be presented itsel, Because the regime of presentation is con sistent mulpldr, the result ofthe count ‘By consequence, since everything is counted, yer given that the one of the count, obliged to be a res, leaves a phantom remainder—of the lip not originally being in the form ofthe one—onte has to allow that Inside the vation the pure o inconsistent mukple sboth excued fom ‘everything. and thus from the presentation island Included, in the name of what would be’ the presentation itsell the presentation ‘nisl if what the law does not authorize to think was tinkable: thatthe one is ‘not, thatthe being of consistency Is inconsistency To put it more clearly, once dhe entrty of a situation is subject the law of the one and consistency, its necessary, from the standpoint of limmanence tothe situation that the pure multiple, absolutely unpresent- able according to the count, be nok. But Deing-nothing is as distinct from non-being as the “there iss astinc from being Justa the stats ofthe one is decided erween the (tru) thesis “here {sonenes” and the [lle thes ofthe ontologies of presence, ‘the one is sso the staus ofthe pure muiiple decided, inthe immanence of a non “toloeal situation: betseen the (sue) thesis ‘incoasstency is nothing’ ind the (fase) structurlist or legals thesis “inconsistency not” Tt i guile true that prior to the count there Is nothing Because everything is counted. Yet this being-nothingwherein resides the illegal Inconsistency of being-is the base of there being the “whole” of the “compositions of ones in which presentation takes pace aust certainly be assumed thatthe elect of structures complete, that what subzacts ise from the later is nothing. an thatthe law doesnot “counter sngular islands in presentation which obstruct is passage. In an indeterminate situation there is no tebe or subtractive presentation ofthe pre multiple upon which dhe empite of the one i exercised. Moreover ‘isis why within a situation, the search for something that would feed an Jnuition of being qua being ia search in vain, The Tog of she acu, of ‘wba the count-as-one would have forgotten’ ofthe excluded which may be postive located assign or eal of pure mulipity, san impasse—an itusion—of thought. as i i of practice. A situation never proposes Enyting other than multiples wowen fom ones, and he law of laws i that nothing limits the eet of the count. “And yet the corelate thesis also imposes sell: that there fs a being of ‘thing, as form of she unpresentable. The ‘nothing’ is wat names the Lnpeccelvable gap, cancelled then renewed, between presentation as Sanicture and presentation a truetuted-presentaton, between the one as result and the one as operation, Between presented consistency and Inconsistency as what-wil-have-been-presented Naturally it would Be pointes tose off in search ofthe nothing. Yet it mast besa that this s exactly What poetry exhausts itself doing: this is that enders poetry, even at the most sovereign point of cary, even in Esperempory affirmation, compli with death. i one must—als!—con- cede that there Is some sense in Pat's project of crowning the poets in ‘rder to then send them into exile, ts because poetry propagates the idea ‘fa inition of the nothing in which being would reside when there is hot even the ste for such intuition—they call t Nature—because every thing i consistent. The only thing we can affirm is thls every station Smplies the nothing of ts all, Bur the nothing s ether place nor aterm ‘lhe situation, For dhe nothing were a term that could onty mean one thing: that it had been counted as one, Yet everything which has been. ‘outed is within the consistency of presentation. Its thus rled out that the nothing—which here names the pure will-have-been-counted. as {iscnguishabe from the effect ofthe count, and thus disunguishable from presentation-be taken as a term, There is mot arnothing. there is ‘noting, phantom of inconsistency ‘By isl the nothing is no more than the name of unpresentation in presentation, te status of being resus from the following: one has fo admit that ifthe one resuls, then “something’—which is not an {nstualon-tem, and which is thus nothing—has not been courted, this something’ being that it a necessary thatthe operation ofthe count scone operate. Ths it comes down to exactly the same thing say that, the nothing Is the operation of the count—which, as source ofthe one. I not itself counted-—and to say thatthe nosing isthe pure multiple upon Which the count operates—which ‘in-tsel’, as non-counted, is quite Aine trom how i turns out according tothe count, ‘The nothing names that undecidable of presentation which iss unpresenable, distributed between the pure inertia of the domain ofthe multiple, and the pure transparency of the operation thanks to which there Is oneness. The nothing is as much that of structure. thus of consistency, a5 that ofthe pure multiple. thus of inconsistency. Ii sald ‘with good reason that nothing i subteated trom presentation, because it feon the bass of he laters double unsdction, dhe aw and the mulpe that the nothing isthe nothing. Foran indeterminate situation, theres thos an equivalent to what Plato named, with respect 40 the great cosmological construcion of the Timacus—an almost catnvalesque metaphor of universal presenta Wion-—the ‘errant cause’, recognizing lis extreme difculty for thought ‘What iat tak I an unpresentable yet necessary igure which designates the gap between the rsult-one of presentation and that ‘on the bass of ‘which’ there is presentation: that ithe non-term of any tality, the nen fone of any countasone, the nothing particular to the situation, the ‘unlocaizable void poin in which its manifest both thatthe situation is sutured to being and that the sharwhio-presents-iself wanders in the presentation in the form ofa subtraction from the count. I would already be inexact to speak of this nothing a point because is nether local noe slobal, bat seatered all over. nowhere and everywhere: ts such that no encounter would authorize ic 10 be eld a presentable. term wid ofa situation tls suture to its being. Moreover, I state that every structured presentation unpresets “is” voi, in the mode ofthis non-one which is merely the subtractive face ofthe count.eING AND evENT 1 say ‘old rather than ‘nothing’, beeause dhe ‘nothing’ the name of the void correlative to the gloat fet of structure (eveything f counted); itis move accurate to indicate that not-having-been-counted is also quite Teal ints currence since i snot counted as one. “Vo” indicates the failure ofthe one, the notone, in a more primordial sense than the no ofthe-whole Wis a question of names here—nothing’ or ‘void'—because being Aesignated by these names, s either local nor global. The name 1 have chosen, the void Indicates precsely that nothing is presented, no tem. and also thatthe designation of that noting occurs empty, I oes not locate structurally ‘The void is the name of being—ol snconsstency—according to a situation, inasmuch a8 presentation ves us therein an unpresentable ‘ccess thus non acces tothe acces, inthe mode of what isot-one, nor ‘Composable of ones thus what fs quliable within the situation solely a5, the errancy of the nothing tis essential to remember that no term within asuation designates the ‘void, ond that in this sense Arist quite rightly declares inthe Ply that ‘he void not f one understands by “being what canbe located within a Situation. that i aterm, or what Aristotle called a substance. Under the ‘normal regime of presentation itis veridical that one cannot say ofthe ‘oid, non-one and wnsubstantal, that is ‘wil establish later on (Meditation 17) tat for the voi to become localizable a the level of presentation, and thus fra certain type of intra situational assumption of being qua being to occur, a dysfunction ofthe fount ls required, which results from an excess-f-one, The event wil be {his ulta-one of a hazatd, on the bass of which the vod of a station i retroactively discernible. ‘But for the moment we must hold that in a situation there i n conceivable encounter with the void. The normal repime of structured situations is that of the Imposition of an absolute ‘unconscious’ of the vd, Hence one can deduce a supplementary prerequisite for ontological Aisourse,ifitexiss, and ft as Imalotain—z situation (the mathemat fea situation). 1 have already established: that ontology is necessarily presentation of presentation, thus theory of the pure multiple without-one, theory ofthe multiple of mules: {THE VOI: PROPER NAME OF BEING > that its structure can only be that ofan implicit count. therefore that fof an axiomatic presentation, without a conceptone of is terms {orithout a concept ofthe multiple) ‘We can now add that the sole term fom whi omtlgy’s compositions swith con weave hemsees i meesary he vid Le’ establish this pont. If ontology i the particular situation which presets presentation, ft must also present the law of al resentation—the ferrancy of the void. the unpresentable as non-encounter. Ontology wll, fonly present presentation inasmuch as It provides a theory of the pre sentative suture to being, Which, speaking verdcally rom the standpoint fof any presentation, isthe void in which the orginary inconsistency i subsracted from the count. Ontology is therefore required to propose a theory ofthe vod But if 15 theory of the void, ontology, in a certain sense. can omy be theory ofthe void. Tha is, fone supposed that ontology axiomaticaly presented other terms than the void-—irespective of whatever obstacle there may be to ‘presenting’ the void—this would mean thet it atin fulshed Between the void and other terms, and that fs structure thus authorized the count-as-one ofthe vod as such, according co ts specie ‘iference to fll terms Is obvious that this would be impossible, since, {5 soon ast was counted as one ins diference to the one-tll, the void ‘would be filled with this alter. If ube void is thematized, it must be according to the presentation of ls ertancy, and not in regard to some Singularity, necessarily fal, which would distinguish it as one within 3 ifferentiatig count. The onl solution is for al of the terms tobe ‘void such that they are composed from the void alone. The void is thus distibuted everyshere, and everything that is distinguished by the Implicit count of pure mulpices i a modality-according-to-the-one of the void tell, This alone would account for the fact thatthe voi, in a situation, i the unpresentabe of presentation Lets rephrase this. Given that ontology is the theory of the pure ripe, what exactly could be composed by means ofits presentative {axiom sytem? What rxiset is seized upon by the Ideas ofthe multiple whose axioms institute the legislating action upon the muliple qua "multiple? Certainly nor the one, whichis not. Every multiple is composed ‘of maltples, This i the fst ontological law, But where to sae? What {the absolutely original existential position dhe first count if cannot bea fist one? There iso question about it: the ‘rs presented multiplicity 2eING ano EvENT without concept has to be a maliple of nothing, because if it was a ‘ultipl of something that something would then be inthe postion ofthe ‘One, And its necessary thereafter, thatthe axiomaticrue solely authorize Companions onthe basis ofthis multiple-ofnodhing. which Is to say on the basis ofthe vod “Shit approach. What ontology theorizes isthe inconsistent muliple of any situation; tha the multiple subtracted from any prticulat aw trom “ny count-asone—the a-structured multiple. The proper mode in which inconsistency wanders within the whole of situation f the nothing, and the mode in which it un-presents selfs that of subtraction from the ‘oun the non-one, the vol, The absolutely primary theme of ontology therefore the void-—the Greek atomists, Democritus and his successors, ‘eat understood this—but ii also its inal theme—this was not their ew-because in te lst resort, al inconsistency unpresentble thus oid If there are ‘atoms, they are not, as the materaliss of anviguty believed. a second principle of being. the one ater the voi. bur compos tions ofthe voi self, role by the ial laws ofthe maliple whose axiom. system is lald out by ontology ‘Ontology therefore, can only count the vod as existent, This statement announces that ontology deploys the ruled onder—the consitency—ol ‘what is nothing other than the sutureo-being of any situation, the that totch presents isl insoar as inconsistency assigns it wo solely being the lnpresenable of any peesentative conssency Tt appears that in this way a major problem is resolved. 1sad that being ‘spresented as pure multiple (Sometimes shorten this perlously by saying being is muliple), being gua beng, sticly speaking is neither one noF ‘utple. Ontology, the supposed science of being qua being. being Submited tothe low of skuations, mot present: at bes i must present presentation, which isto say the pre mutple. How can it avoid deciding In respect to being qua being, n favour of the multe? It avoids doing 50 “inasmuch as its own pong of beings the void that this"multipe’ whieh Isneither one not motile, being the mulipe of nothing. and therefore, tsfaras itis concemed, presenting nothing in the form ofthe malile. 80 more than in the form of the one. This way ontology states that presentation is certainly molile, but that che being of presentation. the that which is presented, being void, is subtracted from the one/muliple dialectic “The following question then arises: f that isso, what purpose does it serve to speak ofthe void as multiple” in terms such asthe ‘multe of "THE VOI: PROPER NAME OF BEING nothing? The reason for such usage s that ontology isa sivation, and thus everything that presents lls under las, which sto know nothing Spar from the multple-without-one, The results that the vod is named as ‘multiple even i composing nothing lt doesnot actualy ft ino the intra Stuational opposition of the one and the muliple. Naming the vod as rule the only sokation let by not Being able to name it as one, given that ontology sels out as is major prin the following: the one i no. ‘but any structure, even the axiomatic structure of ontology establishes, that there are uniquely ones and mulhples—even when, asin this ase, i isin order to annul the being ofthe one, ‘One of the acts of this annulment is precisely to posi thatthe wid i multiple, hat itis the frst multiple, the very being from which any ‘multiple presentation, when presented. is woven and numbered Naturally, because the voids indiscernible s aterm (because it snot fone), its inaugural appearance isa pire act of nomination. This name fannot be specific it cannot place the void under anything that would subsume it—this would be (0 reestablish the one, The name cannot Indicate that the void is this of that, The act of nomination, being a-secifi, consumes isl, indicating nothing other than the unpreset able as such, In ontology, however, the unpresenable occis within a resentative forcing which disposes i as the nthing ftom which every thing proceeds. The consequence is that the name ofthe void is @ pure proper name, vihich sncates set, which doesnot bestow any index of fitlerence within what it refers to, and which auto-dedares itself in the form of the multiple, despite there being thing which is numbered by es Ontology commences, inelucbly, once the legislative Kdeas of the ‘multiple are unfolded, by the pure utterance of the arbitrariness of a proper name. This name, this sign, indexed to the voi, fina sense tht ‘wil lays remain enigmatic the proper name of being.MEDITATION FIVE The Mark @ ‘The execution of antology whichis to say ofthe mathematic! theory of the multiple, or et theory can only be presented in conformty with the requisition of the concept (Mediation 1) asa system of axioms. The grand Ideas ofthe mulipl are thus inaugural statements concerning variables fy, et in respect of which Its implicy agreed that they denote pare ‘ullples, This presentation excludes any explicit definition ofthe mul ple—the sole means of avoiding the existence of the One. Its remarkable that these statements are 30 few in qumber; nine axioms ot axiom- Sabiemas One can recognize in hls economy of presentation the sign that the “fst principles of being’ as Aristotle sald, are as few as they are ‘ucla. ‘Amongst these statements, one alone, strictly speaking, i existential that sits task sto directly inscribe an existence, and not to regulate 3 ‘onstruction which presupposes there already being a presented moll. ‘As one might have guesed, tis statement concer the void ‘i onderto think the singularity of this existential statement on the vod, lets first rapidly situate the principal Meas of the muliple those with a stricly operational value 1 THE SAME AND THE OTHER: THE AXIOM OF EXTENSIONALITY ‘The axiom of extensionality posts that two sets are equa (ential if the ‘multiples of which they are dhe multiple, che mules whose theoredca count as one they ensure, aze"the same’. What does the same mean? Isn't there a Gc he ‘Se? In natural and inadequate vocabulary, which distinguishes between ‘ements’ and ‘sets, a vocabulary which conceals that there are only multiples, the axiom says: ‘two sets are identical if they have the same flements’ But we know that ‘element’ does nox designate anything Intrinsic; all it inicates is that a multiple» presented by the presentation of another multiple. whichis weltten y€ « The axiom of extensionality ns amounts to saying if every multiple presented inthe presentation of tlspresented in that of, and the inverse, shen these wo multiples, and fare the same, ‘The logical architecture of the axiom concerns the universality of the assertion and not the recurrence of the sme, 1 indcates that If for every ‘multiple y, its equivalent and thus indifferent wo afi shat i belongs to ‘corto finn that it belongs of. then wand ace indstingushable and can bbe completely substituted for cach other. The identi» of multiples 5 founded on the idiferens of belonging, This is writen: (lee do be Bae ‘The differential marking of the wo Sets depends on what belongs 10 their presentations, But the ‘what’ is always a mulple. That such a ‘multiple, say y, maintains a relation of belonging with a—belng one ofthe ‘multiples from which a is composed—and does not maintain such a ‘elation with, entail that a and g are counted a different. ‘This purely extensional character of the regime of the same and the ‘other inherent 1 the natut of set theory, being theory ofthe multiple ‘withoutone, dhe multiple as multiple of multiples. What posible source ‘could there be for the existence of difeence, if not that of a multiple lacking from a mile? No particular quality can be of use to us to mack dliference here, not even that the one can be dstingulshed from the ‘multiple, Because the one i not, What the axiom of extension does i reduce the same and the athe othe trict gout af he count such that it structures the presentation of presentation. The same is the same ofthe ‘out of multiples from which all muliples are composed, once counted as However, let us noe: the la ofthe same and the othe, the axiom of ‘extensionality doesnot tell usin any manner whether anything exists Al it does efx, for any possibly existent muliple, the canonical rule ofits ilerestiation@ BEING AND EVENT 2. THE OPERATIONS UNDER CONDITION: AXIOMS OF THE POWERSET. OF UNION, OF SEPARATION AND OF REPLACEMENT It we leave aside the axioms of choice, of infinity, and of foundation ‘whose essential metaontologcal importance wil be et out later on—four ther ‘ass’ anions constitute a second category, all being of the frm: “ake any seta which i supposed existent, There then exist a second set fh construcied on the bass of a in sich a manner! These axioms are equally compatible with the non-existence of anything whatsoever, ith absolute non- presentation, because they solely indicate an existence under the condition of another existence, The purely conditional character of fexstence is again marked by the logical structure of these axioms, which reall ofthe type forall a, there exiss suc that it has defined relation toe The for all” evidendy signifies: if here exists an a. then in all cases there exists a associated to.« according to this or that rule. But the statement does not decide upon the existence or non-existence of even fone of these as. Technically speaking, tis means that the prefi—the initial ‘quantifier of these axioms fof the type oral. there exits. such that." that is, (Va)38N[ Jes dear om the other hand, that aa {axiom which allirmed an unconditioned existence would be of the type ‘there ens. such that, and would thus commence withthe existential ‘quanti ‘These four axioms—whose detailed technical examination would be of, ro use here—concern guarantees of existence for constructions of mul ples on the basis of certain intemal characteristics of supposed existent sulpes, Schematicall The axiom ofthe powers the st of uses “This axiom affirms that glven ast the subsets of that set canbe counted as-one: they area set What s 2 subset ofa multiple? Itisa multiple such that all the multiples which are presented in is presentation (which ‘belong’ ot ate also presented by the nial multiple without the nvr being necessarily tre (otherwise we would end up with extensional identity gain). The logical structure of his axiom isnot one of equivalence but one of implication. The set isa subset of «—this is writen Bc e—if, when y san element ofthat i © tis then aso element of thus y€ a. In other words, «which reads Bs included in a'—Isan abbreviation of the formal: (¥7)1y > &€ al In Meditations 7 and 8,1 will return to the concept of subset or sub smultple. which is quite fundamental, and to the distinction between Pronging (2) and inson (C) For the moment itis enough to know thatthe axiom of the powerset guarantees that ia set exists, de another set also exis that counts a one All the subsets ofthe first In more conceptual language: if a mulple i presented, then another mulipleis also presented whose terms (elements) fare the sub-mulples of the fst The axiom of union Since a miple is 2 multiple of multiples, ti legitimate to ask if the power ofthe count via which « mulpe s presented also extends to the ‘unfolded presentation of the multiples which compose it. grasped in turn ‘ss multiples of mitipls. Can one internally distrinate the moltiles out fof which » muitiple makes the one of the result? This operation ist {nverse of that guaranteed by the axiom af the powese. ‘The latter ensues thatthe multiple ofall the reproupings is counted as ‘one; that i, the mip of al the subsets composed fom miles which belong to 2 given multiple, Thre is the resul-one (the set) of all the posible compoidons—all the inclusions-—of what maintains with a given set the relation of belonging. Can systematically count the decompositions ofthe multiples that belong toa given multiple? Because fa multiple isa ‘muliple of multiples, then ts also a moltiple of muiples of muiples of smulipes, ete ‘This i 8 double question: 4, Does the count-as-one extend 1 decompositions? I there an axiom of dssemination just a there is one of composition? 2s there a halting point—given thatthe process of dissemination, as we have just seen, appears to continue to infinity? The second question is very profound and the reason for this depth obvious. Its object isto find out where presentation Is sutured to some fixed point, 1 some atom of being that could no longer be decomposed This would sem tobe impossible i being-muliple isthe absolute form of presentation. The response this question wil be set out in two tages: by {he axiom ofthe voi, a litle further on, and then by the examination of the axiom of foundation in Meditation 18. ‘The frst question Is decided here by the axiom of union which sates ‘hat each sep ofthe diseminaton is counted as one. Tha is it states thatBEING AND EVENT he multiples from which the mallpls which make up a one-multipe are ‘omposed form ase themselves (remember thatthe word se whieh i ‘either defined not definable, designates what the axlomate presentation uthories to be counted as on). ‘Using the metaphor of elements —iself a perpetually risky substantial laation of the relation of belonging-—he axiom is phrased as such: for very se, there exits the set ofthe elements ofthe elements ofthat se ‘Tha fois prevented, a certain 8 is also presented to whleh all the belong which also belong 1 some y which belongs 1 a. In other words: f ye wand Se y, there then exists such that 3. The mile 8 zathers, Together the lst dissemination ofa tht obtained by decomposing into multiples the multiples which belong to shus by um counting WoN3AG€ AO Gyles a) Be VL Given a. the set @ whose existence is aimed here wail be wit Ue (union of). The choice of the Word ‘union’ refers tothe sea that this Glomatie proposition exbibis the very essence of what a multiple ‘unifes-—tnultiples—and tha this is exhibited by unifying’ the second multiples (in regard to the initia one) from which, in turn, the first, ‘ultiples—those from which the Ina one esults—are composed, ‘The fundamental homogeneity of being Is supposed henceforth on the tasithat Ua. which disseminates the inital one-muliple and dhen counts fa one what is thereby disseminated. no more or less a multiple sell than the initial set, Jus like the powerset. the union set does not i any vay remove us from the concept-less reign ofthe multiple, Netter lower down, nor higher up. whether one disperses or gathers together, the theory does nov encounter any thing’ which is heterogeneous to the pre multiple Ontology announces herein nether One, nor All, nor Atom: solely the uniform axiomatic count-a-one of multiples. «The axiom of separation, o of Zermelo ‘Studied in detall in Meditation 3. <4 The asiom-chema of placement (r of substitution) In its natural formolaton, the axiom of replacement says the following i you havea set and you replace is elements by other elements, you obtain Tn its metgontologcal formulation, the axiom of replacement says rather i 2 multiple of multiples is presented, another multiple i aso presented which i composed ftom the substitution, one by one. of new fmultiples for the multiples presented by the fist multiple. The new Ialtiples are supposed as having been presented themselves elsewhere ‘The idea—singular, profound—is the following: if the count-a-one operates by giving the consistency of being one-mulple to some ml ples iil also operate if these multiples are replaced, term by term, by fathers. This is equivalent to Saying tha he consistency of maple does nor eso upon the particular mails wha mulpe is. Change the multiples and the one-consstency—which {sa result—remains, a5 long as you operate, however, your substitution multiple by multiple. ‘what set theory affirms here, purlying again what It performs as presentation of the presentation multiple, % that the countas-one of multiples indifferent to wha these muipls are mops of provided. fof cours, that it be guaranteed that nothing other than multiples are at Stake. In short, the attbute“to-be-a-mukiple’ transcends the parcicalar multiples which are elements of a given mile. The making-up- ‘multiple (the ‘holding together’ as Cantor used to say, ultimate structured figure of presentation, maintains itself as such, even if everything from Which i s composed is replaced ‘One can see just how frst theory takes its vocation of presenting the pure multiple alone: othe point t which the count-as-one organized by its axiom system institutes its operational permanence on the theme of the bond-muliple in isell, devoid of any speciation of what it binds together ‘The muliple is genuinely presented as form-mulhipe, invariant in any substituton which affects its terms: 1 mean, invariant i that ii always Asposed in the one-bond ofthe multiple ‘More than any other axiom. the axiom of replacements suited even to the point of overindicating it—to the mathematical stuation being presentation ofthe pure presentative form in which being occurs 3 that whichis. ‘However, no more than the axioms of extenslonaity, separation, subsets for union does the axiom of replacement induce the existence of any multiple whatsoever. The axiom of extensonality fixes the regime of the same and the other The posterset anu the union-set regulate internal compositions (subsets) {and disseminations (union) such that they remain under the law ofthe 6s“ ING AND evENT count; thas, nothing ts encountered therein. neither lower down nor bhiuher up, which would prove an abstade to the uniformity of presenta sion as multiple “The axiom of separation subordinates the capacity oanguage to present suutipes tothe fac of there already being presentation "Te axion of veplacement posits that dhe multiple stunder the law ofthe count qua form- multiple, incorruptible idea ofthe bond in sum, these five axioms oF axiom-schemas fx she system of eas under whose law any presentation, 35 form of being, lets itself be presented: belonging (unique primitive idea, ultimate signifier of pre ‘ented: being), difference incusion, dissemination the languagelexstence ‘couple, and subssuton "We defintely have the entre material for an ontology bere. Save that ‘sone ofthese inaugural statements in which the la of Iasi ven has tet decided the question: there something rather than nothing? 3, THE VOID, SUBTRACTIVE SUTURE TO BEING [At this point the axiomatic decison s particulary risky. What privilege Could multiple poses such that tbe designated asthe muliple whose texstence sinaugutlly aimed? Moreover, fits dhe multiple from which Ailhe others resul. By compostions in conformity wit the Tdeas ofthe “lp eit notin truth that oe whose non-being has been the focus of ‘ue entite effort? I on the other hand, iti a muliple-counted-as-one, {hus a multiple of mulipes, ow could it be the absolutely frst mulipe, already being the result ofa composition? ‘his question Is none other than that of the suture-to-being of a theoryaxiomaticlly presented—of presentation, The existential index 0 be found fs that by which the lepslative sytem of ldeas—which ensures hat nothing alflets the purity of the multiple—proposes itself as the inserted deployment of being-qua-being ‘But to avoid lapsing ino # non-ontlogical situation, there isa pre requisite for this index: It cannot propose emthing in particular: conse~ ‘quently it can nether be a matter ofthe one, which isnot, nor ofthe Compose multiple, which i never anything bu a result of the count, an ‘elec of structure, “The solution tothe problem is quite striking: maintain the poston that thing is delivered by the law of the Ideas, but mate this nothing be THE MARK through the assumprlon of a proper name. In other words: verify He ecedetary choc of a proper name, the unpresonuble alone as eset: on tS basis the ideas wl subsequently cause ll admissible forms of presentation to proceed. the framework of et theory what is presented is muiple of multiples, the form of presentation itsel, For this reason, the unpresentable can only figure within language as what is ‘multiple of nokng. Lev’ also note this point: the diference between two multiples, as regulated by the axion of extensional, can only be marked by those ‘uluples that acualy belong to the two multiples tobe differentiated A ‘mulple-of-nothing thus has no conceivable differentiating mark. The “unpresentable i inextensible and therefore in-iflerent. The result is that the insrption ofthis indifferent will be necessarily negative because no possbilty—no mulhple—can indicate that ition is basis that existence i tifirmed. This requirement that the absolutely iia existence be thar ofa ‘negation shows that beng is definitely surured to the Ideas ofthe mule fn the subtractive mode. Here begins the expulsion of any presenti assumption of being But What Is it that this negation—in which the existence of the “unpresentable as indiference is insribed—Is able to negate? Since the primitive idea of the multiple fs belonging, and since iis a matter of ‘egting the multiple as muliple of mulkiples—without, however, res: rectng the one—it sera that ii belonging a5 sich which i negated ‘The unpresentabe is that to which nothing. no multiple, belongs: conse~ ‘quemly it cannot present itself in ts iference To negate belonging i to negate presentation and therefore existence ‘because existence is benin-prsentaion. The srucure ofthe statemet that inseribes the “is” existence is thus, im tuth the negation of any texstence according to belonging. This statement wil say something Uke: ‘there existe that fo which no existence can be said to belong’ of, '2 ‘multiple’ exits which is subtracted trom the primitive Idea of the multiple” This singular axiom, the sivth on ou Uist, ssh axon ofthe oie nits natural formulation thi time actually contradicting ss own laity says: There exist a et which has no clement point at whieh the subtractive of being causes the intuitive distinction between elements and sets to break doven mts metzontolgial formulation the axiom says: the unpresenable i resented, asa subtractive term of the presentation of presentation. Or: a o‘etna AND evENT multiple i which s aot under the Mea of dhe mule. Or: being lets sel the named, within the ontological stuation, as that from which existence does not exis Tn is technical formalation—the most suitable for conceptual expos fkion—the axiom ofthe voi-set wil besin with an existential quantifer (thereby declaring that being invests the Ideas), and continue with a negation of existence (hereby wn-presenting being), which wal bear on ‘longing (hereby unpresenting being as motile since the Wea ofthe ‘multiple is €). Hence the flowing (negation i written ~) (2) ‘This reads: there exists such that there does not exist any a which belongs ‘Now, in what sense was 1 able 10 say that this ® whose existence Is atfirmed hete. and which i thus no longer simple Idea or law but an ‘omolopcal suture—the existence of a inexstent—was in truth a proper rhame? A proper name requires iis teferent to be unigue. One must, Carefully distinguish between the ove and wnicy- 1 she one is solely the Implicit effect without being. ofthe count, thus of the axiomatic ideas, then there fs no reason why unity cannot bean attribute ofthe multiple. Te indicates solely that a mulple i dilerent from any other. I can be oniolled by use ofthe axiom of extensional. However the mullet Inextensibe naiflerent How can [even think its unicty when nothing belongs toi that would serve asa mark ofits ference? The mathem: ticans sayin general quite ight-handedly, thatthe void-set is unique ‘afer the axiom of extensional’. Yer this st proceed as If 490" voids can be identified like two ‘something's. which sto say two multiples of multiples, whist the law of difeence is conceptualy, if not formally, adequate 10 them. The truth i rather this the uncty ofthe vod-set i Jmmedlate because nothing diferentes i, not because its diference can be attested. An iremediable unicy based on in-diference i herein substtated for unity based on dillerence. ‘What ensures the uniqueness of the void-set that in wishing to thnk of it as a species or a common name, in supposing that there can be ‘several vols, expose mysell. within the framework of the ontological, theory ofthe multiple 0 the isk of overthrowing the regime ofthe same land the othet, and s0t0 having 10 fund difeene om something other than Ieonging, Yet any such procedure is equivalent to restoring the being of the fone. That fs, "these’ voids, elng inextensble, are indstinguishable as nulples, They would therefore have to be dillerentiated 38 ones, by ‘ean of an ently new principle. But the one isnot, and thus I cannot tssume that being- voi 3 propery. a species ora common name. There {are not several” voids there is only one void rather than signifying the presentation of the one, this signifies the unity ofthe unpresentable such {s marked within presentation, ‘We thus ative a the following remarkable conclusion: Bemus the cei ot ha he vod i erg ‘saying that the nall-sets unique is equivalent to saying that ts mark is aproper name, Being thos invests the leas ofthe presentation ofthe pure ‘ultpe inthe form of unicty signalled bya proper name. To wet i his name of being this subtractive pont of the mullple—of the general form in Which presentation presents isll and thus isthe mathematicians searched for sign far fom ll thei customary alphabets: nether a Greek, ‘nor Latin, nor a Gothic letter but an old Scandinavian letter, 2, emblem fof the void, zero affected by the barting of sense. AS if they were duly aware that in proclaiming thatthe void alone is—because it alone in-exiss {om the multiple, and Because the Ideas ofthe multiple only Ive on the ‘bss of what is subtracted from them—they were touching upon some sacred region, sel timinal to language; as if thus. rivaling the theologians {for whom supreme being has been the proper name since long ago, yet, ‘opposing 0 the laters promise ofthe One, and af Presence the ieevoce bility of un-presetation and the un-belng ofthe one, the mathematicians had to shelter theie own audaciy behind the character of a forgotten languageMEDITATION SIX Aristotle ———— “absurd fout of place) (to suppose) thatthe points void Physics, Book 1V For most three centuries it was possible to elev that the experiments tion of rational physics had rendered Aristotle’ eutation ofthe existence ‘ofthe void obsolete. Pascal's amous leaflet New Experiments concerning the Void the tle alone being inadmissible in Arsrle's system, had 10 fndow-sin 1647—forrcell's prior work with a. propagandisic force ‘amable of mobilizing the non-scientific public In his cca examination ofthe concept of the void (Pips, Book IV. section 8, Aristotle in three diferent places, exposes his argument to the posiiity ofthe experimental production ofa counterexample on the par. Dt positve slence Fis, he explicitly declares that itis the province ofthe [hist to theorize onthe void. Second, his own approach cites expe Incnts such as that of plunging a wooden cube into water and compering teeffecs to thos of the same cube supposed empty. Finaly his condusion {s entiely negative: the vold has no conceivable type of being, nether separable nor inseparable bir dxdpior ofre nexepapsor However, thanks to the light shed on tis mater by Hekdeggr and some ‘others, we ean no longer be satistied today with this manner of dealing rth the question. Upon a close examination, one has 10 accord that [Arittle leaves atleast ne possiblity open: thatthe void be another name for mater conceived as matter (j ty § zt afr), especially mater asthe ‘concept of the potential being ofthe light and the heavy. The void would thus name the material cause of transport, not—as with the atomits—as anistone ‘a universal miiew of local movement, but rather as an undetermined ‘ontological vitality immanent to natural movement shich carries the Tight upwards and the heavy downwards. The vod would be the latent mlifference of the natural diferentation of movements, suchas they are prescribed by the qualified being—Hght or heavy—of bodes. tn this sense ‘here would definitely be a being ofthe vod, but a pe-substantal beng therefore unthinkable a such. Besides, an experiment in Aristotle's sense bears no relation to the conceptuslarilats materialized in Toricel’s or Pascal's water and mer. uty tubes in which the mathematzable mediation of measure prevails, For Arsole, an experiment isa cortent example, 2 sensible image, which serves to decorate and support a demonstration whose key resides entirely {nthe production af a correct definition. eis quite doubiul that a common referent exists, even inthe shape ofan in-exlstent,shnkable as unique, for ‘what Paseal and Aristo cal the void. Ifone wantsto lear fom Arstote, ‘oreven to refute him, then one must pay attention othe space of thought within which his concepts and definitions function. For the Greek. the ‘old isnot an experimental diference but rather an ontological category, 2 supposition relative to what natural proliferates as figures of being. In {this logic, the arti! producon ofa void isnot an adequate response 10 the question of whether nature allows, according toi own opening forth “a place whete nothing Is’ to occur, Because such Is the Aritotelan definition ofthe void nevi rns & gah Zr) ‘This i because the “physidst" in Arstotles sense is in no way the ‘archaeological form of the modem physics, He only appears vo be such due tothe setzoactve iluson engendered by the Galilean revolution. For Aristrle, a physics studes nature; which so say that reson ofbeing (ve will ay that type of situation) in awhich the concepts of movement aad estate pertinent. Better sl that with which the theoretical thought of the physicist in acord that which causes movement and rest to be ‘mine aribates of that-whichis in a “physical” situation, Provoked ‘movements (Aristotle terms them ‘violent’ and thus, in a certain Sense, ‘everything which can be produced via the artifice of an experiment, via 3 technical apparatus, ate excluded from the physical domain in Aristotle's Sense. Nature isthe being-qua-being ofthat whose presentation implies ‘movement it not the aw of movement, ts movement. Physics attemprs to think the theres of movement a5 a figure ofthe natural coming-to-be of being: physics sts self he following question: why is there movement rather than absolute immobility? Nate isthe principle (dp. the cause nENG AND EVENT fea) of self moving and of beingatrest, whlch reside primordally in Teng: moved or beingeatrest and this in and for ise ka ard) and not by accident. Nothing herein ks capable of excluding Pascal or Toric’ ‘old-not being determined as estentally belonging to what-ispresented in its natural oiginaity—from being an in-exlstent with regard to nature, § physial non-being (in Anstole’ sense): tht isa forced or accidental Production Tris thus appropriate—in our ontlogial projec—to reconsider Aris toils question: our maxim cannot be that of Pascal, who, precisely wlth respect to the existence of the void, declared that if on the bass of a hhypothess “something follows which is contrary to one phenomenon alone, that is sulicient proof of falsity’ To this ruin of a conceptual System by the unicty of the fact—in which Pascal anticipates Fopper—we ‘us oppose the internal examination of Adstole's argumentation; we for {whom the void sin truth the name of being. and so can neither be cast, Into doubt nor established via the effets ofan experiment. The facity of Pinysical refuttion—in the moder sense—is bared to us, and conse: ‘quently we have to discover the ontological weak point ofthe apparatus inside which Aristotle causes the void t0 absolutely inex "Arstole himself dlsmises an ontological facility which is symmeticl, in a certain sense, tothe fadhty of experimentation. I the later prides ‘sell on producing an empty space, the frmer—imputed 10 Melisos and Parmentdes contents self with rejecting the void as pure non-being 76 ‘2 evn of nav draw, the void does not make up one of the number of ‘beings, itis foreclosed from presentation. This argument does not sult [ristile: for him—quiterightly—frst one must think the coreation of the void and ‘physica’ presentation, or te relation between the void and ‘movernent The voi i-isel fs terally unthinkable and ths irrefutable. Inasmuch as the question ofthe void belongs tothe theory of mature itis ‘on the bass ofits supposed disposition within sel-moving thatthe critique must commence. In my language: the void must be examined in ‘The Aristotelian concept of a natural situation i place. Place isl does rot exist itis what envelope any existent insofar asthe later is assigned to ‘natural ite, The vold in station’ would thus be a place in which there ‘vas nothing, The immediate coreelaton is not that of the vod and non- being its rather that ofthe vold and the noting via the mediation non: being, however natral—of place. But the naturalnes of place Is that of ‘being the site towards which the body (he being) whose pace tis, moves, aniston Every places that of body and what testifies to thisis that fone removes, 1 body from is place, it tends to return wo that place. The question ofthe ‘Eaistence ofthe void thus comes down o that os funcon In respect 10 sell-moving. the polarity of which is place. ‘The aim of Arsotle’ fist major demonstration isto establish thatthe void excludes movement, and that it thus excludes itself from being-qua ‘being grasped in ts natural presentation. The demonstration, which very sfletve, employs, one after the other, the concepts of ference, unlit ‘edness (r infinity), and incommensurably. There i great profundity in positing the vold In this manner: a in-dference, a5 in-finite, and as ‘Unemessured. This triple determination spectfles the ertancy ofthe vod isssutractive ontological function and ts inconststency with regard to any presented multiple 4 ference. Any movement grasped in its natural being requites the ferentiation of place: the place that situates the body which moves Yet the void as such possess no dilference (fip wen, ob ye Sapp) Difference, in fact, supposes that the diferenated muliples—termed "podle’ by Ariotle—aze counted as one according tothe naturalness of ‘het local destination. Yer the void, which names inconsistency is prior to the countasone. It cannot suppor diference (cf, Meditation $ on the ‘mathematics of this point), and consequently forbids movement. The dilemma isthe following: “Either there Is no natueal anspor (gop) anywhere, for any being of if there is such transport then the void snot, ‘But the exclusion of movement is absurd, for movement is presentation ‘itself s the natural coming forth of being. And it wold bead this i Arisole’s expression itseli—ridculous yeni) to demand proof of the ‘existence of presentation, since all existence assured on the basis of resentation, Furthermore: Is evident that, amongst beings, there isa plurality of beings arising from nature” Ifthe vold thus excludes ditler- fence, its ridiculous to ensure its being a8 natural being, 2 Init. For Aristotle there san itrinsi connection between the void ‘and infinity, and we shall see in Meditations 13 and 14 for example that, hes emttely correct on this point: the voids the pont of being of infinity. Aristotle makes this point according to the subtractive of being, by posing that inference is common tothe void and infinity as speces of Both the rothing and non-being: How could there be natural movement if, due to the void and infinity, no difference existed? For there is no diference fon the basis of the nothing feo yess). no more than on the ”BEING AND EVENT 1) Yet the void seems to bea non-being and bass of non bing * Tlowence has nity or moe exact the united? Fora Geek si egan of yesenton ise beste what presents sel afm tbs nese dposon of sien To ay thatthe wold itimetay lait eqralent to saying hat Wt sous stions Siptemable as such the voi i in excess of being 3 2 thinkable {unton: and epi as natural potion. sh a tree ma “ru, spposing that shee is movement, and thos natural present sn lnthe ld oracrding othe vid one woul then ave coveeve that dis ae necessary tansped to Innity HS seg den vet feyaince ro aifleenc would diate heir coming 1 4 hak. The Sif ante of ths remark i he moder sense) ian onl Eas pysest—impssbly fn te Avorn sense. I hate Stat tad ne nypomos of» natural ting ofthe void immediately ‘ket inherent ii of any elective presesaion Seon gen tat the ndference ofthe oi canot deere oy stunt etn for movement, hele would be explo whic 80 [Ey multe ranspore woul take place ‘everywhere’ dro eve again the void exceeds the alway ernfated character of nat {sposton ruin the opoloy of stations aly we suppose hats ays eral void which hens and ie ap i teeore, the vod ithe ase of movement woul {uve to ete tater goa the wo transporting isl oars so sett lace ohich one would suppose tobe for example, wad ‘Thorens a eduptation ofthe wo an exces of the vod oe That cre ematng sow moby towards el or what Asode (atk avid ofthe voi fo ses) Yt the indiference ofthe vid Sone hom ferent tell from Sself—which Is In fact an Thug Uhorem (ch Medaton S}—and consequent fom pre Stppotng sel asthe desnation of tral beng. “py nnd the ensemble o thse emark fs etely cere, is the cane psn parr sho this—that the wo ocean ‘Fava enced the tation acrding wt own ify ts ao he {ose ats event crrtence proceeds explosively’ or “everyhee ssa ly stat ta he ed pues ow car wajcoronce unbound rom the eraey in which Hs Tonfnd bythe se Evenly, we ist therfore conclude wih Astle shat the void is nor If by “being” we understand the limited order of presentation, and in particular what x natural of such order, Unmeasire. Every movement is measurable in relation 0 another according tis speed, Or, as Aristotle says, there is alays a proportion, a rato (ies) berween one movement and another. inasmuch a5 they are ‘wan time, and all vine i inte. The naural character of siwation i sos proportionate or numerable character in the broader sense of the term, Thisis actully what {will stabish by linking natural situations to the concept of ordinal multiplicity (Meditations 11 and 12). There is 3 reciprocity between nature (yes) and proportion, or reason (ys). One element which contributes t0 this veprodty asa power of obstruction and thus ofa limit—is the resistance of the mllew in which there is ‘movement. If one allows that hi resistance canbe zero, which Is the ose A the milew is void, movement wall lose all measure it will become Incomparable to any her movement, I wil tend towards infinite speed Aristo says: “The void bears no ratio to the fll, such that neither does ‘movement fin the voi} Here again the conceptual mediation is accom plished subvratvely, whieh so say by means of the nothing: "There s 00 ratio in which the void is exceeded by bodies, just as there is m0 ratio between the nothing fe yn) and number’ The void is in-numerable, ‘hence the movement whichis supposed therein doesnot have atinkable ature, possessing no reason on the basis of which its comparison to other ‘movements could be ensued Physics fin the modem sense) must not lead us astray here. What Axistile is inviting us to think ste following: every reference tothe void produces an excess over the count-asone, an iuption of inconsistency, hich propagates—meraphysically—within the situation at infinite speed ‘The voids thus incompatible withthe slow order in which every station resensures in their place, che muliples tha it presents, Wis this tiple negative determination (indilerence, n-finite, wn: ‘measured) which thus leads Aristole ro eefuse any natura! being or the ‘void. Could, however, have a non-natural being? Three formulas must be Imerrogated here: wherein resides the possible enigma of an unpreset abl, pre-substanal void whose being, unborn and non-arving, would however be the latent iumination of what i, isola a itis ‘The fist of these formulas—attbuted in truth by Arisone 0 those ‘partisans ofthe void” that he sets out to refute—declares that ‘the same being (Zan pertains toa void to fliness, and to place, but the same being | (Gan) does not belong t0 ther when they are considered fom the 1s‘eine AND evENT standpoint of being (re,’ Hone allows that place can be thought as Shtuaion in genera which so say not as a esence (a mulpe), ut as fhe site of existing such that it decumacibes every existing term, then “assole’s statement designates Identity to the situation ofboth fines {that ofan effecve multiple), and ofthe void (the non-presented). Buti Siso designates their non-identxy once these three names—the void fullness and placeare asigned to thet diferenceacording to bens. 1 8 thus imaginable that a situation, conceived asa structured mulipicty Smnultaneously brings about consistent mulpity (fullness), inconsistent oubtipity (the void), and iself (place), according to an immediate [entity vhih s shat of belng-n-totaliy, the complete domain of exper fence. But on the other hand, what can be said va these three terms of being-qua-being I not Mental, since on the side of place we have the fone the law ofthe count of the side of fllnes the muliple as counted ‘sone: and on the side ofthe voi, the withoutone, the unpresente. ers not forget that one of Aristotle's major axioms is “being is sald in several manners’ Under these conditions, the void would be being asnon- being_or un-presenationfullness, being as being-—consisteney—and place, being as the non-existing limit ofits being—border ofthe rtp by the one “The second formula is Aristotle's concession to those who ae absolutly fndoran) convinced ofthe rol ofthe void as cause of transport. He allows that one could adit the void ‘the matter of the heavy and the Hight as ‘auch’. To concede thatthe void ould be a mame for matter-sn-itsell fs fteibute en enigmatic existence 10 I: that of the ‘third prindple’ the Subjeetsupport 6 oneuaor, whose necesty is established by Ariston In the frst book ofthe Phys. The being ofthe void would share with the ‘eing of matter a srt of precartousnes, which would suspend it between pure oan and being-lfecvely-being, which for Artotle can only be a specfiable term, 2 something 8 re n). Lets say that failing presentation in the consistency ofa multiple, the void she latent errancy ‘tthe being of presentation. Aristotle explicitly attbutes this errancy of ‘heing—on the underside and atthe limit of ts presented consistency—t0 matter when he says that matter is certainly 2 non-being, but solely by fccident hard owen) and espedally—in a striking fomola—tha its “in some manner a quasisubstance’ (és cal fafa nos) To admit tht the void can be another name for matter ito confer upon i the status of an almost-being anistonte The lst formula evokes a possi hat Ase ees, and th sere wep om hme athe vl once ts nlc (or outs Suton must be thoughts ape pt, ie know that thi the genuine ntl ston case (4. Medion 3) te ety se uc {bates by sare, ©, can however be quai auque, and thu canner be epciened se pce or exenson ther punctual iy, The wid isthe umpesentable pi of ring of ay preston ‘tse ely dames sich a hypotheses 8 rh ‘Smut of pla) tha the peat be vd. Th reson fr serosa ‘that unin rh wo completely surat te question o he ‘oid om that plae the vid ent ibn one anne chk “rp plac. Ase ex one spose the puncuaiy of he vl Shr point would have oe plaein which here asthe xenon ol tangle ty The nexteson of pt oes not make any placer 2 ‘oi Is predey here that stole cite thought encounters nh polio impesbiy: hats ncetry wo thnk, under the ame che foi the outdepace on the bast of whch any pace—any su sori tl ihre fs ie ht he waa revo) sli the abi cote oe o forget tha he po precy in ‘ot being a place, can mitigate the aporias of the void. pone . is erase i oi the pt beng tht ao dhe lose whch hans the anon wich beng ens The sence he old n-cnsss a de-cazation, ”Part I Being: Excess, State of the situation, One/Multiple, Whole/Parts, or e/c? |MEDITATION SEVEN The Point of Excess 1. BELONGING AND INCLUSION in many respects set theory forms a typeof foundational interruption of the labyrinthine disputes over the multiple. For centuries, philosophy has employed two diaecical couples in ls thought of presented-being, and their conjuncion produced al sorts ofabyses, the couples being the one fand the multiple and the part and the whole. It would not be an exaggeration t0 say that the entirety of speculative ontology is taken up ‘wth examinations ofthe connections and dsconnections between Unity {and Totaly It has heen so fom the very beginnings of metaphysics, since {tis posible ta show that Plato essentially has the One prevall over the All ‘whilst Aristotle made the opposite choice. ‘Set theory sheds ight on the fecund frontier Between the whole/pans relation and the one/muliple relation: because, a ase, it suppresses both of them, The multple—whose concept it thinks without defining ts signfcaton fora post-Cantorln sneither supported by he existence of the one nor unfolded as an organic totality. The multiple consists from, being wthout-one, or multiple of multiples and the categories of Aristotle (or Kant), Unity and Toray. cannot help vs grasp i [Nevertheless set theory ditingulshes two posible relations between ‘multiples. There & the originary relation, belonging, witen ©, which Indicates that 2 motile is counted as element in the presentation of another misiple. But there is also the telaton of incision, writen <. Which indicates that a mmutpe sa sub-mulpl of another multiple: weBEING AND EVENT made reference to this relation (Meitation 5) in regard 10 the powerset, Sriom. To recap, the writing Po, which reads Bs included ino, oF Bis 4 subnet of slifis that every muliple which belongs to aso belongs toa (pile Bb all ‘ne cannot underestimate the conceptual importance of the distinction between belonging and inclusion, This istnction directs, step by step. the cette thought of quantity and filly what I will erm later the great, friemtatons of thought, prescribed by being itself. The meaning of this {istinction must thus be immediately clarified. First of all note that a multiple snot thought diferently according t0 whether it supports one or the ether ofthese relations. IT say 8 belones tow the multiple «exactly the same, a multiple of mulples. as when Tsay “ys Included in His entirely lelevant 10 believe that « is fst, thought as One (or se of elements), and then thought as Whole (or set of jars). Symmetrical, nar can the Set which belongs or the set which is inched. be qualitatively distinguished on the basis of ther relational position. Ofcourse, {wil sy i # belongs toa itis an element of and if jinincluded in itis subset of. Bu these determinations—element and Subset—o not allow one to tink anything intrinsic. In every case, the ‘lement and the subse re pare multiples. What varlsts their positon alone with regard to the multiple In one case (the case), the muphe falls under the count-a-one which isthe other mule. In the other ease {the case) every element presented by the fist multiple ialso presented by the second. But being-mulipe emains completely unaffected by these Aistnctons of relative position, ‘the power-set axiom also helps to daify the ontological neutrality of the distinction between belonging and inclusion. What does this axiom state (Meditation 5)? That if seta exis (is presente) then there also exists the set of alls subsets. What this axiom—the most radical, and in {ts effects. the most enigmatic of axioms and I will come back to this at Tength)—effirms scat between and c there sat least the correlation that all he multiples inluded in a supposedly exiting a Belong to af that is they form ase, a multiple counted-as-one: (WayBAILOM Ny © BO be aT ‘Given a the set whose exlstence ie alfrmed here, these of subsets of wil be written pa). One can thus also write: Dai “Te Pom oF excess epale bce ‘the dialectic which is knotted together here, that of belonging and Inclusion, extends the poser ofthe count-as-one ro what, ia multiple, fan be distinguished in terms of internal mullple-presemtatons tht is ‘emapositons of counts already’ posible the inital presentaton, on the fuss ofthe same multiplicities as those presented in the initial multe. "as ne sallsee later tis of capital importance that in doing so the axiom, es not introduce a spedal operation, nor any primitive teaton other than that of belonging. Indeed, as we have sen, incksion can be defined ‘on the bass of belonging alone, Wherever I write 8a, Levuld decide not abbreviate and wate: (yIly€ #) -» 6 € a). This amounts to saying that even if for commodity’s sake we sometimes use the word “par 10 designate a subse there is no more a concept of @ whole, and thus ofa part. than theze Isa concept ofthe one. There is solely the relation of, belonging ‘The stp) ofall the subsets ofthese ais «multiline fom «ite, This cuca point indicates how false itis to sometimes think of a5 forming a one out of ts elements (belonging) and sometimes asthe whole ‘of isparts inlusion), The set of mails tha belong to ais nothing other than a self, muliple-presentation of multiples. The set of multiples induded ina, or subsets of «, 15 2 mew multiple, ph), whose exis tence—once that of « is supposed—is solely guaranteed by a special ‘ontological Ide: the power-set axiom. The gap between «(which counts sone the belongings, oF elements) and pb) (which counts-as-one the Inclusions, or subsets) sas we shall ee the pint in which the impasse of being resides. Finally, belonging and inclusion, with regard tothe multiple a concern ‘wo distinct operators of counting, and not two diferent ways to think the being ofthe multiple. The structure off asl, which forms a one out ‘ofall the multiples which belong to The set of al the subsets of 0) forms a one out ofall the multiples included ine, but this second coun, despite being related to absolutely stint fom eitsel Is therefore 2 metastucture, another count, which ‘completes’ the ist in that it fathers together all the sub-compesiions of intemal miles, all the Inclusions. The powerset axiom posts that this second count this rmetasructre, always exists if the fist count, or prsentative structut, ‘exits, Meditation 8 will address the necessity of this reduplication orBEING AND EVENT requirement-—counering the danger of the void—that every count-as-one be doubled by 2 count of the count, that every structure call upon 3 inctasiruetute. As always, the mathematical axiom system doesnot think this necesiy athe, dees ‘However, there is an immediate consequence of this decision: the gap between strucute and metastrucure, between element and subse, between belonging and incision, Isa permanent question for thought 8 Intellectoal provacation of being. # said that «and pe) were distinc. 19 what measure? With what elles? This point, aparently technica, will, lead us al the way tothe Subject and to truth. What i sure, in any’ cas is that no multiple a can coincide with these ofits subsets. Belonging and incision inthe order of being-existen, ate ireducbly disjunct. This, as swe shal ee is demonsrated by mathematical ontology. 2. THE THEOREM OF THE POINT OF EXCESS ‘The question heres that of establishing that gven a presented multiple the ‘one-mutipe compose rom its subsets, whose existence i guaranteed by the povser-set axiom, is esentally large’ than the inal multiple, This ‘a eruial ontological theorem, whch lead ro areal impasse: ii erally impossible to asign a measure” to ths superiority in ie In other wor, the “passage to the set of subset isan operation in abot excess ofthe situation tse ‘We must beyin at the beginning. and show that the multiple of the subsets ofa set necesatily contains atleast one multiple which does not Delong to the intial set, We wil term this ae thearem of the point of ees ‘ake a supposed ening multiple a Les conser, amongst the mul ples that «forms into a one—al the Bs suh that a—those which ave the property of not being ‘elements of themselves’ thats, which do not present themselves as multiples in the one-presentation that they are Tm shor, we find here, again, the basis of Russells paradox (cl ‘Meditation 3). These mulpls f therefore fist posess the property of belonging t0 2, = «), and second the property of not belonging to themselves, ~@€ 8. ‘Lets er the mulkiplictes which posses the propety of not belonging to themseives (-(2 © 8)} ordinary mulipicties, and for reasons made ‘Te pownr oF excess ‘deat in Meditation 17, those which belong to themselves (8 « 8) eval ‘multiplicities. ake all the cements of « which are ordinary. The results obviously a subset of the ‘ordinary’ subse. This subset is a mulkple which we can {ally A simple convention one which {il use often—Is that of writing i/ _-ft designate the multiple made up of al che s which have this ‘rthat property. Thus, fr example, the set of all ordinary elements ofa, fan be swriten: y= If / Be a & “Be A}. Once we suppose that «exis, {also nists, bythe axiom of separation (: Meditation 3):1 Separate ine “atthe 5 which have the propery of being ordinary. thereby obtain an ‘entng part of , Let's ten this par the ordinary subset of Since 7 hiuded in a, Ca) 7 Belongs to the set of subsets of be po. But, on the other and, yds nor belong 10 a set I did belong to that is ifwe had y€ then one of two things would come to pass. Either ‘is ordinary = € 9) and it thus belongs tothe ordinary subset of the Subset whlch is nothing other than y sell In that case, we have y € ‘which means y i evental, Bu fit venta, such that» € y. being an ‘ement of the ordinary subst y thas to Be ordinary. This equivalence for y of € y) the evental and ~fy © »). the ordinary, is a formal oniradicion I obliges us to reject the inl hypothests: thus. y doesnot belong toa. ‘Consequently, there Is always—whatever a Isat least one element (here 7) of ph) which s not an element of e. This i to say, no male i capable offorming-one out of eveything it incude, The statement“ 8 incuded it «then B Belong «i alse forall. Inclusion isin irremediable excess of belonging, In particular, the included subset made up of al the frdinary clements ofa set constitutes a definitive point of excess over the set in question I never Belongs othe ater. ‘The immanent resources of @ presented mulple—if this concepts ‘extended to fs subsete—thus surpass the capac of the count whose resulcone I sell. To nuber this resource another power of counting, fone different trom ise, willbe necessary. The existence of this other ‘Count this other one-mulipl—to which tls time the multiples included. In the fist multiple wil olerate belongings precisely Whats sated in the powerset axiom, ‘Once this axiom is admited, one is reguired to think the gap Between simple presentation and iis species of r-presenation which f the count as-one of subsetsBEING AND EVENT 3. THE VOID AND THE EXCESS ‘what i the retroactive effec of the radial distinction between belonging {and inclusion upon the proper name of being that is the mark ofthe ry set? This atypia ontological question: establish the effect upon {point of being (and the only one we have availabe is 2) of conceptual ‘istinction introduced by an Idea (an axiom) ‘One might expect there toe no effect since the vold doesnot present anything, It seems logical to suppose that the void does not include Anything either: not having any elements, how could it havea subset? This supposition is wrong. The void malntaine with the concept of Inclusion two relations tha are essentially new with respect tothe nut ofits relation with belonging = the vold is a subset of any set iis universally included: ~ the void possesses a subset, which i the void itl Lev examine these two properties. This examination is also an onto logical exercise, which links a thess (the vod as proper name of being) to 4 eral conceptual distinction (belonging and inluson) “The fist property testifies tothe omnipresence of the void. reveals the ‘errancy ofthe vod in all presentation: the vod, to which nothing belongs, is by this very fat included in everything ‘One can inulively gasp the ontological pertinence of tis theorem, ch states: “The void-set sa subset of any set supposed existent,’ For if the void i the unpresemtable pot of being. whose uniciy of inexlstence 1s marked by the existent proper name 2, then no multiple, Dy means of its existence, can prevent this inexistent from placing self within it On the basis of everyting which fot presentable Is inferred thatthe void ‘spresentd everywhere int lack: not, however, a the one-oFis-uniy, 8 immediate mulkiple counted by the one-multiple, but as inion, ‘because subsets ae the very place in which a muliple of nothing can ext, just a the nothing iself ers within the al nthe deductive presentation of this fundamental ontological theorem—in what we wil term the regime ofidelty ofthe ontological ‘tuaton—it is remarkable that it appear as a consequence, of rather a8 8 panicula case, ofthe logial principle ‘x fal sequitur quodibe This not Surprising if we remember that the axiom of the empty set sates, in substance, that there exists 2 negation (here exist a set for which to not belong to sa universal atebute, an attabue of every muliple). On the ‘ass of this true negative statement, its denied in turn—i Its falsely ‘supposed that a multiple belongs to the vokd—one necessarily infers Snything, and in pariolar that this multiple, supposedly capable of belonging to the void. cetainly capable of belonging to any other set. In other words the absurd chimera—or idea without being—of an ‘element (tthe void” implies that ths element-—radcally non-presented of course ould, fit were presented. be an element of any set whatsoever. Hence the satement: “Ifthe void presents a multiple a then any multiple @ ‘whatsoever also present tata,’ One can also say that a multiple which ‘would belong the void would be that uta-nothing that ultra-void with regard 1 which no exitence-muliple could oppose it being presented by sell. Since every belonging which s supposed forthe void is extended ro very multiple, we do not need anything more to conclude: the vod i Indeed included in everything "Tis argument may be formally presented in the following manner: Take the logical tautology “A> (A> B) which isthe principle 1 ‘mentioned above in Latin: fa statement A is false {i have non-A) and if {alirm dhe ater (if post), then follows that anything (any statement -B whatsoever) i true {ets consider the following variation (or particular eas) of this aut ogy: “€ ©) ~ [le € 2) -> fe In which « and p are any multiples ‘whatsoever supposed given, This variation is itself a logical tautology 1s antecedent, © @), is axlomatialy true, becuse no a can belong to the empty set. Therefore ts consequent, (b € 2) > © A]. i equally true, Since a and fare indeterminate free variables, I cat) make my formula universal: (¥a)(¥A)Im © D) ~> f © A}. But what i (¥a)(¥B) [lee @) > fee fl itisnot the very definition ofthe relation of incusion ‘between @ and B the relation @ «9? ‘Consequently my formula amounts to the following: (¥BNI@ & fl which reads, as predicted: of any supposed given muluple B, O is a subset “The void is thus cleanly in a postion af universal inclusion. Tes on this very basis tht its inferred that the void, which has no clement, does however have a subset. Tn the formula (¥)1 c A which marks the universal inclusion ofthe void, the universal quantifier indicates that, without restriction, every ‘existent multiple admits the void as subse. The set isl ran existent Iultiple, the mulipl-of-nothing. Consequently, © i a subset of ise aco. ”BEING ano EvENT [At frst glance this formula is completely enigmati, This because inulvely.and guided by the deficient vocabulary which shodly distin fuishes, va the vague image of *being-insie’, between belonging and Inclusion, i seems a8 though we have, by this inclusion “filled” the void ‘with something. Bu thisis not the case, Only Belonging. the unique and ‘Supreme Idea ofthe presented-muluiple, ‘Bll’ presentation. Moreover, tt would indeed be absurd to imagine that the void can belong to sell a hich would be writen @ ¢ @—because nothing belongs toi, But in realty the statement @ = @ solely announces that everything which i presented, including the proper name of the unpreseniable, forms a subset of itsell, dhe ‘maxima’ subset. This reduplcation of identity by inctusion i ‘ho more scandalous when one writes @ ¢ 2 than its when one writes {2c a (which tue in all cases). Tha this maximal subset ofthe void i fel Wold Is the leas of things ‘Now given that the vold admits at least one subset—isel—shere Is reason t believe thatthe power set axiom can be applied here: there must ‘exist since 2 exits, the set of is subsets, p(2). Structure of the nothing the name of the void cally upon a metastructure which counts is subset “The set of subsets ofthe void isthe set to which everything ined in the void belongs. But only the vold Is included in the void: @ c 2. ‘Theretore, pi), st of subsets ofthe vod, i that mutple to which the void, and the void alone, Belongs. Mind! The set to which the void alone belongs cannot be the void self, because nothing Belongs to the void. not ‘even the vod sell I would already be excessive forthe vold to have an ‘lement, One could object: bit given that this element is void there i no problem. Not This clement would not be the vidas the nothing that iti, {the unpresentable It would be the name of the vold, the existent mak fof the unpresentale. The void would no longer be vod if its name belonged to it. Certainly, the name ofthe vold can be incided in the void, ‘which amounts to saying that, i the situation, tis equal to the vol, since the unpresentable i solely presented by its name. Yet, equal tits name, the void cannot make a one out of is name without diferentatng itself from itself and thus becoming 2 non-void. ‘Consequently, the set of subsets ofthe voids the non-empty set whose tanique element is the name of the vold. From now on we will write {fuefu +f} forthe et which composed of (which makesa one out ‘ol the marked sets between the braces, In total the elements ofthis set are Drecsely i, fo, ee. Since pi) has as is unique clement @, this fives ts: p(2) = (2), which evidently implies @ € pi) However let's examine ths new se closely, p(2), our second exstent- multiple in the ‘genealogical framework ofthe set-theory axiomatic Ii ‘writen (2), and 2 sit soe element, fine. But fis of all what signified bythe void being an element ofa multiple? We understood that 9 was a subset of any supposed existent multiple, but ‘element’? Moreover, this must mean, it being matter of (2, that @ is both subset and element included and belonging—that we have @ <[2} and also 2 ¢ {2}, Doesn't this infringe the rule according to which belonging and inclusion cannot coincide? Secondly, and more seriously this multiple (2] basa ts unique flement the namte-othe-void, @ Therefore, woulda't this be, gute Simply, the one whose very being we daimed 0 call into question? ‘There is 2 simple esponse tothe frst question, The void does not have any element ils thus unpresentable, and We are concerned with its proper name alone, which presents being in its lack. Is not the “voi ‘which belongs to the set (2). because the void belongs to no presented ‘multiple, being the Beng itself of mulipe-presentaion. What belongs to this set the proper name which constitutes the suture-to-being ofthe axiomatic presetaton ofthe pre multiple; tha is the presentation of presentation, ‘The second question isnot dangerous either, The non-coincdence of inclusion and belonging signifies that there I an excess of inclusion over belonging thats smpossibe that every part ofa mulple belongs to it (On the other hand tis in no way ruled out shat everything which belongs to a multiple is also included init The implicatve dissymmetry travels in ‘one direction alone. The statement (Yl 8) fe #)] i cern abe for any multiple # (Cheorem ofthe point of excess} However the ‘inverse statement: (alt © £) — &< A] cat be true, for certain multiples. Ii particularly true forthe set [2}, because its unigue element, 2, isalso one Of is subsets, 2 being universally incuded. There s no paradox here, rather a singular propery of (2) Tow come t0 the third question, shih clastes the problem of the One. 4, ONE, COUNT-AS-ONE, UNICITY AND FORMING-INTO:ONE. ‘Ter are four meanings concealed beneath the single signifier ‘one’. Their dliferentiation—a task in which mathematical ontology proves to be &BEING AND EVENT powerful toolserves to clay a numberof speculative, and in particu, Hegclisn, apo “De one a sch as sal, ks not Tt always the result ofa count the cffect ofa structure, because the presentaive form in which all access to being fs tobe had isthe mullple, as mulipe of multiples. As such, inset theory, what L court as one under the name of a set sis multiple femultipes, 1s thas necessary to distinguish the cuntarone,o strc (nhlch produces the one at a nominal sea of the multiple, and che one a {ect sehosefsive being is maintained solely bythe structural retrosetion ‘whlch itis considered. Inthe case of the null-set, the count-as-one “Consistsin fling proper name for the negation of any presented multiple thus a proper name for the unpresentabe, The fictive one-ffect occurs inten, via a shorteut whose danger has already been mentioned, 1 allow Inyetf to say that 2s" vod, thereby assigning the predicate of the one torte sutate-to-being that ithe name, and presenting the unpresentable (a such, The mathematical theory itself is more rigorous in ts paradox: Speaking ofthe ‘void-et ft maintains that this ame, which does not present anything. is nevertheless that of a multiple, once, as name iti Submited to the axiomatic Ideas ofthe multiple is or uni its nota being but a predicate of the mull. 1 belongs to the regime ofthe same and the othe, such ais law is instituted by any ‘euctre. A muliple is ungue inasmuch a iti other than any other. The {theologians besides, alteady knew chat the thesis “God 8 One" quite diferent from the thesis "God 1s unigue,’ In Christan theology, for ‘cxample, the tplety ofthe person of God i intemal othe dialectic of the ‘One, but it never atects bis unety(mono-theism). Thus, the name ofthe Void ting unigue, once it retroactively generated as a-name for the ‘ulkple-of-nothing does not signify In any manner thatthe void is oe. I solely signifies that. given that the vold, unpresenable’ is solely presented asa name, the existence of “several names would be incompat [be with the extensional regime of the same and the other, and would in fac constain us to presuppose the Being ofthe one, even if tbe in the mode of one-void, or pure atoms. nally. ti always possible to count as one an already counted one rmultipie that is to apply the count to the one-resut of the count Ths mounts, in fact. to submiting to the lv in tur, the names that i produces ay sealol-the-one forthe presented multiple. In other words [ny name, which maks thatthe one eeslts from an operation, can be taker in the situation as a multiple to be counted as one, The reason for {HE POUT OF EXCESS. thls thatthe one, such as it accus ia the effect of structure upon the tltpe, and causes to consis, not wanscendent to presentation. AS oon as it esl, the one i resented in turn an taken aterm, thus 5 { muliple. The operation by which the la indefinitely submits to iselt fhe one which it produces, counting ts one-up, term fering int ‘ne, Forming-into-one is not realy distinet from the count-asone: ti rather a modality ofthe latter which one can use to describe the count r-one applying itself to a resultone. 1s lear that forming-into-one Confers no tore being upon the one than does the count, Here agin, the being-ofthe-one fs a retroactive fiction, and what is presented always remains 2 muliple, even be ita multiple of names. Tan thus consider thatthe set [2], which counts-as-one the result of ‘he originary count-—the one-moliple which isthe name ofthe void—is, the forming into-one ofthis name, Therein the one acquires no further ‘being than that conferred upon it operationally by being the structural seal of the multiple. Furthermore, (2) is a multiple, a set. It so happens that, ‘what belongs to. 2, i unique, thats al. But unity Is not the one. [Note that once the exstence of (2}—the forming-into-one of 2s suarantced via the power-et axiom applied tothe name of the void, then the operation offorming-nto-one is uniformly applicable to any multiple already supposed existent. tis here that the value of the axiom of replacement becomes evident (ct: Meditation 5). tn substance this axiom states that sa multiple exists, then there also exist the multiple obtained by replacing each ofthe elements ofthe fist by ther existing multiples ‘Consequently fin (2), which exists, I"eplae’ @ bythe supposed existent set 1 get (5) that the set whose unique element Is 8. This set exists because the axiom of replacement guarantees the permanence of the ‘existent one-multple for any tem-by-term substitution of what belongs to a ‘We thus find ourseives in posession of ou fist derived lw within the framework of axiomatic set theory f the mukiple& exis (ls presented), then the multiple [6 also presented. to which 8 alone belongs, in other ‘words the name-one# thatthe multiple which its received, having been ‘ounted-as-one, This law, 8 [2s the forming-into-one ofthe multiple 4 the latter already being the one-mile which results fom a count. We ‘will term the multiple (3) resulcone ofthe foming-nto-one the singleton of. ‘The set (i thus simply the fist singleton.| ene AND evENT ‘To conclude, let's note that because forang-Into-one ia lw applicable to any existing multiple, and the singleton (2 exis, the later forming iimovone. which iso ay dhe forming-nto-one of the forming-into-one of 2, also exists: (2) -» {2}. This singleton ofthe singleton ofthe vod has, hike every singleton, one sole clement. However, this element is not, but {2}, and these wo sets, acording to the axiom of extension, ae dilleret. Indeed, B isan element of (2) rather than being an element of 2. Finaly, ie appears that {2} and {\2 are also ifferentthemseves This i where the unlimited production of new multiples commences, each drawn from the void by the combined elfect of che poser-set fxiom-—because the name ofthe voids apart of iself—and forming io- "The Ideas thereby authorize that starting from one simple proper name alone—that, subtractive, of being—the complex proper names die ‘emtiate themselves, thanks to which ones marked out that on the bass of Which the presentation ofan infinity of muliples structures sel MEDITATION EIGHT The State, or Metastructure, and the Typology of Being (normality, singularity, excrescence) All multiple-presentation is exposed tothe danger of the void: the void is its being. The consistency of the multiple amounts to the following: the void, which isthe name of inconsistency inthe situation (unde the aw of the count-as-one), cannot, i sel, be presnted or fixed. What Heldegger names the care of being. whichis the ecstasy of beings, could also be termed the situational anxiety af the voi, or the necessity of waning off the void. The apparent solidity of the world of presentation is merely a result ofthe ation ofstructre, even if whi is outside such a result. 1 {snecessry to prohibit that catastrophe of presentation which would be is ‘encounter wth lis own void, the presentational occurence of incon sistency a such, of the rain ofthe One Evidently the guarantee of consistency (the ‘there is Oneness’) cannot rely on structute or the count-a-one alone to czcumseribe and probibit the errancy ofthe vold fom ng self and being. onthe basis ofthis very fac. as presentation of the unpresentable the ruin of every donation of being and the Figure subjacent to Chaos. The fundamental reason behind this insufficiency that comething, tin presentation escapes the count ‘hissomething s nothing ater than the count itself. The ‘theres Oneness ‘sa pure operational result, which transparently revels the very operation from which the result results. thus possible that, subtracted from the ‘count, and by consequence a-structured, the structure isl be the point, where the void is given. In order for the void to be prohibited from resentation, i if esinary the eure Be sacred, thatthe ‘tere is Oneness’ be valid forthe count-asone. The consistency of presentation‘ing Ano evENT thus requires that all structure be doubled bya metastructe which secures the former against any fixation ofthe votd “rhe thesis that al presentation #8 structured rece may appear 10 be complete a prion, But what amounts 1, inthe end, is something that, ‘cach and everybody observes, and whichis philosophically astonishing the being of presentation is inconsistent multiply, but despite this i fnever chaotic. Al am syn is this i on the basis of Chaos not being the form ofthe donation of being that one is obliged to think that there i {Tredupliation of the count-s-ne, The proton of any presentation of the void can only be immediate and constant if this vanishing point of Consistent maltipiity-—which precisely its consistency 2 operational fesull—is, in tum, stopped up, or closed, by a countas-one of the ‘operation sell» count ofthe count, a metasructure T ywould add that the investigation of any effective situation (any region ‘of structured presentation), whether it be natural or historical, eveas the teal operation of the second count, On this point, concrete analysis Converges wth the philosophical theme: al situations are structured rie. ‘Tis also means: there is always bh presentation and representation. To {hin this point sto think the requisites ofthe erranc ofthe void, ofthe hon-presemation of inconsistency, and ofthe danger that being-qua-being represents: hang presentation. ‘The ansety ofthe voi, otherwise known as the care of being can thus he recognized, in all presentation, inthe fllowing: the structure of the count is reduplcated in order to verify itself ro vouch that its effets, fr the entire duration of its exercise, are complete, and 0 unceasingly bring the one ito being within the un-encounterable danger of the void. ANY ‘operation ofthe countas-one (of tems) sin some manner doubled by 8 fount of the count, which guarantees, at every moment, that the gap between the consistent mulple (such that i results, composed of ones) and the inconsistent mile (which i solely the presupposition ofthe ‘oid ad doesnot present anything) s vertably null. 1c hus ensutes tht there Is no possibility ofthat disaster of presentation ever occurring which ‘would be the presentational occurence, in torsion, of the stracture’s own vo "The structure of structure i esponsble for establishing in danger ofthe void, shat itis universally attested that n the situation, the one i. ‘necessity resides entirely im the pot that, given thatthe one isnot i ‘nly onthe basis of ts operational characte. exhibited by is double, shat, the one-ffect can deploy the guarantee of is own veracity. This veracity “THE STATE, OR METASTRUCTURE, AND THE TYPOLOGY OF BEING {slterally the ficionalizing ofthe count va the imaginary being conferred tpn it by ie undergoing in tar. the operation of a count "what is induced by the erzancy of the voids that structure—the place ‘of Tsk due to ts pure operational transparency and due to the doubt ‘ceased, a5 for the one, by i having to operate upon the multiple rst tur, be src Bxed within the one, “Any ordinary situation thus contains a structure, both secondary and, supreme, by means of which the count-as-one that structures the situation isin tum counted-as-one, The guarante thatthe one i s thus completed by the follwing: that from which its being proceeds—the count—i ‘means s-one, given that the la ofa structured presentation dittes the Feciprocity of “being” and ‘one’ therein, by means of the consistency ofthe slip ‘Bue to 2 metaphorical afinity with pols that will be explained in Meditation 9,1 will hereinafter term tat of te situation that by means of which the structure ofa situation—of any structured presentation what Severs counted as one, which iso say the one ofthe one-effect itself, for what Hege! calls the One-One ‘What exactly the operational domain ofthe stat of situation? thls retastructure did nothing other than count the terms ofthe shuation it ‘would be indistinguishable from stractre isl. whose ene roe i uch, ‘On the other hand, defining it a8 the count of the count alone isnot sicient ether or rather itmust be acorded thatthe later ca solely be {final result ofthe operations of the state. A stracture is precisely nota term of the situation, and as such it cannot be counted. A structure ‘exhaust self in ts effet, which is tha there is oneness. ‘Metastructute therefore cannot simply e-couat the terms of the situa tion and re-compose consstent multiplicities, nor can it have pure operation a ts operational domain thats it cannot have forming # one ut of the onevelet ass direct roe. he question s approached from the other sde—that ofthe concer of the void, and the risk it represents fo truture—we can say the following the void—whose spectre must be exorcised by declaring that structural Integrity & integral, by bestowing upon stricture, and thus the one. being-o.tse—as f mentioned, canbe neither local nor global. Tere is no tisk ofthe vod being term (since iis the Idea of what i subtracted from ‘he count, nor it possible fort tobe the whole (since iis precisely the thing of his whole). I there is sk ofthe voi, tis neither a loca sk (inthe sense of « term) nor si global skin the sense of the structural 9sNG AND EVENT Integral ofthe station), What i there Being nether local nor soba tsich could deinit the domain of operation forthe second and supreme “Countas-one the count that defines the state ofthe situation? Initely, ‘ne would respond that there ae parts of a station, being neither points nor the whole "Yeu conceptually speaking, what is a ‘pan’? The fist count, the structure, allows the designation within the stuavion of ferms that are ‘Sne-mulipes, tht consistent multpicies. A ‘par’ is intltively a multiple which would be composed in tm of such multiplies. ‘pat frould generate compositions out of the very multiplies that the ‘eucture composes under the sign ofthe one. A pact is a sub-maltiple ‘But we must be very catefol ere: eer this ‘new’ motile, which 2 ‘subsmultiple, could forma one in the sense of structure, and so in truth it would merely be a term a composed tem. granted, but dhen so ae they {HL That this term be composed of alzeady composed multiples, an that all ‘ofthis be sealed bythe one, ithe ordinary effect of siuctue. OF on the “her hand tis ‘new multiple may not form a one; consequent inthe Siuation, it would purely and simply not exit nthe interest of simplifying thought ler's directly import set theory categories (Metitation 7. Let say that a consistent multiplicity, counted Ss one, Belongs toa situation, and that a su-mulile, a composition of Comsstent multplicies. is nluded ina situation. Only what belongs tothe Situation Is presented. If what is inluded is presented, itis because it belongs Inversely, ta sub-maltple doesnot belong to the situation, ican ‘efinitely besa to be abstractly “ncuded? inthe later: snot, in fat, presented ‘Apparently, ether a sub-mulipe, because it is counted-as-one in the situation, fsonly aterm and thet 0 reason to introduce a new concept ‘ritis not counted, and it doesnot exist. Again there would be no reason to introduce a new concept, save it were possible that what -exiss in this manner is the very place of the rk ofthe vo. If inclusion can be tistnguished from belonging, there not some part, some non-unifed istence lends a latent ‘composition of consistent multiplicities, whose i figure to the void? The pure erzancy ofthe vod i one thing: tf quite another to reali that the vol, conceived asthe imi ofthe one, could i fact “ake place” within the inexistence of 2 composition of consent ‘muliplictes upon which stecture has failed to confer the seal ofthe In shor fit smethera one-term nor the whole, dhe void would seem to have its place amongst the sub-muliples oF pars: However the problem with this ide is that structure could well be ‘capable of conferring the one upon everything found within It that i ‘compost from composidons. Our ene afc Isbased on the distinction ‘perween belonging and inclusion. But why not pose that any composition ‘of consstent multiples is in turn, consistent, which is to say granted ‘one-exstence in the situation? And tha by consequence incision implies belonging? For the fist time we have to employ here an ontological theorem. as demonstrated in Meditation 7; the theorem ofthe point of excess. This ‘theorem esiabishes that within the framework ofthe pure theory ofthe rll or se theory, is lrmally Impossible, whatever the situation be for eveything whichis Included (every subset) to belong tothe situation. ‘There i an irvemediable excess of sub-mulpes over terms. Applied toa sitwation—in which to belong” means: tobe a consistent multiple, thus to ‘be presented, oro exist—the theorem of the point of excess simply states there are always sul-multiples which, despite beng included in a situation 5 compositions of maiplices, cannot he counted tn that stuation as terms, and which therefore do not exis. ‘We are thus ed back tothe point tha ‘pars'—if we choose this simple word whose precise sense, disengaged rom the dialectic of parts and the ‘whole, ‘sub-muliple'must be recogalzed asthe place in which the ‘void may receive the latent form of Being: because there are always pars ‘which n-exst in astuation and which ae thus subuacted from the one {An inexistent part isthe possible support ofthe fllowing—wwhich would ruin structure—the one, somewhere, isnot, inconsistency I the law of being the esence of structure isthe vod ‘The definition ofthe sate fa stuationis then darted immediately. The oman of metres parts: metateuctre guarantees that the one holds for inclusion, just asthe inal structure hols for belonging. Put more precisely, given a station awhose stricture delves consistent one~ ‘multiples, there is always a metasructre—the slate of the situation hich counts as one any composition of these consistent multiplets. ‘What i nuded in station belongs os state. The breach is thereby epsred ia which the eraney of the void could have fixed itself co the ‘multiple, in the inconsistent mode of a non-counted part. Every part, receives the scal of the one fom the sate. ”‘ENG AND EVENT by he same token, it is true, as fl result that the frst count. the sueuctre, s counted by te state tis evident that amongst ll he ‘pars there isthe “otal par, which & 10 say the complete set of everything generated bythe inal structure in terms of consistent multiplicities, of ‘verything it eounts as one Ht the state steutures the entire mile of parts then this toaity ao Belongs tof. The completeness of the inal ‘ne-effee is thus definitly In tur, counted as one by the state in the form of etlecive whole “Pe stte ofa situation ithe sipost to the void obtained by the count as-one of is pants. This riposte is apparently complete, since it both thumbers what the fist structure allows to in-exist (supernumerary pats. the excess of inclusion over belonging) and, finally, it generates the One ‘One by numbering structural completeness isl. Thus. for both poles of the danger ofthe void the in-existent or inconsistent mile and the Iransparent opeationaty ofthe one, the sat ofthe situation proposes a Clause of closure and security, through which the situation consists “according to the one. Tiss certain the resource of the state alone permits the outright affirmation tha. in situations, the one i "We should note thatthe state sa structure which i tsnskally separate ‘om the original structure ofthe situation. According to the theorem of the point of exces, parts exist which in-exst for the original structure, yet which belong to the state's one-ffect the reason being that the late fundamentally dstine from any of the inilal structure's effec. In an fondinary situation, special operators would thus certainly be required, ‘characters of the state: operators capable of yielding the one of those parts which ate subtracted from the stuation’scount-as-one, ‘On the other hand, the state is always that ofa situation: what i presents, under te sign ofthe one, as consistent multiples isin warn Solely composed of what the situation presents since what i incuded i ‘composed of one-multples which Belong. "As such, the sate of a situation can either be sald to be separate (oF ranscendent) or tobe attached (or immanent) with regard tothe situation land is native structure, This connection beween the separated and the attached characterizes the state a5 metasructure, count ofthe count, OF fone ofthe one. Its by means ofthe state that structured presentation i furnished with a fictional bing: the later bantshes, or soit appears. the perl of the void, and establishes the reign, since completeness is num Dered ofthe universal security ofthe one. ‘TE STATE, OR METASTRUCTURE, AND THE TYPOLOGY OF BEING “The degree of connection between the native stracture ofa station and sus statist metastrctue is varable. Ths question ofa gap the Key tothe analysis of Being ofthe typology of mulples-in-stuation, ‘Once counted as one in a situation, a mulple finds iself presented therein. If is also counted as one by the metastructure, oF state ofthe situation then itis appropriate say that tis represented. This means that {ebelongs tothe situation (presentation, and that i equally included in the stuation (representation), Isa term-part Inversely the theorem of the point of excess indicates that there are included represented) multi ples which are not presented (witch do not belong). These mulpes are pnts and not terms. Finally there age presented terms which are not represented, because they do not constitute a part of the situation, but solely one ofits immediate terms. Tl cal normal a term which is both presented and represented. 1 will call exresence aterm whch is represented but not presented. Finally Ell term spur er which i presented but not represented, Ie has always been known that the investigation of beings (hus. of what ‘5 presented) passes bythe filter of the presentation/representaion dias Jectic. In our logic—based dlectly om a hypothesis concerning being normality, singularity and excrescence, linked to the gap between structure and metastructure, or between belonging and inclusion form the Aecive concep of typology ofthe donations of being, "Normality cnsit nthe te-securing ofthe originary one by the state of| ‘he situation in which that one is presented, Note that 2 normal term i found both in presentation (it belongs) and in representation (it i included) Singular terms ae subject othe one-elfet, bur they cannot be grasped as parts because they are composed, 88 multiples, of elements which are not accepted by the count, In other words, asinglae term i definitely 2 ‘one-muliple ofthe station, butt is‘indecompossble inasmuch as what itis composed of, ora least part ofthe later. not presented anywhere Inthe station in a separate manner. This term, unifying ingredients which fare not necesitly themselves terms, cannot be considered. 2 part ‘Although i belongs to, sistem eannot be included inthe situation. As such, an indecomposable term will not be r-secured by the sate. For the state, not being a part this term is actually not one, despite it being evidently one in the station, To pu it dllerently: ths tem exits—it presented-—tbut is existence is not directly veried by the stateBEING AND EVENT ‘existence I ony vere inasmuch as its ‘cars! by parts that exceed it ‘The state will ot have to tester this term as one-of-he state. nally, an excrescence isa one ofthe state that is nota one af the native sinueture an existent ofthe state which in-exissin the station of which the sat the state ‘we thus have. within the complete—state-determined—space of a station, three fundatneatal types of one-tenms: the normal, which are resented and represented: the singular, which are presented and not fepreenied: andthe excescent, whic ae represented and not presented “This triad Is inferred om the basi ofthe separation of the state, and by ‘exten, ofthe necessity of is power forthe protection ofthe ne from “ny fxation-within-the-muipl ofthe void. These Uhee types structure Wont fs essentlly at stake in a situation. They are the most primitive Concepts of any experience whatsoever. Their pertinence wil be demon- Steatea inthe following Mestation using the example of historco-poical, situations. (Ol all these inferences, what particular requirements result for the situation of entology? Is evident tat asa theory of presentation it must tho provide a theory ofthe state, which is to sy, mark the distinction between belonging and inlasion and make sense out ofthe count-s5-one Ot puts particulr restiton, however shat of having tobe ‘stateless swith regard 10 isl If indeed there existed a state of the ontological situation. not only would pure multiples be presented therein, but also represented: conse “qoenly hese would be a rupture or an order, between a fist ‘species’ of hulp, those presented by the theory, anda second ‘species che sub Tulips ofthe fist species, whose axiomatic count would be ensured by the state of the ontological situation alone, its theoretleal metastructare, ‘More lmportany, there would be meta-multipes that the state of the situation alone would count as ane, and which would be compositions of Simple-moliples, the latter presented diectly by the theory. Or rather: ‘here would be nw axiom systems, one fr elements and one for pars, one ‘of belonging (2) and the other of inclusion (c). This would certain be Inadequate since the very stake ofthe theory isthe axiomatic presentation fof the multiple of mukiples asthe wnigue general form of presentation. In other words, it inconceivable thatthe implicit presentation of the multiple by the ontological axiom system imply in fact two disjoint axiom Systems, that of structured presentation, and that ofthe state. {WE STATE, OR METASTRUCTURE, AND THE TYPOLOGY OF BEING 1 pat dierent, ontology canst have te own extent amulet ae rprescte war er having. hem pred a ‘ilipis—tecwte what ology reves spree Dy way ol consequence, ology i obged to cont the concept sutn daw al he comsequent of the gap tetecn blogg and Incision and nota nr the rege of at ap con mat a ere heb ay ether prince of umn than hat ogg. the SE ng ta olor mt ped te a at he oe onc ofa pes abet whatve tht mule may be, oly ever tothe ter within the pace of the ama presataon tthe pure ule and hs equiement most be accepted tout nan, ‘he sat ofthe onologelsuaton ths nsepaal. which tos snextet Ts what sed eaton 7 bythe existence of the setosbset lng an som or ane, ie ees a gies nlp The pce tobe pid des nono the state ‘anol fancns ace nol garanted pari noon posta she faaton of the vld cer smehre win the part bi tein, The veld beers nthe otloi apprati thse pa exec bese nothing teen cn nse explon by sel operator othe coun ‘stn rom theo he stato In ch che vo ound In Mediation 7 we that inst theory the vod lvl nde Te neta eatin. on the at font ohenon-eng the cus ee en fan othe to tht ery inci ncn wh he vote already ving sued belong ‘to having to weave with the void alone. "having secre ons ‘he unpreentable void eren sfres the sation to the non septation of sate ao.BEING AND EVENT “ble 1: Concepis relative to the presentation/representation couple ‘ATE OF THE SITUATION Paosop hy SHTUNTION Pritosopy Mathematics Mathematis Tatermofa J—theset@ican |-Thestate — |—thete cxiss a tution is wha] clement ofthe | sccures the | St ofall the arson | seve itiwenters | coumt-as-one of | Subsets ofa fpesents and. | ino the the sub- | given seta ts Rous ac one. | multe ‘lips, or | Sriten: pe Composition of feiethen sid Belongs 1 ubse oF pars tft situation, Wre-ounts the Every element of pty is Subset (English Ts ie writen:| germs ofthe | terminolosy) oF Bee Situation Spare rench inasmuch as | erminology of they ae the set = presented by to belong to | — isthe sign of Such sub situation? | belonging is | multiples, means tobe | the fundamen frceented By | sgn of3et | ="To be included] - To bea subset Ihatsiteation, | theory. allows | in a situation tote one of the| one to think the | means: be ements | pure mltiple | counted by the Structures, | without recourse state of the toe One| situation = tncusion i thus equivalent ~ aclonging is to representation byte state. We ius equivalent to presentation. wvilsay olan) onahe bss of na term indaded hos | hich beans represented ul aso be sad fermthatits tobe an mre Semen we {TE STATE, OR METASTRUCTURE, AND THE TYPOLOGY OF ING ‘Thus it must be understood that iwesenaton, counta-on, suc, Belonging and element ceo ‘the side of the situation; * representation, count of the count, metasructre, Inclusion, subset land part ate om the side ofthe sae of he situation.MEDITATION NINE The State of the Historical-social Situation eee In Mediation 8 1s tat every stvred presentation suppose & Insaco ere ent othe stn pear anenpii eesesca in spot of ins ces that every effec preset say reve nto bested edn of aectire meticebun oui veo xampi of such epee {lSlotnstnc sca stesone he queso of Nae lhe eaten Meat 116 12) Besides the vento fhe once ote state eNom ths tse metiation mall abo provide us wih on a to employ te te catego of pesese-being: normally Shyu, and exceene vrata reat vanes of Mar was no doubt aving unde sts hat he tein essence, doen entertain any rlansp wth ‘Reduats what the dalecic oe exence not at ofthe one of Shorty ode mile of se. rr ats nes isha aad ned ot hat «he da pron wich pevents lable coysttions—dine thc fontem tothe quien of te cncep—om becoming & “Caan wich makes ols sih range domain—in white ‘lea annie, ocean democces) reply orev ae ar monarchies antec i rept) othe ee ‘he tatten often por Moreover isefrsisparar reise alate and elms ole polls ure tov ovate Reine not hnowing ow Umit te suppres. he osastelorededrng enlace What est dees seeds the extension and, talonaly, the unveali—ol te - middleclass. He thus clearly recognizes that real states relate les 10 the social bond than to is un-binding. to its internal oppositions, and that in the end politi does no suit the philosophical larity of the ot! because the sate in is concrete destiny. defines itself less by the balanced place of ‘zens than by the great mases—the pars which are often parties—both ‘empirical and in lux that are constituted by the rich and the poor ‘Marsist thought relates the Stat directly to sub-miples rather han to tem ofthe situation. 1 posits that the count-as-one ensured by the State isnot orginally tha ofthe multiple of individuals, but that ofthe mile ‘of cases of individuals. Even fone abandons the terminology of clases, ‘the formal idea thatthe State—which the state ofthe histrico-sxia situation-—deals with collective subsets and not with individuals remains ‘essential. This Wea must be understood: the essence of the Sat stat of not being obliged to recognize individvals—when its obliged to recognize thom. in concrete eases, ii always according to a principle of counting ‘which doesnot concern the individval such, Even the eercon thatthe State exercises over uch or such an individalbesides being fr the most, part anarchic. unregulated and stupid—does not sigify in any way that the States defined by the coercive ‘imerest that it det at this individual, for at indvidvals in general, This isthe undetying meaning that must be ‘conferred upon the vulgar Marxist dea that ‘the State salivays the State ofthe ruling dass’ The interpretation propose of this eas thatthe State solely exer is domination according oa law destined wo forta-one ou ofthe part of a situation: moreover the role af the Stat iso qualify, one by one, each of the compositions of compositions of multiples whose general consistency n respect of terms is secured by the situation, thai by a historical presentation which ie ‘aleady’ structured ‘The State ts simply the necesary metastucture of every historio-soil situation, which ico say the law that guarantees that ther is Oneness, not in the immediacy of society—that is always provided for by a non-state stricture—but amongst the set of i subsets. I is this one-ellect that Marxism designates when i says that the State Is ‘the State of the ruling las his formula s supposed to signily that the Sate san instrament ‘possessed’ by the rling class. then It meaningless. If does mean Something. Its Inasmuch as the effect of the State—to yeld the one amongst the complex parts of historico-soial presentation always a ‘structure, and inasmuch as its clearly necessary that there be a law ofthe ‘count and thus aenformity off. At the very leas, the term ruling elas! W100 10s