3.

7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

594. The US Principals were minded to see benchmarks as a record of what Iraq had
not done, rather than a headline list of what Saddam Hussein should do.
595. Sir Christopher also advised that the UKs views were best registered directly
by the Prime Minister with President Bush.
596. Mr Blair sent President Bush a six-page Note on 19 February.
597. Mr Blair proposed focusing on the absence of full co-operation and
a simple resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity,
with a side statement defining tough tests of co-operation and a vote
on 14 March to provide a deadline for action.
598. Mr Hoon was not consulted about the approach to be adopted.
599. Mr Blair sent President Bush a sixpage Note on 19 February.164
600. Mr Blair stated that it was a defining moment in EU/US relations and in
the future direction of Europe. He wrote that it was apparent to me from the EU
summit that France wants to make this a crucial test: is Europe Americas partner
or competitor? For the first time a strong bloc prepared to challenge France
and Germany was emerging.
601. Mr Blair wrote that European public opinion seemed to favour France and
that was being used to embarrass the proUS case, to inhibit the proUS leaders.
Those leaders had been:
remarkably firm in the face of really difficult polls and demonstrations.
But the issue will be this: is it the US that is forced to go it alone with the UK,
or is it France that is left isolated with a choice as to whether to use its veto?
That is in turn a function of where public opinion is outside the US.
602. Mr Blair added that was far more nuanced than people think. In his view, public
opinion outside the US was:
not against conflict in all circumstances. What they fear is that we are hell bent
on war, come what may, that we dont really want the UN to succeed.
603. Mr Blair wrote that fear was absurd:
The issue of time for the inspections has become vicariously, the focus for
this sentiment. At the heart of this is a confusion between active and passive
cooperation. The duty on Saddam is to cooperate fully; ie actively to help the
Inspectors. If he isnt hes in breach. But the France/Germany view too much
shared by others on the Security Council is that the inspectors should have
164

Letter Manning to Rice, 19 February 2003, Iraq attaching Note [Blair to Bush], [undated], Note.

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the time they need to sniff out the weapons and all Saddam needs to do is to
offer passive cooperation, ie the absence of obstruction. Obviously if this is right,
they could be there for months or years.
604. Mr Blair added:
Our view, which is correct is that time is irrelevant unless he [Saddam] is
cooperating fully and actively. If he isnt, the time needed is just the time necessary
to make a judgement as to his cooperation: is it full or not? And actually, no one
is seriously suggesting Saddam is cooperating fully.
605. Mr Blair wrote that Dr Blix unfortunately embodied that confusion. His report
to the Security Council on 14 February never suggested there was full cooperation;
indeed the opposite. But the tone seemed to imply that because Saddam was
cooperating more on process, that was an improvement despite the fact that there
was no cooperation on substance.
606. Mr Blair reported that recent conversations with Dr Blix showed that he was aware
of this problem, and is prepared to countenance a definitive judgement and was shocked
at how negatively for the US/UK his report was spun. Mr Blair added: My faith in Blix
is somewhat shaken. But he remains key.
607. Mr Blair suggested:
the trick we need to take is this: we have to find a way of refocusing the issue
on the absence of full cooperation and do so in a way that pulls public opinion
and the UNSC waverers back to us by showing that we have indeed made every
effort to avoid war.
608. Mr Blair proposed that the US and UK should:

Put down a new resolution soon, probably early next week. That resolution
would be simple and clear and as easy to vote for as we can make it.

Put the resolution to a vote on 14 March, the date France has suggested
for a [Security Council] meeting of Foreign Ministers. That would then become
the deadline for action.

At the same time the resolution was tabled, there would be a side statement
defining the categories of full cooperation: full disclosure of the 1998 leftovers;
witnesses interviewed outside Iraq; destruction of the rocket motors etc. That
should be sufficient if he did it, to amount to a complete and total capitulation
by Saddam. That was the ultimatum.

609. Mr Blair wrote that he would be speaking to Dr Blix the following day to try to tie
him in to accept this is indeed what must happen.

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3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

610. Mr Blair continued that the UK and US should say that:

failure in any respect to meet this test, will amount to noncooperation; that
this is a final attempt by us to disarm Saddam peacefully; that by 14 March it will
be 4 months since 1441, quite long enough to assess whether he is cooperating
or not.
We work like crazy next week to get the UNSC members to agree or at least not
oppose this strategy; and then build the support to carry a majority for 14 March.
611. Mr Blair recognised that there were both advantages and disadvantages in his
proposed approach. The disadvantages were identified as:

The risk that Saddam Hussein might conceivably comply fully but the chances
of this, according to all the intelligence are minimal. If he did comply, it would
still amount to a huge humiliation [to Saddam Hussein].

Saddam Hussein might seem to comply but that was a risk in any event and
by defining noncompliance so clearly the chances of ambiguity would be
minimised.

The start of military action might be delayed by a week: But this is not long and
the blunt truth is that by next Friday i.e. 28 February or even a week later the
chances of securing nine votes are very slim. A weeks wait is worth a resolution;
or at least a majority on the UNSC.

612. Mr Blair saw the advantages as:

putting the US and UK back in the driving seat, with a clear deadline and
ultimatum;

refocusing the debate where it should be on Iraqs duty fully to cooperate;

Above all:

giving the doubters a reason to sign up;

helping the Arab world come on board;
accepting the French date;
allowing the US and UK to show the world we are going to war, not because
we want to, but because we have to; and
{{ show
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the US reaching out;

the UN a fundamental test;

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the Europeans something to rally round; and

{{ When

we do act, it will show we went the last mile for peace.

613. Mr Blair told President Bush:

A successful second resolution would be an enormous success for your diplomacy
over the last few months.

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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

I have never come across an issue in which the dividing line between overwhelming
support and overwhelming opposition is so slender.
614. Mr Blair added that, in the UK, which was reasonably typical of European opinion,
large majorities believed:

Saddam Hussein was a threat and needs disarming;

without the threat of action, he wouldnt disarm; and
in military action if there is a new UN resolution or even without a resolution if
we had a majority of the UNSC ie France would veto and we could still do it.

615. Mr Blair wrote: Around 80 percent in the UK supported an ultimatum and

acknowledged that inspections could only work if Saddam cooperated. Yet a majority
opposed action at that time. The only explanation was that:
they needed to be persuaded that the US and UK would prefer peaceful
disarmament if that were possible. Proving it isnt possible is the huge benefit
of the ultimatum route.
616. Finally, Mr Blair offered two further thoughts:

Publishing the MEPP Road Map would have a massive impact in Europe
and the Arab world.

There was a need to start firming up the humanitarian work for the aftermath
of the conflict and show how we will protect and improve the lives of
Iraqi people.

617. Mr Campbell wrote that the Note had set out the basic strategy: that we put down
a UNSCR, not to push to a vote, instead use it like an ultimatum, give him two weeks
or so to take us to the French date of 14 March.165
618. In their discussion at lunchtime on 19 February, Mr Straw and Secretary Powell
discussed the fact that Dr Blix was not yet ready to say that Iraq was not cooperating
on substance and the difficulties of agreeing a list of tests with him that set the bar
satisfactorily high.166
619. Sir David Manning spoke to Dr Rice before the phone call between Mr Blair and
President Bush on 19 February to explain the UKs thinking. He reported that he had
emphasised yet again that It was critical to give ourselves enough time to secure
nine votes.167

Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.
166
Letter McDonald to Manning, 19 February 2003, Iraq: Foreign Secretarys Conversation with
Colin Powell, 19 February.
167
Letter Manning to McDonald, 19 February 2003, Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice.
165

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9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

38. Sir John Sawers told the Inquiry that Mr Vieira de Mello had identified that, as
well as an interim administration, there might be a need for some form of transitional
government, because a new Constitution would take time to prepare.15 Iraqi politicians
were concerned that the Constitution should not be something that emanated from the
United States and Britain; it should be something that they created themselves.
39. Sir John also told the Inquiry that it had been agreed by early June that a Political
Council, an advisory body but with real powers, was required.16 This needed to
be genuinely accepted by the Iraqis as representative. Over 100 individuals were
considered for membership. Party leaders were told that they should not delegate
membership to their subordinates.
40. Sir John assessed that the UK had quite a lot of influence on the selection of
members, on which Ambassador Bremer was happy for him to take a leading role.17
This was an area in which he thought that he personally and the British political team
added value because:
I was able to work with both Bremer and de Mello in a way which was probably
closer at a personal level than they were able to work with one another.18
41. On 2 June, Mr Blair sent a personal Note to President Bush.19
42. Sir David Manning provided copies to Mr Straw, Mr Hoon, Mr Hoons Private
Secretary and Mr Jonathan Powell (Mr Blairs Chief of Staff) but instructed It must not
go wider.
43. In his Note, Mr Blair wrote that:
I met Jerry Bremer and others in Iraq. He is very impressive, got a real grip and is
doing a great job. But the task is absolutely awesome and Im not at all sure were
geared for it. This is worse than re-building a country from scratch.
We start from a really backward position. In time, it can be sorted. But time counts
against us
My sense is: were going to get there but not quickly enough. And if it falls apart,
everything falls apart in the region.
44. Mr Blair suggested that:

security in Baghdad had to be dealt with at once and police training was vital
and urgent;

Public hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 91-92.

Public hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 92-93.
17
Public hearing, 10 December 2009, page 95.
18
Public hearing, 10 December 2009, page 97.
19
Letter Manning to McDonald, 2 June 2003, Iraq: Prime Ministers Note attaching Note [Blair to Bush],
[undated], Note.
15
16

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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

contracts to rebuild infrastructure had to be let much more quickly;

in general, the CPA needed greater administrative capacity.

the Coalitions communications strategy had to be put on a more energetic

footing; and

45. Mr Blair proposed a small US/UK team with one of our people from our own
circle to act as a rapid conduit to the President and himself, enabling them to clear the
bureaucratic obstacles immediately.
46. Mr Blair concluded his Note by explaining that he would be going back to almost a
war footing in order to restore focus on issues in Iraq.
47. On 3 June, Mr Blair chaired a meeting on Iraq attended by Mr Hoon, Baroness
Amos (the International Development Secretary), Sir Michael Jay (FCO Permanent
Under Secretary), and No.10 officials.20
48. Mr Blair said he had returned from Iraq convinced that an enormous amount
needed to be done. He told those present that:

The CPA lacked grip and organisation, rather than money or staff.

There should be a strong civilian team in the South.

British companies needed to be energised to take up opportunities in Iraq.

The UK should beef up its involvement in the CPA.

There should be a White House/No.10 team to work alongside Mr Sawers and
Ambassador Bremer.
The CPA and US decision-making processes were too slow contracts needed
to be processed faster.

49. Mr Blair also said that he believed Whitehall should go back to a war footing for the
next two to three months, in order to avoid losing the peace in Iraq.
50. Following the meeting, Mr Cannon commissioned a number of papers to be ready
before a further meeting on 6 June, including:

20

a list of 10 to 15 outstanding practical issues for Mr Blair to raise with

President Bush that would make a big difference to the people of Iraq if they
are resolved;

a note from the FCO on what the UK wanted Mr Vieira de Mello to do;
advice on how to improve the Iraqi media; and
advice on a high-calibre replacement for Mr Sawers when his term of
appointment ended.

Letter Cannon to McDonald, 3 June 2003, Iraq: Prime Ministers Meeting, 3 June.

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638. On 31 January, Mr Rycroft informed Mr Blair that, during a visit to Washington

from 30 to 31 January, he had explained that recent comments from Mr Kay, Dr Rice
and Secretary Powell had been damaging in the UK.351 He had also argued against an
intelligence inquiry, and for maximum transparency and co-ordination if the US decided
to go down that route. There was a strong chance that the US would do so, possibly
very fast.
639. Mr Rycroft advised Mr Blair: You need to raise with Bush at Mondays [2 February]
video conference.
640. On 31 January, Sir David Manning reported growing political pressure on President
Bush to admit intelligence failure and announce an inquiry.352 Asked for his views on
whether there should be an inquiry, President Bush had told the press:
I too, want to know the facts. I want to be able to compare what the Iraq Survey
Group has found with what we thought prior to going into Iraq. One thing is for
certain one thing we do know from Mr Kays testimony, as well as from the
years of intelligence that we had gathered, is that Saddam Hussein was a
growing danger.
641. Sir David Manning advised that President Bushs remarks suggested he was
leaving himself room to set up an inquiry.
642. Mr Blair set out his position on Iraq and WMD in a Note sent to President
Bush on 1 February.
643. Mr Blair recognised the need to learn lessons about the difficulties of
gathering intelligence and that there was a legitimate issue about its accuracy, but
at that stage envisaged asking the ISC to address the issue.
644. On 1 February, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice a Note by the Prime Minister on
Iraq and WMD, to be shown to President Bush before the video conference with Mr Blair
on 2 February.353
645. The Note addressed two issues:

Iraq and WMD; and

WMD as a threat more generally.

Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 January 2004, Visit to Washington.

Telegram 1 Washington to Cabinet Office, 31 January 2004, Intelligence on Iraq WMD: US views,
30 January.
353
Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 1 February 2004, Iraq and WMD attaching Note [Blair to Bush], Note on
WMD.
351
352

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4.4 | The search for WMD

646. On the former, Mr Blair wrote:

We know Saddam had WMD. We know the ISG has not yet found weapons, though
it has found evidence of programmes. The truth is that we anticipated finding the
weapons during or shortly after the conflict. So to say we are surprised at the ISGs
findings is no less than the truth.
The issue of US/UK good faith can be laid to rest. We received the intelligence. We
honestly believed it.
The issue now is: was it right; and if it wasnt, what can we learn about the
difficulties of gathering intelligence in these situations?
What we can say is this:
(a) there is no doubt that Saddam had WMD. It was not just US/UK intelligence
agencies that said so, it was many others around the world. In any event, Saddam
used them. The UN when it left in 1998 found stockpiles unaccounted for. That
is why UN resolution 1441 unanimously described his weapons as a threat to
world peace.
(b) we should exercise some caution in saying definitely no stockpiles now exist. In
the 1990s despite intensive investigation, the full extent of his programmes remained
concealed for years. We know from intelligence pre-war that he intended to conceal
them. The ISG has found ample evidence of an intention to conceal. Look at what
we know now Libya is co-operating, compared with what we could speculate on, on
the basis of intelligence.
I dont concede there are no weapons. But I do concede we expected to find them
sooner and there is plainly a legitimate issue about the accuracy of the intelligence.
(c) let us get it clear what the ISG has said so far and what Dr Kay has said.
The ISG has found:

Evidence of efforts to maintain BW and nuclear capabilities including

equipment, documents and organisms. Teams of scientists were retained to
work on them.

Planning and design work for missiles of up to 1,000km in range.

In 2002, Iraq successfully tested an UAV with a range of 500km.

Equipment and documentation being systematically destroyed

Undeclared laboratories and facilities that have a potential for BW and CW
production, that should have been declared to the UN.

All of these things are a breach of the UN resolutions.

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Therefore, though the ISG have not found evidence of actual weapons, they have
found evidence of programmes. Any of this would have triggered a justification for
conflict.
Dr Kay has said:

He believes no major new production of weapons occurred post-1991.

But some old stockpiles may well exist and the capabilities and
determination remained intact.

That Iraq was a very dangerous place.

He speculates that Saddam may have been told tales about the
programmes or that some stuff moved to Syria.

That the conflict was justified, and

That the US/UK did not interfere with the intelligence.

He makes a claim also that Saddam was trying to manufacture ricin up to the last
minute but UK services at least dont seem to know the provenance of this.
(d) however, in view of the fact that we certainly thought production of new weapons
was continuing and it may be that it wasnt, it is sensible to learn the intelligence
lessons.
Therefore, the US is going to have a Commission of Experts look into it.
The UK will refer the issue back to the Intelligence and Security Committee
Meanwhile the ISG will continue its work on the ground since there are at least
26 million pages of documents and many unvisited sites still to follow up.
647. On the wider threat from WMD, Mr Blair wrote:
Whatever the intelligence from Iraq, let us be in no doubt about the threat.
The threat of terrorism and proliferation of WMD continues. It would be disastrous if
doubts about the strength of intelligence in Iraq blinded us to the danger. We know
that Iran and North Korea are trying to develop nuclear weapons and it is only since
Iraq that real pressure on them has started to pay off.
We now know that Libya was far closer then we thought to nuclear capability and on
CW than we thought; and, since Iraq they are working with us to eliminate it
648. Mr Blair concluded:
If we have to accept that some of the Iraq intelligence was wrong, we will do so.
But let us not either (a) lurch to the opposite extreme and start pretending Iraq
had nothing; or (b) let any intelligence inaccuracy move us off confronting the
WMD issue.

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9.4 | June 2005 to May 2006

Private Office. This time, the discussion would have the specific objective of agreeing a
temporary cease-fire in part of Anbar province in the hope that this would help separate
Sunni nationalists from foreign jihadists and act as a model for similar developments
elsewhere in Iraq. It would be for the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and the
Multi-National Force (MNF) to decide whether any demands made in return for such a
cease-fire could be met.
8. On 6 June, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blairs Foreign Policy Adviser, sent a Note from
Mr Blair to President Bush via Mr Stephen Hadley, the US National Security Advisor.3
9. The Note, which covered a wide range of countries and issues, was a reflection on
a huge opportunity to leave a clear and morally powerful agenda in place when we go.
10. On Iraq, Mr Blair wrote that:
Iraq has been tough and we all know now the reserves of political and military
strength required for any military action. The international community should be
united behind us, urging us on, but theyre not.
11. A brief for the visit by Mr Antony Phillipson, Mr Blairs Private Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, suggested that the key point on Iraq was the need for the US to remain active
and engaged in the detail, after a non-interventionist period between the election and the
formation of the ITG during which we lost valuable momentum.4
12. In practice, that meant the US and UK should press the ITG to deliver Sunni
outreach (including sensitive handling of de-Baathification and a media strategy for the
Sunni community) and be active in reaching out to Sunnis themselves.
13. On 7 June, Mr Blair and President Bush held talks on a range of foreign policy
issues in the White House.5
14. In the discussion on Iraq, Mr Blair said that a stable, secure and democratic Iraq
would have a transforming effect on Iran and Syria. But the increasing tension between
Sunni and Shia needed to be watched. He judged that:
Ultimately, without an improvement in security, little progress could be made.
15. Mr Blair commented that the Iraqiisation process was going OK. Mr Blair and
Sir Nigel Sheinwald indicated that the UK hoped to start reducing troops in the next
12 months, and to make a more significant reduction in Multi-National Division (South
East) (MND(SE)) in the first half of 2006. It was important to stick to the political
timetable, as providing security for the next round of elections was a constraint
on withdrawals.
Letter Sheinwald to Hadley, 6 June 2005, [untitled] attaching Note [Blair] to Bush, [undated], Note to
President Bush.
4
Minute Phillipson to Prime Minister, 3 June 2005, Visit to Washington, 7 June.
5
Letter Phillipson to Adams, 7 June 2005, Prime Ministers talks with President Bush, 7 June.
3

491

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

262. Mr Blair added that the best source of leverage over Prime Minister Maliki was his
desire for the UK not to leave precipitately. He concluded that we should therefore
offer him a timetable, conditional on his securing an acceptable political compact, to
which Muqtada al-Sadr had signed up.
263. ACM Stirrup updated the meeting on the continued good progress in Operation
SINBAD and noted that:
once it had concluded, we would have done as much as we judged militarily
possible in Basra. He noted, however, that it did not deal with the fundamental
problem of militias. The Prime Minister queried whether it could therefore be
effective. CDS [ACM Stirrup] suggested that the militia problem would have to
be dealt with politically.
264. On 9 November, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent a Note from Mr Blair to President Bush
via Mr Hadley.154
265. The Note began:
Our foreign policy is so joined, we both face the same issues. So a Democrat
victory is seen here as a thumping for me as well as you!
266. Mr Blair continued:
my worry is: waiting for Bakers group to come up with a strategy. We should
lead the consensus not simply follow it. Our danger is either being seen for political
reasons, to cave in, which we will never do; or have to be told the answer because
we cant think of it. Actually our strategy is already evolving. Before Baker reports we
should spell out that evolution.
267. Mr Blair explained that strategy for Iraq should include:

a political compact to be published by the Iraqis, committing to non-sectarian

government and ruling out partition of the country, with support from both Sunnis
and Muqtada al-Sadr;

a plan for better governance;

accelerating the plan to complete the formation of the army and police; and
a conditional timescale for withdrawal, focused on Iraqi capability and making
no concessions on democracy.

Letter Sheinwald to Hadley, 9 November 2006, Iraq and the Middle East attaching Note Blair,
9 November 2006, Note.
154

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9.5 | June 2006 to 27 June 2007

268. In addition, Mr Blair argued that a whole Middle East strategy was needed which
would frame the debate on Iraq in terms of the whole region and expose the hostile
intent of Iran. Mr Blair wrote:
The huge benefit in Iraq, of such a strategy, is that it gives us more than what
is happening day to day in Iraq to talk about. That is our problem: it is all events,
ghastly and bloody, unconnected to the underlying strategic cause.
269. President Bush and Mr Blair spoke by video conference the next day joined by
Vice President Dick Cheney, Mr Hadley, Mr Jonathan Powell and Sir Nigel Sheinwald.155
270. Mr Blair set out his view that the UK and US should focus on supporting Prime
Minister Maliki to achieve a national political compact, accelerate assistance to the
ISF, improve the Iraqi Governments ability to deliver resources and bring regional
assistance to bear more effectively.
271. Mr Blair suggested that Prime Minister Maliki should set out his political and
security plans in a way that demonstrated he was in the lead, ideally before the Iraq
Study Group reported, and in such a way that allowed the US and UK to respond
positively.
272. On 13 November, Mr Blair discussed Iraq with ACM Stirrup, Sir Nigel Sheinwald,
Mr McDonald, C, Ms Aldred and officials from No.10.156
273. Mr Blair told those present that the major challenge was ensuring that Maliki had
an effective government apparatus around him, underpinned by capable security forces.
274. ACM Stirrup said that the US had given a lot of thought to the latter point and had
a coherent plan to train the ISF.
275. Mr Blair commissioned Sir Nigel Sheinwald to co-ordinate a plan, drawing on
departmental expertise, which would set out the detail underpinning the Prime Ministers
four point strategy for Iraq, together with a clear sense of who would be responsible for
operationalising each element. Mr Blair recognised that it would need Iraqi, US and
wider international support.
276. That evening, Mr Blair spoke at the annual Lord Mayors banquet in Londons
Guildhall.157 He described the growing pressure from terrorism in Iraq and said:
Just as the situation is evolving, so our strategy should evolve to meet it.
Inside Iraq we should empower the Iraqi leadership that wants to take responsibility
that knows that they, not us, must lead and win the fight against terrorism.

Letter Banner to Hayes, 10 November 2006, Prime Ministers VTC with President Bush, 10 November:
Middle East.
156
Letter Banner to Siddiq, 14 November 2006, Iraq.
157
Prime Ministers Guildhall speech, 13 November 2006.
155

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787. Both Mr Browne and Mr Blair said that reconciliation was the key to success;
the Shia had to be made to understand that the UKs support was conditional on a
non-sectarian future. Mr Blair also briefed Cabinet that British thinking on reconciliation
had had a great impact on the US.
788. On 3 May, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Sir David Manning a strictly personal copy
of a Note from Mr Blair to President Bush setting out his proposals for future coalition
strategy, written in preparation for a video conference the next day.431
789. In his Note, Mr Blair characterised the position as:
Everywhere in the region at present, we are pinned back. We remain strong.
We are not losing. But we are not really able to move forward.
790. Mr Blair argued that Islamist extremists had a coherent political strategy for Iraq
whereas our problem is that we dont. He considered himself and President Bush to be
lone voices, with new politicians keen to distance themselves from past events. As a
result:
People start to think this is a fight we cant win; when in reality it is a fight we have
to win.
791. Despite military successes, Mr Blair wrote that progress was always fragile in the
absence of a big political deal:
For example, in Iraq, we fight on three fronts: the Sunni insurgency; Al Qaida;
Iranian-based Shia militia. I asked our top people the other day: if you took Al Qaida
and Iran out of the situation, ie the external extremists, would Iraq be manageable?
Undoubtedly, they said But whilst we fight on all three fronts, the Sunni insurgents
provide a justification for Shia death squads, and reinforce the Iraqi Governments
fears of a Baathist return; Al Qaida can claim to be counter-attacking the Shia; and
everyone, of course, can blame it on us.
792. In the absence of a big political strategy for the region, Mr Blair wrote that the
news was simply dominated by television pictures of carnage. In response, Mr Blair
saw a need radically to upgrade our political approach across the region, changing the
terms of the debate from whether we can win, to an insistence we have to win.
793. Mr Blair wrote that a new political strategy should have three components;
reconciliation, exposing Iranian support for terrorism whilst offering a chance to alter
and improve the relationship and making progress with the Middle East Peace Process.
On reconciliation, Mr Blair commented that The missing part is the politics and that the
Iraqi Government cant succeed and wont survive without it.

431

Letter Sheinwald to Manning, 3 May 2007, Iraq, attaching Note TB [Blair to Bush], 3 May 2007, Note.

148

9.5 | June 2006 to 27 June 2007

794. Mr Blair added:

Iraq has to be bigger than just Iraq. It has to be part of a more profound and
wider picture. People have to see it as a frontier in a battle across the region and the
world. That is a battle, as you always rightly say, between freedom and extremism,
democracy and terror. But we have to get back onto the front foot politically. I am
absolutely confident it can be done. Even after I go, which will be soon now, I will
help in any way I can.
795. On 3 May, members of the international community gathered in Sharm el-Sheikh,
Egypt to launch the International Compact with Iraq.432 It was formally launched by
Prime Minister Maliki and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The UN described the
Compact as:
a fiveyear national plan that includes benchmarks and mutual commitments
from both Iraq and the international community, all with the aim of helping Iraq on the
path towards peace, sound governance and economic reconstruction.
796. Mr Asquith judged that the Iraqi Government would be seeking headline-catching
support and commitment, notably in terms of debt relief from the Saudis and others and
that a poor response could undermine the willingness of line Ministries in Iraq to take
the Compact seriously and therefore to undertake the reforms that it entails.433
797. Mr Asquith proposed that Mrs Beckett, who led the UK delegation, should
encourage Maliki to develop a mechanism for engaging directly with his Arab
neighbours (eg a personal envoy) and to establish the working groups agreed at the
meeting in Baghdad on 10 March.
798. The launch was followed by a Neighbours Conference on 4 May.
799. Sir David Manning reported US reactions to the meetings on 4 May. His contacts in
the State Department and National Security Council considered that the fact that there
had been no big surprises was itself considered a success.434 Now that the Compact
had been formally launched:
the focus was now on substance: exploiting the Compacts reform road-map and
shifting the dynamic between Iraq and its neighbours. It was not clear the Sharm
meetings had marked any real progress on the latter
800. Mr Blair and President Bush spoke by video conference on 4 May.435 Mr Blair
noted that although there were some positive signs emerging from the Baghdad Security
Press Release United Nations, 27 April 2007, Fact Sheet on the International Compact with Iraq.
eGram 18202 Baghdad to FCO London, 1 May 2005, Iraq: Scenesetter for the Sharm Meetings,
3-4 May.
434
eGram 19048/07 Washington to FCO London, 4 May 2007, Iraq/Sharm Meetings: US Reactions.
435
Letter Banner to Hayes, 4 May 2007, Prime Ministers VTC with President Bush, 4 May:
Middle East issues.
432
433

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