Criminal Procedure Principles

Arrest
People vs Doria January 22, 1999
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[105] The rule is, however, not
absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may
be admissible in the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;[107] (2) search of
a moving motor vehicle;[108] (3) search in violation of customs laws;[109] (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view;[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[111]
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."[115] The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested.[116] A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her
co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named
his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was.[118]
Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the
person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria
may have left the money in her house,[119] with or without her knowledge, with or without any
conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to
believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.[120]
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.[121] The "plain
view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.[122] The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.[123] In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.[124] The object

must be open to eye and hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent.[126]

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may
be seized.[127] In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.[128] It must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[129]
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents.[132] On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same
plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic
wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the
ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed
inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color.[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on crossexamination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know
exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.[134] It
was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The
marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of
the law and the Constitution.[135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and
never considered by the trial court.[136]
People vs. Gerente March 10, 1993
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure for the dried marijuana
leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do not
agree.
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found
the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
"Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. -- A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an

offense, without a search warrant."

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first disarmed.
People vs Sucro March 18, 1991
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U. S. v. Fortaleza, 12
Phil. 472 [1909]; and U. S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the
activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters
away from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk
to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did
three times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going
transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.
The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G. R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that
police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier
conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it stated:
"When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would take
place and while positioned at a street corner, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and Warner
Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from them (the public
officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter handed a wrapped
object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his
abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket (p. 2)
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their testimonies
were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that took place leading to
appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing distance, specially since
conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed tones, but they were certainly near
enough to observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these
prosecution witnesses are all law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly
performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Bati, supra citing
People v. Agapito, G. R. No. 73786, October 12, 1987)
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that
their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Thus, it has

been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, et al. (G. R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991):
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that
the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in
contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports
gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was
touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and
time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to
enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all,
the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search,
which must still be present in such a case."
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:
There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of
probable cause (e. g. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless
searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under
the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting
officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband."
People vs Tonog, Jr. Febuary 4, 1992
The "acid-washed maong" pants (Exh. D) were admissible in evidence. They were taken from
Accused-appellant as an incident of his arrest. It may be that the police officers were not armed with a
warrant when they apprehended Accused-Appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified
under Section 5(b), Rule 133 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer
may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." In this case,
Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him
personally in the course of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the
perpetrators.
The "maong" pants having been taken from Accused-appellant as an incident to a lawful arrest, no
infirmity may be attributed to their seizure without a warrant. Section 12 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides that "A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense."
People vs Montilla January 30, 1998
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.[12] Evidence secured on
the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in

evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and
rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches;[13] (2) searches of moving vehicles,[14] (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view;[15] (4) consented searches;[16] (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17]
and (6) "stop and frisk" measures[18] have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant
applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would
be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this
asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or
contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or
were being brought by someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant,
assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they
could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the
defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is
controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural
areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry
points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early
morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the
barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where
their suspect would show up, and how he would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1
Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations.
Moreover, experience shows that although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law
enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect
from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the
apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law
enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical
problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of
judicial chambers.
On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence
obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal
drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer
with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.[19] On the other hand, the apprehending officer
must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in
cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).[20] These instances have been
applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto.

The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which
must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as
to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue
under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof
that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to
"engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's
probable guilt thereof.[25] It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the
same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a
probable cause exists."[26] It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a
warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when
the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him about the
contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him
to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact
that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either
expressly or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a
warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that
person's regard for the supremacy of the law,[28] the case of herein appellant is evidently different for,
here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being
forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.
[29]
People vs Acol May 17, 2004
With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused-appellant, we are of the view that the search
falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the requisite
warrant prior to arrest:
When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the
crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been
robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And
since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid
(People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the

police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition (People vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in
Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:
. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the
offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus
delicti.
Padilla vs CA March 12, 1997
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person.[29] Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who
then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND
proceeds at once to the scene."[30]
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an
urgent need to render aid or take action.[33] The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit,[34] a fleeing
suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which
speed is essential and delay improvident.[35] The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of
the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.[36] Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession
of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.[37]
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b)
as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of
time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves

at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner,[38]its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang),
and the dented hood and railings thereof.[39] These formed part of the arresting police officer's
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in
the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal
knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.[40]
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid,[44] are as
follows:
1.
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46],
2.

Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]

(a).
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b).
are;

the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they

(c).

the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d).

"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[48]

3.
search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity.[50]
4.

consented warrantless search, and

5.

customs search.

Search
People vs. Malmstedt June 19, 1991
he Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[5] However, where the search is made pursuant to a
lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances:[6]
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,

without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense:
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon
his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[8] The required probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Prudente vs Dayrit December 14, 1989
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally
by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[12]
The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense,[13] and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.[14]
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."[15] This
probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses

he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.[16]

In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed"
that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described
therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his
supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous
surveilance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the
said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his
witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing
the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other
sources or persons.
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short.
Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the
contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in
Quintero vs. NBI,[21] "the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's
witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner,
would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.[22] In the case at bar, the application
for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, more
particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the
Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second
floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional
injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were
several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD
No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." While the said decree punishes several offenses, the
alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As
explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other
words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1866
that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score.
Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3, thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree
is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives:
such illegal possessions of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the
same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D.
No. 1866.

Asian Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs Herrera December 20, 1973
the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of: (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3)
tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of
the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." The
aforequoted provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the same section, is something new.
"There is no precedent on this amendment - prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for
more than one specific offense - either in the American books on Criminal Procedure or in American
decisions."[2] It was applied in the celebrated case of Harry S. Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice[3]
the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the search and seizure of personal
properties so vaguely described and not particularized, thereby infringing the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It also
assails the non-compliance with the above-requirement as likewise openly violative of Section 2 of
Rule 126
What is plain and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the
property he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of
personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the
Rules. The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the
personal properties to be seized.
Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that 'unreasonable searches and seizures' may not be
made.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126
of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes
"B", "B-1", "B-2", B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of
reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle
gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein
the nature and kind of documents contained in the folders of which there were about a thousand of
them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that
the respondents took away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is
not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the broad and unlimited search warrant
issued by respondent Judge as their passport.
The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126.[6] Annex "A" of the
Petition which is the search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual
search was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the

morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities[7]
are of the view that where a search is to be made during the night time, the authority for executing the
same at that time should appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and the
application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the application is so far
remote in time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective.
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and
happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs,
books and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.[1] While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government
Nolasco vs Pano October 8, 1985
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance
of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely
upon them and act in pursuance thereof.[10] Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to
identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the
description of the personalities to be seized, which is identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers
from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely
repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly
administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by
one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of
the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the
criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search
Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on
petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a
person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or
premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a search warrant. In this latter case,
"the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it
has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to
what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched".[12] "What must be
considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention

of crime and the apprehension of criminals."[13]

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public
order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was
arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made
within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the
interest of public order.
Malaloan vs CA

May 6, 1994

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a
search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus
categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated
competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.[4] A
search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court.[5] A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process
akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity.[6]
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by
authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings,[8] or all writs,
warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers.[9] It is likewise held to include
a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his
property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment,[10] or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other process
issuing from a court of justice.[11]
It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond
only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the
latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require
observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no
such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other
than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is aside from the
consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules for delitos
continuados or in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over
the same criminal offense.

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can
issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners position that only the branch of
the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may
be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed,
or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such
criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for
the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to
be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is
necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely,
neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal
case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by
Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's
territorial jurisdiction.
No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such
restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American
jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our
jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten
days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the
issuing judge,[19] said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the
same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set
in our Rules at ten days[20] but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be
enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein which
may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of
jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another
court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This
arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this
very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated
therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed
with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to
the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending
on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction
thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall
be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by
the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion
to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not
otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant
shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary
safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different
informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over
the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such
court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants
incident to the criminal case.

Garaygay vs People July 6, 2000

People v. Woolcock upon which the trial court and the Court of Appeals heavily relied, appeared to
have reverted to Templo v. de la Cruz when this Court said that "the remedy for questioning the validity
of a search warrant can be sought in the court that issued it, not in the sala of another judge of
concurrent jurisdiction." At any rate, the latest jurisprudence on the matter is People v. Court of
Appeals[12] where, as in the present case, the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down in
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals was interpreted. The subject guideline, cited in the reasoning of the trial
court, concerns possible conflicts in the exercise of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in
one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended
to be used as evidence in the criminal case. We clarified the principle in People v. Court of Appeals thus
x x x x Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the
results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a
motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with
the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court
or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not
cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the
other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule
against forum-shopping.

Papa vs. Mago

Febuary 28, 1968

The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect
all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties,
accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds
upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported
from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As
long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of customs. As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of
entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes,
fees and other charges must be in full.
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs
area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were
intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department,
acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by
the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the
goods
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present
case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from
that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then
would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the
Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967.
To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect
render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive
the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis
v. Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings
exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in
nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general
legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield
to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without
any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or

building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched
only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor,
that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.
People vs Burgos

September 4, 1986

The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy
and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a
basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is
not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house
does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental

constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows
that they are inadmissible as evidence.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and
pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of
Rights
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in evidence.
The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and
third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative presumption" that indeed
torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog,
to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late.
It could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
People vs. Aruta

April 3, 1998

In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates
only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the
Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time
prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or
warrants of arrest
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly

construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do
otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of
full protection and vindication yet often violated.
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2.

Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4.

Consented warrantless search;

5.

Customs search;[9]

6.

Stop and Frisk;[10] and

7.

Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise
refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought
are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found
in the place to be searched.[13]

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present.
Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the
person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion
or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit
one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not
acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and
conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant
and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect.
The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger
of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason
whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing
finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of
any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.
As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits
of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the
Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in
order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and
an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law.[18]
While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that
appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias
search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search.
The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the
search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on
the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search.
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or

things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.[30]
People vs. Saycon

September 5, 1994

The general rule, therefore, is that the search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above
constitutional provisions.[6] The evidence secured in the process of search and seizure -- i.e., the "fruits"
thereof -- will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding."[7]
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and
seizure is, however, not absolute. "There are certain exceptions recognized in our law," the Court noted
in People v. Barros.[8] The exception which appears most pertinent in respect of the case at bar is that
relating to the search of moving vehicles.[9]
People vs. Aminnudin

July 6, 1988

Warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court not justified unless the accused was
caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed. The evidence of
probable cause should be determined by a judge and not by law-enforcement agents
Vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can
be secured.
A search cannot be considered an incident of a lawful arrest if there is no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest does not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
The constitutional presumption is that the accused is presumed innocent even if his defense is weak as
long as the prosectuion is not strong enough to convic him.
If the warrantless search was illegal, the evidence obtained is inadmissible. It is the fruit of the
poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

People vs Salanguit April 19, 2001

Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search
warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly
describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge
erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold
that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an
undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for
drug paraphernalia, is not.
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29]the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of "dried
marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This
Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1)
offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive.
He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different
articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for
more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been
three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal
possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This
argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals
specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated"
drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which
belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be
validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.[33] For example, a
search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street,
Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six
apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor.
However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant
that the apartment was occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro
Mass."[34] In this case, the location of accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on
record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.[35]
For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the
evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.[36] The question is
whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives,
it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of
the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for
admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the `plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension
of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them; the `plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to
accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest
is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.[38] The
rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to
commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana
recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no
indication of its contents.

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to

justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.[41] In this case, the marijuana allegedly
found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant
was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible
in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be
doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite
the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the
suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching
party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their
mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
People vs. Maqueda March 22, 1995
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph
of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right ...
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second
paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution was an acceptance of the
landmark doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona.[19] In that
case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but
is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings.
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by
making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person not in custody.
[22] Accordingly, as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted in
People vs. Jose[23] that the rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment. Applying the second
paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule in Morales vs. Enrile:[24]
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his

constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason for the
arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a case
had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court had
issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a
person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense.
This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the present Constitution with the
following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and independent, preferably of his
own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one,
and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel.[25] Thus,
Section 12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall "enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel."
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by
virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting
officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge,[27] and since the court has already
acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement
agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If,
nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand
on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights.
Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation,
but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it
was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on
government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away by
government and that government has the duty to protect;[28] or restrictions on the power of
government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle
that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited."[29] They
are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power,[30] or state tyranny and abuse
of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people,
the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals.[31]

People vs. Espanola April 18, 1997

We now discuss assigned errors numbers 2 and 3. Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it
ruled that the sworn statement of Jimmy Paquingan was voluntarily given by him though he refused to
sign the same. Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible
must satisfy the following requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and
4) the confession must be in writing.[44] In People v. Bandula,[45] we ruled that an extra-judicial
confession must be rejected where there is doubt as to its voluntariness. The fact that appellant
Paquingan did not sign his sworn statement casts serious doubt as to the voluntariness of its execution.
It is inadmissible evidence.
Additionally, the claim of appellant Paquingan that he was not assisted by a counsel of his own choice
when his affidavit of confession was taken is worth noting. Paquingan's sworn statement was taken on
November 25, 1991, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. At that time, an information for rape with homicide
had already been filed against him and his co-appellants. Hence, when Paquingan gave his confession,
Paquingan was no longer under custodial investigation[46] since he was already charged in court.
Nonetheless, the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be considered "critical
stages" in the criminal process.[47] Custodial interrogation before or after charges have been filed and
non-custodial interrogations after the accused has been formally charged are considered to be critical
pretrial stages.[48] The investigation by Fiscal Lagcao of Paquingan after the latter has been formally
charged with the crime of rape with homicide, is a critical pretrial stage during which the right to
counsel applies. The right to counsel means right to competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice.[
Moreover, we hold that Atty. Cahanap cannot qualify as an independent counsel, he being a Legal
Officer of Iligan City. An independent counsel cannot be burdened by any task antithetical to the
interest of an accused. As a legal officer of the city, Atty. Cahanap provides legal assistance and support
to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the
maintenance of peace and order. His office is akin to a prosecutor who undoubtedly cannot represent
the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.
People vs. Serzo Jr. June 20, 1997
The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. This
right is granted to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecutory machinery of the state. In the words of Justice Black,[23] this is a
recognition xxx that an average (accused) does not have the professional skill to protect himself xxx
before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the (prosecutor) is xxx an experienced
and learned counsel.
The right covers the period beginning from custodial investigation, well into the rendition of judgment,
[25] and even on appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right to an accused not only

during trial but even before an information is filed

Recently, Republic Act No. 7438 was enacted providing, inter alia, that any person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a
court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is
immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is
obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the statess and the offended
partys equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the
accuseds option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or
the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a
valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like
Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable[30] so long as (1) the waiver
is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law[31] and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made.[32]
People vs. Ayson

July 7, 1989

It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section,
namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination -- i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself -- set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article
III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American
Constitution;2 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation
for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness
of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self-incrimination, "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been
made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.1
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena,
in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.2 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself."
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.3 It prescribes an "option of refusal to

answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."4 It simply secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e.,
one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions.
It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for
some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.1
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect.1
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these
rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and
waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights."2
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons."3 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is
meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."4 The situation contemplated has
also been more precisely described by this Court.5
** After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange
and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the

officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms then into silence. Section 20 of the
Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance."
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been, would already have been ended at
the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with
respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office),
there is no occasion to speak of his rights while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the
second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious
reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self-incrimination set out in
the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a
specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him.2
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony
or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness."
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled, among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself,1 and
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be crossexamined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner
prejudice or be used against him
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is
the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other
process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a
co-accused, or even for himself.3 In other words -- unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil
action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a
particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him -- the defendant in a criminal action can
refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question.4
And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner
prejudice or be used against him."5
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission
in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some
significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT --1

a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
People vs. Cruz March 30, 1970

That very same afternoon, Angeles Cruz was picked up in front of a moviehouse and brought to
the police station for questioning. He was made to walk and turn around in the presence of
Zenaida and Emma. Cruz was not placed in a police lineup, contrary to standard stationhouse
verification procedure, to test the accuracy of the witnesses' memory, and to afford a mere suspect
a fair chance of early relief from the inconvenience inflicted on one who is mistakenly identified.
Moreover, Zenaida and Emma testified that the several accused, including Cruz, were pointed out
to them as the persons suspected by the police as the perpetrators of the robbery committed in
Goso-on, and as notorious "tough guys" in Butuan City. The identification at the police station
was attended, as the two girls themselves admitted, by a great deal of whispered conversations as
well as by at least one unexplained conference elsewhere in the municipal building, at which they
were present, immediately prior to their being confronted with the accused.
The manner by which Emma and Zenaida were made to identify the accused at the police station was
pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all
told, subverted their reliability as eyewitnesses. This unusual, coarse and highly singular method of
identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the
esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance.

People vs Hatton

June 16, 1992

There is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification by Ongue of the accusedappellant. From his testimony, it is clear that he did not positively identify the accused-appellant.
At the time of the incident he made a very fleeting glance on the person who stabbed the victim.
At that moment, he had the impression that the assailant was a mestizo. During the proceedings
in the police station where he was supposed to identify the assailant, he identified the accusedappellant as allegedly the person who stabbed the deceased, not because he was certain that the
accused-appellant was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the station and
because he was pointed to the policemen as their suspect. The fact is that the accused-appellant
was not identified in a police line-up. He was pointed to by the police as their suspect. He being
the only mestizo in the station, Ongue pointed to him as "the man." From all indications, the
identification of accused-appellant by Ongue was suggested by the police and this is
objectionable.
In the instant case, Hatton was brought to the police station only to be identified, by a witness to
the killing of Algarme. Technically, he was not yet under custodial investigation.

Preliminary Investigation
Rodis, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan

October 26, 1988

Under Section 3, sub-section (d) of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, "if the
respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the
ten (10) day period, the investigating office shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by
the complainant." It is to be noted that this provision does not require as a condition sine qua non
to the validity of the proceedings the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him
were made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him.
The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the
prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics.
It is worthwhile repeating that the avowed purposes of a preliminary investigation are "to secure
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an
open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and
also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.[9] And while the absence of
preliminary investigations does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case (n)or do they
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of
the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted.[10] In this case, the Tanodbayan has the duty to
conduct the said investigation.
Thus, although the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the absence of a preliminary
investigation is not a ground for quashing an information, it should have held the proceedings in
the criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution by the Tanodbayan of petitioner's petition for
reinvestigation, as alternatively prayed for by him in his motion to quash.
During the pendency of the case at bar, petitioner manifested to the Court that in a Joint Order
dated September 26, 1985, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutors Roger C. Berbano, Sr. and Eleuterio
F. Guerrero had recommended that the separate petitions for reinvestigation filed by petitioner
and his co-accused be given due course by the Tanodbayan and that said special prosecutors be
given clearance and authority to conduct such reinvestigation. Although it appears that these
recommendations were approved by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez on October 14,
1985,[12] no further report on this matter has reached the Court. As we cannot assume that the
reinvestigation was indeed conducted as would render the instant petition moot and academic,
and considering the importance of the issue involved, we deemed it proper to decide the petition
on the merits.
Paderanga vs. Drilon

April 19, 1991

Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that
of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken

in jeopardy.[8
Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation
should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this
view. Absence of a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but
merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently
waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate court."[12]
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to crossexamine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counteraffidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if
petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they
were presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he
cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely
because such right was never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said
testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the
preliminary investigation.
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan

January 28, 1991

After careful deliberation over the petition and the comments thereon of the Solicitor General, the
Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman/Tanodbayan, the Court finds insufficient merit in the
petition. The settled rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
has jurisdiction to do so
The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid because the
preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. Those
circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
"If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information
on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation/reinvestigation of the case.
'Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the
basis of the Information filed against the accused. So it is explicitly provided for by Section 14,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case
nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective (People vs. Casiano, L15309, February 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1969). The remedy of the
accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation
and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the
information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary
investigation.

People vs. Yutila

January 27, 1981

The lack of preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the proceedings. It did not
affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the case. Moreover, the three defendants
pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned. The denial of the accused of his right to preliminary
investigation cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
People vs. Montesa, jr.

September 29, 1995

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution
of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before
or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court.
The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right
of the People to due process of law.[15]
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was,
therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to
consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information
it had filed should stand. Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final
resolution of the incident.
The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case
never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the
latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is
that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no
complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under
Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 5180,[17] as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911:
[N]o assistant fiscal or state prosecutor may file an information or dismiss a case except with the
prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or Chief State Prosecutor
The Provincial Prosecutor's opinion that the prosecution should present its "evidence that makes
out a prima facie case" clearly indicate that he was convinced that there is at the very least a
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of falsification was committed and the private
respondents are probably guilty thereof. The findings and conclusion of the Provincial
Prosecutor, being the final disposition on the reinvestigation, should have been the sole and only
valid basis for the respondent Judge's final action with respect to the reinvestigation in the light of
the foregoing provisions of the Rules of Court and R.A. No. 5180, as amended, and the ruling in
Marcelo. The respondent Judge must have miscomprehended or misunderstood the notation of
the Provincial Prosecutor that "the court & not this office is in a better position to resolve the
issue of whether the accused are the perpetrators of the falsification" as a carte blanche to act on
the resolution and recommendation of Rutor. He closed his eyes to the Provincial Prosecutor's

stand that the prosecution should present its evidence "that makes out a prima facie case and let
the court decide," which simply means that the case should not be dismissed on the basis of
Rutor's recommendation.
It must be observed that, although the respondent Judge was convinced of Rutor's
recommendation to dismiss the case on the ground of want of probable cause because of the
"admission" of Feliza Constantino that the accused spouses had no participation in the
preparation of the questioned document, he still ordered the arraignment of the private
respondents. He seemed to have something in mind for the protection of the interest of the
private respondents. Presumably, he thought that the arraignment which was immediately
followed by the dismissal of the case would forever foreclose, on the ground of double jeopardy,
any reopening of the case.
For having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
thereby depriving the State of due process of law or a fair opportunity to present its evidence and
prove its case, the challenged order of the respondent Judge dismissing Criminal Case No. 1469M-93 is null and void.[18] We thus set it aside and order the reinstatement of the information.
Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan April 7, 1993
The lack of jurisdiction contemplated in Section 3(b), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
refers to the lack of any law conferring upon the court the power to inquire into the facts, to apply
the law and to declare the punishment for an offense in a regular course of judicial proceeding.
When the court has jurisdiction, as in this case, any irregularity in the exercise of that power is
not a ground for a motion to quash. Reason is not wanting for this view. Lack of jurisdiction is
not waivable but absence of preliminary investigation is waivable. In fact, it is frequently waived.
Petitioner attaches significance to the fact that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman against him was under the title of "malversation." According to him, this is not
sufficient to justify the filing of the charge of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law.
Petitioner loses sight of the fact that preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is
often the only means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. The preliminary designation of the
offense in the directive to file a counter-affidavit and affidavits of one's witnesses is not
conclusive. Such designation is only a conclusion of law of Deputy Ombudsman Domingo. The
Ombudsman is not bound by the said qualification of the crime. Rather, he is guided by the
evidence presented in the course of a preliminary investigation and on the basis of which, he may
formulate and designate the offense and direct the filing of the corresponding information.
Even on the assumption that no preliminary investigation was conducted for the information
filed, petitioner waived his right thereto for failure to ask the Sandiganbayan or the Ombudsman
for a new preliminary investigation. On this score again, petitioner's case is different from the
Luciano and Doromal cases where the attention of the lower court was called to the lack of a new
preliminary investigation. Petitioner bewailed the absence of a new preliminary investigation
only before this Court. It is noteworthy that his only basis for quashing the information is the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over his person because there is no probable cause for the
filing of the information.

It is well-settled that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may
be waived expressly or by silence.[11] Failure of accused to invoke his right to a preliminary
investigation constituted a waiver of such right and any irregularity that attended it.[12] The right
may be forfeited by inaction and can no longer be invoked for the first time at the appellate level.
Probable cause has been defined in the leading case of Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban[14] as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded,
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.[15] The term
does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Webb vs. De Leon

August 23, 1995

We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule 112
provides that a preliminary investigation should determine "x x x x whether there is a sufficient
ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial."

Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall
certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons x x x against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature x x x."[20] An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and
violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.[21] Probable cause to
warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law
reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
[22] Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution[23] or the term ordinarily
prudent and cautious man.[24] The terms are legally synonymous and their reference is not to a
person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the
street.[25] It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs

facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men have an abundance.

Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the DOJ
Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well
put in Brinegar v. United States,[31] while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable
cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the
NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory
questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the
evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory
hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined
in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where
an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and crossexamine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly
adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory
hearing was unnecessary.

The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."

The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect to
issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants.

"It is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is concerned
with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But each requires a showing of
probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances, and thus one can exist without the
other. In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence: that the items
sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items
will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also necessary that a particular person be
implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any
showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's control." Worthy
to note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance
of warrants of arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule
112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused."

Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law[34] repudiate the submission
of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of
witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention
that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law
or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn
statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer[35] as well as
the counter affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the
parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause
to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of
arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused.
In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process
cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent
judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does
not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.
[36]

Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno[37] is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is
predicated on the utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not even
the corpus delicti of the crime was established by the evidence of the prosecution in that case.

Given the clear insufficiency of the evidence on record, we stressed the necessity for the trial
judge to make a further personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses to reach a
correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of probable cause before issuing warrants of
arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however, rests on a different factual setting. As
priorly discussed, the various types of evidence extant in the records of the case provide
substantial basis for a finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the
crime is a given fact. There is an eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The
alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed by sworn statements of their former maids. It
was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take the further step of examining ex parte
the complainant and their witnesses with searching questions.

This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however,
negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional
right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard
against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused.
As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to determine the probability that
the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the
suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to
the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the crime of rape with
homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation
conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial.[44] As this Court emphasized in
Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,[45] "the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right." A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage.

We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI,
the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their
preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable
materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection
of due process which we rule to be operational even during the preliminary investigation of a
potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule 112 which requires during the
preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint which shall "x x x state the known
address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
as well as other supporting documents x x x."

we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an
accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,[54]
we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness
and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity.
Roberts, Jr. vs CA

March 5, 1996

There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul[51] which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable
ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint
or information has already been filed in Court."

Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the last
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court[54] which recognizes the authority of the
Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.

it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and
to defer arraignment on the following grounds:

This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court.
This Court is still capable of administering justice.

The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint
Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. Before that time, the following pronouncement in
Crespo did not yet truly become relevant or applicable:

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.[57]

However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant
or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial
prerogative.

Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued (1) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs) except those in the National Capital Region, Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling within their exclusive original
jurisdiction;[59] in cases covered by the rule on summary procedure where the accused fails to
appear when required;[60] and in cases filed with them which are cognizable by the Regional
Trial Courts (RTCs);[61] and (2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region
(MeTCs-NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed with them after appropriate preliminary investigations
conducted by officers authorized to do so other than judges of MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs.[62]

As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing
and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar[63] that the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, but

[f]ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of

witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.[64]

It must be emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the fiscal
(now prosecutor); they must evaluate the report and the supporting documents. In this sense, the
aforementioned requirement has modified paragraph 4(a) of Circular No. 12 issued by this Court
on 30 June 1987 prescribing the Guidelines on Issuance of Warrants of Arrest under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This requirement of evaluation not only of the report or
certification of the fiscal but also of the supporting documents was further explained in People vs.
Inting,[65] where this Court specified what the documents may consist of, viz., "the affidavits,
the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination of
probable cause.

Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing,
among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended
information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence
supporting the prosecutors finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific
finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest "after June 21,
1993." It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But
then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot
be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.

As earlier stated, per its 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993, the DOJ gave due course to the
petitioners petition for review pursuant to the exception provided for in Section 4 of Circular No.
7, and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to forward to the Department the
records of the cases and to file in court a motion for the deferment of the proceedings. At the time
it issued the indorsement, the DOJ already knew that the information had been filed in court, for
which reason it directed the City Prosecutor to inform the Department whether the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings. It must
have been fully aware that, pursuant to Crespo vs. Mogul, a motion to dismiss a case filed by the
prosecution either as a consequence of a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice after a review of the records of the investigation is addressed to the trial court, which has
the option to grant or to deny it. Also, it must have been still fresh in its mind that a few months
back it had dismissed for lack of probable cause other similar complaints of holders of "349"
Pepsi crowns.[72] Thus, its decision to give due course to the petition must have been prompted
by nothing less than an honest conviction that a review of the Joint Resolution was necessary in
the highest interest of justice in the light of the special circumstances of the case. That decision
was permissible within the "as far as practicable" criterion in Crespo.

Hence, the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion when it executed on 23 July 1993 a

unilateral volte-face, which was even unprovoked by a formal pleading to accomplish the same
end, by dismissing the petition for review. It dismissed the petition simply because it thought that
a review of the Joint Resolution would be an exercise in futility in that any further action on the
part of the Department would depend on the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the
latters denial of the motion to defer arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was clearly an
exercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the Department that the determination of
the case is within the courts exclusive jurisdiction and competence. This infirmity becomes more
pronounced because the reason adduced by the respondent Judge for his denial of the motions to
suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment
finds, as yet, no support in Crespo.

In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause may either be an executive or a

judicial prerogative. In People vs. Inting,[73] this Court aptly stated: We reiterate that preliminary
investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of
a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination
of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of
preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in
nature and is lodged with the judge

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the
case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.

Bail
Almeda vs. Villaluz August 6, 1975
The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial.
This right is guaranteed by the Constitution,[2] and may not be denied even where the accused
has previously escaped detention,[3] or by reason of his prior absconding.[4]
the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or property bonds,
may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require an
actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the
bondsman the bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small
premium. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price
at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production

of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or acquittal. Upon
the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of
the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have
the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.
The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our
rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with
the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes
the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered.[6] And even where
cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the
accused.
Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it could
increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the
court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of
other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as
one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an
accounting of his movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is
not essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution[8] "Trial may
proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified."

the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following factors, where applicable: (1)
the ability of the accused to give bail; (2) the nature of the offense; (3) the penalty for the offense
charged; (4) the character and reputation of the accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6) the
character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's appearance or nonappearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in
other cases.[9]
the amendment of the information to include allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism,
after a previous plea thereto by the accused, is valid and in no way violates his right to be fully
apprised before trial of the charges against him. The additional allegations of habitual
delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct
from the charge of qualified theft (of a motor vehicle) contained in the information. Neither do
they tend to correct any defect in the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter of the
case. The said new allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose
in the event of the conviction. They do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case nor possibly
prejudice the form of defense the accused has or will assume.
A motion to amend the information, after the accused has pleaded thereto, is certainly one that
should be placed in writing and properly set for hearing. We are loath to give our imprimatur to
the kind of shortcut devised by the respondents, especially as it relates to an alteration in the
information. Considering, however, that the petitioner was not deprived of his day in court and
was in fact given advance warning of the proposed amendment, although orally, we refrain from
disturbing the said amendment.

Manotoc, Jr. vs. CA May 30, 1986

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which
his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has
agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted
cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of
the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees
"that it will not take any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties
or affect their remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance
may be discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made
without his assent. This result has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the
trial until after the final disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or
country."[16] Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been
rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending before
said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.
Paderanga vs CA

August 28,1995

Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a person
in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before
any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to
relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial.[10] As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the
same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities,
either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.[11] As this Court has put it in a case, "it would
be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free."[12]

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with
the requirements therefore.[13] Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,[14] where the
petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without
surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of
the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said
petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested
either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless
arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities.[17]

In said case, the petitioner, who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte
Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital
recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap.
Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under
the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings."
On the basis of said ex parte motion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the
Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without
need of her personal appearance in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane
consideration. It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made
it known to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the
hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the
specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served
upon him.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees
shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended,
now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature[21] and
which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the
presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
established beyond reasonable doubt

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense,
an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto
being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment[23] and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said
general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the
accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically
determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114.

On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the
court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,[24] is required with the participation of both
the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.[25] Of course, the
burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.[26]

Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce
before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.[27] If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural
due process, as a consequence of which the court's order in respect of the motion or petition is
void.[28] At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by
the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.[29] When, eventually, the court issues
an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
[30] The court, though cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely
objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are in sufficient to establish the
quantum of evidence that the law requires.[31]

No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the trial
court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of
March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in
its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety
of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained
the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after
sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail.
Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever
committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
Commendador vs De Villa August 2, 1991
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial
proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men
facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside
and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to
conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as

well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things
similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different
from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the
military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not
allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
People vs. San Diego

December 24, 1968

whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce
before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the
instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be
a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground. The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968,
having been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and void.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary
of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be
capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong
Santiago vs. Vasquez

January 27, 1993

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest
of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to
the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.[12] The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody
of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.[13]

We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago wherein she
expressly sought leave that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of

(the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings, and categorically
prayed that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted and that
by said motion she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of said court.
Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction
of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed
therein.

Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before
respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say
that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who
requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have
recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn
around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and
accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.

Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a
public statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher
studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial
notice of such fact of petitioners plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold
departure order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Second,
petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies,
there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that
under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only
when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.

It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and
complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar
circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the
aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in
her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she
may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
People vs. Dacudao

Febuary 21, 1989

Before resolving this issue, we must stress that a private prosecutor in a criminal case has no
authority to act for the People of the Philippines before this Court. It is the Government's counsel,
the Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or their incidents before the Supreme Court.
At the very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the conformity of the Solicitor General,

should have raised the issue before us, instead of the private prosecutor with the conformity of
one of the Assistant Provincial Fiscals of Cebu. In the interest of a speedy determination of the
case, however, and considering the stand taken by the Office of the Solicitor General whom we
asked to comment, we have decided to resolve this petition on its merits, with a warning to the
private prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Fiscal to follow the correct procedure in the
future.
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on
the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment,
and, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of
the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the
killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended
only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably
committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has
to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented.
To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted
or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
The defense counsel insists that the accused should be entitled to bail considering the abolition of
the death penalty in the 1986 Constitution. He advances the argument that due to the abolition of
the death penalty, murder is no longer a capital offense being no longer punishable with death.
This is erroneous because although the Constitution states that the death penalty may not be
imposed unless a law orders its imposition for heinous crimes (Constitution, Art. III, Section 19
[1], it does not follow that all persons accused of any crime whatsoever now have an absolute
right to bail. In Art. 111, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "capital offenses" is replaced by the phrase
"offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua."
Finally, the defense contends that the Judge did not commit any error because actually the
complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is for homicide only (Annex A. p. 60, Rollo), and
the recommended Information was also for homicide (Annex B, p. 61, Rollo). We note, however,
that when the same was filed with the Regional Trial Court, it was already an Information for
murder.
The amendment or changing of an information prior to the plea of the accused is allowed there
being no prejudice to him. Thus, in the case of Gaspar v. Sandiganbayan (144 SCRA 415 [1986]),
this Court held that, "no actual double jeopardy exists where the petitioner had not yet pleaded
guilty to the offense."
Castillo vs. Villaluz

March 8, 1989

Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to
conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections
13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964,[1] was removed from them by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985,[2] which deleted all provisions
granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point this out in Salta v. Court of Appeals,
143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct
of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function ** (but) part of the prosecution's job, a
function of the executive;" (2) that wherever "there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct

preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to
them," and the fact that a certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be
indiscriminately exercised."

The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October
1, 1988,[3] did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did
not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary
investigations.

This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to
make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power -- indeed, it is as
much a duty as it is a power -- has been and remains vested in every judge by the provision in the
Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present (1987) Constitutions securing the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures,1 thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere
Court rule or statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC
Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient
ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information,2 he retains the authority, when such
a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.3 It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than
conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the
authority to order arrest, recognize that function to be judicial in nature.4

The Judge is mistaken. It is the fiscal who is given by law "direction and control" of all criminal
actions.7 It is he who initiates all prosecutions in the name of the People of the Philippines, by
information or complaint, against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense
involve1 It is he (or other public prosecutor), therefore, who is primarily responsible for
ascertaining through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.2 That
function, to repeat, is not judicial but executive. When a preliminary investigation is conducted
by a judge, the judge performs a non-judicial function, as an exception to his usual judicial duties.
The assignment of that function to judges of inferior courts and to a very limited extent to courts
of first instance was dictated by "necessity and practical considerations," and the consequent
policy; as we said in Salta, was that "wherever there were enough fiscals or prosecutors to
conduct preliminary investigations, courts were to leave that job which is essentially executive to
them." It follows that the conclusions derived by a judge from his own investigation cannot be
superior to and conclusively binding on the fiscal or public prosecutor, in whom that function is
principally and more logically lodged.

It may not be amiss to point out, in this connection, that the 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules

on Criminal Procedure (Sec. 5, Rule 112) explicitly provide inter alia that "(s)hould the
provincial or city fiscal disagree with the findings of the investigating judge on the existence of
probable cause, the fiscal's ruling shall prevail."3 Be it noted, however, that once the fiscal files
an information with the Court and the Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, the case
may not be dismissed at the fiscal's instance except only by consent of the Court, which may
grant or withhold it in its discretion.4

It was therefore grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on His Honor's part to
seek to foreclose the petitioner fiscal's prerogative to conduct his own preliminary investigation
to determine for himself the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and to require him to
show cause for not filing the information within twenty-four (24) hours, on the sole basis of the
Judge's conclusions. The fiscal was not bound to a blind, uncritical and unavoidable acceptance
of those conclusions. He had the duty to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause, and
could not shirk or be made to evade it by an unreasoning and indiscriminate reliance on the
judge's investigation.
Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan

March 17, 1993

Definitely settled is the rule that notwithstanding the absence in the information of a certification
as to the holding of a preliminary investigation, the information is nonetheless considered valid
for the reason that such certification is not an essential part of the information itself and its
absence cannot vitiate it as such.[12]
In the case at bar, it is clear that there is a certification to the effect that a preliminary
investigation had been conducted. What is allegedly lacking is the statement that the investigating
prosecutor has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses. We find no compelling
reason why the aforementioned doctrinal rules should not be made applicable to the present case
where the alleged violation alluded to by petitioner merely consists of a failure to state
compliance with a part of the proceedings involved in the conduct of a preliminary investigation,
that is, the personal examination by the fiscal of the complainant and his witnesses but which
examination was actually conducted. The fact alone that the certification contains a statement that
a preliminary investigation had been conducted renders nugatory petitioners arguments on the
supposed nullity of the indictment.
Perforce, the Tatad case may not properly be invoked in this case. There was no violation of
petitioners right to speedy trial for the simple reason that a fair and rational consideration on
both counts of the aforestated evidence on record shows that the preliminary investigation in the
present case was begun not in 1979 but only in 1989; and the corresponding information was in
due time filed in 1990.
Nor are we persuaded by petitioners pretension that in this case the prosecution arm of the
Government allowed itself to be used for political purposes as to put this case within the ambit of
the pronouncements in Tatad. The mere fact that here it was a congressman who called the
attention of the then Secretary of Justice to the failure of the corresponding prosecutorial agency
to comply with its duty, although that was pointedly indicated by this Court itself in
Administrative Matter No. 818-TEL, does not mean that the prosecution spurred thereby was

politically motivated.
Withal, it must not be lost sight of that the concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[18] Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.[19]
Crespo vs. Mogul

June 30, 1987

Thus, a fiscal mho asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to
do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error.[26] The fiscal may re-investigate a case and
subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is
innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt.[27] In a clash of views
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal's should normally prevail.[28] On the other
hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or in final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the
Courts to restrain a criminal prosecution[29] except in the extreme case where it is necessary for
the courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm
of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.[30]
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in
motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured.
After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to
the Court for appropriate action.[34] While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion
to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.[35] The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused,[36] or the right of
the People to due process of law

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not are whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that
the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal
upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A
state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who
does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of
his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of
appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he
abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void.[37] The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but
still under his direction and control.
Rights of the Accused
Marcoz vs. Ruiz

September 1, 1992

However, respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the forfeiture of the bond
and required the bonding company to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against it for
the amount of the bond. One other condition for the granting of bail, set forth in Section 2(b), Rule 114
of the Rules of Court, is that the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by
the court or the Rules of Court.
A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is specifically
required by the court or the Rules of Court and, despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him
before the court on a given date, the accused fails to appear in person as so required.[21] There is no
showing that the court had specifically required the bonding company to produce the body of the
petitioner on 8 and 9 April 1985. Moreover, since Criminal Cases Nos. 3890 and 3892, which involve
two (2) checks with a face value of P3,000.00 each, were merely for the violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 which imposes a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than
one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court," the presence of the accused at the hearing on 8 and 9 April 1985 was not
indispensable.
It will, however, be noted that insofar as the second case, Criminal Case No. 3892, is concerned, the
court made no ruling on the manifestation and offer by petitioner's counsel that the reading of the
information be waived and a plea of not guilty be entered. The petitioner was neither made to confirm
the manifestation nor directed to personally make the plea. There was, therefore, no valid arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 3892. Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires the
accused to personally enter his plea.
Thirdly, counsel for petitioner should not have presumed that the motion, which he prepared and sent
by registered mail only on 29 March 1989, would reach the court and be granted before 8 April 1985.
He knew, or ought to know that the granting of motions for postponement in criminal cases is left to the
sound discretion of the Court -- a rule which has been steadfastly adhered to since United States vs.
Lorenzana[27] and which this Court more explicitly expressed in United States vs. Ramirez[28] in this

wise:
"Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In this
respect, it may be said that the discretion which the trial court exercises must be judicial
and not arbitrary. It is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as those of the
people at large, and should not unduly force him to trial, nor for light causes jeopardize the
rights or interests of the public. Where the court conceives it to be necessary for the more
perfect attainment of justice, it has the power upon the motion of either party to continue
the case. But a party charged with a crime has no natural or inalienable right to a
continuance."
the urgent motion for resetting was a mere scrap of paper. As earlier noted, it does not contain a notice
of hearing to the Prosecution; all it had was a mere request, addressed to the Clerk of Court, that it be
submitted for the consideration and approval of the court immediately upon his receipt thereof. There
was, therefore, a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which is also applicable in
motions for continuance in criminal cases. Said section provides as follows:
"SEC. 5. Contents of notice. -- The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and
shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion."
In Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Far East Molasses Corp.,[29] this Court explicitly ruled that a
motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is but a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question
which merits the attention and consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply
with the rules and hence, the clerk has no right to receive it.
However, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when he capriciously and arbitrarily considered Criminal Cases Nos. 3890 and 3892 -- more
particularly the latter wherein there was no valid arraignment -- submitted for decision after the
prosecution rested its case on 8 April 1985. He thus blatantly ignored and disregarded Section 2(c),
Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court which merely consider the accused's nonappearance during trial -- 8 April 1985, in this case -- as a waiver of his right to be present for trial on
such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates. This is quite clear from Section 1(c) of Rule 115
which further provides:
"x x x The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular
date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during
that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and
escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all
subsequent trial dates until custody is regained." (underscoring supplied)
Thus, with respect to an accused who is not in custody, his non-appearance constitutes a waiver of his
right to be present only for the trial set for the particular date of which he had notice. Upon the other
hand, such non-appearance by an accused in custody and who later escapes is considered a waiver of
the right on such date and all subsequent trial dates until such custody is regained.
Gimenez vs. Nazareno

April 15, 1988

But the question is this - was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the

law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have
consistently ruled in several earlier case,[6] jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his
person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody
of the law.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in
court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides
to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the
delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia.
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be
violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of
conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was
given the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and
to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he
virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived.[10] In the
same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and
protection, may be waived by him.
Gamboa vs. Cruz

June 27, 1988

In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an order denying a Motion
To Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon arraignment, the defendant
shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both and
that, if the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he
should immediately plead, which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is
rendered adversely to the movant (in the motion to quash), he can appeal the judgment and raise the
same defenses or objections (earlier raised in his motion to quash) which would then be subject to
review by the appellate court.
An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is interlocutory and not
a final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the
judgment, after trial. As stated in Collins vs. Wolfe, 12 and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco, 13 the accused,
after the denial of his motion to quash, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court

below, and if final judgment is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and, upon such appeal,
present the questions which he sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.
Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his rights to counsel and
to due process is a question which he could raise, as a defense or objection, upon the trial on the merits,
and, if that defense or objection should fail, he could still raise the same on appeal.
On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he
pleads, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except
where the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of
the same.
Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not applicable, petitioner is deemed to have
waived objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.
Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds
provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or information.
Consequently, the lower court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to Acquit.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not
part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those under police
investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators
that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police lineup, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions
or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this
substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that
he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.
What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 The case at bar is far from

this situation.
People vs. Crisologo

June 17, 1987

Where the accused is afflicted with an infirmity, as in the instant case where accused is a deaf
mute, the presence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in
writing or otherwise, is indispensible in order to protect the fundamental right of the accused to
due process of law: 1. to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charges against him; 2.
when confronted by the witnesses against him, he must be provided all the necessary means to
know and understand the testimony of such witnesses and be given the means to rebut such
testimony and give his own version of the accusation against him which is made possible thru a
qualified interpreter in sign language.
People vs. Garcia

November 6, 1997

The rule is that at any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
information[12] on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.[13] The
failure of the accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack
of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty, and jeopardy
Perforce, a formal defect in the information not being one of the exceptions to the rule, appellants
failure to invoke the same through a motion to quash is deemed to be a waiver of such objection and he
cannot now be heard to seek affirmative relief on that ground. Moreover, objections as to matters of
form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
It may readily be inferred from the decision in Dichao that where there is such an indefinite allegation
in the information as to the time of the commission of the offense which would substantially prejudice
the defense, a motion to quash the information may be granted and the case dismissed without the
benefit of an amendment. On the other hand, where there is a variance between the date of the
commission of the crime alleged in the information and that proved at the trial, and it is shown to the
trial court that the accused is surprised thereby, and that by reason thereof, he is unable to properly
defend himself, the court may, in the exercise of sound discretion based on all the circumstances, order
the information amended so as to set forth the correct date. It may further grant an adjournment for
such a length of time as will enable the accused to prepare himself to meet the variance in date which
was the cause of his surprise
It would then result that, on the basis of the foregoing disquisition in Dichao, an amendment will not be
allowed, and the motion to quash should instead be granted, where the information is, on its face,
defective for failure to state with certainty when the offense was committed, and such ambiguity is so
gross as to deprive the accused of the opportunity to defend himself. For all intents and purposes,
however, a strict adherence thereto would no longer be a sound procedural practice, especially in

criminal proceedings which bears the mandate on speedy trial and wherein the availability of bills of
particulars have over time been adopted and recognized.
We have thoroughly examined the testimony of complainant Jackielyn Ong and we cannot but
conclude that complainant, in spite of her youth at the time she testified, was very candid, spontaneous
and consistent in her testimony in court, both in the direct and cross-examination. Her testimony is
forthright, clear and free from serious contradictions. It is a basic rule, founded on reason and
experience, that when the victim testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed.[20] Thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused
may be convicted on the basis thereof. On this aspect, it is an accepted precept that testimonies of rape
victims who are young and of tender age are credible. Hence, the revelation of an innocent child whose
chastity was abused deserves full credence.
The alleged inconsistency pointed out by appellant, to the effect that complainant remembered the
details of the first and last acts of rape but failed to expound on the other violations committed against
her, is not sufficient to render her testimony doubtful. Such failure does not necessarily detract from her
credibility nor negate the commission of the rape. The testimony of a witness must be considered and
calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.
Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not
something which enhances ones life experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather,
something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim for the rest of
her life, which her conscious or subconscious mind would prefer to forget. Thus, a rape victim is not
and cannot be expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience.[23] With more reason
must we have greater compassionate understanding of herein complainants plight who, at a very tender
age, was mercilessly corrupted by a conscienceless human being with bestial desires.
The alleged absence of resistance cannot likewise alter the condemnatory verdict against appellant.
This Court has consistently held that rape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim and this
includes the moral kind of intimidation or coercion. Intimidation is a relative term, depending on the
age, size and strength of the parties, and their relationship with each other.[25] It can be addressed to
the mind as well.[26] Moreover, the intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception
and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it
produces fear -- fear that if the victim does not yield to the lustful demands of the accused, something
would happen to her at the moment or thereafter.
In contrast, the defense relied solely on the testimony of appellant which, as earlier observed, leaves
very much to be desired as it consists mainly of bare and pharisaical denials. Time and again we have
said that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive
identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses. Appellants denial constituted self-serving
negative evidence which can hardly be considered as overcoming a straightforward and creditworthy
eyewitness account. As between positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on one
hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail,[36] especially given the
facts obtaining in this case.

People vs. Presiding Judge

October 26,1983

Stated differently, the 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital
offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of
identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court
after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. Reason for
requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of
the proceedings without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may
in his defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore,
is entitled to an acquittal.
Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may not know the name of the culprit but can identify him if
he sees him again, in which case the latter's presence in court is necessary.
Borja vs. Mendoza June 20, 1977
the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that
he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted
only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the
evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a
valid law.[6] This Court, in People v. Castillo,[7] speaking through Justice De Joya and following the
language of the American Supreme Court, identified due process with the accused having "been heard
in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, * * *."[8] An arraignment thus becomes
indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is
required to meet
it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is
granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus
made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the
state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose.
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence."
The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is unavailing. . Its

language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: "However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustified."[21] As pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the indispensable
requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come "after arraignment." The express mention in the
present Constitution of the need for such a step emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to
accord an accused due process.
the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning those defects. In fact, the Memorandum in support of the
appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of petitioner at the arraignment and cited
jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to bolster his position. Specifically, the absence of an
arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and
impartial trial."[22]
Prosecution of Offenses
Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr.

July 3, 1992

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which
are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously
refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation
to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which
is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of
Rule 110.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."[6] Both
parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that
the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of
the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law.
And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.[7]
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from
its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The
judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the
Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.
Brocka vs. Enrile

December 10, 1990

Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final. There are however so exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez
vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano,
supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109
Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CAG.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
"i.

Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance

(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rnoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al, vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
577); and
"j.
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134
SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953)."
(cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal
charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until
such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted,
charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
Abela vs. Golez

July 31, 1984

There is merit in the appeal. The public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment and discretion in the
appreciation of evidence presented to him and, in the exercise thereof, he may not be controlled by
mandamus. Whether an information should be filed in court is a matter addressed to the sound
discretion of the fiscal according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the fiscal can not be compelled to act in a distinct manner whether to prosecute or not
to prosecute and, instead, is allowed to stand on his opinion and conviction, "reserving only to the
Secretary, in any appropriate case when the latter believes public interest impels that a different course
of action should be taken, to temporarily relieve the fiscal of the duty to act by designating somebody
else to take his place solely and only for the purpose of such particular case. x x x Under Sections 1679
and 1689 of the Revised Administrative Code, in any instance where a provincial or city fiscal fails,
refuses or is unable, for any reason, to investigate or prosecute a case and, in the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice it is advisable in the public interest to take a different course of action, the
Secretary may either appoint as acting provincial or city fiscal, to handle the investigation or
prosecution exclusively and only for such case, any practicing attorney or some competent officer of
the Department of Justice or office of any city or provincial fiscal, with complete authority to act
therein in all respects as if he were the provincial or city fiscal himself, or appoint any lawyer in the
government service or not in the government service, temporarily to assist such city or provincial fiscal
in the discharge of his duties, with the same complete authority to act independently of and for such
city or provincial fiscal, provided that no such appointment may be made without first hearing the
fiscal concerned and never after the corresponding information has already been filed with the court by
the corresponding city or provincial fiscal without the conformity of the latter, except when it can be
patently shown to the court having cognizance of the case that said fiscal is intent on prejudicing the
interest of justice. The same sphere of authority is true with the prosecutor directed and authorized
under Section 3 of Republic Act 3783, as amended and/or inserted by Republic Act 5184." (Estrella vs.
Orendain Jr., 37 SCRA 640)

However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a motion by the fiscal
for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge may properly deny the motion where,
judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there appears to be sufficient evidence to
sustain the prosecution. This is, as it should be, because the case already in court and, therefore, within
its discretion and control.
But then, the question may be asked: What are the remedies of the offended party or complainant when
the prosecuting officer refuses or fails to file an information or to prosecute the criminal action? As
stated above, "[i]n case the provincial fiscal should fail or refuse to act even when there is sufficient
evidence on which action may be taken, the offended party may take up the matter with the Secretary
of Justice who may then take such measures as may be necessary in the interest of justice under Section
1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Pagan vs. Pasicolan, 103 Phil. 1143)." He may also file
with the proper authorities or courts criminal and administrative charges against the prosecuting officer.
As held in Bagatua vs. Revilla, 104 Phil. 393, "[w]hile it is the duty of the fiscal or the City Attorney,
as prosecuting officer, to prosecute persons who, according to the evidence received from the
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, said officer is likewise bound by his oath of office to
protect innocent persons from groundless, false or malicious prosecution. The prosecuting officer
would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he files the information based upon a complaint,
where he is not convinced that the sufficiency and strength of the evidence would warrant the filing of
the action in court against the accused. This duty of the prosecuting officer involves discretion, hence,
it cannot be controlled by mandamus unless there has been a grave abuse thereof which is not shown in
the case at bar." Or, he may file a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
People vs. Beriales

March 3, 1977

In this case, which involved a prosecution in the Court of First Instance, the Court ruled, inter alia, that
the fiscal's duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present
during the proceedings; and that evidence presented by the private prosecutor at a hearing, at which
neither the fiscal nor his assistant or duly authorized special counsel was officially present, cannot be
considered as evidence for the People of the Philippines. This pronouncement, as can be clearly
deduced therefrom, applies to the trial and prosecution of criminal cases before the Courts of First
Instance, Criminal Circuit Courts, and City Courts (which are provided by law with their own City
Fiscals) only, and not to the municipal courts.
The procedure in the trial of criminal cases before the municipal courts and City Courts which do not
have their own City Fiscals has not in any way been altered or modified by the pronouncement in this
case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 110[1] of the Revised Rules of Court, and in the light of the ruling in the cases
of P. P. I. vs. Alvarez and P. P. I. vs. Perez, et al.,[2] police, constabulary, and other peace or law
enforcement officers and private prosecutors may prosecute criminal cases in the said courts, but this
authority ceases upon actual intervention of the provincial or City Fiscal or their assistants, or upon the
elevation of the case to the Court of First Instance.

Caes vs. IAC

November 6, 1989

It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor
and must always be under his control. 22 This is true even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist
him and actually handles the examination of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. 23
The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling
of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to move for its
dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action.
Their only function is to testify. In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the
government prosecutor, or one acting under his authority, and by no one else.
Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the
prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The
purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not
thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.
It has been held in a long line of cases 24 that to constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded;
and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused himself or
on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. 25 Such a dismissal is correctly
denominated provisional. But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it
was made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be
merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. As we have held in a number of
cases, such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. 26
Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case.
Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This would have been in keeping with People v.
Cloribel, 29 where the case dragged for almost four years due to numerous postponements, mostly at
the instance of the prosecution, and was finally dismissed on motion of the defendants when the
prosecution failed to appear at the trial. This Court held "that the dismissal here complained of was not
truly a dismissal but an acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants' insistence on their
constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of
trial."
People vs. Mabuyo May 8, 1975
It is a settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense
charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime was committed not at the place alleged
in the information, provided the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court.[1]

In the instant case the place of commission does not constitute an essential element of the offense
charged and the evidence discloses that said offense was in fact committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the appellant was misled or
surprised by the variance between the proof and the allegation in the information as to the place where
the offense was committed.
the record does not show that he raised the question of lack of preliminary investigation at any stage of
the trial in the court of first instance. It is well-settled that the right to a preliminary investigation is not
a fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence.[2]
Rocaberte vs. People

January 23, 1991

In line with this last mentioned rule, a variance of a few months between the time set out in the
indictment and that established by the evidence during the trial has been held not to constitute an error
so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score. Hence, where the information sets
the date of commission of a robbery at March 25, 1900, evidence was allowed to show that the offense
was actually perpetrated on the 5th or 6th of March; and an amendment of an information so as to
change the year therein stated to that following it, was allowed it appearing that the alteration impaired
none of the defendant's rights.[8]
Where, however; there was a variance of several years between the time stated in the information,
1947, and the proof of its actual commission adduced at the trial, 1952, the dismissal of the case by the
Trial Court was sustained by this Court, since to allow amendment of the indictment to conform to the
evidence would be violative of defendant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.[9]
Again, the statement of the time of the commission of the offense which is so general as to span a
number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to August, 1912," has been held to be fatally defective
because it deprives the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense
A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however, a
ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for
quashal on that account will be denied since the defect is one that can be cured by amendment; instead,
the court shall order the amendment to be made by stating the time with particularity.[11]
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with
sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars, provided for in Section 6, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court of 1964.[12]
Bill of particulars. -- Defendant may, at the time of or before arraignment, move for or
demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to plead or prepare for
trial. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired

Ponce Enrile vs. Amin

September 13, 1990

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515
[1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce
Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. No. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the
occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion
and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This
Court recently declared:
"The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court.
Which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion." (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of
rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different
offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo
Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioner's alleged act of harboring or
concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting
a component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of
rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
"In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive
factor is the intent or motive."
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us
that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v.
Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA
72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto[2] (80 Phil., 138
[1948]) is instructive:
"In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some
kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a
mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often
is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision, Even so, when the
deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can
not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase
the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be
punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in

robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime
or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive
ingredient of treason."
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is
punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence
prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This agument is specious
in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the
same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components
or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can
not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
"This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and
parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either
separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.xxx
(People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as
provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however,
constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common
crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political
offense.
People vs. Montenegro

March 25, 1988

Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time
before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the
information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the
rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended[3].
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime[4].
The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly substantial and
have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to
"Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby
exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for
the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not

guilty" during their arraignment.

Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely different articles
from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the
accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of
their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were
accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of
robbery of the items listed in the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact
for a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be
allowed by the Court.
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously
included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with
the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court.
Catingub vs. CA

March 25, 1983

It may be true that as testified to by the Auditing Examiner, Amando Dominguez, assigned by the GAO
to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office that fieldmen "are bound to turn over the proceeds of the
tickets at the branch where they are assigned or in Manila" (t.s.n., p. 2, Vol. IV) and that as declared by
Lope V. Salvatoria, Assistant Department Manager of PCSO at Manila that "when the proceeds are
turned over to the branch cashier, the responsibility ends there and the branch cashier in turn transmits
the amount to the treasurer in Manila" (t.s.n., p. 25, Vol. V), the option to deliver the proceeds to the
local branch office appear to be for convenience and for security reasons. But the final accounting, the
settlement of accounts and the final clearances would have to be taken up in the central or Manila
office. Petitioner himself recognizes this fact for as the evidence disclosed, he proposed to settle his
shortages by paying P200.00 monthly in his letter addressed to the General Manager of PCSO in
Manila (Exhibit "K")
Indeed, petitioner could have been charged and tried in Cagayan de Oro City for it is not disputed that
he received the sweepstakes tickets from the PCSO, Cagayan de Oro branch. The essential ingredient
of receiving the sweepstakes tickets took place in Cagayan de Oro City. He could also be charged in the
City of Manila since the final accounting must be rendered in the Central Office, Manila. This is
therefore, a case of concurrent jurisdiction by the proper court of the place wherein "anyone of the
essential ingredients thereof took place." But the choice of venue lies with the prosecuting officer and
not with the accused.