DEC 15 2000
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
v.
No. 99-1150
(D.C. No. 97-B-2257)
(District of Colorado)
Defendant-Appellee.
In an amended complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado on June 9, 1998, Carlson, Berentson and Shotkoski alleged that in
terminating their employment, Coors violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, et. seq. They also alleged several state pendent claims,
including breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
promissory estoppel. (The plaintiffs on August 28, 1998, dismissed their fifth claim for
violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, et. seq.).
On September 15, 1998, Coors moved for summary judgment. After argument, the
district court on January 29, 1999, granted Coors motion and on February 2, 1999,
entered judgment for Coors on plaintiffs ADEA claim, as well as on their state claims.
Plaintiffs appeal therefrom, contending that summary judgment was improper.
In its order granting Coors motion for summary judgment, the district court
analyzed, in considerable detail, the evidentiary matter before it and then set forth its
reasons for granting the motion. In so doing the district court applied the rubric of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that he, or
she, (1) is within the protected age group; (2) was doing satisfactory work; (3) was
demoted or discharged despite the adequacy of his work; and (4) was replaced by a
younger person. The district court noted that the fourth element had been modified by
requiring a plaintiff to produce evidence, circumstantial or direct, from which a
-2-
the plaintiffs had met their burden of showing pretext.) Some limited background is in
order.
In early 1995, Coors decided to create within its construction/fabrication division a
new senior specialist classification and require merit testing for entry therein. Plaintiffs
all took the examination, but others, some older and some younger, got higher scores on
the examination, and plaintiffs were not selected for the new classification. At a meeting
in May, 1995, the new classifications were explained to the affected employees, at which
time, in response to a question, a supervisor stated that no layoffs were as of that time
anticipated. In this connection, plaintiffs suggest that if they had known that layoffs might
occur, they would have studied harder for the tests and made higher scores. Be that as it
may, there is nothing in the present record to indicate that the May statement was
incorrect. And, as above stated, plaintiffs were not laid off until March 8, 1996.
In Chavez v. Coors Brewing Company, 1999 WL 162606 (10th Cir. 1999), an
unpublished order and judgment, we were concerned with the self-same Coors senior
specialist positions as are under attack here. Chavez challenged the changed
classification and the merit selection process for membership therein on the ground that it
violated Title VII, 43 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. 12101, et seq., and breach of contract. The district court granted Coors motion
for summary judgment on the grounds that Coors had articulated a legitimate, nonpretextual business reason for laying off Chavez. In the course of our order and judgment
-4-
-5-
Judgment affirmed.
-6-