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NDI 4wk Sophomores

Foucault K

What does police or police state mean in context to
the 1NC evidence?
Johnson 2014 (Andrew PhD student in Political Science at the Uni- versity
of California at Santa Barbara Foucault: Critical Theory of the Police in a
Neoliberal Age Theoria, Issue 141, Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 2014): 5-29
doi:10.3167/th.2014.6114102 // Copenhaver)
Foucaults use of the term police is pervasive. Foucaults first reference is in
History of Madness (published in French in 1961) and The Birth of the Clinic
(published in French 1963), both written years before his prison publication.2 The Birth of Social Medicine (1976) and The Politics of Health in the
Eighteenth Century (1974) depict a medical police, the Medizinischep- olizei
(Foucault 2000: 945, 1402). In Space, Knowledge, Power (1982), Foucault
speaks of police as the result of urbanisation (ibid.: 3502). In two of his late
essays Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Critique of Political Reason (1979)
and The Political Technology of Individuals (1982), Foucault sepa- rates the
concept of the police into three modes: (a) as a model for a political utopia
via Louis Turquet de Mayerne in 1611, (b) as a political programme or
practice, from Nicholas Delamares 1705 Treatise of the Police and (c) as an
academic discipline, the German Polizeiwissenschaft, provided by Gottlob von
Justis 1756 Elements of Police (ibid.: 31723, 41015). In Security, Territory,
Population, Foucault speaks extensively of the grain police, a monolithic market mechanism coextensive with the rise of commerce (Foucault 2007: 53,
94). Finally, he heralds a Police-State, Polizeistaat, which is hyper-administrative (ibid.: 31819). One cannot help but notice the new vocabulary of
biopower: police deal with the circulation of populations and capital, with
health, disease and inoculation campaigns, but they also supervise life and
happiness in general (ibid.: 325). In an illuminating line, Foucault says the
police deal with living, and more than just living (ibid.: 326). Foucault identifies the police as a security apparatus (ibid.: 3434, 3534). He
provocatively calls the police a permanent coup dtat, also an instantiation
of the raison dtat, and finally, as one mode of his new schema
Governmentality (ibid.: 33940). The police are an extension of the state,
but also autonomous, exceeding state-control. Foucault claims that the term
police has vastly dif- ferent definitions from the sixteenth century, to the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, finally, resulting in little semblance to
our modern use of the simple police (ibid.: 31214). Foucault points to
Nicholas Delamares Treaty of the Police as fixing eleven different functions of
the early French police, but the extent of their control is indefinite.

1NC Generic
The plan is inseparable from the police state You should
view the 1AC with extreme skepticism because the plan is
merely a benevolent move to make the police state seem
a little bit more benign, which only creates the conditions
for surveillance to become much more insidious.
Johnson 2014 (Andrew PhD student in Political Science at the Uni- versity
of California at Santa Barbara Foucault: Critical Theory of the Police in a
Neoliberal Age Theoria, Issue 141, Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 2014): 5-29
doi:10.3167/th.2014.6114102 // Copenhaver)

Jeremy Benthams Panopticon was never intended to be solely an architectural blueprint for a prison, but was, from the outset, a plan for all types of
governmental institutions. In Panopticon; or Inspection House (1787), he entitled his design an: idea of a new principle of construction ... applicable to any
sort of establishment: Prisons, Houses of industry, Workhouses, Poor Houses,
Manufactories, Madhouses, Lazarettos, Hospitals, and Schools (Ben- tham
1995: 29). As a model for managing and controlling populations, Benthams Panopticon structures and governs all of society. Foucault
substantiates this expansive purview throughout his entire oeuvre; in his
19781979 College de France lectures, The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault
asserts: Bentham will propose that the Panopticon should be the formula for
the whole of govern- ment, saying that the Panopticon is the very formula
of liberal government (Foucault 2008: 67). Years earlier, in his Rio di
Janeiro lectures Truth and Juridical Forms (1973), Foucault declared:
Panopticism is one of the characteristic traits of our society. Its a
type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous
individual supervision, in the form of control, punishment, and
compensation, and in the form of correction, that is, the molding and
transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms. This threefold
aspect of panopticism surveillance, control, correction seems to be a
fundamental and characteristic dimension of the power relations
that exist in our society. ... Today we live in a society programmed
basically by Bentham, a panoptic society, a society where panopticism reigns
(Foucault 2000: 70). Surveillance and control are mobilised onto the
whole social field. All of soci- ety works like a prison, everyone is
under surveillance, constantly being dis- ciplined according to a
bourgeoning liberalism. The prison is isomorphic with all of this ... prison
is not unlike what happens every day (ibid.: 85). The Panopticon is
most commonly aligned with factories, schools, military barracks
and hospitals. This is evidence of Foucaults desire to cut off the head of
the King in political analysis (Foucault 1978: 89; 1980: 121). Fou- cault seeks
to undermine the explanatory sway of state power in political phi-losophy by
identifying disciplinary techniques swarming freely throughout the social
body (Foucault 1977: 211). However, the de-institutionalized and diffuse

nature of disciplinary power is juxtaposed with the state-control of the

mechanisms of discipline (ibid.: 213). The Australian sociologist Mitchell
Dean, in his early work on Foucault, fairly wonders: How is it possible that his
headless body often behaves as if it indeed has a head? (Dean 1994: 156).
The police are the state institution controlling disciplinary
mechanics. The organization of the police apparatus in the
eighteenth century sanctioned a generalization of the disciplines
that became co-extensive with the state itself (ibid.: 215). Discipline
spreads throughout the whole social body, including non-state
institutions acting as proxy-disciplinary or self-disciplining institutions, but the State is neither passive nor idle, actively
administering and reg- ulating. The police institution breaks through a
blockade, where discipline is relegated to enclosed institutions, freeing the
concept to be used as a functional mechanism appropriate for all of society.
Discipline, in the hands of the police, improve[s] the exercise of
power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effec- tive, a design of
subtle coercion for a society to come ... one of a generalized
surveillance ... the formation of what might be called in general the
discipli- nary society (ibid.: 209). The police are the exemplar institution
indicative of a disciplinary generalization (ibid.), by disciplining the nondisciplinary spaces (ibid.: 215). Modern liberal society, a panoptic and
disciplinary soci- ety, is governed by a heavy-handed police-state.
Panopticism is ideally suited for the police. Requiring a functional
mecha- nism of control, the Panopticon is applied as a vast policing
schema, carrying out a generalized surveillance upon the whole
social field. [ T]his power had to be given the instrument of
permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of
making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisi- ble. It had
to be like a faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field
of perception: thousands of eyes posted everywhere (ibid.: 214). The police
are characterised by their surveillance of the civil population. They are
empowered to see everything; nothing should be too small or inconsequential enough to escape their gaze. This being an impossible endeavour,
Foucault notes that police surveillance becomes a double-entry
system (ibid.: 214). The infamous letters de cachets, publicly derided as
proof of arbitrary absolutism, were demanded by family members,
neighbours, nobles and parish priests. Society colludes, effectively
policing itself. Police, lacking a single tower which can oversee everything,
relies upon a self-disciplining society, a thousand dutiful eyes, delinquents
and citizens alike, fill[ing] the gaps, link[ing] them together (ibid.: 215),
diffusing surveillance throughout the social field. Liberal policing entails
circular reinforcement through a network of perpetual and mutual
surveillance. Foucault aggressively concludes: We are ... in the
panoptic machine (ibid.: 217). In Discipline and Punish, the police are more
closely aligned with Fichte than Hegel. Fichtes passport police, a proleptic
foretelling of a budding total- itarian security-state, arrange the constant and
continuous regulation of peo- ples and movements by means of identifying
papers, and is diametrically opposed to the welfare-state patrolled by Hegels
polizei. Grgoire Chamayou is mistaken when he claims that: I think that this

type of technology of power [Fichtes passport police] is markedly different

than the one described by Fou- cault under the name of Panopticism
(Chamayou 2013). Foucaults history of the prison is isomorphic with the
control of society by the police. The micro- physics organising disciplinary
power are four-fold: hierarchical surveillance, continuous registration,
perpetual assessment and classification. Hierarchical surveillance receives
the most attention, because of its ominous omnipresence and normalising
affect; however, the police also register, assess and classify (e.g. mandating
identifying papers and controlling points of access; assem- bling easily
attainable historical records), constituting a generalised and total- ising
surveillance apparatus, a polyvalent system of dynamic control. Passports, a
skeleton key providing access to various control points, are cohe- sively
integrated into the logic of panopticism.1 Foucault claims, a surveil- lance
that was once de jure and which is today de facto; the police record that has
taken the place of the convicts passport (Foucault 1977: 272). It is a truism
that: Today we live in a society ... where panopticism reigns. The
police are the archetypal panoptic institution evident in everyday,
free life. Foucaults Discipline and Punish, a history of the prison that
tangentially founds a critical theory of the police, bleakly pronounces that
modern config- urations of power allow nothing to escape and are at work

Biopower puts the people in a false sense of nationalistic

pride for their country while it takes drastic measures to
protect the population turns case
Kelly 03 [Mark, Clinical Senior Lecturer, Obstetrics, Gynaecology and
Neonatology, Westmead Clinical School, Racism, Nationalism and Biopolitics:
Foucaults Society Must Be Defended,] Reynoso
The United States seems ready to tolerate higher levels of casualties in the
War on Terror than in other recent conflicts. One explanation for this could
make reference to a retreat of biopolitical values in the US. There have been
fluctuations in the penetration of biopolitics in relation to the old sovereign
power to kill: the so-called War on Terror is perhaps indicative of a retreat. A
notable recent regain for the right to kill has been the re-extension of capital
punishment in the US. It would seem plausible to couple this with the Republican administration in
the US and the move to wage new wars and deduce a limited revival of the old model of sovereign power
residing in the right to kill. However, it seems that there is also a shying away from the kinds of attacks on
enemy populations seen in previous wars. While large numbers of civilians do die, there is an undeniable
squeamishness about this now. There is no more (official) talk of bombing people back into the Stone Age.
Napalm is used under a different name, precisely because its use is contentious. Here there seem to have

there is an
undeniable willingness to wage wars that were not acceptable before
September 11. One might argue that with September 11 there has been some kind of
breach of the biopolitical compact in the United States, or in the West
generally, which allows the public to tolerate the loss of American lives, with
the large numbers killed in New York being something biopolitically sheltered
Americans are simply not used to. But this would be wrong, because it is precisely because of
been general gains for the biopolitical over the right to kill since the Vietnam War. However,

biopolitics that this attack appears as such an unspeakable atrocityotherwise it might seem like a
rational act of war, rather than an unspeakable act of evil outside of the realm of comprehensible, valid

human conduct. For biopower, September 11 is unacceptable.30 Biopolitics is about the regularity and
stability of a population. Of course, biopower comes into its own in wartime, as in the Second World War in
Britain, though it breaks down when put under too much pressure 65 Contretemps 4, September 2004 (as

Biopower is capable of thriving under the

threat now imposed, but it demands the imposition of massive measures for
the protection of the population as such, even if they appear paranoid from
the perspective of what is strictly necessary for protection . To understand this, we
in Germany towards the end of the same war).

must look to the operation of biopolitics at the level of individuals. Differences in individuals values and
perceptions are utterly necessary for the operation of biopower: it is both a condition of the possibility of

Biopower is a technology, and

can only be deployed if it is understood and desired. It demands cooperation
from a population, demands that they adopt practices of hygiene and medical
self-monitoring, of breeding, that they comply with the measurement of
population. It demands a cessation of random violence and an end to killing .
biopolitical technology, and a necessary part of its functioning.

Part of a biopolitical society is the horror of and taboo of death. Foucault in Society Must Be Defended
argues that this taboo is essentially due to the fact that power no longer cares about death: rather than
death being its stock-intrade, death becomes utterly private.31 In any case, for whatever reason, death is
seen as the ultimate evil. What Foucault describes is the political, or rather the biopolitical, dimension of

The need to defend America from attack at the level of the population has
its corollary at the individual level in the horror of dying in such an
unpredictable and violent way as having a plane tear into your office while
you are sifting through your spam e-mail. There is a psychology which is bound up with

contemporary economics, which is notoriously fragile, as indicated in the index of consumer confidence,

This is the individual demand for a regularized lifestyle, without the

possibility of death, certainly not violent or premature death (which is to say,
irregular death), which essentially corresponds to the same demand made
biopolitically at the level of the population.32 It is an intrinsic element of the technology of
for example.

biopolitics that people not be concerned about dying. When they feel under even a small threat of
extraordinary death in terrorist atrocities they will demand the utmost measures of their government to
eptirpate this, and disruption to the economy will occur far beyond the direct destruction caused by any
terrorist act. The result of September 11, then, has been for biopolitical society to go on the offensive. This
is nothing particularly newbiopolitical

societies have waged offensives ever since

they have existed. September 11, however, constituted a new impetus for a
biopolitical society to expand, to attack to defend, to launch a war which is
not primarily about the biopolitical colonisation of new populations but rather
simply about the interests of the existing populationin the first instance
meaning the United States population. This necessitates a division along
state racist lines between us and those who threaten us.

The alternative is to reject the 1AC. Rejection creates

space for criticism that is necessary to challenge
assumptions that have become deeply engrained in
dominant metanarratives surrounding surveillance policy
David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy at the University of
Southampton, 1994, Morality and Modernity. pp. 208-210. //uo-tjs

The universal intellectual, on Foucaults account, is that figure who

maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which
the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for
generating norms) grounds politics in the truth of our being (e.g.
our real interests). The problematic form of this type of intellectual
practice is a central concern of Foucaults critique of humanist politics in so far

alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can
Foucault present to us? Foucaults elaboration of the specific
intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the
intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and
constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points,
the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move,
doesnt know exactly where he is [they are] heading nor what he
as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case,

[they] will think tomorrow , for he is too attentive to the present


p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside time, leads
Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is

intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific
singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this,

analyses , not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to
acknowledge that Foucaults position does entail the impossibility of
acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any
complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our
historical limits and, consequently, we are always in the position of bargaining again (FR p. 47).
The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is
not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but , in so far as it
involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, a hyper and pessimistic activism
(FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and particularity of
criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and
urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by
coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ideal critique and real transformation. Foucault

critique is not a matter of saying that things are

not right as they are but rather of pointing out on what kinds of
assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the
practices we accept rest (PPC p.154) The genealogical thrust of this critical
activity is to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is
accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such for as soon
as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them,
transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible (PPC p.
suggests that the activity of

155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in

this urgency is given its

character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist
grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics .
The specificity of intellectual practice and this account of the activity
of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal
determination of what is right in favour of the perpetual
problematization of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a
which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although

determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for

The role of the intellectual is thus not to

speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the
space within which others can speak for themselves. The question remains,
reposing the question who are we?

however, as to the capacity of Foucaults work to perform this crucial activity through an entrenchment of
the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the
contestation of determinations of who we are.


Empirics prove the US Supreme Court is an instrument
utitlized as a biopolitical tool by the sovereign state to
extend its control of their citizens this means that reform
about the ideology of the way its used must be addressed
Jennings 14 (Bruce, director of bioethics at the Center for Humans and Nature Encyclopedia of
Bioethics Foronda
The history of biopolitics in social and political advocacy both as a term and as a set of concerns raised by
developments in the life sciences and the biotechnology industryhas been less frequently discussed than has its
academic genealogy. A full discussion of this history would be an important contribution to understanding the current
landscape of biopolitics. This entry provides just a few landmarks on a rather sketchy map. Emergence of Issues. Several
events in the mid-1970s presaged the emergence of biopolitics in the United States and around the world. The
publication in 1975 of Edward O. Wilsons Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, which argued that genetics rather than social
and environmental conditions are determinant in individual human behavior and in social formations, sparked heated
controversy about the politics of biology. Also in 1975 some 140 biologists, physicians, lawyers, and others gathered in
California at the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA to discuss the potential hazards of biotechnology and to
draw up voluntary safety guidelines that many believe were designed to fend off calls for enforceable regulation. The
conference and its recommendations pushed the emerging field of biotechnology into public awareness (Berg et al.
1975). In 1976 venture capitalist Robert Swanson and biochemist Herbert Boyer launched a company called Genentech,
an event often said to mark the founding of the biotechnology industry. In 1980, still during the prehistory of biopolitics,

a US Supreme Court case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and a piece of congressional

legislation, the Bayh-Dole Act, encouraged the development of the private-sector
biotechnology industry and set in motion some of the important economic and
political dynamics underlying the emergence of biopolitics. In Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the court ruled that genetically engineered organisms could be
patented, and the Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities and individual scientists to
patent and commercialize technical inventions. In 1983 the first US publicinterest organization focusing on the social, ethical, and environmental
implications of modern genetic technologies was established in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Called the Council for Responsible Genetics (CRG), the organization has examined biological
weapons, worker and community safety in biotechnology laboratories, agricultural biotechnologies, and biomedical
developments. It has also developed critiques of genetic reductionism, genetic determinism, and germ-line genetic
interventions (Council for Responsible Genetics 2013a). By the late 1980s and early 1990s a different approach to
human biotechnologies in generaland to inheritable genetic modification and other enhancement technologies in
particularbegan to take shape. This was the futurist ideology, today known as transhumanism, which advocates using
genetic and other technologies to enhance (as adherents see it) human capacities and to take control of human
evolution. An early transhumanist organization, the libertarian Extropy Institute, was founded in 1990; in 1998 the
World Transhumanist Association was established (Hughes 2004). starkly different political and ethical commitments.
In 2002 the environmental writer and activist Jeremy Rifkin published Fusion Biopolitics in The Nation, a leftleaning
journal of opinion. Rifkins news hook was thenpending federal legislation about a research cloning technique, but he
went on to note that opposition to creating cloned human beings was found among both progressives and social
conservatives. The latter, he said, were motivated by what they regard as the rights of the unborn, whereas many
progressives argue that with cloning the new progeny become the ultimate shopping experiencedesigned in advance,
produced to specification and purchased in the biological marketplace. The left also warns that cloning opens the way
to a commercial eugenics civilization. Rifkin

went on to predict that new and emerging

biotechnologies would rearrange traditional political affiliations: The current debate over
cloning human embryos and stem cell research is already loosening the old alliances and categories. It is just the
beginning of the new biopolitics. Transhumanists

also began using the term biopolitics.

one end of the
biopolitical spectrum are the bioLuddites, defending humanity from
enhancement technologies, and at the other the transhumanists, advocating for
our right to become more than human. Like Rifkin, Hughes argues that
biopolitics is becoming a new dimension of the political terrain of the twentyAccording to the World Transhumanist Association founder James Hughes (2004, 55), at

first century, cutting across the existing political lines. Hughes distinguishes between
what he calls right bioconservatives and left bioconservatives and describes a polarization between the
transhumanist and bioconservative positions within biopolitics (Hughes 2011, 165). The Center for Genetics and
Society (CGS), with which both authors of this entry are or have been affiliated, was founded in 2001. Its initial focus
was the threat to social justice and equality raised by the prospect of inheritable genetic modifications that could be
enabled by cloning, gene transfer, and assisted reproductive technologies. CGSs mission statement, published on the
organizations website, signaled its commitments to fundamental progressive principles, including the equitable
provision of health technologies, reproductive rights, disability rights, and a precautionary approach to new
technologies (Center for Genetics and Society 2013a). The organization soon adopted the term biopolitics; in 2006 it
established a blog called Biopolitical Times, accessible through its website. For CGS the term progressive biopolitics and
the phrase a new biopolitics connote a commitment to social justice, human rights, and public-interest values. CGS has
worked with scholars across a range of disciplines, including law, sociology, anthropology, public health, biology, and
science and technology studies, and with advocates promoting various issues, including reproductive health, rights, and
justice; racial justice; disability rights; and environmentalism (Center for Genetics and Society 2013b). BIOPOLITICAL

does biopolitics look like on the contemporary political

landscape? This section offers several brief comments on selected biopolitical issues that have emerged as
politically or socially significant in the twenty-first century. This is far from an exhaustive list; the issues discussed here
have been chosen because they are widely recognized as politically salient, have

triggered legislation or
judicial decisions, or have been engaged by public-interest organizations and
civil-society constituencies.

Political institutions in society such as the Supreme Court

are able to refine the rights of the states individuals
through torture and therefore cause them to live life under
an abusive regime

Yamin 96 (Alicia, board member of Physicians for Human Rights and is currently collaborating
with the Reproductive Rights Project at the Columbia School of Public Health Human Rights
Quarterly Defining Questions: Situating Issues of Power in the Formulation of a Right to Health
under International Law

Infringements of control over health can often be characterized in the same way
as most violations of traditionally conceived civil and political rights. 97 These
situations generally can be conceptualized in terms of the government or its
agent(s) making its citizens do something that they otherwise would not do. 98 For
example, in a recent article on the role of the medical profession in the prevention and treatment of torture, the
American College of Physicians states that: Violation of medical neutrality; attacks on hospitals
and physicians; interference with the medical care of civilians; and the use of
poison gas, land mines, torture, mass executions, systematic rape, . . . forced
relocations are all forms of violence that affect the physical and psychological
well-being of persons. 99 [End Page 424] When this dimension of the relationship
between health and human rights is conceptualized in terms of the physical and
psychological sequelae of human rights violations, it tends to cast human rights
as narrowly defined civil rights and, in turn, implicitly leaves the right to health
with the lesser status of the "right to health care." 100 However, within the
empowerment analytic these situations can be understood as presenting
limitations on the right to control over health status and not just adverse health
consequences. Instead of categorizing what class of rights are involved, this
perspective invites an analysis of how power relations are structured and how
power is exercised. At least three elements in this power dynamic are discernable. First, there is an
observable conflict of interest. In torture, for example, this conflict is between the

intention of the government to torture and the desire of the individual to retain
control over her body. Second, there are observable actors, with the government
agent being the subject who acts on the victim, who is the object . Third, there is an
observable outcome. That is, that the torture is conducted evidences the power of
the government. In this view torture is not merely a violation of human rights
because it inflicts pain, but because it deprives the victim of the most elemental
control over her body and her entire affective world. In so doing, torture denies
completely a person's agency, which in turn denies her capacity for
consciousness, which in turn denies her personhood. Thus, the physical and psychological
sequelae of torture constitute evidence of the violation of a right to health, but do not constitute the violation per se.
Here, it

is important to point out how this form of direct power over health status
can be seen as directed simultaneously at individuals and groups . For instance, when Iraq
used biological warfare against Kurds in the northern portion of that country, the individual Kurd was targeted as an

In the
United States, feminist scholars have pointed out in criticizing the reasoning underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade that restricting the right of abortion would
constitute effectively an attack on the sexual equality of all women and not
merely a limitation of individual interests in procreative autonomy. 101 These violations
object of the government's action by virtue of being part of a certain ethnic, social, and economic collectivity.

of control over health status are widespread and can often be egregious. However, they are also readily identifiable and, in
general, it is clear that remedying these violations calls for enjoining the direct behavior or policy of the government or its
agents. The

judiciary is an institution which is well-suited to arbitrating in overt

conflicts of interest and enjoining abusive government actions. Moreover, the
enforcement of [End Page 425] prohibitions on medical experimentation, conventions
establishing medical neutrality during war, and requirements of subjecting
mental patients' commitment orders to judicial review all present issues of
securing existing rights under existing laws or importing well-established,
traditional civil rights constructs to the health context. In fact, although they
generally employ the rhetoric of the health impact of civil/political rights
violations instead of the right to health itself, certain NGOs have developed
considerable expertise in both documentation and advocacy in an effort to amass
public indignation with respect to this kind of health violation. 102

The rhetorical focus on drones as unique form of
surivllence and violence is naive and fuels militarism
Trombly 12 (Dan Trombly, The Drone War Does Not Take Place, 16

November 2012,, mjb)

Ill try to make this a bit shorter than my usual fare on the subject, but let me
be clear about something. As much as I and many others inadvertently use
the term, there is no such thing as drone war. There is no nuclear war, no
air war, no naval war. There isnt really even irregular war. Theres just
war. There is, of course, drone warfare, just as there is nuclear warfare,
aerial warfare, and naval warfare. This is verging on pedantry, but the
use of language does matter. The changing conduct and character of
war should not be confused with its nature, as Colin Gray strives to
remind us in so many of his writings. When we believe that some aspect
of warfare changes the nature of war whether we do so to despair
its ethical descent or praise its technological marvels, or to try to
objectively discern some new and irreversible reality we lose sight
of a logic that by and large endures in its political and conceptual
character. Hence the title (with some, but not too much, apology to
Baudrillard). There is no drone war, there is only the employment of
drones in the various wars we fight under the misleading and
conceptually noxious War on Terror. Why does this matter? To imbue
a weapons system with the political properties of the policy
employing it is fallacious, and to assume its mere presence
institutes new political realities relies on a denial of facts and
context. This remains the case with drones. The character of wars
waged with drones is different the warfare is different but the
nature of these wars do not change, and very often this argument
obscures the wider military operations occurring. Long before the first
drone strikes occurred in Somalia, America was very much at war there.
Before their availability in that theater, the U.S. had deployed CIA and SOF
assets to the region. It supported Ethiopias armies and it helped bankroll and
coordinate proxy groups, whether they were Somali TFG units, militias, or
private contractors. It bombarded select Somali targets with everything from
naval guns to AC-130 gunships to conventional strike aircraft. It deployed
JSOC teams to capture or kill Somalis. That at some point the U.S. acquired a
new platform to conduct these strikes is not particularly relevant to the
character of that war and even less to its nature. We sometimes assume
drones inaugurate some new type of invincibility or some
transcendental transformation of war as an enterprise of risk and
mutual violence. We are incorrect to do so. The war in Somalia is
certainly not risk free for the people who the U.S. employs or contracts to
target these drones. It is not risk free for the militias, mercenaries, or military
partners which follow up on the ground. Nor is it risk free for those who
support the drones. Just ask Abu Talha al-Sudani, one of the key figures

behind the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, who sent
operatives to case Camp Lemonier and launch a commando raid one which
looks, in retrospect, very much like the one that crippled Marine aviation at
Camp Bastion recently that might have killed a great many U.S. personnel
on a base then and now critical to American operations in the Horn of Africa
and Gulf of Aden. The existence of risk is an inherent product of an enemy
whose will to fight we have not yet overcome. The degree of that inherent
risk whether it is negligible or great is a product of relative military
capabilities and wars multifarious external contexts. Looked at through this
lens, its not drones that reduce U.S. political and material risk, its
the basic facts of the conflict. In the right context, most any kind of
military technology can significantly mitigate risks. A 19th century ironclad
fleet could shell the coast of a troublesome principality with basic impunity.
When Dewey said, You may fire when ready, Gridley, at Manila Bay,
according to most history and much legend he lost only one man due to
heatstroke! while inflicting grievous casualties on his out-ranged and outgunned Spanish foes. That some historians have suggested Dewey may have
concealed a dozen casualties by fudging them in with desertions, which were
in any case were a far greater problem than casualties since the Navy was
still in the habit of employing foreign sailors expendable by the political
standards of the day is even more telling. Yes, there are always risks and
almost always casualties even in the most unfair fights, but just as
U.S. policymakers wrote off Asian sailors, they write off the victims
of death squads which hunt down the chippers, spotters, and
informants in Pakistan or the contractors training Puntlands antipiracy forces. And no, not even the American spooks are untouchable, the
fallen at Camp Chapman are testament to that. This is hardly unique to
drones or todays covert wars. The CIAs secret air fleet in Indochina lost
men, too, and the Hmong suffered mightily for their aid to the U.S. in the
Laotian civil war. The fall of Lima Site 85, by virtue or demerit of policy,
resonated little with the American public but deeply marks the intelligence
community and those branches of the military engaging in clandestine action.
The wars we wage in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia are not drone wars any
more than our war in Laos was an air war simply because Operation Barrel
Rolls bombers elicit more attention than the much more vulnerable propdriven spotting aircraft or Vang Paos men on the ground. There is a
certain hubris in thinking we can limit war by limiting its most
infamous weapons systems. The taboo and treaties against chemical
weapons perhaps saved men [and womyn] (but not the Chinese at
Wuhan, nor the Allied and innocents downwind of the SS John
Harvey at Bari) from one of the Great Wars particular horrors, but
they did nothing appreciable to check the kind of war the Great War
was, or the hypersanguinary consequences of its sequel but a
generation later. The Predators and Reapers could have never
existed, and very likely the U.S. would still be seeking ways to carry
out its war against al Qaeda and its affiliates under the auspices of
the AUMF in all of todays same theaters. More might die from rifles,
Tomahawks, Bofors guns or Strike Eagles JDAMs than remotely-launched
Griffins, and the tempo of strikes would abate. But the same fundamental
problems the opaque decisions to kill, the esoteric legal

justifications for doing so, the obtuse objectives these further

would all remain. Were it not for the exaggerated and almost myopic
focus on killer robots, the U.S. public would likely pay far less
attention to the victims, excesses, and contradictions. But blaming
drones qua drones for these problems. or fearing their proliferation
at home, makes little more sense than blaming helicopters for
Vietnam , or fearing airmobile assaults when DC MPDs MD-500s buzz over
my neighborhood. That concern that proliferation of a weapons
system equates to proliferation of the outcomes associated with
them, without regard to context, is equally misleading. Nobody in
America should fear the expansion of the Chinese UAV fleet because, like the
U.S. UAV fleet, it is merely going to expand their ability to do what similar
aircraft were already doing. Any country with modern air defenses can make
mincemeat of drone-only sorties, and for that reason China, which unlike
Yemen and Pakistan would not consent to wanton U.S. bombing of its
countryside, need not fear drones. For an enormous number of geographical,
political, and military reasons, the U.S. ought fear the drone war coming
home even less. Drones do not grant a country the ability to conduct
the kind of wars we conduct against AQAM. The political leverage to
build bases and clear airspaces, and the military and intelligence
capabilities to mitigate an asymmetric countermeasure operation
do. If another country gains that ability to conduct them against a
smaller country, even, it is not because they lacked the ability to put
weapons on planes, but because of the full tapestry of national
power and military capabilities gave them such an ability. It was not
asymmetry in basic technical ability that made the U.S. submarine blockade
of Japan so much more effective than the Axiss attempts to do the same
against Americas shores, but the total scope of the assets in the field and
context of their use. It was not because of precedent or moral equivalence, or
lack thereof that the Axis could bomb Britain or lose the ability to do so, but
because of the cumulative effect of military capabilities and the judgments
guiding them. What might expand the battlefield of a drone war is much
the same. Americas enemies do not refrain from attacking bases in
CONUS or targeting dissidents in the U.S. (not that they have not
before), they wait for an opportunity and practical reason to do so,
and that has very little to do with drones in particular and even less
the nature of the war itself. Fearing that the mere use of a weapons
system determines the way in which our enemies will use it without
regard to this context is not prophetic wisdom. It is quasiSpenglerian hyperventilation that attributes the decision to use
force to childlike mimesis rather than its fundamentally political
purposes. Iran and Russia do not wait on drones to conduct
extrajudicial targeted killings, and indeed drones would be of much
less use to them in their own political contexts. Focusing on drones
and the nature of targeted killings as some sort of inherent link
ignores those contexts and ultimately does a disservice to
understanding of wars past, present, and future, and by doing so,
does little help and possibly a great deal of harm to
understanding how to move forward.

***note: evidence edited for gendered language

FISA is a tool of biopower that allows the state to
reconfigure itself to further utilize their control over
Passavant 5 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges The
Strong Neo-liberal State: Crime, Consumption, Goverance
bio ) Foronda

mentality of the consumer-criminal double based in a politics of fear

that identifies the risk of certain threats as beyond toleration informed political practices prior to
September 11th. For example, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) extended the government's power to obtain Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants, warrants that are excepted from Fourth
Amendment protections in the name of national security's need for counterintelligence. The Fourth Amendment limits governmental searches to situations
where there is "probable cause" of a crime, the suspect being searched is
presented with the warrant, knows that he or she is being searched (the "knock
and announce" rule), and can challenge the constitutionality of the warrant.
FISA warrants, however, are under no such limitations -- in "spy world" the
object of surveillance must not know that he or she is being searched -- and the
basis for the warrant remains secret so that should a target of surveillance be
charged with a crime, that person could not challenge the grounds on which the
warrant was issued. While the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act sought
to create something of a "wall" (better described as a "filter") between spy world
and civil society (it was passed in the wake of the Church Committee revelations
about J. Edgar Hoover's misuse of power to spy on civil rights organizations and
individuals based on their political beliefs), the AEDPA began to circumvent that
wall by allowing the government to spy on not only those suspected of having
committed terrorist acts, but on those who provide "material support" for
organizations deemed by the Secretary of State to be "terrorist." 49 This change,

The political

which would have brought those who worked to end apartheid in South Africa by supporting the African National
Congress (ANC) within the law's provisions if it had been in effect during the 1980s (since the Reagan administration
considered the ANC to be a terrorist organization), allows

the government to identify those it

deems to be intolerable risks and to act preemptively to prevent possible future
illegal action.50 If the AEDPA began to circumvent the "wall" between spy world and civil society to allow the
government to act preemptively based on fear or suspicion, then the USA PATRIOT Act obliterates
this "wall" by further amending FISA to extend the government's power to engage
in secret searches from situations where the primary purpose of the warrant is
foreign intelligence to situations where only a significant purpose of the warrant
is foreign intelligence.51 This, and the rules Attorney General John Ashcroft has issued to implement this
legislation, will allow law enforcement officials concerned with criminal law to direct FISA searches and to use this secret
evidence for law enforcement purposes as long as they can create a counter-intelligence rationalization for the search.
Needless to say, this allows law enforcement officials to evade Fourth Amendment safeguards for individual freedoms that
are necessary for civil society. In light of statistics showing that between 2001 and 2002, "the number of


orders increased by 31 percent while the number of ordinary criminal

surveillance warrants dipped by 9 percent," and the fact that FISA warrants now

account for over half of all federal wiretapping conducted, it appears that the DOJ
is doing an end-run around the Fourth Amendment in its criminal justice policy.
Rather than the government searching those who have committed a crime or who
have taken significant steps towards committing a crime, now it appears that the
government targets those it predicts are likely to commit a crime based on who
they are or their political associations.52 The Government of Consumer Capitalism Of course
we are not only governed out of a fearful criminology by the state, but also as consumers within a post-Fordist capitalist
regime, and here too surveillance has grown enormously. As has been noted by political scientists Matthew Crenson and
Benjamin Ginsberg, after September 11th , when George Bush addressed the nation to do its part in face of tragedy, he

While the consumer is a privileged subjectivity

within contemporary socio-political discourse, there is a mutually reinforcing
character to society's twin fetishes of crime and consumerism. On the one side,
the professional discourse of security and criminology explicitly uses
consumerism and safe shopping for the tourist as a primary justification for
increased policing or public-private security partnerships. 54 On the other side, the
religious commitment to consumerism in the U.S. requires increased delivery of
crime control and security services since not only the reality of victimhood but
the fear of it is understood to be consequential for determining the behavior of
shoppers.55 Indeed, post-September 11, fear of terrorism only further fuels the
way that safe shopping requires a zero-tolerance approach to domestic security as
Israeli policies have become an exemplary guide for securing U.S. malls amidst
the war on terror.56 I will focus in what follows on three aspects of governing subjects as consumers.
First, governing subjects as consumers means inserting subjects into networks of
surveillance that can vastly expand state power in light of the state's powers to
compel a search (for example, through a FISA warrant ). Second, consumerism has led to a
tellingly asked the nation to go shopping.53

merger of market and state interests that vastly expands state power such that the state no longer needs to rely upon a
warrant to compel a single private party like a bookstore or a library to produce information. Increasingly ,

the state
is governing through consumerism and the commodification of information that
this produces. This merger of state and market interests has produced two consequences. (A) Consumerism leads
to the compilation of vast databases, and companies have formed to take advantage of this situation by compiling
information from multiple sources and then selling access to this data. Indeed, information compilation has become a
highly profitable industry. As I shall explain below, the fact that these databases are privately compiled paradoxically
enhances the state's powers. (B) Furthermore, in light of the fact that much of this information profiles consumers and
that, in seeking access to this information, the state is relying upon consumerist mentalities, we can see that the logic of
governance is increasingly based on hierarchized market segments rather than a logic of equal citizenship. Third, utilizing
consumerism to seek security means that as markets are established for security -- often thanks to government contracts
-- stakeholders in this order (i.e., those who hold a financial stake in this state order) are created who will resist any future

Governing through consumerism, then, reconfigures both the state and capitalism.

Legal Frameworks/Reform
Legal frameworks are just a faade for the government to
escape criticisms of their hypocritical actions leads to
torture and human rights violations
Sanders, 12 (Rebecca, Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Political
Science University of Toronto Exceptional Security Practices, Human Rights
Abuses, and the Politics of Legal Legitimation in the American Global War on
01206_PhD_thesis.pdf Access Date 7/13/15 Sharma)
Other pockets of exception have emerged in the history of American torture ,
most notably in the penal system. Chain gangs subjected prisoners to notoriously
brutal conditions. Various water tortures were commonly employed at Sing Sing
and San Quentin prisons in nineteenth century.73 Folsom prison had a chloride of
lime cell that created burning noxious fumes .74 During World War I,
conscientious objectors were tortured in custody . While President Wilson championed
democracy abroad, prisoners found themselves subjected to a litany of abuses.75 As described in a 1918
account by former detainees at the Camp Funston Guard House in Kansas: [The Officer of the Day]
proceeded to abuse and insult us, referring to those of Jewish birth as damn kikes, etc. He then had our
beds and blankets taken from us, and ordered that we be given raw rations pork and beans which we
were to cook in the latrine, if we wanted to eatIn the afternoon Larsen was brutally assaulted, being
choked, his head banged against the wall, and dragged around the room by the Sergeant of the guards
The bayonet was applied to all of us Larsen receiving a scar. Kaplan and Breger were beaten with the
butt end of the rifle. All were kicked and shoved about We were compelled to take a cold shower once in
the morning and once in the afternoon...The Captain himself brought forth scrubbrushes, used ordinarily
for cleaning toilet seats and brooms used for sweeping, and ordered that we scrub each other with them
Mr. Kaplan was forced to remain seated while cold water was trickled on his head and this process was
continued until he fainted, while Mr. Kaplan was bound with his hands above his head in a manner so
painful that he felt his arms were being broken and the pain caused him to scream repeatedly Most of
the mistreatment took place outside, notes the report, with large groups watching the sorry and revolting
spectacle of defenseless men being most brutally punched, shoved, and abused.76 In Delaware, the

Even today, many prisoners

have been subject to beatings, stun shocks, chemical sprays, and sexual
assault while incarcerated. Human rights investigations have uncovered a
systemic failure to prevent and prosecute widespread sexual abuse of
women78 and Moreover, the punitive/disciplinary practice of solitary
confinement may arguably amount to torture when imposed for extended
periods. With the explosion of supermax prisons, the once dark dirty hole has gone
high tech. In some places, the environment is so severe that people end up
completely isolated, confined in constantly bright or constantly dim spaces
without any meaningful human contacttorturous conditions that are proven
to cause mental deterioration, notes an investigative report. 80 In much the same way
that a previous generation of Americans countenanced legalized segregation,
ours has countenanced legalized torture. And there is no clearer
manifestation of this than our routine use of solitary confinementon our
own people, in our own communities, in a supermax prison , argues Atul
Gawande.81 It should be clear from this discussion that legal prohibition does not necessarily
prevent torture. Even after states have accepted human rights principles,
whipping post remained a legislated punishment until 1972.77

extensive abuses are possible. One way this occurs is through the declaration by the
official state sovereign or more localized authorities either overtly or more
tacitly and informallyof law free zones where victims can be abused with
impunity. The law is in essence suspended and pushed aside, allowing
someone in power, be it a fascist dictator, colonial administrator, zealous
general, local sheriff, or sadistic prison warden, to exercise their unmitigated
power. Torture can be practiced relatively openly because no higher authority
is willing or able to stop it.

The government uses plausible legality to create

excuses for their human rights violations.
Sanders, 12 (Rebecca, Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Political
Science University of Toronto Exceptional Security Practices, Human Rights
Abuses, and the Politics of Legal Legitimation in the American Global War on
01206_PhD_thesis.pdf Access Date 7/14/15 Sharma)
Governments may evade accusations of human rights violations in multiple ways. As
typologized by sociologist Stanley Cohen, implicatory denial is premised on justifying
or minimizing violations. Justifications may include asserting the righteousness
of a cause, claiming emergency necessity, blaming and dehumanizing the
victim, making advantageous comparisons with others, and rejecting
universal standards.164 Demonizing the enemy is especially important to
rationalize suspension of law in states of exception . On the other hand, while enemy
images remain pervasive, plausible deniability is essentially a form of literal denialthe
claim that violations did not happen or someone else was responsible . This form
of denial is often accompanied by attacks on the credibility and motives of victims ,
witnesses, and journalists.165 Despite mirroring exception and denial in important ways, the approach
taken to security and intelligence practice in the GWOT is better understood under a third distinctive

plausible legality is a strategy for

getting away with human rights abuses. It should definitely not be confused with an
paradigm that I term plausible legality. To be clear,

assertion that arguments produced via this strategy are in fact plausible or convincing. Just as Cold War
plausible deniability was generally fallacious, so too are most of the legal claims referenced in the

meanings, employs euphemisms and legalisms, fudges lines of responsibility,
and claims abuses are isolated incidents.166 Sometimes evasions are deployed because
following pages. Plausible legality is form of what Cohen terms interpretive denial that

some categorizations are so pejorative, stigmatic, and universally condemned that they cannot be openly

states pay lip service to human rights

considerations, forcing human rights advocates to reveal the pictorial reality
(Orwell's "mental pictures") that lies beneath the intricate facade of legalism.
to expose the gap between noble rhetoric and actual reality .167 Debate is
admitted or defended, he notes. In such cases,

shifted to the terrain of interpretationa struggle made all the more difficult by its legitimate function in
normal legal argument.

Plausible legality has played a large and arguably decisive role in

post-9/11 U.S. decisions about torture . A close examination of the development of
interrogation policy demonstrates that legal interpretation was intentionally stretched to authorize
coercive techniques, while the choice of techniques was, at least partly, shaped, by legal arguments

law was neither suspended nor

simply ignored. Instead, policy makers attempted to employ legal rationales
attempting to legitimize their use. In this circular equation,

for what on first glance appear blatantly illegal practices. Accordingly, plausible
legality combines the desire to break with existing norms found in states of exception with an awareness of

It attempts to legalize
the exception without publicly suspending the existing order . It aspires to
reconcile the normally irreconcilableto permit the impermissible without
fully admitting the move. As Lichtblau notes, For the architects of this new war, there was a
reputational and legal risks apparent in the practice of plausible deniability.

constant drumbeat: the rule of law still had to be followed, they said, but just what those rules really
meant was often malleable, subject to twisting, flexing, and reinterpreting so long as the tactics were
justified to stop another attack. In doing so,

derogations from the rule of law.

plausible legality hides rather than highlights

The internet and the subtle surveillance conducted through
it is the states tool to extend their mechanisms of discipline
Boyle 97 (James, Professor of Law at Washington College of Law at American University
Foucault In Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors
From the point of view of this Article, one

of Foucault's most interesting contributions was to

challenge a particular notion of power, power-as-sovereignty, and to juxtapose against it a
vision of "surveillance" and "discipline."2 At the heart of this project was a belief that both our
analyses of the operation of political power and our strategies for its restraint or limitation were inaccurate or misguided.
In a series of essays and books Foucault argued that, rather

than the public and formal triangle of

sovereign, citizen, and right, we should focus on a series of subtler private,
informal, and material forms of coercion organized around the concepts of
surveillance and discipline. The paradigm for the idea of surveillance was the
Panopticon, Bentham's plan for a prison constructed in the shape of a wheel around the hub of an observing

warden. At any moment the warden might have the prisoner under observation through a nineteenth century version of
the closed-circuit TV.22 ' Unsure

when authority might in fact be watching, the prisoner

would strive always to conform his behavior to its presumed desires . Bentham had hit
upon a behavioralist equivalent of the superego, formed from uncertainty about when one was being observed by the
powers that be. The

echo of contemporary laments about the "privacy-free state" is

striking. To this, Foucault added the notion of discipline-crudely put, the multitudinous private methods of
regulation of individual behavior ranging from workplace time-and-motion efficiency directives to psychiatric

evaluation." Foucault pointed out the apparent conflict between a formal language of politics organized
around relations between sovereign and citizen, expressed through rules backed by sanctions, and an actual experience

of power being exercised through multitudinous non-state sources, often

dependent on material or technological means of enforcement. Writing in a manner that

managed to be simultaneously coy and sinister, Foucault suggested that there was something strange going on in the
coexistence of these two systems: Impossible to describe in the terminology of the theory of sovereignty from which it
differs so radically, this disciplinary power ought by rights to have led to the disappearance of the grand juridical edifice
created by that theory. But

in reality, the theory of sovereignty has continued to exist not

only as an ideology of right, but also to provide the organising principle of the
legal codes .... Why has the theory of sovereignty persisted in this fashion ... ? For two reasons, I believe. On the
one hand, it has been.., a permanent instrument of criticism of the monarchy and all
the obstacles that can thwart the development of a disciplinary society . But at the
same time, the theory of sovereignty, and the organisation of a legal code centered
upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms
of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures .... 24 Foucault

was not writing about the Internet. He was not even writing about the twentieth century.
But his words provide a good starting place from which to examine the catechism of
Internet inviolability. They are a good starting point precisely because, when viewed within the discourse of
sovereign "commands backed by threats" aimed at a defined territory and population, the Internet does indeed look
almost invulnerable. Things

look rather different when viewed from the perspective of a

type of power which is constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than in a
discontinuous manner by means of a system of levies or obligations distributed over time [and which].... presupposes a
tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign." 25 What is more, there is a sense
in which the "system of right [is] superimposed upon the mechanism of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual
procedures ... ,, 26 The jurisprudence of digital libertarianism is not simply inaccurate; it may actually obscure our
understanding of what is going on. Thus, even the digerati may find the analysis that follows of interest, if only to see

how far the Internet can be made to treat censorship as a feature not a bug, how far local ordinances may reach in
cyberspace, and how information's desire for freedom may be curbed.

Life under the federal government is inherently harmful
they present a myriad of abuses which people must live
under and fail to fix themselves
Simon 1 (Jonathan, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley Sanctioning Government: Explaining
Americas Severity Revolution
article=2222&context=facpubs )
Perhaps the best advantage of Parenti's Marxist political economy is that it carries his interpretation of the severity
revolution far beyond the precincts of crime, the criminal justice system, and the immediate interests involved in each.
To Parenti, it is United States Capitalism as a social system in crisis that is the real force
behind the "lockdown." While there are prices to be paid for so strong and structured a theory, it has the advantage of
bringing into view the full range of social relations actually at stake in the crack-down on crime. From this perspective,
Parenti identifies two critical moments that shape the severity revolution. The first takes place in the 1960s during the
administrations of relatively liberal presidents-Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon-as the

federal government

began a sustained intervention in the quality of local law and state law enforcement. The initial motivations were largely
liberal pressures to address racism

and a host of other injustices in the under-funded and

under-reviewed police and court systems of the United States. As the social turmoil of the 1960s
unfolded, however, the impetus became one of building local justice systems capable of maintaining order in the face of

riots, anti-war protests, and a rising tide of aggressive armed robberies and
killings in the formerly "safe" areas of the large cities. 43

The sovereign and its institutions with their constant

policing make it the norm. This breeds a society in which
people silently accept their fate. This is true of all state
entities placing authoritarian and democratic states such
as the United States on the same playing field.
Hardt '15 (Michael, Ph.D. philosopher and theorist best known for his trilogy of political
treatises that explore the dynamics of world order "The Withering of Civil Society" Winter 1995 Foronda
In the work of other authors, however, the

mediatory institutions that define the relationship

between civil society and the State are shown to function not toward democratic
but toward authoritarian ends. From this second perspective, then,. The disciplinary perspective, then,
might recognize the same channels passing through civil society, but sees the flows moving again in the opposite
direction. The institutional labor union, for example, is viewed not so much as a the

representation of
interests through the channels of the institutions does not reveal the pluralistic
effects of social forces on the State; instead, it highlights the State's capacities to
organize, recuperate, even produce social forces. Michel Foucault's work has
made clear that the institutions and enfermements or enclosures of civil societythe church, the school, the prison, the family, the union, the party, et
ceteraconstitute the paradigmatic terrain for the disciplinary deployments of
power in modern society, producing normalized subjects and thus exerting
hegemony through consent in a way that is perhaps more subtle but
no less authoritarian than the exertion of dictatorship through
coercion passage for the expression of worker interests to be represented in the plurality of rule, but rather as a

means to mediate and recuperate the antagonisms born of capitalist production and capitalist social relations-thus
creating a worker subjectivity that is recuperable within and actually supportive of the order of the capitalist State.
Foucault analyzes the institutions of civil society the very same way in which Hegel celebrates them. As we saw earlier,
the labor union and the other institutions

of civil society are to "educate" the citizens,

creating within them the universal desires that are in line with the State.
"Actually, therefore," Hegel writes, "the State as such is not so much the result as
the beginning" (Hegel 1952, ?256). The social dialectic thus functions in order that antagonistic social forces be
subsumed within the prior and unitary synthesis of the State. In order to situate Foucault's work on the terrain of
Hegel's civil society, however, we need to take a step back and elaborate some of the nuances of Foucault's theoretical
perspective. Hegel's understanding of the historical rise of civil society and the generalization of its educative social role
does correspond in several respects to the process that Michel Foucault calls the governmentalization of the State. The
State of sovereignty which, according to Foucault, served as the dominant form of rule in Europe from the Middle Ages
to the sixteenth century, positioned itself as a transcendent singularity with respect to its subjects. The transcendence of
the sovereign State afforded it a certain detachment from the pressures of conflictive particular interests in society. In

the passage to the modern State, however, the transcendence and singularity of the
State were overturned through the rise of what Foucault calls
"governmentality." The rule of the governmental State is characterized instead
by its immanence to the population through a multiplicity of forms. "The art of
government . . .," Foucault said, "must respond essentially to this question: how can it introduce the economy, in other
words, the manner of adequately managing individuals, goods, and wealth, as can be done within a family, like a good
father who knows how to direct his wife, his children, and his servants .. ." (1994c, 641-42).4 The management of people
and things implied by this governance involves an active engagement, exchange, or dialectic among social forces and
between social forces and the State. The same
abstraction and organization, Foucault

educative social processes that Hegel casts in terms of

recognizes in terms of training, discipline, and

management. The channels or striae in which these processes function, recognized as social institutions by Hegel,
are characterized by Foucault in terms of deployments (dispositifs) and enclosures (enfermements). Civil society,
from this perspective, is the productive site of modern economy (economy understood now in the large sense); in other
words, it is the site of the production of goods, desires, individual and collective identities, et cetera. It is the site,
finally, of the institutional dialectic of social forces, of the social dialectic that gives rise to and underwrites the State. In
his extensive work on the nature of power, however, Foucault not only refuses Gramsci's inversion of the priority between
civil society and political society (that is, civil society and the State), he goes one step further and argues that we can
make no analytical distinction at all between them. When Foucault

argues that power cannot be

isolated but is everywhere, that it comes from everywhere, that there is no outside to power,
he is also denying the analytical separation of political society from civil society . In

a now famous passage, Foucault (1978, 94) writes that "relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect
to other types of relationship (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent to the
latter ... they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play." In the disciplinary and governmental society
the lines of power extend throughout social space in the channels created by the institutions of civil society. The

exertion of power is organized through deployments, which are at once

ideological, institutional, and corporeal. This is not to say that there is no State, but rather that it
cannot effectively be isolated and contested at a level separate from society. In Foucault's framework, the modern State is
not properly understood as the transcendent source of power relations in society. On the contrary,

the State as
such is better understood as a result, the consolidation or molarization of forces
of "statization" (etatisation) immanent to social power relations (see Deleuze 1986, 84). The

causes and intentions that inform and order power relations are not isolated in some headquarters of rationality but are
immanent to the field of forces. Foucault thus prefers to use instead of State the term government, which indicates the
multiplicity and immanence of the forces of statization to the social field. While this denies all the moral and teleological
elements of Hegel's social theory, Foucault's understanding of the disciplinary and governmental society does in certain
respects take the Hegelian notion of civil society to its logical conclusion. In particular, Foucault emphasizes the
"educational" aspect of civil society whereby particular social interests are enlightened to the general interest and
brought in line with the universal. Education means discipline. More accurately, Foucault reformulates the educational
process of civil society in terms of production: power acts not only by training or ordering the elements of the social
terrain but actually by producing them-producing desires, needs, individuals, identities, et cetera. I see this not so much
as a contradiction but as an extension of Hegelian theory. The

State, Hegel claims, is not the result but

the cause; Foucault adds, not a transcendent but an immanent cause, statization,
immanent to the various channels, institutions, or enclosures of social

Giving legitimacy to the state surrenders all privacy that citizens have
Henry A Giroux, 2014 (Henry A Giroux, Professorship at McMaster University in
the English and Cultural Studies Department, Totalitarian Paranoia in the PostOrwellian Surveillance State, 2/10/2014, K.GEKKER
The revelations of whistle-blowers such as Chelsea Manning, Jeremy Hammond and Edward
Snowden about government lawlessness and corporate spying provide a new meaning if not a
revitalized urgency and relevance to George Orwell's dystopian fable 1984. Orwell offered his
readers an image of the modern state that had become dystopian - one in which privacy as a civil
virtue and a crucial right was no longer valued as a measure of the robust strength of a healthy
and thriving democracy. Orwell was clear that the right to privacy had come under egregious
assault. But the right to privacy pointed to something more sinister than the violation of
individual rights. When ruthlessly transgressed, the issue of privacy became a moral and political
principle by which to assess the nature, power and severity of an emerging totalitarian state. As
important as Orwell's warning was in shedding light on the horrors of mid-20th century
totalitarianism and the endless regimes of state spying imposed on citizens, the text serves as a
brilliant but limited metaphor for mapping the expansive trajectory of global surveillance and
authoritarianism now characteristic of the first decades of the new millennium. As Marjorie Cohn
has indicated, "Orwell never could have imagined that the National Security Agency (NSA)
would amass metadata on billions of our phone calls and 200 million of our text messages every
day. Orwell could not have foreseen that our government would read the content of our emails,
file transfers, and live chats from the social media we use."1 To read more articles by Henry A.
Giroux and other authors in the Public Intellectual Project, click here. In his videotaped
Christmas message, Snowden references Orwell's warning of "the dangers of microphones, video
cameras and TVs that watch us,"2 allowing the state to regulate subjects within the most intimate
spaces of private life. But these older modes of surveillance, Snowden elaborates, however, are
nothing compared to what is used to infringe on our personal privacy today. For Snowden, the
threat posed by the new surveillance state can be measured by its reach and use of technologies
that far outdate anything Orwell envisioned and pose a much greater threat to the privacy rights
of citizens and the reach of sovereign powers. He reiterates this point by reminding his viewers
that "a child born today will grow up with no conception of privacy at all - they will never know
what it means to have a private moment to themselves, an unrecorded, unanalyzed thought."3
Snowden is right about the danger to privacy rights but his analysis fails to go far enough in
linking together the question of surveillance with the rise of "networked societies," global flows
of power and the emergence of the totalitarian state.4 In a world devoid of care, compassion and
protection, privacy is no longer connected and resuscitated through its connection to public life,
the common good or a vulnerability born of the recognition of the frailty of human life. The
democratic ideal rooted in the right to privacy under the modernist state in which Orwell lived out
his political imagination has been transformed and mutilated, almost beyond recognition. Just as
Orwell's fable has morphed over time into a combination of "realistic novel," real-life
documentary and a form of reality TV, privacy has been altered radically in an age of permanent,
'nonstop' global exchange and circulation. So, too, and in the current period of historical amnesia,
privacy has been redefined through the material and ideological registers of a neoliberal order in
which the right to privacy has succumbed to the seductions of a narcissistic culture and casino

capitalism's unending necessity to turn every relationship into an act of commerce and to make all
aspects of daily life visible and subject to data manipulation.5 In a world devoid of care,
compassion and protection, privacy is no longer connected and resuscitated through its
connection to public life, the common good or a vulnerability born of the recognition of the
frailty of human life. In a world in which the worst excesses of capitalism are unchecked, privacy
is nurtured in a zone of historical amnesia, indifferent to its transformation and demise under a
"broad set of panoptic practices."6 Consequently, culture loses its power as the bearer of public
memory in a social order where a consumerist-driven ethic "makes impossible any shared
recognition of common interests or goals" and furthers the collective indifference to the growth of
the surveillance state.7 Surveillance has become a growing feature of daily life. In fact, it is
more appropriate to analyze the culture of surveillance, rather than address exclusively the
violations committed by the corporate-surveillance state. In this instance, the surveillance and
security state is one that not only listens, watches and gathers massive amounts of information
through data mining necessary for identifying consumer populations but also acculturates the
public into accepting the intrusion of surveillance technologies and privatized commodified
values into all aspects of their lives. Personal information is willingly given over to social media
and other corporate-based websites and gathered daily as people move from one targeted web site
to the next across multiple screens and digital apparatuses. As Ariel Dorfman points out, social
media users gladly give up their liberty and privacy, invariably for the most benevolent of
platitudes and reasons, all the while endlessly shopping online and texting.7A This collecting of
information might be most evident in the video cameras that inhabit every public space from the
streets, commercial establishments and workplaces to the schools our children attend as well as in
the myriad scanners placed at the entry points of airports, stores, sporting events and the like.

Rights presuppose the fundamental structure that places
the natural life of the human as the foundation for the
citizen and produces a community of violence.
Declarations of universal ethical principles and eternal
doctrines of human dignity become the inaugurating
feature of global biopolitics.
Giorgio Agamben, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 1998, pg. 126-128
Hannah Arendt entitled the fifth chapter of her book on imperialism, which is dedicated to the
problem of refugees, The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man. Linking together
the fates of the rights of man and of the nation-state, her striking formulation seems to imply the idea of
an intimate and necessary connection between the two, though the author herself leaves the question

The paradox from which Arendt departs is that the very figure
who should have embodied the rights of man par excellencethe
refugeesignals instead the concepts radical crisis. The conception
of human rights, she states, based upon the assumed existence of a
human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those
who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with
people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific
relationshipsexcept that they were still human (Orz~ins, p. 299). In the
system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man
show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment
in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to
citizens of a state. If one considers the matter, this is in fact implicit in the ambiguity of the very

title of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, of 1789. In the phrase La dicia ration des
dro its tie Ihomme et du citoyen, it is not clear whether the two terms homme and citoyen name two
autonomous beings or instead form a unitary system in which the first is always already included in the
second. And if the latter is the case, the kind of relation that exists between homme and citoyen still
remains unclear. From this perspective, Burkes boutade according to which he preferred his Rights of an
Englishman to the inalienable rights of man acquires an unsuspected profundity. Arendt does no more
than offer a few, essential hints concerning the link between the rights of man and the nation-state, and

In the period after the Second

World War, both the instrumental emphasis on the rights of man and
the rapid growth of declarations and agreements on the part of
international organizations have ultimately made any authentic
understanding of the historical significance of the phenomenon
almost impossible. Yet it is time to stop regarding declarations of rights as proclamations of
her suggestion has therefore not been followed up.

eternal, metajuridical values binding the legislator (in fact, without much success) to respect eternal
ethical principles, and to begin to consider them according to their real historical function in the modern

Declarations of rights represent the originary figure of the

inscription of natural life in the juridico-political order of the nationstate. The same bare life that in the ancien regime was politically
neutral and belonged to God as creaturely life and in the classical
world was (at least apparently) clearly distinguished as zoe from political life
(bios) now fully enters into the structure of the state and even
becomes the earthly foundation of the states legit imacy and
sovereignty. A simple examination of the text of the Declaration of 1789 shows that it is precisely
bare natural lifewhich is to say, the pure fact of birththat appears here as the source
and bearer of rights. Men, the first article declares, are born and

remain free and equal in rights (from this perspective, the strictest formulation of all is
to be found in La Fayettes project elaborated in July 1789: Every man is born with inalienable and

the very natural life that,

inaugurating the biopolitics of modernity, is placed at the foundation
of the order vanishes into the figure of the citizen, in whom rights
are preserved (according to the second article: The goal of every political
association is the preservation of the natural and indefeasible rights
of man). And the Declaration can attribute sovereignty to the nation (according to the third article:
The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation)
precisely because it has already inscribed this element of birth in
the very heart of the political community. The nationthe term
derives etymologically from nascere (to be born)thus closes the
open circle of mans birth.
indefeasible rights). At the same time, however,

Human rights tie the state to the populace by defining

existence only in terms of what can be defended and
protected by the state. This turns the citizen into an
inauthenticated bare life.
Volker Heins, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Concordia University,
Montreal, and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research, Frankfurt,
Germany, 2005, German Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 5, p. 845-48
A more forceful and radical critique has been put forth by the Italian political philosopher Giorgio

noticable contrast to the sociology of globalization, which

has assured us for years that state sovereignty is gradually
disappearing to the benefit of a "world of flows" comprising goods,
individuals, capital and information, Agamben argues in his book Homo sacer that we
Agamben.2 In

continue to live under the auspices of a classical state as it was conceived in early modern Europe.

the primary charasteristic of the state is its capacity to

define and occasionally erase the boundary between "normality" and
"emergency" and thus the capacity to transform society into a
"camp" or Lager populated by citizens reduced to "bare life." Moreover,
the current western state is said to blur the line between the normal
and the exceptional, between peace and war, by increasingly taking
an interest in us not only as citizens, but also as embodied beings
an interest illustrated, for example, by the growing tendency towards biometric registration of

travelers at border crossings. Agamben, in all seriousness, has placed this trend in an epochal relationship
with the tatooing of concentration camp inmates.3 His essay's far-reaching appeal rests on the fact that it
combines in a single formula the moral and legal achievements of western societiesin particular the

By suggesting that human

rights are deeply intertwined with the forces of inhumanity against
which they are being invoked, Agamben plays to a primarily Continental European public
ethos of human rightswith their slides into totalitarianism.

once again afflicted by self-doubts about the moral standing of liberal societies and their legal systems.

The vaguely dystopian perspective of his legal theory explains why

Agamben is considered "interesting" by many.4 Since Agamben's theses are

already well-known and much-discussed, I will confine myself to a nutshell summary of his main argument
before I offer a concise critique of his ideas on the place of humanitarian law and humanitarian action in

"bare life" of the individual has been subjected to a twofold move: it
was given a protected, even "sacred" status beyond the immediate
grasp of political power, but it was also isolated and separated from the wider range of
human forms of expression. The bare life of physical individuals, stripped of
moral agency and social intercourse, became the object of a
today's legal and political world. Agamben maintains that since the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679

particular juridical mode of attention. Agamben mistrusts the human

right to physical integrity in a way that is reminiscent of Michel
Foucault, who felt that the discursive isolation of "sexuality" along
with its construction as a singular object of attention was far more
significant than the fluctuating history of its "liberation" or
"repression."5 There is, of course, some prima facie plausibility that the trafficking of human beings,
medical end-of-life issues or the detention of "illegal combatants" have indeed turned the bare life of

The concern for the life of

others is also nurtured by the reporting mechanisms of U.N. human rights bodies as well as the
individuals into an object of widespread concern and debate.6

continuous attention of specialized NGOs and the media. In all these cases, Agambens principal cause for
vexation lies in the persistent separation of this core aspect of the human from wider political and
communitarian questions. Drawing on the distinction between human rights and civil rights made by

The separation between humanitarianism and

politics that we are experiencing today is the extreme phase of the
separation of the rights of man from the rights of the citizen . In the final
analysis, however, humanitarian organizationswhich to-day are more and more supported
by international commissionscan only grasp human life in the figure of bare
and sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret
solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight [...]. A
humanitarianism separated from politics cannot fail to reproduce the
isolation of sacred life at the basis of sovereignty, and the camp
which is to say, the pure space of exceptionis the biopolitical
paradigm that it cannot master.7 This paragraph contains four propositions that are
Hannah Arendt, he writes:

questionable on both empirical and normative grounds. In what follows, I will either reject these
propositions outright or extract the kernel of truth contained within them before making a suggestion

The four propositions are: 1)

The distinction between the humanitarian and the political is an
expression of the opposition between human rights and civil rights.
2) The goal of humanitarian organizations is the identification and
preservation of "bare life." 3) Because of their reliance on the
political/humanitarian divide, such organizations become unwitting
accomplices of those who are responsible for the very social
suffering that they aim to minimize. 4) The separation between
humanitarianism and politics can and should be overcome in favor of
something completely new.
about how we might theoretically classify Agambens position.

Modern technology takes away the matter of a human body
and turns them into cyborgs turns society under the
soverign into a real life panopticon where everyone is a
Haggerty and Ericson 2000 (Kevin, Professor of Sociology and Criminology at
the University of Alberta, Canada; Richard, principal of Green College and a professor of Law and
Sociology at the University of British Columbia; British Journal of Sociology Vol. No. 51 Issue No.
4 May 2000 The surveillant assemblage Foronda

A great deal of surveillance is directed toward the human body . The observed body is of a
distinctively hybrid composition. First it is broken down by being abstracted from its territorial setting. It is then
reassembled in different settings through a series of data ows.

The result is a

decorporealized body, a data double of pure virtuality. The monitored body is

increasingly a cyborg; a esh-technology-information amalgam (Haraway 1991). Surveillance now

involves an interface of technology and corporeality and is comprised of those
surfaces of contact or interfaces between organic and non-organic orders,
between life forms and webs of information, or between organs/body parts and
entry/projection systems (e.g., keyboards, screens) (Bogard 1996: 33). These hybrids can involve
something as direct as tagging the human body so that its movements through
space can be recorded, to the more renewed reconstruction of a persons habits,
preferences, and lifestyle from the trails of information which have become the
detritus of contemporary life. The surveillant assemblage is a visualizing device that brings into the visual
register a host of heretofore opaque rows of auditor y, scent, chemical, visual, ultraviolet and informational stimuli. Much
of the visualization pertains to the human body, and exists beyond our normal range of perception. Rousseau opens The
Social Contract with his famous proclamation that Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains. To be more in
keeping with the human/machine realities of the twentyfirst century, his sentiment would better read: Humans

are born free, and are immediately electronically monitored. If such a slogan seems unduly
despairing, one might consider the new electronic ankle bracelet for infants , trademarked
HUGS, which is being marketed to hospitals as a fully supervised and tamper-resistant protection system that
automatically activates once secured around an infants ankle or wrist. Staff [are] immediately alerted at a computer
console of the newly activated tag, and can enter pertinent information such as names and medical conditions. Password
authorization is needed to move infants out of the designated protection area and if an infant is not readmitted within a
predetermined time limit an alarm will sound. An alarm also sounds if an infant with a Hugs tag is brought near an open
door at the perimeter of the protected area without a password being entered. The display console will then show the
identification of the infant and the exit door on a facility map. Alternatively, doors may also be tted with magnetic locks
that are automatically activated. As well, Hugs can be configured to monitor the progress and direction of the abduction
within the hospital. Weighing just 1/3 of an ounce, each ergonomically designed infant tag offers a number of other
innovative features, including low-battery warning, the ability to easily interface with other devices such as CCTV
cameras and paging systems and time and date stamping. (Canadian Security 1998) Professor Kevin Warwick of
Reading University is the self-proclaimed first cyborg, having implanted a silicon chip transponder in his forearm
(Bevan 1999). The surveillance potential of this technology has been rapidly embraced to monitor pets. A microchip in a
pets skin can be read with an electronic device which connects a unique identifying number on the microchip to details
of the pets history, ownership and medical record. Warwick has proposed that implanted microchips could be used to
scrutinize the movement of employees, and to monitor money transfers, medical records and passport details. He also
suggests that anyone who wanted access to a gun could do so only if they had one of these implants . . . Then if they
actually try and enter a school or building that doesnt want them in there, the school computer would sound alarms and
warn people inside or even prevent them having access. (Associated Press 1998) These examples indicate that the

surveillant assemblage relies on machines to make and record discrete

observations. As such, it can be contrasted with the early forms of

disciplinary panopticism analysed by Foucault, which were largely

accomplished by practitioners of the emergent social sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. On a machine/human continuum, surveillance at that time leaned more toward human observation.

Today, surveillance is more in keeping with the technological future hinted at by

Orwell, but augmented by technologies he could not have even had nightmares

The state uses terror to purposely target marginalized
groups for the benefit of those higher in its hierarchy
extending its biopower
Simon 1 (Jonathan, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley Sanctioning Government: Explaining
Americas Severity Revolution
article=2222&context=facpubs )
C. The Functions of Terror Parenti is not the first recent critic of the severity revolution to a point to the disturbing trend
not simply toward a bigger penal system but toward a meaner, crueler one.54 Parenti's class analysis allows him to
project a wide variety of functions to terror. Terror

operates to reinforce the terms of the new and steeper

class gradient in United States society. Parenti surveys the extraordinary, overt, and often ritualized violence
which exists in contemporary prisons like California's notorious Pelican Bay Security Housing Unit and in special
police details like the New York Police Department's Crime Suppression Unit, whose members shot Amadou Dialo to
death in 1999.55 The

primary targets of this terror are surplus populations unwanted

by the current labor market because they are too demanding, too unskilled, and
too dangerous.56 Against these populations, the terror of the prison system and the death
penalty operate as a deterrent and ultimately a form of elimination. Rape, for example,
is now a critical part of the maintenance of order inside prisons. It creates a very specific threat that guards can
manipulate to achieve submission from inmates." Other violence, like gladiator-type fights between rival gang inmates
staged by correctional officers, seems less focused on control than on satisfying emotional needs of the staff. Parenti
notes that we

are also moving back toward the use of public spectacle as a device for
social control of the general population, something Foucault theorized was replaced by
the emergence of mass surveil lance in the nineteenth century . 8 In fact, both seem
likely to intensify, with terror aimed at the "social dynamite and social junk " 59 that
worry the urban gentry and surveillance aimed at suburban teenagers and others expected to remain part of society. Set
in a normatively safe context, like inflicting lawful punishment, terror

and cruelty by the state against

those defined as moral monsters provides emotional gratification for more
privileged working and middle class Americans whose own increasing economic
instability may produce real feelings of aggression and resentment.6 Middle and
working class Americans, faced with lower wages and leaner benefits (i.e., more risk), may feel more comfortable and
secure (or at least honorable) knowing that criminals and aliens are treated as having no rights to security. 6 ' As

long as the terror is directed against those considered to be "beyond the law , 62
like those who are perceived as in the grip of evil or monstrous desires (sex offenders,
drug king-pins, and drug addicts),6 3 or those who do not yet belong, such as
asylum seekers or recent immigrant groups, there is little political price to be
paid for the exercise of terror and many interests can be rewarded .

The war on terror is only used to solidify the US as the

benevolent example of liberty and democracy, however
the US is the most warring nation in the world. The
affirmatives plan allows the military to continue to take
the lives of innocent people because it gives the
government the same false positive reputation.
Jackson, 11 (Richard, Writer for E-International Relations, The Worlds
Most Warring Nation, E-International Relations, 06/02, http://www.e- Access Date

7/15/2015) Sharma
The war on terror, particularly the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, demonstrates the
interplay of these two factors, with both strategic interests dealing with the threat of terrorism, the
securing of Iraqs oil and Afghanistans potential role as an access-point to Central Asian oil reserves,
fashioning pro-US regimes, and the construction of military bases in strategic regions to put pressure on

bringing liberty and democracy to

countries wracked by human rights abuses driving the interventions.
Paradoxically, of course, the war on terror, like many previous US interventions,
has resulted in massive human rights abuses around the world and the denial
of liberty to millions, with torture, rendition, and the denial of civil rights
commonplace, among others. At the same time, it has also endangered US strategic
interests: the attack on Iraq strengthened and emboldened Iran, destabilized Pakistan, and greatly
damaged the reputation and standing of the US in the Middle East and large
parts of the Muslim world. In the end, the culturally and politically embedded
ideology of the US its militarized patriotism blinds its leaders and public to
the interests and consequences of its military interventions, and sustains the
likelihood of future interventions. Few Americans accept that its countrys
wars have killed, injured and displaced literally millions of people in the last
few decades, most often for little or no positive result in either strategic or
ideological terms that in fact the real-world consequences of its
interventions are virtually always the denial of its own stated values of liberty
and democracy. Fewer still question why the US is willing to sacrifice
thousands or even millions of lives to secure its strategic interests, or why the
US population is so perennially vulnerable to ideological appeals by leaders
which mask the deeper strategic reasons for violent intervention. While it is
countries like Iran and ideological imperatives

unlikely that its strategic interests will change any time soon or that the military-industrial complex can be
significantly reduced in size, there is always the hope that new leaders might arise and peace movements

the militarized patriotism

and deeply-embedded culture of violence which makes the US the most violent
state in the world.
might emerge which are able to challenge, and perhaps even change,

Terror is only perpetuated by using current tactics to fight

Carrol 04 (David, University of California, The End(s) of the Intellectual:
Ethics, Politics, Terror,
carroll.html#f1) Beutelspacher
In his "Appeal for a Civilian Truce," which he made in Algiers on January 22,
1956, with a hostile crowd assembled outside the meeting hall threatening
his life, Camus pleaded with both sides to agree to the same minimalist, nonpolitical principle he advanced in his 1946 essay: to spare innocent civilian
lives. In practical terms this meant that the FLN would have to agree to stop
its terrorist bombing campaign against civilians and the French to cease
torturing and executing suspects. Not only were the lives of potential victims
of both terrorism and counterterrorism at stake, Camus argued, but also the
freedom of all Algerians and all French were, no matter which side they

supported in the war. For, Camus argued, only if the appeal to "spare a
handful of innocent victims at a solitary spot on the globe" is heard and
responded to by both sides in the war can anyone really be considered to be
freewith free men and women described by Camus as those "who refuse at
the same time to inflict and submit to terror."31 No one is free in a state of
terror: certainly neither the victims nor the perpetrators of terror. But neither
the victims nor perpetrators of counterterrorism either. What was true during
the Algerian War is still true today, for no one should be mistaken about the
sense of Camus' plea: freedom is always the issue, not just for the actual and
potential victims of terrorism, but also for those who order, carry out, or
justify torture and terrorism in the war against terrorism. And this is true
whether the war is waged in the name of religious or political absolutes, on
the one hand, or independence, the security and integrity of the nation, or
even or especially democracy, on the other. Camus knew this and attempted
to bring about a civilian truce based on the basic principle that to save
innocent lives was in fact the necessary first step in the defense of freedom
and the creation of a democratic Algeria. His appeal for a civilian truce fell on
deaf ears, of course, and the French government soon continued torturing
and executing FLN suspects, at which point the FLN resumed its terrorist
campaign [End Page 121] in Algiers, with the consequence that terrorism and
counterterrorism substantially escalated during the Battle of Algiers.

The affirmatives use of legal reforms with the prison
system are used to mask the ways that torture happens
behind closed doors. This makes it possible to make the
prison industrial complex to become more insidious
Sanders, 12 (Rebecca, Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Political
Science University of Toronto Exceptional Security Practices, Human Rights
Abuses, and the Politics of Legal Legitimation in the American Global War on
01206_PhD_thesis.pdf Access Date 7/13/15 Sharma)
Other pockets of exception have emerged in the history of American torture ,
most notably in the penal system. Chain gangs subjected prisoners to notoriously
brutal conditions. Various water tortures were commonly employed at Sing Sing
and San Quentin prisons in nineteenth century.73 Folsom prison had a chloride of
lime cell that created burning noxious fumes .74 During World War I,
conscientious objectors were tortured in custody . While President Wilson championed
democracy abroad, prisoners found themselves subjected to a litany of abuses.75 As described in a 1918
account by former detainees at the Camp Funston Guard House in Kansas: [The Officer of the Day]
proceeded to abuse and insult us, referring to those of Jewish birth as damn kikes, etc. He then had our
beds and blankets taken from us, and ordered that we be given raw rations pork and beans which we
were to cook in the latrine, if we wanted to eatIn the afternoon Larsen was brutally assaulted, being
choked, his head banged against the wall, and dragged around the room by the Sergeant of the guards
The bayonet was applied to all of us Larsen receiving a scar. Kaplan and Breger were beaten with the
butt end of the rifle. All were kicked and shoved about We were compelled to take a cold shower once in
the morning and once in the afternoon...The Captain himself brought forth scrubbrushes, used ordinarily
for cleaning toilet seats and brooms used for sweeping, and ordered that we scrub each other with them
Mr. Kaplan was forced to remain seated while cold water was trickled on his head and this process was
continued until he fainted, while Mr. Kaplan was bound with his hands above his head in a manner so
painful that he felt his arms were being broken and the pain caused him to scream repeatedly Most of
the mistreatment took place outside, notes the report, with large groups watching the sorry and revolting
spectacle of defenseless men being most brutally punched, shoved, and abused.76 In Delaware, the

Even today, many prisoners

have been subject to beatings, stun shocks, chemical sprays, and sexual
assault while incarcerated. Human rights investigations have uncovered a
systemic failure to prevent and prosecute widespread sexual abuse of
women78 and Moreover, the punitive/disciplinary practice of solitary
confinement may arguably amount to torture when imposed for extended
periods. With the explosion of supermax prisons, the once dark dirty hole has gone
high tech. In some places, the environment is so severe that people end up
completely isolated, confined in constantly bright or constantly dim spaces
without any meaningful human contacttorturous conditions that are proven
to cause mental deterioration, notes an investigative report. 80 In much the same way
that a previous generation of Americans countenanced legalized segregation,
ours has countenanced legalized torture. And there is no clearer
manifestation of this than our routine use of solitary confinementon our
own people, in our own communities, in a supermax prison , argues Atul
whipping post remained a legislated punishment until 1972.77

legal prohibition does not necessarily

prevent torture. Even after states have accepted human rights principles,
extensive abuses are possible. One way this occurs is through the declaration by the
official state sovereign or more localized authorities either overtly or more
tacitly and informallyof law free zones where victims can be abused with
impunity. The law is in essence suspended and pushed aside, allowing
someone in power, be it a fascist dictator, colonial administrator, zealous
general, local sheriff, or sadistic prison warden, to exercise their unmitigated
power. Torture can be practiced relatively openly because no higher authority
is willing or able to stop it.
Gawande.81 It should be clear from this discussion that

The Affs preposition to curtail surveillance through

congressional means, solidifies mass surveillance as a
regulated and legalized tool that still provides the means
for a totalitarian type of government
Drehle 13 [David, Politics Editor in Time and author, The Surveillance
Society, Time magazine,]Chowdhury
Since the Snowden disclosures, further protections have been suggested.
Perhaps the government should employ a team of skilled attorneys, with
appropriate security clearances, to argue against the sleuths before the FISA
courtto ensure that the judges hear strong arguments against snooping.
Another suggestion is to declassify FISA court proceedings, to the extent
possible, so the public can better understand whats going on. Even without
those additional steps, however, a majority of Americans support the current
arrangement, even if they dont entirely trust the governments explanations.
According to a recent Washington Post/ABC News poll, after digesting
Snowdens news, a solid majority feel that its more important to fully
investigate terrorist threats than to protect personal privacy. While the scope
of surveillance today is much broader than in the past, Americans long ago
grew accustomed to limits on privacy. The Supreme Court has held that
information voluntarily given to third parties is no longer secret, nor can we
expect privacy to cloak our actions in public places or our communications
via the public airwaves. The government can intercept radio signals and is
allowed to read whats written on the outside of our mail. Its just a step
granted, a large stepfrom those principles to the ones that underpin todays
massive data collections. The header of an e-mail is not so different from the
face of an envelope, nor is the signal from a tablet to a wireless router
entirely unlike the signal from one radio to another. We have also learned to
trade elements of our privacy for all sorts of supposed benefits. Google tracks
our searches so that it will know which advertisements to show us.
Smartphones record our locations to be more helpful in steering us to the
nearest multiplex, restaurant, gas station or church. Drugstores analyze our
purchases to reward us with coupons redeemable on a future visit. And so on.
We want our gadgets to know us intimatelywant our thermostats to know

when were cold, want our toasters to know how we like our bagel, want our
search engines to know what were looking for even when we misspell it. So
far, we have been willing to pay for that intimacy in lost privacy. Which brings
us to a strange crossroads. The more technology endangers our privacy, the
less we seem to prize it. We post family photos on social-media sites and ship
our credit-card numbers to total strangers. We ask websites weve never
visiteddesigned by people weve never metto give us advice on treating
embarrassing maladies and hunting for potential mates. But the government
is different, as Litt acknowledged in his recent speech, because the
government has the power to audit our tax returns, to prosecute and
imprison us, to grant or deny licenses to do business and many other things.
And, he continued, there is an entirely understandable concern that the
government may abuse this power. In recent years, privacy advocates have
persuaded the Supreme Court to require search warrants before police can
sneak GPS trackers onto suspects cars or scan houses from the outside using
infrared devices that sense the telltale heat signature of marijuana grow
lights. Such steps seem small, however, compared with the rapid rise of
surveillance powers and the grim history of governments corrupted by the
temptation to watch their peoples too closely. The admirable goals of public
safety and national security have been exploited time and again by intrusive
regimes around the world seeking to spy on their critics and smother dissent.
Americans need only read the Bill of Rights to see that suspicion of
government intrusion is a national birthright. As tools for prying grow in
number and strength, this is no time to stop being suspicious.


The object of disciplinary power is the natural bodythe
development of biopower forces populations to wage war
in the name of life necessity
Dillon 8 [Michael, Professor of Politics, Department of Politics and
International Relations, University of Lancaster UK, Foucault on Politics,
security and war Palgrave, Macmillan,

This chapter traces the development of Foucaults articulation of the problem of war from its beginnings in

emergence of the military sciences, and

especially eighteenth century thought on military tactics, as among
the original sources for the expression of disciplinary power. It is in
the eighteenth-century military sciences that Foucault discovers the
object of disciplinary power most clearly constituted. That object
was the natural body (Foucault, 1991b: p. 155). Foucaults thought on war, while originating
as an interest mainly in military organization as a specific source for the emergence of
disciplinary power within modern societies, develops into a deeper
and wider ranging concern for the new forms that war assumes
between and within societies as a result of the development of
biopolitical regimes of power concerned with the regulation of
populations. Moving from Discipline and Punish through The History of Sexuality to Society Must Be
Discipline and Punish where he locates the

Defended, I explain how the development of Foucaults conceptualization of the problem of war
establishes the great paradox and crisis of political modernity. From demonstrating in Discipline and Punish

the role of discourses and practices deriving from the military

sciences in the strategies of pacification that modern regimes
pursue against their societies through the development of
disciplinary power over life, Foucault shifts to focus on how the
development of biopower mobilizes populations to wage war in the
name of life necessity. In writing the first volume of The History of Sexuality Foucault argued
that modern powers engagement with life pacifies societies while
exacerbating the problem of war inter-socially to the point where it
is the life of the species itself that is at stake in practices of modern
warfare. In Society Must Be Defended Foucaults primary concern is with war understood not as a
source of modern institutions, discourses or practices, but with war conceived as constitutive of specific
types of modern power relations. In examining how war is constitutive of modern power relations he
likewise lays down a challenge to the major traditions of political theory and their allied conceptualizations
of war, specifically those of Hobbes and Machiavelli (2003b: pp. 87111). War figures ultimately for
Foucault not as a primitive state of being against which modern societies and their power relations can be
differentiated, nor simply as a utile instrument for the pursuit of the grand strategies of states in
paradoxical compromise of the civil condition of modern societies, but, rather, as a condition of possibility
for the constitution of modern power relations in which the aleatory condition of species life is variably
recruited, set free, manipulated, and put to work in the development of modern social arrangements (p.
165). War for Foucault in Society Must Be Defended is the cipher of the forms of peace that modern

the roles of historico-political discourses of war in the constitution of
the power arrangements of modern societies makes him question
the efficacy of his own thought in promoting the desubjugation and
liberation of disqualified peoples and their knowledge (p. 8). This autosocieties realize. This argument, in turn, thrusts Foucaults own thought into crisis.

critique develops alongside his increasing concerns with the radicalized techniques of biopolitical regimes
of power.

How can we escape thinking of politics as the continuation of

war, in spite of the desubjugatory potential for doing so, when it is

that very principle for the practicing of politics, which accounts for
the racial techniques with which power strategies and utilizes life?
This is the question that haunts Foucault throughout Society Must Be Defended and which, given his
untimely death and failure to complete an answer to the question, must ultimately be addressed in order
to do justice to his thought.

Biopolitics gives the sovereignty the power kill, use force,

and wage war
Kelly 03 [Mark, Clinical Senior Lecturer, Obstetrics, Gynaecology and
Neonatology, Westmead Clinical School, Racism, Nationalism and Biopolitics:
Foucaults Society Must Be Defended,] Reynoso
Biopolitics is also contrasted by Foucault (in both The Will To Knowledge11 and Society 60
Contretemps 4, September 2004 Must Be Defended) with the previously existing means of
controlling populations: the right of the sovereign to kill his subjects. Biopolitics is
the ability to control people by maintaining them in life, not just by using the right to kill but by actually
controlling life itself.12 It essentially involves the instruments of control of demography (control of the birth
rate, and of epidemics, etc), and of environmental health (through town planning, draining swamps,

new technology does not replace the sovereign right to kill, nor
has it ever. Biopolitics has always coexisted with the right to kill, both within
the state, with the state reserving a notorious monopoly right to use (lethal)
force, and outside, with the right of the state to wage war, defensively and
typically also offensively. However, there is a tension or contradiction in the coexistence of
etc).13 Now, this

biopolitics and the right to kill.14 The right to kill is problematized in the movement that founds biopolitics,
in that the government which uses biopolitics adopts the aim of keeping its people alive. This comes to be
conceived as the proper end of all government. Foucault refers to the emergence of contractarian theories
of government, in which the sovereign gains legitimacy precisely by being necessary to protect the lives
and well-being of the people hence, the state cannot legitimately harm them, since that would violate
the contract.15 Moreover, the biopolitical society is premised on internal homeostasisviolence can serve
to shatter this stability if it is itself unregulated. Certainly, the use of violent control by despots followed a
pattern of insurrection and repression. Yet

the coexistence of biopolitics and the

sovereign right to kill is a fact.

Hence there needs to be a way in which this killing can be

Our society is identified as a

race which is threatened by racial enemies without and within; the population
with which biopolitics is concerned is demarcated from the enemies of the
population, with whom the sovereign power to kill is concerned. What in fact is
squared with biopolitics. This is where state racism comes in.

racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under powers control: the
break between what must live and what must die.16 State racism allows for the identification of enemies
as being outside of the population, whether they are to be found inside or outside the boundaries of the
state, and thus licenses the killing of these people, or simply letting them die, since part of the biopolitical
technology, at least in its more developed form, is trying to keep people alive. Foucault refers to this as
indirect murder, in which, for instance, some people are exposed to greater risks to which the bdy of the
population would not normally be exposed.17

Expanding biopower only allows more war, worsening the

Dochterman, Political Analyst, Writer for Aporia Journal, 2002 (Zen, An
Anarchist Analysis of the Detention of Immigrants and War, post 9/11)

Policing instances of ill health, sordid living conditions, human rights

violations, and "rogue states" become an affair of the American state, the U.N.,
and N.A.T.O. as well as the N.G.O.s that follow quickly after them. The civil wars that empire
produces (as in the Phillipines), now often melded into the rubric of "terrorism", thus
provide more instances for America to go to war and regulate population
flows and the material conditions of life, Westernizing what it can in the
process. Agamben's concern with the zoe (bare life) of the immigrant and refugee takes on a double
significance. Empire's wars and global capital will increasingly displace people and
provide for violations of so-called "human rights"; however, it is such
displacement that comes to be the concern of the war machine itself. This
type of analysis helps to explain the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
which without a clear short-term economic benefit (who thought Iraq would be
"manageable" within a few months?) have more to do with extending empire's capacity
for biopolitical control. When N.G.O.'s and humanitarian institutions step in to occupied countries,
the biopolitical regulation of "births and mortality, the level of health and life expectancy" swings into full

Introducing such seemingly innocuous organizations can radically alter

the bureaucratic and at times, the cultural constitution of a country, and must
be seen as the first step in neo-colonialist projects by the West. This central fact

illuminates the otherwise mysterious bombings of the U.N. buildings and attacks on health workers in Iraq.

that it is not a question of one master or another,

however benign, but a total rejection of the system of global neo-colonialism
in both its military and bureaucratic guises. Thus, sovereign force, manifest in
the U.N., N.A.T.O., the American military and carried out by N.G.O.'s,
humanitarian organizations and "peacekeeping" groups comes to have a
direct relation to the bare life (zoe) of the people of other nations, their living
standards and their health. This is a biological infection of the "outside" of
Empire by Empire.
These attacks send the message

Panopticon based ideals leads to discrimination against
Lansky 1998 (Ellen, went to college at the College of St. Catherine in St

Paul, MN (BA in English) and graduate school at SUNY-Binghamton (MA in

English/Creative Writing) and the University of Minnesota (PhD in English),
Literature and Medicine, The Johns Hopkins University Press,
Moreover, the panoptic power effect is not limited to prisons.
Foucault contends that the Panopticon is "polyvalent in all its
applications." 20 [End Page 217] In fact, any institution can be
structured panoptically. Foucault explains that "all that is
to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a
madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker, or a schoolboy." 21
Foucault's discussion of the Panopticon and panopticism can, and
indeed must, be extended beyond all-male institutions and men.
Panopticism also fixes its relentless gaze on women. Like Foucault's
nineteenth-century criminals, schoolboys, and madmen, many
nineteenth-century women lived in panoptic institutions. The
Panopticon that women occupied was the house, a disciplinary space
where they were supervised by male inspectors, particularly their
husbands, fathers, clergymen, and physicians. A frequent visitor to
the nineteenth-century panoptic house was the doctor who, with his
morphine syringes, produced and supervised the "docile bodies" of
drug-addicted women--sedate, sedated women who quietly stayed
home under the gaze of their husbands and their doctors. 22

Governmentality allows sovereign states to control and lead
their societies toward violence
Curley 11 (Tyler, Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern California
Normalizing the Exception: Governmentality, Legal Discourse and Post-9/11 US
df&TYPE=2) Foronda
Within his account of governmentality, Foucault sets up a foundation for discovering how
individuals have increasingly become objects and effects of the sovereign aim to control
movements. Governmentality is a historically contingent strategy within the social exercise of
powers, which provides security within a population by managing the behavior of
individuals. As Butler (2004: 52) explains, Governmentality is broadly understood as a

mode of power concerned with the maintenance and control of bodies and
persons, the production and regulation of persons and populations, and the
circulation of goods insofar as they maintain and restrict the life of the
population. With a confluence of factors highlighted in Foucaults historyof
governmentality, including above all population growth and the expansion of
capitalism, sovereign power becomes involved in securing life within society to
guarantee productivity. This sovereign objective to ensure the efficiency and
survival of a population necessarily involves individuals in a war of movement
a war that demarcates who is safe to reside within the society and exorcises
those whom sovereigns deem to be dangerous. Additionally, governmentality represents
a project of population management whereby the sovereign deploys disciplinary powers to
normalize individuals behavior and biopowers to regulate the population. The development of
knowledge about individuals within and possible threats to the collectivity is essential to the
security strategy of governmentality. Sovereign powers extend disciplinary and

biopolitical powers to standardize movements throughout society. These

security tactics require information about how to successfully control
individuals and influence their behaviors. The gathering of intelligence is also
necessary to inform sovereign decisions about who poses a danger to the
existence of the society. Only through the advancement of knowledge about
individuals and their relations with social and environmental surroundings can
sovereigns secure populations through the management of conduct. This
knowledge allows sovereign powers to successfully involve individuals in a war
of movement.

The legitimacy given to structures like the state is used to confirm a power
relationship that makes all violence possible
Michel Foucault, 83 (Michel Foucault, Philosopher, The Subject and Power, p.208-226,
1983, K.GEKKER

The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is
a way in which certain actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called
Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or
diffused form, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course, it is
integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures. This
also means that power is not a function of consent. In itself it is not a renunciation of freedom, a
transference of rights, the power of each and all delegated to a few (which does not prevent the
possibility that consent may be a condition for the existence or the maintenance of power); the
relationship of power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent, but it is not by nature the
manifestation of a consensus. Is this to say that one must seek the character proper to power
relations in the violence which must have been its primitive form, its permanent secret, and its
last resource, that which in the final analysis appears as its real nature when it is forced to throw
aside its mask and to show itself as it really is? In effect, what defines a relationship of power is
that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts
upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in
the present or the future. A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it
bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities. Its opposite
pole can only be passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance, it has no other option but to
try to minimize it. On the other hand, a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of
two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that "the
other" (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the
very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole held of
responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up. Obviously the bringing into
play of power relations does not exclude the use of violence any more than it does the obtaining
of consent; no doubt the exercise of power can never do without one or the other, often both at the
same time. But even though consensus and violence are the instruments or the results, they do not
constitute the principle or the basic nature of power. The exercise of power can produce as much
acceptance as may be wished for: it can pile up the dead and shelter itself behind whatever threats
it can imagine. In itself the exercise of power is not violence; nor is it a consent which, implicitly,
is renewable. It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it
induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids
absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by
virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions. Perhaps the
equivocal nature of the term "conduct" is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the
specificity of power relations. For to "conduct" is at the same time to "lead" others (according to
mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a
more or less open held of possibilities. The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility
of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically power is less a confrontation
between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. This
word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century.
"Government" did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it
designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the
government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It did not only cover
the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection but also modes of action,
more or less considered or calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action
of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible held of action of others. The
relationship proper to power would not, therefore, be sought on the side of violence or of

struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of
power), but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which
is government. When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the actions of
others, when one characterizes these actions by the government of men by other men in the
broadest sense of the term includes an important element: freedom. Power is exercised only
over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective
subjects who are faced with a held of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several
reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized. Where the determining factors saturate the
whole, there is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship when man is in
chains. (In this case it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint.) Consequently, there is
no face-to-face confrontation of power and freedom, which are mutually exclusive (freedom
disappears everywhere power is exercised), but a much more complicated interplay. In this game
freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power (at the same time its
precondition, since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support,
since without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical
determination). The relationship between power and freedom's refusal to submit cannot,
therefore, be separated. The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude (how
could we seek to be slaves?). At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly
provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than
speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an "agonism" of a relationship
which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle, less of a face-to-face confrontation
which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.

Cascading ignorance to restraints on inherent rights leads
to a suppressive and inverted system that destroys value
to life
Giroux 6-19 , [Henry, Holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship
in the Public Interest in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a
Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University, Orwell, Huxley
and Americas Plunge into Authoritarianism,] Chowdhury
Orwells Big Brother found more recently a new incarnation in the
revelations of government lawlessness and corporate spying by
whistleblowers such as Chelsea Manning, Jeremy Hammond, and Edward
Snowden.[3] All of these individuals revealed a government that lied about its
intelligence operations, illegally spied on millions of people who were not
considered terrorists or had committed no crime, and collected data from
every conceivable electronic source to be stored and potentially used to
squelch dissent, blackmail people, or just intimidate those who fight to make
corporate and state power accountable.[4] Orwell offered his readers an
image of the modern state in which privacy was no longer valued as a civil
virtue and a basic human right, nor perceived as a measure of the robust
strength of a healthy and thriving democracy. In Orwells dystopia the right to
privacy had come under egregious assault, but the ruthless transgressions of
privacy pointed to something more sinister than the violation of individual
rights. The claim to privacy, for Orwell, represented a moral and political
principle by which to assess the nature, power, and severity of an emerging
totalitarian state. Orwells warning was intended to shed light on the horrors
of totalitarianism, the corruption of language, the production of a pervasive
stupidity, and the endless regimes of state spying imposed on citizens in the
mid-20th-century. Orwell opened a door for all to see a nightmarish future
in which everyday life becomes harsh, an object of state surveillance, and
controla society in which the slogan ignorance becomes strength morphs
into a guiding principle of mainstream media, education, and the culture of
politics. Huxley shared Orwells concern about ignorance as a political tool of
the elite, enforced through surveillance and the banning of books, dissent,
and critical thought itself. But Huxley, believed that social control and the
propagation of ignorance would be introduced by those in power through the
political tools of pleasure and distraction. Huxley thought this might take
place through drugs and genetic engineering, but the real drugs and social
planning of late modernity lies in the presence of an entertainment and
public pedagogy industry that trades in pleasure and idiocy, most evident in
the merging of neoliberalism, celebrity culture, and the control of

commanding cultural apparatuses extending from Hollywood movies and

video games to mainstream television, news, and the social media.

Society is a prison -- Documentation turns people into cases

Gutting 14 (Gary, professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame

Michael Foucault Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 12/21/14 Foronda

On Foucault's account, the relation of power and knowledge is far closer than in the familiar Baconian engineering model,
for which knowledge is power means that knowledge is an instrument of power, although the two exist quite
independently. Foucault's point is rather that, at least for the study of human beings ,

the goals of power and

the goals of knowledge cannot be separated: in knowing we control and in

controlling we know. The examination also situates individuals in a field of

documentation. The results of exams are recorded in documents that provide

detailed information about the individuals examined and allow power systems to
control them (e.g., absentee records for schools, patients' charts in hospitals). On the basis of these records, those in
control can formulate categories, averages, and norms that are in turn a basis for knowledge. The examination
turns the individual into a casein both senses of the term: a scientific example
and an object of care. Caring is always also an opportunity for control . Bentham's
Panopticon is, for Foucault, an ideal architectural model of modern disciplinary power. It is a design for a
prison, built so that each inmate is separated from and invisible to all the others
(in separate cells) and each inmate is always visible to a monitor situated in a central
tower. Monitors will not in fact always see each inmate; the point is that they could at any time. Since inmates
never know whether they are being observed, they must act as if they are always
objects of observation. As a result, control is achieved more by the internal
monitoring of those controlled than by heavy physical constraints. The principle of the Panopticon
can be applied not only to prisons but to any system of disciplinary power (a factory, a
hospital, a school). And, in fact, although Bentham himself was never able to build it, its principle has come to
pervade every aspect of modern society. It is the instrument through which
modern discipline has replaced pre-modern sovereignty (kings, judges) as the
fundamental power relation.

Turns Case Surveillance/Control

Sovereign states completely control their subjects
discipline through observation is normalized
Gutting 14 (Gary, professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame
Michael Foucault Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 12/21/14 Foronda
At the core of Foucault's picture of modern disciplinary society are three primary techniques of control: hierarchical observation,

control over people (power) can be achieved

merely by observing them. So, for example, the tiered rows of seats in a stadium not only makes it easy for spectators to
normalizing judgment, and the examination. To a great extent,

see but also for guards or security cameras to scan the audience. A perfect system of observation would allow one guard to see everything
(a situation approximated, as we shall see, in Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon). But since this is not usually possible, there is a need for

A distinctive
feature of modern power (disciplinary control) is its concern with what people have not done
(nonobservence), with, that is, a person's failure to reach required standards. This concern
illustrates the primary function of modern disciplinary systems: to correct
deviant behavior. The goal is not revenge (as in the case of the tortures of premodern punishment) but
reform, where, of course, reform means coming to live by society's standards or norms.
Discipline through imposing precise norms (normalization) is quite different from the
older system of judicial punishment, which merely judges each action as allowed
by the law or not allowed by the law and does not say that those judged are
normal or abnormal. This idea of normalization is pervasive in our society : e.g.,
national standards for educational programs, for medical practice, for industrial processes and products. The examination (for
example, of students in schools, of patients in hospitals) is a method of control that combines
hierarchical observation with normalizing judgment. It is a prime example of
what Foucault calls power/knowledge, since it combines into a unified whole the
deployment of force and the establishment of truth (184). It both elicits the truth
about those who undergo the examination (tells what they know or what is the state of their health) and
controls their behavior (by forcing them to study or directing them to a course of treatment).
relays of observers, hierarchically ordered, through whom observed data passes from lower to higher levels.

Excessive amounts of control from the sovereign state

puts their subjects into a state of exception they
become mindless and blindly accept their way of life
Salter 7 (Mark B., Professor at the School of Political Studies at the
University of Ottawa We are all exiles: implications of the border as state of
exception Standing Group on International Relations Conference 2007 9/13/07
doi= Foronda

state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law
on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial
arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order (Agamben,
1995: 169). At the border, however, the exception becomes the rule. At the border, the
Australian government conduct is mostly ungoverned by statute and, therefore, almost ungovernable by the courts. Our
willingness to accept this situation reflects our understanding of the state as our only defence against the state of
nature (Taylor, 2005:75-6). In attempting to make sense of the break with normal politics that the attacks of
September 11th have come to represent, scholars have come to rely on the work of Giorgio Agamben, whose provocative

work on the state of exception has provided fertile territory for critical work on the meanings of torture, the accrual of
emergency powers to the executive, and the camp. The exception has become the rule. Jumping off from criminology,
critical legal studies, social theory, and sociology, this paper argues that governmental

institutionalize a continual state of exception at the border that in turn performs
the spatio-legal fiction of territorial sovereign and the sovereign subject in each
admission/exclusion decision. This argument is made not from extraordinary cases or
even from the consideration of the adjudication of asylum claims, but rather from the
mundane, ordinary evidence of the everyday passage of millions of normal
travelers across the border. Rather than view the border as a simple line indicating sovereign jurisdiction, this

article adopts the performative view of borders, indebted to Wonders and indirectly Butler. Following Butlers analysis
of the performativity of identity, Wonders argues that although 2 states

attempt to choreograph
national borders, often in response to global pressures, these state policies have little meaning
until they are performed by state agents or by border crossers Border agents and state
bureaucrats play a critical role in determining where, how, and on whose body a border will be performed (2006:66).

There are lessons to be learned about the politics of the sovereign state and
citizenship in general from the specific and longstanding example of the
institutionalization of the state of exception at the borders. The (momentary) reduction of
all travelers to homo sacer as they traverse the border can provide the ground for an empathetic, cosmopolitan ethic -based not on citizenship, but precisely from alienation. Agamben and SoE Provocatively argued by Agamben in Homo
sacer and The State of Exception, the foundational

power of the sovereign is the ability to

decide if the law applies to a situation or if the law is held in abeyance due to an
emergence or crisis. Since the sovereign power to decide is itself prior to and outside of the law,
Agamben is anxious about the expansion

of executive powers since the inauguration of the war on

terror. The state of exception is a zone of indistinction, between inside and

outside where there is no difference between law and force, wherein individuals
are subject to the law but not subjects in the law (1995:181). The use of emergency powers and

the use of all means necessary in the war on terror demonstrate that the state of exception tends increasingly to appear
as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics (2005:2). But, in this article, I will not be examining
the role of the USA PATRIOT Act, Guantanamo Bay, Camp X-Ray, Abu Ghraib prison, the black sites in Eastern
Europe, extraordinary rendition, domestic surveillance programs, or other clear indications of the rise of executive

the state of exception is always already fundamental to

sovereign power, and in particular that the sovereign ability to define and limit
the population is a long-standing institution of the state, intimately tied into the
notion of sovereign territoriality and the imaginary of borders implied in this
conception of bounded space. The border is a permanent state of exception.
Agamben gestures towards this: the question of borders becomes all the more urgent
power. Instead, I argue that

(2005:1). But, rather than the metaphorical border between normal and exceptional, I argue that we
take the material border seriously. Wherever the border is located, however it is administered, the

border has been and continues to be an on-going state of exception, based on a prior
assumption of the authority to define a particular security/territory/population

Sovereign states build identities it lets their control span

Curley 11 (Tyler, Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern California
Normalizing the Exception: Governmentality, Legal Discourse and Post-9/11 US

df&TYPE=2) Foronda
Defining a society of normalization is necessary for governmentality to function in
the post- 9/11 environment. Sovereign powers involve individuals in a war of movement, first of all, by discursively
constructing who belongs within a collectivity. The

demarcation of a society determines what forms

must live

of life are to be defended and secured from possible threats. Specifically, discourses distinguish what

from what must die (Lemke 2011). The commitment to state security, Reid (2008: 80) claims, is always by
necessity a commitment to the security of a particular form of life. Leaders construct an identity that separates forms of
life seen as acceptable from those seen as dangerous or warring enemies of a society. According to Campbell (1998: 68),

sovereigns secure identities through exclusionary practices. These practices define the
boundaries of self and other and expel to the outside of the population all that sovereigns deem threatening. Through
discourse, leaders position within an identity lives that must be defended and
remove dangers from this identity. Sovereign powers dictate the boundaries of a
collectivity by identifying the self and exorcising enemies from the society . U.S.
leadership employs various discursive techniques to construct a particular identity and define an international society of
normalization, in response to the attacks on 9/11. The Global War on Terror, above all, represents a strategy to classify
what is to be defended and what are the appropriate means to provide this protection. Days after 9/11, Bush (2001b)
interpreted the events as an act of war committed by enemies of freedom. Official discourses define this war
existentially, in the sense that U.S. security measures aim to protect the liberal democratic way of life. As Bush (2001a)
determines, We wage a war to save civilization, itself. This

civilization is constituted in relation to

an other the enemies of freedom who represent dangers to western existence.
Furthermore, perpetrators of the attacks on 9/11 are seen as responsible for inflicting
upon liberal democracies this new war that requires unprecedented retaliatory
tactics. Bush (in Danner 2004: 105, emphasis added) frames culpability in this manner: [T]he war against terrorism
ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent
civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states. Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm ushered in not by
us, but by terrorists requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with
the principles of Geneva. While U.S.

leaders decide to react to the attacks in ways they see

fit, these discourses construct a truth that terrorists are responsible for this new
paradigm and that exceptional reprisals are necessary. Additionally, the normal functioning
of politics and law no longer permits the removal of these threats posed by terrorists. As Yoo (2007: 572), a legal advisor
to the Bush administration, describes, The traditional legal framework fails to account for a networked, dynamic enemy
like al Qaeda. This

construction of identity allows sovereigns to control movements

worldwide in two crucial ways. First, discourses of danger generate fear and
bolster exceptional security practices. These discourses are not neutral, in the
sense that they objectively explain reality. Instead, they represent an exercise of
power to produce truth (Jackson 2007: 355). In constructing a society of normalization,
official accounts of danger have a visceral effect on individuals within the
population. Fear of enemies to the liberal way of life spreads globally and reaches
into the very fibers of bodies. This fear guides bodily reactions to the security measures enacted by U.S.
leaders in the name of defending western civilization. Discourses desensitize individuals to
unprecedented measures of security that shape various international norms. U.S.
discourses, Huysmans (2004: 338) finds, structur[e] and possibly institutionaliz[e] fear of the enemy as the organizing
principle of politics in both national and international society. It is through discourses of danger, imperative to the
demarcation of an identity, that U.S. leaders indefinitely redefine politics. Once

sovereigns determine the

boundaries of an identity, they can manipulate conduct within the population in
a second way. Official U.S. discourses interact to produce continuity of vision
throughout the world regarding how to interpret the attacks and what are
appropriate responses.TheBushadministrationconstructsinternationalnormsthatspeeduppoliticsanderodeliberal


discipline behavior worldwide by molding international norms about

deliberation. Discourses privilege exceptional political practices, and they further
pressure international society to consider new ways of providing security in the
global war on terrorism.


Examining history in this way is the only way to look at
surveillance without the restraints of prejudiced
information formed by dominance.
Foucault 71 [Michel,French philospher and social theorist,Nietzsche
Genealogy and History,UC Denver,
%20Foucault.pdf] Chowdhury
Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a
field of entangled and confused parchments, on d ocuments that have been
scratched over and recopied many times. On this basis, it is obvious that Paul
Reel was wrong to follow the English tendency in describing the history of
morality in terms of a linear development-in reducing its entire history and
genesis to an exclusive concern for utility. He assumed that words had kept
their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas
retained their logic; and he ignored the fact that the world of speech and
desires has known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys. From
these elements, however, genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it
must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it
must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is
without history-in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive
to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution,
but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles.
Finally, genealogy must define even those instances when they are absent,
the moment when they remained unrealized (Plato, at Syracuse, did not
become Mohammed) . Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a
knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source This
essay first appeared in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite (paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1971), pp. 145-72. Along with "Reponse au cercle
d'epistemologie," which became the introductory chapter of The Archaeology
of Knowledge, this essay represents Foucault's attempt to explain his
relationship to those sources which are fundamental to his development. Its
importance, in terms of understanding Foucault' s objectives, cannot be
exaggerated. It is reproduced here by permission of Presses Universitaires de
France . 76 Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 77 material. Its "cyclopean
monuments" 2 are constructed from "discreet and apparently insignificant
truths and according to a rigorous metho '; they cannot be the product of
"large and well-meaning rrors ." 3 In short, genealogy demands relentless
erudition. Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and
profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective
of the scholar; on the cOJ:ltrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of
ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search
for "origins."

The genealogical approach is one of detachmentonce

the genealogist detaches themselves then they are able
to see that they were fed false information about their
essence, and the ideas of origin that they were taught
have dominate Europe for two thousand years
Sembou 11 [Evangelia, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Social

Theory, Hegel, Political Science, and History of Political Thought (Ancient and
Modern), Foucaults Genealogy 6-16,] Reynoso
Foucault describes genealogy using one of Nietzsches well-known
metaphors. Genealogy is gray, its task being to decipher the hieroglyphic
script of humans past, a past that is neither black (i.e. totally unknown) nor
white (i.e. transparent), but something in between (gray), that is, ambiguous
and uncertain. Thus, a rigorous investigation is needed, if the meaning of the
past is to be uncovered: Genealogy, consequently, requires patience
and a knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation
of source material. Due to its minuteness, genealogy may at first give
us the impression that it deals with trivial, everyday things, rather
than with important developments. However, genealogy acquires its
character from recording what we tend to feel is without history, instances
such as sentiments, love, conscience, instincts. Crucially, the writing of the
human past by the genealogist is necessarily an interpretation, which itself is
neither true nor false. For Foucault, the genealogist is an interpreter but not a
hermeneutician. The genealogist as interpreter recognizes that the
meaning he/she gives to history is doubtful (hence gray),
acknowledges its system of injustice10 and the fact that his/her
interpretation is subject to revision. The genealogist-interpreter has
a sense of where he/she stands in history and does not ignore the
fact that he/she is the product of historic and social circumstances;
however, simultaneously he/she is able to distance him-/herself from
his/her situation in order to examine things from afar. In doing so,
the genealogist-interpreter ignores the actors own interpretation(s)
of the meaning of their actions. Therefore, the genealogical
approach is one of detachment. By contrast, the approach of the
hermeneutician is one of engagement, as he/she attempts to grasp the
significance of things from within them. As opposed to the interpreterhermeneutician, the genealogist-interpreter finds that the questions
which are traditionally held to be the deepest and murkiest are truly
and literally the most superficial. Thus, their meaning is to be
discovered in surface practices, not in mysterious depths. Accordingly, a
genealogical interpretation is distinctly different from a hermeneutical
approach. The claim that interpretation is not the uncovering of a hidden
meaning has revolutionary implications for philosophy; or better, it is a direct
attack against philosophy, as it traditionally has been understood. For
Foucaults genealogy undermines the belief in the existence of
unchanging essences and truths. When he realized that there are no
primordial verities in the world, Foucault shifted his emphasis from his early
studies on madness to his work of the seventies and eighties. In his early
work Foucault had pre-supposed an essence of madness, namely, an original

truth. But in his genealogical writings Foucault engaged in a deconstructive

exercise. Continuing Nietzsches tradition of philosophizing with the
hammer Foucault sought to destroy all the metaphysical ideas that have
dominated Western philosophy since Plato. Foucault was more conscious of
genealogy as a method than Nietzsche was. Therefore, he set forth its
objectives. To begin with, Foucault was more careful to define what genealogy
as an history concerned with tracing origins meant. In examining Nietzsches
genealogy, Foucault noted that Nietzsche used Ursprung, Entstehung and
Herkunft interchangeably. Foucault argues that the problem of the term
Ursprung is that it refers to something that was already there viz. a
deeper reality before the search began. However, if the genealogist
refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he
finds that there is something altogether different behind things:
not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no
essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion
from alien forms In other words, for Foucault, the idea of the origin
is just a metaphysical truth that has dominated European thought
for two thousand years. In Nietzschean terms, genealogy questions the
will to truth: devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods
arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and
ending discussions, and their spirit of competition the personal conflicts
that slowly forged the weapons of reason. According to Foucault, Herkunft
and Entstehung characterize the task of genealogy better. Herkunft is the
equivalent of stock or descent; it is the ancient affiliation to a group,
sustained by the bonds of blood, tradition, or social class. The analysis of
Herkunft often involves a consideration of race or social type. But the traits it
attempts to identify are not the exclusive generic characteristics of an
individual, a sentiment, or an idea, which permit us to qualify them as
Greek or English; rather, it seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual
marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult
to unravel. Genealogy engages in deconstruction, for the analysis of
Herkunft fragments what was considered unified; it does not
merely challenge the linear conception of history but also identifies
an underlying continuity, which is the product of the accidents, the
minute deviations or conversely, the complete reversals the
errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave
birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us As
Foucault says, genealogy elaborates a theory of discontinuous
systematicities. However, although these discontinuous series have their
regularity, there are no links of mechanical causality or of ideal necessity
between the elements that constitute them. Hence the significance of
chance, accident or ala.

A genealogical history begins with the identification of a

power, in order to then see how it emergedpower
produces knowledge and genealogy unmasks the relation
Sembou 11 [Evangelia, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Social

Theory, Hegel, Political Science, and History of Political Thought (Ancient and
Modern), Foucaults Genealogy 6-16,] Reynoso

What is wrong with a history of the past in terms of the present? According to Foucault, this is the
presentist fallacy; the historian takes a model or a concept, an institution, a feeling, or a symbol from
his present and attempts to find that it had a parallel meaning in the past.41 Nor does a genealogical
history attempt to discover the underlying laws of history, thereby falling in the trap of finalism. The latter

genealogical history begins with a diagnosis of the present. The
genealogist-historian locates the manifestations of a given
meticulous ritual of power to see where it arose and how it
developed. Discipline and Punish examines the Entstehung of the human sciences (which Foucault
holds that the present is the accomplishment of some latent goal in the past. Rather,

calls pseudo-sciences) and their relation to the Entstehung of the prison. Foucault says: This book is
intended asa genealogy of the present scientific legal complex from which the power to punish derives
its bases, justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects and by which it masks its exorbitant
singularity. A genealogical enquiry shows that power

produces knowledgethat
power and knowledge directly imply one another . What is the relationship

between the prison and the human sciences? It seems that Foucault does not clearly differentiate between
the two Entstehungsgeschichten, despite the fact that he did not wish to reduce the one to the other.
Notice: I am not saying that the human sciences emerged from the prison. But, if they have been able to
be formed and to produce so many profound changes in the episteme, it is because they have been
conveyed by a specific and new modality of power: a certain policy of the body, a certain way of rendering

The connection that Foucault makes between

power and knowledge is innovative. Foucaults use of a hyphen between these
the group of men docile and useful.

two terms is meant to show the constitutive (or productive) aspect of knowledge.45 Power (relations) and
knowledge (or truth) implicate each other,46 hence Foucaults term power-knowledge47
(pouvoirsavoir).48 The meaning of the composite term pouvoir/savoir is more complex than the
English translation power/knowledge would at first sight suggest. In French there are different words for
different forms of knowledge. In his archaeological works Foucault used the word savoir to refer to the
implicit knowledge characteristic of an historical epoch, that is, to the common sense of a people at
that time at a specific place; he was concerned with how the savoir shaped the explicit knowledge
what he called connaissance that is institutionalized in the disciplines that make up the human
sciences.49 Concerning pouvoir, although it is translated as power, one should not forget that in
French it is also the infinitive form of the verb to be able to, i.e. can. Accordingly, as Ellen K. Feder
says: In Foucaults work, pouvoir must be understood in this dual sense, as both power as English
speakers generally take it (which could also be rendered as puissance or force in French), but also as a kind

Power, Foucault tells us, must be understood to be

more complex than a term like puissance conveys; it has multiple
forms and can issue from anywhere.50 Additionally, it is difficult to translate the
of potentiality, capability or capacity.

composite power/knowledge. Gayatri Spivak draws our attention to the homely verbiness of savoir in
savoirfaire [a ready and polished kind of know-how, in English], savoir-vivre [an understanding of social
life and customs] into pouvoir. So pouvoir-savoir could mean being able to do something only as you

Foucault uses the composite term

power/knowledge to refer to the relation between power and
knowledge that genealogy unmasks. For example, a genealogical study shows that
are able to make sense of it.51

the explosion of discussion about sex in the Victorian age was due to a type of power that bourgeois
society brought to bear on the body and on sex.52 It, thus, casts doubt on the repressive

Genealogy demonstrates that this power had neither the

form of the law, nor the effects of the taboo; rather, it operated by
producing (different kinds of) sexuality and making it a defining
characteristic of individuals. Consequently, there emerged four figures who were

simultaneously objects of knowledge, namely, the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the

These were products of four strategies

which formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power
centering on sex,56 to wit, the hysterization of womens bodies,
the pedagogization of childrens sex, the socialization of
procreative behavior and the psychiatrization of perverse
pleasure, respectively.57 So, far from being an historical fact, sexuality is a historical construct58
Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult.55

(un dispositif historique)59. Therefore, the real questions are whether prohibition and censorship are not
forms of power rather than repression and whether all this discourse on sex is not itself part of the power it
criticizes as repression.

Criticism is the ultimate responsibility of intellectuals,
necessary to ensure that reforms and revolutions dont
replicate the problems they seek to address
Michel Foucault, Professor, College de France, Human Nature: Justice
Versus Power, Noam Chomsky Debates with Michel Foucault, International
Philosophers Project, 1971. Available from the World Wide Web at:
"It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the
workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and
independent; to criticise and attack them in such a manner that the
political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely
through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. This
critique and this fight seem essential to me for different reasons: firstly, because
political power goes much deeper than one suspects; there are
centres and invisible, little-known points of support; its true
resistance, its true solidity is perhaps where one doesn't expect it.
Probably it's insufficient to say that behind the governments, behind the
apparatus of the State, there is the dominant class; one must locate
the point of activity, the places and forms in which its domination is
exercised. And because this domination is not simply the expression
in political terms of economic exploitation, it is its instrument and , to
a large extent, the condition which makes it possible; the suppression of
the one is achieved through the exhaustive discernment of the
other. Well, if one fails to recognise these points of support of class
power, one risks allowing them to continue to exist; and to see this
class power reconstitute itself even after an apparent revolutionary

Answers To

A2 Alt Fails
Criticism is fundamental to any meaningful social
Michel Foucault, College de France, POWER, ed. J.D. Faubion, 1994, p.

I'll reply first to the point about not having "produced any results." There are hundreds and thousands of
people who have worked for the emergence of a certain number of problems that are now actually before

Do you think that

twenty years ago the problems of the relation between mental
illness and psychological normality, the problem of imprisonment,
the problem of the relation between the sexes, and so on, were
raised as they are today? Furthermore, there are no reforms in
themselves. Reforms do not come about in empty space,
independently of those who make them. One cannot avoid
considering those who will have to administer this transformation.
And then, above all, I don't think that criticism can be set against
transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation. A
critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way
they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of
familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the
accepted practices are based. We need to free ourselves of the
sacralization of the social as the only instance of the real and stop
regarding that essential element in human life and human relations-I
mean thought-as so much wind. Thought does exist, both beyond
and before systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is
often hidden but always drives everyday behaviors. There is always
a little thought occurring even in the most stupid institutions; there
is always thought even in silent habits. Criticism consists in
uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things
are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken
for granted is no longer taken for granted. To do criticism is to make
harder those acts which are now too easy. On the other hand, as
soon people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have
been thought, transformation becomes at the same time very
urgent, very difficult, and entirely possible. So there is not a time for
criticism and a time for transformation; there are not those who
have to do criticism and those who have to transform, those who are
confined within an inaccessible radicality and those who are obliged
to make the necessary concessions to reality. As a matter of fact, I
believe that the work of deep transformation can be done in the
open and always turbulent atmosphere of continuous criticism.
Understood in these terms, criticism (and radical criticism) is utterly
indispensable for any transformation. For a transformation that
would remain within the same mode of thought, a transformation
that would only be a certain way of better adjusting the same
thought to the reality of things, would only be superficial
us. Saying that such efforts have not produced any results is completely false.

A2 - Framework

Conservatism DA
Any move to methodologically bracket out our discussion
cannot be viewed as value neutral, it is the worst form of
conservatism favoring the established order at the
expense of the oppressed.
Meszaros 89 (Istvan, likes Marx not Adam Smith. The Power of Ideology, p

Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality the self-proclaimed Wertfreiheit or value neutrality of
so-called rigorous social science stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed , we are

often presented with the claim that the adoption of the

advocated methodological framework would automatically
exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are
adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary

and securing the desired

objectivity and uncontestable outcome.

Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly

assume that their enthusiasm for the virtues of methodological

neutrality is bound to yield value neutral solutions with regard
to highly contested issues , without first examining the all-important question as to the
conditions of possibility or otherwise of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plans of
methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended

procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely

methodological character. In reality, of course, this approach to
methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological
substance. Since, however, the plane of methodology (and meta-theory) is
said to be in principle separated from that of the substantive
issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed .
Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is
supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because
everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of rational discourse. Yet, curiously
enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a
priori excluded from their rational discourse metaphysical, ideological, etc. The effect of

circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only

admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies in the
name of methodology itself, all those who do not fit into the
stipulated framework of discourse . As a result, the propounders of the right
method are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities
as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and
the rival sets of values associated with them. This is where we can see more clearly the social
orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For far from offering an adequate
scope for critical enquiry the advocated general adoption of the

allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent, in fact,

to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter . Instead,
the stipulated common methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of rational
discourse into the dubious practice of producing methodology for the sake of methodology: a tendency
more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the
recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point the new
knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only
for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism
which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for tits own sake
continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose. Naturally,
to speak of a common methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society
torn by irreconcilable social interests and pursuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best,
notwithstanding all talk about ideal communication
communities . But to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of
transubstantiating into ideal types ( or by putting into methodological

brackets) the discussion of contending social values reveals the

ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the
claimed rationality . For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great
variety of forms from the Viennese version of logical positivism to Wittgensteins famous ladder that
must be thrown away at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the
Popperian principle of little by little in the emotivist theory of value inevitably always
favours the established order . And it does so by declaring the
fundamental structural parameters of the given society of of
bounds to the potential contestants , in the authority of the ideally common
methodology. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it out to be fairly obvious
that to consent not to question the fundamental structural
framework of the established order is radically different
according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of the order
or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the
receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall
determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) of that order .
Consequently, to establish the common identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded
hierarchical order by means of the reduction of the people belong to the contending social forces into
fictitious rational interlocutors, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a
beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse would be nothing sort of methodological miracle.
Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational community ,
the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to
acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of
society in substantive terms. This would imply the articulation of the
relevant problems not on the plane of self-referential articulation of the relevant problems
not on the plane of self-referential theory and methodology, but as inherently practical

issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity

of radical structural changes . In other words, it would require the

explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and metatheoretical neutrality . But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely
because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of
fact and value, theory and practice, formal and substantive rationality, etc. The conflicttranscending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of
the ruling ideology. What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its valuecommitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to
bring them into the focus of discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the
conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the
ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and
semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the
impeccable methodologically sanctioned credentials of
procedural rules, models and paradigms? Once , though, such
rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of
reference of what may or may not '''be allowed'''' to considered
the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the
accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the
scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the
inexplicit ideological assumptions upon the basis of which the
methodological principles themselves were in the first place
constitution . This why the allegedly non-ideological ideologies which
so successfully conceal and exercise their


function in the

guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying. Twentieth-century currents of thought

are dominated by approaches that lend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order
through complicated at times completely bewildering mediations, on the methodological plane.
Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the
investigation of the complex dialectical relationship between methods and values which no social
theory or philosophy can escape.

Plan Focus DA
Focus on implementation means we never consider how
our communicative modes enable structural violence.
Cost/benefit is a poor
Gherke 1998 [Pat J, Former Debate Coach and Rhetorical Scholar, Critique
Arguments as Policy Analysis: Policy Debate Beyond the Rationalist Perspective,
Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, 19, 1998, pp. 18-39]
Arguably, some policies may intend no more than their implementation. However, that does not free
such policies from responsibility for far more than they intend. While methods for considering these
interpretive and communicative aspects of a policy are beyond the rationalist perspective, any
evaluation of policy options must consider these communicative perspectives. To
limit these interpretations to the intentional and the nave is to limit policy
discourse and policy analysis, destroying our ability to consider the communicative
effects and influences of policy advocacy. In her analysis of the published reports
of the Tuskegee study, Martha Solomon notes that one reason the Tuskegee
experiment continued for as long as it did was that the rhetorical conventions of
the scientific community obscured and encouraged neglect of crucial human
concerns (243244). Her focus necessarily extends far beyond the intentional,
naive, rogate meanings of the Tuskegee texts. While recognizing these language
choices were not intentional attempts to deceive or manipulate, Solomon accounts
for their occurrence and impact upon the policy process. Attempts at similar
analysis of proposed policies might act as a check against policy actions such as
the Tuskegee study.Ignorance of these aspects of policy analysis may persuade
debaters that policies that meet rational cost-benefit criteria are always the most
effective and preferential policy options, regardless of how they characterize
individuals or communicate roles and obligations. Similarly, it will leave debaters
unable to account for the often enduring and dramatic effects of the
communicative aspects of policies and policy advocacy.

Spectator DA
The detached stance of the policy maker in debate
divorces us from true advocacy and is one of the most
debilitating failures of contemporary education. Their
dismissal of any argument that cannot be proven by
THEIR standards of "evidence" forecloses any discussion
of oppression.
DSRB 2008

the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a sense
of detachment associated with the spectator posture. In other words, its participants are
able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from
the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms
like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate
simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world
participation in the political contexts they debate about . As William Shanahan
Mitchell observes that

remarks: the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the
particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and

When we blithely call for United States Federal

Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that
establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific
atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to
acknowledge these implications (emphasis in original). The objective stance of
the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker
relies upon acceptable forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion,
producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters note, such a stance
is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of
power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression . In other words,
needed to be debated as such.

the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of

Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the

maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government
or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate,
violating the more objective stance of the policymaker and require their
opponents to do the same. Jones and Green argue that debaters should
ground their agency in what they are able to do as individuals. Note the
power and privilege.

following statement from Green in the 2NC against Emorys Allen and Greenstein (ranked in the sweet

our advocacy is grounded in our

agency as individuals. Their agency is grounded in what the US federal government, what the
state should do.117 Citing Mitchell, Green argues further: We talk about, dead prez, talks about how the
system aint gone change, unless we make it change . Were talkin about
what we as individuals should do. Thats why Gordon Mitchell talked about how when we lose
our argumentative agency. When we give our agency to someone else, we begin
speaking of what the United States Federal Government should do, rather
than what we do, that cause us to be spectators. Its one of the most
debilitating failures of contemporary education. As part of their commitment to the
sixteen): And then, another main difference is that

development of agency, each of the Louisville debaters engages in recognition of their privilege, in an
attempt to make their social locations visible and relevant to their rhetorical stance.

A2 - Law Solves
Rules or regulations passed to prevent violence impacts
only further perpetuate the sovereigns power only
genealogical approaches can uncover the unquestioned
ways power has become manifested
Sembou 11 [Evangelia, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Social
Theory, Hegel, Political Science, and History of Political Thought (Ancient and
Modern), Foucaults Genealogy 6-16,] Reynoso

In Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality Foucault isolates specific sites (not
places) of rituals of power, namely, Benthams Panopticon and the confessional. As genealogist, Foucault

The rules that

emerge from rituals of power are passed into civil law or moral
conventions, which supposedly prevent the violence that would
otherwise ensue. But, as a genealogical analysis demonstrates, these
rules and conventions only perpetuate power and facilitate its
diffusion within the body politic as a whole . According to Foucault, Power is
war, the continuation of war by other means.26 He inverts Clausewitzs dictum
that War is a mere continuation of policy by other means,27 arguing instead that politics is the
continuation of war by other means. Genealogy searches for
instances of discursive production (which also administer silences, to be sure), of
the production of power (which sometimes have the function of prohibiting), of the
propagation of knowledge (which often cause mistaken beliefs or systematic misconceptions
to circulate). Genealogy writes the history of these instances and their transformations. So a
genealogical history of sexuality unmasks the fact that since the end
of the sixteenth century the putting into discourse of sex has been
a technique of power exercised over sex, which has allowed the
dissemination and implantation of polymorphous sexualities. Further,
then tries to specify how power works, when, how, and what its effects are.

the will to knowledge has not come to a halt in the face of a taboo that must not be lifted, but has
persisted in constituting despite many mistakes, of course a science of sexuality. Rules are
impersonal and can be bent to any purpose this is one of the most important lessons that Nietzsche has
taught us. A traditional historical analysis of the purpose of social and political institutions cannot unearth
their Entstehung because The

successes of history belong to those who are

capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them,
to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning,
and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them .
Genealogy shows, therefore, that interpretations are dependent on specific configurations of power. And

the more the genealogist-interpreter uncovers an interpretation the

more she/he finds not a fixed meaning but only another
interpretation. In this way the arbitrariness of all interpretation is revealed. Since there is
no original essence, there is nothing to interpret; and, if there is
nothing to interpret, everything is open to Interpretation. This is the
insight we gain by practicing genealogy.

Curtailing regulated mass collection of metadata creates

a void that can only be filled by covert government and
private contracting through circumvention thus increasing
Savage et al 6/4,[Charlie, Washington Correspondent for NY Times_Best
selling author and Pulitzer Prize winner, "Hunting for Hackers, N.S.A. Secretly
Expands Internet Spying at U.S. Border", New York
Times,] Chowdhury
WASHINGTON Without public notice or debate, the Obama administration
has expanded the National Security Agencys warrantless surveillance of
Americans international Internet traffic to search for evidence of malicious
computer hacking, according to classified N.S.A. documents. In mid-2012,
Justice Department lawyers wrote two secret memos permitting the spy
agency to begin hunting on Internet cables, without a warrant and on
American soil, for data linked to computer intrusions originating abroad
including traffic that flows to suspicious Internet addresses or contains
malware, the documents show. The Justice Department allowed the agency to
monitor only addresses and cybersignatures patterns associated with
computer intrusions that it could tie to foreign governments. But the
documents also note that the N.S.A. sought permission to target hackers
even when it could not establish any links to foreign powers. Continue
reading the main story RELATED IN OPINION Edward SnowdenOp-Ed
Contributor: Edward Snowden: The World Says No to SurveillanceJUNE 4,
2015 The disclosures, based on documents provided by Edward J. Snowden,
the former N.S.A. contractor, and shared with The New York Times and
ProPublica, come at a time of unprecedented cyberattacks on American
financial institutions, businesses and government agencies, but also of
greater scrutiny of secret legal justifications for broader government
surveillance. Continue reading the main story DOCUMENT Leaked Snowden
Documents Show Expansion of Cybersurveillance by U.S. Agencies As the
threat of malicious hacking has grown, the National Security Agency and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation have secretly expanded their surveillance of
Internet communications flowing to and from the United States, documents
provided by the former intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden show.
OPEN DOCUMENT While the Senate passed legislation this week limiting
some of the N.S.A.s authority, the measure involved provisions in the U.S.A.
Patriot Act and did not apply to the warrantless wiretapping program.
Government officials defended the N.S.A.s monitoring of suspected hackers
as necessary to shield Americans from the increasingly aggressive activities
of foreign governments. But critics say it raises difficult trade-offs that should
be subject to public debate. The N.S.A.s activities run smack into law
enforcement land, said Jonathan Mayer, a cybersecurity scholar at Stanford
Law School who has researched privacy issues and who reviewed several of
the documents. Thats a major policy decision about how to structure
cybersecurity in the U.S. and not a conversation that has been had in public.
It is not clear what standards the agency is using to select targets. It can be

hard to know for sure who is behind a particular intrusion a foreign

government or a criminal gang and the N.S.A. is supposed to focus on
foreign intelligence, not law enforcement. Continue reading the main story
RELATED COVERAGE President Obama in Washington this month. The data
breach is the third major foreign intrusion into an important federal computer
system in the past year. In an earlier attack, some of the president's
unclassified emails were apparently obtained by intruders.Hacking Linked to
China Exposes Millions of U.S. WorkersJUNE 4, 2015 Joseph Turow, a professor
at the University of Pennsylvania, led the study on data collection and
privacy.Sharing Data, but Not HappilyJUNE 4, 2015 President Obama and his
national security team have insisted that broad surveillance powers are vital
to tracking terrorist threats.News Analysis: In Pushing for Revised Surveillance
Program, Obama Strikes His Own BalanceJUNE 3, 2015 video Obama Seeks
Support on SurveillanceMAY 30, 2015 The government can also gather
significant volumes of Americans information anything from private emails
to trade secrets and business dealings through Internet surveillance
because monitoring the data flowing to a hacker involves copying that
information as the hacker steals it.

A2 - Cede The Political

There is a difference between criticism that offers new
political possibilities and complete disengagement
Wendy Brown, Political Theory @ UC Berkeley, and Janet Halley, Law @
Harvard, 2002, Introduction. Left Legalism/Left Critique p 27-28
Let us admit forthrightly, however, that critique does not guarantee
political outcomes, let alone political resolutions. Yet, rather than
apologize for this aspect of critique , why not affirm it? For part of what it
means to dissect the discursive practices that organize our lives is to embark on an inquiry whose outcome
is unknown, and the process of which will be totally disorienting at times. To probe for its constituent
elements discontent about a particular political aim or strategy is not to know immediately t might reform
or replace that aim. Indeed, one of our worries about le-m pertains to its impulse to call the question too

Marx's critiques of left Hegelianism worked closely with the texts and political
were not expressly organized by a
clear alternative. It was through the process of subjecting political
and philosophical idealism to critique that Marx found his way to dialectical
materialism and political economy, but a careful reading of this v work makes clear that Marx did
not know in advance where his critiques would take him, and that
premature closure on the question would have stymied both the
critique and the productive disorientation it achieved for him about left Hegelianism. Surely we

formulations that he found dissatisfying, but they

should not disavow a critique of the tensions and contradictions

affirmative action


simply because that critique does not deliver in advance

a blueprint or set of strategies for achieving

racial, gender, or class


in America. Not knowing what a critique will yield is not the same
as suspending all political values while engaged in critique . It is
possible to care passionately about offering richer educational
opportunities to those historically excluded from them while subjecting
to ruthless critique the institutional and discursive practices that
have thus far organized that aim. It is possible to sustain a deep commitment to the
vision of equality for sexual minorities in a heterosexual culture while subjecting to critique a range of
techniques from the campaigned for gay marriage to the constitution of queers as genetically
predetermined----advanced in the name of such equality. And even if of racially marked ones but that
strike us as urgently unjust, or by revealing that the idea of "sexual minorities" is at once so incoherent
and so interpellative that it may belong under the heading "the problem" rather than the heading "the

although political
commitments may constitute both the incitement to critique and the
sustaining impulse of it, these commitments themselves will almost
inevitably change their shape in the course of its undertaking.
Critique is worth nothing if it does not bring the very terms of such
solution" the resulting disorientation remains deeply political. And so,

commitments under scrutiny,

if it does not transform its content and the discourse in

which it is advanced. In this volume, Judith Butler argues for just such a transformation when she warns
that to remain within the existing terms of the gay kinship debates is to accept "an epistemological field
structured by a fundamental loss, one that we can no longer name enough even to grieve." So

critique is risky. It can be a disruptive, disorienting, and at times

destructive enterprise of knowledge. It can be vertiginous
knowledge, knowledge that produces bouts of political
inarticulateness and uncertainty, knowledge that bears no

immediate policy outcomes or table of tactics . And it can include on its casualty
list a number of losses discarded ways of thinking and operatingwith no clear replacements. But
critique is risky in another sense as well, what might be called an
affirmative sense. For critique hazards the opening of new
modalities of thought and political possibility, and potentially affords as well the
possibility of enormous pleasure political, intellectual, and ethical.

A2 Institutions Good
Institutions are constituted through discourseour
theoretical critique is simultaneously radical practice
which creates space within policymaking for intellectual
Deleuze and Foucault 72 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault,

Intellectuals and Power, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: selected

essays and interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, recorded
March 4, 1972,
GILLES DELEUZE: Possibly we're in the process of experiencing a new relationship between theory and

At one time, practice was considered an application of theory , a

at other times, it had an opposite sense and it was thought to
inspire theory, to be indispensable for the creation of future theoretical forms. In any event,
their relationship was understood in terms of a process of
totalisation. For us, however, the question is seen in a different light.
The relationships between theory and practice are far more partial
and fragmentary. On one side, a theory is always local and related to a
limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or less distant
from it. The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is
never one of resemblance. Moreover, from the moment a theory
moves into its proper domain, it begins to encounter obstacles , walls,


and blockages which require its relay by another type of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it

Practice is a set of relays from one

theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice
to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a
wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall. For example, your work
eventually passes to a different domain).

began in the theoretical analysis of the context of confinement, specifically with respect to the psychiatric
asylum within a capitalist society in the nineteenth century. Then you became aware of the necessity for
confined individuals to speak for themselves, to create a relay (it's possible, on the contrary, that your
function was already that of a relay in relation to them); and this group is found in prisons -- these
individuals are imprisoned. It was on this basis that you organised the information group for prisons (G.I.P.)
(1), the object being to create conditions that permit the prisoners themselves to speak. It would be
absolutely false to say, as the Maoist implied, that in moving to this practice you were applying your
theories. This was not an application; nor was it a project for initiating reforms or an enquiry in the
traditional sense. The emphasis was altogether different: a system of relays within a larger sphere, within a

A theorising intellectual, for us, is

no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness. Those who act
and struggle are no longer represented, either by a group or a union that
appropriates the right to stand as their conscience. Who speaks and acts? It is always a
multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts. All of us
are "groupuscules."(2) Representation no longer exists; there's only action-theoretical action and
multiplicity of parts that are both theoretical and practical.

practical action which serve as relays and form networks. FOUCAULT: It seems to me that the political
involvement of the intellectual was traditionally the product of two different aspects of his activity: his
position as an intellectual in bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production and within the
ideology it produces or imposes (his exploitation, poverty, rejection, persecution, the accusations of
subversive activity, immorality, etc); and his proper discourse to the extent that it revealed a particular
truth, that it disclosed political relationships where they were unsuspected. These two forms of
politicisation did not exclude each other, but, being of a different order, neither did they coincide. Some
were classed as "outcasts" and others as "socialists." During moments of violent reaction on the part of the
authorities, these two positions were readily fused: after 1848, after the Commune, after 1940. The
intellectual was rejected and persecuted at the precise moment when the facts became incontrovertible,
when it was forbidden to say that the emperor had no clothes. The intellectual spoke the truth to those

who had yet to see it, in the name of those who were forbidden to speak the truth: he was conscience,

the intellectual discovered

that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know
perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and
they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. But there
exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates
this discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in the
manifest authority of censorship, but one that profoundly and subtly
penetrates an entire societal network. Intellectuals are themselves
agents of this system of power-the idea of their responsibility for "consciousness" and
discourse forms part of the system. The intellectual's role is no longer to place
himself "somewhat ahead and to the side" in order to express the
stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the
forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in
the sphere of "knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and "discourse.
"(4) In this sense theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply
consciousness, and eloquence. In the most recent upheaval (3)

practice: it is practice . But it is local and regional, as you said, and

not totalising. This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at
revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and
insidious. It is not to "awaken consciousness" that we struggle (the masses have been aware for some

time that consciousness is a form of knowledge; and consciousness as the basis of subjectivity is a
prerogative of the bourgeoisie), but to sap power, to take power; it is an activity conducted alongside those
who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A "theory " is the regional system
of this struggle.

A2 - Permutation
Panopticon ideals wont change need for completely new
system is required
Ajana 05 (Btihaj, Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities & Creative
Industries Kings College London, Surveillance and Biopolitics, Electronic
Journal of Sociology,

Focusing largely on the increasing advances in information and

communications technologies, each of these arguments stands, discreetly at
least, as an attempt to articulate what Hardt (1998: 35) refers to as the
Postcivil Condition in which the shift from physical to electronic means
heralds several profound changes in the nature and extent of surveillance
(Lyon, 1994: 55) as well as different control possibilities that (arguably)
escape the Panopticon ideal. Nevertheless, such changes and possibilities
tend to be mainly perceived in quantitative (Lyon, 1994: 56) terms i.e. with
regard to the high capacity, durability and transferability of electronic
technologies of surveillance on the one hand, and the low visibility of the
observer on the other, leaving qualitative concerns unscrutinised. Seduction,
self-monitoring, pre-emptive interventions, anticipatory preventions and so
forth are all features enacted within the various practices of biopolitics and
coherent with the state of technicism that characterises contemporary
societies. However, the emergence of such strategies of risk management
by no means amounts to the redundancy of previous modes of discipline and
control for this would (prematurely) entail that the end of the Panopticon
arrived before the end of the Panopticon itself (at this instant, Kafkas axiom
springs to my mind the messiah will arrive one day after his arrival). This
instead raises an urgent need to understand the ways in which old
disciplinary mechanisms are reconfigured and refashioned within the circuits
of everyday existence.

The permutation is impossible The plan starts by using

historic discourses adopted by the state to justify the
status quo only bolster their own claims.
Kelly 03 [Mark, Clinical Senior Lecturer, Obstetrics, Gynaecology and
Neonatology, Westmead Clinical School, Racism, Nationalism and Biopolitics:
Foucaults Society Must Be Defended,] Reynoso
Foucault traces the history of an alternative way of doing
history which grew up at the end of the Middle Ages. Previously, history had
essentially been written from the point of view of the ruler, serving to stress
continuity of succession. This new history challenged the status quo by
positing a basic struggle in society between ruler and some or other group of
ruled. This struggle was always racial, broadly speaking. In England it took the form of bourgeois and
In the 1976 course,

petit bourgeois elements describing themselves as the successors to the Saxon inhabitants of England as
opposed to the monarchy, which represented the successors of Norman invaders (this is only one example
of the kind of ways in which English society was interpreted in the light of the dichotomy of Norman and
Saxon). In France, the aristocracy complained that their rights as Frankish conquerors had been eroded by

discourses took on any

number of forms in different hands, and fairly quickly came to be colonized
by state power, which took to using them to bolster its own claims. The success
the monarchy in league with Gallo-Roman descended elements. These

of these discourses of race struggle was such that they became ubiquitous as a way of thinking about

In the eighteenth century, the state itself started to colonize these

discourses, to use them to its own ends, to justify the status quo. Ultimately, the
subversive discourse of race struggle, which Foucault praises,5 mutates utterly from the idea that there
is a struggle between opposing forces which is basic to society to the idea
that society itself is the agent caught in a struggle with its enemies both
within and withoutfrom the discourse of race struggle to that of state
racism.6 This involves the idea of the nation as race, of a people as which is racially homogenous, for

which internal and external racial others are dangers. We can see two lineages emerging in the nineteenth
century: state racism, which denies the conflict inherent in and basic to society in favour of a conflict
between society and its enemies, and another, coming down to Foucault through Nietzsche, which affirms

This co-option of the discourse

of race struggle as the discourse of state racism is intimately connected with
the emergence of biopolitics, one of the two great technologies7 of power in the modern epoch
the primacy of struggle as the internal dynamic of every society.

identified by Foucault (the other being discipline).8 These two are distinguished by the levels at which they
operate, and by their age (discipline is older), even though they dovetail into one another, which is to
say, they are deeply compatible and complementary.9 Discipline is a technology which is concerned with
individuals, the control of individual bodies; biopolitics is newer and correspondingly more sophisticated: it

Where discipline is the technology

deployed to make individuals behave, to be efficient and productive workers,
biopolitics is deployed to manage population ; for example, to ensure a healthy workforce.
deals with populations at the level of the multiplicity.

The different levels at which these technologies operate is what makes them so easily compatible.

Case Debate

Circumvention Mass Surveillance

The NSA and federal government have numerous
loopholes for conducting mass surveillance on US citizens.
Whittaker, 14 (Zack, Writer for CBS News, Legal loopholes could allow
wider NSA surveillance, researchers say June 30, 2014. Access Date: 7/23/15)
-- Secret loopholes exist that could allow the National Security Agency
to bypass Fourth Amendment protections to conduct massive domestic
surveillance on U.S. citizens, according to leading academics. The research paper released Monday by
researchers at Harvard and Boston University details how the U.S. government could "conduct
largely unrestrained surveillance on Americans by collecting their network
traffic abroad," despite constitutional protections against warrantless
searches. One of the paper's authors, Axel Arnbak of Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet & Society,
told CBS News that U.S. surveillance laws presume Internet traffic is non-American
when it is collected from overseas. "The loopholes in current surveillance laws
and today's Internet technology may leave American communications as
vulnerable to surveillance, and as unprotected as the internet traffic of
foreigners," Arnbak said. Although Americans are afforded constitutional protections
against unwarranted searches of their emails, documents, social networking data, and other cloud-stored
data while it's stored or in-transit on U.S. soil, the researchers note these same protections do not
exist when American data leaves the country . Furthermore, they suggest that Internet
traffic can be "deliberately manipulated" to push American data outside of
the country. Although the researchers say they "do not intend to speculate" about whether any U.S. intelligence
agencies are actually doing this, they say it could provide a loophole for vacuuming up vast
amounts of U.S. citizen data for intelligence purposes , thus "circumventing constitutional

and statutory safeguards seeking to protect the privacy of Americans," they warned. While the researchers do not say whether

current legislation as it stands "opens the door for unrestrained surveillance ," they write.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the subsequent introduction of the Patriot Act allowed certain kinds
of data to be collected to help in the fight against terrorism -- so-called
"metadata," such as the time and date of phone calls and emails sent,
including phone numbers and email addresses themselves. But the contents
of those phone calls or emails require a warrant . The classified documents leaked by Edward Snowden
showed that while the public laws have been in effect for years or even decades, the U.S. government has used
secret and classified interpretations of these laws for wider intelligence
gathering outside the statutes' text. The Obama administration previously said
there had been Congressional and Judicial oversight of these surveillance
laws -- notably Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which authorized the collection of Americans' phone records; and Section 702 of the Foreign
these loopholes are being actively exploited -- saying their aim is solely to broaden the understanding of the current legal framework --

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which authorized the controversial PRISM program to access non-U.S. residents' emails, social networking,

Executive Order (EO)

12333, which remains solely the domain of the Executive Branch -- along with United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) 18,
designed to regulate the collection of American's data from surveillance conducted on foreign soil -- can be used as a legal
and cloud-stored data. But the researchers behind this new study say that the lesser-known

basis for vast and near-unrestricted domestic surveillance on Americans . Play

VIDEO Inside the NSA The legal provisions offered under EO 12333, which the researchers say "explicitly allows for
intentional targeting of U.S. persons" for surveillance purposes when FISA
protections do not apply, was the basis of the authority that reportedly allowed
the NSA to tap into the fiber cables that connected Google and Yahoo's
overseas to U.S. data centers. An estimated 180 million user records,
regardless of citizenship, were collected from Google and Yahoo data centers
each month, according to the leaked documents. The program, known as Operation
MUSCULAR, was authorized because the collection was carried out
overseas and not on U.S. soil, the researchers say. The paper also said surveillance can also
be carried out across the wider Internet by routing network traffic overseas
so it no longer falls within the protection of the Fourth Amendment .
However, an NSA spokesperson denied that either EO 12333 or USSID 18 "authorizes targeting of U.S. persons for electronic surveillance by
routing their communications outside of the U.S.," in an emailed statement to CBS News. "Absent limited exception (for example, in an
emergency), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires that we get a court order to target any U.S. person anywhere in the world for
electronic surveillance. In order to get such an order, we have to establish, to the satisfaction of a federal judge, probable cause to believe that
the U.S. person is an agent of a foreign power," the spokesperson said. The report highlights a fundamental fact about Internet traffic:

Data takes the quickest route possible rather than staying solely within a
country's borders. Data between two U.S. servers located within the U.S. can
still sometimes be routed outside of the U.S. Although this is normal, the
researchers warn data can be deliberately routed abroad by manipulating the
Internet's core protocols -- notably the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which determines how Internet traffic is routed
between individual networks; and the Domain Name Service (DNS), which converts website addresses to numerical network addresses. If
the NSA took advantage of the loophole by pushing Internet traffic outside of
the U.S., it would have enough time to capture the data while it is outside the
reach of constitutional protection. The researchers rebuffed the NSA's statement in an email: "We argue that
these loopholes exist when surveillance is conducted abroad and when the authorities don't 'intentionally target a U.S. person'. There are
several situations in which you don't 'target a U.S. person', but Internet traffic of many Americans can in fact be affected." "We cannot tell
whether these loopholes are exploited on a large scale, but operation MUSCULAR seems to find its legal and technical basis in them." Mark M.

If you are intentionally spying on a

U.S. person, the government must go to the FISA Court ," he said. "That's the way
the law is supposed to operate ." Describing how the NSA says it never "intentionally collects" U.S. information, he
Jaycox, a legislative analyst at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), said: "

warned the agency's foreign data dragnet would inevitably include U.S. data. "The NSA is an intelligence organization -- it's going to be

the way that its targeting millions of foreigners, and millions

of foreign communications that will eventually pick up U.S. persons' data and
information. And once that data has been collected, it must be destroyed." "It's a question the NSA
can't reconcile, so they lean heavily on saying they never 'intentionally
collect' the U.S. person information," he said A recent primer on EO 12333 written by the privacy group said the
order "mandates rules for spying... on anyone within the United States." The group also notes because the order
remains inside the Executive Branch, the Obama administration could "repeal
or modify" it at will. The American Civil Liberties Union said in a post on its website that the U.S. government
interprets USSID 18 to "permit it to sweep up Americans' international
communications without any court order and with little oversight. " Patrick Toomey,
targeting foreigners. But it's

staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union's National Security Project, said: "Today, Americans' communications increasingly travel the
globe -- and privacy protections must reliably follow. This academic paper raises key questions about whether our current legal regime meets

it allows the NSA to vacuum up Americans' private data simply

by moving its operations offshore. " He added that there should be a uniform set of laws that protect Americans'
that standard, or whether

privacy regardless of where they are in the world, and that Congressional oversight of all rules governing surveillance is needed for
comprehensive reforms. The ACLU has also filed a Freedom of Information lawsuit with a federal court in New York, questioning "whether it
[EO 12333] appropriately accommodates the constitutional rights of American citizens and residents whose communications are intercepted in

monitoring firm Renesys observed two "route hijacking" events in June and
November 2013 that led Internet traffic to be redirected through Belarus and
the course of that surveillance." Although there is no direct evidence yet to suggest the NSA has exploited this loophole,

Iceland on separate occasions. These events are virtually unnoticeable to the

ordinary Internet user, but the side effect is that U.S. data may be readable
by foreign governments traveling through their country's infrastructure. It
also could allow the NSA to capture that data by treating it as foreign data.
These legal and technical loopholes can allow "largely unrestrained
surveillance on Americans communications," the researchers wrote. The NSA, whose job it is to produce
intelligence from overseas targets, said for the first time in August 2013 that it derives much of its "foundational authority" for its operations
from EO 12333. Recent Snowden disclosures shed new light on understanding the capabilities of the executive order. It was also recently
revealed that Snowden himself questioned the legal authority of EO 12333, according to one declassified email exchange released by the
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.

AFF Answers

Link Debate

Link Turn Democracy

Curtailing domestic surveillance policy is necessary to reestablish a more
authentic democracy through creating transparency the alt does nothing to
challenge current surveillance policy
Jacqueline L. Ferreira, 2014 (Jacqueline L. Ferreira, Professor of Sociology at University of
Western Ontario, Testing the Democratic Credibility of an NSA (No Secrets Allowed)
Government, 2014, )
In explaining their interest, government representatives have stated reasons of national security
and monitoring criminal activities (Eddlam, 2013). Since this necessarily means that
governments will be monitoring activities that are not yet illegal (and may never be illegal) there
is a necessary contradiction with democratic rights. With this in mind, globalization can be said
to threaten the integrity of democracy with the introduction of new intelligence-gathering
organizations that have been created in order to keep up with the rapidly shrinking virtual world.
The integrity of democracy has been threatened through their invention because there has not
been the transparency required of a democratic government in these organizations, because their
increased presence has resulted in the breaching the human rights of American citizens, and
because the governments actions in relation to these organizations have been contradictory to the
ideals of democracy. Before addressing these main points, it is important to first understand what
type of democracy will be hereafter discussed. Democracy at its most fundamental level is the
rule by and for the people the equal representation of the wishes of each individual person
within a sovereign state (Macpherson, 1965). For reasons of simplicity and availability of
research, this paper will focus on the liberal democracy practiced in the United States. Liberal
democracy exists where the political system of democracy is combined with the attributes of
liberalism (Macpherson, 1965; Fichtelberg, 2006). A democratic society will include free
elections, the rule of law, and the ability to choose between multiple different political parties
(Marable, 2009; Rose, 2009). Liberal attributes relate to human and civil rights as well as
political freedoms (Macpherson, 1965). Liberal societies allow citizens the freedom to vote (or
not) for whichever political party they may choose. In many liberal democratic societies, these
rights are drawn from codified legislation and especially constitutions that dictate what the
fundamental rights of citizens are that must be respected (Rose, 2009). It is assumed that through
exercising these rights, citizens will be appropriately represented by the individuals they elect to
govern them and to produce legislation that will accurately represent the desires of the majority
(Rose, 2009). The way that an elected government behaves in its everyday functions, as well as
under special circumstances as in times of war or likewise, should always take into account the
needs of their citizens and respect the rule of the majority. Additionally, it is important for a
democratic government to have transparency as one of their guiding principles so that their
citizens can remain informed about what is happening in their society. At least, the
aforementioned characteristics are what a liberal democracy should ideally adhere to.

Democracy induced policies like the plan check

biopolitical violence.
Dickinson 04 (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of California-Davis,
Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity", in Central
European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004), pg 35.)

continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical

discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are
unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, socialIn short, the

engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the

And it is certainly fruitful to

view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can
easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly
different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the
democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively
quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere
developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized
National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads
from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is
National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example.

always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the
regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can and historically does create

there are political and policy

potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that
are very different from those of National Socialist Germany.
Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree
of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible
with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of
biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear,
historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive
policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing
liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive
compulsory programs to enforce it. But again,

change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and
welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90

Link Turn - Drones

Drones are an instrument of biopower, which the state uses
to put forth a state of war
Barringer 14 (Durante, political studies student at Bard College Global War, Biopower
and The Rise of Drone Warfare in the 21st Century April 2014
Hardt and Negri posit that in order for

U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to work there must be

a focus on an unlimited form of dominance that involves all dimensions, the full
spectrum of power.82 There are forms of power that present themselves as viable
options when trying to control and retard human behavior: coercion, persuasion,
and manipulation, but undoubtedly they all have a limit to what they can accomplish. All three forms influence
choice, but do not control it and choice leads to action. So, in order to control action and choice, one
must control the life of the enemy, which then becomes unlimited due to the
encompassing character of life itself. Life can be considered in two different models: one being the life
force of a human being and the other being the day-to-day happenings that represent daily life. Foucault creates this
dichotomy in The History of Sexuality by explaining the evolution of sovereign power. In

former times, the

sovereign had the right to decide life and death83 while in modern times,
sovereign power comes in the form of life-administration. Life-administering is
an act, one done for Foucault by an unknown sovereign . This act best shows itself in politics
and the business of economics. The power to decide or take life is focused on the destruction of ones physical control
through death. However, life-administration seeks to control both the physical and life activities of a person. So

only does biopower seek to control the political life of bodies, but also the social
behaviors and interactions as well. This biopower shapes the lives of those in the
system through laws and regulations. Hardt and Negri suggest that biopower threatens us with death
but also rules over life.84 Death, also serves as a tool of subjugation and as a threat, which tries to reproduce certain

War on Al Qaeda, we see

drones as an instrument of biopower, as administers of death . Jeh
behaviors that are deemed acceptable by the powers that be. In the case of the

Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, echoed this in his address to the Oxford Union. In this address, he argues that

there will be a tipping point, a tipping in which so many of the leaders and operatives
of al Qaeda have been killed or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or
launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that al Qaeda as we know it, the
organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively
destroyed.85This statement is biopower at its best for all three scholars. Foucault would
point out the life-administering aspects of what the American government is
trying to do in terms of al Qaeda. The government is seeking to change a behavior
and ultimately produce a human being that would be more acceptable to the
status quo. However, if such conditioning is not possible then the only plausible
use of biopower would be the use of death as a final control against al Qaeda . This,
for Hardt and Negri, is the ultimate culmination of biopower. Hardt and Negri also talk about how counterinsurgency
strategies have to be formed in order to possibly compete with guerrilla fighters or in this case, insurgents. Hardt and
Negri suggest that the

dominant power (...) must adopt counterinsurgency strategies

that seek not only to defeat the enemy through military means but also control it
with social, political, ideological, and psychological weapons .86 The reason for this is best
viewed through Foucault, who says: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a
sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of

everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale

slaughter in the name of life necessity.87 It is no longer enough kill to the opponent; there must be a
regulation of the spaces in which their bodies operate. If not, then danger could still exist. In many ways the War on Al
Qaeda has become a war of biopower; Al Qaeda seeks to use terrorism to control the actions and militaristic choices of
the American people and government, while the U.S. seeks to control, regulate and possibly destroy Al Qaeda. The
social, political, ideological and psychological are all processes and concepts that inform how human beings carry out
life, the way they behave and what behaviors should be reproduced. By infiltrating the aforementioned realms the
dominant power, being America,

would seek to kill Al Qaeda as a viable option, as a way of life.

The idea of the global War on Al Qaeda also falls in line with Foucaults belief that war is
fought on behalf of the existence of everyone.88 George Bushs speech to Congress and the
nation on September 20th, 2001 furthered this idea by bringing not only national security to the forefront of American
politics, but personal security as well. Security becomes a notion important enough for the masses to engage and exert
their might through the extinction of life. However, at the same time even the act of getting the masses to rise and stand
is a form of lifeadministering, a positive form of biopower. Foucault also uses the word purpose which is important to
understand when it comes to trying to understand the meaning of biopower. Biopower

is not just an unseen

it is the ruling body that creates the space for life
processes, such as politics, in order for them to play out. Foucault argues: It is
as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes
have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed .89 To
concept, but it is government,

manage something is an incredible type of power to hold, especially over the lives of men. And survival, which in a
Foucauldian sense would be avoiding death and being productive, is the purpose of biopower. Bodies most live in order
to be productive, however what happens when productivity is lost? Death

becomes much more realistic

as an option for control.

Drones and warfare are tools of the state to extend their

power and push their citizens into a perpetual state of
Barringer 14 (Durante, political studies student at Bard College Global War, Biopower
and The Rise of Drone Warfare in the 21st Century April 2014
Hardt and Negri view the concepts of

global war, the absolute, and biopower through the

overarching theme of security. They observe that there has been a shift from defense to security within
politics.97 Defense in itself is reactionary and based upon a set criterion that justifies action. By contrast, with security
there is a sense of proactivity, of actively seeking ways to deter and prevent threats. Hardt and Negri put it this way:

requires rather actively and constantly shaping the environment

through military and/or police activity.98 Surveillance and the consequent
targeted killings that accompany them are security in its finest form . As Hardt and

Negri assert, security is a form of biopower in the sense that security seeks to reshape and produce social life at its most
general global scale.99 Security, especially defined within previous National Security strategies, has been aimed at the
destruction of Al Qaeda and lessening their influence across the globe. By openly bringing death to Al Qaedas doorstep
and actively exerting power over life, security

is reinforced through fear and possibility of

death. Death then serves as a deterrent, thus solidifying American security. In looking at drones as a
form of security or enforcer of security, taking the place of field soldiers, one has
to view drones as more than simple machines. The expansion of drone operations
to include targeted killing is a response to the unorthodoxy of insurgency and
asymmetric warfare. For a long time, with just ground forces which included spies, soldiers and informants war
efforts could only go so far. While still operating on a global field, ground forces can only conduct intelligence gathering
for a limited time, especially within a network as amorphous as Al Qaeda. The

prospect of conducting targeted

killings using ground forces would also seem unconventional. Drones, on the other hand, can
target and successfully kill more than one enemy during an operation; drones can
also gather intelligence for an undefined amount of time. These capabilities have

become increasingly more desirable in the war against Al Qaeda. Drones have

become the instrument of biopower in technological form . Both


and military powers are able to be carried out at a very low cost while
affording the government maneuverability and global reach; this global reach
allows for the regulation of life abroad and ultimately transforms not only the way Al
Qaeda operatives live, but the way both domestic and foreign civilians live as well. When looking at how one
should view the transformation of war in the 21st century, Al Qaeda and technology become synonymous with ideations
of global security. Using Hardt and Negris framework allows for a comprehensive analysis of the advent of global war
and the

perpetual state of exception that has become commonplace within U.S.

politics today. With the advent of policies such as the AUMF and the Office of Legal Counsels white paper on the
legality of drones, which I will discuss in chapter three, one has to grapple with such questions in an intellectual way.

Global War is not something that is merely conceptual. It exists as a part of

Americas national security strategy. For the past twelve years the U.S. has changed the
way in which it fought the war, however it has not changed the political
objective of the war, which is a global one; the destruction of the Al Qaeda network completely. With
that being said, the U.S. had to adapt to the insurgency tactics of Al Qaeda, which for a military built on conventional
strategic and tactical principles was a feat in itself. However, this

new unconventional war has led to the

expansion of technology as a more efficient and cost effective way of fighting
insurgencies. Drones, armed drones, have come to the forefront of American war
fighting. One could say that this was bound to happen; drones were being used since the late 1970s, yet not at the
capacity they are being used now. In an article written by Frank Strickland called The Early Evolution of the Predator
Drone he quotes a man by the name of James Jim Woolsey, who says, We

have slain a large dragon.

But now we live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.
And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.100 This quote speaks directly to
the frame of thought that is reflected today in American ideations of global war, exception and the use of drones as an
offensive-defensive counterinsurgency weapon. Woolsey said that America, after the fall of Russia, the large dragon, lived
in a world where small dangers would pose a threat to security. Woolsey was right. Dangers did exist that were unseen
and were hard to keep track of especially with human limitations.

Link Turn Legal Protections Good

Although the internet makes surveillance easier, spying
on people is not the right way to go. Large corporations
should not betray the trust of their consumers.
John Sullivan Jan 2014 (Associate Professor of Media and Communication
at Muhlenberg College in Allentown, PA. He received his Masters and Ph.D.
degrees in Communication. The Political Economy of Communication
"Uncovering the data panopticon: The urgent need for critical scholarship in
an era of corporate and government surveillance"
In Philip K. Dicks 1956 science fiction short story, The Minority Report, crime in a futuristic United States
has been all but extinguished because the police have discovered the ability to predict future events. In
this peaceful dystopia, suspects are arrested and charged before their crimes are even committed. While

the recent revelations

about the scope and nature of the National Security Agencys (NSA) domestic
digital spying program suggest they have developed some formidable tools to
locate would-be terrorists. Privacy advocates were outraged by whistleblower
Edward Snowdens revelation that the NSA, in cooperation with technology
companies, routinely stored, processed and analyzed millions of private
emails, video chats, online phone calls, and internet file transfers under the
auspices of a program called PRISM. Recent news reports based upon Snowdens documents
real-world law enforcement agencies cannot (yet) predict future events,

have revealed that even encrypted emails, documents, and online banking transactions are being regularly
accessed by the NSA (Larson and Shane, 2013).

While these revelations about domestic

digital wiretapping without court orders have caused a stir in the American
and global press, the privacy dangers associated with this type of data
surveillance are not new to the scholarly community. Exactly 20 years ago,
communication scholar Oscar H Gandy Jr (1993) meticulously outlined the growing
threat to individual privacy posed by the cooperation between corporate and
government data gathering in a book called The Panoptic Sort. At a time when the internet was
in its infancy, when desktop computer processing was a fraction of what it is today, and five years before
the founding of Google,

Gandy warned that organizations like Equifax, TRW, and the

Direct Marketing Association (DMA) were amassing huge repositories of
consumer data that were gathered passively whenever individuals made
purchases via credit cards. When these data are combined with sophisticated
matching algorithms and sorted against huge government databases like the
census, he argued, they enabled precise tracking of individuals behaviors, political
views, and other sensitive private information . The precision of such discrimination
transforms the routine sorting of personal data into a powerful form of institutional power. Building upon

the scale of
the data collection and analysis performed by government and corporate
institutions created a panopticon wherein citizen actions would eventually
become circumscribed within an ever-widening net of personal data
surveillance. The end result, he observed, is an antidemocratic system of control
that cannot be transformed because it can serve no purpose other than that
for which it was designedthe rationalization and control of human
existence(Gandy, 1993: 227). Weve come a long way since 1993. Who could have imagined
Foucaults (1995) seminal analysis of disciplinary systems in society, Gandy argued that

services like Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr that not only encourage, but actively
incentivize the voluntary dissemination of personal information online? Over the
past 20 years, the centrality of the internet to the global communications
infrastructure has made it a target for the type of panoptic sorting that Gandy
described. Now that the world knows about PRISM, it is tempting to imagine
that enhanced public scrutiny will effectively limit these programs. I dont think
that is likely. In fact, there are four specific trends that foretell a greater
expansion of the data panopticon: convergence and the central place of
software in social, commercial and political systems; the growing importance of metadata
for routing, storage and sorting of information; the global business of data storage and
retrieval; the blurring of lines between corporate and government data
mining. The convergence of digital technologies and the importance of software In the previous
era of analog technologies, such as wired telephones and reel-to-reel tapes, each specific
technology had a limited range of capabilities alongside a specific set of legal
standards to accompany their use. The Wiretap Act of 1968, for example, prohibits law
enforcement from wiretapping telephones without a court order because doing so would violate the 4th

Today, there
are few discrete technologies anymore. Thanks to technological convergence, almost all
forms of communication today utilize some form of digital communication,
and many do this via the Internet. Software has now replaced specific forms of communication
Amendment protections of both the suspect and anyone that communicates with them.

hardware as the nexus for new types of digital communication, from Skype and FaceTime to emails and

Creating legal precedents for protecting individual privacy throughout

this myriad of new options has been difficult . Indeed, new options are emerging
all the time, and software is extremely fungible in functionality as it adapts quickly to new situations

and uses. We lack a coherent legal regime to counteract the interception of these communications. For
example, Skype phone calls can be protected under the existing federal wiretap laws, but emails and text

The expansion of online communications has

generated an explosion of metadata. Metadata are the transaction records
that are generated whenever you send an email or text message . It identifies
the location from which the message was sent, when it was sent, the subject
of the message, the recipient(s) of the message, the web address of the
recipient(s), and more. The Obama Administration has argued that its
domestic intelligence program complied with the law because it simply scanned
the metadata of email transactions to search for anomalies rather than accessing
the content of those emails. As a recent article in The Economist (2013) pointed out, however, while
messages cannot. The rise of metadata

the usefulness of metadata in an analog era was limited (hence the lower evidentiary standards required in
courts to obtain that information), today, thanks to the internet, metadata

can now provide a

detailed portrait of who people know, where they go, and their daily
routines. (para. 8) Therefore, the argument that random metadata searches do not violate users
privacy becomes difficult to sustain.

Link Turn Prisons

Prison is just a subtle form of control the government
uses on the people. The isolation, surveillance, labor etc.
were used to make prisoners feel separated from society.
These feelings are what turned deliquents into law
abiding citizens.
Schriltz 99 (Foucault on the prison: Torturing history to punish
capitalism Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society Karl von Schriltz,
published online: 06 Mar 2008.
In the third and most important part of his argument,

Foucault considers how the structure

of the prison came to reflect the imperatives of power, which were roughly
coextensive with the goals of Panopticism. The aim of the prison, Foucault opines,
ultimately became the transformation of inmates into compliant, law-abiding,
economically productive automatons, reflecting the efficiency demands of
emerging market economies (16364). To this end, prisons came to embody the
coercive principles of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, as did the school, the
hospital, and the factory. Panopticism disciplined its subjects through a
program of constant surveillance coupled with strict regimentation according to detailed
instructions. Constant surveillance forced subjects to internalize the gaze of
authorityenabling them to regulate themselveswhile regimentation molded their
physical movements to maximize productivity. Foucault identifies five ways in which
prisons incorporated Panopticism. First, cellular isolation forced the inmates into
greater selfreflection, pushing them to internalize authority (236). Second, constant
surveillance achieved the same end (249-50). Third, remunerated prison labor was
adopted as a means of regimenting the habits and movements of inmates, while impressing upon them
the centrality of wages as the incentive to work (240, 243). Fourth, flexible prison sentences
were meted out, reflecting the requirements of psychological rehabilitation rather than the
seriousness of the infractionthough Foucault admits that flexible sentencing was
practiced only sporadically (244). The final, similar expression of Panopticism in the prison,
Foucault asserts, was the cognitive shift from viewing inmates as "law breakers" to
viewing them as "delinquents" (255). Prison administrators regarded their
inmates no longer in terms of the crimes they had committed , but rather in terms of
their lifelong social pathologies, as reflected by their "biographies." The prisoners were seen as,
and made to feel alienated from, society. This portion of Foucault's argument is the one that
is the most abstracted from reality, and is therefore the most difficult to relate to the historical record; but
the actual evolution of the prison during the nineteenth century, and the explicit motivations behind its
evolution, seem to diverge markedly from Foucault's account. Industrialization undoubtedly brought an
unprecedented awareness of the importance of productivity to economic life, and the emergence of
surveillance and hierarchy in schools, factories, and hospitals probably reflected this concern. Foucault is
also credible in suggesting that the enhancement of efficiency through discipline initially appeared in the
militarywhere the importance of efficiency was first recognizedlong before the Industrial Revolution

efficiency concerns may have

unconsciously undergirded the pronouncements of prison reformers there is no
way of ever verifying their true motivations (Wright 1983, 22). However , the actual extent to
brought the same concern to other institutions. For this reason,

which ideas other than Panopticism were reflected in the structure of prisons
suggests otherwise. The lukewarm reception of imprisonment in France was
reflected in the disorganized state of the French prison system, which
consisted of two levels. Roughly 400 local prisons housed half the prison population, including
those waiting for trial and petty criminals serving brief sentences (Wright 1983,133-34). These squalid
facilities were described by shocked prison inspectors as "filled with stupor and horror";

the lack of

segregation according to age, sex, or degree of criminality rendered them veritable

"crime factories" (ibid., 134). These prisons remained untouched by the philosophical speculation
about incarceration, and certainly exhibited no trace of Panopticism there was no cellular
isolation, no work, and no organized surveillance of any kind.

Impact Debate

Impact Defense Biopower

Case outweighs biopower physical violence is worse
than disciplinary power
Mark Bevir, Reader in Political Theory @ U. Newcastle, Feb. 1999, Political

power or pastoral-power recognises the value of

the subject as an agent, whereas violence or discipline attempts to
extinguish the capacity of the subject for agency. Although Foucault, of
Perhaps we might say, therefore, that

course, never describes things in quite these terms, he does come remarkably close to doing so. In

defines violence, in contrast to power, as aiming at

domination or as a physical constraint that denies the ability of the
other to act: where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power,
particular, he

rather it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint.27 Similarly, he defines power, in contrast

to violence, as able to come into play only where people have a capacity to act, perhaps even a capacity to
act freely: power is exercised over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free, by which we mean
individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of
behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized.28 If we thus accept that power
always treats the subject as an agent, whereas violence always attempts to extinguish the capacity of the

power, unlike
violence, necessarily entails a capacity for resistance. To treat
someone as an agent, one has to recognise that they can do other
than one wishesthey can resist. Power can exist only where people have a capacity to
subject for agency, we can see why Foucaults later work on power emphasises that

act freely, and so only where they can resist that power. Perhaps, therefore, we should define as violent
any relationshipwhether overtly violent or notin which an individual has his action determined for him.
Violence manifests itself in any relationship between individuals, groups, or societies in which one denies
the agency of the others by seeking to define for them actions they must perform. Power, in contrast,
appears in any relationshipalthough no overtly violent relationship could meet the following requirement
in which an individual does not have his action determined for him. Power manifests itself whenever
individuals, groups, or societies act as influences on the agency of the subject without attempting to

a rejection of autonomy
implies that power is ineliminable, while a defence of agency implies
that power need not degenerate into violence. Foucaults final work on the nature
determine the particular actions the subject performs. Here

of governmentality suggests, therefore, that society need not consist solely of the forms of discipline he
had analysed earlier. Society might include an arena in which free individuals attempt only to influence one

distinction between violence and power might provide us with
normative resources for social criticism absent from his earlier work.
Provided we are willing to grant that the capacity for agency has ethical value and
this seems reasonable enoughwe will denounce violent social relations and
champion instead a society based on a more benign power.29 We will
favour forms of power that recognise the other as an agent, and so
provide openings for resistance. As Foucault suggested, we will judge
societies against an ideal of a minimum of domination. 30A good
society must recognise people as agents: it must encourage forms of
resistance. What is more, of course, if we are to recognise people as agents and encourage forms of
another. I hope my discussion of Foucaults theory of governmentality has pointed to the way in which

resistance, we must tolerate, perhaps even promote, difference. Most discussions of the sort of ethics
poststructuralism might sustain, especially in relation to feminism, highlight the ideas of a recognition of
the other and a tolerance of difference.31 What I hope I have added to these discussions is the suggestion
that one way of generating these values is to treat Foucaults concept of governmentality as implying a
recognition of the subject as an agent but not an autonomous agent. No doubt important questions remain
to be answered. Questions such as, can we devise criteria by which to determine the extent of violence
within a society? how should we promote resistance? and can we make further relevant distinctions
between forms of violence or even between forms of power? It seems clear already, however, that Foucault
provides us with a point of departure from which to address these questions. His concept of
governmentality encourages us to look at social formations to see how they provide possibilities for agency

and resistance understood as key forms of human freedom. As he himself said, the notion of
governmentality allows one, I believe, to set off the freedom of the subject and the relationship to others,
i.e., that which constitutes the very matter of ethics.32

Impact Defense Sovereignty

Sovereignty is not the founding moment of politicsthe
decision is haunted by the traces of its conceptual
predecessorsontologizing the sovereign decision within
the heart of the political is a self-fulfilling prophecy
Barnett 9 Clive Barnett, Reader in Human Geography at The Open

University, Violence and publicity: constructions of political responsibility

after 9/11, Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, 12 (3), 2009, pp.
If Agamben drastically simplifies Foucaults work on power, then nor should Agambens allusion to Derrida
in the analysis of the state of exception be accepted as the authoritative political interpretation of
deconstructions relevance to contemporary geopolitics. It is common to find deconstructive topics such as
undecidability interpreted, with the help of Schmitt, to support an account of the political in terms of

The decisionistic
interpretation of the performative force of foundations tends to take
Schmitts account of sovereignty as the power to decide on the
exception as axiomatic. In Schmitts original formulation and in Agambens faithful reiteration
of it, the sovereign is defined as the one who decides on the
exception. The circularity in this definition (Bull 2004) effaces the
interval between claiming the necessity of making an exception of
suspending the law and the successful enactment of this claim. The
absence of objective foundational validity to norms is, through reference to
the Derridean theme of undecidability, made to imply that application and
judgement are a purely arbitrary imposition of force by the
strongest will. This interpretation misconstrues the practice of
judgement that the deconstruction of foundations is meant to throw
into new relief (see Brenkman 2007, 59-77, Zerilli 2005). In Derridas writings, the
absence of foundations is not the occasion for a depressed
resignation to a decisionistic interpretation of sovereign power at
all. Rather, a distinctive sense of responsibility is made visible by the
undecidability of normative foundations. Derrida does not locate the mystical
arbitrary force and unfounded decisions (see Barnett 2004).

foundation of authority in the self-assertive will of the sovereign who decides on the exception, but in the
exposure to the demands of others (see Barnett 2005). Derrida clearly articulated his doubts about the

Schmitts account of sovereignty and the political, on the grounds that it

depends on a logic of conceptual purity in which enmity is always
found to be the original source lying behind all apparently reciprocal
relationships (Derrida 1997, 246-247). In his own reflections on the philosophical resonances of
sustainability of

contemporary geopolitics after 9/11, Derrida undermines the model of sovereignty as wilful self-assertion

The circularity of the Schmittian

account of sovereignty maintains the assumption of an ipseity of
the self, defined by the security of an I Can (Derrida 2005, 11-13). Against this
self-founding circularity, Derrida affirms the spacing between asserting
sovereignty and the enactment of decision which is implied by
thinking of sovereignty as performative: To confer sense or
meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason for it, is
already to compromise its deciding exceptionality, to subject it to
rules, to a code of law, to some general law, to concepts. It is thus to
divide it, to subject it to portioning, to participation, to being
shared (Derrida 2005, 101). For Derrida, pure sovereignty on the model of
upon which the state of exception analysis rests.

decisionist exceptionality does not and cannot exist, in so far as it

would exclude the possibility of sharing upon which sovereignty
depends. In Derridas account, sovereignty is divided at is origin by a
spacing that implies sovereignty is always distributed, shared with
others (Derrida 2005, 45). The deconstruction of the punctual ipseity of decisionistic sovereignty has
consequences for understandings of concepts of force, power and mastery (Derrida 2005, 17). If
violence is a possibility inhabiting all relations, then so equally is its
opposite, non-violence. While Derrida acknowledged that a certain force and violence is
irreducible in argumentation and discussion, he argued that none the less this violence can only be
practised and can only appear as such on the basis of a nonviolence, a vulnerability, an exposition. []. I
do not believe in non-violence as a descriptive and determinable experience, but rather as an irreducible
promise and of the relation to the other as essentially non-instrumental (Derrida 1996, 83). Reversing and
displacing the order of priority found in decisionistic interpretations of deconstruction, Derrida affirms that

violence is always entangled in a non-appropriative relation to the

other that occurs without violence and on the basis of which all
violence detaches itself and is determined (Derrida 1996, 83). The point of calling

attention to this entangled relationship of violence and non-violence in Derridas work is to underscore that

if the relationship between norms and authority, justice and law, is

understood to be undecidable, then this should not be construed as
authorizing the sort of conceptualisation of power as necessarily
violently sovereign developed by Agamben (see Johnson 2007, Wortham 2007).

Impact Framing - Pragmatism Good

Conventional political action is the only way to reform
power Foucaults alternative fails
Michael Walzer, Social Sciene Prof @ Princeton, 1988, Company of Critics,
p. 207-9
Foucault is certianly right to say that the conventional truths of
morality, law, medicine, and psychiatry are implicated in the
exercise of power; that is a fact too easily forgotten by conventionally detached scientists, social
scientists, and even philosophers. But those same truths also regulate the
exercise of power. They set limits on what can rightly be done, and
they give shape and conviction to the arguments the prisoners
make. The limits are important, even if they are in some sense
arbitrary. They arent entirely arbitrary, however, insofar as they are intrinsic to the particular
disciplines (in both senses of the word). It is the truths of jurisprudence and penology, for example, that
distinguish punishment from preventive detention. It is the truths of psychiatry that distinguish the
internment of madmen from the internment of political dissidents. And it is the commitment to truth itself,
even if it is only local truth, that distinguishes the education of citizens from ideological drill. A liberal or
social democratic state is one that maintains the limits of its constituent disciplines and disciplinary
institutions and that enforces their intrinsic principles. Authoritarian and totalitarian states, by contrast,
override those limits, turning education into indoctrination, punishment into repression, asylums into
prisons, and prisons into concentration camps. These are crude definitions, but they can easily be
elaborated or amended. They indicate, in any case, the enormous importance of the political regime, the
sovereign state. For the state is the agency through which society acts upon itself, It is the state that

It is the
state that holds open or radically shuts down the possibility of local
resistance.* The agents of every Disciplinary institution strive, of
course, to extend their reach and and augment their discretionary
power. In the long run, only political action and state power can stop
them. Every act of local resistance is an appeal for political or legal intervention from the center.
establishes the general framework within which all other disciplinary institutions operate.

Consider, for example, the factory revolts of the 1930s that led (in the United States) to the establishment
of collective bargaining and grievance procedures, critical restraints on scientific management, which is
one of Foucaults disciplines, though one that he alludes to only occasionally. Success required not only the
solidarity of the workers but also the support of the liberal and democratic state. And success was
functional not to any state but to a state of that sort; we can easily imagine other social wholes that
would require other kinds of factory discipline. A genealogical account of this discipline would be
fascinating and valuable, and it would undoubtedly overlap with Foucaults accounts of prisons and
hospitals. But if it were complete, it would have to include a genealogy of grievance procedures too, and
this would overlap with an account that Foucault doesnt provide, of the liberal state and the rule of law.
Here is a kind of knowledgelets call it political theory or philosophical jurisprudence that regulates
disciplinary arrangements across our society. It arises within one set of power relations and extends toward
the others; it offers a critical perspective on all the networks of constraint. The possibility of knowledge of
this sort, specific to institutions and political cultures rather than to points in the power network,
suggests that we still require (I dont mean that society requires, or capitalism or even socialism requires,

We need men and women who

tell us when state power is corrupted or systematically misused, who
cry out that something is rotten, and who reiterate the regulative
principles with which we might set things right. General intellectuals dont
but you and I require) Foucaults general intellectuals.

inhabit a realm of pure value, such as Bends described; Foucault is right to insist that there is no such
place, no value untouched by power. They stand among us, in this place, here and now, and they find in

But Foucault stands nowhere and finds

no reasons. Angrily, he rattles the bars of the iron cage. But he has
no plans or projects for turning the cage into something more like a
human home. But I dont want to end on this note. I dont want to ask Foucault to
be uplifting. That is not the task he has set himself. The point is
rather that one cant even be downcast, angry, grim, indignant,
our laws and norms reasons for argument.

sullen, or embittered with reason, one cant be critical, unless one

inhabits some social setting and adopts, however tentatively, its
codes and categories. Or unless, and this is much harder, one constructs (along with
other men and women) a new setting and works out new codes and
categories. Foucault refuses to do either of these things, and that
refusal, which makes his genealogies so relentless, is also the
catastrophe of his political theory and his social criticism.

Alt Debate

Alt Bad - Conservatism DA

The alternative reproduces the ethics of moral
conservativism, which ensures it is a constant form of
inaction that leaves the subject to be destroyed.
Terry Eagleton, fellow of Linacre college, The Ideology of the Aesthetic,
1990, pg. 393-395

Society is
just an assemblage of autonomous self-disciplining agents, with no
sense that their self-realization might flourish within bonds of
mutuality. The ethic in question is also troublingly formalistic. What matters is ones
control over and prudent distribution of ones powers and pleasures; it is in this ascetic selfAs with Nietzsche, Foucaults vigorously self-mastering individual remains wholly monadic.

restraint that true freedom lies, as the freedom of the artefact is inseparable from its self-imposed law. It
was not a question, Foucault claims, of what was permitted or forbidden among the desires that one felt
or the acts that one committed, but of prudence, reflection, and calculation in the way one distributed and
controlled his acts (p. 54). Foucault has now at last! introduced the question of critical self-reflection
into desire and power, a position perhaps not wholly at one with his Nietzscheanism; but he does so only to
produce a formalistic account of morality. The ancients, he writes, did not operate on the assumption that
sexual acts were bad in themselves; what matters is not the mode of conduct one prefers but the
intensity of that practice, and so an aesthetic rather than ethical criterion. But it is surely not true that
some sexual acts are not inherently vicious. Rape, or child abuse, are signal examples. Is rape morally
vicious only because it signifies a certain imprudence or immoderacy on the part of the rapist? Is there

This is a subject-centred morality with a

vengeance: For the wife [of Greek antiquityl Foucault writes without the faintest sardonic flicker,
nothing to be said about the victim?

having sexual relations only with her husband was a consequence of the fact that she was under his
control. For the husband, having sexual relations only with his wife was the most elegant way of exercising
his control (p. 151). Chastity is a political necessity for women and an aesthetic flourish for men. There is
no reason whatsoever to imagine that Foucault actually approves of this dire condition; but it is one odious
corollary of the ethic he most certainly does endorse. It is also true that Foucault, at least at one point in

Part of the problem of his approach

consists in taking sexuality as somehow paradigmatic of morality in
general a stance which ironically reduplicates the case of the
moral conservative, for whom sex would seem to exhaust and epitomize all moral issues. How
his life, opposed the criminalization of rape.

would Foucaults case work if it were transferred to, say, the act of slander? Is slander acceptable as long
as I exercise my power to perform it moderately, judiciously, slandering perhaps three persons but not
thirty? Am I morally admirable if I retain a certain controlled deployment of my slanderous powers, letting
them out and reining them in in an elegant display of internal symmetry? Does it all come down to a
question of how, in postmodernist vein, one stylizes~ ones s conduct? What would a stylish rape look like,
precisely? Foucaults Greeks believe that one should temper and refine ones practices not because they
are inherently good or bad, but because self-indulgence leads to a depletion of ones vital powers a

The more one aesthetically restrains

oneself, the richer the powers which accrue to one which is to say
that power here would seem in romantic vein an unquestioned good,
a wholly undifferentiated category. The positivity of power can thus be maintained, but
familiar male fantasy if ever there was one.

converted into the basis of a discriminatory ethics by virtue of adding to it the techniques of prudence and
temperance. And the ethical theory which is the upshot of this that the physical regimen ought to
accord with the principle of a general aesthetics of existence in which the equilibrium of the body was one
of the conditions of the proper hierarchy of the soul (p. 104) has long been familiar on the playing fields
of Eton. With The Use of Pleasure, Foucault completes his long trek from the hymning of madness to the
public school virtues. The ethical techniques with which Foucault is concerned in this book are ones of
subjectivization; but how far the long-despised subject actually makes its belated appearance in these
pages is a moot point. It is clear that Foucaults repressive hostility to subjectivity, which he can usually
see only as self-incarceration, deprives him of all basis for an ethics or a politics, leaving his rebellion a

he still
cannot quite bring himself to address the question of the subject as
such. What we have here, rather than the subject and its desires, is the body and its pleasures a halfuseless passion; and this volume is among other things an attempt to plug that disabling gap. But

way, crab-wise, aestheticizing move towards the subject which leaves love as technique and conduct

rather than as tenderness and affection, as praxis rather than interiority. It is symptomatic in this respect
that the practice closest to sexuality in the book is that of eating. A massive repression, in other words,
would still seem operative, as the body stands in for the subject and the aesthetic for the ethical. In one
sense, the sudden appearance of the autonomous individual in this work, after an intellectual career
devoted to systematically scourging it, comes as something of a surprise; but this individual is a matter,
very scrupulously, of surface, art, technique, sensation. We are still not permitted to enter the tabooed
realms of affection, emotional - intimacy and compassion, which are not particularly notable among the
public school virtues.

Blatant rejections of the make imperialism more insidious

state key to stopping multiple international problems
Pasha 96 [Mustapha Kamal, Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International
Relations at the University of Aberdeen, Security as Hegemony, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol.
21, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1996), pp. 283-302, JSTOR]

An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence73 and its drive to
produce a modern citizenry may seem cathartic, without producing the
semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh
forms of life among existing political communi- ties. Central to this critique is an
assault on the state and other modern institutions said to disrupt some putatively natural
flow of history. Tradition, on this logic, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms;
modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a
repository of violence and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. Civil society - a realm of
humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of

The attack on the institution of the state appears to substitute

teleology for ontology. In the Third World context, especially, the rise of the modern state has

been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. The
stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and
alternative forms of social orga- nization. The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of

postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against
hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of greater
capacities against want, hunger, and injustice; as an escape from the
arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of
inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No
doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance
and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can
also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic
the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures.

interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or

A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to

universality can be built. Perhaps the task is to rethink modernity, not to seek refuge in a
religious bigotry.

blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma";

there are
always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. A
rejection of the state as a superfluous leftover of modernity that continues to
straitjacket the South Asian imagination must be linked to the project of creating an ethical
inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But

and humane order based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich

reconstruction of state-society re- lations inside the state appears to
be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be
swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful
institutions. A recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good
over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state,

or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering

An appreciation of the scale of human

tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local
contexts may also provide im- portant points of entry into rethinking
the one-sided onslaught on the state. Nowhere are these costs
borne more heavily than in the postcolonial, so-called Third World, where timereassessment of the role of the state.

space compression has rendered societal processes more savage and less capable of ad- justing to
rhythms dictated by globalization

Alt Fails Inaction

Critique without direction a dead end too much
pessimism about modernity.
Loper 11 (Christiane, a graduate student of International Development,
Critique of the Critique: Post-Development and points of criticism Wadhwani
Post-Development literature is highly influenced by Foucault and the method of discourse analysis:

what follows is the

ignorance of how discourses can be transformed and resisted at the local
level. The celebration of local knowledge and local resistance leads to a
romantization and an unquestioned believe in tradition . The Local is set equally with
authenticity and emancipation. But power structures are , especially in application of the work of
Foucault, ever-present (Jakinow 2008: 313). Why then are grassroots movements
guarantors for being inclusive, non-hierarchic and democratic ? Local forms of
oppression are overlooked (Engel 2001:140). Nederveen Pieterse comments: while the shift
consequently, hegemony and power structures are being deconstructed. But

towards cultural sensibilities that accompanies this perspective is a welcome move, the plea for peoples
culture', indigenous culture, local knowledge and culture, can lead if not to ethnochauvinism, to reification

It also envices a one-dimensional view of

globalization which is equated with homogenization (Nederveen Pieterse 1998: 366).
Additionally, the exclusive validity of local knowledge precludes the view on
multiple knowledge. In consequence the fundamental criticism on modernity and modern
science implicates a rejection of the benefits : for example, the rights of the individual as well
as the techniques of modern medicine are dismissed, although they brought health
security and a higher life-expectancy (Ziai 2007: 102). Nederveen Pieterse even classifies
of both culture and locality or people.

Post- Development to belong to the neo-traditionalist reaction to modernity (Nederveen Pieterse 1998:

Post- Development is struck into a paradox : not showing any

regard for progressive implications and dialectics of modernity but at the
same time dealing with issues like anti-authoritarianism, democratization,
emancipation, that all clearly arose out of the Enlightenment and the modern
age, is highly inconsistent (ebd. 1998: 365). global structures of inequality are not taken into
366?). In his opinion,

concern. Storey asks for example how local actors are supposed to find solutions at the global level (Storey
2000). in emphasizing cultural diversity and in rejecting universalism, Post- Development is criticized of

Post- Development stands in suspicion to accept

oppression and violence and to be indifferent towards the violation of human
rights. Post- Development is accused to feel an affinity for neoliberalism .
According to Nederveen Pieterse, it is argued that both approaches reject state intervention
and agree on state failure: Escobar is skeptical towards state planning, he
questions social engineering and the faith in progress lead by the state. The
being cultural-relativist. Therefore

neoliberal thinker Deepak Lal condemns state-centered development economies (Nedeveen Pieterse 1998:

also advocates of a neoliberal capitalism favor a strong civil society

and the liberty of all citizens to choose their possibilities . The final criticism is that
Post-Development, instead of offering a solution, sticks on the classical
development paradigm by being in position of permanent critique. According to
Tanja Jakimow Post- Development is in danger of having to constantly remanoeuvre to retain its alternative status as elements of its critique are incorporated into
364). Further,

There is no vision of how Post- Development can

look like in practice: Post- Development parallels postmodernism both in its acute
institutions and in being directionless in the end, as a consequence
the mainstream (Jakimow 2008: 313).

Law Good Responsibility

Equating politics with exception naturalizes violence and
empties the political subject of any responsibility for
others and shuts out progressivism
Barnett 9 Clive Barnett, Reader in Human Geography at The Open
University, Violence and publicity: constructions of political responsibility
after 9/11, Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, 12 (3), 2009, pp.
What do these empirical and theoretical reasons for remaining sceptical of Agambens diagnosis of
modernity reveal about the relationship of this strand of philosophical reflection to the task of

The state of
exception argument is informed by and also confirms a model of
action that is freed from any horizon of responsibility whatsoever .
conceptualising the double responsibility discussed in the first section of this paper?

There are two dimensions to this disavowal of responsibility. First, with respect to political responsibility,

this analysis affirms that all constituted power is tainted with

violence and death. On Agambens understanding, the actions of modern states always rest on
arbitrary decision and violent force. This understanding provides resources with which any and all actions

In turn, the
expression of dissent is thereby freed from any sense of the
legitimacy of struggling over the control of institutions (Brennan and
Ganguly 2006, 27). Second, this abjuring of political responsibility is matched
by the account of ethical action that likewise leaves no ontological
or normative space for responsibility. Agamben takes his distance from Schmitt only
of states can be traced back to this fundamental root (Brenkman 2007, 66).

in so far as the latter sought to recuperate foundational, sovereign violence within the scope of the law

for Agamben the notion of

responsibility is felt to be inherently unethical because it is
irremediably contaminated by law. In line with the persistent drive
for conceptual purity which Derrida identifies in Schmittian political theory,
responsibility is therefore abandoned in favour of a model of
untainted ethical action modelled on Benjamins messianic vision of
pure violence, which seeks to assure violence an existence
outside of the law (Agamben 2005, 59). Benjamins concept of the pure or divine violence of
(Agamben 2005, 59). As Leys (2007, 161) observes,

revolution is recuperated as a preferred figure of authentic ethical action freed from subordination to the
law (Agamben 2005, 88). Pure violence is a figure for action as pure means, with no relation to an end

Agamben takes Benjamin as the inspiration for a model

of action entirely freed from any implication in public practices
where responsibility even arises, and not least freed from the scenes
of exposure to alterity upon which Derrida seeks to erect a
deconstructive sense of responsibility. The ontologization of violence
leaves little scope for considering the possibility that power can and
does circulate in normatively justified and justifiable forms. This
posture does little more justice to the potential of concerted action
in the public sphere than does the constant trumpeting of unending
terrorist threats. But there is no good reason to suppose that
violence is not a contingent feature of human affairs. A decisionistic
view of power is little help in understanding the processes of
learning and repair that maintain the fabric of peaceable pluralistic
societies (see Spelman 2002). Nor is a decisionistic view of power very much
help when it comes to thinking about the possibility of addressing
(Agamben 2000).

issues of security, international terrorism, or war democratically, that

is, through apparatuses of deliberatively generated influence (see Dryzek 2006, Habermas 2006, Young

The value of practices of reasoning and reasonableness

which are recognizably democratic is derived from their fragility, not
their firm foundations in grounds of certainty (Keane 2004, 3). It is this
fragility that is threatened by recourse to violence as a political
instrument. What is required, therefore, is to think about the
publicity conditions that function as more or less effective, but
always fragile contexts of legitimation and justification that can
serve as the basis for further progress towards the democratisation
of violence (Keane 2004, 154-164).
2007, Ch. 5).

The law is necessary to prevent suffering

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11,
No 4, 2004).

keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but
make us wary about humankinds supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving
or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical trackrecord of last-minute, technical quick-fixes is hardly reassuring. Whats more,
most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate
change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex,
sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand,

an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the
outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face

An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact

that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable
beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state,
international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in
some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above
cataclysms unprepared.

should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support
public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future
that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucaults Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of
genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing
social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil

Once competing
dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility,
ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups
and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios
societys participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come.

through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the
present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of
options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired
farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so
doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and
extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of

Participants in global civil society can

then take and in many instances have already taken a further step by
committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that,
aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to
rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict
needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.
legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us.

Foucault suggests the scrutiny of discourse WITHOUT
rejection so the perm solves
Foucault 77 (Michel, philosopher, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pg. 25
.pdf) Wadhwani
We must renounce all those themes whose function is to ensure the infinite continuity of discourse and its
secret presence to itself in the interplay of a constantly recurring absence .

We must be ready to
receive every moment of discourse in sudden irruption; in that punctuality in
which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be
repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden, far from
all view, in the dust of books. Discourse must not be referred to the distant
presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs. These pre-existing
forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question,
must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitively of course, but the
tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show
that they do not come out about of themselves, but are always the result of a
construction the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be

Sovereignty must be used strategically critique can be

Mark Owen Lombardi, Associate Political Science Prof @ Tampa, 1996,
Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty, p 161
Sovereignty is in our collective minds. What we look at, the way we look at it and
what we expect to see must be altered. This is the call for international scholars and actors. The
assumptions of the paradigm will dictate the solution and
approaches considered. Yet, a mere call to change this structure of
the system does little except activate reactionary impulses and
intellectual retrenchment. Questioning the very precepts of
sovereignty, as has been done in many instances, does not in and of itself address
the problems and issues so critical to transnational relations. That
is why theoretical changes and paradigm shifts must be coterminous
with applicative studies. One does not and should not precede the
other. We cannot wait until we have a neat self-contained and
accurate theory of transnational relations before we launch into
studies of Third-World issues and problem-solving. If we wait we will never
address the latter and arguably most important issue-area: the
welfare and quality of life for the human race.