SPOUSES GULLA V.

HEIRS OF LABRADOR (CIVIL)

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint against the spouses Pelagio and Perlita Gulla in the RTC of
Zambales for "Cancellation of Tax Declaration and Recovery of Possession with Damages"
(accion publiciana). The complaint involved a 22,590-square-meter lot and the 562-square-meter
lot abutting the titled property. The case was thereafter forwarded to the MTC of San Felipe,
Zambales pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691.4
According to the Labradors, the property was declared for taxation purposes under their names
and the corresponding taxes were paid thereon. In 1996, the spouses Gulla occupied a portion of
the property fronting the China Sea, as well as the 562-square-meter lot within the salvage area.
The spouses Gulla then constructed a house in the occupied property and fenced its perimeter.
The Labradors pointed out that whatever alleged claims the spouses Gulla had on the property
was acquired through a Deed of Waiver of Rights dated July 23, 1996 executed in their favor.
HELD:

The trial court, the RTC, and the CA were one in ruling that the 562 sqm property is part of the
public domain, hence, beyond the commerce of men and not capable of registration. In fact, the
land is within the salvage zone fronting China Sea as well as the property covered by OCT P13350 in the name of respondents.
The provision relied upon is Article 440 of the New Civil code, which states that " the ownership
of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially." This however, does not apply in
this case, considering that the 562 sqm lot is a foreshore land adjacent to the sea which is
alternately covered and left dry by ordinary flow of the tides.
Such property belongs to the public domain and is no longer needed for public use. Respondents
thus have no possessory right over the property unless upon application, the government through
the then Bureau of Lands had granted them permit.
There is no question that no such permit was issued or granted in favor of respondents. This
being the case, respondents have no cause of action to cause petitioners' eviction from the subject
property. The real party-in-interest to file a complaint against petitioners for recovery of
possession of the subject property and cause petitioners' eviction therefrom is the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, petitioners cannot be
required to pay any rentals to respondents for their possession of the property

MACASAET VS MACASAET- DIGEST

https://www.scribd.com/doc/273915151/Macasaet-vs-Macasaet-Digest

IGNACIO VS HILARIO
Facts:

Sometime during the 1940s in Pangasinan, a civil suit arose between Damian Ignacio and
Elias Hilario. Hilario was the owner of a parcel of land. He later discovered that Ignacio built
some buildings therein (a granary and a house). After trial, Judge Antonio Felix of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan ruled that both were in good faith (Hilario was the owner in
good faith while Ignacio was the builder in good faith).
Judge Felix then spelled out the rights of the parties to wit:
a.) Ignacio can retain possession over the buildings he erected until after he is paid by
Hilario for the value of the buildings he erected;
b.) Hilario can choose to buy the said buildings or he can choose to sell Ignacio his land
since the value of his land was only P45.00 while the value of the buildings erected was
P2,000.00.
However, Hilario refused to avail of his options. Instead, he filed a motion in court to have
Ignacio be ejected and have them destroy the buildings he erected. Judge Felipe Natividad
(he replaced Judge Felix), granted Hilarios motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hilario, the owner in good faith, may eject a builder in good faith
without choosing either to appropriate the building for himself after payment of its value or to
sell his land to the builder in good faith.

HELD: No. The owner in good faith has to make a choice. He cannot dispense the
options under the law and then eject the builder in good faith. This is because both are in
good faith.
But when can the owner in good faith compel the builder in good faith to remove the
building he erected?
This is only available if after the owner in good faith chose to sell his land to the builder in
good faith and the latter fails to pay the value of the land within the agree period. Only then
can the owner in good faith compel the builder in good faith to remove the building he
erected.

New Regent Sources Inc V. Tanjuatco

Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint on rescission/declaration of nullity of contract,
reconveyance and damages against the respondent. Petitioner allegedly authorized
Vicente Cuevas being its Chairman and President to apply on its behalf to acquire
two parcels of land by right of accretion. Cuevas applied the lot in his name and while
pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands he assigned his rights to
the respondent. An order from the Director of Lands was issued transferring rights from
Cuevas to Tanjuatco. During the preliminary hearing, respondent filed a motion for
demurrer of evidence after the petitioner presented their evidence. The RTC dismissed
the case for insufficiencies of evidence and ruled that respondent is an innocent purchaser
hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the case upon demurrer of evidence?
Whether or not the respondent is an innocent purchaser of the property in dispute?
Ruling:
As to the first issue the court held that it is a question of fact which is improper for
a petition for review since the Supreme Court can only review a question of law. A
question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and
the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.
The court held that to warrant a reconveyance of land where the mode of acquiring a
property is by accretion, the following requisites should be met: (1) that the deposition
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action

of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent
to the banks of rivers. It is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the
benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant
evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably
failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the
foregoing requisites. Respondent derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. A
certification was issued confirming that said lands were verified to be Alienable and
Disposable property of the State entitling it to transfer ownership to the respondent.
Moreover, petitioners failed to establish fraudulent registration of ownership of the title
to respondent since they did not provide evidence that Cuevas is empowered by the
petitioner to apply a registration of the property in their behalf. The respondent may
safely rely on what appears on the face of the registered title hence he is a buyer in good
faith. Petitioner was not able to substantiate its claim for ownership of the property
therefore their claim for reconveyance should be denied.

BRIONES VS. Macabagdal

Facts:
Respondents spouses purchased a land from Vergon Realty located in
a subdivision in Las Pinas (Lot 2R) with a registered TCT. Vergon
on the other hand owns the adjacent land (Lot 2S).
In 1984, after obtaining the building permit and approval of
Vergon, Jose Macabagdal constructed a house on Lot 2R which they
thought was Lot 2S. After being informed of the mix up, spouses
immediately demanded for demolition of the house constructed. Jose,
refused. Spouses then filed an action to recover ownership and
possession of the said land in RTC Makati.
Jose, insisted that the lot which they constructed their house was
the lot which was consistently pointed to them by the Vergon's
agents over the 7-year period of paying the lot. They interposed
the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded indemnity
from Vergon because of the warranty against eviction, in case the
suit is decided against them.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. Defendants were ordered to

demolish their house and vacate the premises and return the
possession of the lot to the spouses with damages. Defendants
counterclaim as well as the 3rd-party complaint were dismissed for
lack of merit and with no cause of action. On appeal, CA affirmed
the RTC. Saying that, there was no basis that the error was
Vergon's fault and that they cannot invoke the defense of a
purchaser in good faith for wrongful occupation of the land.

Issue:
In the main, it is petitioners' position that they must not bear
the damage alone. Petitioners insist that they relied with full
faith and confidence in the reputation of Vergon's agents when they
pointed the wrong property to them. Even the President of Vergon,
Felix Gonzales, consented to the construction of the house when he
signed the building permit. Also, petitioners are builders in good
faith.

Held: Petition is partly meritorious.

RTC erred in out rightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject
property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the
land as compensation. Article 527[14] of the Civil Code presumes
good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was
done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to
have built the house in good faith (Art. 448).
The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice
between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity
or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice
belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around.
However, even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the
owner of the building to remove the building from the land without
first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to
sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it

where its value is not more than the value of the improvements,
that the owner may remove the improvements from the land.
The
owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen
to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the
necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the subject
property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code provide,
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor;
but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he
has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of
the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may
have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be
refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the
ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it
suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession
does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate
the house on the subject land after payment to petitioners of the
appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of
the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of
the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable
rent.

As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present

sufficient evidence to show negligence on Vergon's part. It is the
plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of
the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond;
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred.

COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC., vs. NANOL

http://civillawabc.blogspot.com/2014/02/communities-cagayan-inc-vs-spouses.htm

Angeles v Pascual
Facts:

Neighbors Pascual and Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land located in
Cabanatuan City. Pascual owned Lot 4.] Angeles owned Lot 5] Each of them built a house on his
respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not
until (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3 caused the
relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascuals house had
encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.

In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his ownLot4 and discovered that Angeles
house also encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square meters comprisingLot4, Angeles occupied
252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded rentals
for the use of the encroached area ofLot4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles house.
Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and
damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inCabanatuanCity.

In the course of the trial, Pascual presented Clarito Fajardo, the geodetic engineer who had
conducted the relocation survey and had made the relocation plan of Lot4.[9][4] Fajardo testified
that Angeles house was erected on Lot 4. On the other hand, Angeles presented Juan Fernandez,
the geodetic engineer who had prepared the sketch plan relied upon by Angeles to support his
claim that there had been no encroachment.[10][5] However, Fernandez explained that he had
performed only a table work, that is, he did not actually go to the site but based the sketch
plan on the descriptions and bearings appearing on the TCTs of Lot 4, Lot 5 and Lot 6; and
recommended the conduct of a relocation survey.[11][6]

In its decision of November 3, 1998,[12][7] the RTC held that there was no dispute that
Pascual and Angeles were the respective registered owners of Lot 4 and Lot 5; that what was
disputed between them was the location of their respective lots; that Pascual proved Angeles
encroachment on Lot 4 by preponderant evidence; and that Pascual was entitled to relief.

ISSUE:
To be next determined is whether the CAs application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct
and proper.

Held:
The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned
by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different
persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith. We
cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that
Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists in the
belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in
his title.[5][15]

With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that
Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights
and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.
Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to
Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or
obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of
Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the
grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.

MORES V YU-GO
The Facts
On January 21, 1998, plaintiffs-appellants filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial
Court in Naga City against defendants-appellees. Appellants alleged that they co-owned a parcel of

land located in Sto. Tomas, Camarines Sur on which a building of strong materials was built. In
March 1983, appellees pleaded to appellants that they be allowed to stay in the subject property in
the meantime that they did not own a house yet. Since appellee Mores used to be an errand boy of
appellants family, they readily agreed without asking for any rental but subject only to the condition
that the said stay would last until anyone of appellants would need the subject property. Forthwith,
appellees and their children occupied the same as agreed upon.
In November 1997, appellants made known to appellees that they were already in need of the
subject property. They explained that appellant Yu-Go needed the same and, besides, appellees
already have their own house in Naga City. Yet, appellees begged that they be given a 6-month
extension to stay thereat or until May 1998. However, even after May 1998, appellees failed to make
good their promise and even further asked that they be allowed to stay therein until October 1998,
which was again extended until the end of the same year. Thus, sometime in the first week of
January 1999, appellants gave their final demand for appellees to vacate the subject property.
However, instead of heeding such demand, appellees hired some laborers and started demolishing
the improvements on the subject property on January 20, 1999.
Appellants protest fell on deaf ears because appellees continued their demolition and even took
away and appropriated for themselves the materials derived from such unlawful demolition.
Consequently, appellants instituted the said action for injunction where they also prayed for the
reimbursement of the value of the residential building illegally demolished as well as for the payment
of moral damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit.
On February 5, 1999, appellees filed their Answer where they denied the material averments of the
complaint. They claimed that appellee Antonio Mores, who was appellants uncle, used to be the
assistant manager and cashier of appellants father at their Caltex Service Station until the laters
death sometime in 1980. Appellants Caltex Filling Station had stopped operation and was just
rented out to Herce Trucking Service. Upon the expiration of such lease contract, appellees were
allowed to occupy the subject property as their dwelling places. They were the ones who caused its
renovation consisting of a 3-bedroom annex, a covered veranda and a concrete hollow block fence,
at their own expense, and with appellants consent, which renovation was made without altering the
form and substance of the subject property. They denied that appellants made a demand for them to
vacate the subject property, insisting that it was merely a sort of reminder that sooner or later
appellees should yield possession thereof since, after all, they had already bought a second-hand
house which was undergoing repair. Appellees argued that what they removed was merely the
improvements made on the subject property, which removal had not caused any substantial damage
thereto as, in fact, it remained intact. By way of counterclaims, they demanded payment of actual
damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

The Issues
In her petition, Alida Mores stated that the decision of the appellate court awarding the Yu siblings
moral damages in the amount of P100,000 is rendered with grave abuse of discretion and is not in
accord with the decisions of this Court.8

The Courts Ruling

The petition has merit.
Alida Mores argues that in case of breach of contract between a lessor and a lessee, moral
damages are not awarded to the lessor if the lessee is not shown to have acted in bad faith. She
proves her and her husbands alleged good faith by quoting the appellate courts decision which
stated that:
[The Spouses Mores] good faith is underscored by the fact that no one from appellants had objected
or prevented appellees from effecting said improvements which, obviously, were undertaken in quite
a span of time. Even if we believe appellant Victoria Yu-Lims testimony that they would only learn of
the introduction of such improvements after each of such improvements had already been built, [the
Yu siblings] never made known their objections thereto nor did they pose a warning against future
introduction of any improvement. After all, the said improvements were not introduced
simultaneously.9
The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was about the building of the improvements on the leased
subject property. However, tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in good
faith as they have no pretension to be owners of the property.10 Indeed, full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It
does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.11
The appellate court is correct in ruling that Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the present
case.
With regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but
he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and
the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
It is incorrect, however, for the appellate court to state that the spouses Mores did not give the Yu
siblings the option to retain the improvements. The appellate court stated that "nothing in the records
reveal that [the Yu siblings] were given the chance to choose from the options of either paying onehalf () of the value of the improvements at the time they were made on the subject property, or to
demand the removal by [the spouses Mores] of such improvements at their expense."
There is thus no reason for the appellate courts award of moral damages to the Yu siblings. We
agree with the trial courts finding that the spouses Mores "removed only the improvements they
introduced without destroying the principal building, after the [Yu siblings] refused to pay them the
reasonable value of the improvements."14When the spouses Mores demanded reimbursement, the
Yu siblings should have offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the value of the improvements.
Since the Yu siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses Mores had the right to remove the
improvements.

OFFICER OF PARANAQUE VS EBIO

FACTS
Respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed
the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local
government of Paraaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro
executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name
for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered
owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8
to the local government of Paraaque. From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity
sought to register the accreted portion.

HELD
Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through
prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their
title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the
acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the
land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration
merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

REPUBLIC vs. SANTOS III

.Facts:

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Ivan applied
on March 7, 1997 for the registration of a Lot in the RTC Parafiaque City. The property, which
had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by a Lot belonging to respondent arcadio
in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the
Northwest a lot was also owned by ivan
On May 21, 1998, Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as
his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the

property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public,
continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it
needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the
applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not
resulted from accretion .

On May 10, 2000 the RTC granted the application for land registration. With this, the Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed. The CA grossly erred in applying
Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents benefit. The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement,
and stated that it could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Ivan and Arcadio are the owners of the land
which was previously part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up
and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was
obtained by the latter from his mother. The Republic submits, however, that the application by
both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that
respondents evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Paraaque
River

Issue:
Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription
(section 14(1) of PD 1529)

Held:
NO. (By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the
current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it
forms. The drying up of the river is notaccretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the
State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership
in some other person.)Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of
proof to establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is
meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more