LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations.
It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasijudicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but
a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1.
WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2.
WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3.
WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4.
WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.
The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so
there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause
for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of
its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The
said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No.
1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office
was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power
duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executives
power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted
full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad
then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So
what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds
are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the
CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for
the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49
of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings,
respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to
refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP
was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no crossborder transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in
the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent
insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of
these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for
by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not
refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings
was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the
law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It
has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may
cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it
is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Smart Communications vs. NTC GR 151908, 12 August 2003

Facts: On 16 June 2000, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations
on the billing of telecommunications services; which includes provisions pertaining to the use and sale of prepaid cards and unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS). On 30 August 2000, the NTC issued
a memorandum to all CMTS operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the
incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. Another memorandum dated 6 October 2000 addressed to all
telecommunications entities reminding them that the validity of all prepaid cards and SIM packs sold and used
on 7 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first use. On 20 October 2000,
Islacom and Piltel questioned the validity of the memoranda, and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The lower court granted the issuance of the injunction. NTC moved for reconsideration, but was
denied. NTC thereafter filed a special civil action for certiorari and probation before the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court granted the petition and dismissed the companies complaint without prejudice to the referral of
their grievances with the NTC. Hence, the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a party should have exhausted administrative remedies before it filed the case in court. Held: A
party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to Court, when questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency. The principle only applies when the
act of the agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed and pertained
to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. Issue: Whether the court or NTC has jurisdiction over the issues
pertaining to the memoranda. Held: The issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters,
and thus are within the competence of a judge in the lower court. What is required of the judge who will resolve
the issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including pre-paid SIM and call
cards (which is within the knowledge of a good percentage of the Philippine population) and expertise in
fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.
Republic vs Extelcom, [373 SCRA 316; GR 147096, January 15, 2002]
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987
Rules of Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the
Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase on its own initiative were deleted and since the
1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and effect in
granting provisional authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the
UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is
merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a
condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations can take effect.
TAADA VS. TUVERA
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;

2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided
on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the
respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force
and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for
an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of
the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication
when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Issues:
(1)

Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

(2)

Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the laws.