ERSPECTIVES

Center for Applied Policy Research Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt Munich www.cap-lmu.de

No. 3 Nov 2012

Jesse Paul Lehrke

Foreign Policy in Obamas Second Term: Between Continuity and Legacy

Obamas first term as president was characterized by several disappointments and notable policy failures.
Nonetheless, much of the disappointment resulted from his pragmatic compromises and incremental policy building. These quiet successes have laid the foundations for the more inspiring institutional changes he is likely to
pursue during his second term. Yet in focusing on building his legacy, we can expect an even less confrontational
stance on international matters in areas where conflict is likely and relative neglect of those areas which he has
no previous success to build upon.

Four years ago, when a young Barrack Obama took the

presidency, bringing with him an inexperienced
National Security Staff (NSS), we had little idea of the
foreign policy he would pursue beyond idealist visions
that sounded good in speeches but were bound to be
difficult to translate into policy. Now, at the dawn of his
second term, we have a four year track record to look
back upon in order to determine what defines the
Obama Doctrine. From this we can get a good idea of
what four more years of Obama means for American
foreign policy and the implications for Europe.

meant that the unilateral tools of foreign policy have

gone unused. While Obama has shown more hesitancy to use military force than his predecessor, he has still
exercised hard power. The main difference is that force
has been used in more complex arrangements:
supporting military action in Libya from behind,
expanding drone attacks while opening negotiations
with the Taliban, pushing the limits of sovereignty in
one case and considering it inviolable in another. Part
of this arrangement has also been the expanded use of
economic statecraft, including the stick of sanctions
and the carrot of free trade agreements.

The Obama Doctrine

The Foundation Built
Despite the idealism of candidate Obama, his foreign
policy as president has been characterized by pragma- So what has this pragmatic approach to his grand
tism and indeed realism. Even while winding down big vision achieved? When set against the idealist rhetoric
and promises of his campaign
wars, he has escalated and
Despite the idealism of candidate
Obamas achievements seem
expanded the drone war. He has
Obama, his foreign policy as presimeagre. Indeed, some of the curbeen cautious in condemning the
dent has been characterized by
rent challengesin the world are
sins of allies and the strong. His
pragmatism and indeed realism.
a result of the very hope he unleagreements have been characterashed. Promising the Palestinized by compromise and incremental improvements on the status quo. His crisis ians a state, they continue to pursue it even though the
management has been cautious and flexible. This US stepped back. His moral tone gave hope to protesdivergence from ideals has led some to question ters and pause to generals during the Arab Spring a
whether he has a strategy at all. Nonetheless, a vision spring which now may be burning out of control.
remains, even if it is unimplemented. Obama believes Raised expectations have been replaced by reality and
in the strength of America while recognizing the very disappointment, the very recipe for revolution. While
limitations and vulnerabilities that come with hegemo- this criticism is deserved, the achievements deserve
ny. He recognizes that America has not always been recognition also. Together these successes form the
true to its values, which opens up the possibility to foundation upon which Obama will build his legacy.
recognize and correct mistakes. He believes there are On the other hand, the clear failures are likely to be
multiple paths to liberalism and freedom and attempts ignored; at best these fires will be smoothed but left to
to channel rising powers towards the destination smoulder in the roots.
regardless of the route. He does so by attempting to reenforce the power and legitimacy of international insti- Clear failures include the stalled Israel-Palestine peace
tutions. But his preference for multilateralism has not process. The recent climate summits have produced

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ERSPECTIVES
Jesse Paul Lehrke Foreign Policy in Obamas Second Term

few tangible results. Negotiations with North Korea operate within the limits imposed by the White House
over its nuclear programme have stalled. Relations or work with the strong-willed persons in the NSS,
with Pakistan have deteriorated. Guantanamo Bay then clashes are likely. In the unlikely event there is
detention camp remains open. Mixed cases include turnover in the NSS, then we may see larger policy
Iran and its nuclear ambitions. The sanctions, with full shifts.
UNSC backing, are taking their toll. Yet Iran could - if
it so chooses - cross the red line in the next four years; While American foreign policy is generally the remit of
thus a showdown is imminent. Russia seems a failure the president, the gridlock that has paralyzed
based on rhetoric and its domestic politics, but there Washington the past two years is set to continue and
are concrete policy successes here: a new START trea- will have implications for foreign policy. Sequestration
ty, cooperation in Central Asia and Afghanistan, acces- could become reality, risking Americas fragile recovery
sion to the WTO. China is also a mixed success. and sending turmoil into international markets.
Relations are good overall. Progress has been especial- Congress could undermine Obamas multilateralism by
ly made on currency and trade issues. But there are cutting off funds to international institutions, as it has
increasingly frequent incidents, most recently the ten- done before. International aid and even defence spensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While to date ding could also be victims, while needed structural
reforms especially in the State
these incidents have not escaDepartment will not occur.
lated, they have raised the temThe gridlock that has paralyzed
This weakness at home means
perature in the region.
Washington the past two years is set
Obama could have fewer tools
to continue and will have implications
for policy making abroad, yet it
for foreign policy.
Obamas first golden star for
could also led him to become
foreign policy is his protection of
American, and likely also European, security via a more engaged abroad in an effort to escape gridlock at
renewed focus on taking down Al Qaeda. Obamas home. We may even see attempts to circumvent DC
economic policy is his other golden star. He successful- gridlock by entering into foreign treaties with domestic
ly prevented a post-Lehman backlash against US-led implications, especially economic in nature.
liberal institutions and ideas and ensured there was no
retreat into nationalistic beggar-thy-neighbour econo- It is important to note how a president builds a legacy.
mics. This was attained primarily though the G20 rath- It is rarely through actions, the unexpected crisis aside,
er than the G8 and represents a successful engagement but rather through institution building. Actions have
between established and rising powers. He also con- too many unforeseeable consequences. Institutions, on
cluded several important free trade agreements. the other hand, can ensure a presidents policy beImproved relations with Europe have also been evi- comes permanent. The first institution we can expect
dent. Obamas tone and values alone made such Obama to further is the UN. Given his overly liberal
improvement inevitable following the Bush years, but interpretation of the Libya resolution, this will require
normative concepts have led to real results. The US and some effort, and much restraint by the Americans no
EU are in near lockstep on Iran, as they were on Libya matter the temptation for unilateral action. Obama is
likely to continue to address the looming problem of
where the US encouraged the EU to lead.
Irans nuclear programme through the UN and possibly even to use the Iranian issue to drive reforms and
The Legacy to Come
an expansion of the UNs powers. While it is has long
In his search for continuity in his foreign policy, been talked of, UN and even UNSC reform may be
Obama would like to keep his team together for his more likely now than they have ever been. A strengnext term. This will not happen. Obamas first term thened UN is a key part of Obamas strategy to conexhibited less personnel turnover in senior staff than strain yet not limit rising powers and tie them to the
most administrations, thus the first year of his new status quo.
term is likely to see a change in leadership in the
Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, and The second part of this rising power management straHomeland Security. In one way this does not matter; tegy is even more likely to be successful. This is tying
Obama and his NSS keep a tighter reign on policy and them to the liberal economic order. Though the WTO
cabinet-level officials than the typical administration, will play a role, expect Obama to build on his success
so changes in the departments will matter less. in the G20 and to also seek more free trade agreeHowever, if the new department leadership cannot ments. Once the world economy, especially in the

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ERSPECTIVES
Jesse Paul Lehrke Foreign Policy in Obamas Second Term

Eurozone, has stabilized somewhat, there will also be a

short window for larger reforms of the international
economic order perhaps even system-wide paradigmatic reforms. This window will also exist if the economies nosedive again, but in this case, the dangers are
higher and the paradigm shift could be less favourable.
Importantly, Obamas economic statecraft is not purely
benevolent, indeed it is somewhat Machiavellian. Its
ultimate purpose is to bolster the American economic
position and ensure continued American economic
leadership (and thereby latent military potential) even
if political leadership is shared through multilateral
institutions.

should avoid duplication of effort, partially because the

US agenda would overwhelm the EUs voice. The EU
should focus on building other institutions, especially
in Europe and with its neighbours (including Russia).

2. Obama is unlikely to respond more forcefully to

events, at least until his main agendas are well in progress. Until then, Europe should be prepared to play a
larger role in international crisis management.
Additionally, Obama is likely to use crises as catalysts
for institutional change. In the event of an international crisis, the EU should already be thinking of the
implications it could have for institutions so that the
US does not present the only post-crisis plan as a fait
accompli. An example is the potential of the looming crisis over
Obama hopes to see a self-reliant
Irans nuclear programme to lead
Europe as a partner, not a postto revisions in the arms control
modern paradise dependant on
and non-proliferation regimes.
America.

Europe figures less in Obamas

pro-active foreign policy. Yet,
despite criticism from Republicans, this is not so much out of
neglect as out of respect, but also
a certain amount of taking for
granted that he had Europe at hello. Obama hopes to
see a self-reliant Europe as a partner, not a postmodern paradise dependant on America. He will continue to encourage the EUs independent development, even in security and defence. The latter may even
be forced upon Europe, as the possibility exists that
Obama will further reduce the US military presence in
Europe, possibly including the removal of the remaining nuclear warheads. Missile defence programmes
will be exempt from this general cutback. All these programmes will be attempted first with Russian input,
the post-re-election flexibility Obama promised
Putin. Whether Putin is also flexible as well will
depend on the success of his own domestic programmes, especially military reform (e.g. command and
control) and modernization (e.g. of its nuclear programme).
Recommendations
1. Obama second term will be
focused on implementing his
domestic agenda in the face of
strong opposition. He will have
correspondingly less time for
foreign policy, where he will
focus on a few key areas and
projects. His legacy will be built
by constructing, reforming, or
strengthening
multi-lateral
institutions, such as the G20 and
UN. Europe can be a partner in
this institution building but

CAP ERSPECTIVES 3 2012

3. Obama lacks a clear Russia strategy. Europe should

fill in for him on the economic front, including supporting Russian military modernization (e.g. the Mistral
ship deal) to decrease Russian insecurities and increase their negotiating flexibility. This will allow the US to
focus on the military front (where Russia will accept
only the US as an equal partner). Nonetheless, on the
military front the EU can help mediate on the controversial US missile shield, for instance by nudgingstationing options in a direction acceptable to Russia or by
encouraging Obama to withdraw US tactical nuclear
weapons from Europe, thereby altering the missile
defence calculations.

4. Europe has done a good job at taking advantage of

emerging markets and it should not let Obamas Asia
pivot lead to a Pacific economic
zone from which it is excluded.
J e s s e P a u l L e h r k e , PhD is a Research
Though controversial, Europe
could even play on Chinas conFellow at the German Research
cern about what this pivot means
Institute for Public Administration
in order to secure benefits for the
Speyer.
EU. However, to take full advantaj.p.lehrke@alumni.lse.ac.uk
ge of this the EU should review its
CAP ERSPECTIVES Editors
embargo on the sale of military
Michael Bauer, Florian Baumann,
and dual-use technology to China.
Sebastian Schffer, Doulas Voigt
CAPerspectives@cap-lmu.de

Center for Applied Policy Research

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81675 Munich Germany
www.cap-lmu.de

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