Maurin, Nino Jay M.

Don Tino Realty and Development Corp. v Julian Florentino 314 SCRA 197,
September 10, 1999
Facts:
This appeal seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45162
which ordered the admission of a late and defective answer in an ejectment case. Before
this case was being filed, alleged the following:
Petitioner Don Tino filed against responder Florentino an ejectment suit. Don Tinio
alleged that he is the owner and in peaceful possession of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 32422. By means of stealth, force, and strategy, respondent Florentino
occupied the said parcel of land and built his house thereon.
Falling within the provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, summons
were served upon respondent on February 13, 1997 requiring him to answer within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
On February 24, 1997, respondent filed his answer through Roel G. Alvear, president
of the Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng RMB, San Juan, Balagtas, Bulacan. The answer
is not verified. The trial court set the case for preliminary conference on April 13,
1997.
However, Don Tino filed a motion for rendition of judgment and motion to cancel the
preliminary conference on the ground that the answer of respondent was defective
and filed out of time.
The trial court granted the motion filed by petitioner. It declared that respondent
failed to comply with Section 3 (b) and Section 5 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. It also noted that Roel G. Alvear has no authority to represent the
respondent as there is no special power of attorney executed in his favor. Thus, it
cancelled the preliminary conference and considered the case submitted for decision
in accordance with Section 6 of the said Rules.
Therefore, trial court rendered judgment and ordered the respondent to immediately
vacate the premises and deliver its possession to Don Tino and pay for 2,000 pesos
for rental for the use of the land from March 25, 1996 until he vacated the premises.
However, respondent Florentino filed a Manifestation with Motion to Lift Order through his
counsel. He alleged that his answer was filed late and by a non-lawyer because of its
economically destitute. He asked the trial court to consider because the same as honest
mistake and excusable negligence.
Thus, the trial court admitted the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not under the facts of the case, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be
liberally interpreted in order to allow the admission of an answer filed one (1) day late.
Held:
No - Forcibly entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to
provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a
time procedure designed to remedy the situation.

In the case of Gachon vs. Devera, Jr., we ruled that the use of the word shall in the Rule on
Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character. Giving the provisions a
directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat
its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, xxx, is to
put a premium on dilatory maneuvers-the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress.
Considering this, the view of the Court of Appeals that such provisions should be liberally
interpreted is misplaced. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220, April 03, 1995
Facts:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which
Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty.
Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in
her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against
Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers
of defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act
of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one
filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent
argued that petitioners filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction
of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employers subsidiary
liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant
on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both
motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
Issue(s):
Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed
Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
(1) Yes - Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage

done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to
the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.
(2) No - The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil
action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it
must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with
reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No - Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore,
it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Eastern Shipping Lines v Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 546, July 12, 1994
Facts:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and brokerforwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by the
insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such losses/damages.
The losses/damages were sustained while in the respective and/or successive custody and
possession of defendants carrier (Eastern), arrastre operator (Metro Port) and broker (Allied
Brokerage).
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee P19,
032.95, under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all
the rights of action of said consignee against defendants.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * trial court: ordered payment of damages, jointly and
severally * CA: affirmed trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods can be a solidary, or
joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre operator and the customs
broker.

Whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be computed
from the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is rendered;
and
Held:
Yes - it is solidary. Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good care of the goods that
are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility
also devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore
charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee.
The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts
from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a
reasonable time for their acceptance by, the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 17361738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship
Lines, 52 Phil. 863). When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition,
a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there
need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable.
Employees Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 717, June
28, 1996
Facts:
The deceased P/Sgt Alvaran was a member of Mandaluyong Police Station, assigned at the
Pasig Provincial Jail as 2nd Shifter Jailer with tour of duty from 7:00 PM to 7:00 AM. On
November 19, 1988 at around 11:50 in the evening, the deceased was infront of the Office
of the Crime Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong Police Station and was talking with
another policemen. When another policeman arrived, Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who had just arrived
immediately got off to the car and holding his service firearm and approached the deceased
without any saying word, he fired three successive shots. The deceased, however, although
critically wounded, shots twice back to Pat. Cesar Arcilla. Both fell fatally wounded. They
were rushed to the Mandaluyong Medical Center but Sgt. Alvaran died on the same day and
Pat. Cesar Arcial on the following day.
Furthermore, before the day of incident, it was learned that Sgt. Alvarans son, stabbed the
patrolmans nephew. On the day of the incident, Sgt. Alvaran came to the Mandaluyong
Police Station accompanying his son who was to be interviewed at the same time and
investigate the incident which he got involved a day before.
The wife of the deceased, appellant, filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626,
as amended. However, the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that at the time of the
accident the deceased was supposed to be at Pasig Provincial Jail as 2 nd shift Jailer and with a
specific duty to perform, in a particular place, his presence in Mandaluyong Police Station,
although, he was a member of the same, who was requested to be interviewed by another
policeman pertaining to the stabbed incident. In the other words, he was plainty acting as
father to his son, an act which is purely personal, foreign, and unrelated to his employment.
His death at the place where he was not required to be and not in performance of duty,
cannot be considered to have arisen out of and in the course of employment.

But, appellant requested a reconsideration of the respondents GSIS ruling. However,

respondent GSIS took a firm stand and elevate the case to the ECC for review.
Thus, ECC affirmed the holding of the GSIS that the death of the private respondents
husband is not compensable under P.D. 626, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Sgt. Alvaran is compensable under P.D. No. 626.
Held:
Yes the court held that by the nature of his work, a police officer exercises his official duty
on a 24 hour basis and that his death came as an incident in the performance of his
duties in the police force and must be declared compensated under our law.
In case of doubt, the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and
the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of outmost liberality in their favour.
For this reason, the court lends a very sympathetic ear to the cries of the poor
widows and orphans of the police officers. If we must demand as we ought to
strict accountability from our policemen in safeguarding peace and order day and
night, we must also to the same extent be ready to compensate their loved ones
who, by their untimely death, are left without any means of supporting themselves.
Wherefore, Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision is again AFFIRMED. No costs.