On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of

"Intentionality" in Brentano

ABSTRACT. The early Brentano identifies intentionality with

~'intentional inexistence", i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the
intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped
apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian--Thomistic
doctrine of the multiple use of 'being' (to on legetai pollachos). The
fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is
intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference
or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of
intentionalityfor the early Brentano.

Franz Brentano, together with Bolzano and Meinong,

can be considered one of the founders of so-called Austrian philosophy. Thinkers such as Mach, Wittgenstein,
Schlick, Carnap, G6del, etc. also belong to this school.
But what is Austrian philosophy, and who can properly
be called an Austrian philosopher? "Is an Austrian
philosopher one who was born in Austria, one who
lived or lives in Austria, one who has developed his
main work in Austria, one who is an Austrian citizen, or
one who has taught in Austria?" 1 The concept Austria is
itself problematic. Does Austria mean the Austria of
today or that of the monarchy? Brentano, in any case,
does not even come from Austria but from Germany.
Nephew of poet Clemens Brentano and brother of
German national economist Lujo, he was not called to
the University of Vienna until 1874. 2
It would seem impossible to find a common denominator for the first so-called Austrian philosophers. At
most they share a few negative characteristics, namely,
their anti-idealistic stance in epistemology and ontology
and their anti-naturalism in ethics. Morscher doubts
whether there is anything "like an essence of Austrian
philosophy". 3 Nevertheless, the so-called Austrian philosophers are noted for their methodological procedure:
"They attempted to 'do' philosophy in a rational w a y . . .
using rational methods, the instruments of logic, and a
clear and concise language -- even when showing that
Topoi 8: 97-103, 1989.
9 1989Kluwer Academic Publishers, Printed in the Netherlands.

Edmund Runggaldier

philosophy is not and cannot be a science". 4 Brentano

himself is noted for his clarity of style and logical
precision and in these respects became a model and
teacher for various Austrian philosophers.
Brentano came from a Catholic family but experienced at the age of seventeen -- like his father before
him -- his first crisis of faith. He sought at first refuge in
contemporary German philosophy. Dissatisfied with
and then repelled by this philosophy he turned to the
church and decided to become a Catholic priest. 5 His
philosophical drive left him no peace, however. Since he
could not find a teacher acceptable to him among the
philosophers of his day, he turned to Aristotle. Brentano
was to become in fact one of the best authorities on
Aristotle.
It is perhaps less commonly known that the scholastic
education Brentano received as a candidate to the
priesthood also had an influence upon him. As a seminarian he had to study scholastic theology in Munich
and at the Theological Seminary in Wiirzburg after
having been introduced to scholasticism in Miinster. 6
The rejection of the modern and idealistic philosophies
of the nineteenth century was typical for the scholastic
Aristotelian--Thomistic philosophy of the church.
Brentano gradually distanced himself from many theses
of the Aristotelian--Thomistic tradition after his departure from the church in 1873 but remained nonetheless
deeply influenced by this tradition.
In this paper I would like to pursue one aspect of this
influence. The theory of the intentionality of the mental
or the psychical which is attributed to Brentano is not an
invention of his but rather a quite common, almost
self-evident theory of the scholastic manuals. I would
especially like to explore in this paper, therefore, the
scholastic--Aristotelian roots of "intentionality" as put
forward by the early Brentano, who relates it to and
even identifies it with "intentional inexistence". The
latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background.

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RUNGGALDIER

II
What are the final distinguishing characteristics,
Brentano asks in his principal early work Psychologie
yore empirischen Standpunkt (1874), 7 between the
psychical-mental and the physical-corporeal) In an
initial attempt to establish what is common to all mental
phenomena Brentano concludes that these phenomena
are either representations (Vorstellungen) themselves or
phenomena at the basis of which are representations.
Representing forms the basis for judging and for
desiring as well as for every other psychological act.
"Nothing can be judged, nothing can be desired, nothing
can be hoped for or feared, if it is not represented". 8 All
mental acts are further distinguished, Brentano goes on
to argue, by a kind of directedness toward an object
regardless of whether or not the object exists in the
external world. They indicate a direction toward something: "In the representation something is represented,
in the judgment something is acknowledged or rejected,
in desiring, it is desired, etc".9 No physical phenomenon
appears to have such a directedness toward something
else as the mental does.
But how is it with feelings? One has the impression
that feelings come and go without being directed toward
objects. But Brentano maintains that one is happy about
something, one is sad or annoyed about something:
"And again one says: that makes me happy, that hurts
me, that makes me sad, etc. Just as affirmation and
negation, love and hate, desire and repulsion, so too, joy
and sadness clearly follow a representation and are
directed upon that which is represented in the representation"J ~ The objects to which the mental acts refer
are not always existing things. One can imagine something which is not the case and even become incensed
about what one has imagined. A phantasy can make one
angry.
Brentano concludes: "Every psychical phenomenon
is characterized by what the medieval scholastics called
the intentional (or mental) inexistence (Inexistenz) of an
object and which we, not wholly unambiguously, would
call the reference to a content, the directedness toward
an object (which is not to be conceived as something
real) or the immanent-object-quality (Gegenstiindlichkeit)". ~1 In this passage intentionality, the distinguishing
mark of the mental, is described in scholastic terms as
the intentional inexistence of an object, i.e., as a kind of
immanence or presence of the intentional object in the
mind. This description does not seem to make much

sense for modern readers. Nonetheless, what we mean

today by intentionality, Brentano identifies with "intentional inexistence" or "immanent-object-quality". Are
we dealing here with one and the same aspect or with
two different aspects of the mental? Anzenbacher 12 and
Ineichen 13 hold that one must distinguish between
intentionality as directedness toward an object and
intentionality as (actual) immanence or inexistence of
the intentional object. This distinction may be seen to
correspond to Brentano's distinction 14 between the
representation as act and the content of the representation or that which is represented. The passage cited is in
any case unclear. Ineichen is convinced that Brentano is
not in the position to specify his theory of intentionality
further: "If he does not say what is meant by immanentobject-quality, then it is also unclear what is meant by
intentional inexistence of an object and thereby what is
meant by reference to an object". 15 It might well be the
case that Brentano abandoned in his later philosophy
the doctrine of mental inexistence because of its
unclarity. 16 It is well known that Brentano distanced
himself in the course of time from the doctrine of
intentional inexistence without, however, discarding the
doctrine of intentionality.
I would like first to show with an example from
Brentano the background to his talk of inexistence:
When we flee from the flood, we could say that the flood
is in our mind insofar as we imagine it and fear it. That it
is present in our mind simply means that we think of it,
that we fear it. What is present is naturally not the real
flood. In order to avoid the misunderstanding that a
kind of indwelling of a real object could be meant by
inexistence, Brentano says in the passage cited that one
should not understand it as something real.
But why should we double the objects which we
represent and refer to through psychical acts by postulating non-real counterparts in our mind? It seems
evident enough that we flee from the real flood and not
from a non-real one in our mind. In his later philosophy
Brentano opposes the multiplication of objects in
ontology. In this sense Brentano also rejects the
immanence or inexistence of the intentional object in his
own early philosophy. In his late philosophy Brentano
does not recognize things existing in the mind. One
comes to this doubling of objects, according to the later
Brentano, through a false interpretation of truth,
especially of the truth of negative existential statements:
"So, for example, he who correctly rejects the existence
of the centaur is said to have judged that the non-being

ON T H E R O O T S O F " I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y "

of the centaur is real while the being of the centaur is not

real. And vice versa. Because it is true that there is a
tree, one does not merely say, there is a tree, but in
addition, that there is the being of a tree and this is not
its non-being", j7 A badly conceived correspondence
theory of truth thus leads to an unacceptable infinite
multiplication of objects.
The reason for Brentano's early acceptance of intentional inexistence has to be traced back to Aristotelian
scholasticism. In a letter to Kraus of March 21, 1916,
Brentano writes that he has let himself be seduced by
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas: "I had first to attach
myself as a pupil to a master. In a period characterized
by a lamentable decline in philosophy I could find no
one better than the ancient but difficult Aristotle whom
Thomas Aquinas often helped me to understand. Then
it happened that I let myself be seduced into considering
the 'is' in the sentences 'a tree is' and 'that a tree is, is'
as functioning equivalently", t8 Aristotle uses not infrequently the "is" in the sense of "is true". This can lead to
the mistaken view that this "is" is used in the same sense
as when it is said of a thing that it "is". ~9 Brentano also
deals in the same letter with Thomas Aquinas who, he
maintains, uses in the sentence "deus est" the "est" in
the sense of "is true". 2~ Mayer--Hillebrand, editor of
Brentano's Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, even maintains that Brentano holds that Aristotle's actual doctrine
is that the "is" has the same meaning in all cases. 2~
It is, however, not the case that "is" is always used in
the same sense in the Aristotelian--scholastic tradition
to which the early Brentano belongs. On the contrary
the thesis of mental inexistence is only acceptable
against the backdrop of a multiple or analogous use of
"is" and "to be" (to on legetai pollachos). It is certainly
problematic to say of non-real objects, which are
represented, that they are, that they appear in consciousness. It is less problematic to say so, however,
when one presupposes an analogous concept of being
instead of a univocal one.
Whoever interprets statements about intentionality
solely as directedness toward the real in the sense of the
later Brentano does not understand the early Brentano's
identification of intentionality with the intentional
inexistence of objects. T o understand this use of
inexistence one cannot simply consider the passages
from the late Brentano in which he speaks of being
seduced by Aristotle and Thomas. One must also
explore earlier passages especially in the early writings
on Aristotle where Brentano discusses precisely the

doctrine

of

99

IN B R E N T A N O

the

multiple

use

of

"being"

("on",

"Seiendes") and "is". Through this analogous use it

becomes clearer to what extent intentionality is related
to inexistence. In fact the early Brentano seems to be
particularly fascinated by a multiple understanding of
being. Nor may one hold that Thomas understands the
"est" in "deus est" solely in terms of "is true", as the late
Brentano maintains in the aforementioned letter. The
"esse" of God according to Thomas can be understood
in a double sense. When we know that "deus est" is true,
we comprehend that only in a second sense which
concerns the conjunction of subject and predicate of a
proposition and not in the more basic sense of actuality:

"esse dupliciter dicitur." Uno modo significat actum

essendi; alio modo significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit conjungens praedicatum
subjecto ". 22
Brentano's first work Von der manniffachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles 23 is an excellent
introduction to the Aristotelian doctrine of the homonymity or analogy of being. In this work Brentano
introduces us to, among other things, the transferred or
analogous sense of being as the true (on hos alethes)
since it is also said of the true that it is. This "is" is,
however, not to be conceived of as the "is" by which we
say of a substance that it is. The term "intention" already
appears in this work, to be sure, not in the sense of the
directedness of human mind toward something other,
but in a technical scholastic sense. "Intention" here
indicates a content represented, sought, and recognized
by mind. This meaning of "intention", too, can help us
understand intentionality in the sense of inexistence.
In his discussion of the Aristotelian categories
Brentano underscores the difference in the division of
categories from that of the "praedicabilia" or "kategoroumena", i.e., definition, proprium, species, difference,
and accident. We can ask of existing things what they
are, how they are, where they appear, etc. Answers to
these questions are classified according to the categories. They refer to that which is independent of the
human mind: "Thus the elements of the classification
into categories are real concepts and the various
questions, which are posed to the 'first substance' and
which in the difference of their directions correspond to
the difference of the categories, are real questions". 24
On the other hand the elements of the other division, the
"praedicabilia", are not real things in the proper sense.
They do not exist apart from the thinking mind: they are
purely "second intentions" and as such are all merely

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EDMUND RUNGGALDIER

"onta hos alethes". 25 The diversity of the elements of the

"praedicabilia" is, Brentano teaches, "a diversity of
merely rational questions, as for example when I ask:
What is the definition of man? What is his genus? Is this,
is that his proprium? his difference? his accident? . . .
The definition as definition, the genus as genus, and so
on, like the universal as such do not exist apart from the
abstracting reason", z6 The definition of man is as such
purely "second intention" and "mere 'on hos alethes' ".27
Aristotle seems to predicate "true" and "false" only of
propositions. Neither definitions, representations, sense
perceptions and certainly not things are true or false in
the proper sense. The reader finds, however, in Aristotle
places in which the opposite is apparently held. In his
first work Brentano pursues this tension and unfolds
step by step the Aristotelian doctrine of analogy and
attempts to dispose of the apparent contradictions. True
and false are used in different ways, not always with the
same meaning: "Just as the name of the existing thing is a
word of several meanings as we came to see in this
treatise, so too is "the true" a word of several meanings
which can be used homonymically of this and that. One
speaks of truth in another sense when one speaks of the
judging reason; and in still another sense when one
speaks of the truth of simple representations and
definitions or when we call things themselves true". 28
Truth in the first and proper sense occurs only in the
judgment of reason. That does not, however, exclude -according to the early Brentano and the scholastics -the possibility that it can also be predicated of things
themselves in "a secondary and analogous way"] 9
insofar as these verify judgments or form the object of a
true judgment? ~
Brentano indeed distinguishes between the "is" in the
sense of "is true" and the "is" of an assertion of real
existence. Only in later years does he seem to distance
himself from the doctrine of analogy and thus speak of a
seduction by Aristotle. In his first introduction to
Aristotle Brentano endeavours to keep separate the
different uses of "is". "It is also certain that the 'to be' of
the copula does not designate . . . a real attribute since
we can just as well say something affirmative of negations and privations, of purely imaginary relations and
other quite arbitrary constructs of thought"?
Since the time of the translations of Aristotle from
the Arabic in the High Middle Ages there have been two
fundamentally different uses of the term "intentio".
Thomas says "intentio" is used equivocally, that is, with
two basically different meanings. The one is the practical meaning. It refers to the act of intending or desiring:

it stands "pro actu mentis, qui est intendere"? 2 This

meaning corresponds somewhat to the modern usage in
the sense of directedness toward something other. The
second meaning is theoretical. "Intentio" in this sense
means the essential content of a thing which the intellect
grasps: it stands "pro ratione quam significat definitio"? 3
The definition expresses the essential content (ratio)
which the human mind abstracts from the things known.
"Intentio" in this second sense can also mean that which
the soul grasps or perceives from sensual things.
"Intentio" means then not only striving, intending
(Absicht), directedness toward something other, but
also that which is conveyed by the Arabic "Ma'na",
namely essential content, idea, concept, essence. 34 The
"intentio intellecta" or "intelligibilis" is one of the most
important kinds of "intentiones" in this sense. It is
abstracted by the "intellectus agens" from the sense
impressions. It is so to say the image of a thing known or
knowable by reason (Vernunfi). 35 The "intentio intellecta" is neither the known thing itself nor the knowing
mind but "quaedam similitudo concepta intellectu de re
intellecta"? 6
In Thomistic doctrine merely intentional existence,
"esse intentionale", is attributed to each "intentio" or to
each "similitudo". The "esse intentionale" is contrasted
to the "esse reale". "Intentional indicates here a certain
mode of being -- in contrast to the being of real objects
--, an unreal mode of being characteristic of images,
intentions, the goals of an intention".37 This theory with
its implied multiplication of "entia" was to be sure
attacked by the nominalists. But scholasticism continued
to speak of "intentiones" as entities which cannot be
reduced to known things themselves nor to the knowing
mind. We read in Goclenius' Lexicon Philosophicum
that the scholastics call that "ens .... intentionale" which
appears in knowing and thinking alone ("quod sola
conceptione et consideratione inest") or which is within
the soul ("seu ens quod est intra animam per notiones")? 8
Brentano appears to subscribe to the scholastic view
of man's knowledge and experience. According to this
view the objects experienced or known are somehow
contained in the mind, appear within it -- but to be sure
only in an analogous sense. The "intentional inexistence"
of objects, of which he speaks, appears to be an indwelling according to a kind of scholastic or Thomistic
"intentio". Brentano's position is related to the scholastic
view "insofar as it leads likewise to a doubling of the
external object in consciousness in the form of a
correlate of the real object. Thus for Brentano the word
'intentional' means the same as immanent and stands in

ON T H E R O O T S O F " I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y "

contrast to transcendent, the intentional object meaning

the same thing as the immanent object". 39
The doctrine of the inexistence of objects in the mind
is already established in Greek philosophy especially in
Aristotle. Even the ancient Ionians were occupied with
the question of how something which is not identical
with the knower can be present to him in knowledge.
They succumbed to the solution, as Brentano's pupil
Marty tries to show, that it need not be the known itself
but something similar to it which is present in the soul in
order for knowing to be possible at all.4~ The images of
the things seen and heard are said to be the "mediators"
of seeing and hearing, of representing, perceiving, and
knowing.
In his second work Die Psychologie des Aristoteles 41
Brentano addresses the Aristotelian doctrine of the
soul. He says of the sensitive soul -- as it is described in
Aristotle's De anima -- that in perception it becomes
similar to that which is perceived. 42 Knowing through
mind (nous) is similar to sensual perceiving. But it is
distinguished already by the fact that it is open to
anything. The mind's reception is thereby of a different
kind. In the final analysis it is only in an uncharacteristic
sense passive reception. Reason (der Verstand) "is
potentially anything intelligible without, as Empedocles
believed, actually being one of the objects . . . . We must
concur rather with Anaxagoras when he says that reason
is unmixed because it is in and of itself flee from all
forms in order to be able to receive all forms".43
Reason abstracts the intelligible forms from the
perceived things and thus arrives at knowledge. It
cannot be the real objects themselves which are
received. These are material. What are received and
then found in the perceiving and knowing individual are
solely abstracted forms. According to this doctrine that
which dwells in the soul, that is the inexistent, are
"non-real counterparts of the real". And Marty states:
"And so it remained in the Middle Ages where, in
general, representing and knowing were mediated by
so-called, as one put it then, species intentionales; the
sensual, by species sensibiles; the intellectual or conceptual, by species intelligibiles. The scholastics thus
believed, as did Aristotle, in a characteristic mode of
presence in the mind of the object which one called at
first mental, then intentional, and then objective.. ,,44
In 1 91 1 Brentano published a spirited defence of the
Aristotelian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul: 45
If the human faculty of knowing is an intellectual one,
then the known objects dwelling therein must be
intellectual: "intelligible is namely that which is in an

IN B R E N T A N O

101

intellectual mode, a n d . . , the corporeal objects, if they

are being thought of in the mind, are present there in an
intellectual mode . . . . The corporeal thing is to be sure
something material and remains so when it is received in
the mind. But it exists in the mind in an immaterial mode
and not as it exists outside of the mind". 46 What really
exists is individually determined in all respects. That
which dwells in the mind has lost this individual
determination.
Without the Greek and scholastic doctrine of immanence or inexistence of intelligible objects as here
described Brentano's doctrine of the intentional object
loses its foundation. 47 Let us look therefore once again
at the key passages in Brentano's psychology in which
he presents his theory of intentionality.
Brentano is widely considered the first modern philosopher who referred to intentionality as directedness
of the psychical or mental toward objects. It may well
be, however, that by "intentionality" the early Brentano
meant not so much this aspect of the mental or psychical
but the "object-like-immanence" (gegenstiindliche
Immanenz) or the inexistence of the intentional object.
Spiegelberg strives to show from Brentano's longer
annotation to the passage cited above 48 that the word
"intentional" does not primarily mean the directedness
to an object. In addition to intentional inexistence the
scholastics also tend to speak of "being objectively in
something". Brentano himself in the same note points
out that he does not want to use this expression
"objective" since it could be mistaken as indicating the
really existing things. "Immanently" or "being intentionally gegenstiindlich", on the other hand, avoids
such a misunderstanding. Such expressions do not
necessarily imply a connection to things existing outside
of the mind. The interpretation of "intentional" in the
sense of objective immanence or inexistence is reinforced by the historical remark in Brentano's second
annotation to the same passage. 49 Aristotle had already
spoken of psychical indwelling: "In his books on the soul
he said that the perceived as something perceived is in
the perceiver, the sense receives the perceived without
the matter, that which is thought is in the thinking
mind". 5~ Brentano then mentions Philo, the Neoplatonists, Augustine, Anselm and naturally Thomas:
"Thomas Aquinas teaches that that which is thought is
intentionally in the thinker, the object of love in the
lover, the desired in the desirer...,,.51
In order to show that intentional inexistence does not
primarily mean the directedness toward an object, the
intention, or the pursuit of a goal, Spiegelberg points to

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EDMUND R U N G G A L D I E R

a further note from the second b o o k of psychology f r o m

the year 1911 in which B r e n t a n o clarifies anew why the
scholastics also used the expression "objective" instead
of "intentional": they thereby m e a n that something can
b e c o m e an object for the striving and knowing p e r s o n
and "as such - - whether it be merely thought or desired,
fled from, etc. - - it is to a certain extent present in his
consciousness". 52 If Brentano prefers the term "intentional", he says it is because he wants to avoid the
previously mentioned misunderstanding.

III

The fact that Brentano a b a n d o n e d the theory of mental

immanence or inexistence in the course of time does not
contradict Spiegelberg's thesis that it is mental inexistence and not the reference or directedness to something
other which comprises the essence of intentionality for
the early Brentano. T h e early Brentano's position would
then stand on the dividing line between medieval or
scholastic and m o d e r n conceptions: "His use of the term
'intentional' is strongly scholastic, his c o n c e p t of the
mental reference is o n the other h a n d modern...,,.53
It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that only
the theory of intentionality as i m m a n e n c e or intentional
inexistence, which B r e n t a n o in fact a b a n d o n e d , is due to
his scholastic background. This is also the case with
Brentano's intentionality as directedness toward something other. Intentionality in this m o d e r n sense is also
rooted in the classical Aristotelian and Thomistic works.
If intentionality there appears or is interpreted mainly as
inexistence, that is so because the directedness toward
something other was not thinkable without "intentiones
intelligibiles" in the mind or in the soul. F o r the
scholastics the doctrine of the contrast between the
intellectual--mental and the purely physical--corporeal
was self-evident due to the different m o d e s of being of
the two. T h e intellectual--mental is directed toward
something other; the purely corporeal, on the other
hand, rests in itself. In o r d e r to appreciate the early
Brentano's theory of intentionality we must not overlook Aristotle's and Aquinas' theory of the multiple
meanings of being. C o n t e m p o r a r y philosophers, w h o in
contradistinction to the scholastics hold to a univocal
c o n c e p t of being or existence, might have difficulty in
interpreting the early Brentano.

Notes
t Morscher, Edgar: 1978, "Brentano and His Place in Austrian
Philosophy", Grazer philosophische Studien 5, 3.
2 Kraus, Oskar: 1919, Franz Brentano, Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens
und seiner Lehre, Beck, Munich, p. 9.
3 Morscher, 1978, 8.
4 Ibid.

5 Kraus, 1919, p. 4; Kastil, Alfred: 1851, Die Philosophie Franz

Brentanos: Eine Einffihrung in seine Lehre, "Das Bergland-Buch",
Salzburg, p. 10.
6 Kraus, 1919, p. 9.
v Quoted here from the Felix Meiner edition of 1924: Brentano,
Franz: 1924, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, edited by
Oskar Kraus, Felix Meiner, Leipzig.
"Nichts kann beurteilt, niehts kann aber auch begehrt, nichts kann
gehofft oder gefiirchtet werden, wenn es nicht vorgestellt wird."
Ibid., p. 112.

"In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in dem Urteile ist etwas
anerkannt oder verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse
gehaBt, in dem Begehren begehrt usw." Ibid., p. 125.
~0 "Und wiederum sagt man: das freut reich, das schmerzt reich, das
tut mir leid u.s.f. Freude und Trauer folgen, wie Bejahung und
Verneinung, Liebe und Hag, Begehren und Fliehen, deuthch einer
Vorstellung und beziehen sieh auf das in ihr Vorgestellte." Ibid., p.
126.
i~ "Jedes psychische Phfinomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was
die Scholastiker der Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir,
obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdr6cken, die Beziehung
auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht
eine Realit~t zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente Oegenst~indlichkeit nennen wfirden." Ibid., p. 124f.
~2 Anzenbacher, Arno: 1972, Die Intentional#fit bei Thomas yon
Aquin und Edmund Husserl, Oldenbourg, Vienna/Munich, p. 22.
13 Ineiehen, Hans: 1982, "Intentionali6it und Sprache', Grazer
philosophische Studien 15, 24f.
~4 Brentano, 1924, p. 111.
i~ Ineichen, 1982, p. 26.
16 Kraus, 1919, p. 26.
Jv Ibid.,p. 30.

ta "Ich hatte reich zun~ichst als Lehrling an einen Meister anzuschlieBen und konnte, in einer Zeit klfigliehen Verfalles der Philosophie geboren, keinen besseren als den alten Aristoteles finden,
zu dessen nicht immer leichtem Verst~ndnis mir oft Thomas v. A.
dienen muBte. Da geschah es denn u.a., dab ieh reich verfiihren lieB,
das 'ist' in den S~itzen 'ein Baum ist ~ und 'dab ein Baum ist, ist' fiir
gleiehm~iBig funktionierend zu halten." Brentano, Franz: 1966, Die
Abkehr yore Nichtrealen, edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand,
Francke, Bern/Munich, p. 29 if.
19 Kraus, Oskar: Introduction, in: Brentano, 1924, p. XLVI.
20 Brentano, 1966, p. 292.
21 Ibid., p. 2.

22 Thomas Aquinas, S. th. P q. 3, a. 4 ad 2.

23 Brentano, Franz: 1862, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des
Seienden nach Aristoteles, Herder, Freiburg i. Br.

ON THE ROOTS OF "INTENTIONALITY"

24 "So sind denn auch die Glieder der Kategorieneintheitung reelle
Begriffe, und die verschiedenen Fragen, die an die erste Substanz
gestellt werden, und die in dem Unterschiede ihrer Richtungen dem
Unterschiede der Kategorien entsprechen, sind reelle Fragen". Ibid.,
p. 123.
25 Ibid9
2c, ,,... eine Verschiedenheit blog rationeller Fragen, wie z.B. wenn
ich frage: Welches ist die Definiton des Menschen? Welches ist sein
Genus? 1st dies, ist jenes sein Proprium? seine Differenz? sein
Accidenz? . . . Die Definition als Definition, das Genus als Genus
u.s.f., wie fiberhaupt das Universale also solches, existieren nicht
auger dem abstrahierenden V e r s t a n d e . . . " Ibid., p. 123f.
27 Ibid., p. 124.
2~ "Wie der Name des Seienden, den wir nach seinen verschiedenen
Bedeutungen in dieser Abhandlung kennen lernen, ist auch 'das
Wahre' ein vieldeutiges Wort, das dem Einen und Anderen in
homonymer Weise zugesprochen wird. In einem anderen Sinne
spricht man yon Wahrheit, wenn man von dem urtheilenden
Verstande, in einem anderen, wenn man v o n d e r Wahrheit einfacher
Vorstellungen und Definitionen redet, oder wenn man die Dinge
selbst wahr nennt." Ibid., p. 25.
z9 ,,... in secundfirer und analoger W e i s e . . . " Ibid., p. 30.
~o Ibid.,p. 31f.
3~ "Auch ist es sicher, dab das 'sein' der Copula n i c h t . . , ein reales
Attribut bezeichnet, da wir ja auch von Negationen und Privationen,
von rein fingierten Relationen und anderen ganz willkfirlichen
Gedankengebilden nichtsdestoweniger etwas affirmativ aussagen
9 Ibid., p. 36.
32 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate 21, 3 ad 5.
~ Ibid.
~4 Spiegelberg, Herbert: 1969, "'Intentio' und 'Intentionalit~it' in der
Scholastik, bei Brentano und Husserl", Studia Philosophica 29, 192.
3.~ Thomas Aquinas, S. th. I a q. 85, a. 1.
~(' Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles IV, 11, Nr. 3466.
~7 Spiegelberg, 1969, 203.
3s Cited by Spiegelberg, 1969, 204.
39 Spiegelberg, 1969, p. 206.
4o Marty, Anton; 1908, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der
allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Max Niemeyer,
Halle, p. 385.

IN B R E N T A N O

103

4~ Brentano, Franz: 1867, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos, Kirchheim, Mainz.
42 Ibid., p. 79.
43 , . . . ist der M6glichkeit nach alles Intelligibele, ohne, wie
Empedokles geglaubt hatte, eines der Objecte wirklich zu sein . . .
Vielmehr m/.issen wir Anaxagoras beistimmen, wenn er sagt, der
Verstand sei unvermischt, denn er ist an und ffir sich frei von allen
Formen, um alle aufnehmen zu k6nnen." Ibid., p. 115.
44 Marty, 1908, p. 386.
45 Brentano, Franz: 1911, Aristoteles' Lehre vom Ursprung des
rnenschlichen Geistes, Veit & Comp., Leipzig.
4~'"intelligibel ist nfimlich das, was in geistiger Weise ist, u n d . . , die
k6rperlichen Objecte sind, wenn sie im Verstande gedacht werden,
in geistiger Weise in ibm . . . . das k6rperliche Ding aber ist zwar
etwas Materieltes und bleibt es auch, wenn es in dem Verstande
aufgenommen wird, allein es ist in ihm in immaterieller Weise und
nicht so, wie es ausser ihm besteht." Brentano, 1867, p. 138.
47 Spiegelberg, 1969, 206.
4s Brentano, 1924, p. 124f.
4,~ Ibid., p. 125.
~0 "In seinen Bfichern von der Seele sagt er, das Empfundene als
Empfundenes sei in dem Empfindenden, der Sinn nehme das
Empfundene ohne die Materie auf, das Gedachte sei in dem
denkenden Verstande." Ibid.
51 "Thomas von Aquin lehrt, das Gedachte sei intentional in dem
Denkenden, der Gegenstand der Liebe in dem Liebenden, das
Begehrte in dem Begehrenden,..." Ibid.
52 ,,... als solches, sei es als blo13 gedacht oder sei es auch als
begehrt, geflohen oder dergleichen, gewissermassen in seinem
Bewul3tsein gegenw~irtig ist." Brentano, Franz: 1925, Psychologie
vom empirischen Standpunkt, Vol. 2: Von der Klassifikation der
psychischen Phdnomene, edited by Oskar Kraus, Felix Meiner,
Leipzig, note, p. 9.
53 Spiegelberg, 1969, 208.

. Universitdt I n n s b r u c k
I n s t i t u t fiir P h i l o s o p h i e