Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DEREK SUNDERMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WESTAR ENERGY, INC.,
No. 08-3059
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-02347-JAR)
(D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background.
In her published Memorandum and Order Granting Defendants Motion
for Summary Judgment, the district judge thoroughly detailed the complicated
factual background pertaining to plaintiffs retaliation claim, see Sunderman v.
Westar Energy, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1271-76 (D. Kan. 2007), and we
commend the district judge for her excellent work in this case. Further, we see no
reason to repeat her efforts here.
Accordingly, we incorporate by reference the district judges lengthy
statement of Uncontroverted Facts regarding the following matters:
(1) Westars business operations as a public utility company, id. at 1271;
(2) plaintiffs employment history with Westar and his position as a Manager,
Origination in Westars Generation and Marketing Group, id. at 1271-72; (3) the
background regarding Westars creation of two Manager, Origination positions
and the placement of plaintiff and Tony Delacluyse in the newly-created
positions, id. at 1272; (4) Westars 2002-2003 corporate reorganization, id.
at 1272-75; (5) Westars elimination of the Manager, Origination positions and
the transfer of plaintiffs and Delacluyses job responsibilities to Westars
Customer Support Group, id. at 1275-76; (6) plaintiffs placement in Westars
Career Placement Center program in June 2003, id. at 1276; (7) Westars
termination of plaintiffs employment in August 2003, id.; (8) plaintiffs
complaint to Westars Human Resources (HR) Department in March 2002
-2-
-5-
reason, plaintiff contend[ed] that several pieces of evidence suggest[ed] that the
reason is unworthy of belief and therefore a pretext for retaliation. Id.
In her published decision granting Westars motion for summary judgment,
the district judge concluded that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case
of retaliation because he had insufficient evidence showing a causal connection
between the filing of his complaint with the KHRC and his termination. Id.
at 1279-82. In the alternative, and also in support of her causation analysis, the
district judge concluded that plaintiff had failed to put forth sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether Westars proffered
reason for plaintiffs termination was unworthy of belief and thus a pretext for
retaliation. Id. at 1280-82. With the exception of the matter discussed below, we
agree with the district judges well-reasoned analysis of both the causation and
pretext issues, and we therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of
Westar for substantially the same reasons relied on by the district judge. More
specifically, we note that we are particularly persuaded by the following
reasoning of the district judge with regard to the causation issue:
The only alleged retaliatory conduct that occurred after the
filing of his [complaint with the KHRC] was the January 14, 2003
write-up and plaintiffs job elimination. The write-up was removed
from plaintiffs file and did not have any adverse consequences on
his employment. Moreover, the write-up was issued by Olsen [in the
Generation and Marketing Group]; the evidence is that Wilson [in the
Customer Support Group] was the decisionmaker [with regard to
plaintiffs termination] and that there was no nexus between the
-6-
-7-
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend judgment, the district judge
explained her reasoning on this issue as follows:
In its [Summary Judgment] Order, this Court held that plaintiff
may not rely on prior acts of alleged retaliation that predated his
administrative charge and declined to consider this as evidence of
causation. As discussed at length in the Order, plaintiff generally
asserts that he engaged in a protected activity in approximately
March [the complaint to the HR Department] and October [the
written memorandum to John Olsen] of 2002. Each of these events
would be the basis for a separate and distinct claim of retaliation,
which plaintiff failed to identify in the Pretrial Order. Accordingly,
the Court determined that any alleged protected activity or instances
of retaliation prior to the filing of plaintiffs administrative charge
were not the basis of plaintiffs claim as set forth in the Pretrial
Order and would not be considered as evidence of causation.
Plaintiff has failed to show why the Court should reconsider this
holding.
Plaintiff also argues that the Courts Order ignored the
Supreme Courts ruling in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan[, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)]. In that hostile work environment
case, the Supreme Court held that a continuing violation theory of
discrimination is not permitted for claims [based on] discrete acts of
discrimination or retaliation. The Court noted, however, that
plaintiffs are not barred from using time-barred acts as background
evidence in support of a timely claim. Plaintiff argues that the
Courts failure to consider what he characterizes as background
evidence is contrary to the ruling in Morgan. Plaintiffs reliance on
the statement in Morgan regarding background evidence overlooks
the analysis of causation in an employment retaliation case. At the
prima facie stage of a retaliation case, the plaintiff must show that a
causal connection exists between the adverse employment action and
the protected activity sufficient to justify an inference of retaliatory
motive. In other words, for a protected activity to cause the adverse
employment action, the adverse action must necessarily occur after
the protected activity. Here, plaintiff sought to rely on alleged
retaliatory acts that occurred prior to his protected activitythe filing
of his EEOC charge. This background evidence is antithetical to
-8-
-9-
at 15-16; and (2) the prior acts of retaliation are the predicate wrongs in the
complaint that plaintiff filed with the KHRC, id. at 291-92.
That said, we see no reversible error here. Instead, we conclude that any
evidence concerning the alleged reduction in plaintiffs compensation and/or
plaintiffs suspension was insufficient, either standing alone or in combination
with plaintiffs other evidence, to raise a jury question on the causation and
pretext issues that are associated with plaintiffs termination. To begin with, the
alleged reduction in plaintiffs compensation was presumably implemented by
Westars Generation and Marketing Group, and there is no evidence in the record
linking it to Terry Wilson and the Customer Support Group. Consequently, the
alleged reduction in plaintiffs compensation is insufficient to raise an inference
of retaliation with regard to the entirely separate decision of Wilson and the
Customer Support Group to not transfer plaintiffs position to the Customer
Support Group as part of Westars corporate reorganization in 2002-2003.
Likewise, the fact that plaintiff was suspended on October 31, 2002, by his
then-supervisor in the Generation and Marketing Group, John Olsen, allegedly for
complaining about retaliation for making his complaint to the HR Department in
March 2002, is also insufficient to raise an inference of retaliation with regard to
the separate decision of Wilson and the Customer Support Group to not transfer
plaintiffs position to the Customer Support Group. Indeed, as the district court
found, although Olsen was involved in the reorganization process and, in fact,
-10-
was the one who ultimately informed plaintiff and Delacluyse that their job
responsibilities were being transferred to the Customer Support Group, it is
uncontroverted that [n]either Olson nor [his supervisor in the Generation and
Marketing Group] was involved in the decision by Wilson as to what would
happen [to plaintiff] when the Manager, Origination responsibilities were shifted
to the Customer Support Group. Sunderman, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
Moreover, plaintiff has no evidence to support a cats paw or rubber stamp
biased-subordinate claim with regard to Olsen and Wilson or any of the other
decisionmakers in the Customer Support Group. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that
cats paw refers to a situation in which a biased subordinate, who lacks
decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker as a dupe in a deliberate
scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action, and that [t]he rubber
stamp doctrine . . . refers to a situation in which a decisionmaker gives
perfunctory approval for an adverse employment action explicitly recommended
by a biased subordinate).
-11-
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge