TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2112
v.
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10 th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and appellant, Juan Manuel Carbajal-Moreno, proceeding pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to enable him to appeal the district
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
courts denial of his 28 U. S.C. 2255 motion. For the following reasons, we
deny Mr. Carbajal-Moreno a COA and dismiss this matter.
BACKGROUND
This is the fourth time Mr. Carbajal-Moreno has appeared before our court.
We derive the relevant procedural history of his lengthy case from the last
decision we issued involving Mr. Carbajal-Moreno, United States v. CarbajalMoreno, 332 Fed. Appx. (10 th Cir. 2009) (Carbajal-Moreno III):
Carbajal was indicted in 2001 on eight counts relating to drug
possession and distribution. A jury convicted him of all counts, and
the district court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 262
months on each count. Carbajal timely appealed his convictions on
two counts.
We reversed on one of the counts, a conspiracy charge, on double
jeopardy grounds, but affirmed a related continuing criminal
enterprise conviction. We remanded the case to the district court and
ordered it to vacate the conspiracy conviction . . . and to adjust
Carbajal-Morenos sentence accordingly. United States v. CarbajalMoreno, 87 Fed. Appx. 700, 706 (10 th Cir. 2004) (Carbajal-Moreno
I).
During the time the case was before the district court on remand, and
35 months after the jury verdict, Carbajal filed a Rule 33 motion for
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, alleging that
sometime after his convictions were entered he discovered that his
trial attorney surrendered his Bar license prior to trial. United
States v. Carbajal-Moreno, 136 Fed. Appx. 163, 164, 167 (10 th Cir.
2005) (Carbajal-Moreno II), and that his representation was therefore
ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the
motion in July 2004, reasoning that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are ordinarily best pursued in collateral proceedings.
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appeal. My brother called your office to ask as to the status of my appeal and
was informed that my appeal had been denied since January. Request and
Inquiry, id. at 213. The accompanying Notice of Appeal similarly indicated
that Mr. Carbajal-Moreno had not been informed of the Courts denial of his
habeas corpus appeal. . . . The clerk informed my brother that the A.U.S.A. and
my prior counsel had been sent notification. . . . The fact remains that I was not
notified. Notice of Appeal at 1, id. at 214.
Upon receipt of this letter and Notice of Appeal, the district court entered
an order construing the letter as a motion for extension of time to file notice of
appeal or, alternatively, to reopen the time to file an appeal. 6/21/10 Order at 1,
id. at 222. After determining that an internal mistaken entry in the district court
docket (regarding whether Mr. Carbajal-Moreno was represented by counsel or
not) had caused the failure to notify Mr. Carbajal-Moreno of the dismissal of his
case, the district court construed the letter as a motion to reopen the time to file
an appeal. The court then granted that motion and reopened the time for
Mr. Carbajal-Moreno to file an appeal nunc pro tunc to and including May 3,
2010. Id. at 2.
Our initial inquiry, then, is whether we agree with the district courts
determination that Mr. Carbajal-Morenos notice of appeal was timely. We
conclude that we do agree with the district court, for substantially the reasons
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stated in its 6/21/2010 Order. We therefore have appellate jurisdiction over this
request for a COA. 1
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2), a prisoner seeking a COA must make
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). He may do so by showing that reasonable
jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when the district court has ruled on the
merits of the prisoners claims, he must show that reasonable jurists would find
the district courts assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.
Id. Where the district court ruled on procedural grounds, a COA may be granted
when the petitioner shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and . . .
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id.
In his 2255 motion, Mr. Carbajal-Moreno also claimed that his counsel
was ineffective in failing to argue that the CCE charge against him violated his
Due Process rights. He argues that the indictment against him did not charge him
with committing the underlying crimes that compromised the series of crimes
that constituted a continuing criminal enterprise with five persons. Def.s
2255 Motion at 21, R. Vol. 1 at 40 (emphasis in original). The government
argues that a reading of the indictment refutes this argument. It does not appear
that the magistrate judge specifically addressed this issue in his report and
recommendation. The argument is meritless, both because we agree with the
governments reading of the indictment and because, given the overwhelming
evidence against Mr. Carbajal-Moreno, the failure by his counsel to argue this
issue would not have affected the outcome of the trial. Put in COA terms, no
reasonable jurist would believe that the magistrate judges failure to specifically
address this claim would merit further analysis of Mr. Carbajal-Morenos claims
(continued...)
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(...continued)
of ineffectiveness.
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Cir. 1986) (Neither suspension nor disbarment invites a per se rule that
continued representation in an ongoing trial is constitutionally ineffective.)
After concluding that Mr. Carbajal-Morenos counsel was not per se
ineffective, the magistrate judge went on to examine whether defense counsel had
been ineffective under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Accordingly, under Strickland, Mr. Carbajal-Moreno had to show, first,
that his counsels performance was deficient: that the representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing professional
norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Second, he needed to establish prejudice:
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsels unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.
As indicated above, Mr. Carbajal-Moreno argued that his counsel was
ineffective for allowing him to be tried on both the CCE and the conspiracy
charges, claiming that such a double trial violated the Double Jeopardy clause
of the Constitution. The magistrate judge rejected this argument on the ground
that Double Jeopardy protects an individual from being convicted more than
once for an offense or for suffering multiple punishments for the same offense.
Since Defendant had one trial and did not suffer multiple punishments, there is no
Double Jeopardy violation. Mag. J.s Second Rep. & Rec. at 8, R. Vol. 1 at
206 (citing United States v. Ziskin, 360 F.3d 934, 948-49 (9 th Cir. 2003) (holding
that nothing prohibits a trial for both conspiracy and CCE; Double Jeopardy only
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Mag. J.s Second Rep. & Rec. at 15, R. Vol. 1 at 209. Further, the magistrate
judge concluded, given the overwhelming evidence against Mr. Carbajal-Moreno
which was properly admitted into evidence, the one erroneously admitted hearsay
statement did not affect the outcome. The magistrate judge then recommended
dismissal of Mr. Carbajal-Morenos 2255 petition. The district court adopted
this report and recommendation and dismissed the petition. Final judgment was
entered on January 14, 2010. 6
The district court dismissed Mr. Carbajal-Morenos petition after
considering the merits of it. As summarized above, the magistrate judges report
and recommendation (adopted by the district court) thoroughly explained its
disposition. We cannot see how reasonable jurists would find any of the courts
determinations debatable or wrong. Accordingly, we deny Mr. Carbajal-Moreno
his requested COA for substantially the reasons stated in the magistrate judges
report, adopted by the district court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA, we GRANT Mr. CarbajalMoreno leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and DISMISS this matter.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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