PEOPLE VS AMADO HERNANDEZ (99 PHIL 515)1.

What happened:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and
other appellants were accused of conspiring,
confederating and cooperating with each other,
as well as with the thirty-one(31) defendants
charged in the criminal cases of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Theywere accused of being
members of PKP Community Party of the
Philippines which wasactively engaged in an
armed rebellion against the government of the
Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP
(Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they
committed thecrime of rebellion causing murder,
pillage, looting plunder, etc., enumerated in 13
attackson government forces or civilians by
HUKS.
2. Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies
3. Contention of the State:
The government, headed by the Solicitor General,
argued that the gravity of thecrime committed
required the denial of bail. Moreover, the complex
crime charged by thegovernment against
Hernandez has been successfully imposed with
other arrestedcommunist leaders and was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
4. Contention of the Accused:
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants
regarding the judgment rendered by theCFI in
Manila that rebellion cannot be a complex crime
with murder, arson or robbery.
5. Ruling:
The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery
are mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as
means necessary for the perpetration of the
offense. Such common offense isabsorbed or
inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as
the acts specified in Article 135constitutes, one
single crime it follows that said acts offer no
occasion for the application of Article 48 which
requires therefore the commission of at least two
crimes.***
HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE
: Rebellion cannot be complexed with
commoncrimes such as killings, destruction of
property, etc., committed on the occasion and
infurtherance thereof. The thinking is not
anymore correct more so that there is no legal
basisfor such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY
ONE CRIME. ***
Enrile vs SalazarG.R. No. 92163June 5,
1990Facts:In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile
wasarrested by law enforcement officers led by
Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued
by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional TrialCourt
of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day filed by a
panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State
Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
FerdinandR. Abesamis and Assistant City
Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, thespouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion withmurder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of
the failed coupattempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.Senator Enrile was taken to

and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on

Taft Avenue, Manila,without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and none
fixed in the arrestwarrant. The following morning,
February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp
Tomas Karingal inQuezon City where he was
given over to the custody of the Superintendent
of the NorthernPolice District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Dula Torres.On the same date of February 28,
1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition forhabeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on
March 2, 1990),alleging that he was deprived of
his constitutional rights.Issue:(a) Whether the
petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito
compleio) arising from anoffense being a
necessary means for committing another, which
is referred to in the secondclause of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code?Held:There is one other
reason and a fundamental one at that why Article
48 of the Penal Code cannotbe applied in the
case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimeswere punished
separately (assuming that this could be done),
the following penalties would beimposable upon
the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000and
prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying
circumstancespresent, but never exceeding 12
years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of
murder,reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstancespresent. In other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty couldnot be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out tohim, even in the absence
of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construedin conformity with the
theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable
to the movant.The plaint of petitioner's counsel
that he is charged with a crime that does not
exist in thestatute books, while technically
correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion
may not becomplexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, must
therefore be dismissedas a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the
information does indeedcharge the petitioner
with a crime defined and punished by the Revised
Penal Code: simplerebellion.Petitioner finally
claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the
light of the Court'sreaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical
and necessarycorollary that the information
against him should be considered as charging
only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correctproposition. But the
question remains: Given the facts from which this
case arose, was a petitionfor habeas corpus in
this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicatingits denial? The criminal
case before the respondent Judge was the normal
venue for invoking thepetitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment.
The original jurisdictionto grant or deny bail
rested with said respondent. The correct course
was for petitioner to invokethat jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se byreason of the weakness of

the evidence against him. Only after that remedy

was denied by thetrial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
even then, notwithout first applying to the Court
of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available
there.The Court reiterates that based on the
doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
thequestioned information filed against
petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco andErlinda Panlilio must be read as
charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitledto bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitionersbeing merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered remanded tothe respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by
the petitioners. Once bail is fixedby said
respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Courtshall
become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to
costs.
G.R. No. 93335
September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO
M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge,
SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State
Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor
FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor
EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law
Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information
charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having
committed rebellion complexed with murder 1
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
government prosecutors filed another information
charging him for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989,
at Dasmarias Village, Makati, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, having reasonable ground
to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did
then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully
and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or
delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or
concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause,
and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the
information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio

Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge
Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus
motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was)
probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce
Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the
Information on the grounds that:
(a)
The facts charged do not constitute an
offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable
cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed
with murder and frustrated murder against
Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col.
Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on
December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of
the Senator for harboring or concealing the
Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an
order denying the motion for reconsideration for
alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's
arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the
respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss
the information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen.
Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on
1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a
component element of, the "complexed" rebellion
presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged
co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the
same meeting on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires
that there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion;
IV.
There is no probable cause to hold Sen.
Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for
alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829.
The preliminary investigation, held only for
rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities
resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not
the petitioner could be separately charged for
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the

rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the

theory that the former involves a special law
while the latter is based on the Revised Penal
Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew
to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515
[1956]) the rulings of which were recently
repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163
and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave
this Court the occasion to reiterate the long
standing proscription against splitting the
component offenses of rebellion and subjecting
them to separate prosecutions, a procedure
reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court
recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and
determines the primary ruling of the Court, which
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the
occasion thereof, either as a means to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a
person can not be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be
applied, neither can he be charged separately for
two (2) different offenses where one is a
constitutive or component element or committed
in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having
violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c)
which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in
its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000
to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the following
acts:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c)
harboring or concealing, or facilitating the
escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has
committed any offense under existing penal laws
in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and
conviction.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that

the petitioner entertained and accommodated
Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on
December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen.
Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because
of such failure the petitioner prevented Col.
Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner

in Quezon City were based on the affidavits
executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis
International Hotel who stated that the fugitive
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100
rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday
party held at the residence of the petitioner in
the evening of December 1, 1989. The
information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads
that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989,
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with
accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied
by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing
white armed patches". The prosecution thereby
concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel
leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his
house in the presence of about 100 uniformed
soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred
that they were co-conspirators in the failed
December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis
supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations
supporting the rebellion charge constitute or
include the very incident which gave rise to the
charge of the violation under Presidential Decree
No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice
resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only
one crime of rebellion complexed with murder
and multiple frustrated murder but there could be
101 separate and independent prosecutions for
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100
other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The
splitting of component elements is readily
apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion
in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo
Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or
concealing was for no other purpose but in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constitute a component thereof. it was motivated
by the single intent or resolution to commit the
crime of rebellion. As held in People v.
Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed
against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve
a political purpose. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is
described as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us
that acts committed in furtherance of the
rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed absorbed in the one single crime of
rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90
[1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958];
People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People
v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act
of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly
a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an
act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate
charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil.,
138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and

comfort can only be accomplished by some kind
of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental
operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or
physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as
an element of treason it becomes Identified with
the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination
with treason to increase the penalty as article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one
can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force
and trespass are inherent in smoking and in
robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be
made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of
treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by
contending that harboring or concealing a
fugitive is punishable under a special law while
the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal
Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not
bar a prosecution under the other. This argument
is specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the
prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale
remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable
under a special law or general law, which are
mere components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the
crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and
charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that
the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same
and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez,
supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention
common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts
of violence such as murder, arson, robbery,
kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal
Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant
case, however, constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not
confine itself to common crimes but also to
offenses under special laws which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political
offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged
conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel
Honasan is too intimately tied up with his
allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for
practically the same act to form two separate
crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring

or concealing which was based on his acts of
conspiring with Honasan was committed in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and
must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in,
and Identified with the crime of rebellion
punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and
jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as "common" offenses, and
assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished separately
from the principal offense, or complexed with the
same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960],
the accused, after having pleaded guilty and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an
independent prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled:
An examination of the record, however, discloses
that the crime with which the accused is charged
in the present case which is that of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition is already
absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in
the crime of rebellion with which the same
accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and
was convicted. (at page 662)
xxx

xxx

xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime

with which the accused is charged in the present
case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and
so to press it further now would be to place him
in double jeopardy. (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v.
Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where
the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly
similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas,
an alleged member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of
subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his
motion to quash the information, the petitioner
based his arguments on the Hernandez and
Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of
common in rebellion. The Court, however,
clarified, to wit:
... in the present case, petitioner is being charged
specifically for the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under PD
1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING
SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus,
the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo
and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
The Court in the above case upheld the
prosecution for illegal possession of firearms
under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution

for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The

prosecution must make up its mind whether to
charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone
or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also
violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion
in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in
Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a
separate prosecution for rebellion already filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In
such a case, the independent prosecution under
PD 1829 can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or
motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile
is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or
concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the
latter is a friend and former associate, the motive
for the act is completely different. But if the act is
committed with political or social motives, that is
in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be
deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion
instead of being punished separately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be
tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his
being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this
ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass
upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is
QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining respondent Judges and their successors
in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court
of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen.
Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further
proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Coup detat as Distinguished from Rebellion
Posted on December 10, 2012 by Intentional
Lacunae
A continuing crime is a crime whose elements are
committed in different localities, such that the
accused may be charged in any place where an
element of the crime is committed.
In Umil v. Ramos(1), several members of the NPA
were arrested by the police without a warrant.
The court held that the arrests during that the
arrests were lawful, for the offenders were caught
in flagrante delicto that is, committing a crime
in the presence of the police officers. To begin
with, they were rebels and this was coupled with
the fact that they possessed unlicensed firearms
and explosives when they were apprehended by
the police. Rebellion is a continuing crime, for it
has an ideological base which fuels the rebellion.
To wit:
Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base which compels the repetition of
the same acts of lawlessness and violence until
the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.

But rebellion and coup detat are completely

different crimes. True, a coup detat is usually
undertaken through rebellious means, but their
aims are completely different.
Lets have a look at this table that I made to
make our life easier:

REBELLION (ART. 134)

COUP D ETAT (Art. 134-A)

REBELLION
(ART. 134)

COUP D ETAT (Art. 134-A)

(1) To remove
from the
allegiance to
the Philippines
or to its laws:
(a) The
national
territory or
any part
thereof,
(b) Or any
body of land,
naval, or
armed
forces.

(2) Or to
deprive the
Chief
Executive or
the
Congress, in
whole or in
part, of any
of their
prerogatives. To seize or diminis
Purpose
h state control.
Public
officers/employ
ees and
Military, Police, or
Persons
private
any public
liable
citizens.
officers/employees.
A swift
Committed by attack accompanie
multitudes
d by violence,
Manner of rising publicly intimidation,
Commissio and taking
threat, strategy
n
up arms.
or stealth.
Target of The
The duly constituted
Attack
Government
authorities of the
Philippines, military
camps or
installations, or
communications
networks, or public
utilities (e.g:
NAWASA, PLDT,
LRT), or other
facilities necessary

for the exercise

and continued
possession of
power.
Justice Ynares-Santiago had the opportunity to
elucidate on this on the case of the Oakwood
mutiny back in 2004 (2). She said:
ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection How
committed. The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and
taking up arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of
any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the legislature,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
On the other hand, a coup d etat is defined as
follows:
ART. 134-A. Coup d etat. How committed. The
crime of coup d etat is a swift attack
accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, directed against the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
communications networks, public utilities or other
facilities needed for the exercise and continued
possession of power, singly or simultaneously

carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any

person or persons, belonging to the military or
police or holding any public office or
employment, with or without civilian support or
participation, for the purpose of seizing or
diminishing state power.
Under these provisions, the crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed only by rising publicly
or taking up arms against the Government. A
coup d etat, on the other hand, takes place only
when there is a swift attack accompanied by
violence. Once the act of rising publicly and
taking up arms against the Government ceases,
the commission of the crime of rebellion ceases.
Similarly, when the swift attack ceases, the
crime of coup d etat is no longer being
committed.
Rebellion has been held to be a continuing crime,
and the authorities may resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. However, this doctrine should be
applied to its proper context i.e., relating to
subversive armed organizations, such as the New
Peoples Army, the avowed purpose of which is
the armed overthrow of the organized and
established government. Only in such instance
should rebellion be considered a continuing
crime.
When the soldiers surrendered peacefully in the
evening of July 27, the rebellion or the coup d
etat ended.