457465)
Viajar v. CA
F a c t s : The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of
Lot
7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay Cawayan,
Pototan, Iloilo (154,267 sq. ms., TCT T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo). Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a
parcel of land described in their title as Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pototan. On 6 September 1973, Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his
wife, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A
Torrens title was later issued in the latters names. Later, Angelica Viajar had
Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of
Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido
refused. The piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan,
Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 sq.ms.; that at the time of the cadastral
survey in 1926, Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River;
that the area of 11,819 sq.ms of what was Lot 7340 has been in the
possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly
the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been
in the possession of Ladrido; and that the Viajars have never been in actual
physical possession of Lot 7340.
On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a civil action
for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido (Civil
Case 9660) with the CFI Iloilo. Summoned to plead, Ladrido filed his answer
with a counterclaim. The Viajars filed their reply to the answer.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo Te as
another defendant. The Viajars sought the annulment of the deed of sale
and the restitution of the purchase price with interest in the event the
possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Te filed his answer to
the amended complaint and he counterclaimed for damages. The Viajars
answered the counterclaim. During the pendency of the case, Celso Viajar
sold his rights over Lot 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F.
Viajar. For this reason, Angelica F. Viajar appears to be the sole registered
owner of the lot. On 25 May 1978, Ricardo Ladrido died. He was
substituted in the civil action by his wife, Leonor P. Ladrido, and children,
namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P.
Ladrido, as parties defendants. After trial on the merits, a second
amended complaint which included damages was admitted. On 10
December 1981, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
Ladrido, dismissing the complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with
costs against them, declaring Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes LadridoIgnacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the
parcel of land indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan situated in
barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo, and containing an
area of 25,855 sq.ms., and pronouncing that as owners of the land, the
Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof.
Not satisfied with the decision, the Viajars appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo on
29 December 1986 (CA-GR CV 69942). The Viajars filed a petition for
review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to
costs.
1. Accretion belongs to riparian owners Article 457 of the New Civil
Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters."
2. Change in the course of the river gradual The presumption is that the
change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and
erosion (Martinez Caas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate
Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109
Phil.
133). In the present case, the lower court correctly found that the evidence
introduced by the Viajars to show that the change in the course of the
Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear
and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many
years after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511 took
place by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial
deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been added to
Lot 7511 (Lot A: 14,036 sq.ms., Lot B, 11,819 sq.ms. and Lot C, which is
not in litigation, 4,057 sq.ms). The established facts indicate that the eastern
boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For
a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually
received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The
consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvion or accretion
was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the
same with corn and tobacco. The quondam river bed had been filled by
accretion through the years. The land is already plain and there is no
indication on the
ground of any abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the
banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the
banks. (Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took
effect on 30
August 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to
Lot 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belong to the
Ladridos.
3. Finding of facts by lower court conclusive upon Supreme Court The
trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was
gradual and this finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court found no valid reason to disturb the finding of fact.
4. Section 45 and 46 of Act 496, Land Registration Act Section 45 of
Act
496 provides that the obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a
certificate of title shall be regarded as an agreement running with the land,
and binding upon the applicant and all successors in title that the land shall
be and always remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this
Act and all Acts amendatory thereof." Section 46 of the same act provides
that No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."
5. Registration does not protect riparian owner against diminution of
the area of registered land; Interpretation of Article 366 of the Civil
Code with the Land Registration Act / Torrens System The rule
that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land through
gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. In
Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason (53 Phil. 55), it was ruled that
Article 366 of the Civil Code provides that any accretions which the
banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current belong
to the owners of the estates bordering thereon. Accretions of that
character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and are
not affected by the registration laws. It follows that registration does not
protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Similarly in
C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia (109 Phil. 133), it was ruled that if the land in
question has become part of ones estate as a result of accretion, it
follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to
his land used to pertain to another's estate, which is covered by a Torrens
Certificate of Title, cannot preclude the former from being the owner
thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of
the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually
receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners
of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such
accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and
the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the
Registration Act.
6. No damages recoverable from Ladridos As the Ladridos are the
owners of the premises in question, no damages are recoverable from them.
Agustin
IAC
v.
THWEEK,ART.457465)
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5
Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo Balisi, accompanied
by the mayor and
some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and
drove away the Melads, Binayug and Urbina from the premises.
On 21 April 1970, Maria and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case
343-T) to recover Lot 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare
accretion. On 24 April 1970, Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil
Case 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions. On 16 June 1975,
the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case 343-T, ordering Eulogio
Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud, their
representatives or agents to vacate Lot 3351 of Solana Cadastre together
with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of
Tuguegarao Cadastre and to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad
and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.
The trial court likewise ordered, in Civil Case 344-T, Justo Adduru, Andres
Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero
Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong
Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong
Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, their representatives or
agents to vacate Lots 3349, 7875 to 7879,
7881 to 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore
possession to Pablo Binayug and Geronimo Urbina. Without
pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to
costs. Eulogio Agustin appealed the decision in Civil Case 343-T, while
Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo
Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed the decision in Civil Case 344-T. But upon
motion of the Melads, Binayug and Urbina, the trial court ordered on 15
August 1975 the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case
344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their
appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial. On 29
November 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the
Agustin, Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay. Hence, the petition for review.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the
decision of the IAC, now CA; with costs against Agustin, et.al.
1. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeal conclusive with the Supreme
Court The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to
the lots of the Melads, Binauyg and Urbina who did not lose the ownership
of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by
the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is
conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New
Civil Code which provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters. (366)"
2. Conditions for accretion to benefit a riparian owner Accretion
benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
In the present case, the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan
River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49
years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot 3351, with an
original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to
Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become
known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot 3351, covered by a
homestead patent issued in June 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its
original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium
as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions
belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were
made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil.
806).
3. Reason for the principle of accretion benefiting a riparian owner The
reason for the principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are
exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the
waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as
may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be
compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil.
567).
4. Ownership of accretion not lost upon sudden and abrupt change of
the river The' ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost upon the
sudden and abrupt change of the course of the river (Cagayan River in
1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed), and separated or
transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river.
Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation. Article
459 provides that whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent
segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers
it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the
same within two years." Article 463 provides that whenever the current
of a river divides itself into
familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great
respect, and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of
branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the
land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated
from the estate by the current.
Binalay v. Manalo
F a c t s : The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated
in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of 20 hectares. The
western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an
elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the
national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically
go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the
coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear
during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under
water for the rest of the year. On 9 May 1959, Guillermo Manalo acquired
8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan
Taccad (N: Francisco Forto, E: National Road, S: Julian Tumolva, W:
Cagayan River). In 1964, Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from
Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Taccad
(N: Balug Creek, S: Faustina Taccad [now Manalo], E: Provincial Road, W:
Cagayan river). On 21 October 1969, during the rainy season, the two
parcels of land were consolidated as one lot during the cadastral survey at
Balug, Tamauini, Isabela (Lot 307, 1.8 hectares
+ 2.9489 hectares of 8.65 hectares purchased; the other portion under water
was left unsurveyed).
The Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to
form two (2) branches the western and the eastern branches and
then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land.
The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of and is inundated
with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch
is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to
Manalo. For about 8 months of the year when the level of water at the
point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water
does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the
eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation. The elongated strip of
land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River
looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12
December 1969. It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares
and was designated as Lot 821 (10.8122 hectares) and Lot 822
(11.9087).. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated
from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the
rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being
a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Manalo claims that Lot
821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of
the property to which it is adjacent.
Binalay, et.al., other hand, who are in possession of Lot 821 insist that they
own Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks,
i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural
products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion
during summer. This situation compelled Manalo to file a case for forcible
entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the
Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear.
On 15 December 1972, Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against
petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, Manalo filed a complaint before the then CFI Isabela,
Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He
prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the
western strip of the unsurveyed portion, and prayed that judgment be
entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim
during the survey. On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring Manalo as the lawful owner of Lot 821 and ordering
Binalay, et.al. to vacate the premises of Lot 821 and restraining them
further from entering said premises; without pronouncement as to costs.
Binalay, et.al. appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed
the decision of the trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration,
without success. In effect, both courts rejected the assertion that the
depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is,
during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV 04892, declared Manalo as the owner of Lot 307, and declared that the
regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River to be
property of public dominion. The Court also declared that the ownership of
Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted
by the interested parties inter se; without pronouncement as to costs.
1. Finding of facts by lower courts entitled to great respect; Whether
the conclusion reached thereafter is correct is a question of law It is a
the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of
the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court
of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. But whether a
conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law
TH
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5
cognizable by the Supreme Court. In theWEEK,ART.457465)
present case, the conclusion
reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that
periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows
through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
2. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Colegio de San Jose not
applicable to present case Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Colegio de San Jose is not applicable to the present case. That case
involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied
the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their
beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of
the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the
natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of
3 August 1866. Upon the other hand; what is involved in the instant case
is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
3. Article 70 of the Law of Waters applicable, not Article 74 Article 70
of
the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the present case.
Article 70 provides that the natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the
ground covered by its waters during the highest floods". Article 70 defines
the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its
waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of
the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river
waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. The
conclusion of the Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon
evidence of record. The description of the lot acquired from Taguba and the
other from Taccad refer to the dried up bed or the eastern branch of the
river as the Cagayan River serving as the western boundary in the Deeds of
Sale. Further, Manalo himself, during direct examination, depict the
depressed portion separating Lot 821 and Lot 307 as a river bed. The dikelike slope of such depression, or such topographic feature, is compatible
with the fact that huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed
regularly during the rainy season. Even if there is no record of when the
Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel, the bed already existed
even before the sale of the land to Manalo (with the bed being referred to
as old bed or even Rio Muerte de Cagayan).
4. Private ownership of the bed of a river cannot be acquired as
the
land constituted property of public dominion; Article 420 applies to
existing beds, Article 462 applies to new beds in relation to Article 457
(Accretion) Pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, Manalo did not
acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river
even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio
Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have
validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420
of the Civil Code states that (1) those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (2) those
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are
property of public dominion. Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and
banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the running waters,
(2) the bed, and (3) the banks. Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339
of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the
Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river
beds. Still, evven if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River
first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio
Taguba and Faustina Taccad; Article 462 of the Civil Code would then
apply divesting, by operation of law, Manalo of private ownership over the
new river bed.
5. Accretion, requisites Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites:
(a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers
(or the sea coast). In the present case, the Court notes that the parcels of
land bought by Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which Manalo may claim
must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion
(Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but
directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
6. Alluvial process is slow and gradual, not sudden and
forceful Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the
man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible
sedimentation by the waters of the river. Article 457 of the New Civil Code
provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters."
3. Accretion, requisites Article 457 requires the concurrence of three
THWEEK,ART.457465)
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457
of the New Civil Code all
requirement.
7. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title Even if the land sought to be
registered is public land, applicant would be entitled to a judicial
confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the
requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141 as amended by RA 1942).
TH
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5
years immediately preceding the filing of theWEEK,ART.457465)
application for confirmation of
title."
8. Reclamation requires proper permission; reclaimed land does not
automatically belong to party reclaiming the same Private persons
cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the
public domain without proper permission from government authorities. And
even if such reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not
automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be
subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. In the present case,
private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged
reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.
9. Tolerance of possession cannot ripen into ownership As the private
oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the
permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio; the fact that some of
them at one time or another did not pay rent. Their use of the land and their
non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these
could not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has
already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for
registration. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner
can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription.
Grande v. CA
F a c t s : Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande are the owners of
a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio
Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of
Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who
inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose
name said land appears registered, as shown by OCT 2982, issued on 9
June 1934). Said property is identified as Lot 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it
was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in
the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on
the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan
River, so much so, that by
1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters
from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters
(1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area.
On 25 January 1958, the Grandes instituted an action in the CFI Isabela
against Domingo and Esteban Calalung to quiet title to said portion (19,964
square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (Civil
Case
1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful
and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when the
Calalungs entered upon the land under claim of ownership. The Grandes
also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as
well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer, dated 18 February 1958,
the Calalungs claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been
in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior
to the year 1933 to the present. After trial, the CFI Isabela, on 4 May
1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in
question to the Grandes, and ordering the Calalungs to vacate the premises
and deliver possession thereof to the Grandes, and to pay to the latter
P250.00 as damages and costs.
Unsatisfied, the Calalungs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered, on 14 September 1960, a decision (CA-GR 25169-R) reversing that
of the CFI Isabela, and dismissing the Grandes' action against the Calalungs,
to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied
by the latter without the Grandes' consent. Thus, the appeal by the
Grandes to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with
costs against the Grandes.
1. Alluvium belongs to riparian owner By law, unless some superior title
has supervened, alluvium should properly belong to the riparian owners,
specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that to the owner of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and for the other
Grandes, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered
by their title. Thus, the Grandes relinquished their possession to the part
thus included, containing an area of some 458 sq. ms.
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the water. The area in
controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvion, which
started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence
for both parties. There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the
new Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, the Grandes are the lawful
owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land
to which it adjoins.
2. Accretion to registered land does not ipso jure becomes entitled to
the protection of the rule of imprescriptability of title under Land
Registration Act An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific
provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural
accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of
the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act.
Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in
the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It
would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land
given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area
of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a
negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the
riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development
Co. vs. Tuason,
53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred
by
the Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the
provisions of the Civil Code on accession; and these provisions do not
preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through
prescription. (See Galindez, et al. vs. Baguisa, et al., CA-GR 19249-R, 17 July
1959).
3. Ownership of a piece of land and registration under Torrens system
are different; Imprescriptibility of registered land under land
registration law; Accretion not registered subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons Accretion does not automatically
become registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a
Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible; just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land
does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a
piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that
ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the
land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the
Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land,
but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
The fact remains that the Grandes never sought registration of said alluvial
property (which was formed sometime after the Grandes' property
covered by OCT 2982 was registered on 9 June 1934) up to the time they
instituted the action in the CFI Isabela in 1958. The increment,
therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled
or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered
property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
4. Calalungs in possession of land since 1934, not 1948 Domingo
Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in
1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the Grandes. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for
purposes of taxation, the tax declaration of which was superseded in 1948 by
another, after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was
changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's
testimony
is
corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro
Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for
three terms (recollection of the Calalungs peaceful possession since
1940 or 1941), and Vicente C. Bacani (Calalungs' possession started
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof was then less than one
hectare). The testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight
and credence than that of Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez.
5. Grandes relinquished possession of lot occupied by the
Calalungs The Grandes did not file an action until 1958, because it was only
then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor,
Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for
taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. The excuse they gave for not
immediately taken steps to recover possession of the lot was that they did
not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958
for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan. When the
Calalungs had their land surveyed in April 1958, Pedro Grande tried to stop
6. Finding of Court of Appeals conclusive; Prescription supervened in
favor of Calalungs The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the
evidence, was convinced that the Calalungs were really in possession openly,
continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership since 1933 or 1934,
immediately after the process of alluvion started up to the filing of the action
in 1958; and that the Grandes woke up to their rights only when they
TH
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5
received their copy of the title in 1958. By WEEK,ART.457465)
then, however, prescription had
Reynante v. CA
F a c t s : More than 50 years ago, Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the
late Don Cosme Carlos, over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of 188.711 sq. m. (TCT 25618,
Land Registry of Bulacan). During the tenancy, Reynante constructed a nipa
hut where he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan)
he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5,096 sq. m. and 6,011
sq. m. respectively. These lots are located between the fishpond covered by
TCT 25618 and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Reynante
harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition
from anybody. Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to
plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them
as his own. After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs entered into a
written agreement denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagsasauli ng
Karapatan dated 29 November
1984 with Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum
of P200,000 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don
Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or "bantaykasama at tagapamahala. Pursuant to the said written agreement, Reynante
surrendered the fishpond and the 2 huts located therein to the heirs of Don
Cosme Carlos. The heirs of Leoncio and Dolores Carlos, and the heirs of
Gorgonio and Concepcion Carlos thereafter leased the said fishpond to one
Carlos de la Cruz. Reynante continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by
him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted
therein. On 17 February 1988, the heirs formally demanded that Reynante
vacate said portion since the latter had already been indemnified for the
surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, Reynante
refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
On 22 April 1988, the heirs filed a complaint for forcible entry with
preliminary mandatory injunction against Reynante with the MTC
Meycauayan Bulacan (Branch 1, 3rd Judicial Region, Civil Case 1526)
alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the
physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of
the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or
disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto. On 10 January
1989, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and
finding that Reynante had been in prior possession of lots 1 and 2.
The heirs appealed to the RTC Malolos Bulacan (Branch 8, 3rd Judicial
Region) and on 8 August 1989 it rendered its decision in favor of the heirs,
and reversed the decision of the lower court. The Court ordered Reynante
to restore possession of the piece of land, together with the sasa or nipa
palms planted theron; without pronouncement as to attorney's fees, and
each party bearing their respective costs of the suit.
From said decision, Reynante filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review. On 28 February 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
(CA-GR 19171), affirming the decision of the lower court in toto, and thus
denied the petition seeking to issue a restraining order. On 5 November
1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Reynante. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 February 1990 and reinstated the decision of the MTC
Ronquillo
CA
v.
TH
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5
including the adjoining dried-up portion WEEK,ART.457465)
of the old Estero Calubcub,
having bought the same from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, said
titled lot was occupied by Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of
del Rosario on condition that the former will make improvements on the
adjoining dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub. In the early part of
1945 defendant occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as the
dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub which abuts del Rosario's
titled lot. After a relocation survey of the land in question sometime in
1960, del Rosario learned that Ronquillo was occupying a portion of
their land and thus demanded Ronquillo to vacate said land when the
latter refused to pay the reasonable rent for its occupancy. However,
despite said demand Ronquillo refused to vacate. On the other hand,
Ronquillo claims that sometime before
1945 he was living with his sister who was then residing or renting Del
Rosario's titled lot. In 1945 he built his house on the disputed dried-up
portion of the Estero Calubcub with a small portion thereof on the titled lot
of del Rosario. Later in 1961, said house was destroyed by a fire which
prompted him to rebuild the same but, this time it was built only on the
dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub without touching any part of
del Rosarios titled land. He further claims that said dried-up portion is a
land of public domain.
Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia del Rosario lodged a complaint with the
CFI Manila praying, among others, that they be declared the rightful
owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. Ronquillo filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case since the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is
public land and, thus, subject to the disposition of the Director of
Lands. The Del Rosarios opposed the motion arguing that since they are
claiming title to the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as riparian
owners, the trial court has jurisdiction. The resolution of the motion to
dismiss was deferred until after trial on the merits. On 26 December 1962,
the trial court rendered judgment ordering Ronquillo to deliver to del
Rosario the portion of the land covered by TCT 34797 which is occupied
by him and to pay for the use and occupation of said portion of land at
the rate of P5 a month from the date of the filing of the complaint until
such time as he surrenders the same to del Rosario and declaring Del
Rosario to be the owners of the dried-up portion of estero Calubcub
which is abutting del Rosario' property; with costs against Ronquillo.
On appeal (CA-GR 32479-R), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court on 25 September 1975 and declared that since Estero
Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change in
the course of the waters, under Article 370 of the old Civil Code which it
considers applicable to the present case, the abandoned river bed belongs to
the Del Rosarios as riparian owners. Consequently, respondent court opines,
the dried-up river bed is private land and does not form part of the land of
the public domain. It stated further that even assuming for the sake of
argument that said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or
disappeared, said dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian owner,
citing its ruling in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama. Upon motion of Ronquillo,
respondent court modified its decision on 28 January 1976 by setting aside
the first portion of the trial court's decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender
to the Del Rosarios that portion of land covered by TCT 34797 occupied by
the former, based on the former's representation that he had already
vacated the same prior to the commencement of this case. However, the
appellate court upheld its declaration that the Del Rosarios are the rightful
owners of the dried-up river bed. Hence, the petition for review.
On 17 May 1976, the Supreme Court issued a resolution requiring the
Solicitor General to comment on the petition in behalf of the Director of
Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the Republic of the
Philippines, and who, not having been impleaded, was subsequently
considered impleaded as such in the Courts resolution of 10
September
1976.
In his Motion to Admit Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that
actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370
does not apply to the present case and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be
entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
4. Dried up portion of Estero Calubcub belongs to public domain;
THWEEK,ART.457465)
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5
Bureau of Lands, stating that the alleged application
filed by Ronquillo no
Baes
CA
v.
by the canal, the government gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area as
Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated 20 June
1970. The property, which was near but not contiguous to Lot 2958-C,
was denominated as Lot 3271-A and later registered in the name of Felix
Baes under TCT 24300. The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up
the old bed of the creek. Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion
of Lot
2958-A designated as Lot 1, Blk. 4, resurveyed and subdivided. On 12
January 1968, he submitted a petition for the approval of his resurvey and
subdivision plans, claiming that after the said lots were plotted by a
competent surveyor, it was found that there were errors in respect of their
bearings and distances. The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the
CFI Pasay City in an order dated 15 January 1968. As a result, the old TCTs
covering the said lots were canceled and new ones were issued (Blk. 4: Lot
1- A, 672 sq.m., TCT T-14404; Lot 1-B representing the increase in size
after the resurvey, 826 sq.m., TCT T-14405; Lot 2958-C-1, 452 sq.m.,
TCT T14406; and Lot 2958-C-2 representing the increase after resurvey,
2,770
sq.m., TCT T-14407). Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-C-2 were later consolidated
and this time further subdivided into 4 lots (Lot 1, 147 sq.m., TCT 29592.;
Lot 2, 950 sq.m., TCT 29593; Lot 3, 257 sq.m., TCT 29594; and Lot 4,
1,868 sq.m., TCT 29595). In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines
discovered that Lot 1-B (TCT 14405) on which the Baes had erected an
apartment building, covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a
filled-up portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C
(TCT 29592 to 29595), with an increased area of 2,770 sq.m. after
resurvey and subdivision, had been unlawfully enlarged.
On 17 November 1982, the Republic filed a petition for cancellation of
TCT 14405 and 29592 to 29595 with the trial court (Civil Case 0460-P).
Baes did not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT 29592,
29594 and
29595 and was not able to prove during the trial that the government utilized
a portion of Lot 2 under TCT 29593. The trial court therefore decreed that
the original Lot 2958-C (452 sq.m.) be reverted to its status before the
resurvey-subdivision of Lot 2958-C. Baes appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court, declaring TCTs 14405,
29592, 29593, 29594, 29595, and TCT 29593's derivative titles TCTs
124725,
124726, 124727 and 124729, ordering the Register of Deeds for Pasay City
to cancel them and issue new ones in their stead in the name of the Baes
after segregating from TCT 29593 452 sq. m., the actual area of Lot 2958C (covered by cancelled TCT 11043) belonging to Felix Baes, and
dismissing the counterclaim. Baes appealed to the Supreme Court by way of
certiorari.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, with costs against Baes.
1. Article 461 of the Civil Code applies to a natural change in the
course of the stream; If change of course is due to works, belongs to
concessioners if not to owners of land covered by the waters Article
461
of the Civil Code provides that River beds which are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the
owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value
shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. Article 461
refers to a natural change in the course of a stream. If the change of the
course is due to works constructed by concessioners authorized by the
government, the concession may grant the abandoned river bed to the
concessioners. If there is no such grant, then, by analogy, the abandoned
river bed will belong to the owners of the land covered by the waters, as
provided in this article, without prejudice to a superior right of third persons
with sufficient title.
2. Riparian owner entitled to compensation if change in the course of
river by artificial means If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation
for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all
the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of
the river is effected through artificial means. Baes loss of the land
covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the
government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina
creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.
3. Ownership of dried up portion of creek in addition to fair exchange
of similar lots by parties a double compensation Baes has already been
compensated as there has been a fair exchange of Lot 3271-A belonging to
the Government and Lot 2958-B belonging to Baes, which were similar in
area and value, through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property which the
parties freely entered into. Baes cannot claim additional compensation
because allowing Baes to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of
the creek would be a clear case of double compensation and unjust
enrichment at the expense of the state. The exchange of lots between the
petitioners and the Republic was the result of voluntary negotiations. If
these had failed, the government could still have taken Lot 2958-B under
the power of eminent domain, upon payment of just compensation, as the
land was needed for a public purpose.
Jagualing
CA
v.
Ineng in 1964 the river control was washed away causing the formation of an
island. Jagualing started occupying the land in 1969, paid land taxes as
THWEEK,ART.457465)
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5
evidenced by tax declaration 26380 and tax
receipts, and tax clearances.