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FILED
United States Court of AppealsTenth Circuit
July 12, 2011
Elisabeth A. ShumakerClerk of Court
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSTENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,Plaintiff - Appellee,v.No. 09-1533EDWARD BENITO ARMIJO,Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO(D.C. NO. 1:09-CR-00247-PAB-1)
Jessica E. Yates (Neil Peck with her on the briefs), Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.,Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.James C. Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney (David M. Gaouette, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.Before
 BRISCOE,
Chief Judge,
HOLLOWAY
, and 
 MURPHY
, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY
, Circuit Judge.
 
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Armijo was sentenced pursuant to the 2008 version of the SentencingGuidelines. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the Guidelines are tothe 2008 version.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Edward Benito Armijo pleaded guilty to a single count of being a felonillegally in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The PresentenceInvestigation Report (“PSR”) concluded Armijo’s base offense level was twenty-four because he had two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. U.S.S.G.§ 2K2.1(a)(2) (2008)
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 (setting base offense level of twenty-four for unlawful possession of a firearm by a defendant with two previous felony convictions focrimes of violence);
id.
 § 4B1.2(a) (defining crime of violence). In support of theapplication of § 2K2.1(a)(2), the PSR identified Armijo’s 1998 felony menacingconviction, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-206, and his 2002 manslaughter conviction,Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-104(a). Armijo objected to the application of § 2K2.1(a)(2), asserting neither his felony menacing conviction nor hismanslaughter conviction constituted a crime of violence. The district courtrejected Armijo’s objections, concluding both predicate felonies were crimes of violence for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2).Armijo asserts the district court erred in treating his Colorado convictionsas crimes of violence for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2). Furthermore, for the firsttime on appeal, he argues the district court erred in considering his felonymenacing conviction for the additional reason that the conviction is stale.
See
 
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U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.10 (providing that for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(2) “useonly those felony convictions that receive criminal history points under § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c)”);
id.
 § 4A1.2(e) (providing that prior convictions notexceeding “one year and one month” that were not “imposed within ten years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense” are not counted for  purposes of § 4A1.1);
id.
 § 4A1.1 cmt. n.3 (same). Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), this court concludesArmijo’s manslaughter conviction is not a crime of violence as that term isdefined in the Guidelines. Armijo’s felony menacing conviction, on the other hand, is a crime of violence for purposes of the Guidelines. Because this matter must be remanded for resentencing, and because the facts surrounding thesentencing proceedings on the felony menacing conviction in Colorado state courtare not fully developed, we decline to resolve whether Armijo’s menacingconviction is stale and thus not to be considered in calculating Armijo’s baseoffense level. Instead, that matter can be fully adjudicated on remand to thedistrict court. Accordingly, we
remand
 this matter to the district court toconduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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