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Focusing on the dilemmas connected to transatlantic relations and European integration in
the Johnson years, this article argues, first, that Washington did not neglect the European
situation in 196468, but a clear analysis of Allies policies fostered growing doubts in
some sectors of the administration about the wisdom of supporting them when they could
directly damage the national interest of the US; and second, that though such changes help
explain the general reassessment of American policies vis--vis Europe carried out by the
Nixon administration, Johnsons policy remained pro-European and genuinely favourable
to the integration process in the old continent, despite the internal doubts and the open
criticism it encountered both at home and abroad.
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officials had granted the fundamental problems of the alliance all the
attention they deserved.3
Two years earlier, talking to a group of European ministers in the
White House Cabinet Room, Johnson had defined NATO as the
greatest peacekeeping force in history. The US, Cleveland concluded,
had contributed to adapt it to a new era, in which the Allies would
have to combine forces vis--vis continuing security risks with
flexibility in seizing the opportunity for peaceful changes in the
European status quo. NATO, then, was ready for a new decade, in
service to its members and the whole world, since the lessons learnt
by the Allies in the North Atlantic Council, in terms of cooperative
political endeavor, might certainly prove useful even out of the
Treaty area.4
So, peacekeeping. But also peacemaking the very word Pope Paul
VI used to praise Johnsons constancy and personal commitment in
trying to set in motion the complex and difficult mechanism needed
for settling the Vietnam War. The Pope underlined the Presidents
efforts for the advancement of the social and economic progress of all
mankind and for the rational control of nuclear power.5 Johnson
answered on 14 January 1969, shortly before leaving the White
House, to thank him for the comfort and strength that their
correspondence had given him during the difficult years of his
administration. All I could do from this office I have done on behalf
of Peace, security, and order, he wrote. Whenever he had been able
to seize that opportunity, Johnson added, he had sought to turn mens
minds from violence to reason, from conflict to understanding and
negotiation.6 Yet young people marching in European streets to
protest against the Vietnam War had not taken notice of that and had
written Johnson boia on Italian walls7 the tragedy of a man and a
president who had done almost everything well.
In foreign policy, Johnson had been a firm guardian of the status
quo. He had resisted the traumatic blow of Kennedys assassination,
accomplishing some tasks his brilliant predecessor had just started or
simply announced. He had held a dialogue with the Soviets without
forsaking firmness. He had taken sides when international challenges
had asked for sharp choices, as in the Middle East. But he had not
accepted the idea of an honourable withdrawal from Vietnam early
enough, procrastinating over an unavoidable decision for too long. In
the Atlantic and European issues, Johnson had resisted the French dfi
without yielding to the temptation of resentment, but aiming to
preserve the Alliance cohesion at all costs. Aware of Eisenhowers and
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European pole the right alter ego, or junior partner, for leading a
hegemonic power system based on respect for complexity and
diversity (in marked contrast to the opposite bloc, the eventual defeat
of which would also depend on this) had always prevailed.
The great American wartime intuition that multilateralism could
and had to be extended from the economic field to the political and
collective security realms had gradually become an hazardous and
brave bet, namely, that rebuilding the Allies power was much better
than balkanizing their resources, in order to contain both the outer
enemy Moscow and inner threats, such as German temptations of
revanche or Gaullist drives to national grandeur.9 Moreover, that
seemed the best approach even in the optimistic hypothesis that, after
the Cold War parenthesis caused by the inopportune breaking off
with the Soviets, one might lead Moscow back to free market and
free international trade rules a sort of pax americana, rooted in
general goals singled out by the US administration during the war,
and based on the eventual diffusion of the American global
development model.
In the 1960s, the astonishing acceleration of European recovery
forced the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to consider that the
final victory of the market economy, which Washington had to pursue
together with the goal of strengthening American leadership based on
military paramountcy and US preeminence in the world monetary and
trade systems, needed a policy of friendly interdependence, not of
counterproductive rivalry, with Americas transatlantic partners.
Otherwise, there was a danger, given historical precedents, that the
states of Western Europe might yield to the temptation of
protectionism or other patterns unfavourable to US interests.
The Americans approach was even too pragmatic. Common
interests, they hoped, would allow the formulation of common
objectives, at which the Allies should aim, proportionate to
everyones resources and assets. This applied to the military sector,
where US leadership was more than evident, but also to the economic
domain, including financial, monetary, and trade patterns; to the
political realm, as well as to the extremely delicate field of cultural
relations. So, the main nerve-centres of the Atlantic system were all
at stake. But the European partners were not that inclined to accept
Washingtons point of view in toto. Such reluctance characterized not
only the French, who hardly tolerated the superpowers very
presence in the continent, but even those who looked favourably on
American theses in most circumstances, out of intellectual affinity or
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Cautious Optimism
In 1967, the American perception of transatlantic relations was
particularly influenced by the new British bid to enter the European
Community, set in motion by the government of Harold Wilson. On
that occasion, Washington once again witnessed the possible
confluence of the two main streams of European policy the US had
developed and implemented to contain the Soviet threat during the
previous 20 years.10 Her Majestys Government was trying to get
closer to the continent, but did not wish to completely lose its
function and ambitions of global co-responsibility, while the
European Community, having survived its dramatic 1965 crisis,
worked in a satisfactory way, confirming its role of important inner
engine for the Six and their partners.
According to the State Department, the Federal Republic of
Germany was led by a stable, moderate, and responsible
government. Germanys 400,000 soldiers in NATOs integrated
force gave the strongest land-based contribution to the Alliance
defence. The economy, growing at an annual rate of five per cent,
provided jobs for over a million foreign workers and abundant aid
for developing countries two-thirds of a billion US dollars per year.
France had remained loyal to the West, notwithstanding Charles de
Gaulles impatience vis--vis European and Atlantic integration
perspectives. With the Indo-China and Algerian wars finally over,
the country had apparently reached a satisfactory political and
economic stability.
As for Italy, the fear of economic collapse and the communist
threat, which had been so strong after the war, had given way to
economic expansion and sufficient political stability. The socialist
entry into the government had turned out to be helpful, and the
centre-left coalition had succeeded in making liberal democracy work
at home, while developing a sturdy foreign policy, imbued with
European and Atlantic integration principles. The renewal of the
Catholic Church began to bear fruit, transforming the Holy See into
a powerful engine for political, social, and economic progress, while
communist East Europe was undergoing a quiet revolution, based
on three main factors national self-assertion, internal liberalization,
and progress in reassociation with the West.11
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was accompanied by the fear that they might reach agreement at their
partners expense. Whenever a summit was organized, like that at
Glassboro, some Europeans immediately grew alarmed that the US
and the Soviet Union might be about to make a deal affecting
Europes vital interests behind Europes back, others were just happy
with the idea, and yet others the majority were uncertain what
they felt. Not enough, however, according to a regional survey
prepared by United States Information Agency (USIA) officers in
September, were ready to convert that uncertainty into more
responsible behaviour, such as seeking to persuade the US
government to evolve towards a total, reassuring convergence of its
policies and objectives with the European Allies own concerns.15
There was quite a passive attitude on the European side towards
prominent foreign policy issues, as American officers often noticed.
Except for defence, the Allies did not feel any direct need for specific
aid from the US and consequently tended to refuse to accept its
leadership. Washington had few real means to compel them to accept
it hence the importance of persuasion, the USIAs fundamental
raison dtre. Western Europeans seemed more and more prone to
rely on international cooperation just to achieve national goals. They
had given up their empires and were not inclined to respond to US
urgings to assume full responsibilities outside their continent once
again. They shouldered with no enthusiasm their part of the burden
of aid to developing countries, ready to get political influence out of
that, but incapable of understanding the substance of future world
crises of food and population.
A paradox, or even a schizophrenia, resulted from that attitude.
On the one hand, postwar low self-esteem had given way to a
renewed leadership instinct: Europeans want to believe that they are
world leaders Their governments demand to be consulted often
and in detail. They claim special titles to direct the affairs of the
Western Community in certain fields: e.g. the Italians in the
Mediterranean, the Kiesinger government in Central and Eastern
European affairs etc. But on the other hand the continent tended to
introversion, within the environment of a Europe at peace with itself
and in no mood for adventure. The Vietnam War, despite some
governments supportive attitude, was generally interpreted in
Europe as a difficult situation into which the US had stumbled
without knowing how to disengage, thus shaking the Allies
confidence in the American ability to lead the West towards its
basic goals.16
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had never hidden his intentions in 1967 regarding the key issue of the
British entry into the Community. During the Rome summit, in May,
he had already made them clear, notwithstanding Italian and Dutch
pressure, confirming the strong doubts expressed in a press
conference just a few days before.18 Anyway, Frances reluctance had
been taken for granted by the US administration since the beginning
of that year, with respect to the British bid and, beyond it, the overall
status of American relations with Europe.
From the trade point of view, the Johnson administration was
already focusing its attention on the post-Kennedy Round period,
with a specific aim maintaining its leadership in the Wests global
trade policy. Such an objective implied that the US preserved its own
export surplus despite the EECs prospective enlargement, a
development which would lead to the creation of the largest market
in the world, with free trade among members and probable strong
barriers against the US and other countries. Washington also had to
take into due account the proliferation of special trade arrangements
discriminating among developing countries, against Latin America,
and also against US exports; and to decide how to respond to those
developing countries that reasonably appealed for preferential tariff
treatment to be granted for their exports. It was necessary for the
administration, therefore, to keep urging the Europeans and other
industrialized countries to accept a progressive reduction of trade
barriers, and also to openly debate the controversial issue of
preferential treatment given to poor countries, discussing American
proposals on the matter.19
The correct perception of an endemic conflict in the Atlantic
context, linked to the different European approach to global
responsibility in the economic and trade fields besides the politicomilitary and security domains, remained a background consideration.
It did not prevail, however, even in those American circles that could
have been more inclined to criticize, or even sabotage, the European
integration process. Top-rank contacts that Robert Schaetzel
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs until
September 1966 and thereafter US Representative to the European
Communities and other administration officials carefully cultivated
in high finance, politics, mass media, as well as the intellectual or
technical debate over US foreign policy confirmed that, in spite of the
irritation and impatience that European attitudes and behaviour
sometimes raised in America, the notion of a United Europe carrying
its weight in the world continued to have great appeal. As Schaetzel
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at the time of fear and need, among ruins left by World War II. After
that, they had grown rich and lazy. The 1960s was the decade of
missed opportunities, for European construction and the
strengthening of a European role within the Atlantic Alliance. All
problems left unsolved would present themselves again and again
during the following decades, complicated by the new tougher rules
of the international system after the turning point of the mid-1970s.
One has only to remember the tragic weakness of the Communitys
foreign and security policies; the democratic deficit undermining the
bond between the legislative and executive powers in the
Communitys top institutions; the difficult coexistence of
protofederal agencies like the Central European Bank with
intergovernmental approaches to the European Union dynamic; and
the key issue of majority or unanimity vote on the most important
decisions to be taken by the Community quite a leitmotiv linking
Luxembourg 1966 with Nice 2000.
The Europeans made their worst mistake, affecting Community
integration, but with a remarkable fallout in the Atlantic context,
when they did not dare to choose either the brave proposal of
European responsibility on an intergovernmental basis inspired by
de Gaulle and favoured by everybody who deemed best, for various
reasons, to use old power structures instead of inventing new ones
or the energetic organization of new protofederal relations, which
would have been even more sympathetic to Washingtons
expectations and concrete encouragement. On the contrary, they
were not able to leap forward and almost miraculously, but at a very
high cost, saved the Community by the Luxembourg compromise, in
January 1966.
After that, however, the Six gave up the goal of a substantially, not
only formally political integration, and preferred to remain on the
more technical, familiar ground of economic cooperation, mistaking
out of propaganda or self-deception enlargement for deepening,
and fragmentary policy collaboration for a global effort building a
common European identity. That has produced a new body, partly
international and partly supranational, very interesting for scientific
observation, but also very backward in its ability to effectively
influence key nexuses of international power relations, as the recent
Iraqi crisis has widely demonstrated.41
On the other side of the Atlantic, Johnson took up Kennedys
legacy in US European policy, trying to free the grand concepts his
predecessor had enunciated in Philadelphia on 4 July 1962, from the
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
111
responsibility for the proposed theses and the methodological approach to sources and
bibliography on the subject remains that of the author.
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (LBJL), National Security File (NSF),
Agency File (AF), NATO, box 10, vol. Filed by the LBJL, no.17a, Cleveland to
Johnson, 8 Jan. 1969.
Ibid. See also Clevelands answers in LBJL, Oral History Interviews (OHI), Harlan
Cleveland, 13 Aug. 1969. Cf. Larry Berman, Johnson and the White House Staff , in
Divine (ed.), The Johnson Years, vol.1, pp.187213; David Kaiser, Men and Policies:
196169, in Kunz (ed.), The Diplomacy, pp.1141.
LBJL, NSF, Files of Walt W. Rostow (FWR), box 14, File Official, no.19d, Pope Paul
VI to Johnson, 5 Jan. 1969.
Ibid., no.19h, Johnson to Pope Paul VI, 14 Jan. 1969, draft. On the Vietnam issue see
among others Richard H. Immerman, A Time in the Tide of Mens Affairs: Lyndon
Johnson and Vietnam, in Cohen and Bernkopf Tucker (eds.), Lyndon Johnson,
pp.5797; Robert D. Schulzinger, Its Easy to Win a War on Paper: The United
States and Vietnam, 19611968, in Kunz (ed.), The Diplomacy, pp.183218; Lloyd C.
Gardner, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Final Months, in Divine (ed.), The
Johnson Years, vol.3, pp.198238; idem, Pay Any Price. Lyndon Johnson and the Wars
for Vietnam (Chicago: Dee, 1995); Michael H. Hunt, Lyndon Johnsons War. Americas
Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 19451968 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996),
pp.72128.
This typical slogan-like red-pastel writing, meant to insult the President by describing
him an executioner, could still be read in Pavia, in a short alley very close to the main
courthouse, in the year 2000. It has recently disappeared under a layer of new paint.
See Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New
York: St. Martins Press, 1993); idem, American Support for European Integration
from World War II to 1996: Not Just a European Marketplace, in Luigi V. Majocchi
(ed.), Messina quarantanni dopo. Lattualit del metodo in vista della Conferenza
intergovernativa del 1996 (Bari: Cacucci, 1996), pp.15590; Eckart Conze, Die
gaullistische Herausforderung. Die deutsch-franzsischen Beziehungen in der
amerikanischen Europapolitik 19581963 (Mnchen: Oldenbourg, 1995).
On this topic examined in Guderzo, Interesse nazionale, and a previous essay,
Globalismo, nazionalismo, federalismo e rischio morale: gli Stati Uniti e
lintegrazione europea, 196364, Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali 1112/1
(199697), pp.141201 see Geir Lundestad, Empire by Integration. The United
States and European Integration, 19451997 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998), esp. pp.14, 5882; idem (ed.), No End to Alliance. The United States
and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1998). Cf. among others Ren Schwok, Les relations entre les Etats-Unis et la
Communaut europenne: conflits ou partenariat? (Genve: Georg, 1992); Thomas
Alan Schwartz, Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: The United States
and Western Europe in the 1960s, in Kunz (ed.), The Diplomacy, pp.11548; idem,
Lyndon Johnson and Europe: Alliance Politics, Political Economy, and Growing Out
of the Cold War, in Brands (ed.), The Foreign Policies, pp.3760; idem, Lyndon
Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2003); Beatrice Heuser, Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), esp. pp.533, 90104; Francis
H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (eds.), The United States and the Integration of
Europe. Legacies of the Postwar Era (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996); David W.
Ellwood, Lintegrazione europea e gli Stati Uniti (19571990), in Romain H. Rainero
(ed.), Storia dellintegrazione europea, vol.2, LEuropa dai Trattati di Roma alla caduta
del muro di Berlino (Roma: Marzorati, 1997), pp.52371; Frances Burwell and Ivo H.
Daalder (eds.), The United States and Europe in the Global Arena (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1999); Jeffrey G. Giauque, Offers of Partnership or Bids for Hegemony?
The Atlantic Community, 19611963, International History Review 22/1 (March
2000), pp.86111; idem, The United States and the Political Union of Western
Europe, 19581963, Contemporary European History 9/1 (March 2000), pp.93110.
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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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Cf. also Georges-Henri Soutou, Was There a European Order in the Twentieth
Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War, Contemporary
European History 9/3 (Nov. 2000), pp.32953; Schmidt, Europe and the World,
pp.35566.
On Britains first application cf. among others Wolfram Kaiser, The Bomb and Europe.
Britain, France and the EEC Entry Negotiations (19611963), Journal of European
Integration History 1/1 (1995), pp.6585; Simona Toschi, Washington London
Paris, an Untenable Triangle (19601963), Journal of European Integration History
1/2 (1995), pp.81109; Rolf Steininger, Grossbritannien und de Gaulle. Das Scheitern
des britischen EWGBeitritts im Januar 1963, Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte 44/1
(1996), pp.87118; Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward (eds.), Courting the Common
Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community, 19611963 (London:
Lothian Foundation Press, 1996); George Wilkes (ed.), Britains Failure to Enter the
European Community, 196163. The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in
European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations (London/Portland: Frank Cass,
1997); N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing with Britain. The Six and the First UK Application to
the EEC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); John Newhouse, De Gaulle
and the Anglo-Saxons, in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths (eds.), John F.
Kennedy and Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), pp.3248;
Ward, Kennedy, Britain, and the European Community, pp.317332; Frances M.B.
Lynch, De Gaulles First Veto: France, the Rueff Plan and the Free Trade Area,
Contemporary European History 9/1 (March 2000), pp.11135; Oliver Bange, The
EEC Crisis of 1963. Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp.108206.
LBJL, NSF, Name File (NF), box 1, Bator Memos, no.20, European Box Score,
Bator and Davis, undated. On general aspects of US foreign policy in 1967, cf. Dallek,
Flawed Giant, pp.391493.
On the topic see among others Steve Dryden, Trade Warriors. USTR and the American
Crusade for Free Trade (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Diane B. Kunz,
Cold War Dollar Diplomacy: The Other Side of Containment, in idem (ed.), The
Diplomacy, pp.80114; idem, Butter and Guns. Americas Cold War Economic
Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1997).
LBJL, Office Files (OF), Ernest E. Goldstein, box 13, White House Luncheon for
European Ambassadors, no.2 ff., memo, Rostow to Johnson, 14 Nov. 1967.
Cf. Robert A. Divine, Lyndon Johnson and Strategic Arms Limitation, in idem (ed.),
The Johnson Years, vol.3, pp.23979. See also Glenn T. Seaborg, with Benjamin S.
Loeb, Stemming the Tide. Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, MA: Heath
& Co., 1987).
LBJL, OF, Ernest E. Goldstein, box 16, Western Europe, no.4, Regional Analytical
Survey for the Western European Area, USIA/IAE, 15 Sept. 1967.
Ibid.
Ibid.
LBJL, NSF, Country File (CF), France, box 173, vol.11 (memos), no.160, Bohlen to
Rostow, 23 May 1967; no.159, Bohlen to Rostow, 24 May 1967.
Ibid., NF, box 1, Bator Memos, no.29b, memo, Rusk to Johnson, 11 Feb. 1967. On
monetary issues, cf. CF, Germany, box 188, vol.13 (memos), no.128a, memo of
conversation between K. Schiller and Rostow, 27 April 1967. Among other recent
works, see G. Grin, Lvolution du systme montaire international dans les annes
1960, Relations Internationales 100 (1999), pp.37792; on the Sixs association
policy, cf. Anna Bedeschi Magrini, Dalla Convenzione di Yaound ai Trattati di Lom,
in Rainero (ed.), Storia dellintegrazione europea, vol.2, pp.26183.
LBJL, NSF, NF, box 7, Rostow Memos, no.160a, Schaetzel to Rostow, 16 Feb. 1967.
Ibid., National Security Council Meetings File (NSCMF), box 2, vol.4, tab51, no.6,
memo, Bator to Johnson, 3.5.1967.
Ibid., no.3, memo, Problems ahead in Europe, undated. On nuclear issues see, among
other recent works, Beatrice Heuser, European Strategists and European Identity: The
Quest for a European Nuclear Force (19541967), Journal of European Integration
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23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
113
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37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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(memos), no.147, memo of conversation between Rusk, Leddy, Cheslaw and censored
names, 9 Dec. 1967; and, above all, no.148, memo of conversation between Rusk,
Cheslaw and censored names, 6 Dec. 1967. In the latter document, in particular, Rusk
remarked that holding bilateral talks on France might prove quite dangerous.
FRUS, 196468, vol.13, doc.283, Intelligence Note No. 1020, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Denney to Rusk, 26 Dec. 1967. On the various European countries
attitudes cf. Rainero (ed.), Storia dellintegrazione europea, vol.2, esp. the essays by
Raffaele DAgata on the FRG (pp.42758), Massimo de Leonardis on Britain
(pp.389426), Marinella Neri Gualdesi on Italy (pp.287338), Donatella Viti on
France (pp.33988), and Marcello DellOmodarme, LEuropa dei Nove (pp.85118).
See also Landuyt (ed.), Europe, esp. the short essays by Ralph Dingemans, LAllemagne
de lOuest et lintgration europenne, pp.6376; idem, Les Pays-Bas et lintgration
europenne, pp.8596; Ariane Landuyt, LItalie entre lidal europen et
lintgration, pp.3547; idem, La Belgique, le Luxembourg et lintgration
europenne, pp.7783; and Jacques Valette, La France et lide du fdralisme
europen, pp.4961.
LBJL, NSF, CF, France, box 173, vol.12 (memos), nos.7676a, memo, Rostow to
Johnson, 30 Nov. 1967, and encl. memo, Read to Rostow, 29 Nov. 1967; no.74,
memo, Goldstein to Rostow, 1 Dec. 1967; White House Central Files (WHCF),
Subject File (SF), CO 81 France, box 30, memo, Goldstein to Johnson, 30 Nov. 1967;
memo, Goldstein to Johnson, 13 Dec. 1967; Monnet to Johnson, 16 Dec. 1967. On
Monnet, among many other works, cf. Grard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens (eds.),
Jean Monnet, lEurope et les chemins de la paix (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne,
1999), esp. pp.20393 and pp.357433.
FRUS, 196468, vol.13, doc.296, memo of conversation between Rusk and Erhard, 21
March 1968. On Erhards foreign policy see for instance Horst Osterheld,
Aussenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard 19631966. Ein Dokumentarischer
Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt (Dsseldorf: Droste, 1992); Volker Hentschel, Ludwig
Erhard. Ein Politikerleben (Mnchen: Olzog, 1996), pp.435649.
FRUS, 196468, vol.13, doc.302, tel.151414, Rusk to the Embassy in Switzerland, 23
April 1968.
Among recent works on these issues, see Alan S. Milward, with George Brennan and
Federico Romero, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge,
1992); Alan S. Milward et al., The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and
Theory, 19451992 (London: Routledge, 1993); and other books and essays quoted in
Bernard Bruneteau, The Construction of Europe and the Concept of the NationState, Contemporary European History 9/2 (July 2000), pp.24560.
On Johnsons attitude towards Kennedys legacy cf. for example Lyndon Baines
Johnson, The Vantage Point. Perspectives of the Presidency, 19631969 (New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), pp.141; George W. Ball, The Past Has Another
Pattern. Memoirs (New York: Norton & Company, 1982), pp.31637; and Paul R.
Henggeler, In His Steps. Lyndon Johnson and the Kennedy Mystique (Chicago: Dee,
1991).