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The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
ISSN: 0308-6534 (Print) 1743-9329 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fich20
Negotiating with the Malayan Communist Party,

194889
Karl Hack
To cite this article: Karl Hack (2011) Negotiating with the Malayan Communist Party,
194889, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39:4, 607-632, DOI:
10.1080/03086534.2011.615603
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.615603
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Vol. 39, No. 4, November 2011, pp. 607 632
Negotiating with the Malayan

Communist Party, 1948 89
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Karl Hack
This article looks at one of the best documented examples of negotiations with insurgents
in a British colonial territory: the Baling Talks of 28 29 December 1955. At these, the
Malayan Communist Party Secretary-General, Chin Peng, attempted to negotiate an
end to the Malayan Emergency. It examines how the communist leadership came to
desire negotiations over the period 195456, how it viewed them, and on what
terms they might have succeeded. It also seeks to understand the British perspective. It
shows how, for the British, these one-off negotiations have to be understood in relation
to a wider British persuasive strategy. Finally, the paper shows why the attitudes and
interests of the British and host nation politicians meant that the 1955 talks were
doomed to fail.
The one and only object of our struggle is a peaceful, democratic and independent
Malaya. If only this is possible, we are willing, always, to strive by peaceful means . . .
Ng Heng [pseudonym for Malayan Communist Party Secretary General Chin Peng],
letter of 1 May 19551
. . . the Malayan Communist Partys advocacy for peace and proposal for negotiations is reflecting the peoples demand and aspiration . . . On the other hand
the British Imperialists blood-stinking colonial rule is being resolutely opposed
by the people. Their war-craving policies and various plots to continue with the
war have already been utterly defeated. [MCPs Freedom News, Issue 66, October
1955]2
If we were to come out, we will be detained. That is unrealistic, of course we are not
prepared to surrender to this Government. While we are in the jungle, we are free.
[Chin Peng speaking on the second and final day of the failed Baling Peace Talks,
29 December 1955.]3
The Malayan Emergency of 194860 officially ended on 31 July 1960. On 1 August, its
demise was celebrated by a march-past at Kuala Lumpurs Padang (central green).
Framed by the Tropical Tudor Selangor Club (black and white painted timbers,
skirted by generous verandahs) and the Selangor Secretariat (somewhere between
Correspondence to: Karl Hack, 28 Harley Road, Oxford, OX2 0HR, UK. Email: k.a.hack@open.ac.uk
ISSN 0308-6534 print/1743-9329 online/11/04060726
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.615603 # 2011 Taylor & Francis
608
K. Hack
Westminster Cathedral and the frontispiece of a . . . childrens edition of Sinbad the

Sailor), regiments and bands marched.
The First Battalion, Malay Regiment led the way, in dress uniform of green songkok
(headgear), white tunic and trousers, and green and brown sarong. This was fittingly
symbolic of Malayas statussince 31 August 1957as an independent member of the
Commonwealth. The seven Malay Regiment battalions were followed by the Royal
Hussars, the Brigade of Gurkhas, the Royal Malayan Police, Senoi Praaq aboriginal
trackers, Fijians, New Zealanders, Australians, Kenyans and Rhodesians. It was a
march-past befitting security forces (SF), which had peaked, in 1952, at around
40,000 soldiers, 67,000 full and part-time police, and 300,000 Home Guard: all for a
country of around 6 million people. A flypast followed: Sycamore helicopters;
spindly Pioneers who had been employed on leaflet drops and reconnaissance tasks
over Malayas jungle; and sleek jet aircraft.4
But the celebrations belied one inconvenient fact: insurgency had not ceased.
It would simmer on until December 1989. British counterinsurgency (COIN) had
indeed driven most communist insurgents 290 per cent of Chinese immigrant
stockto the MalayanThai border between 1952 and 1954. It had featured population resettlement of 500,000 rural Chinese into New Villages, dominance of the
area around those by intelligence and patrolling, and pervasive surveillance and
control of population and food movements. The campaign reached a murderous
peak in 1951, when there was an average of 7,291 insurgents, and when the High
Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney was ambushed and killed in October5 (Figure 1).
In 1951, the British experienced a leadership crisis. Ironically, British tactics simultaneously persuaded the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to alter strategy, as it
Figure 1 Strength of the MNLA.6

Notes: The asterisk ( ) represents the 1957 figure for the period up until 31 August
1957, for combined HQ, Min Yuen and MNLA.
609
found supplies squeezed and contact with Chinese villagers ever more dangerous. The
MCP issued October 1951 Resolutions that shifted many fighters to armed work forces
to protect civilian cells, broke others into smaller groups, and increased deep jungle
farming and political work.7 In 1952, attacks on transport, SF and rubber trees
slumped by a third or more. The arrival that year of General Sir Gerald Templer, as
both Director of Operations (DOO) and High Commissioner, also presaged improved
intelligence organisation, optimising the advantage taken of improving circumstances.
By 1954, incident rates were fractions of their peak (SF and civilian casualties less than
one-seventh), and insurgent strength now averaged 3,402.8 The Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) also moved towards the border with Thailand in 195254. On
31 August 1957 (at independence), there were an estimated 1,830 MNLA, those still in
Malaya clustered in small groups. By 1960 only a few hundred MNLA remained.9
Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of negotiating with the enemy the notable fact is
that that insurgency did not end in 1960. This was due to the failure of negotiations. A
meeting between the MCP leaders and local politicians, held at a schoolhouse in Baling
(a town in the State of Kedah in northern Malaya), had ended in failure in December
1955. The failure of these Baling Talks left the MNLA remnant to consolidate close to
the MalayanThai border. It did briefly lie low, with its Fold Up the Banners and
Muffle the Drums policy of 195861. In 1961, Secretary-General Chin Peng even
moved to Beijing. Once there, however, the Chinese told him that developments in
Indochina, and the ending of Chinas policy of peaceful coexistence, meant the
MCP should expand. This it did from 196268, increasing from the low hundreds
to over a thousand in the first year.
From 1968 until the 1980s, the MCP infiltrated small columns back into Malaysia
(as Malaya became in 1965). Notable efforts included 1970s assassinations of senior
police and Chinese Special Branch officers.10 This is referred to as the Second Emergency (196889). Race riots in Kuala Lumpur of May 1969 also saw emergency
powers (including detention without trial) re-introduced. The conflict finally ended
in December 1989, when the MCP (from the 1970s 80s better known as the Communist Party of Malaya or CPM) signed agreements for a ceasefire with the Thai military
and the Malaysian Government.11 CPM resilience had been worn down by fading of
the Cold War (China ordered the closing of the CPMs Hunan-based Voice of the
Malayan Revolution radio station by June 1981),12 the ageing of its old guard, and
party fractures.13 The Thai military had sent out peace feelers as early as 1984. The
eventual 1989 peace accords were explicitly not a surrender. They provided for the
laying down of arms by the remaining 1,118 insurgents, and assistance for them to
re-integrate as full citizens of Thailand or Malaysia. Indeed, the 1989 terms achieved
much of what had been the MCPs minimum requirements for peace of 1955.
Subsequently the Thai Government assisted the development of Peace Villages in
southern Thailand, from which several hundred comrades returned to Malaysia. CPM
Secretary-General, Chin Peng, was denied return on the tendentious grounds that he
could not prove his birth in Malaya, but he was the exception to the rule.
This history makes the Malayan case-study of negotiating with the enemy intriguing. The existence of two sets of elite negotiationsin 1955 and 1989allows us
610
K. Hack
to isolate key issues. For instance, why did 1955 negotiations break down, when many
of the critical issues recurred in the successful 1989 negotiations? Why did the politicians of Malaya, and the British, take the stance they did in 1955? That is, both
held that any terms the communists would accept would convert the MCP from
enemies at bay, to a Trojan Horse within Malayan politics. Guy Madoc, the then Director of Intelligence in Malaya, later said that the British had feared communists returning like maggots to a pile of bread.14 This stance means that the Malayan case-study
runs counter to the increasing tendency to view negotiation as the answer to colonial
and postcolonial conflicts. That trend has been accelerating from the Northern Ireland
Good Friday Agreement of May 1998, through British Army negotiations with militias
in Basra and the Anbar Awakening in Iraq; to the twenty-first century calls to negotiate
with Taliban elements in Afghanistan.15
Thus far, however, the debate has usually centred on the counter-insurgent power,
and to a lesser extent on host nation politicians. By contrast, this paper attempts to
reconstruct the story not only from British and host nation perspectives, but in
addition from the insugents viewpoint.
The British and Alliance Road to Baling
In 1955, host nation politiciansthe leaders of Malayas Allianceproposed talks
with insurgents. Eventually these resulted in the Baling Talks of 28 29 December
1955. At first, however, British officials were implacably opposed. This British attitude
needs to be placed in the context of the full spectrum of its engagement with insurgents
and their supporters. This mixed judicial, propaganda, and security aspects, and
ranged from posters aimed at civilians, through to the 1955 elite negotiations.
British policy emerged from a longer-term approach of executing captured insurgents (and deporting supporters where these were aliens), while hoping that those
who surrendered would turn an informer. For surrendered enemy personnel (SEP),
the British could demand the death sentence for offences under Emergency Regulations as simple as carrying weapons, or assisting insurgents. In reality, SEP were
not executed from 1950. By 195051, the government was dropping thousands of
safe conduct passes promising good treatment, and rewards for co-operation. Propaganda leaflets contrasted certain suffering and probable death if insurgents stayed in
the jungle, and safety and possible rewards if they surrendered. By 1955, bringing
one hand grenade out could earn $50, a light machine gun $1,000.16 To put this in
context, insurgents awaiting rehabilitation were paid $100 a month ($40 plus $2 a
day for food).17 An additional inducement for SEP was that their betrayal made erstwhile comrades their deadly enemies, whose capture or removal was essential to their
own security.
By 195254, another plank of the British engagement was the concept of selfrenewal.18 While rank and file SEP might be obtained due to hunger, loss of hope
of victory, or hope of reward, leaders were more valuable. British propaganda used
SEP to write and talk to insurgents, to emphasise the ideological redundancy of the
communist position, the way insurgent life prevented them from being filial
611
Chinese, and the possibility of self-renewal. This involved employing communist terminology, in order to challenge insurgent ideology on its own terms. The number of
ranking defectors was small, but of disproportionate value. Political Commissar of the
4th Regiment MNLA Lam Swee, for instance, worked with the Emergency Information
Services as an SEP from March 1951, writing the booklet, My Accusation (Kuala Lumpur:
Federal Printers, 1951). This alleged that the MCP had made political and strategic mistakes, over-emphasising violence. In the same year, the British captured the MCPs
Freedom News printing press, and used this to write their own version, as New Path
News. With an initial circulation of 50,000, the latter had SEP such as Lam Swee
writing pieces in pseudo-MCP language.
New Path News and other propaganda media were increasingly based on thorough
research on captured documents. The British also recognised the need to match propaganda to Chinese values, which gave more weight to personal relations.19 Hence
increasing use of tours and broadcasts by SEP, and of SEP voices aimed at specific
insurgents, whether in print, aircraft-delivered voice broadcast, radio, tours, film, or
as stool pigeons to CEP (Captured Enemy Personnel). The British realised that replicating western modes of communicationreliant on print and abstract argument
was no substitute for adapting to target needs. This also meant New Village tours
and direct voice messages for insurgents by Templer and his successor as DOO, Lt.
General Geoffrey Bourne.20
Despite these efforts, the overwhelming majority of communists eliminated were
killed. During 194854, there were 8,120 eliminations, including: 1,494 SEP (18 per
cent); 1,115 CEP (14 per cent); and 5,511 killed (68 per cent). Yet small numbers of
skilfully employed SEP had a multiplier effect.21 Furthermore, the percentage surrendering rose from 147 in 1950 (under 16 per cent of eliminations); to peaks of 372
(around 27 per cent) in 1953 and 248 (35 per cent) in 1955. By the latter date, sustaining eliminations required ever more SF pressure and ever more sophisticated targeting
of arguments, as those remaining were hard-core.22
British policy thus rested on the wide contrast between wide Emergency powers to
detain without trial, remove aliens and/or their family, and execute for a wide variety
of infractions of Emergency regulations on the one hand, and yet to offer rehabilitation, reward, and self-renewal on the other. It tapped fear, hope and ideology, and
rehabilitation had to be earned through co-operation.23
Likewise amnestiesto which the 1955 Baling Talks would be closely relatedwere
initially grudging. A first, September 1949, Amnesty only promised that the death
penalty would be averted if SEP had avoided becoming assassins or other more dastardly crimes, and was vague on what would happen after surrender.24 In August
1950, the decision was taken (but not publicised) not to immediately prosecute SEP
for capital offences, allowing their increased use for tours of resettlement areas alongside
SF. SEP now either went into rehabilitation, or to work with SF for at least three months.
Afterwards some continued with the Special Branch, or with the small group used to
directly support military operations: the Special Operational Volunteer Force.25
The visible association of SEP with the SF from 1950 undermined suspicion that
government would maltreat captives. Meanwhile, the September 1949 Amnesty
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K. Hack
remained in force into 195253. No SEP could be sure of avoiding prosecution. All
they were promised was fair treatment. Changes in insurgent perception about surrender were influenced more by propaganda of deedvisible evidence of good treatment of SEPthan words. SEP went into villages to give talks, and wrote messages for
propaganda leaflets. That said, millions of leaflets were being dropped by 195253,
including safe conduct passes which gave clear instructions on how to surrender,
and sometimes that civilians who assisted such surrenders would be rewarded.26
The idea of a more generous amnesty was several times mooted, and turned down.
Government did not want to automatically offer a clean slate, appear weak, or
antagonise victims and European planters. It also felt that the right psychological
moment had not been reached.27 To be effective, an improved amnesty offer needed
to be timed for when insurgents (either generally or in a target area based on a
local MCP branch committee) felt under intense pressure. Domination of the
target area was seen as crucial, as was reduced hope of outside help.28 Engagement
possibilities were, therefore, not seen as free-floating, but as related to the national,
regional and international contexts. This was still the situation in 195455, when
an acceleration in the pace of decolonisation placed local politicians to the fore.29
The key impetus for negotiations now came from local politicians, whose primary
aim was to accelerate the path to full self-government. Elections had been held in
municipalities from late 1951, followed by State-level elections. In 1954, it was
agreed that there should be national level elections in 1955, followed by the largest
partys leader becoming Chief Minister, with a large degree of internal selfgovernment. Britain would continue to control finance, internal security and external
defence.
The victorious party would obviously be the Alliance, which had dominated almost
every Malayan election to date. The Alliance joined together several communal parties.
It was dominated by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), who due to
citizenship laws would command by far the largest number of votes. Many Chinese,
who comprised around 40 per cent of the population, did not yet qualify for
citizenship. UMNO were joined in the Alliance by the Malayan Indian Congress
(MIC, joined 1954) and, more importantly, the Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA, co-founders in 1952).
The MCA was led by Chinese business and association leaders who were, by dint of
capitalist interests and traditional roles, implacably opposed by, and to, communism.
The MCA accepted UMNO predominance in the Alliance, and the entrenchment of
Malay rights (such as Malay as the national language, and Malay majorities in the
civil service), in return for influence on policy, and Chinese freedom to continue
their economic activities and distinct cultural and linguistic existence. In short, the
Alliance was based on elite accommodation and the assumption of a plural society
under a thin crust of overarching, Malay-dominated nationalism. Once this understanding had emerged, over 195255, UMNO and the MCA agreed on pushing for
accelerated decolonisation. In 1954, they briefly boycotted Emergency committees,
in order to persuade the British to provide for an elected majority on the next
Legislative Council.30
613
Given that the Alliance could promise a semblance of inter-communal cooperation, the only major stumbling block remaining was now the Emergency itself.
So long as Britain felt its defeat was not assured, and that large numbers of Commonwealth SF were required, internal security and defence were unlikely to be transferred.
In addition, Emergency restrictions, which in some areas included restrictions on
movement of food, and curfews, remained burdensome and expensive. The creation
of much freer White Areas (declared free of insurgents) reminded everyone how
much was to be gained by ending insurgency everywhere.
In January 1955, the Alliance leader Tunku Abdul Rahman told the Malay Mail that
the Alliance would declare a new amnesty for communists if it won forthcoming
Federal elections, as part of a wider deal to end the Emergency. He intimated the communists might be allowed to come out and join the constitutional process. On the
other hand, should they reject such offers, the Emergency should then be prosecuted
with greater vigour. The MCA leader Tan Cheng Lock (from 1952 technically Sir
Cheng Lock Tan) endorsed the Tunkus call, even offering to go into the jungle to
negotiate. Soon afterwards, the Governor of Kenya offered the Mau Mau insurgents
amnesty from the death penalty, though not necessarily from imprisonment
(JanuaryJune 1955 Amnesty).31 In Malaya, government leaflets now told people
that not one person who has voluntarily surrendered himself since 1949 has been
executed.32
The Alliance decided to ask the government for an amnesty at a 12 January meeting,
to allow terrorists guilty of crimes to go to China, others to be rehabilitated. The Alliance made an 8-point proposal.33 The Tunku had by then already met DOO Sir Geoffrey Bourne on 11th. He had reassured Bourne that he was not making the offer so
much in the belief that the MCP would accept, as to be seen to have done everything
possible. The MCP refusal might then allow the post-election government to go
further than the colonial one in mobilising society. He acknowledged that direct negotiation was out of the question as was legalising the communist party.34 Despite these
reassurances, the DOO Committee meeting of 17 January (attended by the Tunku and
the MCAs H. S. Lee) agreed that the negotiations were undesirable: partly because they
would imply recognition of the MCP. It also agreed to quietly set up a committee to
examine the possibility of a wider amnesty. It was announced publicly that current surrender terms were adequate.35
Even the liberal Manchester Guardian applauded the rejection of the suggestions by
the Alliance, fearing that they might allow the MCP to convert the armed into a political struggle.36 The Guardian was well-informed, since one of the 17 January DOO
Committee papers had argued that as the Communists have no intention of giving
up their struggle for domination of the country it would move the battle from the
field of open military warfare to the far more threatening and dangerous fields of subversion and infiltration.37 Though the Colonial Office wanted to conciliate local politicianson whose goodwill decolonisation and postcolonial relations dependeda
British consensus prevailed that even further amnesty concessions were not yet
called for. The moment was seen as not ripe for inducing mass surrenders, which
were only likely when combined military pressure, and falling faith in the chances
614
K. Hack
of outside help, combined. Instead, the government made public in March 1955 its de
facto policy of not prosecuting SEP.38
The Alliance, however, still needed to be seen to try and end the conflict. It needed
to remove an obstacle to the transfer of security powers and so full independence, and
to free resources to meet the needs of its distinct Malay (UMNO), Chinese (MCA) and
Indian (MIC) constituencies, at a time when rural poverty was still rife.39
In May 1955, the Alliance therefore included the amnesty issue in its election manifesto. It suggested a new amnesty be offered, to end the Emergency and so unblock the
road to independence. In May, the MCP then sent a letter, under the pseudonym Ng
Heng, offering to negotiate, on the basis that it had helped to win concessions for selfgovernmentits main aimand therefore wanted to enter the constitutional process.
This included the now imminent federal elections of July 1955. The government
rejected this offer when received in June. British officials feared Malayan politicians
might, in any negotiations, pay too high a price for peace, in the hope of removing
the last significant obstacle to full independence. Britain was unwilling to see the
MCP recognised, or its members return to civilian life without screening, and
wanted to deprive the MCP of publicity.
Tunku Abdul Rahman was appointed Chief Minister following the Alliance trouncing of the opposition in July elections. By August he was insisting not only on a new
amnesty, but also that he must meet the communists to discuss them. He would use
any meeting to seek communist surrender and clarify amnesty terms, rather than to
negotiate. But he should be able to talk without restriction and listen to Chin Peng.
British officials were reluctant to risk losing the Alliance co-operation, given the Alliance had won every seat bar one in the July elections.
British authorities were now in a quandary. Rejection of the MCP offer as a sign of
their desperation was one thing, but the Alliance had to be conciliated. In July, the
DOO Committee had already decided to head off calls for talks by offering a more generous Amnesty. The MCP aim of emerging from a peace talk with dignity, and as a
legally recognised party that claimed success in accelerating decolonisation, was now
pitted against the British aim of getting them to surrender, and to submit to initial
detention.40
The upgraded Amnesty terms came into effect on 9 September 1955. Under them,
the AMSEP (Amnesty SEP) would not be prosecuted for offences committed under
the Emergency regulations, and could surrender to members of the public. Local ceasefires might be arranged, and all SF would be primed to look out for surrendering
insurgents. Government would conduct investigations into SEP (the military had
originally asked for the words hold in detention). Those demonstrating loyalty and
peaceful intent would be helped to reintegrate. Those not recanting communism
would have restrictions imposed, and requests for repatriation to China would
receive consideration.41 Supporters implicated by the AMSEP were not to be arrested.
Safe Areas were announced, where SF would withdraw and surrender points be established (withdrawn 21 November 1955 for alleged abuse of these areas).42 Pre-existing
rewards for facilitating surrender, payable to insurgents and the public, were emphasised. The SF were also ordered to Shout before you Shoot. This was clearly an offer
615
intended to split off a less resolute rank and file from its leadership, rather than a
prelude to elite-to-elite negotiation.43
If the British thought an amnesty would head off talks, they were soon proved wrong.
By 24 September, the Tunku and Tan Cheng Lock had received letters purporting to be
from the MCP Central Committee, which proposed negotiations with them to end the
Emergency and facilitate independence. The British now realised that, though they
might try to shape any talks, it would be foolish to block them. On 30 September,
Tunku Abdul Rahman announced he was willing to meet Chin Peng, though only to
clarify to him the recent declaration of amnesty. On the 1 October, he also suggested
that he would like Singapores Chief Minster, David Marshall, to join any talks. Chin
Peng then wrote two more letters: to the Tunku on 2 October, suggesting their liaison
officers meet; and to David Marshall on 4 October, to say he would be welcome to
join discussions. Thus, in October, it became obvious that talks would almost certainly
take place. This largely nullified the September amnesty offer. There were just 62 AMSEP
from its announcement to the year end, as insurgents held out for better terms.44
The first of three preliminary meetings took place on 17 October (with subsequent
meetings held on 18 November, and 13 December). The communists were represented
at the 17 October meeting by Chen Tien (also rendered Chen Tian), its Deputy
Propaganda Chief.45
Alan Lennox Boyd (as Secretary of State for the Colonies in London) was increasingly concerned. In meetings with the British officials on 17 and 18 October 1955, the
Tunku insisted that, though he would not grant recognition of the MCP, he must be
free to discuss demands for safety, freedom and freedom of political action for surrendering communists. He could not merely elaborate on the amnesty.46 On 23 October,
the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, R.H. Scott, telegraphed London
that the Tunku is in a tearing hurry to end emergency before going to London for
constitutional talks scheduled for January 1956, and supremely confident of his
ability to absorb the Chinese terrorists into the country and deal with those who
give trouble. He no longer accepted that the amnesty terms went far enough, and
said he had a mandate from the people to end the emergency on the best terms he
could get. The talks, said Scott, would inevitably end up as negotiations. About the
only consolation was that David Marshall was regarded by the British as likely to
stiffen the Tunku, given the communist-influenced riots he had recently experienced
in his own territory.47 On 25 October, Lennox Boyd told the British Cabinet that it was
not practicable to abort the meeting, but that Britain might reject any agreement if the
Tunku conceded too much, even at the cost of the latters resignation.48
By 27 October, the Tunku took a much firmer line in public. He was reported in the
Straits Times as saying I am not going to negotiate with Chin Peng (something he
would reiterate to the Legislative Council on 3 December 1955).49 Despite this, the
British remained worried in early December that the Tunku may be prepared to
take his stand well in advance of what we regard as our last ditch position.50
British concerns now switched as to how to avoid the Tunku being outmanoeuvred.
They held a mock meeting, information officer C.C. Too playing Chin Peng, and British
Major-General Lindsay the Tunku. At this Too/Chin Peng offered to end fighting for one
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K. Hack
concession, legal recognition of the MCP so that its men could walk free. Lindsay/Tunku
was cornered.51 The fear was that the Tunku would find such an offer irresistible. To
counter this, High Commissioner Donald McGillivray announced, in the Legislative
Council on 30 November, that the Emergency at its present level was not an impediment
to further advances towards independence.52 Pressure on the Tunku to make concessions was much reduced. By December, the most prominent worries were that the
Tunku might concede the ending of powers of arrest and detention, and/or the
recognition of the MCP without detention or deportation of hardcore communists.53
The MCP Road to Negotiations

The MCP road to Baling was longer, more complex, and their commitment to give
and take greater, than that of the British and the Alliance. This was partly a reflection
of military reality. By 1955, their main force was at the border, and remnants in
Malaya under pressure. The average guerrilla strength for 1955 was estimated at
under 2,800 (7,292 in 1951) and in August 1957 at 1,830 (300 in the MNLA, the
rest in the command structure and supporting Masses Organisation).54 Commissioner-General R.H. Scott wrote that They have no hope of military victory.55
On the other hand, the MCP decisions were also defined by an evolving communist
international line from Moscow and Beijing, and by key international events. They saw
themselves as part of a universal ideology, linked in a loose network with key nerve
centres. Just as the move to violence in 1948 had been couched in the Cominform
language of 1947of a shift from united front tactics towards inevitable conflict
between two campsthe move of 1955 followed the contours of the international
communist policy.56 Figure 2 below outlines the main domestic and international
milestones in the journey towards negotiation.
In addition to eyeing communist international thinking, MNLA leaders also looked
to events in the Peoples Republic of China and Indochina for inspiration and hope of
outside succour. It so happened that from 195155, these converged with accelerating
decolonisation in Malaya to make negotiation seem desirable.
The MCPs October 1951 Resolutions had presaged, increasing emphasis on
subversion of schools and unions. By 1954, the MCP also had covert representation
inside the Peoples Action Party of Singapore, which took three seats in elections
there in April 1955.
At the same time, China committed itself to the Panch Sila, or Five Principles of
mutual respect and coexistence, in talks with India conducted over 1953 to June
1954. These were embedded in the ten principles of World Peace declared at the conclusion of the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference of April 1955. This period seemed to
show that communism could gain most by negotiation, with the Geneva Conference
dividing Vietnam into two in July 1954, and establishing a communist government in
the north. It established International Supervisory Commissions (ISC) that included
on them India, and provided for all-Vietnam elections within two years. It also provided for the integration into the Government and Army of Laos of elements of
that countrys communist Pathet Lao.
617
In this context, the 2nd Empire Conference of Communists and Workers Parties
of the British Commonwealth, meeting in London in April 1954, called for a peaceful
solution to the Malayan conflict. The MCP, meanwhile, sent a representative to
Figure 2 A Select Chronology of Events Leading to the Baling Meetings.57,58,59
K. Hack
618
Figure 2 Continued.
Moscow in 1954. The Soviets gave, in the joint name of the Soviet and Chinese communist parties, a written suggestion, or you may call it advice, suggesting to us to
end the armed struggle, and to hide the weapons, and our guerrillas to be transferred
from the jungle to the city and the village, to work underground. The MCPs Siao
Chungbased in Beijing and intermittently in touch with the Centralrelayed
619
this line to the London conference of communist parties. The MCP statement read
out on their behalf, therefore suggested ending the conflict by peaceful means, and
demanded the end to the Emergency measures and the colonial rule. The MCP Secretary-General Chin Peng relates that we found ourselves faced with the urgent
requirement of devising how best to implement the Partys new approach. The leadership at Betong in southern Thailand, close to the Malaysian border, accepted that
Beijing and Moscow had concluded the MCP could not win, and prepared urban
cells to switch emphasis from armed struggle to calling for negotiations.60
When they proposed requesting formal negotiations, however, the MCP were told
that perhaps the conditions in Malayaso different from Korea and Indochina
might not support this.61 Chin Peng relates that we took our own initiative,
sending the letter to the Government. The letter was just a feeler, to see how the Government was going to react. The Party would later debate whether they had been
unduly influenced by revisionist suggestions from the Soviet Union and Chinas
Liu Shao Qi. Chin Peng emphasises that had they followed international guidance
to the letter, they might have scaled down or ended the armed struggle without
attempting negotiations in 1955.62
What gave the MCP hope of negotiating, despite the lack of a military stalemate as
in Korea and Vietnam, was the domestic political scene. In 1954, Dato Onns Party
Negara had supported suggestions for an elected minority in the forthcoming
federal elections. Dato Onn had previously enjoyed British sympathy as the most effective Malay leader. By contrast, the UMNO-MCA Alliance demanded a majority. They
secured a partial compromise after a June 1954 boycott of representative councils. By
early 1955, therefore, it was clear elections were imminent, and that only the Alliance
supported independence soon, in fact within four years. Given that independence was
the main MCP demand, and it could not possibly secure it through violence in less
than four years, it saw negotiation with a view to rejoining politics as a good
option. That would allow it to reap the benefits of British acceleration of decolonisation, which it perceived as a response to MNLA pressure. Even if the party then had to
lie low for a period, it would be well placed to eventually re-enter politics.
Hence the party despatched a letter from Wu Xing, dated 1 March, with the press
transliterating this into Ng Heng. The letter was intended for the Alliance. It proposed
a roundtable conference of all parties for peace discussionsnot surrender as the Alliances amnesty proposals suggestedand the cessation of Emergency Regulations. It
claimed the MCPs main aim was full independence, rather than the restricted selfgovernment due to start from July 1955, under which the continued presence of
British forces made it possible that Malaya could be drawn into a war of Asians
killing Asians. Other key words, easily lost in the letters four pages, were mutual
understanding and respect, any attempt to intrigue and force people to surrender
is completely unreasonable and illusive and that the MCP will never be [totally]
defeated in this war.63 With the British unwilling to lose support by blocking a
meeting, the Tunku confirmed over Radio Malaya in September that he would
indeed be willing to meet. There followed the three preliminary meetings to arrange
practicalities noted above, the first on 17 October.64
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K. Hack
The Preliminary Meetings: Framing Talks

The MCP sent Chen Tienits Deputy Propaganda Chiefto these preliminaries.
Chen Tien had met the British police representative thereActing Police Commissioner Ian. S. Wylieduring the war. This had happened when the latter parachuted
in to liaise with the MCPs wartime anti-Japanese forces in 1945. The Alliance, meanwhile, sent Assistant Education Minister Too Joon Hing to the 17 October meeting.
The meetings about the meeting (17 October, 18 November, and 13 December) set
the scene. The MCPs Chen Tien arrived unannounced at Klian Intan on 17 November
before the second meeting, using this as an opportunity to issue press statements:
demanding safety for communist delegates, an agenda for the meeting, and an international peace commission. He was warned that a repetition of such publicity would
end all talking. The communists also tried to propose a longer meeting, only to be
rebuffed. On 19 November, the Tunku further responded by publicly reaffirming
that he was going to explain the Amnesty conditions, not to negotiate.
Chen Tien put the MCP proposals for an agenda at the preparatory meetings. When
combined, these covered:
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
New villages.
Restriction of movement.
Release of political prisoners.
Security measures.
More liberal amnesty terms.
All political parties banned under Emergency Regulations to be recognised.
Regulations concerning sedition, banishment and the registration of societies to be
rescinded.
Banishees to be allowed to return if desired [affecting 30,000 people].
An International Peace Commission to be set up, of members from outside
the country to enforce the peace terms agreed upon by both sides.
Duration.
At the first meeting on 17 October, the MCP envisaged up to weeks of discussions.

The Government thought Wylie rash in hinting at up to 72 hours. On 18 November,
Chen Tien made it clear that the Amnesty terms were unacceptable, and if insisted
upon guaranteed failure. On 13 December, in a tent at the airstrip at Kroh (todays
Pengkalan Hulu), the MCP were told two days was the limit before the Chief Minister
would depart for London for constitutional talks, and that there would be no formal
agenda.65 Chen Tien was told that it was the Chief Ministers intention to explain
to Chen Ping [sic], in more detail, the existing terms of amnesty, and that the
Chief Minister had also agreed to listen to any points which Chin Peng might put
forward.66
The MCP considered abandoning the talks after the Tunkus public announcement
of 19 November, that he was not going to negotiate with or treat Chin Peng as my
equal. But instead they chose to interpret the Alliance as captive to the British,
and to keep open the possibility of further talks should these fail. According to
621
Chin Peng, the Tunku himself gave this impression. During the final preparatory
meeting of 13 December:
Wylie went to the toilet, so he [Too Joon Hing] told our representative, Chen Tian
[Chen Tien]: I have got a personal message from the Tunku to convey to Chin Peng.
He hurried his conversation in two minutes only . . . No matter what happened,
Tunku hopes Chin Peng would come out, and if the talks cannot reach any conclusion, he promises he will resume the talks after the London talk . . . otherwise
we would not go. He gave us a promise. And we believed his promise. There will
be another talk.67
Chin Peng claims that this promise trapped him.68

The MCP Chairman Musa bin Ahmad has further stated that, when Chin Peng
went to see Tunku Abdul Rahman, we took advice from the Communist Party of
China.69 Chin Peng confirms this happened by wireless and courier.
The MCP now finalised their strategy for the meeting. The optimal aims were to be
of MCP recognition, freedom of returning insurgents, and early independence. The
minimum position was ex-insurgent rights to participate in political life despite no
recognition of the party, with guarantees of freedoms for returning insurgents, and
no detention. A few days before negotiations the Alliance, meanwhile, agreed that it
would seek independence within 18 months if possible. Even when informed of
this, however, the MCP did not believe the British would agree to such demands at
the London talks scheduled for early 1956. In other words, they thought they could
still play the card of helping the Alliance to secure faster decolonisation.
The Baling Talks70

On 28 December, Chin Peng finally emerged from the Malayan jungle to be greeted by
John Davis, who had been a Force 136 liaison officer with the communists during the
war. Davis said Long time no see in Cantonese, and accompanied his old friend to the
talks.71 The British still feared, in McGillivrays words, that the recent attitude of
Abdul Rahman suggests that he may be prepared to take his stand well in advance
of what we would regard as our last ditch position.72 In opening, however, the
Tunku stuck to the line that he was there to explain the amnesty, and the communists
must say how they wanted this changed. As the talks broke down, he would later tell
Chin Peng that the insurgents must surrender, and that there would be no recognition
of the MCP. His colleague Tan Cheng Lock had been ill recently and made few comments, and David Marshall intervened mainly to emphasise concessions the MCP
must make.73 Chin Pengs colleagues were Malay comrade and Party Chairman
Musa Ahmad, and Rashid Maidin (or Mydin), one of the leaders of the MCPs 10th
(Malay) Regiment: neither contributed significantly at the talks.
The meeting opened with general statements, and Chin Peng presenting his
maximum demands (MCP recognition included), before gradually retreating over
the two days towards his minimum position. It is that minimum position, and Chin
Pengs arguments, that we now focus on. The gap between this and the Alliance can
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K. Hack
be summarised in two quotations. The Tunku ultimately told Chin Peng that therefore
if you do not come out to surrender, we would rather not accept you in our society.
Chin Peng retorted that, If the MCP is recognised, if members of the MCP are not
subject to detention and investigation, they can throw down their arms at once.
[but] . . . If we are to come out, we will be detained. That is unrealistic. Of course
we are not prepared to surrender to this Government. While we are in the jungle, we
are free. At root he needed to be able to emerge with dignity, and with freedom to
act politically, even if not as the MCP per se. These statements reflect three issues
central to the Baling meeting: recognition; investigation of MCP members who came
out of the jungle and surrender; and the decommissioning of arms.
Recognition
At Baling, Chin Peng pointed out that the Tunku had previously suggested that, if the
MCP stopped fighting, our party could then enjoy equal status so that we could fight
for independence by constitutional means. This was the maximum MCP position. It
was also unattainable. Chin Peng did start by suggesting the MCP to be legalised, but
soon retreated to suggesting it to be allowed to establish a new party. He rejected
Tunkus suggestion that communists stop communist activities and then be
allowed to join or form parties after they had demonstrated loyalty to Malaya. Ultimately, the Tunku did seem to suggest thatafter investigationthey might be able to
form a new party. Marshall seemed set against even this.74 Chin Peng argued frankly
that We will never allow ourselves to be forced by others to give up this ideology . . .
We do not wish to join other political parties and then do our scheming or intrigues.75
He assured the Tunku that the MCP would not revert to its 194648 tactics, that is, of
infiltration of other groups and semi-violent methods. This question overlapped that
of loyalty, something the Tunku and David Marshall both demanded. Was loyalty to
an existing state and constitution compatible with being a communist dedicated to its
long-term replacement?
This debate also touched on a core issue of negotiation, where the insurgent party
believes it can still sustain conflict: the method of re-integration. Power sharing was
tried in Laos from 195462, and resulted in resumed civil war, and finally insurgents
winning power in 1975. More successfully, it was the preferred route in Northern
Ireland from the late 1990s. But in Malaya, the Alliance and the British judgement
was that a movement with an ideology that called for class warfare, and tactics that
included entryism, neither integration nor operation as a separate political entity
was likely to prove acceptable.76 Classic Marxist Leninist theory calls for a twostage revolution: bourgeois first; communist second. Chin Peng hoped that if they
could form a new party, even if after lying low, they could over five to ten years at
worst re-emerge. They would resurface with a claim to having helped attain a stage
1 bourgeois nationalist revolution, and positioned for delayed progress to stage
2. Hence the Tunku made it clear he viewed communist activities as alien and contrary to loyalty to the state. In the last session, he told Chin Peng that this ideological
chasm meant that, in effect, You have got to surrender.77
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Investigation and Surrender

A second major issue was what would happen to ex-insurgents. All previous amnesty
and surrender arrangements involved detention, followed by either rehabilitation or
service in the SF. The MCP leadership viewed their forces as the heroic successors to
wartime anti-Japanese forces (with whom Chin Peng and many fighters had served),
and as having helped to accelerate decolonisation.78 Any solution had to allow them
to preserve this self-identity and status. They could not come out like prisoners and
be detained. Chin Peng, therefore, repeatedly said that there must be no appearance
of surrender. He emphasised the need for dignity, and said the amnesty terms
offered that year differed little from preceding surrender terms. The reply was that
there was, under the new, September 1955 Amnesty, no prosecution for any Emergency-related offence. The verbatim record of the Baling meetings show Chin Peng
even said there might be more MCP concessions if this issue was resolved. He asked:
what if many MCP members returned to China? Might the remainder then be
allowed to return to their houses without arrest or reporting, merely being observed?
The reply was there were not enough Special Branch police, unless a very large
number returned. At root, the Alliance (whose MCA leadership had suffered intimidation and assassination attempts by the MCP) could not stomach the MCP operating
politically among rural Chinese, schools and unions. The ideology and modus operandi of the insurgents made an offer of the dignity and freedoms they needed problematic. Every help would be given to rehabilitate, but investigation, loyalty and the
giving up of communist ideology were refrains.79 This was the point of breakdown,
during the third session, on the first Day of talks. The Tunku insisted investigation
might take a few months and Chin Peng said if so they would prefer to continue
their struggle For the dignity of man . . . you cannot force us to give up.80
Decommissioning of Arms
Decommissioning of arms was one of the last problems (along with police reform) to be
settled in the Northern Ireland peace process, even after the IRAs political wing (Sinn
Fein) had been accepted as a possible power-sharing party. Would this question have
prevented peace in 1955? According to Musa bin Ahmad again: when Chin Peng
went to see Tunku Abdul Rahman, we took advice from the Communist Party of
China. Their advice was that, at least you must not surrender your arms.81 Chin
Peng made it clear at Baling that if the local Alliance Government got control of internal
security and local forces, the MCP would not surrender or hand over weapons, but
throw down their arms at once. The maximum demands for an ISC or supervisory
commission were never going to be granted in Malaya, but for this problem to be
resolved, some sort of independent monitoring might have been required.
Host Nation Versus Sponsoring Power
Another theme was the tension between Britain as sponsoring power for COIN, and
the Alliance as the host nation political leaders. Chin Peng claimed the British were
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K. Hack
listening in if not guiding, and made it clear before that he anticipated British influence might limit results, and necessitate further meetings later when such control
eased. The British debated if they could risk rejecting any agreement that exceeded
what they thought acceptable. The Tunku is very difficult to measure, but the
British did believe in OctoberNovember that he might be tempted to back further
concessions, hence the 30 November announcement. During the meeting, he told
Chin Peng that If I decide, and Mr Marshall agrees with me, that will be all.
Broken Promises?
Two charges of bad faith were subsequently made over the negotiations. First, there
was the accusation that Chin Peng promised to lay down arms if the Alliance got
full control of internal security and national defence at the forthcoming constitutional
talks in London. This occurred during the final, fourth session, after all hope of settlement at the time had ended.
Chin Peng brought up the idea that, if the Alliance got such full control, all problems
could be solved easily. This was probably part of the toilet break strategy to hint that
there should be further talks once the Alliance had more freedom. Hence the communists had earlier made a show of asking to see the recording room next door to the negotiations, to emphasise British presence.82 The Tunku, however, immediately saw the
opportunity in Chin Pengs suggestion, retorting Is that a promise? As clarifications
ricocheted back and forth Chen Tien said that National Defence includes control
over all armed forces within the country . . . At least local forces, and Chin Peng that
then we will stop our hostilities at once, even if before David Marshal had gone to
London to negotiate over Singapores future. However, this meant laying down
weapons not handing over, and no restriction on liberties. In reality, this had
brought discussion back to the question of investigation and terms. Hence David Marshall prepared a piece of paper expressing Chin Pengs promise to lay down arms, Chen
Tien added, It does not amount to accept the present amnesty terms.83 The Tunku then
briefly suggested that they might also offer less stringent investigation of any insurgents
who chose to remain in Malaya after disarming, if enough of their comrades were likely
to return to China. The point was not pursued, and Chin Pengs argument that it could
not be surrender then inspired Tunkus final break, that surrender was inevitable . . .
since ideologies are completely at variance . . . Therefore, if you do not come out to surrender, we would rather not accept you in our society.
The Tunku did indeed get a complete control of internal security at the London conference of January 1956, followed by full independence on 31 August 1957. Hence, he
could demand, on Radio Malaya on 22 February 1956, that the MCP honour its
promise.84 This made the MCPs continuation of struggle look at best selfish
aimed to secure better terms for their own personnelat worst inconsistent with
the spirit if not the letter of their assurances at Baling.
The Tunku also announced, on 30 December 1955, that the current amnesty terms
would be withdrawn on 8 February 1956. By then it had secured just 74 AMSEP.85
625
From the communist viewpoint, the Alliance success in securing accelerated decolonisation from the British in early 1956 should have led to a re-opening of talks: activating the toilet break assurance, so they could resolve the final issues of investigation
and either the MCP recognition, or terms for ex-insurgents free participation in politics. In their eyes, the Alliance had played them along, hinting there could be further
talks, then refusing these after communist pressure had helped to accelerate British
concessions at the JanuaryFebruary 1956 Constitutional Conference. There the
Tunku successfully argued that internal security control should be transferred immediately, in the light of Chin Pengs Baling promise to lay down arms if this happened,
and because the best possible people to lead COIN were a strongly anticommunist,
democratic local force: which the Alliance had demonstrated themselves to be.
The subsequent Alliance refusal to reopen negotiations in 1956 was, to the MCP, an
act of bad faith. They have continued to lay claim to a role in accelerating decolonisation ever since, including in Chin Pengs memoirs, published in 2003, and to a private
Singapore audience in October 2004. They have continued to portray 1955 as a
genuine chance for peace, one spurned by the British and Alliance.86
The British, meanwhile, had quietly encouraged Chin Peng to keep lines open. After
the talks failed on 29 December, he spent one last night, in a tent at the jungle edge at
Gunong Paku, with his wartime colleague John Davis. The two men felt respect and
warmth towards each other. Davis (now a District Officer) had been asked to encourage
Chin Peng to think about whether he might make any further compromises. Talking
together in their tent, Chin Peng suggested some investigation or reporting of insurgents might be accepted, if carefully framed. According to Davis, they talked about a
scheme by which MCP leaders might sign a provisional agreement, form committees,
and through these facilitate the gradual relocation of all communist personnel. According
to Chin Peng, he dismissed ideas of further talks in the jungle, and thereafter the topic was
dropped. Davis further claims that they discussed an agreed letter drop position, where
drops might be made on the fifteenth of each month, starting in January 1956. Davis
finally parted company from his old comrade a little inside the jungle, as the latter
returned to fight. In Daviss words, we parted amicably. I was very sorry to see him go.87
Conclusions
The Baling Negotiations were a case of one sidethe MCPgenuinely desiring peace
and willing to make substantive concessions to achieve it, provided they could emerge
with dignity and a right to participate in politics, in whatever reduced form. The weak
position which induced them to negotiate, however, also encouraged Host Nation
politicians to refuse sufficient concessions. Underlying that refusal was a belief that
contrasting ideologies meant that any reintegration would have to be heavily controlled. From the viewpoint of the host nation politicians and supporting power,
any reintegration sufficient to secure peacelet alone power sharingwas tantamount to state suicide.
Another thing that emerges from this story is the extreme importance of contextual
factors in various levels of engagement with the MNLA, including state of battle,
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K. Hack
nuances of ideological thought, encouragement from outside ideological allies, and

above all, the delicate balance between the particular local forces pitted against each
other at the time negotiations are mooted.
The Malayan case of negotiation also raises a number of specific issues who potential general significance merits discussion, namely:
1. Technical issues over how to calibrate disarmament with reintegration into society
were vital, here including:
a. Decommissioning of arms (and external supervision), rather than surrender of
arms. The difficulty being to balance the governments desire for security against
reversion to violence, with insurgent desire for insurance against continuing
repression in early stages of reintegration. Here external supervision was ruled out.
b. recognition of the insurgents politically, and of the right of them as a political
unit and individuals to participate in politics. In Malaya, as in Afghanistan,
the ideological and proselytising nature of the insurgent force was/is a potentially critical issue. This contrasts to the silo effect of an identity/ethnic-based
organisation, as in Northern Ireland. In short, political reintegration was seen
as dangerous, and power-sharing was beyond contemplation.
c. Dignity of man issues. Insurgents are likely to seek reintegration in ways that
allow them to claimhowever disputedvictory (in terms of positive contributions to a new situation) and high status (no detention or surveillance, prisoner releases, assistance/encouragement of recruitment into state forces). The
CPM continued to claim victory after 1989, when it also got substantial resettlement assistance.
2. Negotiation in Malaya was located within a very wide spectrum of engagement
with the enemy, recognising varying levels of enemy and types of persuasive
approach. Hence:
a Level of insurgent, from tacit supporter, hardline civilian supporter, uncommitted/unideological participant, ideologically motivated fighter, regional/
ranking leaders, and central command. Different persuasive techniques were
applied to different levels.
b Type of persuasive technique varied, from leaflet, through targeting of local/
regional/unit leaders in tandem with intensified operations, and a changing
balance of prosecution policy versus amnesty and reward, to elite-to-elite negotiation. Persuasive techniques were seen as a continuum.
c Mode of communication was recognised as important. Hence the government
adopted the visual (including SEP tours and display of killed insurgents) and
personal (targeted, personalised messages), as well as more purely printed
materials. Use of SEP to deliver messages provided concrete propaganda of
deed, visibly proving good treatment.
Emphasising only the carrot side of negotiation would also have seemed nave to
Malayan officials, compared with their variegated and layered approach to persuasive
activity. Short of the very top level of negotiation, insurgent surrender was expected
to come from the contrast between the stick (up to execution for Emergency crimes,
627
fear family or wage-earners would be deported for supporters) and the carrot.
In addition, they were very concerned with the psychological aspects of the
timing and content of persuasive moves: the idea of the psychological moment
for offers or campaigns.
3. Ideology. The Malayan case emphasises the difficulty in reintegration, and a solution that preserves the dignity of insurgents, but which does not at the same
time open the way to undermining the political system. If Taliban ideology concerning an Islamic state and needs is taken seriously and as analogous to communism, it
is difficult to see any all-Afghanistan negotiated outcome that would not be a
prelude to Taliban attempts to win central power (possibly aided by coercion at
local levels). Unless, that is, a solution is preceded by an emphasis on building up
regional and ethnic identities as a bulwark versus Taliban influence. To understand
this, contrast the cases of Laos and Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland equally
ideologically entrenched and balanced blocks cancelled out in a Mutually
harming stalemate, making sustainable power-sharing an acceptable alternative to
any reversion to violence, and potentially sustainable. In Laos, by contrast, the
Pathet Laos communist ideology and possibility of outside renewed assistance rendered true reintegration almost impossible, and so a 1954 ceasefire ultimately ended
in failure. At Baling it is notable that David Marshall for Singapore (where communist penetration of parties, unions and schools was advancing) was if anything
harder against any recognition of the MCP than was Malayas Tunku Abdul
Rahman. Furthermore, the concept of self-renewal for SEP drew on the idea of
rejecting communism as alien, versus Malayan and traditional Chinese community identities. The idea of irreconcilability of ideologies was deeply rooted in the
government and Host Nations campaign against communism.
4. Working with rather than against the flow of local forces was vital to defeating
Malayan insurgency: a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for success. In
Malaya, the possibility of marginalising insurgents came from working with the
balance of local forces. Hence, the main host nation negotiator was the Alliance,
and within that the Malay party, UMNO. Its main partner was the equally communally based MCA, rooted in Chinese businessmen and traditional community leaders.
UMNO provided a voice to the Malays who manned much of the police and local
military, and MCA helped screen detainees and organise anti-communist action
among the Chinese. The Alliance willingness to stand firm (and before that in the
case of MCA leaders to risk assassination) was the bedrock for COIN and for
hard-headed negotiation.
5. The balance of the Host Nation and supporting power roles was important in
Malayan negotiations. A key characteristic of the Malayan case was the delicate
balance between the British as COIN sponsors and declining imperial power, and
the Alliance as host nation politicians and independent-government-in-waiting.
Ultimately, the Alliance played this situation best, getting MCP promises while
remaining set against MCP reintegration without controls, and simultaneously
leveraging concessions off Britain. But its ability to play this game successfully
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K. Hack
rested on its foundation on communally rooted UMNO and MCA parties, and
some legitimacy in having been more radical than the opposition IMP/Party
Negara of its former leader Dato Onn. Chin Peng recognised the genuineness of
its mandate from the outset at Baling.
In summary, the Baling negotiations were almost certainly (as Chin Peng later noted)
doomed to fail, since both the British and Host Nation politicians believed that they
might attain victory without making significant compromises. There was also no
mutually hurting military stalemate in 1955, and that limited the MCPs leverage.88
Hence the Malayan case-studys main attribute is the position of counterinsurgent
strength at the time of negotiation. Despite this, we have seen how Malayan negotiations can provide a useful window through which to view both a moment in
Malayan history and British decolonisation, and to label and think about the problems
of negotiating with the enemy, in its multiple forms.
Notes
[1] Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (henceforth ISEAS): H.S. Lee papers, Folio 18.2/
1-4.
[2] From Ramakrishna (ed.), Freedom News, 262 64.
[3] Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 78. Baling transcripts in The
National Archives, Kew, London (henceforth TNA): Co1030/29.
[4] Plum, The End of the Emergency, 385 93.
[5] TNA: Air20/10377, Director of Operations, Review of Emergency in Malaya, June 1948Aug.
1957, Oct. 1957, pp. 3 4. Henceforth DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957. See also
Straits Times, 2 Aug. 1960, 1, The Big V-Parade Parade.
[6] TNA: Air20/10377, DOO Review of the Emergency in Malaya 1957. Min Yuen supporters lived
in the jungle fringe near villages. From 1952 they were armed. A peak of over one million of the
Chinese population were at least potential supporters. As of 31 Aug. 1957, of the 1,830 remaining insurgents, 200 were in the MNLA, the remaining 1,600 being Command and Min Yuen.
The name and general location of almost all were known to Special Branch, 9,581 terrorists
were eliminated from June 1948 to Aug. 1957, and over 11,500 men and women were at
some time insurgents. The MNLA was 90 95 per cent Chinese. But a number of Malay and
Indian trade unionists, radicals and workers joined the MCP after 1948. Its 10th Regiment,
originally in Pahang, was mainly Malay.
[7] TNA: Co1022/187, has more than 60 pages of the Resolutions, in an (MCP) English version.
[8] DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957, 4, 8.
[9] Historiography is discussed in Hack, The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm, 383 414; and Iron Claws on Malaya: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency,
99 125. The conflict is related to current COIN in Hack, Extracting Counterinsurgency
Lessons.
[10] The Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman bin Hashim, was assassinated by the
CPM-ML (Marxist-Leninist Faction) on 4 June 1974.
[11] See Chin Peng, My Side of History, 479 507; and Ratanachaya, The Communist Party of Malaya,
Malaysia and Thailand: Truce Talks.
[12] The correct Malay title was Radio Suara Revolusi, and the station was re-established as a mobile
unit in Thailand. Hack, The Long March to Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in
Southern Thailand, 194.
629
[13] For the second Malayan Emergency and CPM splits (notably of the CPM-Revolutionary and
CPM-Marxist-Leninist Factions in 1970 and 1974), see Hack, The Long March to Peace of
the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand, 173 200; Chin and Hack (eds.),
Dialogues with Chin Peng, 23 24, 368 72; and Ong and Wang (eds.), Voice of Malayan
Revolution.
[14] Rhodes House, Oxford, Granada End of Empire papers, Research Interviews with Guy Madoc.
[15] Storrie, Talking to the EnemyInformal Conflict Termination in Iraq.
[16] ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.28, Leaflet No. 34444/HPWS/58, Chinese-language, 22 Feb.
1955, Government Reward Policy. See also Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 190.
[17] ISEAS: H. S. Lee Papers, Folio 19.57/1-9, Malayan Combined Emergency Planning Staff,
Disposal of SEP, 7 Sept. 1955.
[18] For government and SEP use of the term self-renewed, see London: Imperial War Museum,
Harry Miller papers, editions of the New Path News (Sin Lu Pao).
[19] The key role of personal relationships is noted by sociologist Pye, Guerrilla Communism in
Malaya.
[20] Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 109, 16263.
[21] Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 198. Thus SEP and CEP together meant the SF had about 30 per
cent of insurgent eliminations as live and so potentially as self-renewals.
[22] SEP percentage of eliminations for 1948 60 was c. 25 per cent, and killed was 62 per cent.
Statistics derived from Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 190202. For post-1953 government
surrenders see Ramakrishna, Content, Credibility and Context: Propaganda, Government
Surrender Policy and the Malayan Communist Terrorist Mass Surrenders of 1958.
[23] See Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 107. Lam Swee was the perfect SEP, having a long
record as a popular MCP leader, and also being genuinely repulsed by the MCP strategies.
[24] Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 81 83.
[25] ISEAS: H. S. Lee Papers, Folio 19.57/1-9, Malayan Combined Emergency Planning Staff,
Disposal of SEP, 7 Sept. 1955.
[26] Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 114 15, 155.
[27] DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957, 10, notes that 1955 operations were focussed on
MCP areas of weakness. The original Briggs Plan of 1950 (for joint military-civil committees,
area dominance and resettlement) had aimed to roll up the MNLA from south to north, but
dropped this (Johor in the south was one of the toughest states) in favour of targeting areas of
opportunity and/or MNLA weakness. See also: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.41a, Appendix A to
the Second DOO Meeting of 1955, DOO Staff, Surrender Policy, Conclusions, (c).
[28] ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.33, DOO Directive to SWECs, Feb. 1955, in which DOO
Bourne reported that ranking MCP SEP Osman China had confirmed the importance of SF
dominance of MCP committee areas for periods of 20 plus days. The DOO emphasised that
air and artillery action should push MNLA towards better kill zones.
[29] ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.18, Appendix D to Agenda for DOO Committee meeting 6 of
1955, 17 March 1955, Review of Surrenders, 1951Feb. 1955.
[30] A compromise was reached in 1954, by which the elected component remained a slight
minority, but the High Commissioner would select some nominated members on the
recommendation of the majority party.
[31] Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 2, citing Malay Mail of 6 Jan.
1955. The Alliance eyed Kenya, see ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.43 of July 1955.
[32] ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18/28, Leaflet 3489/HPWS/63.
[33] ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.38, DOO Committee Minutes, 2 meeting of 1955, 17 Jan.
1955. The Tunku read a paper on the eight conditions, including: (i) the terrorists [since
1954 insurgents were officially termed Communist Terrorists or CTs] including known criminals to have option of return to China; (ii) non-criminals option of remaining, but to undergo
rehabilitation, (iii) time-limit, (iv) safe conduct to both sides, (v) every effort to contact CTs if
630
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
K. Hack
necessary through intermediary such as Nehru. (vi) operations to continue except in truce area,
(vii) safe conduct back after negotiations. The DOO offered a battery of objections, and the
committee agreed that Any form of peace negotiations would be unacceptable, and to set
up a committee to re-examine amnesty terms.
TNA: CO1022/22. Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 4.
TNA, CO1022/22, Federation of Malaya to Secretary of State for Colonies, 19 Jan. 1955.
Manchester Guardian, 9 Feb. 1955, p.6.
ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.41a, Appendix A to the Second DOO Meeting of 1955,
Surrender Policy. The paper even suggested that accepting negotiations might open the way
to an independent cease-fire commission.
ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.28, Leaflet No 3489/HPWS/63, Federal Amnesty. Government
Surrender TermsThe Facts, saying no SEP (as opposed to CEP or arrested supporters) had
been executed since 1949. This leaflet was explicit about what happened to those who have
surrendered. There were also leaflets listing Self-Renewed and Hints on How to Escape.
TNA: Co1027/27, Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to Prime Minister, 23 Oct. 1955,
Rahman thinks that, with the end of the emergency, he will have vast sums at his disposal
to promote social welfare and economic development . . ., but the UK was actually providing
most additional funding.
Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 192 93.
The full Sept. 1955 Amnesty terms can be found in TNA, Co1030/29.
The Chief Minister and DOO jointly announced the 1 Dec. 1955 deadline for ceasefire areas,
alleging the MCP had used them to make contacts and replenish supplies. Annuar, Tunku
Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 24 25.
Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 193. DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957, 10.
Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 195. Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the
Baling Talks, 14 15.
Chin Peng, My Side of the History, 364. The Head of Propaganda was Lee An Tung.
Stockwell, Malaya, vol. iii, Document 380, 17274.
TNA: Co1027/27, Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to Prime Minister, 23 Oct. 1955.
See TNA: Cab128/CM(55)36, 20 Oct. 1955, minute 4, for Colonial Office fears this could
mean the end of responsible government; and Stockwell, Malaya, vol. iii, 118ff.
Straits Times, 27 Oct. 1955.
TNA: Co1022/27, Talks, draft CO memorandum for ministerial circulation, apparently not
discussed by latter. See also Stockwell, Malaya, vol. iii, 20103.
TNA: Co1030/27, Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor of Singapore, 27 Oct. 1955. See
also Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 195.
TNA: Co1022/27, Legislative Assembly address of 30 Nov. 1955.
TNA: Co1022/27, Copy of letter from Mr A.M. Macintosh, received 21 Dec. 1955, and
MacGillivray to Governor of Singapore, 7 Dec. 1955; Commissioner-General Southeast Asia
to PM, 23 Oct. 1955.
DOO Review of Emergency in Malaya 1957, pp. 3 4, 8, 10 11.
TNA: Co1027/27, Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to Prime Minister, 23 Oct. 1955.
For 1948 see Hack and Wade, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40, 3 (Oct. 2009), and related
H-Net roundtable: http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-30.pdf.
Coe, Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds, 17475.
Extract from TNA: CO1022/187.
Coe, Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds, 175.
Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 272 73, for MCP Seven Point Proposition: Peoples
Struggle for Freedom, report to Second Congress of Representatives of the Communist and
Workers Parties of the British Commonwealth, 21 April 1954. See also Chin Peng, My Side
of History, 351 53.
631
[61] Chin Peng, My Side of History, 367 69.

[62] Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 20507.
[63] ISEAS: H. S. Lee papers, Folio 18.2/1-4, Translation of a Letter posted in Haadyai, 7 June 1955,
to UPAM, Kuala Lumpur.
[65] ISEAS: H.S.Lee Paers, Folio 20, 20.2/5, Summary by Principal Staff Officer, 29 Nov. 1955. See
also TNA: Co1022/27, Decisions taken at the Meeting of the Amnesty Working Party held in
the Chief Ministers office on Sat. 26 Nov. 1955.
[66] TNA: CO1030/27, 10 Dec. 1955, Commissioner-General Southeast Asia to Secretary of State.
[67] Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 17374.
[69] Just before the meeting, the MCP announced that Musa bin Ahmad was made chairman of the
Central Committee with an Indian and former leader of the Rubber Labourers Union, R. G
Balan, as Vice-Chairman. Coe, Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds, 275.
[70] The following passages combine information from: TNA, Co1030/29, Record of the Baling Talks;
Chin Peng, My Side of History, 36786; and Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 17185.
[71] Chin Peng, My Side of History, 371.
[72] TNA: CO1030/27.
[73] Tan, David Marshall, 320 26. For Tan Cheng Locks (later Sir Cheng Lock Tan) sole significant
intervention see Co1030/29, Verbatim Record, Tan saying Why waste money unnecessarily on
the Emergency, there is no point in that.
[74] The Government defined loyalty as including: no communist activities, as these were alien;
abandon class warfare; renounce subversion and violence; accept the Malay Rulers role;
assume citizenship responsibilities; accept the Constitution; work for racial harmony; demonstrate loyalty to the Government; abandon loyalty to foreign forces; and support peoples individual rights. Coe, Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds, 264. Annuar, Tunku Abdul
Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 80 81, Once you are free to join society, you are
free and can form whatever party you like from the Tunku, versus Marshalls there can be
no question of the Communist Party forming a political party under another name.
[75] All quotations from the talks are taken from the record in Co1030/29, unless otherwise stated.
[76] ISEAS, H. S. Le Papers, Folio 20/9/1-9, Appendix A to Agenda for DOO Committee meeting 17
of 1955, The Future Development of the amnesty, 25 Sept. 1955.
[77] TNA: Co1030/29, Verbatim Record, Fourth Session.
[78] Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 77 78. Marshall was spiky and
brilliant, asking if you have the welfare of Malaya at heart, what are you prepared to sacrifice
for the welfare of Malaya? For comments on the MCP claim see also, Dialogues, 18 19.
[79] Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 75, the Tunku suggested SEP in
rehabilitation and agricultural training (Kemendore) have got to give up their Communist
ideologies too.
[80] Co1029/30, Draft transcript, and verbatim record, and Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His
Role in the Baling Talks, 75 76.
[81] Coe, Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds, 275.
[82] TNA: Co1030/29, Verbatim Record of Baling Talks, communist request made first day at 1900
hours.
[83] The piece of paper is shown in Annuar, Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks, 67.
[84] Coe, Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds, 17576.
[85] Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda, 197.
[86] Chin Peng, My Side of History, 39091. At a closed session at the ISEAS, Singapore, on 7 Oct. 2004,
Chin Peng further described his faith in the Tunkus promise of a further meeting as nave
(authors notes on the meeting). Further discussed in Abraham, The Finest Hour, 17071.
[87] Shennan, Our Man in Malaya, 218 20, utilising Daviss scribbled notes on this last meeting.
632
K. Hack
[88] Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, develops the mutually hurting stalemate concert. See also the
article by Duyvesteyn and Schuurman in this special edition.
References
Abraham, Collin. The Finest Hour: The Malaysian-MCP Peace Accord in Perspective. Petaling Jaya:
SIRD, 2006.
Annuar, Nik Mahmud. Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks: A Documentary
History. Kuala Lumpur: Arkib Negara Malaysia, Memorial Tunku Abdul Rahman, 1998.
Chin, Peng. Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History, as told to Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor. Singapore:
Media Masters, 2003.
Chin, C. C. and Karl Hack., eds. Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on the Malayan Communist
Party. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004.
Coates, John. Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948 1954. Oxford:
Westview, 1992.
Coe, John. Beautiful Flowers and Poisonous Weeds: Problems of Historicism, Ethics and Internal
Antagonisms, the Case of the Malayan Communist Party. D.Phil. thesis, University of
Queensland, 1993.
Hack, Karl. Iron Claws on Malaya: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency. Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (March 1999): 99 125.
. The Long March to Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand. In Thai
South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula, edited by Michael Montesanto and Patrick Jory. Singapore: NUS Press, 2008.
. The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm. Journal of Strategic Studies 32,
no. 3 (June 2009): 383 414.
Hack, Karl. Extracting Counterinsurgency Lessons: The Malayan Emergency and Afghanistan,
RUSI website (Autumn 2009). Available from http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/
ref:C4B14E068758F1; INTERNET
Hack, Karl and Greg Wade. Introduction: The Origins of the Southeast Asian Cold War. Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, 40, no. 3 (October 2009): 44148.
Ong, Wei Chong and Wang Gungwu, eds. Voice of Malayan Revolution: The CPM Radio War against
Singapore and Malaysia, 1969 1981. Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
2009 [research edition contains CD-ROM].
Plum, Patrick. The End of the Emergency. Blackwoods Magazine, 288, no. 1471 (November 1960):
385 93.
Pye, Lucien. Guerrilla Communism in Malaya. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956.
Ramakrishna, Kumar. Content, Credibility and Context: Propaganda, Government Surrender Policy
and the Malayan Communist Terrorist Mass Surrenders of 1958. Intelligence and National
Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 242 66.
Ramakrishna, Kumar., ed. Freedom News: The Untold Story of the Communist Underground.
Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.
Ratanachaya, General Dato Kitti. The Communist Party of Malaya, Malaysia and Thailand: Truce Talks
ending the Armed Struggle of The Communist Party of Malaya. Bangkok: Dungkaew, 1996.
Shennan, Margaret. Our Man in Malaya: John Davis, SOE Force 136, and Postwar Conterinsurgency.
Stroud: Suton, 2007.
Stockwell, A. S. J. Malaya. Vol. iii. London: HMSO, 1995.
Storrie, Brigadier Sandy. Talking to the EnemyInformal Conflict Termination in Iraq. British
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Tan, Kevin Y.L. David Marshall of Singapore: A Biography. Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.
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University Press, 1989.

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Chin Peng claims that this promise trapped him.68

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Investigation and Surrender

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nuances of ideological thought, encouragement from outside ideological allies, and

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