The Roman Way of Warfare

David G Terrell
26 September 2009

Rome used military force to wage war against foreign enemies; to maintain law and order within

the boundaries of the Republic and Empire; and, to execute sophisticated engineering and administrative

tasks.1 The “Roman Way of War” encompassed specific strategic, operational, and tactical characteristics

that were refined over time. This essay will briefly describe the principle characteristics of the roman

military paradigm from these three points of view.

Romans were cognizant of, and repelled by, the costs of war in blood and treasure; which led

Rome to prefer a non-violent, commercially-agreeable, bound-by-treaty, defensive strategy but, was not

always consistent in pursuing this course. Rome experienced periods of aggressiveness when legions were

created and deployed in the conduct of belligerent policies. Also, Roman respect for law and treaty did

not stop their close observation of neighbors and their executing preventive operations and reprisals to

protect their interests. Rebellions were especially disdained and were ruthlessly suppressed. 2

In spite of their costs, once Rome began military operations, warfare was characterized by

ferocity and unrelenting pursuit of victory; and continued as long as the enemy possessed the capability to

threaten Rome. Nevertheless, the Romans did not normally fight wars to utterly destroy but to achieve

subjugation. The only acceptable status for a former enemy was that of clearly subordinate ally. The

destruction of Carthage after Rome’s repeated experience in the Punic wars was the ultimate example of

this strategic objective. This attitude, founded upon a strong sense of righteousness, stemmed from

Rome’s reluctance to fight without a legitimate cause, though legitimacy was sometimes manufactured.

1
Adrian Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), 24.
Yann Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army, (New York: Routledge, 2001), 14-15.
2
Le Bohec, 149-50.
M. Cary, and H H Scullard, A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine, (3rd Edition. New York:
Palgrave, 1975), 88.
Marcel Le Glay, Jean-Louis Vosin, and Yann Le Bohec, A History of Rome, (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley
& Sons, 2009), 92.
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 24.
 2
Terrell, David G

Regardless of the cause, Roman warfare was always pursued to practical ends—even if those ends were

less than altruistic by modern standards (i.e. self-interest, profit, and glory)—and, in that spirit of

practicality, defeated enemies were usually assimilated into the citizenry. 3

Once Rome’s military requirements rendered the unorganized raiding force inadequate, probably

in the 6th century BCE, the Romans adopted the phalanx-based, infantry-centric organization and

operational art of the dominant military power in their world, the Macedonian Greeks. They continued

using the phalanx until realizing the principle flaws of the formation; a vulnerability to flanking attacks

and an inability to fight effectively across uneven ground. They began to move away from the phalanx

after their defeat at the Battle at the Alia River. 4

The Roman Army evolved into a hierarchical organization of smaller units subordinate to larger

ones (legions); within which were found elite troops, and first-, second- and third-line soldiers. Legions,

by the mid-Republic, were combined-arms forces consisting of three types of heavy infantry, light

infantry and cavalry. Later years saw the raising of auxila, units of foreign troops organized and trained to

legionary standards. As forces became more professional, they developed Cavalry and Siegecraft

capabilities pioneered by the Macedonians to a high proficiency, but never used cavalry as decisively as

the Macedonians. In its ultimate manifestation, each legion consisted of about 5,000 fighting men, plus

about 1,000 men in auxiliary, combat support units. 5

3
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 24, 26, 71, 81, 85, 93. Le Glay, 73-4
4
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 33. Cary, 84.
5
Le Bohec, 19, 25.
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 49, 108, 126.
Cary, 104.
F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), Ch 4.
Adrian Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2003), 186-197.
 3
Terrell, David G

Maneuver was simple, with Roman commanders trying to achieve the most favorable opportunity

for tactical victory. In support of maneuver, the Romans developed a sophisticated infrastructure of roads

that facilitated the rapid movement of men and materials within Roman territory. 6

The Roman operational art emphasized detailed planning to reduce the chance of accident or

coincidence ruining a military plan of action. Principle considerations included implementing operational

security measures to deny information to an enemy; gathering accurate geographic knowledge about the

battlespace; and having accurate information about the logistic capabilities of available transport and

infrastructure.7

The Roman Army was an infantry-centric fighting force designed for fighting pitched battles.

Cavalry played a secondary, harassing role. There was no attempt to attack an enemy asymmetrically and

both sides in a battle often used the same operational doctrines. The results were often uncertain and

indecisive battles characterized by tentative fighting. 8

Discipline was the most significant force multiplier for the Roman Army. Units moved and acted

with an order and cohesion that served well. Collaboration between officers and men, based on attention

to strict recruiting standards and difficult but thorough training, produced a harmony of action that

conquered the known world.9

The tactical doctrine evolved in the face of changing threats. Unorganized bands of fighters were

supplanted by the hoplite phalanx, which later were divided and spread apart into more maneuverable and

flexible maniples assembled into the legion. The legion had no effective tactical units for separate

operations. Later, changing threats resulted in maniples being enlarged several times over into cohorts

6
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 71, 28.
7
Polybius. The Rise of the Roman Empire, (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 395-6.
8
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 55, 71.
Le Bohec, 143.
Cary, 84-5.
9
Le Bohec, 146.
Cary, 99-100.
 4
Terrell, David G

having an integral command structure and capable of independent action. While there was no explicit

counter-insurgency doctrine, skirmishes and small actions occurred among deployed cohorts and between

cavalry and light infantry units on the periphery of pitched battles.10

Once abandoning the phalanx, Roman forces came to rely on the short sword and shield as its

principal weapon system. The spear (pilum) was retained, but was thrown before battle was engaged;

being designed to penetrate an opponent’s shield and, if not wounding the target, to increase his

vulnerability by rendering his shield useless through the heavy weight of the attached spear.11

Roman infantry doctrine was optimized to defeat another infantry force or stationary cavalry

force with an advancing charge, encouraging the aggression of the legionnaires. Cavalry on the move was

to be met with a stationary, prepared square with spears braced to the ground. Roman infantry, preparing

for battle, would not engage until the best formation had been determined and established. The

commander would then give a speech to encourage the forces. The legion would them move towards the

enemy. Final approaches to pitched battle were characterized by a disciplined, linear approach. As the

legion approached enemy lines, an initial salvo by archers and slingers would attempt to create some

demoralization and disorder in enemy ranks. Once the enemy was within range, thrown javelins and

spears might be added to the initial barrage. Then a huge shout from the Roman ranks was issued, both to

encourage the Romans and put fear into the enemy.12

After the initial shout of battle, three maneuvering scenarios could develop, according to Le

Bohec. The enemy might run away at once, in which case, Roman cavalry would pass through the Roman

infantry to pursue the fleeing enemy, keeping up pressure while the infantry advanced in good order.

Secondly, the enemy might begin a flanking maneuver, attempting to turn the flanks of the Roman

infantry lines. Rather than move the infantry to respond, the Roman commander would use cavalry to

10
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 108, 71.
11
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 50.
12
Le Bohec, 137,142-3.
 5
Terrell, David G

refuse the flank. Or, the infantry lines would advance on each other. Auxiliary infantryman might be sent

to a point of apparent weakness. Once the lines closed to contact, the Roman soldier would use his shield

to punch an opponent, attempting to distract an enemy or throw him off balance while attacking

underhand using his short thrusting sword.13

Roman forces achieved their tactical prowess through training. Physical training developed

stamina for long marches and extended close-quarters battle. Drill in movement and preparations for

battle ensured that soldiers and leaders could act reliably in the face of the fear, noise and chaos

characteristic of the battlefield. The construction of marching camps at day’s end and the army’s

regimented appearance were often intended to overawe a potential enemy before combat was joined. 14

The Romans learned in the early republican era how to defeat their neighbors by direct action. In

actions against Carthage, they learned to master large-scale military campaigning. Over all, the Romans

learned that the best strategic use of military force is the attainment of political goals. Roman tactics were

sound but not superior. Roman soldiers were not elite glory seekers but rather long-service professionals.

Roman weapons were not inherently superior to those of their enemies. Roman generals were not always

military geniuses. Roman military strength derived from its methods… the complex of ideas and

traditions that subjugated military power to political purposes. Rarely was the military power of Rome

misused for purely tactical gains or purposeless victory. Romans understood the value of conserved force

and the indirect use of military power to gain political ends. 15

The Roman way of war was the conservation and application of measured amounts of violence to

gain a desired political end. The legions advanced deliberately, building supply roads, fortified camps and

13
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 143, 134.
14
Le Bohec, 106-7, 109-119, 131-3.
Cary, 102.
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 28.
15
Edward N Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire From the First Century A.D. to the Third,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 1-3.
Cary, 113-121.
Livy, The Early History of Rome, (New York: Penguin Books, 1960), 293 (4:5), 309 (4:18).
 6
Terrell, David G

other infrastructure as they advanced. Generals allowed enemies to retreat into fortified positions, fixing

their position and mobility, rather than risk the uncertainties of open battle. This caution, when combined

with their reliance on the military engineer, gave the Roman armies a resilience with which they won

victories slowly, but definitely.16

David G. Terrell
Herndon, VA

16
Luttwak, 2-3.
 7
Terrell, David G

Works Cited

Adcock, F.E. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957.

Cary, M, and H H Scullard. A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine. 3rd Edition. New
York: Palgrave, 1975.

Goldsworthy, Adrian. Roman Warfare. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000.

—. The Complete Roman Army. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2003.

Le Bohec, Yann. The Imperial Roman Army. Translated by Raphael Bate. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Le Glay, Marcel, Jean-Louis Vosin, and Yann Le Bohec. A History of Rome. Translated by Antonia
Nevill. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2009.

Livy. The Early History of Rome. Translated by Aubrey De Selincourt. New York: Penguin Books, 1960.

Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire From the First Century A.D. to the Third.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

Polybius. The Rise of the Roman Empire. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York: Penguin Books,
1979.

© David G. Terrell, 2009-2010, except where otherwise noted, content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. For permission to reprint under terms outside the license, contact
davidterrell80@hotmail.com.