CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

FRANCISCO VS. PP (ANTI-FENCING LAW)

PP V. DUNLAO (ANTI-FENCING LAW)

FACTS: Pacita Linghon was the helper of Jovita Rodriguez.

Pacita, through her brother Macario, sold to petitioner Ernesto
Francisco several pieces of jewelry stolen from Rodriguez. The
RTC found petitioner guilty of violating PD 1612.

FACTS:

The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his

guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. He
avers that the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the
jewelry, and that the same was sold to him by Macario.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is guilty of violating PD 1612
HELD: No. One of the elements of fencing is that the accused
knew or should have known that the item was stolen. In the
case at bar, there was an absence of evidence as to the
knowledge of the accused regarding the item. Because of this,
the proof that was left was Macario's testimony. However,
Macario's testimony was not sufficient in proving that
Francisco knew that the jewelries were stolen.
DIMAT V. PEOPLE (2012) ANTI FENCING LAW
FACTS:
Sonia Delgado, wife of herein respondent, brought a Nissan
Safari from Mel Dimat. Spouses Delgado where driving along
E. Rodriguez Ave. when they were apprehended by the Traffic
Management Group(TMG), afterwards they found out that the
vehicle was a stolen property. Mantequilla, the registered
owner of the vehicle, filed charges against Mel Dimat for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. On his defense he claims
that he did not know Mantequilla, and that he bought it in
good faith for value. The RTC found him to guilty and which
the CA affirms with modification.
ISSUE:

Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. is accused of

violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as
the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and
wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the business
name Dunlao Enterprise.
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato
Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees of Lourdes Farms,
were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to
petitioners premises together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio
Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify information
received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from
Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioners compound, the group saw
the farrowing crates and pipes inside the compound. They
also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipes inside a cabinet in
petitioners shop and another pile outside the shop but within
the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that
said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and had been stolen
from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the items. These
were then taken to the police station.
On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 was
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao city, Branch 9,
accusing petitioner of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
On March 13, 1987, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded NOT
GUILTY. RTC rendered judgment holding petitioner guilty.
Petitioner appealed to CA, which affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.
Hence, this petition.

Whether Dimat guilty of fencing.

ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has
been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article or object taken during that
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known
that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by
the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino
where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for
a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of
registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even
promised to give him a new certificate of registration and
official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on
this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentinos failure to deliver
the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could not produce any certificate of registration or
official receipt. Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew
that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old
certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly
could not be true because, the vehicle having been
carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That
Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce
new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the
Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the
same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to
check the papers covering her purchase. That she might
herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not
stand accused in the case.

Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the fact

that, in receiving and possessing the subject items, he was
motivated by gain or that he purchased the said articles.
HELD:
No, thus, he is guilty of violating the anti-fencing law.
Under Presidential Decree 1612, fencing is the act of
any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal
in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
There is no question that the farrowing crates and
assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in the premises of
petitioner. The positive identification by Fortunato Mariquit,
an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these items were
previously owned by it gave rise to a presumption of fencing
under the law:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any
good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.
In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao
succeed in rebutting this presumption?
We hold in the negative.

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

First of all, contrary to petitioners contention, intent to

gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law
such as P.D. 1612.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in
themselves called acts mala in se, and acts which would not
be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called
acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with
reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The
rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent
governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial. Secondly, the law does not require
proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere
possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of
fencing.
It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this
presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but he
failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal,
was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a person
aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment
and left them there. The Court notes that the stolen articles
were found displayed on petitioners shelves inside his
compound. If petitioner were merely keeping the farrowing
crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep, why did he
display them? When a storeowner displays articles, it is
assumed that he is doing so with the intention of selling them.
Furthermore, the Court finds it strange that petitioner did not
even bother to ascertain the identity of the person or persons
who deposited the articles with him. Petitioner should pay
Lourdes Farms, Inc. represented by its owner Mrs. Lourdes Du,
the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value of the pipes and
farrowing crates recovered and in the custody of the police,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
PEOPLE VS. ORTEGA
[G.R. NO. 116736. JULY 24, 1997]
FACTS:
On October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the afternoon,
Diosdado Quitlong, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel
Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a
drinking spree in the compound near the house of Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. While they were drinking, accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were already drunk arrived
and joined them. The victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered
the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house.
Then, the accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and later
the the participants in the drinking session heard the victim
Andre Mar shouted, Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo
ako!) Diosdado Quitlong and Ariel Caranto ran towards the
back portion of the house and saw accused Benjamin Ortega,
Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a
canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with a long
bladed weapon. Quitlong went to Romeo Ortega in the place
where they were having the drinking session for the latter to
pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. Romeo Ortega went to the
place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal
and brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter
inside the well. Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia then dropped stones to the body of Andre Mar
Masangkay inside the well. Upon reaching home, his
(Quitlong) conscience bothered him and he told his mother
what he witnessed. He then went to the residence of Col.
Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. Col. Orig accompanied
him to the Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers
went with them to the crime scene. Accused Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. and Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were brought to
the police station.
The NBI Medico Legal Officer testified after conducting an
autopsy that the cause of death is multiple stab wounds,
contributory, asphyxia by submersion in water. There were 13

stab wounds, 8 of which were on the frontal part of the body,

2 at the back and there were contused abrasions around the
neck and on the left arm. The large airway is filled with muddy
particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim
inhaled the muddy particles.
The RTC ruled that the crime committed by the accused is
Murder with conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior
strength.
ISSUE:
WON Manuel Garcia should be acquitted for the
crime charged.
HELD:
Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide. Appellant
Garcia deserves acquittal. The drowning was the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony that Appellant
Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter
intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of
homicide although he had no original intent to kill. In spite of
the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held
liable as principal in the crime of homicide, there are,
however, two legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as
an accessory.
First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia and Appellant
Ortega of attacking, assaulting, and stabbing repeatedly with
a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body of one
ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA The prosecutions
evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the
stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant
Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the attempted
concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim
Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that
an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is
clearly
charged
in
the
complaint
or
information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove
that Appellant Garcia assisted in concealing the body of the
crime, in order to prevent its discovery, he can neither be
convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article
19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that
Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, the
latters sister, Maritess, being his wife. Such relationship
exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided
by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of
the principal accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled
to the aforequoted exempting provision of the Revised Penal
Code. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit him.
PEOPLE VS SALLE JR.

Where the judgment of conviction is

still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in
the instant case, executive clemency
may not yet be granted to the
appellant.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not
operate as an abandonment or waiver
of the appeal.

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The
appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24
March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January
1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
They were granted a conditional pardon that with their
acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be
released from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted
their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal
should be dismissed. They were discharged from the New
Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. Lao further
informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his
province without consulting her. She then prays that the Court
grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it
withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon.
Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by
the trial court is enforceable.
HELD:
No pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction
becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is
seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to
serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly
waived in writing, except where the death penalty was
imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies
for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the
judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive
clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those
in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon
as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y
Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof
within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon
granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only
upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody
the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National
Bureau of Investigation.
RAMON C. TAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal
Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., Tondo, Manila,
engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare

parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees

working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito
Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim
noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat
spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass
screws were missing. She conducted an inventory and
discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00,
more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed
Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss.
Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas
and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop
stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare
parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass
screws.
Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one
who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of
P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the
amount with one another. Complainant did not file a case
against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of having
committed the crime of fencing
HELD:
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain
items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those
items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim
never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee,
confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave
him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It
can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private
complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As
complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for
certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the
first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of
anothers property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an
extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had
pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an
admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense
may be given in evidence only against the person admitting
or confessing.[15] Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the
confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise,
the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the
person so admitting.[16] Here, the extra-judicial confession of
witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel,
hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such
extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against
accused.[17] There must be corroboration by evidence
of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.[18] Corpus
delicti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its
primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been
actually committed.[19] The essential elements of theft are
(1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs
to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain;
(4) the taking away was done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things
(U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000).[20] In theft, corpus
delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was
lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.
[21]
In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant
Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the
felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former
employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole
certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and
sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to
convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.[22]
What is more, there was no showing at all that the
accused knew or should have known that the very stolen

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know a

particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something,
or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something
within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element
of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually
believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words
should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his
conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge
refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the
court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with
certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such
knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And
given two equally plausible states of cognition or
mental awareness, the court should choose the one
which sustains the constitutional presumption of
innocence.[23]
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen
articles, he can not be guilty of fencing.[24]
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the
essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is entitled
to an acquittal.
PEOPLE V. YANSON-DUMANCAS
FACTS:
Acting upon the alleged inducement of spouses Jeanette and
Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and
undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas Torres, taking
advantage of his position as the Station Commander of the
PNP, with the direct participation and cooperation of other
Police Inspectors, concurring and affirming in the said criminal
design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and
detain Rufino Gargar Jr., with evident premeditation and
treachery, nocturnity, and the use of motor vehicle, did then
and there shot and kill the said victim, while being handcuffed
and blindfolded; that accused did then and there secretly bury
the corpse in a shallow grave or the purpose of concealing the
crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accused charged
as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Heirs of Rufino Gargar Jr.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused charged
as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law,
indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of Danilo
Lumangyao.
Accused Charles Dumancas, Police Officers Pahayupan and
Cadunay Jr. are hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. On the case of accused-appellant Jeanette
Yanson-Dumancas, the information charged her of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom with murder as principal by
induction together with her husband, Charles, who was found
by the trial court not guilty of the crime.
ISSUE: WON Jeanette is principal by Inducement
HELD: No
Why?
Requisites of PBI

Article 17, Revised Penal Code, provides: The following are

considered principals: (i) Those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; (ii) Those who directly force or induce
others to commit it; and (iii) Those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a
crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by
causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of
all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to
conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused
uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to
commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of
command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial court,
to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to
the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct and later
kill the victims in this case.
In the Present Case
What the Court now has to examine is whether or not
sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any
of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to commit
the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.
(verbatim)
The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to show that
Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said meeting to
come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force or
causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis relied upon by the
trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of
the crime as principal by inducement, is the supposed
commands or order given by her to accused-appellant
Dominador Geroche.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to take
care of the two does not constitute the command required
by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by
inducement.
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of
inducement, should precede the commission of the crime
itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the case at bar,
the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime
charged (kidnapping for ransom with murder) has already
taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant
Geroche to take care of the two. Said utterance could,
therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the crime
charged in this case. (emphasis supplied)
Note: In short, nagsabi lang sya na kayo na bahala which
the SC did not rule as a command.
PEOPLE VS. BACANG
July 30, 1996
FACTS:
On December 1, 1993, William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin, together with the other co-accused(s), were found
guilty of murder by the RTC, sentencing each of them to
reclusion perpetua plus damages.
William and Franklin filed a supplemental notice of appeal to
the Supreme Court, which was accepted on December 7,
1994. However on January 11, 1996, the SC received an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal from appellants which

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

did not state the reason therefor. The SC first required the
counsel of the appellants to comment on the urgent motion.
On 22 March 1996, the SC received a 1st Indorsement from
Superintendent Venancio Tesoro informing the Court that
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin "were released on
Conditional Pardon on January 25, 1996."
Upon direction by the SC, Tesoro submitted certified true
copies of the conditional pardons separately granted to
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
showing that they were released from confinement on January
25, 1996 in view of the grant of conditional pardon.
ISSUE:
Whether the conditional pardons were valid.
HELD:
No. It is clear that the conditional pardons separately
extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the
pendency of their instant appeal.
In a prior resolutions, the SC categorically declared the
"practice of processing applications for pardon or parole
despite pending appeals" to be "in clear violation of law." The
"conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19,
Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted
upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn. The acceptance of the pardon
shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal,
and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,
commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of
an appeal shall render those responsible administratively
liable.
It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in this
case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
are void for having been extended on January 19, 1996 during
the pendency of their instant appeal.

PEOPLE VS TADULAN
(PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY)
FACTS:
Complainant B owns a house in Metro Manila, where she
resides with her common-law husband and their minor
daughter A. Beside their house is an apartment building
wherein one unit was rented by accused Irvin Tadulan along
with his family.
One morning, when Complainants minor daughter A was
playing outside the apartment, accused Tadulan brought
called her and brought her upstairs where he eventually had
intercourse with the child. Initially, A did not inform her
mother about the incident, and it was only when the laundry
woman discovered bloodstains on the panty of A that they
knew of the said incident. When accuseds wife returned to
the apartment, Complainant B told her of her husbands
sexual advancement towards her her daughter A, and that
she would not take legal action against the accused if he
would vacate the apartment unit right away. Accuseds wife
promised to uphold the condition, but her husband was still
coming home to the apartment every night.
Days later, Complainant B heard a commotion in the
apartment unit of the accused, where she saw the accused
arguing with his wife. B called the police, and when they
came, the accuseds wife denounced him and told the police

that he raped the minor daughter of Complainant B, in which

he was thereafter arrested. The trial court found the accused
guilty of rape, and upon appeal, raised the contention that he
was pardoned by the mother of the victim.
ISSUE:
W/ N pardon granted by the mother of the minor offended
party without the concurrence of the offended minor is valid
HELD:
Pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an
offended minor but also by the minor herself to be effective as
an express pardon.
In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was
allegedly granted only by the mother B, without the
concurrence of the minor A. Hence, for the sake of argument,
even if said mother B initially pardoned the accused, it is clear
that such pardon is ineffective without the express
concurrence of the minor victim A.
PEOPLE VS NERY
FACTS:
Accused Soledad Nery received 2 diamond rings from
Federico Matillano to be sold by her on commission on Nov 15,
1954. In their agreement, Nery should deliver Php 230.00 to
her principal, to whom she represented having a ready buyer,
and whatever excess money obtained by her be retained as
her commission. She failed to comply with their agreement,
and was thus brought to the police station where she
promised to pay the price of the rings.
After failing to pay, a complaint was filed against her.
This was however withdrawn/dismissed following her partial
payment of Php 40.00. After failing again to pay the balance
of Php 190.00, an estafa case was filed against her. During the
pendency of the case, she paid Php 50.00, but the remaining
balance was never paid. She was eventually convicted for
estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement made between the
accused and Matillano (with partial payments) novated her
criminal liability into a simple civil liability.
HELD :
NO. the court held that novation does not apply in
the case at bar, wherein a criminal information has already
been filed by the complainant. Furthermore, said liability
cannot already be novated since this is a public offense, and
the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal
liability that the law imposes for the commission of the
offense.

DEGANOS VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Office of provincial prosecutor of Bulacan charged
Brigida/Aida Luz and Narciso Deganos with estafa. They
allegedly received from spouses Atty. Jose and Lydia Bordador
gold and jewelry amounting to 438,702 to sell on commission
and remit the proceeds or return the unsold pieces of gold and
jewelry. However, the accused misapplied and use for their
own benefit the said merchandise and/or the proceeds
thereof. RTC held Narciso guilty but acquitted Brigida/Aida. CA
affirmed trial courts decision with modification.
On appeal, Narciso contented that the transaction
between him and spouses Bordador was converted from

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

agency to sale on credit when he made partial payments

thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil.
ISSUE:
liability

RULING: We reconsider our stance and shall rule in the

AFFIRMATIVE.

W/N Novation converted liability of Narciso to a civil

RULING:
The court ruled that the transaction
between Narciso and the spouses was an agency and not a
sale on credit. The Kasunduan at Katibayan, document
covering the transaction expressly states that the accused
received the items to sell it in behalf of the complainants. It
was a consignment and Narciso was under obligation to
account for the proceeds. The court denied Narcisos
contention that their contract was novated from agency to
loan when he paid partial payments to the spouses. Novation
must be clear and express. Furthermore, even if there was
Novation, the court held that. . . .
Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability.
It is well settled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected
by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public
offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
Government on its own motion even though complete
reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by
the offended party. A criminal offense is committed against
the People and the offended party may not waive or
extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the offense. The criminal liability for estafa
already committed is not affected by the subsequent novation
of the contract.
In short, Novation is not a ground to extinguish
criminal liability. Therefore, Narciso is guilty.

ROMUALDEZ VS MARCELO (July 28, 2006)

FACTS:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman
gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24
informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
A.) that
the
Ombudsman
cannot
revive
the
aforementioned cases which were previously
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of
February 10, 2004;
B.) that the defense of prescription may be raised even
for the first time on appeal; and thus there is no
necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon
before the court a quo.

Prayer of Petitioner: This Court may accordingly dismiss

criminal cases pending before the Sandiganbayan and the
RTC, all on the ground of PRESCRIPTION.
The Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the
informations in the criminal cases does not mean that
petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution.
A.) that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987
and the filing of the information with the
Sandiganbayan
in
1989
INTERRUPTED
the
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD ;
B.) that the ABSENCE OF PETITIONER from the
Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also INTERRUPTED
the PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD based on Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether the offenses for which petitioner are
being charged have already prescribed

PROVISIONS ON PRESCRIPTION AS PROVIDED IN RA NO

3019 (the law which petitioner violated)
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section
7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets
and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the
period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in
the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses
punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Significantly,
the Court already declared in a previous jurisprudence that for
offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up
to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On
the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the
petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985,
the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is
made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of
prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under
special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The
prescription
shall
be
interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy.
In view of the nullity of the proceedings initiated by
then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and by
the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989, no proceedings
exist that could have merited the suspension of the
prescriptive periods.
ABSENCE OF PETITIONER IN THE COUNTRY : Should Art
91 apply when the special law is silent on this matter?
Both respondents in the instant case aver that,
applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily, the
absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986
until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for the
alleged offenses from running.
The Court disagrees.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to
whether the absence of the offender from the Philippines bars
the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law
can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No.
3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription
unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are
dismissed
for
reasons
not
constituting

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not

provide that the absence of the accused from
the Philippines prevents
the
running
of
the
prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be
gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting
Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused
from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
prescriptive period. Had the legislature intended to include
the accuseds absence from the Philippines as a ground for
the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the
same could have been expressly provided in Act No. 3326.

prosecute an act prohibited or punishable by law. Hence, while

it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash
pleading is deemed to waive all objections but thus rule
cannot apply to the defense of prescription, Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code to apply such rule contravenes Article 89
of the Revised Penal Code which is a part of substantive law.
Further strengthened by Section 8 Rules 117 of 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which added extinction of offense as one
exception to the General rule regarding the effects of a failure
to assert a motion to quash.
YAPDIANGCO V. BUENCAMINO (122 SCRA 713)

Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily

conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is
supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all
cases.
In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over
Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies
to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply
to special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do
not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of
statutory construction dictate that special legal provisions
must prevail over general ones.

FACTS:
On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed information for slight
physical injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner on
December 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after the
prescribed 60-day period, petitioner moved to quash the
criminal prosecution on the ground of prescription.
Respondent contended that it was filed within the prescriptive
period since the last day fell on a Sunday or legal Holiday,
therefore, should not be counted.

LIBERAL APPLICATION OF PRESCRIPTIVE LAWS

ISSUE:
Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or
Legal Holidays.

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny

petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal construction
of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription
emanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to or cause
of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot
simply be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any
diminution of this endowment must be directly and expressly
sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this
matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the
accused.
EUGENIO DAMASCO VERSUS JUDGE HILARIO LAQUI
FACTS: Atty. Damasco on July 1987 threaten Rafael
Sumadohat with the infliction upon his person of a wrong
amounting to crime. The petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Respondent Judge Laqui found that the evidence presented
did not establish the crime of grave threats but only light
threats. Petitioner filed a motion to rectify and set aside the
dispositive part of Respondent Judge contending that he
cannot be convicted of light threats necessarily included in
grave threats charged in the information as the lighter offense
prescribed in the information filed.
The crime was committed on July 8, 1987, it was filed on
September 17, 1987. Light threats prescribes in 2 months
which means 60 days. The complaint was filed after 71 days.
The trial court holds on to the principle that the allegation in
the information confers jurisdiction and that jurisdiction once
acquired cannot br lost. The information was filed within
prescriptive period. Grave threats cannot be lost by
prescription if after trial what has been proven is merely light
threats.
The Office of Solicitor General agreed with the trial court
that the allegations in the information confer jurisdiction and
once acquired cannot be lost but this is not applicable in the
case. The jurisdiction of lower court was never questioned,
instead the legal dispute is whether or not the Judge was right
to convict the petitioner after finding him guilty of the lesser
offense of light threats but has already prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offense of light threats already
prescribed.
RULING: Yes, the Petition is granted.
Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime
or offense as a loss or waiver by the state of its rights to

HELD:
No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop the
running of the prescriptive period as a matter of statutory
articulation. According to Article 91, the only exception is the
offenders physical absence and no other cause can be
sufficient to interrupt prescription.
The Court ruled that Where the sixtieth and last day to file
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day
period cannot be extended up to the next working day.
Prescription has automatically set in. The fiscal cannot file
the information on the next following working day as it would
tantamount to extending the prescriptive period fixed by law.
Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecution was
granted on the valid ground of prescription.
CABRAL V. PUNO 1976
70 SCRA 606
FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification of Public
Documents for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the
signature of private respondent Silvino San Diego in a deed of
sale of a parcel of land. Cabral moved to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime charge,
since the said document of sale was notarized on August 14,
1948 and registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on
August 26, 1948. The said notarization caused the
cancellation of the original certificate of title and a new
transfer certificate of title was then issued. On March 25,
1975, the motion to quash was granted on the ground of
prescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Resolution. However, according to
petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longer
intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action
against the same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the same
factual averments contained in the criminal information. The
Fiscal, upon the order of respondent Judge Puno, submitted his
comment expressing the view that the crime, has not
prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered
the crime sometime in October 1970, and that in the interest
of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the
respective evidence of both parties in their total meaning.
Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant of
motion to quash. Petitioner Cabral moved for reconsideration
of the Order on the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal
which became final immediately upon promulgation and could
not, therefore, be recalled for correction or amendment"; and

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

(b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San

Diego lost his right to intervene in the prosecution of the
criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the second
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of March 25, 1975
(granting the motion to quash and dismissing the Information)
based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense
HELD:
YES. The Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime became
a bar to another charge of falsification, including the revival of
the Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had
already become final and executory. When the Fiscal moved to
reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or about two (2) months
from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal, the same had
already long been final.
The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion
to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the
grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner
was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172,
sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which
carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. Here, San
Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged
forgery after the document was registered in the Register of
Deeds on August 26, 1948.
While it is true that the offended party, San Diego, through
the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsideration
within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not
stop the running of the period for appeal. He (private
prosecutor) did not have the legal personality to appeal or file
the motion for reconsideration on his (San Diegos) behalf. The
prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor
is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the
motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could
have interrupted the period for appeal.
More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal
case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September 24,
1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara,
on the basis of the same allegations that San Diego's
signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery, filed
on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina
Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case
No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the same property and
damages. It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the
time the order of dismissal was issued there was a pending
civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document
filed by the offended party against the same defendant, the
offended party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of
the criminal case and consequently cannot ask for the
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or appeal from said
order.
SERMONIA v CA
Petitioner: Jose Sermonia
Respondent: Court of Appeals, RTC
FACTS: Jose Sermonia entered into a subsequent marriage in
1975 during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Upon the
knowledge of a second marriage, his first wife filed an
information charging Sermonia with bigamy.
Sermonia moved to quash said information contending that
his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by
prescription, since bigamy is punishable by an afflictive
penalty, it prescribes in 15 years. The information had been

filed only in 1992, seventeen years after he contracted the

said marriage.
The RTC denied the motion to quash, as well as the
consequent motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the appellate court, however, dismissed his
petition for lack of merit, hence the present recourse.
Petitioner avers that since the second marriage contract was
duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,
such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and
thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party
therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the
subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was
registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for
bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only
in 1992.
ISSUE: whether the prescriptive period is deemed to have
taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of
the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the
Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice.
RULING: Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. Bigamy carries
with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being
punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes in
fifteen (15) years. The fifteen-year prescriptive period
commences to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents.
Moreover, the Court is of the view that the principle of
constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the
offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting
marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into
in a place where the offender is not known to be still a
married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to
contract another marriage.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of
constructive notice is not contrary to the well-entrenched
policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of
the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the
offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to
almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor.
While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said
to be open and made of public record by its registration, the
offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the
officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his
previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that
he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his
legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he
contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not
known to be still a married person. And such a place may be
anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the
bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take
time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for
the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on
which the said crime was discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by
the offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration
thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense
would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social

institution cherished and protected by law.
G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIZPAH R. REYES
FACTS:
Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a land. Both
are now deceased. Julio died on September 6, 1970 and his
wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the following
children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes (Petitioner) and the
complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora
Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the
records of the Register of Deeds that the property had already
been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, the
conveyance was allegedly effected through a notarized deed
of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents
Julio and Patricia. The deed of sale was registered with the
ROD on May 26, 1961. The complainants found out that the
signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and that
Reyes also made an untruthful statement that she was single
although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes on May 2,
1950. The document was examined by the NBI experts, and a
report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio
Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged.
Upon complaint by the sisters of the accused and after
conducting an investigation, the fiscal filed with the RTC on
October 18, 1984 2 informations both for falsification of public
document and for making an untruthful statement by stating
that accused was single.
Before arraignment, Reyes filed a motion to quash both
informations on ground that the action has prescribed
The trial court granted the petition, stating that:
...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. x x x
If registration is a notice to the whole world, then registration
is in itself a notice and therefore, the prescriptive period of
registered document must start to run from the date
the same was annotated in the Register of Deeds.

The CA affirmed the RTCs decision, further stating that:

The rule on constructive notice has been applied in the
interpretation of a provision in the Civil Code on the
prescription of actions for annulment of contracts which is
parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The Civil Code
provision states:
Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four
years. This period shall begin:
xxx
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of
the same [Emphasis supplied].
In Armentia v. Patriarca, x x x the Court, interpreting the
phrase "from the time of the discovery" found in the
aforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled that "in legal
contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken
place from the time the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a
notice to the whole world . . ."

ISSUES:
(1) W its discovery may be deemed to have taken place from
the time the document was registered with the Register of
Deeds. YES
(2) W the rule on constructive notice may be applied to
criminal cases. YES
RULING:
The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it
an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime
prescribes in ten (10) years. The ten (10) year prescriptive
period commences to run "from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents . . ."
Citing Cabral vs Puno, x x x This crime prescribes in ten (10)
years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice
of the alleged
forgery after the document was registered
in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
The rule is well-established that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is
constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal
and equitable, included therein.

The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the

presumptions and rules of interpretation used in the law on
prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive
notice, can not be applied in criminal actions.
The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits
are based mainly on practical and equitable grounds. The
lapse of a considerably long period of time obscures the
surrounding circumstances of a particular claim or right and
erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be presented
in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or
right. Moreover, where a particular right has accrued in favor
of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left
on a precarious balance, always susceptible to possible
challenge by an adverse party.
In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that
which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The
application of the rule on constructive notice in the
construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most
certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive
period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e.,
from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the
Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of
sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal
informations for falsification of a public document having been
filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years
from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was
charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's
order quashing the two informations on the ground of
prescription.

CABELIC VS JUDGE GERONIMO

FACTS:
Loreto Cabelic charges Judge Geronimo of MTCC with
Gross Ignorance of the Law.

Petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code

which states that "the period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. . . cannot be construed
in the same manner because the rule on constructive notice is
limited in application to land registration cases.

Cabelic avers that he was manhandled at his former

employer in Antipolo, hence he filed a criminal case for slight
physical injuries and grave coercion before the Prosecutors
Office which referred it to the barangay authorities of Antipolo
(for settlement of the case). No settlement happened thus it
was returned to the Prosecutors Office. A criminal case for
slight physical injuries was filed before MTCC Antipolo (in

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

Judge Geronimos court). On February 29, 1990, respondent

Judge dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Slight
Physical Injuries is a light offense which prescribes in two
months (Art. 90, RPC). It was filed only on February 14, 2000,
it happened on October 9, 1999- more than sixty days.
MR was denied by Judge Geronimo. He said the filing
of criminal action with office of public Prosecutors Office did
not stop the running period of prescription.
Here (this administrative case), complainant
charges respondent with gross ignorance of the law. He
contends that the filing of his criminal case to the Prosecutors
Office on November 3, 1999 tolled the running of prescriptive
period.
Judge contends that the criminal case in question
falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure and therefore the
interruption of the prescriptive period under Section 1, rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not apply.
Court
Administrator
recommended
the
dismissal of the administrative case. The filing to the
Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period. It would have interrupted the period if the
information was filed with the MTCC Antipolo, Rizal on
February 20, 1999.

ISSUE:
1.
2.

Whether or not the administrative case against Judge

Geronimo should be dismissed?
Whether the filing of the criminal action with the
Public Prosecutors Office suspended the running of
the period of prescription?

DECISION:
1.
2.

Yes, it should be dismissed.

Yes, it suspended the running of the period of
prescription.

HELD:
The Supreme Court agrees with the court
administrator only in so far as the dismissal of the instant
case is concerned. The respondent judge was correct in
stating that Slight Physical Injuries is a light offense (arresto
menor- one day to thirty days), being a light offense, the
crime of slight physical injuries prescribes in two months.
Article 91 of RPC provides the period of prescription
shall be interrupted by filing the complaint of information. In
the case of Reodica vs CA, filing of the complaint even with
the fiscals office suspends the running of the statute of
limitations (citing Fransisco vs CA and Pp vs Cuaresma).
In the Reodica case, Section 9 of Rule on Summary
Procedure which provides that cases covered thereby, the
prosecution commences by filing the complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MTCC cannot be taken to
mean that prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing
of a complaint or information directly with said court. In case
of conflict between Rule on Summary Procedure and RPC
(which is a substantive law), latter prevails.
Respondent Judge erred in declaring the crime of
slight physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint before the Prosecutors Office did not toll or
suspend the running of the prescriptive period.
The matter however is judicial in nature and the rule
is that a partys remedy (if prejudiced by the orders of a judge
given in the course of trial) is the proper reviewing court and
not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of
administrative complaint.

An administrative complaint is not the appropriate

remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.
Administrative liability for ignorance of the law does not arise
from the mere fact that a judge issued an order that may be
adjudged to be erroneous.
Rule: Only when a Judge acts fraudulently or
with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are
called for.
Wherefore, administrative case is dismissed.

REPUBLIC VS COJUANGCO ET AL
Facts:

On April 25, 1977 respondents incorporated the United

Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM).

On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its

capitalization by (1) increasing its authorized capital
stock to three million shares without par value; (2)
converting the original subscription of 200,000 to one
million shares without par value and deemed fully paid
for and non-assessable by applying the P5 million
already paid; and (3) waiving and abandoning the
subscription receivables of P15 million.

On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized

capital stock to 10 million shares without par value. On
September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors,
approved
another
amendment
to
UNICOMs
capitalization.

About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of

the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 against
respondents.

The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in UNICOM was

manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5
million and it had no track record of operation.

About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of

the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum,
stating that although it found sufficient basis to indict
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the
action has already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents alleged violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.
Held:
Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses
committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its
amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16,
1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable
under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years. Since the acts complained
of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the
prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in
Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
Assuming the offense charged is subject to prescription,
the same began to run only from the date it was discovered,
namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge
could be filed as late as 1996.
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year
prescriptive period should be computed in accordance with
Section 2 of Act 3326, which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

Two rules for determining when the prescriptive period

shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, if such commission is known; and second,
from its discovery, if not then known, and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the
discovery of such loans.The reason for this is that the
government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that
those loans existed when they were made. Both parties to
such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against
the government. They could only have been discovered after
the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people ousted President
Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no person would
have dared question the legality or propriety of the loans.
PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
FACTS:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavitcomplaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg.
22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan(respondent) with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges
that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate
amount of P9,658,592.00 in favor of private complainant
which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment.
Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3,
2000 that two countsfor violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed
against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan inthe Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed
anOmnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31,
Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liabilityhas been
extinguished by reason of prescription. In defense of her
claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs
theprescription of special penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 (An Act ToEstablish Periods Of Prescription For
Violations Penalized By Special Acts) where the right to file an
action to a proper court and not to merely to prosecution
office forB.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the
commission of the crime. The imputed violation occurred
sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case
was formally filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the
action already prescribes. RTC granted the motion.On the
other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the
office of cityprosecutor constitutes an interruption to the
prescription.
ISSUE: Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered
a judicial proceeding that can interrupt prescription of crime
under B.P. 22?
HELD: YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that,
there is no more distinction between cases under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws with
respect to the interruption of the period of prescription; that
the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation in
the office of prosecutor against accused interrupts the period
of prescription. Following the factual finding the crime was
committed sometime in 1995, the filing of complaint on
September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the
crime validly interrupts the running of precription. Therefore
the action against the respondent Pangilinan did not
prescribe.
GARCIA VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Guevarra spouses seeks recovery of one (1) ladys
diamond ring 18 cts. White gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05
cts. Diamond. Solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. Total
weight which she brought on October 27, 1947 from R.
Rebullida, Inc. Mrs. Guevara lost her ring on February 1952.
On October 11, 1953, while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia,
owner of La Bulakena restaurant recognized her ring in the

finger of Mrs. Garca and inquired where she bought it, which
the defendant answered from her Comare. Spouses Garcia
together with Lt. Cementina and their Attorney proceeded to
the store of Mr. Rebullida who examined the ring, Rebudilla
confirmed that indeed it was her ring. Mrs. Garcia refuted that
the said ring was purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got
it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the
owner , Aling Petring who was boarding in her house; that the
ring might be similar but not the same with that she bought
from Rebudilla.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Garcia is liable for the lost ring
of Mrs. Guevara
HELD:
Yes, according to Article 559 of the Civil Code,
recovery of the lost possession even though the one who got
it is in good faith. But in the case at bar, Mrs. Garcia cannot
invoke good faith since she ought to know that the said ring is
a property in question. The Court found out that Aling Petring
is a mysterious and ephemeral figure. The testimony of Mr.
Rebullida was reliable. Therefore, Mrs. Garcia will pay
Attorneys fee and Exemplary damage.
THE PEOPLE OF
GECOMO y OSIT

THE

PHILIPPINES

vs.

PERCIVAL

FACTS:
Complainant Regina Rapuzon alleges that she has been raped
twice by the accused-appellant Percival Gecomo the first
instance being on June 20, 1994 and the second on July 3,
1994.
Regina and Percival were co-employees at Kim Hiong
Restaurant located near Gil Puyat Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila
where the former worked as a waitress and the latter, a
mami steamer. Both worked in the 7:00 P. M. to 5:00 A. M.
shift of said restaurant.
According to the complainant, on June 20, she was walking
towards her workplace when the accused suddenly placed his
left arm over her shoulder and poked a knife at her. She was
threatened of being killed if she wouldnt come with him.
Scared and intimidated, the victim went with him and she was
brought to Mansion Hotel where she was hit in the stomach
twice leaving her unconscious. When she woke up, she found
blood on her genitalia. The accused slapped her and then
again had carnal knowledge of her and was threatened that
she would be killed if she told anyone about it.
On July 3, Regina went to her workplace to inform her
employer about her resignation. As she was going home, the
accused again intercepted her as he did on June 20 and took
her to his house where the second instance of rape happened.
Upon arriving home in the morning of the following day,
July 4, 1992, complainants mother noticed her wounded and
blackened right cheek and asked her how she got those
injuries. It was then that she told her mother everything that
happened to her. They then went to the Jose Abad Santos
Police Station in Tondo to report the crimes committed by
appellant.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) medico-legal officer Dr.
Louella I. Nario conducted a physical examination of Regina.
Genital findings compatible with sexual intercourse with man
on or about the alleged date of commission.
For his defense, appellant vehemently denied the
charges of rape. He claimed that the complainant was his
girlfriend and that the sexual intercourses on June 20 and July
3, 1992 were with the voluntary will of complainant. He
added that the second carnal intercourse occurred in the
Pension Hotel, and not in his house as alleged by complainant.

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

Appellant posits that under ordinary situations, if the

accusations were true, complainant should have shouted and
cried or screamed for help from the time she was accosted in
the street up to the time that they checked out from the
hotel.
Also, appellant holds it against complainant for failing to
immediately tell her mother or the police authorities about
her ordeal on June 20, 1992. He postulates that the effects of
his supposed threats should have ceased to exist after the
June 20 incident and said complainant being free from the
clutches of her transgressor, no amount of threats could have
prevented her from reporting the crime to her mother or to
the police authorities thereafter
ISSUE:
W/ N the failure of complainant to disclose her defilement
without loss of time to persons close to her or to report the
matter to the authorities destroys the contention that she was
sexually molested and that her charges against the accused
are all baseless, untrue and fabricated
HELD:
Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a
fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or
file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear
the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the
world or risk the offenders making good their threats to kill or
hurt their victims.
The failure of herein complainant to report the incident
immediately does not discredit her credibility, her hesitation
being attributable to the death threats made by appellant, not
to speak of the natural reluctance of a woman having to admit
in public her having been raped. It is not uncommon for young
girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtue
because of the rapists threat on their lives. Not every victim
of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably
with the expectation of mankind. One persons spontaneous
or unthinking, or even instinctive, response to a horrid and
repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while anothers may be
cold indifference.
The law on prescription of crimes would be meaningless
if we were to yield to the proposition that delay in the
prosecution of crimes would be fatal to the State and to the
offended parties. In fixing the different prescriptive periods
on the basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribed therefor,
the law takes into account or allows reasonable delays in the
prosecution thereof. In a number of cases, we have ruled that
a delay of seventeen days, thirty-five days, or even six
months,by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her
honor does not detract from the veracity of her charge.

PANGAN v GATBALITE
GR No. 141718 January 21, 2005
Petitioner : Benjamin Pangan y Rivera
Respondents : Hon Lourdes F. Gatbalite Col. James D. Labordo

On August 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the

decision in the court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel for
the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was
returned unserved with the notation that he no longer resided
at the given address. As a consequence, he also failed to
appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin
issued an order of arrest against the petitioner.
The petitioner was detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell.
On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus and contended that his arrest was illegal and
unjustified on the grounds that:
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto
mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 of the
RPC
(b) having been able to continuously evade service of
sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long
been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the RPC
Petitioner claims that:The period for the computation of
penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to
run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes
final and the convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges
arrest for him to serve sentence.
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime charged with a penalty of arresto
mayor has already prescribed.
HELD
NO. The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the
petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the decision
adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his
detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 93. The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if
the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go
to some foreign country with which this Government has no
extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
The elements of prescription are:1. That the penalty is
imposed by final judgment;
2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence;
3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not
given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign
country with which we have no extradition treaty, or
committed another crime;
4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time
from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by
the convict.

FACTS
The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in a criminal
case in Angeles City MTC.During the trial of the case, Atty.
Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision
without offering any evidence, due to the petitioners constant
absence at hearings.

In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the

evasion of the service of sentence is absent. It was cited in
the case of Infante v. Warden that There was no evasion of
the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion
presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence
consisting in deprivation of liberty.

On September 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the

offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the RTC on
October 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an essential

element, the convict must serve at least a few seconds,
minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentence and then
escapes before the computation of prescription of penalties

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

begins to run.
The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the
convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the
term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered
deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000
and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping
during the term of his service, the period for prescription
never began.

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.

Monsanto (assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three
other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.

Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence

of two months and one day of arresto mayor and should
forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another
offense or charge.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction which was

granted. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while
said motion was pending, she was extended by then President
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted.

TORRES V THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City

treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post
as assistant city treasurer since it was still vacant.

FACTS:
In 1979, Torres was convicted of estafa and was pardoned by
the president with the condition that if he shall violate any
penal law again, his sentence will be carried out. Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was released from
prison. However, by 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole
recommended to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been
charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of
sedition. His pardon was cancelled. He appealed the issue
before the Supreme Court. He contended that his pardon
should not have been cancelled since the judgment on the
new estafa cases were still on appeal. Through his wife and
children, he petitioned to be released from prison alleging that
he was denied due process, and that his constitutional rights
to be presumed innocent and to a speedy trial were violated
upon his recommitment to prison.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms
of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance
of his original sentence.

RULING:
Where a conditional pardonee has allegedly
breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to
proceed against him under Section 64
of the Revised
Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his
conviction therefore by final judgment, in order to effectuate
the recommitment of the pardonee to prison.
It did not matter that Torres was allegedly been acquitted in
two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent
to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains
pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his
right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's
liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. The
incarceration of Torres is legal since he would have served his
final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000,
had he not violated the conditions of the pardon and had thus
had it revoked.
Lastly, only the President has the prerogative to reinstate the
pardon if in his own judgment.Courts have no authority
to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a
convicted criminal.A final judicial pronouncement as to the
guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the
terms of a conditional pardon.
MONSATO VS FACTORAN
FACTS:

Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of

Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local
Government Code. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner
may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended
the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see
to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan
had required to be indemnified in favor of the government as
well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry addressing that the full pardon
bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that
her service in the government has never been interrupted.
That the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the
date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she
should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50.
Petitioner's letter was referred to the Office of the President
for further review and action and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. It was held that the
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the
only ground for reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and
emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension
pendente lite.
Petitioner's contends that the general rules on pardon cannot
apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended
executive clemency while her conviction was still pending
appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of
conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or
forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of
conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not
attach and the status of her employment remained
"suspended." More importantly, when pardon was issued
before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because
there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has
declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has
accordingly dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not public officer, who has been granted
an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
RULING:
The petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to
imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of
prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor
carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal

penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict
from public office or employment, such disqualification to last
during the term of the sentence. Even if the offender be
pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties
remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by the
pardon. The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of
its accessory penalties, suspension from public office.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute
pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the
crime for which she was convicted. Pardon cannot mask the
acts constituting the crime. Thus pardon does not ipso facto
restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended
primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of
the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor
private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude
the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office
forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is
clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular
disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may
apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by
reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications
and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her
offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into
account to determine ultimately whether she can once again
be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot
go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
Lastly, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The
Court cannot oblige her since civil indemnity subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence.
PP V. NACIONAL
Facts:
On December 18, 1989, Walter Nacional alias "Ka Dennis,"
Absalon Millamina alias "Ka Alvin," Efren Musa, Rudy Luces,
Javier
Mirabete alias "Commander,
"
and
Zacarias
Militante alias "Care" were charged with murder.
The six accused were all civilian members of the barangay
organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
NPA at Daraga, Albay. 10 A few days before February 21,
1985, their organization had conference at Barangay Lacag,
Daraga for the purpose of identifying suspected informers of
the military whom they perceived as posing a threat to the
NPA's operations within the vicinity. They identified Quirino
and Joel Lagason, both residents of Barangay Salvacion,
Daraga as military informants and conspired to kill them.
Elevino Rincopan, their team leader, however, disapproved
the proposal for lack of clearance and approval from the
higher NPA authorities.

On Febuary 21 1985 they found them and carried out their

plan. Walter Nacional approached Quirino and said something
to him. Walter then pulled out a gun from his waist and shot
Quirino in the face, hitting him between the eyebrows. Quirino
fell to the ground and died instantly. A few seconds later,
Absalon Millamina shot Joel Lagason on the head. The group
then fled towards the direction of the RCPI Relay Station. Joel's
mother, who was at the scene of the crime, rushed him to the
hospital where he died a few hours later.
Five of them were caught and tried and the trial court found
them guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and were
sentenced accordingly (RP+50k indemnity) The decision was
made on May 31, 1993. And then all five of the accused
appealed their case.
On March 1, 1994, Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante and
Efren Musa, through counsel, moved to withdraw their appeal.
They claimed that the charges against them were political in
nature "committed while they were members of the New
People's Army (NPA). They informed the Court that as political
prisoners, they applied for and were recommended by then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon for conditional pardon
by the President of the Philippines. The Court granted their
motion on May 11, 1994.
ISSUE:
Does the conditional pardon and consequent dismissal of the
appeals of the accused exempt them from payment of the
civil indemnity?
RULING:
The court ruled that the grant of conditional pardon and the
consequent dismissal of the appeals of Walter Nacional,
Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does not
exempt them from payment of the civil indemnity. A
conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the
civil liability arising from the crime.

ARNEL
PROBATION

COLINARES

v.

PEOPLE

FACTS: Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at

around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus
Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby
store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with
Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind
and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about
15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias testified that he was walking home when he saw
Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but
someone struck him with something hard on the right temple,
knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit
him. Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole
incident since he happened to be smoking outside his
house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they
brought Rufino to the hospital. The doctor testified that these
injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to
go home after initial treatment.
On the other hand, Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified
that he was on his way home that evening when he met
Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel
asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but,
rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus
and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back.
Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a
stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with
it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and
tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the
attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled
and hid in his sisters house. On September 4, 2000, he
voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and
four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only
up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court
required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit their
respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel
committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months
of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be
entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a
new
penalty
on
him
that
makes
his
offense
probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law
warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other
hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for
probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected
his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arnel has the right to apply
for probation, when he had already appealed his case, and the
new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one
erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
HELD: The Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted
homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be
entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him

to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he
did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with
its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for
probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him
straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to
instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating
the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was
right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years
and four months maximum, he would have had the right to
apply for probation.
TOLINTENO V ALCONEL
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Tolentino was charged wih Section 4,
Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment on
September 4, 1981, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 8, 1981, after the prosecution had presented part
of its evidence, petitioner manifested his desire to change his
plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser offense of
possession of Indian Hemp [marijuana], under Section 8 of
Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425.
As no objection was interposed by the fiscal, the court allowed
petitioner to withdraw his former plea of guilty and to enter a
plea of guilty to said lessor offense. Petitioner was thereupon
sentenced to imprisonment of six [6] months and one [1] day
to two [2] years and four [4] months, to pay a fine of
P1,000.00, and to pay the costs, with subsidiary imprisonment
in
case
of
insolvency.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of
attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the
penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of
four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and
four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this
new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right
to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

On October 13, 1981, petitioner applied for probation.

Respondent judge forthwith directed the probation officer of
the City of Manila to conduct a post sentence investigation on
said application and to file said report thereon within 60 days.
After conducting such investigation, the probation officer
submitted its report, recommending that petitioner be placed
on a two-year probation upon the claim that the latter was
already on his way to reformation and that a prison cell would
turn
him
into
a
hardened
criminal.

It is true that under the probation law the accused who

appeals from the judgment of conviction is disqualified from
availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out
to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

Such recommendation notwithstanding, the respondent judge

issued the challenged order of March 9, 1982, denying
petitioners application on the ground that it will depreciate
the seriousness of the offense committed.
Motion for reconsideration was denied.

The Probation Law requires that an accused must not have

appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. This requirement outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result
of his appealthat when his conviction is finally affirmed on
appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the
service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for
probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the
appellate courts affirmance of his conviction. Here, however,
Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed
him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between
appeal and probation.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of
correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that
the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from
the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where
the law would allow him to apply for probation. Arnel was
convicted of a wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried

ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that "probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed.
RULING:
"SEC. 5. Post Sentence Investigation. No person shall be
placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the
probation officer and a determination by the court that the
ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as
that of the defendant will be served thereby."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It is evident from the foregoing that the potentiality of the
offender to reform is not the sole, much less the primordial
factor, that should be considered in the grant or denial of an
application for probation. Equal regard to the demands of
justice and public interest must be observed. Thus, Section 8
of P.D. 968 lays down the criteria for the placing of an offender
on
probation,
as
follows:
"Sec. 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In
determining whether an offender may be placed on probation,

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

the court shall consider all information, relative to the

character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical
condition of the offender and available institutional and
community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court
finds
that:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
a)

b)

criminal beyond correction or redemption. Furthermore, the

Sandiganbayan merely relied on the probation officers report,
which is mostly speculative and misleading.
PABLO C. FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS
FACTS:

c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense

committed."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"The conclusion of respondent judge that "probation will
depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed" is based
principally on the admission by the petitioner himself, as
reflected in the report of the probation officer, that he
[petitioner] was actually caught in the act of selling marijuana
cigarettes. Petitioner did not deny or dispute the veracity of
the fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto of selling
marijuana cigarettes. He merely attempted to justify his
criminal act by explaining in his motion for reconsideration
that "he did it only to make some money for the family during
Christmas. Such admission renders a hearing on the
application for probation an unnecessary surplusage and an
idle
ceremony.
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon
the discretion of the court. As aptly noted in U.S. v. Durken,
this discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.
Thus, while under Rep. Act 6425, as amended by P.D. 44,
possession or use of marijuana was punishable by
imprisonment of 6 mouths and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months
and a fine ranging from P600.00 to P6,000.00 - the penalty
imposed upon petitioner herein -possession and use thereof is
now punishable by imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1
day to 12 years and fine ranging from P6,000.00 to
P12,000.00
under
B.P.
Blg. 179.
The observation of the Solicitor General on this increase of
penalty
is
apropos:

Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees,

was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5)
separate Informations instituted by five of his employees,
each Information charging him with gravely maligning them
on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner
Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4)
of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a
prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime
committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda
Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the
offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Unsatisfied with the decision of MeTC, the petitioner appealed
to the RTC.
After failure to interpose an appeal, the RTCs decision
became final.
Before he was arrested, we filed a certiorari to the CA, and
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even
after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the
MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties
imposed.

"The implication is clear. The penalties were increased to take

it out of the range of probationable offenses. Thus, the State
has spoken and considers that this is one case where
probation will depreciate the offense committed, and will not
serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the
community, particularly, the innocent and gullible young."
Petition dismissed..

HELD:

CABATINGAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 102 SCRA 187 [1981]

Criminal Law 1: Probation Law (PD 968)

Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly

mandates that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction,"

FACTS:
Petitioner Alicia Cabatingan was convicted for operating an
illegal Jai-Alai betting station. She applied for probation, but
the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the grounds
that there is undue risk of her committing another crime
and that the granting of the petition will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense she committed. The decision was
mainly based on the probation officers recommendation for
dismissal of the said application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
Sandiganbayans act of denying petitioners application for
probation.
HELD:
YES. In the case at bar, it was established by ample evidence
that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation.
Moreover, it was not established that she is a hardened

Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.

First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its
benefits cannot extend to those not expressly
included.

In the case at bar, the petitioner perfected an appeal upon

raising it to the RTC.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the
MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no
need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within
the probationable period.
The petitioner in the case contended that the appeal made is
for the court to lessen the penalty for him to avail of the
probation (which limits it to the penalty of imprisonment not
exceeding 6 years) and not on asserting his innocence.
The court found the petitioners contention untenable. The
penalty imposed by the MTC is probationable. The petitioner
does not have to appeal for reduction of penalty. The court
provided the following guidelines in computing for the
maximum period to qualify in a probation:

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found

guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should
not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms
imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of
his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The
multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none
of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation
Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to
probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified.
P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total
when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term
of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law
does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take
each penalty separately and distinctly with the others.
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or
even correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but
to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that
petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole
purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for
probation since he was already qualified under the MeTC
Decision but rather to insist on his innocence. In such case,
makes the petitioner disqualified in availing probation.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way
beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital way
beyond the period allowed by law and crucial.
From the records it is clear that the application for probation
was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had
been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of
the Decision" of the RTC. This is a ground of disqualification as
provided in Sec 4 of PD 968:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . .
place the defendant on probation

SABLE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

APRIL 7, 2009
Purpose of Probation and when to file
Probation not tenable when appeal has been perfected

FACTS:
Petitioner allegedly falsified an Extrajudicial Declaration of
Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Partition Agreement, as the
signatures contained therein were not the signatures of the
true owners of the land. Petitioner and Ildefonsa also allegedly
caused it to appear that a certain Remedios Abangan, who
was already dead, signed the document. On 28 November
2000, the RTC convicted petitioner of the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents under Article 172 in relation to Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code, but Ildefonsa was acquitted.
On 13 December 2002, a copy of the Order denying
reconsideration of the judgment was received by
petitioners counsel. Due to petitioners failure to interpose
a timely appeal, an entry of judgment was issued on June 5,
2003.
Pending resolution of the Motions to Recall Warrant of Arrest
and to Vacate Entry of Judgment with Reconsideration,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on 17 June 2003.
Subsequently, in an Order dated 22 July 2003, respondent
Judge denied the Motions to Recall Warrant of Arrest and to
Vacate Entry of Judgment. Petitioners Notice of Appeal was
also denied for having been filed out of time.

On 25 August 2003, petitioner moved for the

reconsideration of the 22 July 2003 Order and
intimated her desire to apply for probation instead of
appealing the judgment of conviction. The RTC and CA denied
her motion for lack of merit. They stated that the alleged
failure of petitioners counsel to timely appeal the judgment of
conviction following the denial of the reconsideration thereof
could not amount to excusable negligence. It further
enunciated that a notice of appeal of judgment filed six
months after the denial of the motion for reconsideration was
denied is filed out of time and, as a result, the application for
probation must necessarily fail because the remedies of
appeal and probation are alternative and mutually exclusive
of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in affirming the trial courts order denying
petitioners application for probation
HELD:
NO.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a
penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and
encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately
admit his liability and save the state the time, effort and
expenses to jettison an appeal. The pertinent provision of the
Probation Law, as amended, reads:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The petitioner filed the application for probation on 25 August
2003, almost eight months from the time the assailed
judgment of the RTC became final. Clearly, the application for
probation was filed out of time pursuant to Rule 122, Sec. 6 of
the Rules of Court, which states that an "appeal must be
taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from."
Furthermore, the application for probation must necessarily
fail, because before the application was instituted,
petitioner already filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC on
17 June 2003. The Probation Law is patently clear that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction."
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part
of the accused -- to wager on the result of his appeal -- that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment
of truth well night at hand and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch,"
thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of
his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of
at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be
reformed and rehabilitated; who manifest spontaneity,
contrition and remorse.
Therefore, there is no abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution affirming the trial courts Orders
denying petitioners Notice of Appeal, Motions to Recall

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

Warrant of Arrest and to Vacate Entry of Judgment, and the

application for probation. There is nothing capricious in not
granting an appeal after the time to file the same has lapsed,
nor is there anything arbitrary in denying an application for
probation after a notice of appeal has been filed.

FACTS:
On 1994, petitioner Alejandra Pablo was charged with a
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as
the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations, for
issuing three bad checks in the total amount of P2,334.00
each to complainant Nelson Mandap.

LAGROSA VS PP (PROBATION)
Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D, 94-00198-D
and 94-00199-D, respectively, the three cases were not
consolidated.

FACTS:
The RTC of Tagbilaran City, rendered a decision in Criminal
Case finding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin
guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 for having in their
possession forest products without permits. The trial court
sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from (2) years, (4) months and (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC, with the modification as to
the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from (6) months and (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, tom(1) year, (8) months and (21)
days of prision correccional, as maximum.
Petitioners filed an application for Probation with the trial
court which was denied. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. However, the CA still affirmed the
resolutions of the trial court.
Petitioners contend that they should be allowed to apply for
probation even if they had already appealed the decision of
the trial court. They argue that their case should be
considered an exception to the general rule which excludes an
accused who has appealed his conviction from the benefits of
probation. In the case at bar, the trial court sentenced
petitioners to a maximum term of eight years, which was
beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became
eligible for probation after the CA reduced the penalty
imposed on them. They submit that the ruling in the case of
Francisco v. CA is not applicable because the accused
appealed their conviction notwithstanding the fact that the
maximum term of the prison sentence imposed by the trial
court was less than six years.
OSG reiterates the express provision of P.D. 968 prohibiting
the grant of probation to those who have appealed their
convictions. It argues that, even if the petitioners have
appealed for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty, this
fact does not serve to remove them from the prohibition in
Section 4 of P.D. 968 for the law makes no such distinction.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners can apply for probation. Held:
HELD: No. Petitioners should be precluded from seeking
probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto
relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the
Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent
speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who,
although already eligible, does not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.
Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar
the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is solely
to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be
equitable, the court did not accept this proposition, especially
given the factual circumstances of this case. Had the
petitioners appeal from the decision of the trial court raised
the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole
issue, perhaps the Court would have been more sympathetic
to their plight.
PABLO

V.

CASTILLO

(2000)

On June
rendered
convicting
her a fine

21, 1995, Branch 41 of the said lower court

judgment in Criminal Case No. 94-0199-D,
petitioner of the crime charged and imposing upon
of P4, 648.00.

On November 28, 1995, Branch 43 promulgated its decision

in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-D, finding
petitioner guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, and sentencing her
to pay the amount of P4, 668.00 and to serve a prison
term of thirty (30) days in each case.
Petitioner applied for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 9400197-D and 94-00198-D. Her application was denied on the
ground that the petitioner is disqualified under Section 9
of P.D. 968 (Probation Law). Respondent judge denied
petitioners application for probation in the Order dated
March 25, 1996. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to
no avail. The same was denied on April 29, 1996.
ISSUE: Whether the denied application for probation by the
petitioner, in violation of Section 9 of P.D. 968, is proper.
RULING: Yes.
Under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the following
offenders cannot avail of the benefits of probation:
a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years;
b) those convicted of subversion or any crime against the
national security or the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not
less than two hundred pesos;
d) those who have been once on probation under the
provisions of this Decree; and
e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
The National Probation Office denied petitioners application
for probation under Section 9 paragraph (c) P.D. 968 because
a prior conviction was entered against the petitioner
on June 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 94-0199, penalizing
her with a fine of P4,648.00; thereby placing her within the
ambit of disqualification from probation under Section 9
paragraph (c) of P.D. 968.
Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the
effect that a person who was previously convicted by final
judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less
than two hundred pesos, is disqualified from applying for
probation.
ANSELMO DE
PHILIPPINES

LEON

CUYO

vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

FACTS:
On August 25, 2009, Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) in San Fernando City, La Union, found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
him to imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day to

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

one (1) year. He was likewise ordered to pay private

complainant Alejo Cuyo the amount of P10,000 for attorneys
fees and litigation expenses. Petitioner was not present during
the promulgation of the judgment and was represented by his
counsel instead.
His motion for reconsideration was denied on October 23,
2009. He subsequently filed a Motion for Probation on
November, 5, 2009 but is denied on the ground that it had
been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen days as
provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. 968.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of
probation.
HELD:
This court held that the RTC that the Motion for Probation was
filed out of time.
Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by
reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the
Court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is
for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is
absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused
to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and
the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his
absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day
to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional
penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light
felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of
which the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of
imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos
(P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light
felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was
therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the
promulgation of the judgment.
To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when
the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25 August 2009.
Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is
convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
In case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation despite notice, and the failure to appear was
without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the
remedies available in the Rules against the judgment.

MORENO VS. COMELEC

(G.R. NO. 168550. AUGUST 10, 2006)
FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify
Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that
the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four
(4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28
of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayonv. Mutia,
the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the
accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also
argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976
(Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any
fine
imposed. The
order
of
the
trial
court
dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation
and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in
the July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary
hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer
recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running
for Punong Barangay. The Comelec First Division adopted this
recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed with
the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was
affirmed. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. The
grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution
of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.
Moreno argues that the disqualification under the
Local Government Code applies only to those who have
served their sentence and not to probationers because the
latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law
should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies
only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
disqualified,
his
subsequent
election
as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon
of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment dated November 18, 2005 on behalf
of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that
this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec definitively settled a similar
controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense involving
moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted
probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment dated March 27,
2006, reiterating his arguments and pointing out material
differences between his case and Dela Torre v.Comelec which
allegedly warrant a conclusion favorable to him. According
to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral
turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case,
applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction
and only after appealing his conviction, such that he could not
have been eligible for probation under the law.

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and

was granted probation within the period specified therefor. He
never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code does not apply to him.

expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not

affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.
We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run
for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in
the
July
15,
2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

ISSUE:
WON Morenos sentence was in fact served.
HELD:
Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. the
phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence should
have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those
who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude and to those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment. It has been held that the
perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative
remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which
is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply
for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order
placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather,
in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held
that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed
upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of
probation. It appears then that during the period of probation,
the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under
probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides
that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer
does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but
is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed
in the probation order.

SAPIERA VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on several
occasions, purchased from Monrico Mart grocery items, mostly
cigarettes and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo
de Guzman. These checks were signed by Sapiera on the
back. When they were presented for payment, the checks
were dishonoured because the drawers account was already
closed. Respondent Ramon Samua informed Arturo de
Guzman and petitioner but both failed to pay. Hence, four
charges of Estafa were filed against Sapiera while two counts
of BP 22 was filed against Arturo de Guzman. These cases
were consolidated.
Petitioner was acquitted in the charge of estafa filed against
her but she was found liable for the value of the checks.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable
when she was acquitted in the criminal charges against her.
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court provides that
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil, unless this shows that the fact from
which the civil liability is based is proven to not have existed
because of such acquittal. Civil liability is not extinguished
where: (a) the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt. (b)
Where the court expressly declares that the liability is not
criminal but only civil, (c) where the civil liability is not derived
from or based on the criminal act. The decision of the case
would show that the acquittal was based on failure of the
prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy
between her and De Guzman. Since all checks were signed by
Sapiera on the back, sec 17 of Negotiable instruments law
says that she would be considered an indorser of the bill of
exchange and under section 66 thereof would be held liable
for breach of warranty and is held liable to pay the holder who
may be compelled to pay the instrument.
LUISITO P. BASILIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA
FACTS:

When Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts

finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to
him, including the right to run for public office.

On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the

Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with double homicide and
double physical injuries.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 70278.

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere

privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred
by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who
thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by
law for the offense of which he was convicted. Thus, the
Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding
who are qualified for probation.

"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the

municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck
with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of
Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and without taking the necessary care and
precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries
to persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck in a
careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a
result of which said dump truck being then driven by him
hit/bumped and sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a
motorized tricycle with plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto
Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00; b)
an automobile Toyota Corona with plate no. NAL -138 driven

We agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should

be construed as an exception to the Local Government
Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local
elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation
which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in the amount of

P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018
driven by Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount d) an automobile Mitsubishi Lancer
with plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto thereby
causing damage of an undetermined amount and 3) a Ford
Econo Van with plate no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron
thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount; that
due to the strong impact caused by the collision, the driver
Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo
Advincula y Poblete were hit/bumped which directly caused
their death; while the other 2 passengers, namely; Cirilo
Bangot sustained serious physical injuries which required
medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days which
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained
physical injuries which required medical attendance for a
period of less than nine days and incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial
court
a
"Special
Appearance
and
Motion
for
Reconsideration"[6] praying that the judgment dated February
4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected
him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil
aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of
merit on September 16, 1991.[7] Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for
Execution of the subsidiary civil liability[9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders.
One denied due course and dismissed Basilios appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period. [10] The
other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him
for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil
indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991. [11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the
Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4,
1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was
concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing
the issuance of a writ of execution against the petitioner.
Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not
afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for
the civil liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65.

vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal

proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner
should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the
essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against
accused because it was his truck that was involved in the
incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance company, with which
his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the
accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.
[23]
Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings,
despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution
adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship.
[24]
With the convicts application for probation, the trial courts
judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view
that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner
was not denied due process. He had all his chances to
intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was
not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to
intervene at the appropriate time. Nex old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the
proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming
that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion
for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial
court to make an opposition thereto, which he did on October
17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and accused
and that the latter was not discharging any function in relation
to his work at the time of the incident. [25] In addition, counsel
for private respondent filed and duly served on December 3,
1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation
praying for the grant of the motion for execution. [26] This was
set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for
petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in
open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was
only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a
counter-manifestation[27] that belatedly attempted to contest
the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the
civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the
Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary
liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree
with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of
law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for
sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court.
PEOPLE VS. DAGAMI
Rape-Indeterminate Sentence
Circumstance

Law-Information-Aggravating

Facts:
Visitacion Locaas is a mother of 3 and wife of a convict. On
October 31, 1991, respondent ALBERTO DAGAMI entered
the house of the victim Visitacion. The respondent with the aid
of a gun, raped the victim.

HELD:
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is
found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. [17] This liability
is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the
award is made.[18] However, before execution against an
employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing
set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employeremployee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty
of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he
commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that
said employee is insolvent.[19]
There are two instances when the existence of an employeremployee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged

Later, the victim went to her father and reported the incident
to the Barangay Captain which is the respondents brother
who told them to lodge the complaint to the police. Visitacion
submitted herself to an examination by an OB-GYNE. Which
the latter affirmed that rape actually happened.
Upon the release of her husband, Visitacion later went to fetch
and live with him.
In the respondents defense, he invoked the sweetheart
story. He alleged that Visitacion and him had an illicit affair
while the formers husband is in jail. His testimonies were
supported by some witnesses.
RTC found the respondent guilty. .with the use of a deadly
weapon, a handgun, and applying the pertinent provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, convicts him to suffer an

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE

(1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law
CA affirmed RTC decision: .The appellate court found no
cogent reason to disturb the judgment of the trial court, but
ruled that the trial court erred in applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law because the law does not apply to persons
convicted
of
offenses
punishable
by reclusion
perpetua. Rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a
single indivisible penalty which, under Art. 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, must be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Thus, the CA increased the
penalty
meted
to
the
appellant
from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, and likewise increased his
civil liability from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
Issue: WON Alberto Dagami is guilty of rape with attendant
aggravating circumstances?
Held:
Alberto Dagami is guilty of rape but the aggravating
circumstances being not alleged in the information will not be
counted. ..the aggravating circumstances in question cannot
be appreciated for the purpose of fixing a heavier penalty in
this case, they can, however, be considered as basis for an
award of exemplary damages. Evidence proving these
circumstances forms part of the actual commission of the
crime and justifies an award of exemplary damages under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code even when the said aggravating
circumstances were not alleged in the information...

Accused-appellants insist that they had no motive to shoot the

victims. However, even in the absence of a known motive,
the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential to convict
when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Lack of
motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the
participation of the accused therein are definitely shown.

*The RTCs ruling wasnt presented in the full text, but I

presumed that in the ruling of the RTC, the civil indemnities
awarded were kind of excessive or unsupported since this
issue was comprehensively addressed by the SCs ruling. Its
just a logical deduction though.*
ISSUES:
1. Whether Banisa is considered a co-conspirator in the case;
2. Whether the civil indemnities awarded by the RTC were
proper and justifiable
HELD:
1.

During the trial, the special aggravating circumstance of the

use of a weapon (handgun) and the aggravating circumstance
of dwelling were proven. Nonetheless, these aggravating
circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty
because the same were not alleged in the Information.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure now provide that aggravating as well as qualifying
circumstances must be alleged in the information; otherwise,
they cannot be considered against the accused even if proven
during the trial. Being favorable to the appellant, this rule, as
amended, should be applied retroactively to this case.

NO. From the testimony of the victims as well as from

the physical evidence, it seems that SPO1 Bangcado
was the lone gunman, while PO3 Banisa merely stood
behind him with his gun drawn. Thus, as to the identity
of the gunman, it is apparent that both witnesses were
positive
only
as
far
as
Bangcado
was
concerned. However, it seems that they only
concluded that Banisa participated in the shooting
because he was also holding a gun. The failure of the
surviving victims to assert with confidence that Banisa
also fired his gun raises reasonable doubt as to
whether he participated in the shooting.

In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to

commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from
different acts directed against one and the same
person is individual and not collective, and that each of
the participants is liable only for his own acts.
Consequently, Banisa was absolved from criminal
responsibility for the assault on the victims.

PEOPLE VS. BANGCADO

November 28, 2000
FACTS:
On 27 June 1993, Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino were at
the Skyview Restaurant. Moments later, the group of SPO1
Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa sat one table away
from Cogasi and his friends. When the latter left the
restaurant to go home, they noticed Bangcado and Banisa
following them. Asserting their authority as part of Operation
Kapkap, Bangcado frisked the 4 persons for possible weapons,
to which they obliged since the two policemen were armed.
With Banisa standing guard behind him with a drawn gun,
Bangcado ordered Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to form
a line against the Ford Fierra facing him in that order. Without
any warning, Bangcado suddenly fired his gun in quick
succession at the 4 persons.

Cogasi woke up to find himself confined together with

Clemente. Lino and Adawan died from gunshot wounds in
their heads while Cogasi suffered a gunshot wound at the
neck and Clemente received 2 gunshot wounds. After their
release from the hospital, Cogasi and Clemente filed a
complaint with the NBI in Baguio City and thereafter positively
identified the accused during a lineup.

2.

YES. The general rule is that claims for actual damages

should be supported by actual receipts. However, it was
undisputed that the victims are members of the
indigenous community and were buried according to
their customs and traditions. The relatives of the
victims attested that they incurred expenses for the
caao, the traditional gathering of Igorots. The Court is
not unaware that the informal market system still
governs the economic transactions of indigenous
communities. Thus, receipts and other documents do
not play a large role in their daily commercial
transactions. In this case, wherein it is clearly
established that the claimants were indeed members of
indigenous communities, then the court should allow
reasonable claims for expenses incurred in relation to
traditional burial practices.

The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of

earning capacity of the deceased Leandro Adawan. The
fact that the prosecution did not present documentary
evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude
recovery of the damages. Testimonial evidence is
sufficient to establish a basis for which the court can
make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

the loss of earning capacity. Moreover, in fixing the

damages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased
victim, the Court can consider the nature of its
occupation, his educational attainment and the state of
his health at the time of his death. The testimony of
Adawans father sufficiently established the basis for
making such an award.

heirs of the victim P 77, 421 for the actual and moral
damages including death indemnity.
ISSUE:
W/ N the trial court erred in the civil indemnity and actual and
moral damages given to the heirs of the victim
HELD:

On the other hand, the Court has no basis to award

damages for Richard Linos loss of earning capacity
because the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence
on this matter. Civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 is automatically granted to the offended
party, or his/her heirs in case of the formers death,
without need of further evidence other than the fact of
the commission of any of the crimes of murder,
homicide, parricide or rape. Moral and exemplary
damages may be separately granted in addition to
indemnity.

Under present case law, the award of P50,000.00 for civil

indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
murder. Moral
damages, vis-a-vis compensatory
damages or civil indemnity, are different from each other
and should thus be awarded separately.

Bangcado was convicted and held liable for:

1.

P75,000.00 as indemnity for Linos death, P59,300.00

as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages;

2.

P75,000.00
as
indemnity
for
Adlawans
death, P93,100.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00
as moral damages;

3.

P100,000.00 each as moral damages to Cogasi and

Clemente

There is no sufficient basis as an award for unearned

income, isnce the said P 65,000 alleged income of the victim
who is a farmer, is self-serving. The wife of the victim did not
also adduce proof of the average expenses of the victims
burial
and
his
net
income.

It bears stress that compensation for lost income is in

the nature of damages and as such requires due proof of the
damage suffered; there must be an unbiased proof of the
deceaseds average income. Hence, in the present case, with
the accuseds wife giving only a self-serving and assumed
average income of the victim, and having no sufficient proof
of the expenses made., there can be no reliable estimate of
the deceaseds lost income.

PEOPLE VS MALLARE
FACTS:
On October 4, 1999, an Information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging Melchor M. Mallare (Mallare) and
Elizabeth M.
Gosudan (Gosudan), Mayor and Treasurer,
respectively with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the accused
were public officers and that an audit report was made. There
was also restitution in the amount of 110,000.00.
Additionally, there was a written demand on the accused to
pay the shortage amount of 1,487,107.40.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court is correct in convicting Mallare and
Gosudan of Malversation of funds
HELD :

PEOPLE VS CASTILLANO
(Civil Indemnities)
FACTS:
The family of victim Diosdado Volante, a farmer, and
that of accused Jaime Castillano and his family, were in bad
blood since the latters frequent indiscriminate firing of his
gun in their neighborhood. This incident worsened when the
victim approached the accused and asked to stop firing his
gun, for fear of someone from his family getting hit; but
accused rebutted that their neighbors arent even
complaining. A heated altercation ensued, and prompted the
accused to fire towards the house of the victim. Since then,
the accused was always carrying a bolo everytime he passed
the
house
of
the
victim.
A week later, a neighboring teacher witnessed the
accused and his two sons as they were planning to go to the
victims house, and tried to convince them to settle the
dispute peacefully. But the accused and his sons forged on
towards the house of the victim at night. At first, the victim
did not mind them, but the accused and sons barged inside
the house and his sons ganged up on the victim by taking
turns on stabbing him. The victim died.
When the trial ensued, the victims wife testified that
when he was still alive, he had an annual income of over P
65,000. She also spent P 18,000 for the funeral and 9,000 for
the food and other expenses. She also suffered sleepless
nights and mental anguish from his death. Thus, the trial court
found the sons of the accused guilty of murder and to pay the

The essential elements of the crime of Malversation

of Public Funds are the following:
(1) That the accused is a public officer;
(2) That he/she had custody and/or control
of funds by reason of his/her office;
(3) That the funds involved were public
funds for which he/she is accountable; and
(4) That he/she appropriated or consented,
or through
abandonment
or
through
negligence, permitted another person to
take said public funds.

On the first element, Mallare and Gosudan are public

officers at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense. On the second and third elements, as
Municipal Treasurer, accused Gosudan had the duty
to have custody and the obligation to exercise proper
management of the municipal funds, and accused,
Mallare, as the local chief executive, is responsible
for the supervision of all government funds and
property pertaining to his agency. On the fourth
element, there is evidence showing that accused
Gosudan herself admitted that she gave the

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

1 Wigmore

missing amount to several municipal officials and

employees.
The petitioners contended that what Gosudan gave
to certain officials and employees were not loans but
reimbursement expenses such as cash advances for
traveling expenses, purchase of spare parts and
salary advances. The prosecution contended that all
the elements of Malversation of Funds were present.
The Court carefully reviewed the records and find no
reason to overturn Sandiganbayans decision. The
subject loans that Gosudan extended to the said
municipal officials and employees including herself
were unofficial and unauthorized loans and,
therefore, anomalous in nature. The Sandiganbayan
was correct in ruling that said loans were nothing but
personal loans taken from the cash account of
the Municipality of Infanta,
Pangasinan.
Gosudan

unlawfully disbursed funds from the coffers of the

municipality and, therefore, guilty of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds. Like Gosudan, Mallare
is also guilty of the same crime for accepting or
getting for himself the loan amount of 300,998.59
from Gosudan as evidenced by his written
acknowledgment
in
the
COA
Audit
Teams
confirmation letter. His acceptance of the subject
loan amount of 300,998.59 without any supporting
official voucher is proof that there was a conspiracy
in the illegal disbursement of the subject loan
amounts. Mallare and Gosudan appropriated, took,
misappropriated
or
consented
or,
through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take public funds.