DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEA000ARIERS 1V(ELFTH Ain FORCE IACC)

BERGSTROM MR FORCE BASE, TEXAS

20 gcl 192

FROM: CC

SUBJ: Aircraft Accident Investigation: F-117A, SN 82-0801

4 August 1992, 49 FW (416 FS), Hollonan AFB NM
TO: JA

Subect aija accident investigation is approved.

Commander

Ot ir

n'teliCa

CERTIFICATION
I certify that all copies are true and accurate copies of the
originals. The original is used in every case where available.
The original pilot flight and personnel records are kept at
Nolloman AFB, New Mexico. The original stereo flight plan is on
file with Albuquerque center (FAA), Albuquerque, New Mexico. The
flight data recorder information (TAB 0) is a copy of information
provided by Lockheed, Palmdale, California. The aircraft
maintenance records and maintenance personnel records (where
copies) are copies of originals on file at Holloman AFB, New
Mexico.

A. HOLM
Investigating 0

Col, USAF

1.

STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE:

a.

AUTHORITY:

At the direction of the Commander, Headquarters Twelfth

Air Force, an AFR 110-14 investigation of a major aircraft
accident involving F-117A, SN 82-0801, was conducted at
Bolloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. 12 AF/CC, letter dated
24 August 1992, appointed the investigating officer and 12
AF/CC letters, dated 3 September 1992, appointed the
technical advisors (TABs Y-1, Y-2, 1-3, Y-4).
Investigating Officer:
Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Holmes Jr.
12 COS/AOS, Bergstrom AFB, Texas
Technical Advisors:
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin West, Flight Surgeon
49 Medical Group, Holloman AFB, New Mexico
Captain Greg Sembower, Operations Advisor
415 FS, Rolloman AFB, New Mexico
Senior Master Sergeant Richard R. Evans,
Maintenance Advisor
415 FS, Holloman AFB, New Mexico
The objective of this investigation is to obtain and preserve
available evidence for claims, litigation, disciplinary and
administrative actions, and for all other purposes deemed
appropriate by competent authority.
b.

PURPOSE:

This investigation was conducted to determine the facts

and circumstances surrounding the crash of Air Force F-117A, SN
82-0801, Call Sign SHABA 67, on 4 August 1992, 3NM west of La
Luz, 814 NNE of Holloman AFB, New Mexico. The aircraft was
destroyed. The pilot, Captain John Mills, suffered a minor post
ejection chin laceration.

HEADQUARTERS
TWELFTH AIR FORCE
STAFFJUDGEADVOCATE

8 Mar 95

TO: 49 FW/JA
Holloman AIR, NM
Attached AFR 110-14, Accident Investigation is
forwarded to you per instructions from HQ USAF/JACT,
Mr. Cormier.

DWAYNE P. ASH
Paralegal Specialist

Ptoktsion

2. SUMMARY OF FACTS:
a. HISTORY OF FLIGHT: SHABA 67, a single ship F-117A,
departed Holloman Air Force Base on a night mission qualification
training (MQT) mission at approximately 2115 MST on August 4,
1992. It was the pilot's fourth night mission, with three previous night missions having been accomplished within the previous
thirteen days. On August 3, the pilot flew Night Surface Attack1 (NSAT-1), which was the same route of flight as the mishap
mission (TAB T-18, V-119). On the day of the mishap, the mission
was briefed in the early afternoon, allowing the pilot four to
five hours of mission preparation time prior to stepping to the
aircraft.
The primary aircraft for his line was not ready, so
the pilot went to the spare, aircraft 82-0801, the mishap aircraft. _After going to the spare, ground operations proceeded
normally and without incident. The end-of-runway crew noticed
two loose fasteners on the aircraft video tape recorder (AVER)
panel in the nose wheel well, and tightened them.
No other
problems were discovered. SHABA 67 departed on runway 16.
The
pilot reported in to departure control while climbing out, and
immediately declared an emergency. He turned left to a heading
of 340 degrees and climbed to approximately 7300 feet, which is
the radar downwind position at Holloman AFB (TAB V-14, AB-10
through 28).
Captain Mills contacted the Supervisor of Flying
(SOF) and reported an environmental control system (ECS) light
with associated right bleed duct overheat light, followed shortly
by multiple hydraulic lights. He also had a single flight control system (FCS) light on the annunciator panel. Within two
minutes of these reported problems, the aircraft performed an
apparent uncommanded right aileron roll from which the pilot was
He ejected
unable to recover (TAB J-6, 14-5, V-108, V-126).
successfully after approximately 540 degrees of roll. The aircraft impacted the ground seconds later and was destroyed on
impact. The pilot initiated his own recovery by calling his
squadron on the telephone from a nearby home within minutes of
landing (TAB V-1, V-2, V-126).
b.
MISSION: The mission was scheduled as an MQT upgrade
mis sion, NSAT-1X, a single ship night mission with multiple

targets enroute. A NSAT-1 sortie was flown the previous night,

and was noneffective due to a broken AVTR and Infra Red
Acquisition Designation Subsystem (IRADS) problems. The route
of flight for both nights was to be identical (TAB T-13).
C.
BRIEFING AND PREFLIGHT: Mission planning
for the
sortie met standards. On 4 August, the pilot attended the 1400L

mass brief. The emergency of the day briefed by Capt Brannon,

discussed bleed air malfunctions (TAB V-118). After the mass
brief he was individually briefed by Capt Kohntopp (designated
Instructor Pilot) on specific techniques and mission upgrade
requirements. Capt Kohntopp also was the instructor for the five
previous flights. Crew rest was not a problem, and testimony
indicates the pilot was getting nine to ten hours of sleep in the
previous few nights. The pilot stepped one hour and five minutes
prior to scheduled takeoff time. His primary aircraft was not
ready for flight so he was given the spare; acft 0601. All
ground activity was normal from that point (TAB V-99, V-115, V118).

d.

FLIGHT ACTIVITY:

SHABA 67 was filed for a CLOUD ONE departure.

He
took off at 2115 MDT on runway 16. Takeoff was normal through
gear retraction (TAB K-5, V-4).
(2) During ground operations the auxiliary power unit
(APU) provides bleed air to the environmental control system
Upon gear retraction the ECS surges as the
(TAB AB-48)
(ECS)
engine starts providing high pressure, high temperature engine
bleed air (TAB AB-46, 47). Within seconds after takeoff the
pilot got a master caution light, ECS light, and an associated
He contacted departure,
right bleed duct overheat light.
immediately declared an emergency, and entered a radar downwind
position, heading 340 degrees at approximately 7300 feet MSL (TAB
.

V-17, 14-3, 5).

(3) At approximately the same time he rolled out 340

degrees, the pilot got a hydraulic (HYD) caution light with a
SINGLE FCS, and multiple hydraulic caution lights, including
right flight HID pump, utility A and utility B, with hydraulic
pressures indicating normally. The pilot contacted the SOF and
reported his ECS and hydraulic lights. He asked the SOF to help
Capt
with the emergency checklist for the ECS (TAB 14-5, 7B-49).
Mills was hand flying the aircraft and while flying north started
a one-to-two degree climb for terrain clearance. He was about
seven miles east of Holloman AFB (TAB V-103).
(4) The aircraft continued a gentle climb in a level
flight condition, at a reported best guess airspeed of 325 knots
A ground witness best guess for
indicated airspeed (KIAS).
airspeed was 150 KIAS (TAB V-111, 9-126). The pilot had his
hands on the stick and throttles when the aircraft entered an
3

uncommanded right roll, reported by the pilot as a full deflection right aileron roll. No yawing tendencies were reported. He
recalls no specific actions taken to counteract the uncommanded
right roll. Captain Millswatched the roll through the Head-UpDisplay (HUD) with the mountains still visible in the distance.
He looked down at his hands once during the roll ensuring a
neutral stick. After an estimated 540 degrees of right roll he
ejected with the aircraft inverted and estimated 10 degrees nose
low. Pilot testimony indicates that the aircraft impacted the
ground before he experienced opening shock from his parachute
(TAB V-109, V-127).
Captain Mills' contact with the Supervisor of
(5)
Flying (SOF) was limited to one minute and 28 seconds (TAB N-5):
This began with initial contact and stopped when the tower hears
the first emergency locator transmitter (ELT) beacon. During
their brief discussion, Capt Mills asked the SOF to "give him"
the ECS checklist (TAB N-5). This was followed by a discussion
of his hydraulic malfunctions. During the transmissions between
the SOF and pilot, another pilot in the tower upgrading to SOF
pulled out T.O. 1F-117A-1 to chapter three (emergency
procedures). Because he heard the discussion about the hydraulic
system, he went straight to that section (TAB V-69). Before the
SOF could confirm which emergency lights were on in Capt Mill's
cockpit an ELT transmission was heard in the tower (TAB N-5).
F-117A aircraft SN 82-0801 impacted the ground
The
at 2120:24 MST on 4 August, 1992, near La Luz, New Mexico.
crash location is 8 nautical miles north-northeast of Holloman
Air Force Base, at North 32 58 10, West 106 00 15. The aircraft
impacted 70 degrees nose low, 52 degrees right bank, with the
standby airspeed indicator reading 190 KIAS (TAB J-14). Fuel and
hydraulic systems were functioning properly at impact. Electrical
power was available throughout flight. Engines were operating at
No vertical velocity
low power at impact (TAB J-6, 13).
indicator (VVI) readings were available from impact. Total fuel
on-board was 12,200 pounds, with 5800 in the left side, and 6400
in the right side (TAB J-15).
e.

IMPACT:

f. EJECTION: Ejection was initiated at approximately 6000

feet MSL. Crash site elevation is 4400 feet. Ejection was well
within the performance envelope of the ACES II seat. A parachute
landing fall (PLF) was not required. The parachute hung up in a
power line pole which was of sufficient elevation above the
ground to facilitate a stand-up PLY. The pilot attempted a

fourline jettison, but was unable to accomplish one due to his

inability to release/break the tackings on one side.
g. PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EOUIPMENT:
(1) All personal and survival equipment inspections
were current (TAB 7iB-42).
(2) No difficulties were noted with any of
equipment, none was used after landing.

the

It. RESCUE:
(1) The mishap occurred at approximately 2120 MDT on 4 August
1992 (TAB A-1, N-5).
(2) The first acknowledgement of the mishap was made on UHF
Guard (243.0) by Holloman tower. An ELT transmission was heard
at 21:20.24 MDT (TAB 11-5). This was followed by a visual siting
Coloof a fireball by the tower supervisor (TAB V-4). SUN 03,
nel Huff (49 OG/CC), was notified at 2124 MDT. Confirmation of a
downed aircraft was phoned in to the SOF by the Texas Air National Guard via a military member that lived near the crash site
(TAB 14-6, V-6).
(3) The pilot landed East-South-East of the crash site.
During landing his chute became entangled on a small power pole.
He used a phone in a nearby residence to call the 416 FS.
Approximately 15-20 minutes later he was given a ride back toward
the crash site (TAB V-2). An Otero County Sheriff Deputy was
located and the deputy transported Capt Mills to Holleman AFB
(TAB V-62).
(4) No rescue calls on the emergency frequency were attempted
by the pilot; he went straight to a local phone (TAB V-2).
1.

CRASR RESPONSE:

(1) At 2120 MDT the primary crash net was activated by

Holleman tower. Also during this period, the 49 FW Command Post
and Colonel Huff (49 OG/CC) were contacted by SOF (TAB K-6).
Disaster Control Group (DCG) recall was initiated at 2135 MDT
(TAB AB-35).
(2) At 2135 MDT two fire units and one tanker truck were

dispatched to the crash site. The units arrived at the crash

site at 2147 MDT. Chief 1 arrived at 2151 MDT. Aircraft fire
was put out at 2200 MDT (cassette tape of primary crash radio).
(3) Emergency Ordinance disposal and Medic 2 (Ambulance) were
dispatched to crash site at 2156 MDT (TAB AB-33).
(4) DCG departed Base Operations at 2238 MDT and arrived at
2308 MDT (TAB AB-33).
(5) Otero County Sheriffs Department personnel were first on
scene. They provided initial site control and swept the area for
non-essential personnel (TAB V-59, V-129). After the pilot was
located, the Sheriffs Department provided transportation to
Holloman-AFB (TAB V-62).
(6) The La Luz volunteer fire department was the first
civilian fire unit on scene. They primarily tried to keep the
fire away from two dwellings close to the crash site (TAB V-12).
The La Luz fire chief approved the call-out of additional
civilian fire units. He also maintained overall control of all
fire assets until Holloman AFB crash units arrived at 2147 MDT
(TAB V-11).
(7) Fire response was delayed slightly due to difficulties
The
experienced in determining the exact location of the crash.
determination on which Holloman gate to use was made when exact
crash site location was available.
(8) The pilot was located and returned to the Holloman AFB
hospital before the flight surgeon's office could deploy
personnel to the crash site. A physical exam was completed on
the pilot at 2230 MDT by Major Benjamin Christian, Flight Surgeon
(TAB E-6).
j.

MAiNTENAMCB DOCUMENTATION:

(1) AFTO Form 781s and Core Automated Maintenance system

(CAMS) computer records were reviewed. There were no
discrepancies which related to the mishap documented in CAMS (TAB
0-4 through 0-14), however, the aircraft 781A page 45 dated from
15 July 1992 shows the right bleed air system being removed, and
reinstalled on 29 July 1992, with a system operational and leak
checks still required before flight(TAB U-28, U-29, J-5). These
6

parts were installed by Sgt Sowell, and the Red-X was signed off
by SSgt Matthews. Both are environmental system specialists, and
qualified for the task that was being performed. Both training
records reflect no certification dates, due to the 416 FS maintenance unit decertifying them pending the outcome of Mishap
investigation (TAB U-31, U-32). Their completion dates before
being decertified were, 14 December 1989 for SSgt Matthews, and
16 June 1992 for Sgt Sowell. SSgt Matthews has worked on the F117 aircraft since February 1989 and Sgt Sowell came to the
program in February 1990. The leak check could not be performed
at the time of installation due to the aircraft being in a number
2 phase inspection with both tail pipes removed. This prevented
the aircraft from being moved. Additionally extensive work being
performed required both engines to be run after the phase was
completed. On 3 August 1992 the number 2 phase inspection was
completed, and the mishap aircraft (MA) was towed to the run up
area for post phase leak checks. These checks were performed by
Sgt Williams, a crew chief and phase worker, not an environmental
specialist. Sgt Williams On-the-Job records show no training in
Environmental Control Systems (ECS) leak checks. However, he has
had power plant maintenance training, which includes fuel, oil
and air leak checks. An ECS specialist would normally receive
leak check training under Tactical Electra-Environmental System
Specialist Training Standards(STS) 452X5, Page 13, item 33,
which is titled, Bleed Air Distribution System. Sgt Williams'
STS training records on power plant maintenance has incomplete
documentation for STS 5423(4, task 18e, which is fuel, oil, and
air leak checks. This record has no certifying official's initials, and there is no 623a action showing that the task had been
transcribed from another set of records(TAB U-38). The required
checks were performed with the engines running. However, only
the leak check was completed. No system operational check was
done or signed off, although one was written up in the aircraft
781A Forms (TAB U-20 & U-30). The leak check was completed using
only APU supplied bleed air (TAB AB-47 and AB-49). An operational check of the engine bleed air system can only be completed on
the ground by activating the gear weight on wheels switch or
short cutting the system, which was not done (TAB AB-46 & AB-47).
The API) air is lower in pressure than the engine bleed air, with
less than half the temperature about 35 PSI and 300 Fahrenheit.
The engine bleed air system uses 4th and 7th stage air at about
47PSI and 800 Fahrenheit. The bleed duct overheat light, which
receives information from the bleed duct overheat fire loop
illuminates at
7

310 Fahrenheit (TAB 0-43 & 0-44). Tech Order 1F-117A-2-213G (TAB
U-1 & 0-2), page 1-110 and 1-112 requires only the APU to check
out the ground air start connection and check valve
(TAB AB-50).
A1C Jackson preflighted the mishap aircraft on 4 August 1992 at
0430 hours, and MSgt Morse the production superintendent signed
the maintenance release (TAB 0-4).
(2) An automated records check (ARC) was compiled on 31 July
1992 four days before the mishap, with two items shown to be
overdue for inspection (TAB 0-5).
(a) 30 day oxygen connection, emergency hose.
(b) 60 day hot purge of oxygen converter.
On 5 August 1992 a second automated report was compiled, titled
Inspection and Time Change Forecast. There were no overdue
inspections on the MA (TAB U-S through 0-12). There were seventy
nine (79) service bulletins (TCT0s) listed in the F-117A service
bulletin report dated 15 July 1992 that had not been complied
with. All of these would have been complied with at Depot in
Palmdale, California when the aircraft was retrofitted with the
Offensive Combat Improvement Program (OCIP) modification (TAB U40 through 0-43).

(JOAP)
(3)
Review of the joint oil analysis program
documentation for GE-404 engines /344248 and 344169 did not
reveal any adverse information. The JOAP program for the F-117A
aircraft is on an as needed only requirement, i.e. new engine,
RED CAP (immediate) sample etc. (TAB U-16 through 11-24). Engine
historical documents were in order.
(4) This was the first flight after the completion of a
number 2 phase inspection (TAB 0-25), and also the first phase
performed at the squadron's new location. Two experienced phase
workers transferred with the unit. However, one was TOY until
October 92. The time period required to complete a number 2
phase on this aircraft is normally one week. However, it was
increased to three weeks to allow for training of newly assigned
personnel. Although additional time was given for training,
three non-phase related maintenance actions were also performed.
The three non-phase actions were:
(a)

Dual engine removal and installation

(b) Dual tail pipe time change

(c) Dual exhaust heat shield time change
There were seven delayed discrepancies at the time of the mishap
(TAB 0-26, 0-27). All discrepancies were properly documented.
However, one entry had been recorded on 16 October 1991 with no
reason for the delay in fixing the problem(TAB 0-26).
Personnel
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND
SUPERVISION:
k.
involved in the preflight, servicing, and launching of the MA
were qualified to do the task (TAB U-31 - U-37). The MA was
launched by Sgt Slaughter performing the duties as the A-person,
and SrA Abarca was the B-person/fireguard.
OIL, FUEL TRUCK, 'swum OXYGEN, AND HYDRAULIC
ANALYSIS: All applicable servicing carts and
fuel se vicing trucks were impounded immediately after the
Samples were taken from each with the following test
mishap.
results:

L.

nom I N SPECTION

(1) Engine oil inspection data not available.

(2) Fuel truck data was normal.
(3) Liquid oxygen data was normal.
(4) Hydraulic fluid data not available.
m. AIRFRAME AND AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: Analysis of all aircraft
flight and Navigation instruments and their related systems
indicated that they were operating normally prior to impact (TAB
J-16).
OPERATIONS PERSONNEL AND SUPERVISOR: The mission was
authorized by Major Peter S. Joyce (Order number 92117), 416 FS
Operations Officer (TAB K-2). Capt Kohntopp briefed the 416 FS
mission with the 49 FW standard Mass Briefing Guide (TAB AA-1).
Capt Kohntopp briefed the mission qualification upgrade ride with
his expanded NSAT guide (TAB AA-16). Captain Kohntopp was also
Captain Mills' instructor for the 4 August mission. All
personnel involved attended the mass brief and the upgrade brief.
Squadron supervisory personnel were in the squadron and attended
the mass brief (TAB V-88). The mission was thoroughly and
adequately briefed (TABs V-118).

o.
PILOT QUALIFICATION: Captain Mills is an experienced
fighter pilot with 1598.2 total flying hours, and 1351.2 fighter
hours in the A-10, AT-38B, and F-117A. He had 33.3 hours in the
F-117A at the time of the mishap. His 30-day/60-day/90-day
totals are 13.5 hours/21.5 hours/36.7 hours (TAB T-35, T-36).
Captain Mills was trained and qualified to fly the mission in
accordance with the current guidance. His training program
during the month of July 1992 included eight day sorties that
would not normally be part of his Mission Qualification Training
syllabus. The additional day sorties were flown in response to a
49 WG policy to fly only day sorties until the squadron was more
experienced with the Holloman area. The 416 FS moved to Holloman
in early June 1992 (TAB V-87).
pEDICAL: Capt Mills was medically qualified at the
of the mishap. The toxicology reports were negative for
legal drugs and alcohol. Capt Mills sustained a post ejection
injury (chin laceration) and he was picked up by a local sheriff
and transported back to base without incident (TAB X-2).
p.

q. NAVAIDS AND FACILITIES: All NAVAIDS and facilities were

operating and functional for the entire duration of SHABA 67
flight with the exception of the approach end Runway 25, BAK-12
arresting gear (TAB W-13).
r. WEATHER: The 24 hour forecast released at 0101Z (03202
mishap) was for winds at 150 degrees at 5 knots, unrestricted
visibility, 2/8 cumulus clouds at 6000 feet, 3/8 alto cumulus
The
clouds at 11,000 feet, 4/8 cirrus clouds at 25,000 feet.
altimeter, 29.95 with a reported ceiling at 11,000 feet. Thunder
Just
showers/rain showers were forecast over the mountains.
after the mishap (0326Z) clouds were 6000 scattered, 10,000 feet
miles
20
scattered and 25,000 thin scattered with
thin
visibility. The temperature was 81 degrees, dew point was 58 and
the winds were 014 degrees at 2 knots. The altimeter was 1004
millibars. Cumulonimbus (thunder shower clouds) were reported 80
A Cumulonimbus
miles north-northeast and movement was unknown.
cloud in the NW had dissipated (TAB W-1).
s.

DIRECTIVES AND PUBLICATIONS:

(1) The following regulation, manuals, and technical orders

had a bearing on the conduct of the mishap flight:
(a) AFR 60-1, Flight Management
10

(b) AFR 60-16, General Flight Rules

(c) TACR 51-50, Tactical Aircrew Training
(d) TACR 51-50 Vol XX, F-117 Aircrew Training
(e) ACCR 55-117, F-117 Aircrew Operational Procedures
(f) ACCR 55-117, Chap 8, Local Operating Procedures
(g) T.O. 1F-117A-1, Utility Flight Manual
(h) 37 TFW, F-117A MUT Course, June 91
- (i) T.O. 1F-117A-6, Aircraft Scheduled Inspection and
Maintenance Requirements
(j) AFT! 50-23, Training (Enlisted Specialty Training)
(k) T.O. 1F-117A-2-21JG
(1) 1F-117A-2-00GV, Aircraft General Description
(m) 1F-117A-2-26G5, Fire Protection Systems
(n) 1F-117A-2-49G5, Auxiliary and Emergency Power Units
(o) 1F-117A-2-70Gs, Power Plant
(p) 00-20-1, Preventive Maintenance Program General
Policy Requirements and Procedures
(q) 00-20-5, Aircraft, Drone, Aircrew Training Devices,
missile
Engines
and Air Launched
inspections, Flight reports and supporting
maintenance documents
(2) There is no evidence of any violations
provided in a, b, c, e, f, 1, m, n, or o.

of

guidance

(3) There is evidence of individual violations in

and directives provided in d, g, h, i, j, k, p, and q

guidance

a.
1F-117-1,

During the mishap, Captain Kills did not apply T.O.

Flight Manual, section 3 (Emergency
Procedures)
11

guidance pertaining to Environmental Control System Emergencies

Rather, his testimony describes his decision to ask
(TAB AB-49).
the SOF to read him the checklist. His F-117A Pilot checklist
Before
remained in his make shift publications bag (TAB V-113).
the ECS checklist could be read, additional emergency situations
began to appear which diverted his attention to what was thought
to be a higher priority event (TAB V-104).
T.O. 1F-117A-21JG for the Environmental Control
b.
System was violated by Sgt Williams' failure to perform the task
on page 112, step 2 (TAB 0-1) and page 110, step 6 (TAB 02)properly for the ECS required leak checks.
T.O. 1F-117A-2-21JG was probably violated by Sgt
C.
Sowell on page 1-170. He failed to ensure proper engagement of
flange coupling (TAB J-18, 0-)).
Program,
T.O. 00-20-1, Preventive Maintenance
d.
General Policy, Requirements and Procedures was violated by Sgt
Williams when he failed to perform required inspections and
operational checks properly, page 3-2, item 3-4 (TAB U-47, V-90).
e.
T.O. 00-20-1, Preventive Maintenance
Program,
General Policy Requirements and -Procedures was probably violated
by SSgt Matthews by failing to properly inspect the ECS coupling
installation for accuracy, page 3-1, item 3-2c (TAB U-46).
f. T.O. 00-20-5, Aircraft Inspections, Flight Reports
and Supporting Maintenance Document was violated by Sgt Williams
who failed to clear the entire write-up in the 781A forms
discrepancy block, page 44, item 1 (TAB 0 47 and U 29).
-

g. AFM 50-23, Enlisted Specialty Training was violated

by MSgt Strawderman (Chief, Phase Dock) and Sgt Knight, training
supervisor for Sgt Williams, by failing to certify that the
trainee had attained necessary skills and documenting those
skills in the 623 records, page 15, item 4-3 (TAB 0-49 and 0-36).

Col, USAF

12

MEMO FOR RECORD

Subject: Testimony of Witnesses Not Used in Report
1. All witnesses interviewed by the safety board were also
interviewed by the AIR 110-14 board except the following:
a. Mr. Bookout--He was contacted at least six times. He
told us he was in the middle of a move out of town. He was given
our number but never called. We were unable to get in contact
with him during the last few days of the board.
b. Mr Meyers--Although we made contact with Mr. Meye rs,
were unable to establish a date for a interview. He was out of
town during most of the boards work.
C. Lt Reilly--Telephonic interviewed him. He is now in St
Louis going through the seminary. He suggested that our
interview with Mrs. Ryle would cover everything he saw. They
were driving down the road together at the time of the accident.
2. The following individuals are not included in the AFR 110-14
report as the testimony was either redundant or did not add to
the report.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
3.

k.
1.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.

TSgt Alderete
MSgt Anderson
1Lt Clark
Mr Gillen
Mr Gorby
SrA Harlow
Mr Houston
MC Jenkins
Family Jergens
Maj Joyce

Capt Maesee
SrA Moellendorf
Lt Reilly
SSgt Riley
Mrs Ryle
Sgt Slaughter
Mrs Trujillo

Their testimony is on file with 12 AF/JA, Bergstrom AFB, TX.

FRANK A. HOLMES JR.

Investigating Officer

Cel, USAF

MEMO FOR RECORD

Subject: Location of Original Documents for AFR 110-14 Board,
F-117A, SN 82-0801
All documents in the AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Report are
originals, except the following:
1. TAB 0-2, Flight Control System Recorder Data
Original on file at HQ 12 AF/JA
2, TAB 0-35, ECS Problems During Mod Delivery PCP's
Original on file at Det 5, 2874 Test Squadron,
Palmdale, California
3. TAB Q, Orders Appointing Safety Investigating Board
Originals on file at HQ 12 AF/SE
4. TAB T, Captain Mills original personnel, Physiological
Aeronautical, Record of Evaluation and Aircrew Qualification
AF Form 8 on file at 49 FW/416 FS, Holloman AFB, NM
5. TAB U-1, Excerpts from T.O. 1F-117A-2-21JG, Page 1-110, 112
Original on file with 416 FS
6. TAB U-3, Aircraft 82-0801, 781H
U-4, Automated Records Check, Overdue Inspections
U-15, Oil Analysis Record
U-24, 781A, Phase Overprint
U-25, 781K, Delayed Discrepancies
11 26, 781K, RAM Delayed Discrepancies
U-27 through U-29, 781A, pages 44 46
U-35, Special Certification/Inspection Listing
Originals on file with 12 AF/JA
-

7. TAB U-30 through U-34, Personnel Tra Inn

U-37 through U-38,
Originals on file with 49 FW, 416 FS

Records

B. TAB W, Weather Data, 4 Aug 92

Originals on file with 49 OG/OSS
9. TAB X-2 through X-8, Pilot Physicals'
Originals on file with 49 Med Group, Pilot Medical Folder
10. TAB Y, AFR 110-14 Appointment Letters
Originals on file with 12 AF/JA
11. TAB AA-16, Capt Kohntopp's personal briefing guide
Original on file with Capt Kohntopp, 415 FS

12. TAB AB-7, SOF Activity Report, RAID For 0-128

Original on file with 12 AF/JA
13. TAB AB-29, 416 S.E.P.T. Accomplishment Log
Original on file with 12 AF/JA
14. TAB AB-30, Daily RECAP Sheet, 416 FS, 4 Aug 92
Original on file with 416 FS
15. TAB AB-32, Capt Aohntopp's Mission Lead Upgrade Checklist
Original on file with 416 FS
16. TAB AB-35, 49 FW Command Post Events Log, AF Form 1924
Original on file with 49 FW Command Post
17. TAB AB-40, 49 FW Fire Dept Events Log
Original on file with BQ 12 AF/JA
18. TAB AB-42, Egress and Life Support Inspection Records
Original published in T.O. 1F-117A-1
19. TAB AB-46 through AB-49, T.O. 1F-117A-1 Excerpts
Originals published in T.M. 1F-117A-2-21GS
20. TAB AB-50 through AB-51, T.M. 1F-117A-2-21GS Excerpts
Originals published in T.M.. 1F-117A-2-21GS
21. Cassette recording of Fire Dept primary crash tape recording
40 mins. Tape located with 12 AF/JA.

A A. HOLMES,
Investigating Off

Col, USAF

FROM: AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Board

23 Sept 1992

SUBJ: Wreckage Release, F-117A SW-82-0801

TO: 49 FW/JA
The accident investigation board convened to investigate the 4
August 1992 crash of F-117A, SN 82-0001, flown by Captain Mills,
has completed its investigation. The wreckage is hereby released
to 49 FW/JA for disposition.

1st Ind, 49 FW/JA

TO: Lt Col Holmes
Receipt acknowledged.

BRENT H. LANDIS, Capt, USAF

Assistant Staff Judge Advocate

Vox O**+C$I. tat 049.* Mae Ottsd

AP REPORT

USAF
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shop aircraft departed on a sinac- ship

on Training syllabus
n,
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i
n
On takeof,shortly after gear retraction, the
Master Caution liht, Environmental Control System caution light, and Right Bleed Duct
Qverhezt t caution light illuminated,
The mishits pilot declared an emergency with
depirture <antic', requested a radio frequency change to the supervisor of flying (SOE)
d climbed to a radar downwind position. Soon after establishing communication with
the SOY, Several hydraulic warning lights illuminated. The mishap pilot advised the
OF that just after takeoff he got an ECS light and a right duct overheat light and
n ow he rieht utility pump, right flight Phan, utility hydraulic system A and
ud
ty hydraulic system S caution lights on the master test panel were illuminated,
but he hydraulic gauges indicated good pressure. While the SOP was confirming which
caution lights were illuminated the mishap aircraft began an uncommanded right roll.
The mishap pilot ejected successfully. the aircraft impacted the ground and was
dest roved .

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FLIGHT AND PERSONNEL RECORDS

INDEX

TITLE

PAGF

Al Forms Individual Data Summary

G-2

Flying History Report

G-3

30/60/90 Data for Pilot

G-4

416 FS Pilot Qualification Letter

G-5

Pilots Individual Training Summary

G-6

TAD Form 134, SOT Training Summary

G-8

TAG Form 206, IQT Simulator Grade Sheet

G-9

G- I

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fia
7
PERSONAL DATA- PRIVACY ACE OF 1974
AS OF
DATE:

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT DATA

MILLS JOHN B
29
M011150

RN: CPT
LAST PHYSICAL: 920220
LAST ALT CHMD: 901231

MOS C 5E0 TOTAL PRIMARY

A0I0A P 00
1248.9
1087.1
F117A P 01
23.5
33.3
40384 P 00
4.3
4.3
- 0388 P 03
43.2
35.7
;A0278 P 00
1.5
0.0
1A010A P 00
17.0
17.0
1F117A P 02
22.7
22.7
11058A F 00
5.0
5.0
1 103813 P 04
0.0
0.0
[(ALS

vy.7*.*
CRLW-P05:

05 AUG 92

1375.7

SECOND
0.0
0.0
0.0
4 4
E.E
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

INSTR
93.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

2.2

95.5

1205.1

-.PEER TOTALS
AING TIME: ALL
.1/IN3T TIME: ALL

1331.2
1253.9

FPI:
1
PAC: 1

2'':

giMMONOMMI
10
10C

NAJCOM:

EVAL
DINER
COMBAT
66.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.5
0.0
0.0
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
68.17

6.8

GRAND TOTAL
MOS PRI/INST TIME

0_ ti

1509.7
125'3.9

ae 05 AUG 04 AUG 03 AUG 02 AU O 01 AUG 31 JUL 30 JUL 29 JUL 20 JUL

MS 00.0
00.0
01.4
00.0
00.0
00.0
02.3
01.4
00U

-27 39I
00.0

JUL 75 JUL 24 JUL 23 JUL 22 JUL 21 JUL 20 JUL 19 JUL 10 JUL 17 JUL
00.0
00.0
01.8
00.0
00.6
00.0
00.0
00.0
00. ri
16 JUL 15 JUL 14 JUL 13 JUL 12 JUL 11 JUL 10 JUL 09 JUL on JUL 07 JUi
01.4
01.5
00.0
00.0
00,0
00.0
00.0
077.0
02.1
01.6
AY TOTALS

FLYING TIME: 013.P.,

DAYS: 08

06 JUL 05 JUL 04 JUL 05 JUL 02 JUL 01 JUL 30 JUN 29 JUN 20 JUN 27 JUN
00.0
00.0
01.6
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.5
01
00.0
26 JUN 25 JUN 24 JUN 23 JUN 22 JUN 21 JUN 20 JUN 19 JUN 10 JON 17 J00
00.0
00.0
00.0 0,7.0
00.0
00.00.0
00.0 00.0
02.2
16 JUN 15 JUN 14 JUN 13 JUN 12 JUN 11 JUN 10 JUN 09 JUN 00 JUN
00.0

00.0

00.0

00.0

00.0

00.0

00.0

00.0

01.2

JOr
of),

60 DAY TOTALS
FLYING TIME: 021.5
DAYS: 13
06 JUN 05 JUN 04 JUN 03 JUN 02 JUN 01 JUN 31 MAY 30 MAY 29 MAY 211
00.0
00.0
01.1
01.2
01.4
01.2
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.1
27 MAY 26 MAY 25 MAY 24 MAY 23 MAY 22 MAY 21 MAY 20 MAY 19 MAY IS MAY
01.2
01.2
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0. 00.0
00.0
01.4
17 MAY 16 MAY 15 MAY 14 MAY 15 MAY 12 MAY 11 MAY 10 MAY 09 MAY 08 MAY
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.3
01.4
01.3
01.2
00.0
00.0
00.0
90 DAY TOTALS

FLYING TIME: 036.7

C-4

DAYS: 25

2020.Rmin
AS CF: 13 JUL 92
NAME

FAHR SSAN

ADAIR
MAJ
BACHMAN CPT
BRANNON CPT
COUTURE CPT
EILAHC CPT
INSEMAN (FT
FOLEY
(PT
HILTON
CPT
HUFF
CCL
HEAT
MAI
JOYCE
MAJ
KELLEY
CPT
KOHNTOPP CPT
LAZARSKI CPT
LEEK
CPT
ASSET LCPT
MERRITT LTC
MILLS CPT
NEWTON BGEN
PHILLIPS MAJ
POPE CPT
POUND
LTC
REGAN
CPT
FOBERTSONCPT
SHOAF
CPT
SILVIA
CPT
VEEDER
CPT
WRIGHT
CPT

TOTAL QUALIFIED

VERIFIED

416 FS LETTER OF X'S

**1*NyNwAGUALIFICATIONSr*********rntAx
F-1174
1-38
NEFESIAMESE0 OMWES IFF5
XXLDEPTSCEGCCRXXEPLCG G
CPTRF
DNEERIILEPF
TEER
4
LME
II
IPPV 4
E
L
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D
PD
LL P
ON
x
UN
ON
X
CEET
X
BEFT
XX
CEET
X
BEE%
XXX
UN
CE
OTT
CEET
X
CEET
XX
[ILEX
XXX
BEEX
XXX
CEET
X
X
CEET
BEFX
0 N
O N
CELT
X
X
CEEX
X
BEET
x
D N
ON
X
BEF X
XXX
T
ON
BEET
XX
BEI XXXXX

y
1.
7
A
7
I
X
X
X
T

A
A
A
A
XXAON

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7

1-

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1

ADA
7
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XXADN
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X X X

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XX
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FESIANIFSED 0
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TRF MERIT
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4 5 1 5 6 1Z 7 0 6 8

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R. PHILUFSMAJ, USAF
AND ER

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US 92
(0911001
ILLS JOHN D 05 1

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING SOMMAR

ACI1 IT;
c MAT TYPE-TNG C

C ACedeft
:'VENT
ID DL
DO
1117 TOTAL AROO 920708
950104
F117 DAY A AROI 920708
000000
NITE A AR05 000000
000000
F117 DAY LW LD01 920729
920020
NI1C L LNOti 920722
920806
rJ27 LNDO C LNIO 920729
920813
IOTAL FREC P400 920729
9208'20
PPEC WREN PA01 920722
920821
1/APP PPNL PA02 920729
000000
fOtAL NPAP PACES 000000
000000
unu PREL AP P404 920722
000000
NPAPP FPFIL P405 920708
000000
TOTAL RENE PA09 000000
000000
I7 PENE PA10 920707
000000
PENE PPNL PALI 000000
U00000
PEN W/0 HUD PA/5 000000
000000
WARP W/0 H P4I7 000000
000000
RAF& W/0 Hu PAI9 000000
000000
SSE APRCH P920 920708
000000
'DAIL DEP PASO 000000
000000
FII7 TOTAL STOO 920729
920828
F117 TOTALU SU00 000000
000000
FII7 101 GO 5010 920608
000000
NOT GORTY 9020 920729
000000
"70N DMND AS SX00 920729
920028
018-7 1X55 000000
000000
HI VAL SORT 1200 000000
000000
CHED FLAG 1101 000000
000000
RED FLAG TZ02 000000
000000
GREEN FLAG T203 000000
000000
LOPER FLAG 1104 000000
000000
MAPLE FLAG T205 000000
- 000000
AIR WARRIOR 1. 206 000000
000000
FEND 1207 000000
000000
LIVE FIRE T208 000000
000000
LIVE DROP 1209 000000
000000
JOINT EXER TZIO 000000
000b00
GRO DP SAT 1211 000000
000000
AIR OP SAT 12I2 000000
'000000
LOCAL ORE
T21:1; 000000
000000
DACT
T215 000000
000000
CET
1116 000000
000000
ACM1
1217 000000
000000
OCEAN XING 1219 000000
000000
CENDAT
1220 000000
000000
s0EWCO
1221 000000
000000
WPNDEL A/G 1223 920622
000000
WANS DEL 1224 000000
000000
PLANO OGG T227 000000
000000
ACPLSH GCC 1228 000000
000000
MX
1230 000000
000000
WX
123I 000000
000000
UPS
1232 000000
900000
Alt
1233 000000
00000,0
LOGISITICS 1134 000000
000000
RHO
1135 000000
000000
OTHER
1236 000000
900000
ALAND 0= 1 1237 000000
000000
ACALSH OCC1 1138 000000
000000
PLANO SC 21 1239 920622
000000
ACPLEM 0CC2 1740 920622
000000
RCD LED All 1254 920622
000000
AIM-7
1255 000000
000000
AIM-9
1256 000000' . 000000
SUN All
1259 000000 000000
RED LOB HIT 1269 920622 000000
AIM-7
1270 000000 000000
AIM-9
1271 000000 000000
GUN HITS
T274 000000 000000

AUG
00/
06/
00/

JU1
o
01
0.

LVENI 11<
CREN POS
FF'AN
APR
00
00

n/
OB
04
02

02
04

+I

00/
00/
00/
00/
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00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00f
00f
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/

00
Ok
01
00
00
00
00
08
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
Oct
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
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00
00
00
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00
00
00
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00

V0

01,

001

00/
00/
00/
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00/
001
00i
00/
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00/
00/

Out
7
07/
00/
07/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00f
00/
00/
00,
00/
0041
00/
00/
001

00/
00/

021

00/

00/
00/
00/
00/
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Out
00/
00/
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01/
01/
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00/

00/
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Out
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
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00/
00/
00/

00
00
00
Oct
CU
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
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00
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00
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00
00
00

00/
41

, /

09/
'IC,,
OW
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/
00/

00 /
00 /

05 AUG 92
(09:14:26/
NAME MILLS JOHN B

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING SUMMAIIY

TYPE-IMS A
ACE" S

EVENT
ID DL
DO
F-I17 S 41460 000000 000000
LOCAL GRVL L$OI 920505 930531
CW EQUIP LS02 000000 000000
CST INNS L904 920505 930531
LIFE SPT A LSIO 920505 930531
CW WET DR! L916 920505 930531
F-117ESPESD L921 920506 921120
HANG H L822 920505 921130
CW HANG H L823 92050S 930531
F-117OWEGRD L524 000000 000000
WET 0 LS25 920505 930531
CW ORIEN L526 000000 000000
rior PHYS PPG' 720220 930228
ALT CHM8R PP11 901231 931231
CENTRIFUGE PP12 000000 000000
RECDS REVW RROi 920501 920228
TOTAL SIM S 9E00 920519 920718
ANNUL SOF T 0E01 000000 000000
SOF TOUR
5F02 000000 000000
SOP MIS
SF03 000000 000000
CW SIM
8E04 000000 000000
CT 1 GRDED WOG 000000 000000
CT 2 GRDED SF09 000000 000000
MOT SIN SOP 5E14 000000 000000
107 SIM SOS SF16 920519 000000
TAG EPE SOR SF24 000000 000000
0/1 EEL SUR SF26 000000 000000
EPT SIN SOS SF28 000000 000000
CONSL IP
sr30 000000 000000
SPIER PROC S 5F3. 000000 000000
INST/DIVERT SP34 000000 000000
IOTAL TAC SF36 000000 .000000
SIN SFIGL EN SF50 920420 000000
P/PPP F/PN SE52 920420 000000
F/AFF, P/PN SF54 920420 000000
NP APP F/PN SF56 920420 000000
NP APP P/PN SP58 920420 000000
PE NE F/PN SF60 920420 000000
PE NE P/PN SF62 920420 -000000
ACFT BY NAOS 000000 000000
FREE WPNS WA02 000000 000000
CONY WRNS WA03 000000 000000
RIME DEV WA04 000000 000000
NSW PLAN WADS 000000 000000
EMEL TRNG 14406 000000 000000
WRNS TEST WPC? 000000 000000
YE RIF
WASS 000000 000000
YE RIF
aR WA60 000000 000000
UNUSL ATM WA65 000000 000000
ELEC CMAT NAM 000000 000000
SP VP FILM N475 000000 000000
PLAN BRE
NA80 000000 000000

EVLMI HALF F***

Cl/LW FUL FIAN

TRAINING SUMMARY
....c ri...,.

Phut. IlmWu. 1/t/M/1

t 0 Ate

MILLS, JOHN

Ckas

[AFT

92-06

tT A4U
7 llABLO from .-FI

37 vh Nellis AFB, NV

TAC Syllabus, F-II7AIXORI Dec 90

HD

F PlIASE lialYil

I. SIMULATOR: Average to above average.

F-117A instrument cross check.
2.

hste

In

rte./ie.. we

Capt Mills quickly mastered the

CONVERSION:

a. Aircraft Handling: Average to above average.

control exhibited throughout this phase.
b.

Formation:

Average.

Smooth, positive

No problems noted.

C. Air Refueling: Average. Some problems interpreting the director

light s resulted In Capt Hills falling off the boom the first
three attempts.
Final hook-up was executed nicely.
3,

SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT:

Average.

No problems noted.

4. SURFACE ATTACK: Below average, Capt Mills had problems identifying

targets throughout this phase. His problems were caused by failure to
properly tune the scope and cursor fixation. He maintained a very positive
attitude throughout this phase and should progress nicely in MOT

ENO

OF

C SWkMARV

5. FLYING TMININ6 SUIINRYtAverage. Capt Mills ou t s t an dingattitude

throughout this o se made It a pleasure to work with him. With emphasis
on scope tuning expect
do well in mqr with normal supervision.

15 J on 92
15 Jo n

97

WATrOPIV177 1Wig itrAP AT"

Officer

Mt Op erations

MIN S. FAF
Cotumander

Col,

OF

EV

4,,
UM

4
1

1 F-II7A 7ALNUALEFI I

NAME

DifFITUCTCH

IiI
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WAWA W3034753

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GRPOE0
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JOI4191t

SIGNIFICANT AIRCRAFT HISTORY

All current AFTO 781 series forms wer
e reviewed for
acc
ura
completenes s, A review of mainte
cy
and
nance rec
ord
s
fro
m
31
through 4 Au g 92 produced the fol
Mar
92
lowing historical informati
on:
5
Apr
Rem
92
oved and replaced right ble
ed air thermostat for
constant venting
15 May 92 - TOD 2914, weapons bay
trap up switch mod, complied
with
18 May 92 - TCD 3194, EIT IC
upgrade, complied with
19 May 92 - TCD 3131, LOX dum
my converter, complied with
19 may 92 - TCD 3102, replac
e STEMS EEO, complied with
15 Jul 92 - Fuel quantity sys
tem mop
-- Removed and replaced fuel
quantity processor
16 Jul 92 - Outside air temper
ature remains at 20 - 50 deg
rees
-Rem
ove
d
and
rep
laced total temperature probe
17 Jul 92 - 02 phase inspectio
n due
-- 3 Aug 92 - 2 phase inspec
tion complied with
20
Jul
92
Left engine bleed air packag
e removed to F.O.M
(engine removal)
-- 30 Jul 92 - Reinstalled lef
t bleed air package
20 Jul
92
Right engine bleed air packag
e removed to F.O.M
(engine removal)
-- 26 Jul 92 - Reinstalled lef
t bleed air package
20 Jul 92 - Left and right eng
ines removed for TCD 3-0060
-- 30 Jul 92 - Reinstalled lef
t and right engines
20 Jul 92 - Left and rig
ht
tai
l
pip
and transition ducts
removed for 300 hour time es
change
-- 30 Jul 92 - Replaced tailpi
pes and transition
ducts
23 Jul 92 - ?CD J-0060
com
pli
ed
wit
h
on
borescope plugs on each left and right engines (6
engine
rem
ove
d
reinstalled with safety
wire to ensure plugs and
back out)
don't
29
Jul
92
Ble
ed
air
gro
und
receptacl in right wheel wel
l (-60
hook Up) removed to F.O.M e(re
position oil drain lin
c)
-- 29 Jul 92 - Reconnected gro
und receptacle
29 Jul 92 - Bleed air duct
and overheat loop In right
outboard
airframe mounted access
drive (ARAD) compartme
disconnected to E.O.M (reory
position oil drain line) nt
-- 29 Jul 92 - Reconnected duc
t and loop
11-1

TAB J
TECHNICAL OR ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS OF MATERIAL
(DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)
INDEX
TITLE

Pagi

Fuel, Electrical 1 EnvironmQntal Control

and Hydraulic Sys
Mishap Investigation

3-2

Fire Pattern Investigation

J-7

Condition of Engines

3-13

Instrument Report

3-24

Evaluation of Exhibits from F-117A 82-0801 Mishap

3-17

J-1

FUEL, ELECTRICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL

CONTROL
AND HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
AIRCRAFT MISHAP INVESTIGATION
F-117A 82 0801
-

14 August 1992
I. INTRODUCTION
We were asked by the MID president, Col Gosl
fuel, electrical, environmental control andin, to evaluate the
hydraulic systems
debris to see if we could draw any conc
lusi
ons:
The systems will
be addressed in separate sections below.
II. FUEL, STAXEN
a. Aircraft fuel systems, because
of the low pressures
involved, are typically made of thin-wal
l
castings. These light-weight parts are not aluminum tubing and
designed for any sort
of abuse or rough treatment, and are therefor
e usually heavily
damaged in a crash. This was the case for
this aircraft.
b. A significant number
fuel system components were
recovered from the crash site. of
There was no evidence that the
system had not been functioning prop
erly.

c.

Observations

(1) A partial inventory of the pumps

and valves was
made to provide a statistical basis for
evaluation.
Seven (of 13) motorized shut-off valves (4 clos
ed, 3 open)
Four (of 4) double ended boost pumps
Three (of 8) transfer pumps
Seven high level cut-off valves
Several vent valves and regulators.
Only one (1) boost pump had impact marks indi
operational. Examination of five other pump cating the pump was
The lack of impact marks is consistent with s was inconclusive.
low impact speeds.
(2) A number of fuel cell
panels, particularly
those on the upper exterior surfaces ofskin
the
off by the hydraulic force of the fuel at feed tanks, were torn
impact. Several fuel
tank components and the air refueling rece
ptac
the outer perimeter of the impact area. This le were found near
is consistent with
having nearly full fuselage fuel tanks after
take off.
(3) Significant portions of the uppe
r inboard wing
skins had melted and collapsed from a loca
lized fire supported by
J-2

residual
The top wing skin collapsed on both wings. The
main root structure, however, had only minor ground
fire damage.
d. Findings
(1) Based on the estimated remaining fuel, the valve
positioning and the pump operation could be consistent
normal, abnormal, or emergency operation. The facts that with
both
engines were operating and that the cockpit fuel flow gauges
showed approximately 600 lbs/hr each at impact indicates, however, that fuel was getting to these units, malfunction or no.
(21 Fuel leaks, both major and small, could have been
present without leaving any systems evidence. If these
leaks
were to become the cause of the catastrophic failure or fire,
however, something would have shown up in the fire pattern investigation. That investigation turned up no evidence of inflight
fire and many pieces of evidence indicated no problem whatso
ever.
III.

HYDRAULICS

a. Unlike fuel systems, hydraulic system compon

are
built to handle high pressures and low-to-medium flow ents
volumes.
Consequently, the components are made of titanium, steel,
heavy aluminum castings and forgings. These items survivedand
in
broken, but generally intact condition.
b.

Observations

(1) As before, the remaining hydraulic components

served best to indicate the positions of the flight contro
l
surfaces and availability of fluid and pressure. Tubing, filter
packs and (wedges were completely torn apart into individual
small pieces.
(21 The flight control actuators and control valve
manifolds were all recovered. Upon being opened, they showed
no
evidence of galling or restricted movement. The right outboard
elevon actuator had a clear impact indication of being in
trailing-edge-up position. The left inboard elevon actuatthe
indicated that it was in the trailing-edge-down position, and or
in
concert with the other actuators, may have been operating normal
ly to counteract the right outboard up position. The right
inboard elevon and left outboard actuators had no distinct impact
marks. The rudder actuators appeared operational and in normal
position prior to impact. Both were pulled to full extension by
impact forces which rotated the rudders 180 degrees.
(3) Significant portions of the reservoirs were
The piston impact marks evidenced that both were at leastfound.
quarters full. The utility reservoir had fluid well abovethree
the
system A and system B switches.
1-3

(4) The flight system 2, system 1B and brake accum

ulators were recovered. The piston locations
indic
ated
that
all
hydraulic systems had pressure.
(5) The right hydraulic utility and flight
pumps were
in good condition and appeared to have
been operating normally.
c. Finding
Iv.

The hydraulic system was operating normally.

z e n
jtn

a. The evidence indicates that electrical power was

available, however, discrepancies between the repor
ted
cauti
on
light
s
and examination of the components indicate that the
elect
rical
system was damaged prior to impact.
b. Observations
(1) The-Utility hydraulic reservoir has a mecha
tical
linkage to reset system A if the reservoir level
deact
ivate
s
system B. This linkage makes it impossible to mech
anic
ally
illuminate both the system A and system B lights simul
taneously,
but, grounding of their indicating electrical wires
would
cause a
dual indication.
(2) The right utility and flight hydraulic
pumps
showed no indication of failure prior
to impact, and the accumulators indicated pressure in the system.
evidence conflicts
with the pilot testimony and flight recorThis
der data, however. Only
a grounding of the wire(s) from the right
pressure switch
would cause a warning light in the cockpit pump
while the system was
still functioning.
(3) Several cockpit indicator panels were still opera
tional at impact including the engine monit
panel. Several
light bulb filaments showed positive evideoring
nce of being on at
impact.
(4) The right outboard inte
ed servo actuator
impacted in the trailing-edge-up position,grat
appro
ely five (5)
degrees up. The loss of both electrical inputsximat
would cause the
actuator to go to this factory-biased position.
(5) Most of the electrical runs through the righ
t
landing gear well, AMAD and cheek bays
found. Mo signs of
shorting/arcing Were found, however, the were
through the flight
control and hydraulic indicating wires ispower
low and it is unlikely
that the evidence would be visible after
post-impact fire.
The wires were closely inspected and onlythe
tensi
le and shearing
failures were noted. All the insulation was burne
d off during
the post-impact fire.
J-4

c. Findings
(1) Most of the electrical system was operat
ing normally at impact. The right outboard servo actuator
and the AHAB
hydraulic component indicating systems wiring were inoperative.
(2)
All effected systems have electrical
wires running
through the right MAD compartment.
Nearly all of the wiring in
the AMAD compartment has a service
ature limit of 300
degrees Fahrenheit. A minority of thetemper
wiring is through conduit
(generator feed wires) or is protected with higher temperature
Ben Bar" wrap. Half of the wires are ground wires.
-

(2, All electrical lines for the

four redundant channels of the flight control system run adjacently throug
h the
cheek and AILAD bays where they split into bundles
of two channels
each run on the forward and aft wing spars to the integrated
servo actuators.

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL RESTER

a. The environmental control system consists of two distinct subsystems % the bleed air supply and the condit
air
subsystems. The bleed air components are designed ioned
for high
temperatures and pressures; whereas, the conditioned air carries
lower temperatures and pressures. The bleed air lines are made
of stainless steel.
b.

Observations

(1/ Most of the bleed air system was recovered. Only

one broken clamp was found and all intact clamps
were still
attached over their -flanges with the exception of a clamp on the
ground start duct. The ducts usually broke at impact, tearing
off from the clamped flanges at the weld lines.
(2) The right bleed air line from the ground start
receptacle was found with a clamp installed aft of the flange at
approximately fuselage station 260. The flange, while collapsed
from impact, still retained the 90 degree alignment ring around
most of the flange face. The mating flange was found with little
damage. Damage typical of flanges pulled from clamps could
include rolled-over flange edges, scratches in the tensile direction, or opened V-band clamp edges. Evaluation of the matching
flanges and V-band clamp under a stereo microscope showed no
marks which would indicate that the clamp was insta
lled
correctly.
c.

Findings

(1) It is highly unlikely that the clamp on the bleed

air l ine from the ground air start receptacle was
properly
installed.
3-5

(2) A leak of engine bleed

in the AMAD compartment
would be within 12 inches of hydrauliair
c, fuel and essential electrical wiring. Its temperature from
ne bleed is more than
enough to melt wire insulation, seals,engi
and clamp cushions in the
compartment.
VI.

SUMMART
(a)

properly.

The hydraulic and fuel systems were

functioning

(b) Electrical power was available thro

ughout the flight.
The engines were operating at low powe
r at impact.
(c) The flight control positions at impact
were not strongly evidenced. The right outboard actuator
trai
ling-edge-up
position would cause an uncommanded right roll
only
if the right
inboard did not counteract in the trailing-edg
e-do
wn
position.
The position of the left inboard actuator does
functioning properly, the right inboard should suggest that if
trailing-edge-down position. A dual channel have been in the
right surfaces to their trailing-edge-up positionfailure of both
ble with loss of all four channels to both right s is only possiintegrated servo
actuators with available hydraulic pressure.

ROBERT M. MCGREGOR
SM-ALC/OL (916) 643-1064
DSN 633-1064

CALUME
L (916) 643-69)5
DSN 633-6935

3-6

FIRE PATTERN INVESTIGATION

F-117A S/N 82-0801
Holloman AFB, New Mexico
18 August 1992
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the request of the accident boar

Mr. Robert M. McGregor,
SM-ALC\OLA (AFMC), was detailed to inved,
stig
an F-117A inflight
mishap. The investigation began on 6 Augustate
1992.
II. BACKGROUND
The incident aircraft was an F-117A (WSC vers
the 49th Fighter Wing of Holloman AFB in Alam ion) belonging to
The 4 August 1992 mishap occurred on a nigh ogordo, New Mexico,
t training flight, the
first flight since completing it's Phase
II maintenance and
inspection.
Approximately one minute after being cleared
for takeoff on
runway 16, the aircraft MASTER CAUTION and
RIGH
T ECS OVERHEAT
lights illuminated. The pilot continued his
climb to pattern
altitude and heading, and contacted the SOF
checklist items. Approximately 3.5 minutesto read the emergency
aircraft entered an uncommanded right roll.after lift-off the
The pilot ejected
safely after the first roll, landing near some
The aircraft crashed shortly afterwards in flat private homes.
approximately 3 miles north of the city of Alam desert terrain
and burned for a shOrt time, and then exploded ogordo, broke up
fire in the small crater was extinguished by. The main body of
volunteer fire department and the Holloman AFB the local La Luz
fire department.
Some small fires were ignited by burning debr
is
ejected from the
crater, but most were extinguished with wate
r
with
in the hour.
One main landing gear tire did, however, cont
inue
d to smolder
until the next morning. The fires were extingui
shed
with plain
water (ie; no AFFF) and dirt shoveled onto
some dispersed
components by the local volunteers.
/II. FINDINGS:
General Observations: The crash site
on open, level desert
terrain. The dry soil supported typiwas
cal
desert grasses, thorn
bushes and cactus, but no trees. The airc
northwesterly heading at an extremely steeraft impacted on a
p angle, digging a
nonuniform hole approximately two and one
half
feet long, and twenty feet wide. Most fire pattfeet deep, eight
could be made directly, or in the case of the ern observations
aft body section,
after removal of a few panels.

The aircraft was totally destroyed by ground impact forces and

the following fire. Post-crash fire damage ranged from severe
for those pieces which remained near the impact site to none for
some rare pieces thrown far downrange at impact. Most damage was
from burning fuels and oils, but some minor damage or sooting was
caused by a fire which crept slowly upwind through the dry
grasses. Working generally clockwise from the nose of the
aircraft, the following fire effects were noted.
1. nose and Forward Fuselage
a. The nose gear strut and drag brace were found in the
impact crater with extensive depainting, but no sooting, from
ground fire. The tire was burned completely to it's wire beads.
While small portions of the wheel rim were found buried in the
pit without fire damage, the main portion of the wheel was found
30 feet from the crater with discolored paint and moderate sooting on manufactured and fracture surfaces from ground fire.
b. The lower surfaces of the nose and those structures
immediately aft were severely crushed accordion-style and buried
in the crater with no fire damage whatsoever. The manifold block
on the back of the right-most probe (B-probe) had been snagged on
the turnbuckle of a nearby antenna support guywire and was
severely melted by ground fire. At the aircraft waterline 100.0,
the probe tips and adjacent structures were buried and undamaged
while their aft portions in the nose itself were severely burned
and unseated. The transducers from the inner structure were
found at the berm of the crater in a burned, but unsooted
condition.
c. The FLIR was thrown just beyond the impact crater and
was severely broken upand burned by ground fire. The steel
screen frame was sooted but otherwise undamaged by fire. The
DLIR was also thrown out of the crater and suffered damage
similar to the FLIR, however, the screen frame remained in the
crater and was extensively tooted by ground fire,
d. Most cockpit structures and instruments were severely
burned and damaged in the ground fire. The left console landed
in a tangled heap just beyond the crater with most all wire
insulation burning away in the ground fire. Some occasional
forward panel instruments were thrown even further and suffered
less damage; for example, the clock was undamaged by fire but
broken after having been thrown 100 yards to the left and downrange, and the HSI, while packed with dirt and seated by the
grass/fuel fire, was unaffected internally.
2. Sight Wing's Wheel Well
a. The right MLG assembly and drag brace were thrown
approximately 25 feet back from the impact point with only occasional minor sooting and no discoloration. The tire smoldered
slowly until the morning, but was essentially undamaged by ground
3-8

fire. The main door was somewhat depa

d and Booted by f
but showed no signs of melting or simiinte
lar
hookup connectors were thrown away from damage. The hydraulic
the main body of
with only very minor sooting.
b. Substantial continuo
portions of the outboard
wiring harnesses in the wheel wellushad
away by ground fire. The FS 472-562 alumtheir insulation burned
area were depainted and sooted from groundinum structures in this
fire, but there was no
melting.
c. Most of the wing structure forward
and outboard of
the forth wing attach pad was crus
and ripped off during
ground impact. The remaining section hed
of the wing was thrown free
of the crater fire and damaged by a loca
l fire-fueled by residual
fuel in the wing. The inboard eleven, inte
and support structure were torn free of grated servo-actuator
and survived in clean, nearly unsootedthe wing during impact
paint on the support structure was in part condition. The white
with only a thin coating of dust/mud from icularly good condition
noon rain showers. - The inner half of the the evening and aftertorn off and folded outboard where it wasaft upper wing skin was
heavily sooted by ground fire. Inboard surf partially melted and
rib were only lightly sooted with no evid aces of the wing root
sooting or burning. The forward edges ence of inflight fire
moderately burned in the small local fire of the wing tip were
cal wires running down the aft side of theafter impact. Electrirear beam were burned
free of their insulation.
3. Aft Section
The titanium aft structure survived the cras
h in remarkably good condition. - Titanium mate
rial was selected for this
structure primarily because of its strength
at elevated temperatures, and for all intents and purposes
,
it
can be considered
"fireproof" in inflight and post-crash fire
s.
b. The structure's forward face
ducts were crushed aft by the impact, and tailpipe/transition
but showed only minor
sooting from a localized post-crash grou
nd fire. The lower
surface RAM coatings had the binder resi
ns
the remaining materiel to merely fall to the burnt off, allowing
ground.
c. Neither tailpipe showed any evidence
of inflight
fire, such as spattered metal or exte
Astech cover panels were thrown clear ofrior sooting. The upper
ping point and were free of any type ofthe aft section's stopsooting or other fire
damage.
d. Although both rudders avoided any cont
act with the
ground or other structure during post
sh breakup, their righthand surfaces were de-RAM'ed and the-cra
osite surfaces of the
edges delaminated from their cores. comp
This
damage was entirely
attributable to the ground fire.
3 -9

e. The aft section compartment housing

the rudder actuators was heavily sooted by ground
fire
fuel
ed
by
hydraulic fluid
from broken actuator lines.
was a low-grade internal fire
causing little damage to evenThis
the ISA wire bundles, and no other
structural damage.
4. Left Wing 4; Wheel Well
a. Damage to the left wing was
quite similar to the
right except that the inboar
d elevon was not detached
in the
breakup and sustained grou
fire damage. The composite trailing
edges skins were detached nd
from
core material by the ground
fire. A sustained ground firethe
in
the forward inboard fuel
compartment melted substantial portions
then flowed in small streams down the of the upper skin which
attach fittings and structure inboarremaining skin. The wing
heavily sooted and/or burned by ground d of the root rib were
thrown free in the breakup showed no fire. Matching components
indications of inflight
fire.
b. The main landin gear, drag str
ut, and attaching
hardware and hydraulics were gonly
ligh
tly
soot
ed by ground fire.
The tire showed only localized damage
from
grou
nd smouldering.
These components came to rest midway betw
een the wing and impact
crater.
S. Aft Central Fuselage
a. Extensive portions oi
upper fuselage skins were
thrown downrange at impact by hydthe
rau
lic
ram of the fuel. Most
sections showed no sooting or other
fir
e
damage on either the
inside or exterior surfaces. Occasi
ona
l
panels were lightly
seated by sustained burning of the spra
yedon
sealants, but only
after impact. The refueling rollover
assembly and surrounding
structures were unsooted or otherwise dama
ged.
b. Both engines were thrown free of the
impact crater
and sustained only light exterior soot
ing. There was no evidence
on the engine faces of any material whic
ited by an inflight fire. Similarly, theh might have been deposfan ducts showed only ground fire dama outside cases and inner
were burned and blistered by the gro ge. The VITON duct liners
und fire. The intumescent
coatings on the fan and compressor actu
generally only lightly sooted. In an inteators were unfoamed and
nse fire, these coating
foam up before "burning" to provide an
insu
lating blanket for the
cast aluminum actuators. (Their working
fluid is the aircraft's
fuel.) Most engine bay wall sections
which could be identified
were crushed by the impact and thorou
ground fire. One or two small sections ghly burned/ sooted by
lage fuel cells escaped any fire damage. torn free with the fusec. There was no evidence of inflight dama
ge in either of
the two weapons bays. Portions of the
trapezes and one uplock
J-10

roller structure were thrown clear of the

lightly sooted on their painted or fracturemain fire and only
d surfaces. Those
sections found in the crater were generally
depa
only on the surfaces in contact with the eart inted and sooted
remained in the impact crater and was burn h. The right door
ed until only the
graphite fabric remained. The left
door was broken in half and
thrown back toward two mobile home
s. One half was then
moderately damaged by a secondary fire of
the mobile home; the
other was undamaged. One BDU-33 practice bomb
quite far back along the flight path and show fin set was thrown
ed no fire damage or
sooting whatsoever.
d. significant portions of the left grid
and smaller
portions of the right grid and inta
ke fram survived the impact.
Burning on these pieces extended onto torn efabr
ic edges and core,
indicating ground fire damage only.
Lowe
r
and
the right Blow-In Door (BID) were undamage upper surfaces of
d or only lightly
sooted by ground fire.
6. Forward Central Fuselage
a.
far beyond
damage from
blades were

The ECS heat exchanger and expansion fan were

thrown
the impact point suffering only mino
r
soot
ing
and
the short-lived grass fire. The faces of the
ECS
fan
clear of any deposits from debris in the blee
d ducts.
b. The electronics bay was extensively dama
ged by postimpact ground fires. Held together
with
thei
r
inte
rconnecting
wire bundles, the bay and significant port
ions of the cockpit
consoles were crushed into lumps and exte
nsiv
piles just beyond the impact crater. Insu ely burned in two
cushions were completely burned away. Complation and clamP
delaminating because their binding resi uter boards were
Suprisingly, large LIFT closure lids made of ns were baked out.
a depainted and unsooted condition. This is aluminum survived in
a characteristic of
intense -- but short-lived -- fires with temp
approximately 800 0 Farenheit. Occasional eratures exceeding
removed from the mass with internal workIngs instruments were
enough to be read by an experienced instrume in a condition good
nt technician.
C. While most cockpit articles were dest
royed in the
impact, two (the clock and HUD camera)
had
no
fire
dama
ge at all,
and several (the HUD screen, ADI, VSI and
others) were only
Booted by the ground fire.
IV. FIRS PATTON! ANALYSIS
I.
Both engines were evaluated at Holloman AFB
by General
Electric representatives. They determin
ed
analysis that both engines were operating at from inspection and
probably near flight idle. I evaluated the a low power setting,
exterior surfaces for evidence of inf light engine interior and
fire (primarily metal
splatters) and found none.

2. After a comple
believe that there waste review of the aircraft wreakage, I
inflight fire effects wer112 inflight fire. None of the usual
found in this mishap. Specifically, the following evidenecetoisbeimp
ortant:
a. There were no
ten metal splatters on any of the
recovered wreakage. Had themol
re
n an internal fire, some of thn
bulkheads, frames, or structurebee
s
in
have been splattered. Although an the internal flow paths would
or hydraulic fluid is a small pos external fire fueled by JP-4
of it on the clean exterior surfac sibility, there is no evidence
tions of the aircraft systems, or es, the otherwise proper operaobserver's testimonies. A fire in the pilot's and most ground
of this type would be very
obvious.
b. Large numbers of
ces from the wheel wells,
areas, weapons bays, and fuel pie
ek
tanks were recoverd with only che
minor
ground fire sooting. Had an inflig
many of the broken edges of pieces ht fire caused the sooting,
thrown free of the crater fire
would have remained clean.
C. Many sections of composite mat
erial were found outside the crater with charre
d
e threads. The threads had
obviously been charred by the groedg
und fire after breakup.
d. There was no evi
ce of "broom straw" aluminum.
While its absense does not necden
ess
arily rule out inflight fire, it
has been my experience on many air
small ones -- result in this produc craft that most fires -- even
t.
3. There was a short-lived fuel-f
ed crater fire which was
followed closely by a small fuel/a
ir
exp
losion. The initial fire
caused most of the general sootin
g found on items thrown out of
the crater, while the overpressure
structure exposing occasional cle itself further broke up the
explosions are not uncommon and expan fracture edges. Secondary
lain why some heavily 'rooted
pieces could he found far
afield laying next to "clean
"
fragments.
V. CONCLUSION
There was no inflight fir
lubricating or cooling oils. e fueled by JP-4, hydraulic fluid,

m )4(

ROBERT N. McGREGOR
Fire Pattern Investigator
Office of Specialized Management (SM
-ALC/QL)
Sacramento Air Logistics Center
Phone: (916) 643-1064
DST
633-1064
4-12

/404)

CONDITIONS OF ENGINES - 34410 AND 344148 INSTALLED IN F-117A

AIRCRAFT 801
Roth engines have similar impact damage: accessories and gear
boxes broken up and spread over the crash site. Roth
take-off shafts show torsional shearing which indicatespower
that
engines were operating at time of impact. Sheared tufbine shafts
show that the compressor stopped first, most likely due to impact
while the turbine was still rotating.
The core IGV and stage 1 and 2 actuators and fan IGV actuat
ors
were recovered and measured to determine what percen
t of RPM was
on both fan and core. The left fan TM/ actuator
dimension A was
13 3/4 inches with left HPC actuators on left side
on A at
1 15/16. The right actuator was bent and an accuratdimensi
e measurement
could not be made. The rig ht fan actuator dimens
ion A was 13
3/4, with the core actuator deminsion A at 1 15/16.
the
chart furnished by General Electric, these measurementsUsing
indicate
that both engines were operating somewhere between idle
and
flight idle. The throttles could not be located to obtain
a
throttle setting at impact. One throttle linkage from the engine
was found, but was not frozen nor marked to be usefull as
on
indicator of throttle settings.
Both engine bypass ducts were removed to inspect core, combust
or,
HPT and LPT modules for any damage. All borescope plugs were
inplace except one that had been removed for a borescopo inspection by another team member. High pressure compressors
showed
rotational damage and other damage due to impact, but nothin
g
that indicated any problems with the engines.
Due to the measurements on the actuators, an engine was checke
for actuator arm extensions in the open and closed positions.d
The measurements showed that the vanes on the mishap engines
were
in the closed position indicating low RPM settings.
CONCLUSION: Even though the engines appear to have been at
low
power settings, / found nothing driving my investigation to indicate that either engine had any problems. They appear to have
been capable of normal operation at impact.

3-13'

Mishap Aircraft: instrument Rep

ort F-117A, S/A 82-0801
Mishap Date: 4 August 1992
OC-ALC Investigator: Melvin R.
Underwood
I. iNTACOUCTION: The follow
ing are the results of the ana
conducted on the Ins
lysis
truments And associate
d cockpit components
recovered from F-117A, S/N
82080
1 class - A" flight mishap.
mishap occurred 4 August 1997
This
ments and components examined near Holleman Ara, NM. All instruhad
sus
tai
ned
minor to major impact
damage and some degree of fir
to determine readings at thee damage. Several methods were Usnd
signal: (1) Visual presentat time of imfact or loss of imphel
ion as received; (2) Exa
of the dial faces and pointe
ation
rs for impact marks; (3) min
examination of the operating gea
Int
ernal
impact marks or capture. Sin rs and mechanisms for evidence of
ce
ins
tru
men
ts
are extremely delicate,: heynai iit v:erla tt oila
n scir il and heat. Ins
reactions to impact forces
trument
and heat vary depending upo
particular design, Where app
n the
discussed under the individual licable, the peculiarities ate
sub-headings,
II. RVALUATIOH1

1. Attitude Director Indica

tor (ADI).
the ADI is such that it
design of
ds to retain the indicaThe
upon loss of electricalten
tio
ns
power. The presentation can existing
the sphere or roll gimbal
nge if
struck by a foreign objcha
indicator sustained major is
ect. This
imp
act
and minor fire damage. The
front glass and pitch
m knob were missing. The
flag, glide slope warnintri
localizer
flag, and attitude warning fla
were captured by impact gout
il
of
view. This would indicagte(Of
the indicator was being ele
tha
t
ctrically powered at impact
sphere had sustained fire dam
. The
age
.
An initial observati
vealed that the sphere and rol
ivl gimbal were captured by on
end depicted approximately
impact
50
deg
ree
s
right wing down and 70
degrees nose down. - Internal
impact marks on the sphere and examination revealed conclusive
degrees right wing down and 71 roll gimbal that correlated to 52
degrees nose down at Impact.
2, Horizontal Situation Indica
tor (HSI). The design of
the HSI is such that it emp
s a high ratio gear mechan
position the numerous presenloy
ism to
tions existing at loss of eletations and will retain the indicatained major impact and very ctrical power. This indicator susminor fire damage. The front
heading set knob, course
knob, OFF flag, bearing poiglass,
miniature airplane, and set
nter,
cou
Internal examination reveal rse deviation bar were missing.
ed
tha
t
all
gea
r mechanism were
captured by impact damage. The
following readings were obts
ained;
Compass Card
Bearing Pointer
Heeding Marker (Captains Bars)
Course Select Indicator
Course Arrow
Range Indicator

321
033
262
075
075
008

degrees
or 213 degrees
degrees
degrees
degrees
miles

3. Standby Airspeed Indicator

. The design of this
indicator is such that it
rates from direct inputs
and static pressures. Theope
pointer will return to itsof impact
stop upon ions-of impact pre
low end
damage. It employs a pressu ssure unless captured by impact
positioning and cat be affect re bellows assembly for pointer
ed by heat acting upon the bel
This indicator sustai
lows.
glass was cracked, but ned very minor impact damage. The dial
int
act
.
Whe
n examined the poi
cated 190 knots. Examination
r indirevealed that the pointente
bent towardu the dial fac
r tip was
e
and
was
mak
ing
contact with the dial
face. Microscopic examination
of the dial face revealed
er tip rub mark that ext
ended from 223 knots down to 190 a pointknots.

4. Standby Ver
al Velocity Indicator
I). The
design of this indicatortic
is such that it operates (UP
from static
pressure inputs. The indicato
r sustained very minor impact and
fire damage. The dial glas was
cracked but intact. The pointer
was off it shaft. Dial faces exam
of a pointer impact mark. No readination did not reveal evidence
ing W4S obtainod.
E. Bnizipe Instruments:
1. Engine Perfor
ce Indicator. The design of thi
indicator is such that itman
s
wil
retain the indication existing
upon loss of electrical power,l Thi
s
ind
ica
tor sustained majoz
impact and fire damage. The fron
t glass was missing.
tal drum readouts had sust
digiained major fire damage. By The
analyzing
burn patterns and impact marks on
the digital drums, the following readings were obtained:
Left Engine Core RPM
Right Engine Core RPM
Left Engine EGT
Right Engine EGT
Left Engine Fuel Flow
Right Engine Fuel Flow
Left. Engine Fan RPM
Right Engine Fan RPM
Left Engine Oil Pressure
Right Engine Oil Pressure

68 percent
67 percent
422 degrees C.
450 degrees C.
600 pounds
600 pounds
37 percent
Percent
No reading
No reading

35

C.1c2.1Steil
z izADMPLIS Tustruments ,
1. Pressure Indicator (Not Coc
kpit). The desi gn
this indicator is such that the
pointer will return to its low
end stop (zero) upon loss of inp
indicators were recovered. Their ut pressure. Parts of three
dial faces were examined. No
evidence of pointer marks wer
e
fou
nd and no readings were obtained.
2. Fuel Quantity indicator. The
design of this indicator
ouch that it will retain the
loss of electrical power. This indi presentations existing upon
cator sustained major
and minor firs damage. The dial
ct
glass and bingo fuel indeimpa
x were
missing. The total fuel poin
ter
was
loos
e on its shaf and was
free to rotate. The dial
sustained fire damage andt no
were found. By analyzing face
burn patterns and impact marks onmarks
digital drums, the following read
the
ings were obtained:
Total
12,200 pounds
Left
5,800 pounds
Right
6,400 pounds
D. agsatiintgat glingit and Lights:
1. Environmenta Control Panel
(ECS). This panel
sustained major impact and lfire
lever lock toggle was available damage. Only the left bleed air
for analysis. When examined it
van in the PORN position.
No
evid
ence was noted to indicate any
other position at impact.
2. Flight Contro Surface Center
ing Lights. These
lights sustained major firel dama
extent no analysis could be perge. Some were destroyed to the
formed. Their status were as
followsz
Left Rudder Lighte
Right Rudder Lights
Left Outboard Eleven Light
Left Inboard Elevon Light
Right Outboard Elevon Light
Right Inboard Elevon Light
PCS Reset Light
t-11

Destroyed
Destroyed
Not illuminated
Not illuminated
Destroyed
Destroyed
Not illuminated

3. Hydraulic System Panel. This

l sustainmajor
impact and fire damage. Only four warningpane
light modules
analyzed. Their status were as follows:
Right Flight Pump
P/N 302881SW - 039
CUSTI 20Q2007 - 339

Illuminated

Flight Hydraulic B
P/N 3028015W - 043
CUSTO 2042007 - 343

Not illuminated

Left Utility Pump

P/N 302801SW - 044
CUST4 20Q2007 - 344

Not illuminated

Left Flight Pump

P/N 302661SW - 045
CUSTI 20Q2007 - 345

Not illuminated

III. DETERMINATION: Nothing was noted during this analy

indicated instrument or instrument system failure prior sis that
to impact
or loss of input signal.

Qa
t, atm(
Equipment Specialist (Electronic)

Oklahoma City ALC/LIINT (EPSN 336-2750) Comm (405) 736-2

750
Tinker AFB, OK 73145

MATERIALS ENGINFHING SECTION

SCIENCE & ENGINEERING LABORATORY BRANCH
McCLELLAM AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA
EYAIDATICH OF EXHIBITS FROM F-117A 82-0801
MISHAP
CHARGE NR: T3624G
TIE!. NB: 92-0878
SUBMITTED BY: 49114/MIB (Capt. Bob Worsen)
1. DMIDDUCTICIR We were requested to
uate two exhibits from a Class
A mishap. The first exhibit consisted eval
of
pain
aircraft. We were requested to determine if t chips frai part of thR
hydraulic fluid. The second exhibit was a the shiny material was
of two mating ducts and including the V-bandbleed duct section consisting
Specifically, we were requested to determin clamp connector.
e if the clamp was properly
installed over the mating flanges at Impact.
2 FIRST EXHIBIT: The paint chips ranged in
size from 20 micron; to 10
millimeters across.
a. The soluble components of the
s were extracted with Freon IF
solvent and the residue analyzed using achip
Nico
spectrophotometer. The infrared fingerprint,le:. 203X ET-IR
the extremely small amount of sample, did not which was very weak due to
indicate the presence of
hydraulic fluid (MIL-H-5606 or 83282). The
spec
Indicating the presence of an organic coating trum contained Information
system decomposed by heat.
b. A visual Observation using a stereo micr
oscope at 17.5X indicated
that the paint chips had been exposed to extr
eme
heat. Scale parts of the
paint had blisters and bubbles with a glossy
appearance on the surface.
3. SEOZIKD EXHIBIT: The second exhibit
consisted or two mating bleed air
ducts, which were Identified only by
their relative positions (fore and
art). The forward duct is shown in figure
figure 2. A V-band clamp was entrapped in 1. The aft duct is shown in
the folds of the aft duct; the
position of the clamp was adjacent to the flan
ge of CYR duct.
a. Figure 3 shows a close-up view of
the latching mechanism or the
V-band clamp. TO latch the clamp, the half
-cyl
ptacle and the nut is tightened. Figure inder is placed into the
V-band clamp, including a view of the interior4 shows the other side of the
of the V-shaped section of
the clamp.
b. The interior of the V-shaped section
of the clamp was examined
microscopically. Only very small scratche
s
were
present. This indicates
that there were no substantial impact forces
betw
een
the flanges or the
ducts and the interior of the V-shaped sect
ion of the clamp.
c. The threaded rod and nut (see figu

re 3 for identification) were

examined microscopically. There were no
imp
act marks Oil the end of the
rod or nut which might have indicate
d that it was hit on the end. IL
could be possible to unlatch the clamp 1..)
striking the end of the rod or
nut. However, the lack of impact mark
; indicate that this probably did

7-11-

not occur. If something soft-ended, but with

for example, a metal part with sealant atta sufficient kinetic energy,
rod, it might have unlatched the clamp withched, had struck the end of the
out leaving an Impact mark.
however, this is improbable.
d. There were substantial impact marks on
the top sid
away from the duct axis) of the threaded
rod,
as
shown in ft
marks indicate that the rod WO'S struck from
a
dire
ction rougbly parallel
to the axis of the duct. The force which caus
ed
this
Impact mark miiibt
have been sufficient to unlatch the clamp.
Howe
ver,
in our opinion, if
the clamp was in proper position around the
flan
ges
of
the ducts, such a
force would have caused substantial Impact
mark
s
on
the
Anterior of tfle Vshaped section of the clamp. As mentioned
prev
ious
ly,
no such marks
exist.
J. DICrUSSION: The evidence indi
that the clamp was probably not
properly installed at the time of
t. It is possible that the clamp
was installed correctly and an impa
even
without damaging the interior of the V-sh t caused the clamp to enlat(11
aped section of the clamp, but
this is unlikely.
3 Atch
1. Fig 1, Fig 2, Photos
2. Fig 3, F1 I, Photos
3. Fig 5, Photo

approved,

EVALUTATION OF EXHIBITS FROM F-117A 82-0801 MISHAP

NOTE:

Figures referred to in

his report ayeco ntained in Tabie.

4'. 19

TAB K
DD FO

- FLIGHT PLAN OR AUTHORIZED SUBSTITUTE FLIGHT PLAN

FORMS
INDEX

TITLE

PAGE

Local Flight Clearance - Flight Order

K-2

OD Form 175

K-3

Mission Map

K-4

Flight Strip

K-5

1 HOME STATION
.OLLOMANAFB

LOCAL FLICkir CloISaketargaE

UNIT
416 F$

ORDER NUMBER
92117

DATE

FX,TCHP OFWEEZ
SI

AUThENtICATING OFFICIAL

04 AUG 92

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT OF 1974. Authority: 5 ESC 301. Principle Purpose: To identify individual ranted authority to operate
USAF aircraft. Routine Uses: Same as preceding. Whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary and effects on individuals for
not providing information: Disclosure at SSAN Is mandatory. Failure to provide this nullifies authorization granted herein,
All paryonnel on this order are subject to the articles of the UCM.I.
WWI

rail

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FORM F WEIS" BAL CLEARANCE {TACTICAL)

DATE
920814
MISSION

MODEL/DESIGN
F-117A
SERIAL NO
801
saes=

FR611

!
1
1
:
t

====
=7
1 WEIGHT

ITEM
BASIC A/C From Chart C
Oil in Airplane
PILOT(S)

81
81

1 OPERATING WEIGHT

FUEL
BDU-33s 2 EA.

WEIGHT

NOME

30314 142103
N/A
180
500

MAU-12 RH AFT
MAU-12 LH AFT

Corrections
1 Additional Load
WEIGHT MOMENT I
FUEL, INT.(2327
TAXI/TO FUEL
1 SUU-20
BDU-33s 6 EACH

Less Eapendables

GEAR MOM CH
-558.2
CONSTAN
10e;

======

CMPT ITEM

HOME SASE
PS-66
PILOT

TO

REMARrS
1.FUEL BASED ON 6.4 PPG.
2.FULL FUSELAGE.
7.W1NGS + 500 LBS. EA.
4.NON BLADDER CELLS.

==

: FORMAT; DI

365
760

30656 14374o
1 WEIGHT

HOME

14890
-500
276
142

70275
-245e
1257
640

:
0
1
1

45464
0
45464

217058

: LESS EXPENDABLES
1 LANDING (Fuel
3000 lbs)1

11437
34027

53529
15952S

GALS)

MOMENT :

11390 53714.6 :
47
214.5
TALEOFF (Uncorrected/
: CORRECTIONS
1 TAKEOFF (Corrected)

213058

{CO in %MAC/
LIMITATIONS :

W/

NO

CORR

1
...........

TAKEOFF (GROS-WT)
LANDING (GROS-WT)
TAKEOFF (GEAR-ON)
LANDING (GEAR-DN)

41.3
41.3

52500
52500 /
1
45.0
45.0 1

TAKEOFF (SEAR-UP)
LANDING (SEAR-UP)

41.3
41.3

45.0 :
45.0 :

CASE CONFIO
41.3
45.0
=WORST
==== ====== === ======= ==
====== === 1 ... ..
COMPUTED PT{

CORR

L-1

N/A
N/A

45464
34027

...........
t

N/A
N/A

43.8
43.9

N/A
N/A

43.4
43.3

...........

.....

42.6

MOST AFT;

43.

: ......
1

MOST FWD:

....

= ==

P.

nes( .

trrtflc..?'1,

...........

.........

TA I3 M

1. Based on visual inspection of mishap aircraft, F-117A, 820601, I certify that the aircraft was totally destroyed.
2. The total cost of the mishap aircraft TAW T.O. 00-25-30 is as
follows;
F-117A

640,561,500.00

Blue Streak Modification (2419 Platty)

CU-4 (WSC) Modification
CLSS Modification
SUU 20 Dispensor

BDU 33 (4 ea)
Total Cost

SA

AKER, Capt, USAF

nce Member

130,330.00
2,760,385.00
194,172.00
6,293.20
56.16
$ 43,652,736.36

TAB N

TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS

INDEX
TITLE

PAGE

Local Control (Tower) LCL eh 2

N-2

Departure/Arrival

LCL Ch 3

N-3

SOP

LCL Ch 12

N-5

rOR OFFtCAL U3E ONLY

TARE TRANScRIPT OF A/RCRAFT MISHAP, SHABA 67, F117/R

SUBJECT: LOCAL CONTROL
IDENTITY OP RECORDING FACILITY: RADAR APPROACH CONTROL, HOLLOMAN AFB, NK
FACILITIES AND CONTROL POSITIONS RECORDED: HOLLOMAN AFB CONTROL TONER, LOCAL
CONTROL (LCL).
DATE AND TIME OF TRANSCRIPT: 4 AUGUST 1992 FROM 0313Z/21131, TO 0318Z/2118T.
SOURCE OP TIME ENTRIES , TIMING TAPE
0313:16 Shaba 67: Tower, Shaba Six Seven to number one for one six
13:21 Let*

Shaba Six Seven, Holleman Tower, runway one pis, change to

departure. Cleared for takeoff.

13:26 Shaba 67: Cleared for takeoff one eta.

0319:00
031S:00
0316t00
017:00
0318:00
CUSTODIAN OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDING, I CERTIFY THIS TO HE A TRUE AND EXACT
T SCRIPT.

DAVID H. FOGLB
USAF
Air traffic Control Operations

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TAPE TRANSCRIPT OP AIRCRAFT MISHAP, SHAB
A 67, F117/R
SUBJEcT: APFROACH/DEPARTURE CONTROL
IDENTITY OF RECORDING FACILITY: RADAR APPR
OACH CONTROL, BOLLOMAN APB, NM
FACILITIES AND CONTROL POSITIONS RECO
CONTROL, APPROACH/DEPARTURE CONTROL (APPRDED: MOLLOMAN APS RADAR APPROACH
/DEP) ASR3, APPROACH CONTROL (APP)
AS133, HOLLOMAN APB CONTROL TOWER
WATC
H SUPERVISOR (TWR WS). NOM AT
0320Z/2120L THE APPROACH/DEPARTURE
CONTROLLER WORKING SHABA 67 REMAINED IN CONTROL POSITION WAS DECOMSINED. TUC
APPROACH CONTROL.
DATE AND TIME OP TIUMSCRIPTI 4 AUGUST 1992
PROM 03172/2117L TO 03223/2122L.
SOURCE OF TIME ENTRIES: TIMING TAPE
0317;06 Shaba 671 Departure, Shaba Six
Seven is with you passing fifty five
hundred. I'm going to be declaring an emer
gency and talking
to the SOP.
17:23 APP/DEP: Calling departure, veri
fy Shaba Six Seven doclarin
an emergency.
17:26

Shaba 67: Affirmative. I'd like to swit

ch over to..
talk to the SOF and then..ah..come up thir ah..twelve and
teen, or do you
want ale to come Up thirteen?

17:33 APP/DEP: Shaba Six Seven change to

SOY frequency, monitor guard.
17:38 Shaba 67: Shaba six Seven
.
17:44 APP/DEP: Angry Two Two,
fly heading one eight zero.
17:45 Angry 221 One eight zero, Angry Two
Two.
0318:30 APP/DEP: Angry Two Two,
contact Holleman Arrival. h. .Three Nine
Six
point zero.
18:35 Angry 22: Three nine six zero, good
night,
18:41 MEET:
Holleman Approach, Aztec One Eight Romeo
Juliet over.
18:43 APP/DEP: Aztec One Eight Romeo Juli
et, Holleman Approach, go ahead.
18:45 N1BRJ:
Yee ma'am, We just departed Alamogordo.
We are climbing
through six thousand, two hundred. We
are
flying to El
Paso at eight thousand, five hundred.
We'd like a flight
following please, V-F-R.
18:56 APP/DEP: Attec One tight Romeo
Jullet..ah..eguawk zero three zero
two and ident.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

031902 NMI:

Aztec One Eight Romeo Juliet, squawk Zero three

Zero two
and ident.

1903 Angry 22: Approach, Angry Two Two, nothi

ng heard on three nine six
zero.
19:08 AFFIDEP: Angry Two Two, say again sir,
19:10 Angry 22: Nothing heard on three nine six
zero,
19:17 APP/DE?: Angry Two Two, roger..ah..try
calling Holloman
three eeven two point nine. If not, come back Arrival on
up channel
eight.
1924 Angry 22: Three seven two nine, goodnight.
19:25 APP/DEP: Aztec One Eight Romeo Juliet
radar contact one mile south
of Alamogordo/White Sande Regional Airp
ort, Verify
at..ah..six thousand five hundred now,
19:31 N1BRJ:

One Eight Romeo Juliet, that is affir

mative.

19:34 APP/DIP: One Eight Romeo juliet, roger.

0320:24
ELT (Six audible sweepe)
0321:44 TWR WS:

Shaba Six Seven, Heileman Tower on guard,

if you hear me,
come up..ah,.SO

Tower out.
21:06 ITKX:
032200 APP:

F frequency or channel fourteen.

Holtman

Loud and clear, how me?

Lent calling Holloman Approach..ab..on three
two four point

three,. SAY again:

22:22 ELT (Two audible sweeps)

Td(SCRI PT.

OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDING, I CERTIFY THIS TO

BE A TROT AND EXACT

DAVID
Chief, Ai r Tratiic Contro l

FOR OFFICIAL VS E _ONLY

rOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TAPE TRANSCRIPT OF AIRCRAFT MISHAP, SHABA 67, F117/R

SUBJECT: SUPERVISOR OF PLYING
IDENTITY OF RECORDING FACILITY: RADAR APPROACH CONTROL,
HOLLOMAN APB, NM
FACILITIES AND CONTROL POSITIONS RECORDED: HOLLOMAN
AEG CONTROL TOWER,
SUPERVISOR OF FLYING (SOP), WATCH SUPERVISOR (TWR WS), LOCAL
CONTROL (LCL).
DATE AND TIME OF TRANSCRIPT: 4 AUGUST 1992 FROM 0318Z/21181
TO 0125T/2125L.
SOURCE OF TIME ENTRIES: TIMING TAPE
031856 Shaba 67: Holloman SOP, Shaba Six Seven,
1859 SOP:
0319:02

Shaba Six Seven, SOF, go ahead.

Shaba 67: Rog. Took off..ah..got a ECS light, I got a right

duct
overheat..and thenuhfor some reason, also I've got a,
I've got a hydraulic lightand stand by, if you could just
give me the ECS overheat right now.

19:21 SO?:

01Iahunderstand you've got anahECS overheat light

with a right duct light.

19:26 Shaba 67: That affirmative.

19:27 SO?:
19:29

And what about the hydraulic light?

Shaba 67: Stand by.

1936 Shaba 671 OK, I'm shoving that I've lost..

19:46 Shaba 671 ...utility A and 8 is on the lights there
but the gauge
shows good.
19:64 SOF:

Copy both utility A and a lights are on but the gauge shows
good.

19:68 Shaba 67: That's affirmative.

I've got a right utility problem,
right flight pump..utility A..
0320:06

Shaba 67, ..and utility

20:12 SO?;
20:17 SOP:

OK, understand right utility pump, right flight pump lights

uh, your utility A light Is on.

20124 ELT (Si, audible weeps)

OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

20:33 soP:
20:41 So?:

And uh, you copy that in that, uh, what you got?
Why don't ya go ahead and take care of what you'r
e doing
and let me know what: going On.

21:19

Shaba Six Seven, you still up/

SOP:

21:41 $or:

Shaba Six Seven, SOP?

2149 TWR VS:

Shaba Six Seven, Holloman Tower on guard, if

you hear me
come up SOP frequency or channel fourteen. Hollo
man Tower
out.

0322:22 ELT (Two audible sweeps)

0323:02 Shaba 69: Tower, Shaba Six Nine,
ready for departure one six.
23:06 LC1.1
Shaba Six Nine, Holloman Tower, (inaudible) taxi
up to and
hold short runway one six.
23:10 Shaba 69: Up to, hold short runway one
six, Shaba Six Nine.
23:16
Sun 3:
Raymond, Sun 3.
23:20 La:
23:20 UNR:

(unintelligible) correction, hold short runway

two two
Tower (unintelligible).

23:23 Shaba 69: Holding short runway two two,

Shab
23:47
Sun 3:
SOP, Sun 3.
23:50

SOP:

x Nine.

Sun), SOP..ah..it appears..

23:53 SOP:

..it appears we have an aircraft down in the

Tularosa
area-.

2357 SOP:

.Shaba 67..

23:59 SOP:

..called in with multiple problems..

0324:01

So?:

..and then went off the air.

24:04 SOF:

We got a report from the Texas Air Guard that

we.ah..had
one down between Tulaross..

24:013 SOP:

..and Alamogordo.

24:14 SOP:

We'll run the list now.

24146 Sun 3:

Sow, Sun 3.
2

rOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE NLY

24:52

SOF:

Sun 3, SOF. Did you copy my last transmission?

24:55

Sun 3:

Negative.

24:56

SOF:

Roger.

24:58

SOP:

Shaba 67..

0325:00 SOF:
25:05

SOF:

..e single 117, appease to have went down betwe

en Tularosa
and Alamogordo..
..He
called up with..ah..multiple..ah..lights
emergency..

as

an

2509

SOF:

..and..ah..as we were talking to him, he went

Tried to call him back, there wae nothing. We off the air
had a..

2516

Soy:

..We had a abort ELT and, uh, nothing else happe

ned after
that. Couldn't get a hold of him. Texas Air
Guard called
and said they uh, thought we had one
down..

25:24

SOP:

..One of the controllers appeared to have seen

a fireball.
0E0 Copy that..ah..Command poet know?

25:30 Sun 3:
25:34 SO?:

Yeah, I've got another SOF up here. He's talki

ng to command
post at this time, right now.

25:39 Sun 3:

OF. Copy that. I'm going to command poet.

25:41 SOP:

And, Uh, Sun 3, would you like to send a uh, helic

opter out
there at this time?

25:47

I'1I-uh, plan on sending one out right

now.

SOP:

25:51 SOF:
25:57

SUN 3:

And Sun 3, did you copy that.

I'm gonna
on..all..getting a helicopter out there now if
I can?
That's - affimative. Do it.

25:59

SOF:

Tel) , I'm doing it.

plan

AS CUSTODIAN OF THE ORIGINAL RECoROING

E r CERTIFY THIS TO BE A TRUE AND EXACT
T SCRIPT.

DAVI
Chief, A

rp OFFICI ALE _ONLY

-- TAB 0
ANY ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIATING DATA REPORTS
INDEX
TITLE

PAGE

Plight Control System Recorder Data

0-2

ECS Problems During Mod Delivery FCF's

0-35

Summary of Reported ECS Discrepancies

0-36

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F-JIM Flight Test

Da 5, 2874 Tea
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PpJarkale. CA

SOMM."1

.0.1 1296

9300-2700

aQ%X to
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or: DO

Star'

PCS Problems During

Mod Delivery PCPs

19 Aug 92

so. Mr 13ch McGregor

1. Two aborted PCP fli

ghts occurred on 2 fu
n and 29 lel 92 due to RC
S problems
a. On 2 fun aircraft
11
10 retmred to ba
Indicalion bathe cockpi
t was R DUCT OVI-17 se with an WE miter 10 minutes of flight.
off the R ENG BLEED
light. Checklist proced
Maintenance corrective MR switch, were accomplished. Light went ures, to include turning
out on final.
actions were to
to R and k da
e right hand wan valve reroute the right engine bay door heat detect
or, and
coupling.
b. On 29 Jul aircraft 01
1 returned to base with
lndkataa
Thr in the cockpit vms
an
RC
S OYHT tight_ Checkl ' IFE after 5 minutes of 1.1
the R an L ENO RIM
istprocedures, to
, MR switch, were acco
mplished. Maintenance include turning off
was to repositiem the
ovedn loop in the A/C
corrective action
bay.
2. Both mann subseque
ntly passed the PCP ch
eckout with no nuttier
problems.

SUMMARY OF REPORTED ECS DISCREPANCIES FOR

THE F-117A FLEET
FROM JAN 92 - AUG 92
15 Jan 92 - A/C 793 - Discrepancy: Left
and xdght duct light
intermittent
Corrective Action: Cleaned and resnated
canon
pluy
27 Feb 92 - A/C 841 - Discrepancy: ECS over
heat inte
Corrective Action: Repositioned ECS loop
oft
right side
12 Aug 92 - A/C 821 - Discrepancy: intermit
tent ECS
Corrective Action: Replaced pneumatic ther
mostct
4 Jun 92 - A/C 840 - Discrepancy: Left
bleed duct overheat on
in flight
Corrective Action: Replaced left engine
bleed
air duct elbow
11 Jun 92 - A/C 841

Discrepancy: ECS overheat light

Illuminated three times in
flight and would go cut after
1 - 2 minutes

Corrective Action.: Could not duplicate

18 Jun 92 - A/C 841 - Discrepancy: ECS over
heat light
illuminated three minutes
into flight
Corrective Action: Reporitioned overheat
loops

0-3 t

NEC 559

To: -

R. J. Karl

From: Ken Gousman

D/72-02 Bi90-4

PIA-1

Date: 08/11/92

D/2$-33 11/3:1

P/B-6

ext: 7-3475

Subject: Results of A/C 801 Flight Control System Recorder Download (U)
(U) The following pages describe the results of the downloading of the A/C 801 Flight
Control System Recorder (FCSR) on August 7, 1992. The FCSR was hand delivered to
LADC facilities by Master Sergeant G. Rivera of Holloman AFB. Downloading of the FCSR
mem ory occurred at site 7 from noon until 2 pm on August 1. 1992. The download was
performed by R. K. Wyllie of Lear Astonics Corporation (LAC), the manufacturer of Mt.
FCSR. using the Flight Control Computer (FLCC) Test Set and a flight test FLCC. It was
witnessed by Master Sergeant G. Rivera (Holloman AFB), J. Herr (LADC flight test) and
K. Gousman (L_ADC flight controls engineering). The FCSR under investigation was serial
number AST 0133. It has an LADC part number of 20R2085-1 and an LAC part number
of 463900-01-01.
The FCSR is located on the canopy of the aircraft and as such is jettisoned from the
it during the ejection sequence. It stores 64 frames of Flight Control System Status
information which is stored in Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) on a Flight Data Memory
Module (FDMN1). The status information is accumulated M the FLCC and sent to the FCSI2
on a 128 bit serial digital word (16 8-bit byte). This word is also stored within the FLCC.
The 17.8 bit word is sent from the FLCC to the FCSR once every 64 seconds or when a change
occurs to one of the status bits. Once 64 frames are recorded. the system wraps around to
the first FDMM location and begins Co overwrite memory locations. Therefore. only the last
64 recording frames are available during a download. Table 1 defines the contents of the 128
bit status word. The timing bits denote elapsed time (in seconds) from vehicle lift off. (U) Visual inspection of the unit was performed before the downloading process. The unit
exhibited no outward appearances of damage other than a scuff mark down one edge. The
connector and pins were in excellent condition. The inspection seals were not broken and
indicated that the Unit was sealed on February 24, 1983.
(U) Results of the download are as hallows (a detailed frame by frame account is available
upon request):
I.

(U) The 64 frames of status information extracted from the recorder

cover the time period from 138 to 192 seconds after liftoff. Due to the
manner in which the FCSR memory is updated. the actual time covered
by the data could be from 128 seconds (64 seconds '2) to 256 seconds
(64 seconds 4) after liftoff (provided changes to the status information
bits did not occur between 128 and 138 seconds and between 192 and
256 seconds).

2. (U) From frame 38(138 seconds) to frame 64 (145 seconds) and then
from frame 1 (145 seconds) to frame 34 (153 seconds) there are
consistent CAUTION and FCS FAIL indications due to failures with the
right inboard and outboard elevon ISAs (Intent- aired Servo Actuators).
Throughout this period a right inboard SERVO AMP failure was
continuously reported and right inboard and outboard ISA FAILS were

0-36

oscillating between failed and non-failed SIJI.:ti right outboard nearly

always failed and right inboard oscillating nearly every frame). At frame
7 (146 seconds) the right outboard ISA reports an ISA MISTRK (ISA
rnistrack) while the right outboard ISA FAIL indicates a non-failed
condition. The misirack is not present at frame 8 (147 seconds).
(U) ISA FAILS are obtained when one of ;he ISA hydraulic pressure
sensor switches in an ISA reports a loss of pressure for right outboard
these are Flight Hydro B for primary and lUtil Hydro B for secondary
and for the right inboard these are Util Hyro B (or primary and Flight
Hydro A for secondary). The switches provide a ground to the ISA FAIL
circuitry in the FLCC. Such asignal is also provided if the wires carryinP.
these signals short to ground or the ELCC lSA FAIL circuitry:fails. ISA
NIISTRKs are caused when a command to an ISA results in ISA
movem ert (measured by an LVOT in the ISA) that does itot track
se y with an ISA model within the FLOC. TyiIy his points to a
faulty ISA though a faulry FLCC or wiring can be the culprit. A SERVO
AMP failure is strictly a problem within the FLCC (or its power source).
-7 FLCC ID BIT (labeled 104) and BEG BIT (beginning bit) are
continuously on during the time period covered by the data. These are
correct indications of a proper system configuration and mode of
operation.
4.

(LI) At frame 35(168 seconds). a complete loss of channel b power

indicated. The following bits are set high:
PITCH B
R011 B
YAW E3
Qc/Ps B
Qc 13
ALPHA B
BETA B
P-RATE GYRO B
R-RATE GYRO B
POWER SUPPLY B
P TRIM B
All elevon SERVO AMPs
MI elevon ISA M1STRKs
All elevon DUAL fails
DUAL FAIL LO
CAUTION
FCS FAIL
BEG BIT
-7 FLCC ID BET

15

(U) It should be noted that pulling the channel B circuit breaker on the
FLCC test set will simulate this condition and results in the same status
0-37

indi cions except that the Y-RATE GYRO B and left rudder SERVO

AMP failure indications also occur and the DUAL FAIL LO does nor
indicate a failure. Ws Of Channel 13 power disables the elevon ISA
FAIL indicators on the FLCC Test Set and the data showed this to be
true. The rudder ISA FAIL indications are still active though they did
not indicate any failures.

(U) At frame 36 (168 seconds) the following changes to he frame 35

data occur:
Y-RATE GYRO B goes to failed indication
Left and right rudder SERVO AMPs fail
DUAL FAIL LO goes to non-failed indication
This results in a complete and correct collection of status indications for
a channel 9 power loss.
1U) At frame 37(192 secunds=64seconds*3) a normal update occurs
with no changes to the status indications. This is the last frame of status
information within the FCSR.
(U) These results were obtained directly from the download of the FCSR memory. No
attempt is made here to try and derive an explanation for the events that occurred on AC
801. More data concerning the time at which events occurred and the status of other
shipboard systems is required in order to properly relate this data to actual events.

Ken Gousman
F-117A Flight Controls
cc: R. Baker
B. Baughman
G. Beatty
D. Landon
It Loschke
R., Newton
B. Tanner

0-38

Table 1: FCS STATUS WORD

liLT I
116384
1

N AME
Timing Bit

18192

TimingBit

14096

Timing Bit

2048

Timing liii

I1024

Timing Bit

512

Timing Bit

256

Timing Bit

128

Timin g Bit

5
7
is

Timing Bit

10
111
112
I

DESCRIPTION

,,

Timing Bit

16

Timing Bit

Timing Bit
Tirn ingliii

!
2

Timing Bit

Timing Bit

END OF FLIGHT

End of flight - based on gear

BEGINNING BIT

In flight bit

17

YAW A

Yaw command signal channelA is failed

18

YAW 5

Yaw command signal channel B is failej

19

YAW C

Yaw command signal channel C is failed

t 20

YAW D

Yaw command signal channel D is faded

21

ROLL A

Roll command signal channel A is faded

22

ROLL B

Roll command sinul channel li is failed

23

ROLL C

Roll command signal channel C is failed

24

ROLL D

Roll command signal channel D is failed

25

PITCH A

Pitch command signal channel A is failed

26

PlTCH B

Pitch command signal channel B is failed

27

PITCH C

Pitch command signal channel C is failed

26

PITCH D

Pitch command signal channel D is failed

129

POWER SUPPLY A

Channel A power supply fai lure

30

POWER SUPPLY B

Channel B power supply failure

13

I 14

115
1
1 16

0-39

31

POWER SUPPLY C

Channel C power supply failure

32
j33

I POWER SUPPLY D

Channel D power supply failure

1PITCH TRIM A

Pitch

i PITCH TRIM B
I PITCH TRIM C
I ?ITCH TRIM D
I PITCH RATE GYRO A
I PITCH RATE GYRO B
I PITCH RATE GYRO C
I PITCH RATE GYRO D
I ROLL RATE GYRO A
I ROLL RATE GYRO B
I ROLL RATE GYRO C
I ROLL RATE GYRO D
I YAW RATE GYRO A
i YAW RATE GYRO B
I YAW RATE GYRO C
I YAW RATE GYRO D

Pitch trim signal channel B is failed

34
36

_
39
40

41

43
1

44
45
46
47
48
40

m signal channel A is failed

Pitch (rim signal channel C is fail ed

Pitch trim signal channel D id failed
Pitch rate gyro signal channel A is failed
Pitch rate gyro signal channel B is failed
Pitch rate gyro signal channel C is failed
Pitch rate gyro

I D is failed

Roll rate gyro signal channel A is fulled

Roll rate gyro signal channel Id is failed
Roll rate gyro signal channel C is failed
Roll rate gyro signal channelD is fai led
Yaw rate gyro signal channel A is failed
Yaw rate gyro signal channel B is failed
Yaw rate gyro signal channel C is failed
Yaw rate gyro signal channel D is tailed
Air data Qc signal channel A is failed

Qc A

Air data Qc signal channel B is failed

51

I Qc C

Air data Qc signal channel C is failed

52

Qe 0

Air data Qc signal channel D is failed

53

55

I ALPHA A

Air data alpha signal channel A is failed

ALPHA B

Air data alpha signal channel B is failed

[BACKUP TRIM

Trim commands are being supplied by backup system

56

SPARE A

Spare

57

DUAL FAIL HI

Indicates that a dual failure has occurred

58

BETA A

Air data sideslip signal angle channel A is failed

59

BETA B

Air dam sidestip signal angle channel'

60

BETA C

Air data sideslip signal angle channel C is failed

61

BETA D

Air data

62

DUAL FAIL LO

Indicates that a dual failure has occurred

63

NWS ON

Nose wheel steering is

0-40

failed

deslip signal angle channel D is failed

aged

64

SERVO AMP LR

Failure of a LR servo amp

65

SERVO AMP RR

Failure of a RR servo amp

be

SERVO AMP LO

Failure of a LO servo amp

67

SERVO AMP U

Failure of a U servo amp

I SERVO AMP RI

Failure of a RI servo amp

LbE
69

SERVO AMP RO

Failure ut a RO servo amp

71)

Oc:Ps A

71

Owl's B

Air data Ch;Ps signal channel A is failed

Air data Qeflos signal channel B is Iai kd

Qc/Ps C

Air data OciPs signal channel C is failed

73

Qc:Ps D

Air data

74

ALPHA C

Air data alpha signal channel C is f ailed

75

ALPHA D

Air data alpha signal channel D is failed

76

CAUTION

Caution light

77

CAUTION RESET

Caution Light ROC I

lb

RESET

FCS Reset

79

GEAR HANDLE DOWN

Gear handleis down

EIGHT ON GEAR

SO

R REFUEL

82
83

SPARE B
A FAlL RR

c!Ps signal channel D is failed

Wight ison mai n

Retueting modeengaged
Spa re
RR iSApressure supply 01 o r

85

ISA MISTRACK RR

RO response does not match ISA model response

RR response does not match ISA modal response

80

ISA FAIL Li

U ISA pressure supply 01 or C failed

87
88

ISA MISTRACK LI

U response does not match ISA moth! reTonse

ISA FAIL RO

RO ISA pressure supply 0 -1 or

89

ISA FAIL RI

RI ISA pressure supply 01 or 07. failed

90

ISA FAIL LR

LR ISA pressure supply 01 or 02 tailed

91

ISA FAIL LO

LO ISA pressure supply 01 or #2 failed

92

ISA MISTRACK LR

LR response dues nor match ISA model response

193

SPARE

Spare

94

SPARE

Spare

95

SPARE

Spare

96

SPARE

Spare

ISA MISTRACK RO

0-41

#2 faded

97
irfs

SPARE

'Spare

SPARE

Spare

1 ISA NI ISTRACK LO
100
!

i ISA MISTRACK

IF

SPARE

102

SPARE

11.0 response does not match ISA mode response

RI response doe: not march ISA model response
'Spare

E1 7.ZooLING AIR OFF

101 IrAT ENGAGE
105 iffliaA131 PD
11

Spare
!Indicates whether or not coolina air is being supplies!
Indicates whether or not Autopilot is esweed
Power Failed-Disabled

1 loh

1 HI'S FAIL

Indicates the existence of any FCS fairure

107

, SPARE (7

Spare

Iss

SPARE D

Spa It

1109

1SPARE

Spare

1110

ILO DLSAL FAIL

Dual LO Servo Amp failures

1111

Li. DUAl... FAIL

Dual ii. Servo Afhp tatlarris

;1 112

LK DUAL FAIL

Dual Li( Servo . amp failures

1113

'PITCH SECOND FAIL

Dual failure aniong the pitch axis failure sensors

1114

RR DUAL FAIL

Dual RR :servo Amp re:Lures

115

1RIDLAL FAIL

Dual RI Servo Amp failures

110
1117
is

' RO DUAL FAIL

Dual RD Servo Amp ;allures

SPARE M
1-7 FLCC ID BIT

:Spare
1Confirms -7 earnhgaration

11 7

SPARL 0

i.

I 120

SPARE P

!Spare

1.21

'SPARE
1SPARE ft

Span:
I Spare

124

SPARE S
SPARE if

125

SPARE U

Spare

125

!SPARE V

1Spare

1217

1PARYIN

'Enforces odd panty for each word

1 122

123

Sparc

Spare
Spare

0-42

STATEMENT OF DAMAGE TO
PRIVATE PROVRTY

The xni5hap aircraft cras

miles north-northeast of hed on 4 August 1992 approximately eigh
Holloman nen, NM on priv
ate
Two mobile home trailers
personal equipment was were damaged. One used for storage of
destroyed by five. The
liv ng quarters was dama
ot
ge
d by flying debris. Two her used for
150 foot transmission to
guy wires to a
wer were nevered.
Legal claims are pending.
No coot estimate availahl
n.

WARREN, Capt, USAF

ating Officer

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE (ACC).
8ERG5TROM AIR FORCE BASE, TDAS 78743-5002
SPECIAL ORDER

M-012

31 August 1992

With the concurrence of the commanders concerned, the following individuals,

organizations indicated, are appointed to serve as Safety Investigation Board
members to investigate the Class A Flight Mishap, 49 FW, Holloman AF0 NM.
which occurred 10 101 NNE of Willman AEI KM, 4 Aug 92, Involving an F-I17
aircraft, 02-01301. Individuals are relieved from all duties pending completion of the investigation. Authority: AFR 127-4.
5 814/CV, Mi

COL THOMAS B. GOSLIN, JR.,

Board President

0 58705-5000

319 FW/4 FS, Hill AFB UT 84056-5000

CAPT ROBERT L. WARREN.

Investigating Officer
CAPT DANIEL J. A. DECAMP,
Pilot Member

49 FW/417 FS, Holloman AFB NM 20330-5000

IT COL STANLE1 F. UCHMAN,

Flight Surgeon

, 554 MG, Nellis AEA NV 89115-5000

CAPT SALLY O. BAKER,

Maintenance Member

554 SS, Nellis AFB NV 89115-5000

CAPT ANTHONY J. SEELY,

Life Support Member

49 FW/415 FS, Nolloman All NM 88330-5000

2LT REBECCA L. GABLE,

Recorder

49 FW/SUPS, Holloman AFB NM 88330-5000

FOR THE COW4MOE

APPROVING OFFICIAL
/ 64,4,4-4.e.4.

BRIAN J. COTE, Lt
Acting Director o
JO
Ch

Captai
tion

1, USAF
Safety

A
14-012

p-I

- TAB R
DIAGRAMS
INDEX
TITLE

PAGE

Wreckage Diagram

R-2

F-117A Bleed Air Supply System

R-3

Mew MI
Moen. VW
41.111117 (W}
EFIWI NW uomx
woss. I.9/ WOW
WOW 401114
191,94 Limn Co
1 JO
' Met InOhm
Wan Ohmetv

PO

t.

74
fri.

49

12
77
W
W

W.
W
14

m1194 Iw41

WS 11711 ( irrtANEIX
10111111117 1.11.71.10114
an law %VI WII WM
OP %al
1011.1411191 WM MO, WI
1111 M771177. 71 11 /59071,79 MINA
Otlial

ntMtuni
MI
WIZ WPM
WOW WI WIWI WOW)
WaN
o
IflJ1 VII
rn rn4

7,7, 1 me/ 74 Miaow

WHI 71449
mc711 91171twit WMAertea
MILL OM OM WW1
1011
Ow

Litt NH

17

91

weemw em 99014 IMMO

OM

pm 1141014 'KM

VI AP PIIM

WO tor 11 14
j
Ufl
Afl
I
10
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Me 'WIMP
1n4 MOWN
Me 'MOW
Me

1t$ I 01404 on SI CUON

1P119 AWM WC

4.7.1.e Mtw OM AMY,

4.7,144911/11
WI we
drl
WI WM

WI
ON

IM
ti&
jl.

. PP

M
111
ril.
b.
En
74
11/
MIA
ft.

run. (An.,
OW
WI
We

114
111

MOW Wm
IIIMIOn Mel 11/14
OPOWO ma I PO
00w14b ,+Ir LO
4041.1h WWI IPA

CIOW
1.1191 ean 40741110a1M
Peleelette 1,91444
Wein reep CM,
WO WOW MAO
MOW 0 ( WIWI(
WOW PM LOU(
MI
t(M90011
#114 11 1110 IMPOOMI

I Wm
Ilike41

MO
lit,

119
l2
US
7
Oft

no.
121.
O.

imp

144

147li
1u9
710,
UI.
n9
19

Ill

Me

11.1

101*
474411404 WPM ea+
Wm
nes
1141*

ID
STARIIR

r;RATNO AIR START CONNECTION,

S=IFF VALVE

SIARIT.R

F-Ii7A

BLEED AIR
SHUTOFF VALVF

4.i

RIGHT ENGINE

AP ; SOLAT T: VALVE

LIID :NG i NI

GROUND

e 1.

all configuration.

FOUncii -

Aft du:

ided into

Atch 1
S-2

. Latching. end of clam . ,

5-3

Figure 5. Impact marks on the top

S-4

roc

TAB T
TITLE

TAB

Medical Recommendation of Flying

T-1

Physiological Training Records

T-3

Aeronautical Orders

1-4

AF Form 942

T-7

AF Form 8

T-8

MQT Gradebook (Excerpts)

T-9

IDT Gradebook (Excerpts)

T-27

Individual Flight Data

T-30

Flight Records

T-31

FCIF Cards

T-33

Capt Mille Career Flying Times

T-35

AFORMS Printout

T-36

Assignment Processing SURF

T-44

a>,

MEDICAL REcOMMENDA11ON FOR FLYING OR SPEOtALtRERATIONADU TY

s &

TO

tomt PWacy Aa f 974 Use Sante PAS ITO Foml MON

ft

DA

OM

/ 44 4 y. V

ET 4. 4

i Iv ity) I.

44..a .4

S BEEN FCJND (

ATE

tOALLY PESTNETED FROM WERE OR SPECIALOPERATIONAL DUET KEEL

NEDICALLY CLEARED FOR EXEC OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY FOLLOWER AN LANESS OR WILEY
CATTY CLEARED FOR MEW DUTY FCZI OWE*:
WifIALI44EDICAL
EXAMINATION

yLf

PERIODIC ACME_
EXAMINATION

D TO WEAR VISION CORRECTION LICE:RCS

EIRE CLEA

AIRCRAFT ANSWER

ths 41zzo;

44

(4(

F PERFORMING WINNE OR SPECIAL OPERATKINAL DUTY.

RATED OFFICER.: E. TRESS OR INJURy WEE NOT NE RESCATED WITHIN 180 DAYS
NONRATED OFFICER OR ENLISTED PERSONNEL:KJJ4ES&CW4 PEERY WET EDT BE RESOLVED WIT HIN 9C DAYS
L DATE FOUND LETAIWILYEEA 0

I DATE. miND DEE 4 EST TED

DA

DOE CLEA

E
744E
GPADE OF FLIGHT SURGEON

TOt AL onsoeir THIS LLNESSUWU

BE A

mcerni *)IC YEAR I4DtAtED;

044

SIGNATURE
(

CERTIFY that I haYe been notified and understand IS above actions and recommendations.
NOT wear contact lenses while performing flying or seeoiai operational duty.
OF FLYEJOR. JTVDUAL

DATE
E I X EX

AF FORM 1042, FEB 92

PRE EKES EDIT ET EV US( P

MEDICAL RECOMMENDATION FOR FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY

(THIS FORM IS SUBJECT' TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 - Use blank et PAS DL) Form 2005)

TO

DATE

FROM:

20 Bob 92

354 Mal 000:22 MC)

unapt se 29579-5300
LAST N ASf

FIRST NAME .114/DOLE

INITIAL

MIN

an B.

CrT

RATINGIFLTINO OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY

Pilot

Ut

THE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL HAS SEEN FOUR

ABC

ACTIVE FLYING

(CEPAS APPKWAIER

ORGANIZATION

MAJCOM

lie

35S

YES 0 NO

boxer):

MEDICALLY RESTRICTED FROM FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY

(PNW)

MEDICALLY CLEARED FOR FLYING ON SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY FOLLOWING AN ILLNESS ON INJURY

MEDICALLY

TV FOLLOWING:

it

0 INITIAL MEDICAL
EXAMINATION

PERIODIC MEDICAL
EXAMINATION

0 INITIAL CLEARANCE
(This SAW

0 AIRCRAFT
MISHAP

0 REQUIRED TO WEAR GLASSES WHILE PERFORMING FLYING OR OTHER DUTIES MOMARING CORRECTED VISUAL ACUITY

(CONTACT LENSES ARE PROHIBITED UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED.)

0 RATED OFFICER: ILLNESS OR INJURY W ILL NOT DE RESOLVED WITHIN 1110 DAYS.

NONRATED OFFICER OR ENLISTED PERSONNEL: ILLNESS OR INJURY WILL NOT SE RESOLVED WITHIN SO DAYS.

ACTUAL DATE FOUND DNIF

ESTIMATED DURATION OF DRIP

ACTUAL DATE FOUND MEDICALLY CLEARED

TOTAL OATS DRIP EMS

ILLWEIGNINJURY

..

..
REMARKS

DATE MEDICAL CLEARANCE EXPIRES

MEDICAL EXAMINATION MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED

AND YEAR INDICATED

IN THE MONTH

28 Feb 93
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND GRADE OF FLIGHT
SURGEON

SIGNATURE

LARY R. MRS, CAM MAP, IC

I CERTIFY that I have been notift d and undentan tt

<
oVeac

20 Feb 92
dj4pejm datlons.

e''...-'_

SIGNATURE OF FLYER OR INDIVIDUAL

20 Feb 92

e->?
....-

AF Form 1042, PAN(

DATE

88 rnavious

USED.

INDIVIDUAL PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING RECORD

177115 FORA( IS SUBJBL r TO THE PRIV ACT ACT OF 1 9 74. USE BLANKET P.45 - OD FORM 900..11

For aircrew Rennes Rib record will be knit u e permanent put of the Individual Flight Record (1Fillo Me Al' Form NC Aircrew TOMOS/
Enduation Record. Fet WI other peraonnel Orb record may be kept u a permanent pan or the Field Medical Round. Only Undologierd Training Offitere may authenticate fatties. This record ebould at-company inclieddrol when reporting ran rthirsher training coono.
I StA N

LAT NAM, -FIRST NAME ,. MIDDLE INITIAL

Mills,

OR

03

John B.

TYPE OF
TRAINING

AL

BASE

TRAININ G

Sheppard AFB, TX

24 Oct 86

'51 ORATORS OF

OATES

AIR FORCE

31 Oct 89

L TRAINING OFFICER

SIOLOG/C

rt

BSC

PASSENGER

LIFT

REPPESKER

Holloman AFB NM

10 Feb 88

*EJ4C37SJF

28 Feb 91

MI BA.

31 DEC 93

13W

FAR
REFRES HER

TAC
Centrifuge

SHAW AFB, SC

12 DEC 90

10 May 89

Holloman AFB NM

N/A

IJSAF, 13C

Mr2;_ty- --1-R. CRE E, Co 1, USAF. BSC

PNRISUICE SUIT
ONIGI TYPE.
PROSAISM SLOT
Reflex TYFE

Warrior
Fitness Tng
m

SEAT

PAR-AIL

..--

Holloma

11 Dec 87

Sheppard AFB, TX 17 OCT 1986

shapp.ord

ram,

We

OCT 1985

REM *Rgs

F OTT 702

PREVIOUS COITION IS OBSOLETE.

N/A

MIC ,
.1.

!USAF BSC
LUSAUSC

AERONAUTICAL ORDER

N45E: AUERMANN JOHN E

CREW POSITION: PILOT

ORGANIZATION:
LOCATION: SHEPPARD AFS TEXAS
WING: 0080 FTW

88 ITS

REQUIRED TO PERFORM FREQUENT AND REGULAR

ir.

1'77

77

7 7

flJT

EFFECTIVE DATE: 01 OCT 36

TY AFR 643-13 PARAGRARH 3-5
RE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTIOATING OF.
oOMOANDER
DFP RTMRNT CIF THE A
LYTRA
fl-''fl
DoTL!
ALLAN 6 HAGELTHORN
REIFF. FLIGHT OFERATIONS RFANOD

USE
BRENT F.

' -A

2Lt

28 May 85

2L:

26 Kay 86

2Lt

28 May 86

21.%

28 May 86

2L:

26 Nay 86

HiN F

28 May 86
21.[

- 1N,

)C

, WARE
KEI

28 May

21%

2L:

86

2Lt

28 May 66

2L:
2Lt
2Lt

gam -

2Lt
QU'

J
VID R

21.c

- 02 May 86

2Lt

03 Mzy 86

AERONAUTICAL ORDER IPA/

AVIATION SERVICE

ENTITLEMENT: ACM
IS NOT AFFECTED

CHANGE AVIATION SERVICE CODE FROM IX / FAC

NAME: MILLS JOHN B
CREW POSITION: PILOT
ORGANIZATION: 0356 IFS
WING: 0354 TFW
LOCATION: MYRTLE BEACH AFB

GRADE; 1LT SSAN:

OFFICE SYMBOL; 3567FS

REQUIRED TO PERFORM FREQUENT AND REGULAP FLIGHTS: YES

NO
REQUIRED TO PERFORM PARACHUTE DUTIES
ASE: IA

FAC; I

AGO: 01 OCT 86

OSD: 03 MAY 86

OFDA:

REMARKS: ADMINISTRATIVE EXIGENCIES PREVENTED WRITTEN ORDERS IN ADVANCE.

EFFECTIVE DATE: 06 JUL 88

AUTHORITY: AFR 60-1 PARAGRAPH 2-2

TERMINATION DATE: 30 SEP 98

REQUEST DATE: 10 AUG 88

SIGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL:

FOR THE COMMANDER
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
354TH COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP ;TAM
MYRTLE BEACH AFS, Sc 29579
I, USAF
FRANCIS
ASER
HOST BASE FUNCTIONAL
DISTRIBUTION: B + C

AERONAUTICAL ORDER NUMBER: 0

RECORD OF EVALUATION
1414N

Na4E,LAn , r1Ms1.4 00LE

MILLS, John 5
me
AntCRAFT

tyPE
00
EJALUAT Ok

**** **** ASSIGNED

7-3

INSTRUMENT

DATE
COMPLETED

OUALMAtipm
LEVEL
1
(0E4MAND)

TYPE
A

CRAFT

TO 90FTS*** ***********
7 Oct 87
TTW**

****ASSIONE0

( ATC)
**********

A-10 :NIT OUAL/IN

Apr 88
;JAC)
****Q****5ASSIGNED TO 354Tro4d,A*****

In LI isI
Pr- 10 Tac tie al
; a Iinssrument/
- 545 a a I Qinatizan
A-10 1 Tactical
A-I0 N0-Nctice
Instrument
Intial
A-10 Instructor
Tactical

A-

10

************assaasE
F-I47 Inst./Qua'

0 Jul 89

$IRC,

9 Nov 89

LIM)
Q
13 MflY 90 .AMC)
25 Jan 91 STACI
31 an 91 i

InstiQual

AF arat "74 442

(TAO)

19 Jan 92 !

CIAO
( T C)

40 144H***********1
TO 444

27 Mar 92i

(TAG)

PftErncL-s cO,T 4. 401,._ nL 33C,,'

Ty44
04
EVALUATION

DATE
COMPLETED

QUALIFICATGM
LEVEL
OZMWAED)

'Mr

CERTIFICATE OF AIRCREW QUALIFICATION

21 Mn

EXAMINEE IDENTIFICATION
SIAM

AD

NAME (Laif, Finf, ..1111ale blirlall

Mills, John B.

Capt
ACYT/CREVI PONITICIP

ORGNIETION AND LOCATION

417 PS, Tonopah Test Range, NV

LIOIRILITV ERIOC/

N/A

IF - 117A/P
QUALIFICATION

FLIGHT /MAST

GROUND ITTIAST
ORAOS

OATS

NAMINAT/OPPICITICII

Closed Book

6 Apr 92

100(6)

Open Book

6 Apr 92

91

EP E

28 Apr 92

IRC

5 May 92

27 Nay 92

Initial Inat/Qual

96
ADDITIONAL TRAINING

TIESTRICTION

QUALIFICATION LEVEL

*DATER

(CUEIT041

UNQU ALIFIED

QUALIFIEP

PATS

1111110R/CRECN

Commerim
0

Tam li NO

N/A
OATS ADDITIONAL TRAIIIIINO COMPLATIEP

ERITINIATION RATE Or GILJLIFICATIOPI

N/A

Oct 93

on morsel
GOMIIIENT Of sIGIV /PVT /4 PUNIP4 C0/04114f

Qualified
, .

CENTIFWATICM
NT

GHEDK
ORGANIXTION

TV..MAUI AND WOAD&

.

o
U

00
Dv

a
I
4
II

,
/

41001T ERANINER

PHILIP V.. mcpAmilL

.
.
i Captain
2

fikretwgfirrii171
Lt Col

BARRY E. WINE
Lt Col

...54.......4

/MAL APPROVING OFFICER

..

417 P4/CC
[AND GRADE CJI EXAMINEE

John

jimi 9

A'
1 d i,t)

I CERTIFY Thot I have bun bnaled and unt staM tho scion
Rao,

Li

PATS

110,1TURE

B. Mills , Capt

1
PREVIOUS EDITMIT WILL IT VERO

EICURA VRE

9 -1--

IV. Examiner's Remarks:

A. Mission Description. The enminee briefed and flew this initial
instrument/qualification flight evaluation at Tonopah Teat Range. Mission
elements included single-ship takeoff, enroute navigation to 14407 for
formation and area work, RTB via fix-to-fix navigation to the TAT, VICAR
holding, penetration and approach, instrument missed approach, ILS
'approach, simulated single-engine approach, an overhead pattern to a full
. stop landing. A PAR was not available. The flight examiner conducted the
evaluation from an AT-39 chase aircraft. It Col Borne, 417 FS Commander,
was debriefed.
B. Discrepan cies:
1. EPE. None.
2. Flight. Area 21, Emergency Traffic Patterns (Q-). The examinee
was late to initiate go around on a single-engine approach. Debriefed.
C. Recommended Additional Training. N/A.
D. Additional Comments. Emergency procedures, unusual attitudes,
and a PAR were evaluated in the simulator.
Reviewing Officer's Comments:
Approving Officer's Comments:
VII. Additional Reviews:

00/CC

/C)

Pilch 2

16 Apr 02

OG 01 50-4

FROM: 417 FS/CC

SUBJ.: Gradebook,
TO: UNIT/DOT
UN1T/FLT CC
UNIT/DO
UNIT/CC
49 OSS/OST
490C/CC
EN TURN

book Please assure expeditious and secure

ransmittal is forrouting o
erg,
OFFICE./
4GENCY

RECOMMENDED
RECEIVED

16 (Ps) f;-

UNIT/DOT
ITN-IT/ELT cc
liNTEDO

FORWARDED

94:

VI/

92

IL:IT/CC
OSS/OST
49 00/CC

Comr4ander

Z3 limpl?

REV1EWE::

CRAPE

FOLDER

OrYIE

Oaca
.

qf

.".-.-

30,

cc

.
.

1
.

41.

27.

14

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4
6.

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51.

IKel

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Atch 4

15 Apr 92

CG OT 50-4

SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATION

DATE

Lemont Lead
0012 1?
::ht Lead

Tr

IV= tor

Pilot

11th.THER CATEGORY

017 mAY9P-.
-

LOCAL AREA ORIENTATION CERTIFICATION

Ramat

Squadron: 914

/WI MILLS
GROUND TRAINING

Date Accomplished/
Initials
Review of RAFB regulation 55-3.
Review TACR 55-117, local Chapter 8.
Review/Signoff all applicable FCIFS
and wing read files.
Local Area Orientation briefing.

FLYING TRAINING
DATE/MISSIONLEAD/
SIGNATURE
S.

LAO-1
This certiftea that
area orientat ion

Commander,

FS

hoe completed the local

16

OG 01 504

Awl] 9

FIRST FLIGHT- C t ST

FIRST FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS:

LAND CURRENCY:

LAST ACCOMP ailfis/

DAY C

I. PILOT
SOLID FACE/FETE/PUBS
REVIEW TACM 51.50 VOL XX, TACR 55-117
PHASE MANUAL
2.

FLIGHT COMMANDER
- BRIEF MQT PROGRAM
REVIEW GRADEBOOK
- REVIEW CURRENCIES
- INITIAl TRANSMITTAL LETTER

NIGHT CURR
PILOT

FLT CC de,/

3. OPERATIONS OFFICER
REVIEW GRADEBOOK
RECOMMEND LEVEL OF SUPERVISION
INITIAL TRANSMITTAL LETTER

UNIT DO

4. SQUADRON COMMANDER
REVIEW GRADEBOOK
INITIAL TRANSMITTAL LETTER

UNTI CC

Y"Yrk-

5. ADDITIONAL TRAINING EMPHASES AREAS

COMMENTS

MGHT TRANSITION PHASE BRIEF

DATE /7 074/

/. DIVERT BRIEF

DATE 2 ..A.-

8. AT!) MQT-1 (MILITARY LF)

DATE- 7 jtr--

9. CLEARED TO FLY

DATE V/ Sr- -

re

10. REQUIRED MQT COMPLETION DATE

(UNIT DOT)
(NLT 60 DAYS AFTER FIRST MQT SORTIE FOLLOWING IQT)

STUDENT ACTIVITY RECORD

MISSION

wssion

Toy EL

TIME

TIME

Ls-

I5

GRADE

REMARKS

3 a

94
f 4.

h2

7_5

l it

if 3

/on

'Ls

3
44--ntr-F

/..15

1'1.1

TA

0:4;iLt,

1000010os cot t ions

f3 /A

Se 0 EEGGEE r;

.11"

FAic -

0 HATTEETS-

An 1
PENDk A

MOT CHECKLIST

GROUND TRAINING
Phase Briefings
PB-1 (NTH)
PB-2 (Off Range)
PB-3 (NAAR)
PB-4 (NSA)
PB-5 (NSAT)
Pere (Differences, as required)
Weapons Test SCORE
Unfamiliar Range(s)
Range o6/ rfr
Range te
Range
MOT Academics
TAC 1
TAC 2
TAC 3
TAC 4
TAO 5
TAO 6
TAC 7

2. DEVICES
OFT-1
OFT-2
OFT-3
OFT-4
OFT-5
CWS
3, SORTIES
NTR
NSA
NSAT-1
NSAT-2
NSAT-3
NSAT-4
NSAT-5
NSAT-6
NAAR

Pilot
Intlials Date

- A-2
Pilot
Initials Date

4. MOT EVENTS
HOLDING
TACAN PEN/APP
ASR
ILS
NO-HUD PREC APP
NO-HUD NON-PREC APP
NO-MCI PREC APP
NO-MCI NON-PREC APP
NO-HUD/NO-MDI PREC APP
NO-HUD/NO-MDI NON-PREC APP
SSE APP (2)
SENSOR UPDATE
EIGHT MINUTE RETRIM
MAIL DEPARTURE (wing)
HEAVYWEIGHT TAKEOFF

V
LGB DELIVERY (Simulated or Actual)
MK-82/-84 DELIVERY (Simulated)
MANUAL LASING
DUAL-DOOR DEUVERY
6. MR REQUIREMENTS
WEAPONS QUAL OCC LEVEL A
NAAR
LOB DEUVERY(Actual)
VERIFICATION
CW ACADEMIC/SIMULATOR TRAINING

Atch 11

Y LIST IN ORDER
DATE COMP INTTTALS
1. F-117 Course Syllabus (Read)
2. F-117 A-1 Section 2 (Stilts)
3 F-117 Phase Manual (Read)
4. F-117 and Site FOIE' (Read)
5 F-117 A-1s2 (A111 (Study)
6 F-117 A-s1 Section 5 (Study)
7. F-117 Al Section (Study)
B. F417 A-I Section 7 (Study)
9. F-117 A-1 Section 3 (Study)
1G, F-I17 A-1 Section 4 (Study)
11. F-117 A-1 Section 1 (Study)
12. Pilot Irdlight Guide (Read)
13. TAC Reg 55.117 Cliced)
14. F-I17 A-)34 (Skint)
15. ITIF Tactical Information File (Skim)
I& Test Report File (Skins)
) craft System. Academic Guides (Review)
17. Air
18. F-I17 Master Question Fite (SIQF) (Review)
19. F-117 Weapons MQF (Review)

PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PFLOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT

an,nEr

PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT
PILOT

(
1
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14 .LIDOMENT
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X X

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DANGEROUS - Portormancouwa unto we deluxe maiked Vmponsue WU reSSINt os MARS Mw11101 2/10.4
GRADE 0
- Patennance fridicites a Iack d /Witty et Masted.
GRADE 1
- Performance Is ode, but iodates Rata, proficiency, makes entre a/ =Mica a town! Sat
GRADE 2
- Pa:nuance is essentsly cam/ Ftenxinkes and camas was.
GRADE 3
-Pertainancs is atm" ellicierc *MI and voirmuthoStatlm.
amoe 4
-Pettamancs reflects an unususThy Nip derma abitty.
ACCOMPLISHED (A) -Podamance Was au cbsenrat but the ekaant low pmfcrmed.

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INXION (XVOSEFEET
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A BOLDFACE

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XX X X X X X

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Mat N114

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-Perfameecea min bit itxicatee limited proficiency, makes grafi et menial a canneselon.
GRADE 2
-Petermann:4N anent* carom Recognise and cornice) ant
GRADE S
-Patcrmince a caned, efficient. Saul and *tout houlatket
GRADE 4
- Performance ectlects en nommen high degree ot Way.
ACCOMPLISHED fA) -Perlarnimai wan act absented out the derriere wee penonned

UNKNOWN -Pertannance ens not awned a the gannet rate Ad pedamed

DANGEFCUS - perkrinentie woe unfelt is (one donee evitken Vengenouttwel regent el amen grade 4 lglertf.)
GRADE 0
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NAME

MELL.-5

MISSION NUMBER
F-117A FILE
N/A

N/A
F-117A

DATE

MISSION DURATION
1. 0
INSTRUCTOR

PASSION STATUS

MISSION ELEMENTS

GRADE
1/001224

6 6 6 xx
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A. DniitaCeIler acor.iFailur e
A
B.Engine Fire at Start
TC.
C . Engine OVILT/Fire or
X X X X X X X
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71..
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S
E.Dual. Engine Flameout
X
F.Complete Flight System XX X X X X X
Fail and Utility Fail
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TRAINING SUMMARY 'vb.,

SAME

(La*. 1k., MIddle Mitt.,)

AD

06

APT

MILLS,
IT

SVLLASLJS

eASE

AC Syllabus, F-117ATKOP2 Dcc 90

7 FM Nellis AFB, NV

E ND OF PH ASE

1. SIMULATOR: Average to above average.

F-117A instrument cross check.
2.

A.1

a a

Capt Mills quickly mastered the

CONVERSION:

a. Aircraft Handling: Average to above average.

control exhibited throughout this phase.
Average.

b. Formation:

Smooth, positive

No problems noted.

c. Air Refueling: Average. Some problems interpreting the director

lights resulted in Capt Mills falling off the boom the first three attempts.
Final hook-up was executed nicely.
3.

SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT:

Average.

No problems noted.

.4. SURFACE ATTACK: Below average. Capt Mills had problems identifying
targets throughout this phase. His problems were caused by failure to
properly tune the scope and cursor fixation. He maintained a very positive
attitude throughout this phase and should progress nicely in MOT

D or

UR

5. FLYING TRAINING SUMMARY: Average. Capt Mills outstanding attitude

throughout this course made it a pleasure to work with him. With emphasis
on scope tuning expect him to do well in MOT with normal supervision.

ATE

15 Jun 92

D ADE. A

TY TIT

ATUR

15 Jun 92
ORM

I li

JOHN S
Commander

IA

USA

TYPED NAMEGRADE. ANO DUTY MLA Or

OATh

14

E OUR
s
Operation
Asst

Col, USAF
1-- :4

3-

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117201014

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X X X

GRAMM GRIMM,

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GRADE 1
- PerlermAxe US tax Incleales
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Polcrource 1 amaratidy Dna Flacovera inci carom Ara
GRADE 2
GRADE 3
ROGLaance
Iaera
LOcion,
maul
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tem Rattocn
GRADE 4
Pelanunce Islam entsuaLaIR Ii
dens d Nay.
A00043USHED - PatIcnnosn in cbenext but the dam* ma pal Lanai

LAIXNEWN -PvIcrinevio na cLuncl ar the Sawn' ea nel patarned

OANGUICLIS - Perkrinrce unmie Ana alma% rretbad tennoar VU racpska s, oanil foals cl Matf.)
GFVOE a
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10 AMENS 1040WLECXX
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37 RIF CIVERFRINT
JAN 97

Cr"

IA

PER-7410,-IL DATA - PRIVACY ACT OF

NAME: MILLS JOHN B

29
AGE:
M01115N
DAFSC:
MO S
AOIOA
FII7A
AT038A
AT0388
0A0378
SMA010A
SMF117A
SMT038A
SMT0388

C
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P

RNK: CPT
LAST PHYSICAL: 920220
LAST ALT CHMB: 901231

RPI: 1
FAC: 1

5E0 TOTAL PRIMARY SECOND INSTR

93.5
0.0
1087.1
1248.9
00
0.0
0.0
33.3
33.3
01
0.0
0.0
4.3
4.3
00
0.0
2.2
35.7
43.7
03
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.5
00
0.0
0.0
17.0
17.0
00
0.0
0.0
22.7
22.7
02
0.0
0.0
5.0
5.0
00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
04
1375.9

TOTALS

*******
MDS;
CREW-POS:

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT DATA

AS OF
DATE, 05 AUG 92

CAREER TOTALS
FLYING TIME: ALL
PR1/INST TIME: ALL

93.5

1205.1

SSAN:
ASC:
MAJCOM:

EVAL OTHER COMBAT CMBT

0.0
0.0
68.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.3
0.0
0.0
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
68.3

SPT
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0

6.8

1589.2
1253.9

GRAND TOTAL:
MDS PRI/INST TIME:

1331.2
1253.9

A
TAC

JUL 28 JUL 27 JUL

DATE 05 AUG 04 AUG 03 AUG 02 AUG 01 AUG 31 JUL 30 JUL 29
00.0
00.0
01.4
02.3
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.4
00.0
00.0
HRS
JUL 17 JUL
26 JUL 2S JUL 24 JUL 23 JUL 22 JUL 21 JUL 20 JUL 19 JUL 18
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.8
00.0
00.0
00.0
JUL
U JUL 15 JUL 14 JUL 13 JUL 12 JUL 11 JUL 10 JUL 09 JUL 08
02.1
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.5
01.4
30 DAY TOTALS

FLYING TIME: 015.5

7 JUL
01.6 ,

DAYS: 08

JUN 27 JUN
06 JUL 05 JUL 04 JUL 03 JUL 02 JUL 01 JUL 30 JUN 29 JUN 29
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.5
01
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.6
JUN 17 JUN
26 JUN 25 JUN 24 JUN 23 JUN 22 JUN 21 JUN 20 JUN 19 JUN 10
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
02,2
00.0
00.0
00.0
16 JUN
00.0

15 JUN 14 JUN 13 JUN 12 JUN 11 JUN 10 JUN 09 JUN

00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0

oe

JUN 07 JUN
00.0
01.2

13
DAYS:
FLYING TIME: 021.5
60 DAY TOTALS
29 MAY 28 MAY
MAY
30
MAY
31
JUN
01
JUN
06 JUN 05 JUN 04 JUN 03 JUN 02
01.3
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.2
01.4
01.2
01.1
00.0
00.0
MAY 18 MAY
27 MAY 26 MAY 25 MAY 24 MAY 23 MAY 22 MAY 21 MAY 20 MAY 19
01.4
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.2
01.2
MAY 08 MAY
17 MAY 16 MAY 15 MAY 14 MAY 13 MAY 12 MAY 11 MAY 10 MAY 09
00.0
00.0
00.0
01.2
01.3
01.4
01.3
00.0
00.0
00.0
90 DAY TOTALS

FLYING TIME: 036.7

3e;

DAYS: 25

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416 FS CAREER TIMES

NAME
ADAI
BACH
COUT
DANI
EILA
ENGE
HILT
HUNT
JOYC
KELL
KOHN
LAZA
LEEK
MASS
HERR
HILL
NEWT
PHIL
POPE
BMA
SHOA
SILV
VEED
WHIG

CAREER
PILOT
TIME
1578.6
1101.0
2459.5
2445.3
2459.0
1328.3
1292.4
2502.8
3217.0
1425.8
1407.9
1435.1
1590.7
1097.7
2164.6
1329.8
3701.9
2642.2
2137.3
2131.8
1381.9
1845.4
1417.6
2131.9

TOTAL
FIGHTER
TIME

TOTAL
F117
TIME

1572.9
1101.0
1563.3
2445.3
1218.5
1328.3
1292.4
2456.1
1283.8
1425.8
1407.9
1429.3
1590.7
1097.7
2136.9
1328.3
1982.1
2642.2
1162.4
1079.6
1381.9
1645.4
1417.6
2130.9

76.4
54.0
106.1
136.5
162.1
156.1
44.5
62.5
134.1
144.3
238.6
144.8
117.7
158.6
371.4
31.9
18.5
125.2
149.8
53.0
218.8
54.2
158.9
232.4

DATE:920803
IF
HOURS
IN F117
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
18.3
1.6
0.0
0.0
63.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.6
0.0
5.8
0.0
0.0
1.5

EP
HOURS
IN F117
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

FLYING STATUS LAST 30 - 60 - 90 DAYS

AS OF:

UNIT: 416
NAME
ADAIR DAVID A
BACHMAN JONATHAN E
COUTURE DOUGLAS E
DANIELS, JAMES H.
EILAND ANGELO B
ENGEMAN MARK D
HILTON MICHAEL J
HUNT JAMES P
JOYCE PETER S
KELLEY MICHAEL R
KOHNTOPP GUS A
LA2ARSKI ANTHONY J
LEEK KEVIN L
MAME JOHN T
MERRITT MICHAEL L
MILLS JOHN B
NEWTON LLOYD W
PHILLIPS JAMES R JR
POPE MARK A
REGAN JOHN P
SHOAF THOMAS P
SILVIA JOHN D
FEEDER TIMOTHY A
WRIGHT RICHARD L JR

920803

30 DAYS

60 DAYS

80 DAYS

11.9
11,5
10.6
0,0
7.4
3.6
11.9
8.2
10.6
20.4
18.0
13.7
15.5
19.1
9.8
13.7
15.5
10.2
13.2
11.0
19.8
19.4
11.6
27.1

11.3
17.8
16.3
6.7
29.8
12,8
21.6
11.2
18.5
32.1
40.0
20.0
24.0
33.2
14,2
20.1
39.3
18.0
20.9
16.2
41.8
22.5
21.0
44.1

24.0
19.6
17.6
20.3
45.4
21.7
24.6
24.0
18.5
35.2
56.1
22.1
28.2
34.8
25.6
38.1

46.7
21.8
27.9
19.2
85.1
28.6
27.7
54.7

03*AUG 92
TOTAL
PERE
NAME
ADAIR DAVI
BACHMAN JO
COUTURE DO
DANIELS, J
EILAND, AN
ENGEMAN, M
HILTON MIC
HUNT JAMES
JOYCE PETE
KELLEY MIC
KOHNTOPP,
LAZARSKI A
LEEK, KEY!
MASSEE JOH
MERRITT MI
MILLS JOHN
NEWTON LLO
PHILLIPS J
POPE, MARK
REGAN, JOH
SHOAF, THO
SILVIA JOH
VEEDER, TI
WRIGHT, RI
REQUIRED:
REMAINING:
% REM:
TOT REQ:
TOT REM:
TOT % REM:

PA09
CRS
00
03
01
06
06
02
00
02
02
00
04
02
02
00
00
05
05
00
00
03
03
05
00
04
0144
0055
38
1104
0724
65

PERE
PPNL
PAll
CRS
02
02
00
02
02
02
02
01
01
00
01
02
02
00
02
02
02
01
00
02
02
02
00
01
0048
0033
69

AB99
CRS

0000
0000
OD

TOTAL P/APP
PREC
PPNL
ARCH
PA00
PA02
AB99
CRS
CRS
CRS
02
04
05
04
01
02
04
12
11
03
08
03
04
05
09
02
04
11
06
01
05
02
07
02
02
06
03
09
04
11
08
02
10
04
02
05
11
04
07
04
07
02
08
04
09
04
10
03
0000
0288
0096
0073
0000
0181
00
62
76

TOTAL NPAPP
NPA
PPNL
PP
PA03
PA05
CRS
CRS
06
04
08
04
02
02
04
12
10
02
12
04
04
12
05
03
11
04
00
00
08
03
04
11
09
03
06
00
04
05
08
03
11
04
04
11
01
01
12
04
04
10
03
10
00
00
01
09
0096
0288
0189
0069
71
65

SSE A
PRCH
A899
CRS

0000
0000
00

PA20
CRS
06
06
04
06
06
05
05
05
06
05
04
05
04
02
06
05
06
06
06
05
06
06
05
04
0144
0124
86

03*AUG 92

NAME
ADAIR DAVI
BACHMAN JO
COUTURE DO
DANIELS, J
EILAND, AN
ENGEMAN, M
HILTON MIC
HUNT JAMES
JOYCE PETE
KELLEY MIC
KOHNTOPP.
LAZARSKI A
LEEK, KEVI
MASSEE JOH
MERRITT MI
MILLS JOHN
NEWTON LLO
PHILLIPS J
POPE, MARK
REGAN, JOH
SHOAF, TAO
SILVIA JOH
VHEDER, TI
WRIGHT, RI
REQUIRED:
REMAINING:
% REK:
TOT REQ:
TOT REM:
TOT % REM:

TOTAL
Sm
SRTY
SFOO
c
t6
06
04
04
04
04
06
06
04
04
04
04
04
04
04
04
06
04
04
06
04
06
04
04
0110
0110
100
0110
0110
100

TOTAL
,
SRTY
SFOO
AS
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

CT 1
GRDED
AB99
CAS

SF06
CAS
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

EMER
PROC
SIM
SF32
CAS
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

CT 2
GRDED

OW SI
M
SF04
CAS
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

AB99
CAS

SF09
CAS
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

TEST/
DIVER
T SIN
SF34
CAS
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

TOTAL
TAG
SF36
CAS
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

03*AUG 92

NAME
EILAND, AN
KOHNTOPP,
LAZARSKI A
SHOAF, THO
WRIGHT, RI

PREC NON P T38 S 138 S

TOTAL
TOTAL TOTAL
PEN
T38
138
APRCH RECAP IM SG IM SG
138
L ENG L ENG
SORT?
SORT? SORTY
RCH
STOO AB99 STOO STOO AB99 FAGS PA01 PA02 PA60 PASS
CD!)
ORS
CRS
CRS
CRS
CRS
CRS
CRS
CDL
CDD
06
06
06
06
06
920623 920714
30
06
06
06
27
920730 920820
06
04
00
06
00
00
00
23
920723 920813
06
06
920729 920819
05
05
06
28
04
04
04
04
05
920729 920819
25

03*AUG 92

NAME
EILAND, AN
KOHNTOPP,
LAZARSKI A
SHOAF, THO
WRIGHT, RI

T35 D
AY LA
ND
LD01
CDD
920723
920829
920822
920828
920827

138 B
KST L
AND
AB99 RLO1
ODD
CDD
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
920912

AB99
CDD

TAKE
OFF L
EM)
T000 AB99
CDD
CDD
NODATE
820613
NODATE
920913
NODATE

T38 I
P SOR
TY
IP10
CDD
NODATE
920913
NODATE
920829
920823

03*AUG 92

NAME
ADAIR DAVI
BACHMAN JO
COUTURE DO
DANIELS, J
EILAND, AN
HILTON MIC
HUNT JAMES
JOYCE PETE
KELLEY RIC
KOHNTOPP,
LAZARSKI A
LEEK, KEVI
MASSEE JOH
MERRITT MI
MILLS JOHN
NEWTON LLO
PHILLIPS J
POPE, MARK
REGAN, JOH
SHOAF, THO
SILVIA JOH
VEEDER, TI
WRIGHT, RI

F117
TOTAL
STRY
STOO
CGS
46
46
36
36
36
96
30
46
36
36
96
36
36
36
36
30
30
96
96
30
36
46
36
36

1117
TOTAL
STRY
STOO
CAS
09
08
06
00
02
05
00
07
04
10
07
01
06
11
06
00
00
08
10
00
07
06
10
07

1117
TOTAL
GCC
SGOO
CAS
09
07
06
00
01
05

F117
TOTAL
GCC
SGOO
CAM
00
00
00
00
00
00

1117
TOTAL
GCC
SGOO
CAI
09
07
06
00
01
05

1117
TOTAL
GCC
SGOO
CA2
00
02
04
04
06
06

1117
TOTAL
GCC
SGOO
CA3
04
00
00
08
02
02

AHC
5G70
CAS
00
00
00
00
00
00

INST
SORTI
E
SG80
CAS
00
01
02
00
01
00

06
04
09
04
01
06
11
06

00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00

06
04
09
04
01
06
11
06

04
05
06
00
04
06
06
03

07
00
01
04
01
00
00
01

00
00
01
01
00
00
00
00

01
00
01
03
00
00
00
00

07
10

00
00

07
10

03
04

02
02

00
00

01
00

07
05
10
07

00
00
00
00

07
05
10
07

00
04
05
02

04
02
01
01

00
00
00
01

00
01
00
00

03*AUG 92

NAME
ADAIR DAVI
BACHMAN JO
COUTURE DO
DANIELS, J
EILAND, AN
ENGEMAN, M
HILTON MIC
BUNT JAMES
JOYCE PETE
KELLEY MIC
KORNTOPP,
LAZARSKI A
LEEK, KEVI
MASSEE JOH
MERRITT MI
IMLLS JOHN
NEWTON LLO
PHILLIPS J
POPE, MARK
REGAN, JOH
SHOAF, THO
SILVIA JOH
VEEDER, TI
WRIGHT, RI
REQUIRED:
REMAINING:
% REM:
TOT REQ:
TOT REM:
TOT % REM:

L/A S
EN 0/
DEL
NH10
CRS
02
02
02
02
02
02

A899
CRS

OFFSE
T DEL
CAM
NH11
CRS
04
04
03
04
04
01

OFFSE
T DEL
BDU33
NHI2
CRS
01
01
01
01
01
01

SENSR
UPD
W/L
WHIS
CRS
04
04
04
04
04
04

02
02
01
02
02
02
02
02

04
03
00
01
01
00
00
04

01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01

04
04
04
04
04
04
04
04

02
02

03
02

01
01

04
04

02
02
02
02
0040
0039
97
0416
0322
77

03
03
03
03
0080
0050
62

01
01
01
01
0020
0020
100

03
04
04
04
0080
0079
98

0000
0000
00

F117
F117
TOTAL RITE
MR
AAR
AROO
AR05
CRS
aRs
01
00
01
01
01
00
00
02
00
01
02
00
00
00
00
00
02
00
01
00
02
00
00
01
02
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
01
00
00
00
00
00
01
00
02
01
01
00
00
00
0040
0004
0021
0002
52
50

BACKU
P DEL
VRY
WD30
CRS
00
00
06
06
06
03

COORD
ATTA
OK
WD22
CRS
00
00
01
01
01
01

HVYWT
DEL
WD16
CRS
02
02
02
02
02
02

00
06
00
06
02
01
04
04

00
01
01
01
01
01
01
01

02
02
02
02
01
02
02
02

03
03

01
01

02
02

00
00
02
05
0096
0057
59

01
00
01
01
0016
0016
100

01
02
02
02
0040
0036
95

03*AUG 92

NAME
ADAIR DAVI
BACHMAN JO
COUTURE DO
DANIELS, J
EILAND, AN
ENGEHAN, 14
HILTON MIC
RUNT JAMES
JOYCE PETE
KELLEY MIC
KOHNTOPP,
LAZARSKI A
LEEK, KEVI
MASSEE JOH
MERRITT MI
MILLS JOHN
NEWTON LLO
PHILLIPS J
POPE, MARK
BEGAN, JOH
SHOAF, THO
SILVIA JOH
VEEDER, TI
WRIGHT, RI

1117
TOTAL
STRY
STOO
CDL
920728
920730
920730
920623
920708
920729
920729
920727
920723
920729
920729
920730
920729
920726
920728
920729
920714
920730
920728
920730
920730
920725
920728
920714

NON D
MND M
SN
SX00
CUD
920818
920820
920829
920723
920807
920828
920826
920817
920622
920828
920628
920829
920828
920825
920627
920828
920813
920829
920827
920829
920829
920815
920827
820613

A899
CUD

F117
DAY L
HUG
LD01
CUD
920827
920829
920913
920807
920822
820912
920828
920826
920908
920912
920912
920913
920912
920909
920911
920828
920813
920913
920911
920827
920913
820814
920911
920828

PREC
APRCH
NLIO
CDD

PA01
CDD
920827
920829
920913
920806
920806
920912
920628
920818
920906
820912
920912
920913
920912
920909
920828
920821
920808
920913
920826
920829
920913
920824
920909
820824

A099
CUD

F117
TOTAL.
AAR
ARO
CUD
930116
990126
930107
921219
921231
921003
NODATE
930101
921215
930113
921113
930126
920825
930122
930124
930104
NODATE
990126
930124
921006
930120
921209
930118
930110

03*AUG 92

TOTAL
SIN
SRTY
9E00
NAME
CDD
ADAIR DAVI 920529
BACHMAN JO 920515
COUTURE DO 920210
DANIELS, J 920706
EILAND, AN 920531
ENGEMAN, M 920215
HILTON MIC 920612
HUNT JAMES 920329
JOYCE PETE 920125
KELLEY MIC 920516
KOHNTOPP, 920329
LA2ARSKI A 920607
LEEK, KEVI 920509
MASSEE JOH 920210
MERRITT MI 920225
WILLS JOHN 920718
NEWTON LW NODATE
PHILLIPS J 920622
POPE, NARK 920424
REGAN, JOH. 920516
SHOAF, THO 920531
SILVIA JOH 920606
VEEDER, Ti 920515
WRIGHT, RI 920727

ASSIGNMENT PROCESSING SURF (&517R)

NAME; MILLS JOHN 8

OR/DOE: CPT 900715

FILE DATE:22

UG 92

SSAN:

1115S DTY TITL: PILOT,F117

DAFSC:
PROJ GR:
COMMAND: CMB
PAS CODE: HS1CFP3H
BASE: MOLLOMAN
SEX:
M
MDEPNS: 02
MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED
------------N
SAN/STATUS/INTENT)
MILITARY JOIN SPOUSE CONSIDERATI
--N/A
NOT APPLICABLE
RESTRICTIONS

** ****
ASG BLOCK CODE/DATE: ** ****
NONE-N/A
000
DDAFSC/REASON/DATE:
LPTI/DOC:
P-PAS
P-JA

JDAMIS POSN 6:

304-TYPE:

J50-SIT-EFF-DT:
350-5TAT:
ASG AVAIL CODE/DATE:
ASG LIMIT CODE/DATE:

** ****
0000

IN-CYC-OFC:
SAFSC

ASID:
EASE

WEIGHT CONT:
UIF: *
ETZ: *
TP/PP/DR: * * *
ANN
RNLTD

-PROJECTED TRAINING
CRSE 6:
TAFCSD: 86097:
GD:
ST:
TAFMSD: H60925
TY5D/PLSO: 860507:: CRSE 6:
ST:
GD:
R5SP:
GRES 14:
ST:
OD:
Cne>: COM1 1200/8/N Help - Alt H
Fr nter Offline

SERVICE DATETS420613

DAS:
DEROS:
060923
USD:
9TED/61 8609 (0)

MPCVT 2.11

89880B
DOS:
ADSCD: 940612
EAD:
960975
CONT ID/DATE:

PAGL
NAME MILLS JOHN P
ETDM: AN ETES/YR: Y/00
------FLYING DATA
CMET HR5: 0000
R/5 ENT:
NONE
A10
NONE
NONE
NONE
R/5 CON:
9203/1248
YR/HES
AVSD:
AFSVC CD/DT:1A/S80706
HRS TOTiJET: 01572/
GATES:
5E1:
AERO RTG: PILOT
97
RI RID:
EXP: 0100 FAC: 1
--EDUCATION-METHOD
YR
DEGR ACADEMIC SPECIALITY
PME COURSE
NONE
BAC
8DCY=EARTH SOI,GEOLOGY
NONE
NONE
NONE
=NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
--OTHER DATA
APDP-TRACK:APDP-LVL:
TOP SEC
NON-CONUS RES: NOT APPL
PSN 6: 07481151C
SECCLNC:
TYPECLNC: El
CITIZENSHIP: BIRTH IN UNITED STATES
DOE: a
CLNCDATE: 880106
SOURCE OF COMMISSION: RTC 4YR
PHONE: MO
FUNGI- CAT: PERM PARTY
RECORD STATUS: 10
PRF-STAT:
QS PR EFERENCES--- TYPE TOUR -CONUS PREFERENCES151 GERMANY
CONUS TO LONG
EGLIN AFE FL
7ND UNITED KINGDOM UK
CONUS TO LONG
MCCHORD APE WA
3RD
NONE
SHAW APB SC
4TH
NONE
POPE AFP NC
DAVIS mONTHAN APB A2
5TH
NONE
FM40 DT: 9108
ASG-FREF-PRIORITY: NONE
PHCTO:
ASG-PREF-DAFSC-1ST:
1115N -- D
1115N -3R0
1115N
OnsN CON! 1200/8/N Help - Alt H
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7- - Lei

NAME: MILLS JOHN B

'
ORGANIZATION
11155 PILOT,F117
0000 0416 FIGHTER
M1115N STAN EVAL FLIGHT EXAM A-10
_0000 0356 FIGHTER
M111SW'STAN EVAL FLIGHT EXAM A-10
0000 0356 TACTICAL FIGHTER
K1115N NSTRUCTOR POLOT, A-10
0000 0356 TACTICAL FIGHTER
1115N AIRCRAFT COMMANDER, A-10

0356 TACTICAL FISHIER

STUDENT COURSE P-V4A-N
0000 0088 FLYING TRAINING

0000
0006

JT-DAT-TR EFF-DT-DY
LOCATI ON
13 JUN 92
N/A
CMF
NM
HOLLOMAN

DUTY TITLE ----------- -CHO

DAASC

SO
SO
SO
SO

SQ
SO

TAC N/A
MYRTLE BEACH
TAC N/A
MYRTLE BEACH
TAG N/A
MYRTLE BEACH
TAO N/A
MYRTLE BEACH
N/A
ATC
SHEPPARD

01 NOV 91
SC
01 JUL 91
SC
29 JAN 91
SC
le JUL BB
Sc
23 SEP B6
TX

PAGE:
- - OFR DATA-1
PRDJ CER
GR RT
CLOT
920209 03 YE
910630 03 YE
900007 02 YE
890807 02 YE
090207 02 YE
000700 01 TI)
880210 01 ID
671023 01 TV

-076 HISTORYNONE
NONE
NONE

NONE
MPCVT 2.11

Printer Offline

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COM1

1200/B/N Help - Alt H

TAB V
TITLE

T.

T.O. 1F-117A-2-217G, Excerpts

U 1

781H, 4 AUG 92

U-4

Automated Record Check, Over Due Inspections U-5

Planning Requirements, Inspection and
Time Change Forecast

U-9

Unscheduled and Deferred Event

U-13

Significant Aircraft History

U-14

Oil Analysis Record

U-16

Phase Overprint, 781A, page 13

U-25

781K, Delayed Discrepancies

U-26

781K, RAM Delayed Discrepancies

U-27

781A, Phase Book Excerpts

U-28

Training Records

Sgt Matthews

U-31

Sgt Sowell

U-32

SrA Abarca

U-33

A1C Jackson

U-34

Sgt Slaughter

U-35

Sgt Williams

U-36

Special Certification/Inspection Listing

U-38

TCTO's Not Complied With

U-40

T.O. 1F-117A-2-21G5, Excerpt

U-44

T.O. 1F-117A-2-48GS, APU Temp Chart

U-45

TAB U (cant)

TITLE

TAB

T.O. 00-20-1, Excerpt

U-46

T.O. 00-20-5, Excerpt

0-46

AFM 50-23, Excerpt

U-49

..

..

arsasitasamismaiii

TO 1
;

AND CHECK VALVE.

C
C
r 041,

3
4.

as,
te*;,1Spip

tabs

TO IF-117A-2-2110
1-17-2. INSTALLATION OF GROUND AIR START BLEED AIR DUCT
Remove protective cover from duct flange (II) in AMAD compartment. Clean and inspect duct flanges
1.
and recesses. Any damage must be corrected before bleed air duct is installed.
Remove protective covers from duct flanges (4, 7). Clean and inspect duct flanges and recesses, Any
2.
damage must be corrected before Installation.
3.

Ensure that new E-seal is clean and undamaged. Install A2873-300 E-seal (1) in bleed duct male end (4).

Install bleed air duct by sliding bleed air duct through opening in wheel well bulkhead and mate duct
ti
flange (4) with duct flange (11). Ensure that E-seal remains in position and that duct flanges are not damaged.
Position duct flanges together, carefully aligning ducts to obtain full contact alignment and engagement
5.
of flanges, and install coupling (2). Do not tighten coupling.
6.

1 170
-

Install band clamp (5) to secure duct to support saddle (10). Do not torque band clamp.

1. DATE

2-,CREW CHJE
3, ORGANIZATION 4, LOCATION
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DOCUMENTED MAINTENANCE
EVENT ID

TYPE SYN

EDF ID: 40e01

**** UNSCHEDULED & DEFERRED EVENTS ****
EVENT NARRATIVE
(0/0 SUPPLY DATA)

*** LESS THAN 30 DAYS

921952669 AWP / LT AND PT WEAPONS BAY DOOR BUMPER PADS WORN
30 DAYS
1

UNSCH & DEER TOTALS

OTY CODE DEFERRED CODE NARRATIVE

1 AWF AWAITING PARTS

30 DAYS

90 DAYS
0

TOTAL DISC
1

QTY CODE DEFERRED CODE NARRATIVE

EVENT ID

DATE
*** SCHEDULED EVENTS **w
SC-I SYM
EVENT NARRATIVE

921970361
921970364
921970353
921970358
921980300
921960301
9219603.03
921990034
922060016

97197
92197
92197
92197
92196
92198
92196
92199
92206

/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

60 DAYS
0

DATE RANGE: ALL

(W/0 SUPPLY DATA)

SEVERAL PIECES OF RAM DELAM. INBOARD OF RIGHT ELEVON

RAM MISSING INBOARD OF LEFT ELEVON
RAM MISSING AFT RT. CORNER OF ROLLOVER DOOR
RAM DELAMINATING UPPER UHF ANTTENA
RAM MISSING AFT OF RI WEAPONS BAY DOOR
ONE FASTENER MISSING FROM AVTR PANEL (NO FO)
RAM REMOVED FROM LEFT AMAD PANEL
RAM MISSING LEFT OUTBOARD SIDE OF LEFT EXHAUST
30 DAY OXY CONN, EMERGENCY HOSE/FARA VISUAL

*** TOTAL SCHEDULED EVENTS

( * = STARTED )

*4* TOTAL DEFERRED, UNSCHEDULED, AND SCHEDULED EVENTS

10

RECORDS CHECK CERTIFIED BY ......., ........... . DATE

AHE 92219 095427 095427

PROCESSED.

VERSION DATE: 0927

SIGNIFICANT AIRCRAFT HISTORY

All current AFTO 781 series forms were reviewed for accuracy and
comfleteness. A review of maintenance records, and Jacket file
from 31 March 1992 through 4 August 1992 revealed the following
historical information;
DATE
DATE
NOMENCLATURE JOB CONTROL # DISCOVERED CORRECTEp

CORRECTED
ACTION

TCD 2914 DUE

1333098

15/05/2

15/05/2

Drilled Mod
hole for
Bracket L#R

Remove &
relaced bleed
air thermostat
for constant
venting

0932801

05/04/2

05/04/2

Removed and
replaced air
thermostat

TCD 3194 (Kit

IC upgrade) DUE

1343036

18/05/2

18/05/2

TCD 3194 CB

1363104
TCD 3131 (Lox
dummy converter)
not complied with

19/05/2

19/05/2

TCD 3131 CW

1401280

19/05/2

19/05/2

TCD 3102 CW

1976940

15/07/2

15/07/2

Removed and
replaced fuel
Processor
unit

Ou t side Air -- 1984291

temperture
remains 20-50
degrees thru-out
flight causing TAS error

16/07/2

17/07/2

Removed and
replaced
total temperature probe

Phase inspection 2028001

#2 DUE

17/07/2

03/08/2

2050037
Left engine
bleed air package
removed to FOM
(engine removal)

20/07/2

30/07/2

TCD 3102
(Replacement of
STEMS EPU) not
complied with
- - - - - Fuel quantity
system
inoperational

--- - - - Phase #2
Complied with
Reinstalled
Lt bleed air
package

DATE
DATE
NOMENCLATURE JOB CONTROL # DISCOVERED CORRECTED

CORRECTED
ACTION

2050038
Right engine
bleed air package
removed to FOM
(engine removal)

20/07/2

26/07/2

Reinstalled
Rt bleed air
package

Left engine
removed for TCD
J-0060

2050037

20/07/2

30/07/2

Left engine
reinstalled

Right engine
removed for TCD
J-0060

202R001

20/07/2

26/07/2

Right engine
reinstalled

2028001
Lt 6 Pt tail
pipes and transition
ducts removed for
300 hour time change

21/07/2

30707/2

Lt & Rt tail
pipes and
transition
ducts
Installed

23/07/2

23/07/2

6 each borescope plugs

installed
w/safey wire

Bleed air ground 2028001

receptical
connection point
In Rt wheel removed
to FOM (reposition
ANAD oil drain line)

29/07/2

29/07/2

Reinstalled
bleed air
ground
reception
connection
system op
check DUE

2028001
Bleed air duct
in Rt outboard
AMAD compartment
disconnected to
FOM (reposition
RMAD oil drain line)

29/07/2

29/07/2

Reinstalled
Rt outboard
bleed air
duct Leak
Check DUE

202B001
Bleed air
overheat loop in
Rt outboard AMAD
compartment unsecured

29/07/2

29/07/2

Resecured
bleed air
overheat loop
on Right outboard loop

-------2050037
TCD J-0060
(installing safety
wire on borescope
plugs) DUE.

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C
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0 / 0
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0

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1101.1.ACES OR CORM 4s61, OCT 73 RHO MAHER FORM 137. 057, OCT 7 WHICH WILL RC UMW

NEMARKS

4
,9

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II

I DISCREPANT
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DO I1" UG
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2021

43

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5T5 45233

mat IMOwl10011 M49

/104,NICab IMPIHUAIC101

I.

0
c

4)

de

Inspect

O.

Alan" LOpoatats

t.

ineair tooPoneret*

g.

Install cosponvet*

fl
-

..

C9

Portent leakage aback,

34.

All CONDITIOSIOO IftriatS

11.1 applitabie aircraft SU

.,

Gpa ntLnaX funtlasaarala

kt

/6

la

35.

LIQUID COOLittt BEFAICEP411011

MIER
Vie Applicable aircraft Ws

gy 'Ca.

34.

Operational fundaatatala

b.

banns operational aback

te

Treablasbaot

4,

Impart

a.

Warn cooperating

le

Ilaplao* conpontat4

g.

Inch attack cospotuott

he

Antler cospactanta

Lt4Uw CfCLI liffilaan1014 SPAM

Usable aircraft TO*

Oparationi f WithubeaCs le
be

Perrone efearattenal Clack

lb

$IM 432E5
0
TAMULKNONUDOtAND
TEC.MMAtREFERENCII

s,. s

mD TO

Ca

in

0$

ill

Ill

23
OC

00t

Op natLt,l

flk

toublflh*r

lb

d. Inspect
e. Eamon componente
1.

Repair camponenta

g.

Install components
Perform leakage checks

lb

34, AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

TR: Applicable aircraft TO

Perform op.rfl1otal

heck

26

ublesbaot

lb

ct

Repair coponenta

macall

?&r.

on

35, LIMED) =LAMS REERICERATION

SYSTEM
TR: Applicable aircraft TOs
Oper ational

nadamaatalo

b.

Perform operational cheek

t.

lk.oubleasoct

d,

Inspect

C.

Remove components

t.

Replace components

g. Mend, check components

h. Repair components
36.

LIQUID CYCLE AZERIO2EATI0N SYSTEM

TR1 Applicable aircraft TOs

Perform operational check

14

OS Q UALIFICATION STANDARD CONT NUATION

TASKS. K

AND

ICAL AtrICK

ANO

AIRCRAFT GENERAL TR: AFR 6011;

Alan 127-68; A
a

Launch aircraft

Recover aircraft

Perform airnft inspections

Preflight

Thru-

ght

d EPO/FR

End of Runway

Quick Turn

Acceptance/Transfer

page 1 of 47
AF Form 797 MAY 87

JOB QUALIFICATION STANDARD CONTINUATION/COMMAND XIS

CERTIFICATION

rII e

T31144.14NOWLEIDUII AND T KCHNICAL REFERENCE

0
4

P4A.ICOM OIRCTEO
LIS4 CINI.Y

I/ a
E4

ro:

va.

1.

AIRCRAFT GENERAL TR: AFB 60-11:

Applicable F-117 TO's
AFOSH 127-66:

a.

Safe

b.

Launch aircraft

a.

Recover aircraft

d.

Perform aircraft inspections

(1)

Preflight

(2)

Thru-flight

(3)

Basic Postflight

(4)

Combined BPO/PR

(6)

End of Runway

len

Quick Turn

(7)

Acceptance/Transfer

JO

aircraft for maintenance

Cly

Lu

TRAINEE RAMC

page
AFFo 797,IMAY87

Pliet VtaySt EDITH:I/NIS 0111110LCTIL.

49 /ft J63

1 of 47

B QUALIFICATION STANDARD CONTINUATION/COMMAND JOS

CERTIFICATION
ma./CON 01liaCT0

r J

TASKS, IKNOWLCOGE AND TKCHNICKL AMP1414C55

VIM NCI'

MK

1.

AIRCRAFT GENERAL TR: AFR CO-11;

AFOSH 127-88;
Applicable F-I17 TO's

a.

Safe aircraft for maintenance

b.

Launch aircraft

c.

Recover aircraft

0Q

.117
Mi
F -

04
1.10

,
4.

Perform aircraft tnapectlone

( 1)

Preflight

(2)

Thru-flight

(3)

Basic Postflight

(4)

Combined BPO/PR

(5)

End of Runway

(B)

Quick Turn

(7)

Acceptance/Transfer

J.

TIIKINt MADAM

54 4,C.
AF Form 791, AV 87

page
RATIORS tOrtfON ObROANTE.

I of 47

WO GROALWICATIOM IP TOOMAII0 CONTINIJTIOH/COMMANO

CERTIFICATION

LLc. vS

mas
MAJCOM OIRIECTIRD
UWE ONLY

TAIcti. KNOWLEDGE MUD TECHNICAL FIMPARENCelf

Z
0

;a
.7
a

18,

POWERPLANT

TI :

TO

IF-117A-70J0

Perform preparation for engine

performance checkout

b.

Perfonn engine prestart (pickled motor)

a.

Perform engine run checks'

(cockpit)

4.

P erform alternati start procedures

e.

Pertoi'rn f uel, oil and air leak checks

t.

Perform oil preeatare checks

g.

Perform anti-ice valve checke

h.

Perform fan overepeed check

(ground)

I.

Perform engine boreecope inspection

Remove

Engine
a.a.P.O. INN 10h 3011 / HEM

44TU

- 3 C,

page 54 of 47

ON-THE -JOBTRAINING RECORD

CONTINUATION SHEET

uicwts

INITIAl. EVALUATIO N

As the immediate su.ervisor of

e individual

below

that

ems listed below indicate

Memb er

Initials next to

conducte d an initial eval uation ii accordanceAPR50-23.

the

Brielers initials

been briefed on

1.

Enlisted force structure (AIR 30-e)

AFDC deocript o

AFR

3. Duty positionfdeacription

uadron, sectio

5. Mission (wing,

6. Job safety standards (AFOSH)

TD

Recall procedures

D.

In/ Out processing

Appointments

11

4. Chain of commend

Quality assurance program

2.

Duty hours

13.

Work habits

14

POD preventi on

15.

Security (COMM and physical

18. Divers licencequ'

curity)
(

see

Leave
IL

APE

-10

19. Immediate supervisor /trainer

(co ntinu e doe

ni

AF FORM g
MAR 7* .""'

PRIV IOUS EDITION WILL Mt Ufa.

O9

,PC 2h

ALL

CCATIFICATION gft....ulf+1 ..Ni SC1A3UL4P

5,P CIAL
U4XT

C
PIflmMt

I al C

OUT Y PIT
AF4C

Octet.
E.T. 4 .11.1S

Piro thtIf

Lel

+Id

4.6
f f A >%2 AAA vA14
'At AAP:, A IRA? AAA

/ A I AA

CA f I f IC f II
I NPA f 16Afit
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SAPS
SAAAP

Ks

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;:7

fIT AA; A/ I" hi

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At IA? If I ,

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CERT IF :LA T1 on
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ALVA
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'

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y:511V: !:7011.t.

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c c:

?i t v ftCY ACT Lf I 4 71

41

TCTO's Not complied with.

25791 Dual Door-wpn bay improvement
2618A & D OCIP Retrofit
2674 Main landing gear flow regulator bracket clamp
2702 Bleed air overheat sensor
2702A Bleed air overheat sensor
27061% 6 B Drag chute door latch
2730 APU fuel line improvement
2730A APT fuel line improvement
2751 Retrofit Boot TAEs
2754 FCS/Tailhook wire rev
2754A FCS/Tailhook wire rev
2755 APU compartment fire detector
27551% APU compartment fire detector
2759B Hydraulic pressure switch
2759C Eydraulic pressure switch
2778 Torquing Backshells
2778A Torquing Backshells
2824 Retrofit Shroud/Throttle cable
2832 Missing PSNTRS-CNTD BUM
2834 Escape system modification
2834A Escape system modification
2862 Hydraulic tube chafing-main wheel well
2867 Engine compartment ventilation increase
2867 A-D Engine compartment ventilation increase

U- WO

2922 APU exhaust duct replacement

2960 APU increase EGT operational limits
2960A APU increase EGT operational limits
3004 C238 INSUL platy heatshield
3005 C238 INSUL platy heatshield
3021 Inlet AFT screw Rev
3022 Aural warning system Mech
3035 Fuel system xfer improvement
3035A-C Fuel system xfer improvement
3036 Pass system air drier improvement
3037 APU air vane STRTR Mat 6
3037A MU air vane STRTR Mat 6
3039 Add valve supports
3039A Add valve supports
3040 Valve placement
3041 Wing MTV flow shut-off valve
3042 "
3043 "
3044

"

It
"

3049 WPN bay wire ERNS RT/INS

3050 WPN loading panel
3065 Ice detector wire gage
3068 E-bay rack hoist
3070 Install 0FP45 in aircraft

LI-

41

3072 Flit Shrd.Cmpt inspect

3084 Est DBLR/UPR skin Pnls
3087 Probe adapter coating rework
3089 AMAD oil supply lines
3089A AMAD oil supply lines
3091 Perm Shims inflt fuel door
3119 Tapped hilok collar insp
3120 AERP provisions
3128 CLEVIS-THRSTR RWK/INSTL
3137 Permanent map lite instl
3151 Cable retention-drag chute
3156 Improve exhaust duct drain
3166 APU surge relay mod.
3169 Landing gear control handle improvement
3179 ECS airflow cutout
3181 Door SEQU control valve improvement
3182 ISO/Dir control valve replacement
3183 Overheat detector control unit relocation
3190 RLS removal
3194 KIT-ie upgrade for Mod IV
3206 Overheat detector connector backshell
3207 Delete cycle MSTR-ARM
3208 UPD SMP/DELE MSTR-ARM
3218 Fuel crossfeed mod.
3221 Cockpit supply orifice removal

3222 Blo-in door spring Mach - right aide

3223 "

left

It

3224 APU EGT MEET TM DLY INC

3235 Main landing gear WOW switch rigging

TM. IF-D7A-2-21GS

AIRE(
us in

Ps
ysterns,

Rleed ir is ken from the 4th and 7th

1-9.
engine
bleed ports, on the
bottom centerline of each engine, through
engine bleed air valve packages. Components in
each package include a low stage bleed air
check valve (7, figure 1-3), a high stage bleed
air regulator valve (8), a bleed air Pressure
regulator and shutoff valve (6), a pneumatic
thermostat ( 4 ), and a BITE pressure
indicator (5), Drain valves, in the ducts
between the bleed ports and the packages, open
o drain fluid from the system when the engine
1-10. A mixing manifold connects the discharge side of the low stage and high stage
valves together and to the inlet of the shutoff
valve. A port in the mixing manifold provides
connection for mixed air pressure sensing to
the high stage valve. The discharge side of the
shutoff valve is connected to the bleed air
system manifold by an elbow containing a
mounting Port and boss for the pneumatic
thermostat, connected to the high stage valve,
and a pressure sensing port, connected to the
pressure regulator and shutoff valve and the
HITE pressure indicator.
I-11. Each engine bleed air value packa
performs all pressure regulation, temperature
control, and shutoff functions for control of
bleed air front that engine. The BITE pressure
indicator function is to record excessive
Pressure to inform maintenance personnel of the
malfunction. The BITE pressure indicator
protrudes at 120 (+10) psi,
1-12. The bleed air pressure
and
shutoff valve is controlled by an
ical
solen oid and is spring-loaded to th
position. When the solenoid is not energized,
and engine bleed air pressure is more than
bleed air system manifold pressure, the valve
will open. If low stage airflow through the
check valve does not meet system demand, the
high stage valve will open as necessary to add
enough high stage airflow to provide a mixed

Mr pressure of 60 psi while Ii

discharge air temperature, at
thermostat, to 800 F. In event
valve malfunction, the pressure
shutoff valve limits package disc
to 75 psi
1-13. APU compressor discharge is connected
directly to the aft cross-ship portion of the
bleed air system manifold. Near the left and
right ends of this manifold section, the APU
isolation valves (9, figure 1-3) control entry of
AEU compressor air into the rest of the
manifold. In the EPU compartment, a branch
from the cross-ship duct delivers APU compressor air to the PASS shutoff valve (10) and the
EMI isolation valve (11)
From the left and right APU is olation
vaLve, in the AFL( and EELS compartments
respectively, manifold ducting turns and goes
forward on each side of the aircraft to the left
and right API; check valves (3) on the inboard
side of each engine compartment. These valves
allow flow of API' compressor air into the
forward portion of the manifold, when engine
bleed air Or high pressure ground air is not in
use, and prevent entry of engine bleed air or
high pressure ground air into the art portion of
the manifold.
1-1.5, Engine bleed air valve packages connect
to the left and right manifold ducts just
forward of the API' Check valves,
1-16. Left and right manifold ducts continue
forward from the engine compartments, through
the AMAD compartments, into the left and right
aft cheek bays. At this point, each duct turns
outboard and branches both forward and aft.
The aft branches go to the left and right
starter valves (0. On the right, the outboard
branch also goes aft to the ground air start
connection and check valve (2) in the forward
face of the right main wheel well. The forward
branches on each side go forward then inboard
to the left and right crossbleed shutoff
valves (12) in the inboard aft corners of the
left and right forward cheek bays. From these
valves the ducts go inboard into the E-bay then
up into the au- conditioning bay,

IF-117A-2-090S

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AMBIENT TEMPERATURE IF)

MZI3-0-4403-si

11
Figure 1-22. Static ANI Bleerl hymn Venu Ambie
nt Thmperarurr for Itrying Altitudes
(LAC Serial No. 785 Through
SD N-2618 and N-2960)

TO 00-20-1

SECTION III
SYMBOLS AND THEIR USE
PURPOSE AND USE.
it in this sert
e (locomen
,
jut maintenance status ci tile
lace
quipin nnt unit, These s mhnls and their
use must be fully unders!tod in order to nmk
monwr entries on main
a. Symbols will be entered in ref
important warning signals stand out rip
for the black last name initial. The red
sents the most serious possible comfition The r
W the next most serious condition, the red dash the
next most serious, and the red diagonal the least
serious condition.

NOTE
Automated forms may have symbols in
black.
Ii. More specific ;unifications of symbols are
contained in the instructions for completing each of
the various maintenance, discrepancy, and work
documents.
NOTE
No means for identifying aircraft/equipment discrepanciesother than those outlined
in this
hnical order may be used unless
approved by IIQ AFI,C/MMER and 11Q
'ISA Ft !YAM.
3.2. RED X. A red X indicates that the weapon
system, support system, or equipment is considered
unsafe or unfit for flight or use and that the
weapon system, support system, or equipment will
not be flown or used until the unsatisfactory condition is corrected or symbol is cleared.
a. The restriction to operational use of the
equipment does not apply to operation determined
necessary by the maintenance activity to
troubleshoot and repair the equipment.
I,. For TCT0s, a red X will be used to ground
ft remove equipment from service upon receipt of
an immediate iwthin TUTU, when work is started on
intent action and safety TCT0s, and within the
time limits established by To f
"mono IT
r, When the rmI N has been
am lied, inspection
id work performeii to rioted the discrepancy and
the accimiplishment of an audit of all related
entritoi, for comideteness anti accuracy, are
required by nmilItq,aiict( personnel authorized to
dear a red X.

IL No one wil
he flown, a missile t
he used until the red X ha
accordance with applicalde tee
e. Except for ground launched missiles, u
a red X will be mandatory for time change itet
prescribed in table 4-1 and 4-2.
1. The repairs made or work accomplished to
remeilv dangerous conditions indicated by red X or
red W symbols will he inspected by maintenance
personnel who are delegated such authority. When
a weapon or suliport system is in an unsafe coltdition and a depot or contract field team is dispatched, the chief of that team will dear the red X
for only the work the team has corrected, if speeifi
cally authorized by the dispatching organization.
The inspection of work performed to clear a red X
will be accomplished before an initial is placed over
the symbol, and is required to ensure that the work
has been properly accomplished and that nothing
has been overlooked. When the work is found to he
satisfactory, inspectors or supervisors will enter
their signature or personal stamp in the
INSPECTED BY block and their last-name initial
over the symbol. (See TO 00-20-8 for instructions
pertaining to groundlaunched missiles). Special
procedures for clearing red X and red W symbols
are outlined in the following instructions.
(I) Supervisors who participate in accomplishment of the repair work and who are authorized to clear red X symbols may enter their signature and grade in the "INSPECTED BY" block,
provided that another member of the maintenance
crew accomplishing the work signs the "CORRECTED BY" block. The maintenance technician
must be involved in the work which is required to
complete the task. In addition, both the supervisor
and the other maintenance technician must have
the opportunity to accomplish, monitor. or verify
the correct completion of the work. Work acer,(M'
plished by such stmerrisors. in any other way. wiii
not be verified in this manner and will require a
cheek by another supeervisor or inspector.
(2) When operations are conducted in locations where qualified ma illiellATICe personnel are
not available. the flight engineer, flight mechanic,
dispatched qualified maintenance mechanic from
airy/lifts home station or aircraft commander may
clear red X symbols when specific authorization is
granted by the home station DCM. When any of
these personnel is (he hest qualified nmintenance
person available at the location, that person may

Change 6 3-1

TO 00.204

accomplish the required work arid clear the red X

en tering signature and grade in the CORA) BY black, initialing the INSPECTED BY
k, lind /lacing the last name initial over the
I. An exceptional release by the aircraft comer will he required after the repairs are
accomplished and the red Xis cleared.
When an immediate or urgent Relic,
TCTO or special inspection prescrihe "INSPEC.
TION ONLY" and the inspection is accomplished
by an inspector or supervisor designated to clear
red X Igymhols, the symbol mo) lie cleared by the
inspector or supervisor hy entering their signature
and grade in the INSPECTED BY block and their
lust name initial over the symbol.
(1) When a weapon system, support system, or equipment is placed on a red X for ACCOMI, hment of a scheduled inspection, the red X will
cleared as follnws: llw lock supenisors, their
designated representative, or personnel authorized
in dear the red X will enter a statement in the
CORRECTIVE ACTION block indicating the
required inspection has been Accomplished in accordance with the applicable technical order, enter
their signature and grade in the INSPECTED BY
bluck iind place their WI( name initial over the symbol. This entry will indicate the individual has
reviewed all applicable maintenance documents and
that the inspection requirements contained in the
scheduled inspection and requirements manual have
been accomplished. If not accomplished, due to
lack of parts, test equipment etc., this entry will
indicate these inspection requirements are entered
in the AVM FORM USIA or APTO FORM 244 on a
red dash
g.
A red X will he used when it is suspected or
known that an aircraft has become eontaminated
with a nuclear, biological or cheinieal contaminant
and may be hazardous to personnel. For specific
procedures on clearing see 'futile 1-2, TO (141-20-5.
h. A red X will be used when egress or life
support personnel perform maintenance or an
inspection on the escape system, that involves disassembly and subsequent reassembly of a component or sub-component of the escape system. A
separate red X entry will be required for an egress
final when required by applicable technien1 orders.
When technical oniers du not specify an egress
MAJCOMs may detail such requirements as
necessary.
i. A red X will he used when an inspection of
installed life Figwort equir wield becomes past ilue.
EXCSIMON: Those item(s) corning due while an
aircraft is ini alert status or away from home station. These will lie placed 4111 a red dash unlit the

aircraft goes off alert or returns to home station

before upgrading to a red X.
A red X will be used when a new or
j.
returning aircraft arrives with installed individual
survival kits and/or man carrying parachutes which
life support/egress personnel discover have not
received a complete inspection/ repack by unit personnel. Exceptions to this are the F/FB-Ill and
the B-I personnel parachutes.
3-3. RED W (GROUND-LAUNCHED MISSILE USE
ONLY). See TO 00-20-6 for procedures concerning the Red W. A red W symbol for ground
launched missiles is 1.1SE4 I to reflect a condition of
an item of AGE, SE, or RPIE that is inoperative for
its intended use and requires careful attention: (I)
because of a condition at a missile site that will not
prevent successful launch, flight impact, or cornnd and control of the launch or flight; (2)
because of a condition off site that will not prevent
the operation of a major end item of powered or
non-powered SE; and (3) because of a condition at a
missile trainer that will not prevent its operation.
3-4. RED DASH (NOT APPLICABLE TO GROUNDLAUNCHED MISSILES). The following directions
will be used:
a. The red dash indicates that a required special inspection, accessory replacement, operational
check or functional check flight is due. The red
dash also indicates that a scheduled inspection
(preflight, post flight, BPO, HSC, etc.) is overdue
(Time or other factors will not allow accomplishment of the inspection before flight). It may also
be used for in-progress inspections when conditions
(work stoppage, crew change, etc.) necessitate an
entry in the AFTO FORM 781A, as determined
locally. The presence of the symbol indicates that
the condition of the equipment is unknown and tha
a more serious condition may exist. This condition
will be corrected as soon as possible by performing
the required inspections, accessory replacement,
operational check, functional check flight, and/or
any necessary maintenance.
Li, The red dash symbol will be used to indica
Lint an aircraft listed in TO 00-25-4, Table II, is
overdue programmed depot maintenance (PDM).
The red dash will be upgraded to a red X 90 days
after assignment unless an extension has been
obtained from the appropriate SPM. Refer to TO
00-2:e4 fur detailed instructions.
c. Time change items, other than life sustaining items identified in section three of the
appropriate -6 series Pis, continued in use beyond
their scheduled replacement will be carried on a red
dash until upgraded to a red X (table 4-1 rule 2).
Use of the red olash symbol will begin at the hourly

3.2 Citar.p.s. 4

47

TO 00-20-5

00 Prior to entering discrepancies, the

will be reviewed to prevent duplication. If a
previous discrepancy is considered to he more men :in represented. it should be vended (*Ilt MImtton 111).
(7) Aircrew members or maintenance per
sound will enter their signature in the DISCOVblock for each discrepancy recorded.
ERED
(8) Whenever a Red X discrepancy is of a
nature that operation of the affected system(s) under
any circumstances would be hazardous or result in
further damage, a warning note shall he included
following the discrepancy statement For example:
NOTE-DO NOT apply electrical power to fuel system or operate engine - FIRE HAZARD. The word
"NOTE" most be entered in red followed by the
remarks which may also be written in red. If the
remarks are not written in red, they must be underlined in red. The word "NOTE" will never he written
in the symbol block. When required, only the applicable red symbol will be entered in the symbol block
to denote the seriousness of the entry. When the
condition which created the note no longer whin,
line through the note.
(9) Whenever a maintenance action is
stopped before completion or disrupts a system other
than the one under repair, an entry will be made on
the AFT FORM 791A.

ustained flight below

8000 feet
inspection,
i A required
ent operational t eck or func
accessory rot
Iluinil check flight due or it scheduled inspection
(I'mitight PR /IWO, U l'0,11truf light, etc-) overdue.
Enter the job control number assigned
(11)
the discrepancy in the JCN block.

UP

(1H Only one defect will be entered in each

discrepancy block of the AITO FORM 781A. Preceding such entries the technician will enter the
tiroper symbol, when discovered code and date disLevered in the appropriate blocks.
panties discovered during achedill be recorded on AFTO FORMS
349 and only Red X entries will be required on the
Ait'PO FORM 78IA. MAJCOMS have the option of
using locally developed forms to record thc removal
of panels required by an inspection as long as an
entry is made in the 7814 which reflects their use.
This will preclude a separate Red X entry for each
panel. Discrepancies, other than Red X conditions,
discovered during scheduled inspections that cannot
be corrected by the allotted scheduled inspection
time will be transcribed to the AVID FORM 781A or
may be transcribed directly to the AVM FORM
78IK.

(30) Certain entries are required to assure

that adequate inspections of affected systems or
components are made to prevent or reduce the possibility or future mishaps. The entries will be made by
the individual having initial knowledge of the occurrence regardless of the apparent condition of the
aircraft If the aircraft is dropped from the property
records on a report of survey, the reason, authority,
and date for the survey will be entered in this block.
A brief entry will be made in the discrepancy block
when an aircraft has:

(14) When an item is removed and is not

immediately replaced (equipment temporarily
removed ETR) the reason for removal and the signature, grade and employee number of the mechanic
will be entered in the disci-young block. If the
discrepancy Mock is full, the KTR action will be
documented as a separate discrepancy, end reference will be made to the original discrepancy by
including: 'Sec page_,

a Made a barrier arrestment/

engagement. -

(16) When oil dilution is used for cold weather

operation or engine des lading purposes, the duration
of each oil dilution will he recorded In the DISCREPANCY block.

b Been involved or damaged in a

ground or air Mishap.
c Encountered severe turbulence or
icing during flight.
d Made contact with a
object
irspecd or "G"lead
I Made a hard landing.
e braking action.

fib) Repeat discrepancies will be identified by

entering in red "REPEAT' in the discrepancy block

RRECTIVE ACTION. When the write-up

on the Al-TO FORM 78IA is cleared, it brief
notion of the corrective action taken will be
umented in the CORRECTIVE ACTION block
and the date will be entered in the DATE CORRECTED block.
(I)
When any corrective action is accomplished on an aircraft away from he home station.
enter in the CORRECTIVE ACTION block the station location code at which the corrective action wis
taken.

3.9

t U 0

AIM 5923

IS

IS July 1990

C(6) \ :Maintain appropriate progress within

the training program. Supervisors or trainers
identify appropriate progress based on the
trainees' ability and initiative.
4-3, The Supervisor., The trainee's supervisor is a key person in the unit training system.
This is the person who plans, schedules, and,
perhaps, even conducts much of the training. In
addition, the supervisor controls quality of
training, certifies that the trainee attained necessary skills, and documents the necessary
records. The supervisor is a manager, leader,
teacher, coach, and inspector.
Everyone else's role in the training system-unit, base, and MAJCOM training managers and the various functional managers-is
to help the supervisor train the trainee.
The supervisor is normally a functional exper -such as an aircraft mechanic, air traffic controller, or computer technician--and not a training expert. Thus, supervisors must not work in a
vacuum but closely with training experts and
vice versa. Supervisors should actively seek as' tance when needed. SuPeSioes iire
reSpon-:=
ke sure trainees are trained to do their
ccording to necessary standards. Supervisors are responsible for their trainees' performances. This is the primary responsibility of
the supervisor.
ib.antegrate training with day-to-day work
center operations.
c; attend unit training manager meetings
and EST advisory service training, and qualify
trainers and evaluators to perform their responsibilities, as appropriate,
identify work center duty position qualifications and skill-level upgrade requirements.
When unit commanders direct, develop a master task list (MTh) (see paragraph 5-2a),
a0T.Make sure airmen are entered into required qualification and skill-level upgrade
training(see paragraph 5-2a1.
rt.:Conduct initial airman evaluations. Certifyand decertify airmen qualifications, as appropriate, in their training records. As required,
schedule periodic recertification. As appropth
ate, adjust airman duties (see paragraph 5-2b).
, g. As required, provide formal training feedback using AF Form 1284, Training Quality Report (fQ11), on the adequacy of formal training.

h. Counsel airmen on duty position

responsibilities
i. :Plan and schedule training. As necessary,
adjust training plans.
'j. As necessary, serve as trainer or appoint
qualified trainers.
k. :Advise airmen of self-training requirements.
. I. rAs appropriate, document training record.
.m. As necessary to support the unit mission,
schedule airmen for additional formal training.
n. As needed, seek unit training manager assistance.
appropriate,
monitor
airmen's
=o. As
progress, conduct review training, and counsel
airmen.
sp. As appropriate, request waivers and take
administrative action,
Prior to certification, evaluate airmen's
qualifications compared to standards. As required, conduct periodic recertification and reschedule training.
As appropriate, provide unit training
managers, unit commanders and command
functional managers status of training and recommendations to improve EST.
Coordinate field evaluation surveys questionnaires, and visits as requested by formal
training activities to provide feedback on formal training.
4-4. titre;TicitiittePdistiiilei: The unit
training manager serves a dual role as adviser
to the commander for the unit's EST system and
also provides training advie,,,agd assistance to
unit personnel Cgintiininginanageritiiiii tit

Assist supervisors, trainers, and

tra inees to accomplish their training duties.
This is the primary responsibility or unit
training managers.
unit commanders direct, serve as uni
office of primary responsibility OPR) and man
ager for EST policy and programs. Coordinate
policy and program changes with unit work cen
ten, unit commanders, and base training man
agers (or maintenance training, as appropri
ate.
c. Serve as unit training adviser and provide
unit commanders and supervisors recommendations on cost effective training methods to
satisfy specialty qualification and skill-level

MEMO FOR RECORD

All witnesses were read the general advice from attachment 3,
AFR 110-14 and confirmed that they understood the difference
between this accident investigation and a safety mishap
investigation. They were then sworn in from the same APR 110-14
attachment. I certify this to be true.

C , USAF

TAB V
TXTrP

TAB

MRS. MASSEY

V-1

SSGT RANK

V-4

TSGT HAWLEY

V-8

MR. GLIDDEN

V-11

SRA ULMER

V-13

SRA AMMONS

V-17

A1C THAYER

V-21

CMSGT MERCER

V-25

CAPP MUELLER

V-29

MSGT STRAWDERMAN

V-33

SGT PERRY

V-39

SSGT MATTHEWS

V-43

MC FOSBROOK

V-48

SGT SOWELL

V-52

DEPUTY LEDBETTER

V-59

DEPUTY HOUSE

V-62

MR. MARVIN

V-64

CAPT SENNA

V-69

MSGT MORSE

V-73

SSGT BALDWIN

V-77

TSGT SWALLOW

V-79

SRA ABARCA

V-82

ANN JACKSON

V-64

MAJOR PHILLIPS

V-89

SGT WILLIAMS

V-69

TAB V (CONT)
TITLE

TAB

MAJOR PAPP

V-93

CApT MILLS

V-97

CART KOHNTOPP

V-118

MAJOR COUTURE

v-121

MR. DELLACORINO

V-123

SGT GANSEL

V-126

AGENT ELDRIDGE

V-129

TESTIMONY OF MRS. CAROLYN MASSY

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN82-0601. The testimony was taken at her residence of 53
Country Lane, Tularosa, New Mexico on the 8th of September at
1445L.
Ql: Where were you on the night of the 4th of August 19927
A: At home watching Tv.
Q2:

Can you tell us what you heard?

A: Well, I heard a plane come by, just like they always do, so I
didn't think anything about it, until I heard a second loud
noise. I thought something must have happened. It seemed like
there was a third noise. I got up, my sister knock on the door
to see what had happened. I told her a plane had probably
crashed. We are right in the flight path.
Q3: You say the pilot landed right out here on one of the poles?
Did he come to your house?
A: Yes, my husband and sister were out there in the yard looking
at the fire. My husband looked up and said, Oh my gosh there's
the pilot, he was floating right across the trailer. He almost
hit the trees he was trying to miss. He ended up on the power
line instead.
Q4: How light was it outside? Was it pretty dark?
A: Well, I think he could see the outside light, he must have
been aiming for it. He saw the tall trees and missed them, but
he didn't see the power line until he was right there cause it
was a darker area. It was a dark night.
Q5: Did the pilot stay here after he got on the ground until the
authorities got here and what happened to him?
Yes. My husband went out and asked if he was okay. He said
that he was okay. My husband came back in to get a flashlight.
The pilot was already on the ground by that time, I had already
called 911. By the time I finished with 911 they were coming in.
The first thing he did was call the base, to tell them he'd
crashed, and that he was okay.

AI

Q6: He called from here then?

A: Yes.
Q7: Who took him from here?
A: He received several phone calls here he had given them the
number. They called back a several times just trying to find out
where we lived. Its difficult to find. My son took him up to
where the railroad track crosses the road. He planned on taking
him to the base, but finally a sheriff or policeman did.
Q8: They picked him up from your son up where 525 crosses the
railroad track?
A: Yes. No one ever showed up
couldn't find the place. They
he got transportation to the
take him out when a sheriff or

to get him out here, I guess they

were gone for quite awhile before
base. He had asked my son if he'd
someone came by.

Q9: Did you have any other pieces of the airplane hit out here?
A: No. Some landed over in a field and in other peoples yards,
but I don't think anything but the parachute was here.
Q10: About the aircraft, I guess it landed right over here. Did
it shake the house? When the plane was first coming over, were
there different tones as it was coming over? What did it sound
like?
A: Well, can I speak from what my husband said? He had just
come to bed and it was terribly hot that night, he had the window
up. He heard a loud boom. And then he heard whirling, like a
planes whirling, and he used to be in the air force and worked on
jets. He knew that was the sound of one crashing or spinning.
Be had a couple crash, so he was getting up about that time, he
thought it has going to hit the trailer. I never did actually
get outside to see the crash and all. He heard the sound of it
and knew the plane was about to crash.
011: Did anything strike you when you first met the pilot?
A: Of course he was shaken up, but I thought that he was very in
control, under the circumstances. He had a cut on his chin, he
was very upset that he might get blood on the floor. He asked us
for a towel. He called the base. I thought he was very well in
control and calm under the circumstances. After it happened he
was out in the yard looking at the crash when he grew more upset.
Re could see something burning and thought he might have hit
something. I thought he did very well under the circumstances.
2

all the pilot was acting rationally?

- Al :Yes.

TESTIMONY OF SSGT YOLANDA PE'A RANK

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
6N82-0801. The testimony was taken at Rolloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 9th of September at 0835L.
For the record, will you state your name, rank,
011
organization.
A: In SSgt Yolanda Pe'a Rank, 49 OSS.
Q2:
in?

On the night of 4 September, what position e

you Serving

A: 4 September?
Q3:

4 August, I'm sorry.

A: I was the watch supervisor of the tower.

Q4:

In that position, what are your main duties?

A: To oversee the arrival and departures of the aircraft that

are under my control and work with the crews that are available.
The watch tower has a total of four positions up there. At the
time I had my position manned, ground control manned, flight data
manned, and local control manned with a trainee in it.
Q5: On the night in question, when did you first suspect
something was wrong? How did you find out that there was an
airplane in trouble?
A: I sit up there, Major Papp, the SO?, was SHABA 67 had taken
off on runway 16 immediately after his departure he called the
SOF and I have the capability to monitor the SOF frequency
instead of just keying it up. I started monitoring the SOF's
frequency and then we had another SOF up there that was getting
checked out at the time. He jumped up and he made reference to,
this airplane's messed up, so I reached over, and he asked me for
a piece of paper, BO grabbed him one and I grabbed my emergency
board. I just started listening and they were writing all kinds
of stuff down. The supervisor for the RAPCON had called that
SHABA 67 was coming up on the SOF frequency and wanted to talk to
him. Local channel 14 would be available if we needed it. So I'm
listening, I get the other SOF a piece of paper and they are
talking about all their problems and everything. That's the
first I knew. That's how I knew. I was listening to the SOP talk
4

The RAPCON supervisor had told me also that he was

ing up to talk to the SOF.
Q6: When did you first know there was a crash?
A: Me personally, okay, after the SOF had got, when I saw it
basically. We were going through our checks, and he couldn't
contact him, and I was trying to get the airplane on guard, I
turned around and looked out the window, I saw a flash and then I
saw a fire. I looked over at the SOF and said that's a fire. My
local controller said, no way, that's not a fire. I said that is
a fire, I know its a fire. They asked me how I knew, and I said
that I've stared at that horizon for many years. I only orange
lights that I know of to the east is the Space Hall of Fame It
just did not look like it. I thought at first when I saw the
flash, it might have been the reflection of the lights in the
control tower. I said no, that's a fire.
Q7: Was it an airborne flash or a ground level flash?
A:

Ground level flash.

Q8: After it was discovered there had been a crash, what actions
did you take to inform the tower to initiate crash response?
A: Immediately I started, well my crash procedures, I follow
the 210, we had aircraft that were airborne. I was trying to
talk to the watch supervisor down in the RAPCON, and my ground
controller jumped up and grabbed the crash phone. He started
putting information out, I was talking to the SOF and trying to
coordinated that was the crash site. My ground controller had
just started talking like, suspected crash, this is where it was,
and I had to tell him to get off the crash phone we'll call them
back. I told him that's not how we do it. We have to confirm
with this office, I'll find out, it might have been a ground fire
or controlled burning, whatever. Initially my ground controller
jumped up and grabbed the crash phone when I told him to hang up.
So I could start calling RAPCON, the fire people downtown. I had
called the Sheriffs department, but the phone was busy.
Ironically, my sister is the dispatcher, I couldn't ever get
through to her. So I called DPS and asked them if they had sent
some people out there. I talked to some guy named Mike or
something like that. They had already started their
coordination.
Q9: Were there any aircraft (i.e. helicoptersl aunched from
Holloman to go out to the site?

A: NO. We had called over to base ops and told them to get a
hold of rescue or Army rescue to go ahead and get them on stand
by. We did not actually launch anybody.
910: In the tape from the tower, you got a phone call from
someone identifying themselves as someone from the Texas Air
National Guard.
A: Yeah, Texas Air Guard. He had called the SOF. What it was,
he flies for the alert unit out here. He was at home and saw it
or his wife saw. I don't know if he called the tower directly or
if he called his unit, we have a hotline to the SOFs position
from the Air National Guard, and they in fact called.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Did anyone see SHABA 67 when he took off? Did anyone
411:
track him visually from the tower?
A: NO. Usually what we do is watch them until they airborne, as
soon as they take off, all their lights go out. We watched him
tracking around. We watch them to the departure ramp, and that's
it.
Q12: Nobody saw him until you saw the fire ball?
A: No. I watched him on the bright, T-bright upstairs because
that's when the RAPCON supervisor upstairs says SHABA 67 as you
know, is gonna go to channel 14 talk to or go to the SOF
frequency. He's got some problems OK he's got an emergency. He
was just talking to departure, he was just east of us. The only
time I looked up to the T-Bright to see if he was due east, and I
just saw his target. That's the only time I looked up to track
him.
How long did he delay on the runway from the time he was
Q13:
issued his runway clearance and the time he took off? Did he
delay any excessive time?
A: No. No unusual delay.
914: About 30 seconds?
A: Be got on there, did his checks and turned his lights off.
Well, see this is what I can't remember specifically. I know
when he was getting departure clearance, there was no undue
delay. He got on the runway, usually we have them hold on the
runway, their lights off, then they turn their lights on, then
they roll. There wasn't anything out of the ordinary from his
6

departure roll.
Q15: Nobody saw anything unusual right after he took off? When
he had his problem?
A: No sir.
Q16:

Who was the upgrading SOF?

A: I don't remember his name.

TESTIMONY OF TSGT RONALD F. HAWLEY

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN82-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 9th of September 1992 at 0851L.
Ql: For the record, will you give us your name, rank, and
organization.
A: TSgt Ronald F. Hawley, 49 OSS
Q2:
in?

On the night of 4 August, what position where you serving

A: Working as a dispatch with TSgt Hays at base operations.

Q3: What were your duties that night?
A: Duties were pretty much what they are all the time. They
don't normally change, they just change with the situations.
Filing flight plans, recording the departure and arrival times,
passing those times on to the appropriate agencies. Basically
that's what it is. There are a few other incidental, but that's
the core of it.
Q4: Would you say the filing of the flight plan for the 416th,
and in this case SHABA 67, went normal.
A: SHABA 67 was flying with the 416th, is that correct.
Q5: Yes.
A: Yes sir. As far as I was concerned, Yes.
Q6: Do you happen to remember the condition of the air field
facilities the night of the accident?
A: You mean base operations or the air drome?
47: The airdrome?
A; There was nothing out of the ordinary that I was aware of.
Nothing that doesn't happen on a routine occasion.
Q8: Row where you notified that a crash had happened?
A: We have a console at base operations, behind the console

there is room for a desk, that the chief dispatcher uses. Being
at night only Sergeant Hays and myself working, I was sitting at
the desk doing some type of paper work, I really don't know what,
that's why I was at the desk, the phone rang. I answered the
phone. Someone called saying, I'm Sergeant so and so, I work in
so and so, I live downtown, I seen something that looked like an
explosion, an aircraft crashing. I said okay hang on just a
minute, let me get some paper to take this information down.
got up was walking to the console for a pad for paper. I got
about halfway to the console when the primary crash phone rang.
I went to answer that. As they are passing out the information
on the crash phone, they don't just blurt out information, they
take pauses every now and then to make sure they have all the
information they need. During one of the pauses, I told Sergeant
Hays to take the other line, it looked like he was doing the same
thing on another line. We have multiple lines in base ops. I
told him get line so and so. I think there is another guy on
with the same kind of stuff. I diverted my attention to the
crash phone. That's how I got notified.
Q9: What are your actions in the crash response side of the
house?
A: Well we have what we call QRF, Quick Reaction File. After
the primary phone was activated, I secured it. Then I
immediately went to the secondary crash phone and activated it.
Then I opened the QRF to be certain that I didn't overlook
anything. Tried to call the chief of airfield management, Mr.
Schaffer. He wasn't at home. So I called the chief dispatcher
and told him about it, He said he was coming in. I said okay.
Most of the time, we answer telephones. Phones were ringing off
the hook. Everyone calls base ops cause I guess its a high
visibility place to get information. Most of our calls were
pretty much repetitious. Is so and so there. I don't remember
anyone asking about the crash per say, I know personally, I
didn't answer any calls about it. I can't speak for Sergeant
Hays.
So basically, your part of the response went straight by
Q10:
the checklist and as far as you know it went fairly normal for a
crash response?
A: I thought it went fairly well, on our side of the house.
The only thing that was a little confusing to me was that with
the new BDUs they have the name patch here, most people were
coming in wearing reflective vests and I didn't know who they
were, so I have to ask. I had to ask a couple of colonels who
they were. I probably should have known but I didn't.
9

Capt Sembower asked the following:

Q11:

Do you have any radar facilities in base ops?

A: No.
Q12:

So you wouldn't have any altitude readouts or anything?

A: There is no radar at all

similar to this.

Base ops is just an office, very

Lt Col Holmes asked the following.

Q13: I was wondering where the disaster response force depart
from? They departed from base ops7
A: They are supposed to assemble at base ops. Inside we've got
a list they are supposed to sign in on. One of the representatives from a group will come in and sign in to make sure that
they are represented there. I think that's how the senior officer on duty determines when it time to leave, when everybody is
there.
Q14: Do you happen
accident site?

to remember what time they left to go to the

A: Its been over a month sir, but somewhere around 10:30 or

10:35 maybe, I not really sure. 10:35 sticks in my mind.

10

TESTIMONY OF MR. WAYNE GLIDDEN

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
S7102-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 9th of September at 1300L.
Ql: Where were you on the night in question?
A: Before the accident, I was at home watching TV. Once the
accident happened, being a volunteer fire fighter, being the
chief out there I have a scanner, I heard the sheriffs office
talking about the explosions. Once I heard that it was in our
district, I immediately went to the station and got a truck. I
waited for another individual to show up and we responded to the
scene.
Q2:

Do you live out by the crash site then?

A: I live approximately three miles from the crash site.

Q3: You didn't hear the airplane or see the crash site as it as
until you heard something over the scanner?
A: I heard the explosion. I thought to myself that it was
thunder. Right at that time is when the sheriff office started
to talk about the explosion. Other than hearing the explosion,
that's all I heard or saw.
Q4: On your scanner they told you where the explosion was and
how to get there?
A: No. Originally they just said north of Alamogordo, towards
the La Luz area. Once I started leaving the La Luz area with the
fire truck I could see the fire from there. I knew where to go.
QS: Were you the first fire fighters on the scene?
A: Yes. I was the first fire unit at the crash site.
Q6: What other units ended up coming out there?
A: Four units from our department, we had the Tularosa fire
department show up, Alamo West fire department, Boles Acres fire
department, Burrow Flats fire department, and DPS Alamogordo had
an ambulance there. That was it as far as our side of the emergency services.

11

Q7: Did the base finally send out any vehicles?

A: Yeah, it seemed like probably 40 to 45 minutes from the time
we arrived until the base got there with there fire units.
Q8: When you were responding to the fire, did you happen to know
where the pilot was during at any of this time?
A: No. Not at that time.
(29: When you got to the fire was the trailer there involved at
that time?
A: There was fire underneath the trailer, the grass area and the
skirting of the trailer that was being used for storage was
already in flames and was starting to burn up. When we pulled
into the site, there was more people there what I really cared to
have available. We started trying to get those people out, when
an individual came out and said, that's my trailer over there
that's about to catch on fire. Please do to something that one.
The other ones just a storage trailer, we don't care about it.
We took our one unit, after looking and seeing what had happened,
went by the one storage to make sure what the situation was.
Went over to the other trailer and prevented that one from
catching on fire. Once other units started arriving, I tried to
get them to position to fight that storage building. About that
time was when we found out that the pilot had ejected and was
found okay.
Q10: Do you have anything else that you think I should know
about?
At No.

12

TESTIMONY OF SRA GRANT L. ULMER

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
5N82-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 9th of September at 1419L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Ql: Will you please state for the record your name, rank, and
your organization?
A: SEA Grant Ulmer, 49 OSS.
Q2: On the night of the 4th of August

hat were you doing?

A: I was working the arrival control position at the RAPCON for

Holloman.
Q3: What do those duties entail?
A: Sequencing arriving aircraft to the radar final or ILS final
for runway 16/34.
Q4: On the night in question, did you work SHABA 67, the
aircraft involved?
A: SHABA 67. No, I did not. He was pointed out to me from the
departure controller. I observed him going into a downwind on
his own, he was talking to the SOF at the time. I never talked
to him at all.
Q5: Once he was pointed out to you, I'm sure the departure
controller said be advised he's going to be coming to you?
A: Well, what I heard was SHABA 67 call up an emergency on
departure. The departure controller proceeded to point him out
to me and she told me that he was an emergency and that he
talking to the SO?. At that time we had no information on him.
We didn't know if he was going to talk us again, if he was going
to talk to the tower or what.
Q6: Did you then after he was pointed out to you, continue to
watch his track as it was coming around or did you go on with
other duties?
A: Yes, I did. I continued to watch him cause he was going into
a downwind at the time. At the time he was pointed out to me he
13

was at 7500 feet. He was starting to track north, north west

bound, 3 miles east of the field. I had two other aircraft
inbound at the time. Our priority is an emergency aircraft takes
priority over anybody. I was watching him to see if he was going
to turn in to land or do anything else, so I could take either
one of my aircraft out and let him land.
Q7: I understand that you have the capability on your radar set
to not only bring up the squawk and attitude presentations, but
also the airspeed presentations?
A: If the target has been tagged up. At the time it was not.
QB: You have no idea what airspeed the aircraft was flying all
the way up to when he disappeared off your screen.
A: No.
Q9: As you continued to watch the airplane, did it come to your
attention that all of the sudden he seemed to be going in the
wrong direction, i.e. he was falling out of the sky, or were you
watching him that close?
A: I was working with my other two aircraft, I had ANGRY 23 and
ANGRY 22 at the time. I was doing what I had to do with them and
in between I was keeping an eye on him to see if he was going to
be turning in or whatever he was doing. I saw him level off at
about 6500 feet for a couple sweeps and then I went back to my
other two aircraft and did what I had to do there. When I
looked back down at him again, I saw his altitude go to 5400,
then 5000 feet. That's the last altitude I saw on him.
Q10: He seemed to hesitate between, you weren't watching him
real close cause you had the other aircraft, he seemed to go from
73 hundred feet down to about 65 and stabilized for a couple of
sweeps?
A: Yeah, I just watched him for a couple of sweeps and that's
the altitude that I saw on it for about two sweeps. Whether he
stayed at that altitude or was just in a slow descent at the
time, I'm not sure.
Q11: About how many seconds per sweep.
A: It's about 6 seconds per sweep.
Q12: When he started going down below 5000 feet on your radar
scope, what happened then?
14

A: At that time I informed the watch supervisor that I saw him

go down. I marked his position on my scope. We center the scope
per AF regs. I got a fixed position on him. At that time the
approach controller went on guard to try and get him on guard.
That's the last I heard from him. At the time I had a ANGRY 22
was on 12 mile final and reported a fire over by point alpha.
Q13: Are you part of the crash response?
A: No we are not.
914: Your responsibility after an aircraft goes down is to mark
the position and basically keep other airplanes away from that
position.
A: Right, we marked the position and protected a 3 mile radius
of the crash site. We didn't let anyone fly over it. We took
everyone around for about a week or so after the incident.
Q15: Is your radar picture saved in any way through tape?
A: No it's not, the only thing saved is the voice.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q16: Can you tell on the last three sweeps or so, as it's
descending, how far it went forward?
No visible movement that I saw between 54 hundred and 5000
A:
feet.
Q17: How about from 7300 down?
A: I saw him at 7300 when he was about 4 miles south of the
field. I saw him at 66 hundred when he was just about due east
of the field. So he was in a gradual descent at the time.
Q18: You get a sweep every 6 seconds?
A: Yeah, from 5 to 6 seconds.
9191 How many, backing up from the crash, how many sweeps had
you gotten?
A: Quit a few. Between his take off time and when he crashed
was about 5 minutes.

15

Q20: When he crashed until he was like flying level a

hundred or up and down from 73 hundred?
A: It was about two minutes, minute and half, between when I eaw
him at 66 hundred feet until when I saw him crash.
Q21:

Before he started a significant descent?

A: Yes.
Q22: How far across the ground would you have estimated him to
have traveled?
A: About, approximately 10 miles.
Q23:

From 73 hundred down to the crash site?

A: No, 73 hundred down to the crash site would be closer to 20

miles.
Q24:

Is there anything else you think we should know about?

A: Not that I can think of.

16

TESTIMONY OF SRA KIM AMMONS

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN02-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 9th of September 1992 at 1500L.
Q11 Will you please state for the record your name, rank, and
your organization?
A: SrA Ammons, 49 OSS.
Q2: On the night of 4 August, where were you?
A: I was in approach and departure combined. They were just
getting ready to open up arrival cause we had some guys that
wanted to multiple approaches.
Q3: Your duties that night were departure and arrival both?
Departure and approach. Approach is 60 miles to 20 miles.
A:
Departure is everything that departs Holloman.
Q4: On the night of 4 August, SHABA 67 took off and came over to
talk to you. Can you tell us what happened when you first talked
to SHABA 67?
A: We were getting ready to put a trainee in the position with
me and separate departure and approach. Just as we were putting
in our headsets, I had pulled out so she could plug in. At that
point it comes over the speaker. I heard somebody call up saying
he was emergency on departure. I didn't hear his call sign. She
pulled back out and I plugged in. I verified, I thought it was
SHABA 67, I think that was the only departure strip we had. I
asked him to verify SHABA 67 on departure declaring an emergency.
He said affirmative. I wanted him to go to channel 14, the local
emergency frequency channel we use or if he could talk to the
SOF. He wanted to talk to the SO?. I just told him to contact
SOF and monitor guard. So that way I could get hold of him any
time. That's all. He wanted to talk to the SO?.
Q5:

Did you talk to him again after that?

A: No I didn't.
Q6: During the departure, he is now semi declared an emergency
with you? Are you continuing to watch him as he comes around the
corner? How far out on departure did he go out before he made
17

his turn? Was it a normal departure?

A: It appeared that he was turning himself on a radar downwind.
Nobody turned him, but that's what it appeared he was doing.
Normally we turn them 340 and climb up to 73. It appeared that's
what he was doing. Everything looked real normal. Nobody told
him to turn, he just did that, I guess he figured he'd be
saving
Q7: During any of this point, basically he is the only airplane
out there, and your monitoring him?
A: I was talking to two other people, two other inbound
aircraft. Not when he took off, but they called up after.
was talking to them, and trying to watch them and keep an eye on
him too.
QB: Did at any time during his maneuvers, to what might be
called an outside downwind, where you able to monitor his
airspeed?
A:

No, I didn't see it. I can't remember if he even tagged up.

Q9: Can you describe what tagged up is?

A: The computer system that we have for radar, it will
automatically selects a code for them, a squawk. When he comes
on departure and squawks that, he'll tag up with his call sign,
airspeed, altitude, and everything. If not, if he wasn't tagged
up yet, then the most we'll get is his squawk and altitude.
That's it. I don't believe he had even tagged up.
Q10: About how long does that take usually?
A: Almost immediately.
Q11: When did you first notice that there was something wrong on
the downwind since he wasn't talking to you?
A: Like I said, I was talking to two other people. The last
time I saw him he was almost directly east of the field. So it
was much farther after that when he went down, or that we lost
his tower tag anyway. That's the last time I saw him was east of
the field and like I said I was talking to two other people, so I
had to watch them too. I didn't see any drastic altitude
changes or swerving of any sort. Nothing like that. The arrival
controller who wasn't busy, he was the one that was keeping a
major eye on him.
18

Q12: Who is that?

A: SrA Ulmer. Grant Ulmer.
Q13: When did you find out there had been a crash?
A: I was listening to I think it was the SOF frequency or maybe
the emergency frequency, but anyway, it was coming over my
speaker. I could hear the SOF was telling someone else, he
wasn't talking to the aircraft, he was telling someone else that
he hadn't talked to him. About the same time SOF said he wasn't
talking to him, nobody was talking to him. I went to transmit
off guard to tell him to come back on my frequency so somebody
could talk to him. At the same time, tower made their transmission on guard. Immediately we heard an ELT and tower saw the
fireball.
Q14: Do you have any part in the crash response that you are
required to do when something like this happens?
A: Not, really. Just mainly do what the supervisor tells us to
do. Re's the one that has to acquire all the information. The
times, time that we last talked to him, time that he went down,
time we heard the ELT, that kind of thing. Tower mainly rings up
the crash phone and that sort of thing. Not from the position
that I was in, no.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q15: Were you monitoring him right after take off? I'm curious
if you remember how far south he went before he turned around?
Like I said, it appeared like he was going on a radar
A:
downwind. He didn't extend himself too much. I would say 5
miles or so, 5 to 8 miles somewhere in there.
416: Five miles south before he started turning?
A: Yeah, five mile before he started turning.
Q17:

Is that normal for a runway 16 departure?

A: Yeah, we have to wait

because the towers ATA.
their ATA. We do have to
We don't always turn them
and a half. Sometimes at

until they are a certain amount of time

We can't climb and turn them inside
wait. Normally it's past three miles.
exactly at three miles. Sometime three
8.
i9

Q18: Isn't there a cloud 1 departure for 16, how far down does
that go before you have to turn?
A: 5 miles. 5 DME
Q19:

How did his voice sound when you talked to him?

A; He sounded real calm, he sounded real calm like he was just

keeping himself together, but he had said something that let me
know he was nervous, because he called up for one of the
emergencies frequencies, the wrong local channel. I think he
said local channel 13 or something. I knew he, everyone knows
what the local channel for emergency is, so I knew he was
nervous. He sounded real calm, real together.

20

TESTIMONY OF A1C KEVIN R. THAYER

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
8N82-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at 1002L.
Ql: Will you please state your name, rank, and organization?
A: Airman Thayer, 416th Fighter Squadron, used to be Phase Dock
now I'm back on the flight line.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q2: Could you tell us a little bit about your maintenance
background?
Immediately after tech
A: Yes sir. I went to tech school.
school I went to Tonopah Test Range, where I began working on the
Stealth. I've been with the program since June 15th of last
year. I got my 5-level in March.
Q3:

What is your position at the 416th?

A: I'm a crew chief at this time.

Q4:

At the time of the accident?

A: At the time of the accident, I was working at the phase dock.

Q5: You just stated how long you had been with the program. How
do you like working the 117 aircraft?
A: I like it. It's the first and only jet I've ever worked on.
I thinks it's kind of a honor to go from tech school to working
on this, especially at the time I did it.

Q6:

How long have you been stationed at Holloman AFB?

A: I've been at Holloman since May approximately. Can't recall

the exact date the I got here.
Q7: Have you worked on any other aircraft since joining the Air
Force?

A: No si r.
QB:

What did you know about the mishap of aircraft 801?

21

Al Nothing really. We haven't been told anything that happened.

I know that he lost flight controls. He had an ECS problem. he
ended up having to punch. Other than that, I don't know what
happened yet.
09: You did work on 801 while assigned to phase?
A: Yes sir.
Q10: What section of the airplane did you work on?
A: Pretty much all of it. I did some work on the exhaust area.
I did some the phase inspection on it. I did a little bit of
work in the engine bays. We had several TCTOs to do on it.
That's basically the parts I worked on.
Q11: When you say you did some of the inspections, which
sections did you inspect?
A: I inspected each engine bay after I was done doing the work
that I had to do in there. I inspected the nose cone, and I
believe both cheek bays. The forward equipment bays.
Q12: Do you remember finding any discrepancies in those areas?
A: I found some tears in the heat blankets in the engine bays.
I found, I believe it was a cracked bracket in the right engine
bay. I believe those are the only things I found.
Q13: How were you informed about the accident of aircraft 801?
A: By knocking on my door the night that it happened. I was
going home from work, I heard something about an aircraft
crashing on the radio. Shortly after I got home that night, my
supervisor at that time knocked on my door and told me that I was
not to go anywhere and stay available.
Q14: Do you feel that you were given sufficient training to work
on the F-117 aircraft?
A: Yes.
Q15: That's both at Tonopah and Holloman, and tech school?
A: Yes.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:

22

Q16: Had you done any phase work prior to coming to Holleman?
A: Yes sir. I had been in phase for approximately three weeks
at TTR before I came down here. I'd been in on two phases One
complete phase. One I just got in the very end of.
Q17: Were you considered one of the experienced people coming
from TTR to Holleman?
A: Yes sir.
Q1B: Do you know how many experience people came from TTR to
Rolloman?
A: To the phase dock?
Q19: Yes?
A: There was two of us. One is in Saudi, and me.
Q20: You were the only person that came from TTR to Holleman
that was working the phase on this aircraft?
A: Correct.
Q21: Everybody else was new.
A: Regular flight line people. We had one other person that has
been on the aircraft longer than I have, but he had never been
involved in the phase aspect of it before.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q22: What kind of training program were you given here at
Holleman, as far as you being the experienced person coming from
Tonopah? Did you train any of the new people that went to phase?
A: Yes sir. I was showing them several of the things that I had
been shown at Tonopah, that I guess would be called problem
areas Where they usually find something that's missing or find
something that's wrong with it. As I said before, I was only in
phase for three weeks and it was kinda messed up cause everyone
was getting ready to leave. The people that I was working with
at that time had been in phase for, several had been in phase for
a couple of years. That was all they'd done. They basically did
it, they were just showing me several problem areas
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
23

Q23: How long was aircraft 801 in phase? Was it a longer time
than a normal phase should have taken?
A: Yes sir. It was in there for quite some time. The reason
being, I believe was, all the phases that I'd done prior to B01,
was the phase. On 801 we were changing the whole platty areas
out, the T-ducts out, the tail pipes out, we had TCps on the
intakes. They just added a lot of extra stuff on. Other than
just the phase itself.
Q24: The airplane wasn't in phase an extra long time to help
train the people who were working the first time on phase. It
was in to do other maintenance along with the phase?
A: Yes.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q25: The other people working in phase did not come from
Tonopah, what was their experience level? On other aircraft or
with the 117?
A: MSgt Strawderman he was a 7 or 9-level. I believe a 9-level.
Sgt Perry. I believe he's a 5 -level also. Airman Fosbrook who
is a 3-level right out of tech school. There's Sgt Williams who
did come out of Tonopah, and he 's also a 5-level.
Q26: The other people were all people that were new to the 117?
A: Yes sir.
Q27:

Any previous F-15 or F-16?

A: Yes sir. Sgt Perry had worked F-16s prior, Sgt Strawderman
had worked F-15s prior.
Q26: Is most of the phase work done during the day or night?
A: During the day.
Q29: All during the day?
Well we did stay over late a few times. Majority
A: Yes sir.
was done during the day.

24

TESTIMONY OF CMSGT JOHNNIE P. MERCER

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN82-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at 1055L.
Q1: Will you please state your name, rank, and organization?
A:

CMSgt Johnnie P. Mercer, 416th Fighter Squadron

SMSgt Evans asked the following:

Q2: Could you tell us a little bit about your maintenance
background?
A: Well I have 26 years in Air Force all in maintenance. Almost
17 on the F4. Just left Myrtle Beach with A-10 experience.
Three years T-38 experience here back from 84-87. The rest has
been F-4 and A-10, except for the four months here.
Q3: What is your position with the 416th?
A: I'm the Chief Enlisted Manager for the 416th, or the
maintenance superintendent.
Q4: Bow long have you been with the F-117 program?
A: Arrived here on or about the sixth of June of this year.
That was the start of the 117.
Q5: That was about the same time that you were stationed here is
the extent of your experience with the 117.
A: Yes.
Q6: How do you like working with the 117?
A: Fantastic. Good airplane.
Q7: Do you feel that you would given sufficient training to work
on the F-117?
A: Oh yes, I think so. As a superintendent I did. I didn't go
through the Tactical Aircraft Maintenance System class yet. I
do books. Just like any airplane read books and learn, learn,
learn.

25

QB: What do you know about the mishap of the aircraft 8017
A: Meaning?
Q9: Meaning, what do you know about it? What were you told
about it?
A: Told about it? I wasn't hardy told anything. Nothing at all
about it. The only thing I read is the 10 day report that came
out, on the little message. That's the only thing I know about
the part of the accident.
Q10: When were you informed about the accident?
A: I was there the night it happened.
Q11: You were at work that night?
A:

Yes.

Q12: The aircraft was on the first flight out of phase chief.
Your phase training program, how much time were the people that
you have in phase given for training?
A: I'm really not sure cause they were set up when I got here of
who was going to be in phase and the training. We had two
experienced 117 guys, the 9-level had only been on the airplane 5
to 6 months. I'm not sure of his background, it was already set
up who was going to be in phase. But it was two 117 guys. We
did set up a program since it was the first phase here, to extend
the length of time and only work one shift. Their was no one
rushed or anything. There were no question during that phase
that there was any problems over there.
Q13: Have all of your phase people gone through your TANS class?
A: I'm pretty sure they have. We've just increased the numbers
now to make it a two shift operation. I'd have to check on the
last four we put over there.
Q14: Were you aware of any problems with aircraft 801?
A: None whatsoever. We checked on it daily, the captain and I.
We'd go over and check to see how phase was going. There were no
problems encountered.
Q15: What was the reason for accomplishing the phase on 801
early? By inspecting the records, I noticed that it was phased
26

about 30 hours early. The tail pipes were changed about 60

early.
A: That was our phase flow, our TDI phase flow. Everything was
compressing together so wanted to get them early. Moved that one
in and start the phase so everything didn't congest together.
Cause our times were running together there on a number of
airplanes. That was the closest one so spread them out.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q16: You say the phase was extended a little bit?
A: We didn't give them a block of time a normal phase. We
extended it out and gave them an extended length of time. Take
your time, there's no hurry. Get it done. There's no rush. One
shift operation, no two shift operation to say.....
Q17: Row many people are normally involved working on the phase.
I'm basically ignorant on how many people worked on it?
A: Well, the phase here are 16 authorized in the phase dock. It
was the first phase so we only had 7 assigned. They all worked
that one shift.
Q18: Was there any training going on during the phase, or was it
all people who were supposed to be checked out on the airplane?
A: There was some training going on. We had qualified and
people that were not never changed tail pipes before or done
other things. They were checked out as well.
Q19: So you'd have a 9-level checking out a 3 or 5-level?
A: There was a 9-level. Well, the experienced guys were
checking the other guys out.
Q20: Do you know who the experienced guys were?
A: Sgt Williams. I can't recall the other name.
Q21:

It wouldn't happen to be Thayer would it?

A: I can't remember sir. I'd have to check. The one was more
experienced than the other guys.
Lt Co]. Holmes asked the following:

27

Q22: Did you combine any other maintenance with the phase Itself
on this aircraft?
A:

Meaning?

Q23: When an airplane is put in for phase, is other maintenance

other than wha i s normally called for on a phase also done?
A: No sir.

Whatever goes through the phase flow is done.

26

TESTIMONY OF CAPT MARK MUELLER

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
5N82-0801. The testimony was taken at Bolloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at 1335L.

Ql

Will you please state your name, rank, and organization?

A: Mark R. Mueller, Captain, 416th Fighter Squadron

SMSgt Evans asked the following:

Q2: Could you tell us a little bit about your maintenance

background?
A: Basically I'm an acquisition officer who has been selected to
take maintenance training. They take acquisition officers and
try to get them front line experience on the fighter units or
whatever just so that we have a better understanding be able to
go back and tell the guys all the stupid stuff we're designing
out in the field. I came out of that and came out here in
October of 88. January of 1989 I went over to 8th AMU. I've
been there since May of this past year. About three and a half
years F-15 experience. Since then 117.

q3: How do you like working with the 117 aircraft?

A: Right now it's a heck of a challenge. Supply problems are
unbelievable. Temporary work arounds. I enjoy it though. It's
a unique plane and I guess I'm happy that I got the opportunity
to work on it.
Q4:

You've worked on the F-15 and 117 aircraft only?

A: Only, yeah.
Q5g Do you feel that you were given sufficient
on the F-117 aircraft?

ainin to work

A: Well no. Maintenance officers move from plane to plane,

managing people, resources and things like that so. Training
that I've received, I went to egress on the 117. I went to the
AFL) EPU MAD class that they had. I tried to get into the TAMS
class to learn more about specific systems of the aircraft, but
the backlog of the young troops coming, I thought it was more
important to those guys, supervisors, and expeditors to get in
before me.

29

96: How were you informed about the accident?

A: I was sitting upstairs that night with Major Joyce discussing
Setember's flying hour program. Sgt Stevens, one of the clerks
here, said that a the pilot had just called the jet was down, and
he was calling. I said you're kidding. He said NO. About 30
seconds later he actually called Major Joyce on the phone. Major
Joyce said we just lost one. We took off down stairs and started
gathering all the appropriate records we found, making sure it
was all gathered.
Q7: Since that was your first airplane in phase, how much time
was give to the training of the people that you had here?
A: As far as training of the people, when the people came down
here there were only 2 qualified phase people that came. One
went off to Saudi and the other, I think was Thayer, went into
phase. We didn't sit down and have a formal training program
with them. We talked about, Sgt Strawderman told we that we were
supposed to have the first aircraft in phase in the whole wing,
so he going to get people from the 415th, 417th, basically the
417th, they were all going to try to get together to walk
through this first one. So they could all bump heads and work
the cards and stuff like that. As far as any formal training
prior to that, they had all gone thru TAMS and classes like that,
but nothing formal structured program.
98: So you did use 417 people in addition to your people?
No. The jet rolled a week later and I think the 417th ended
A:
up putting one in at about the same time. So the people never
did show up.

Q9: So you were stuck with using your own people?

A:

Right.

910: Were you aware of any problems with the airplane coming out
of phase?
Almost daily the chief and I spoke with MSgt
No.
A:
Strawderman, the inspection flight NCOIC. Found the work cards
and things were progressing along good. I don't know of any post
problems. I think I remember, well there was an aztec panel that
was cracked. That they found after it rolled out that they

worked it.

30

011: What was your reason for putting the plane in early? I
noticed by examining the records that the plane went in about 30
hours early.
A: Yeah, we have a deployment coming up. The way the aircraft
were bunched up we, we had a lot of high timers and we needed to
get ahead of the program, otherwise they'd all be coming to
phases they'd of just fell right on top of each other in the
December time frame. We would never have gotten from here to
there to make it happen.
Q12: After the accident, what changes have you made to your
phase program?
A: Well we added another 7-level TSgt in there. Tried to get
another experienced Tonopah person in there. Beefed them up a
little bit more than they've had. Other than that we've just had
them take their time, follow the work cards and progress through
it slowly. The next phase that we are in now, this is the third
phase now, we've been giving them more than ample time, five or
six more days than normally required.
Q13: Is there a training program set up now that those people
are following, a specific training program?
A: Not that I know specific. I mean, I don't know what you
could do to set up a training program, because there's really
know one here at least in our squadron, they're might be someone
in the wing, whose phase qualified other than Thayer from
Tonopah. It's a matter of following the work cards and tech
data.
Q14: Who set up your phase training program?
A:

Phase training or the phase people themselves?

Q15: For the phase program?

I had conferred when I went up to Tonopah in March with
A:
basically Major Kelly, the maintenance officer who was deployed
over in Saudi. I asked him who he had coming down as far as MSgt
and I showed him who we had remaining. We plugged and chugged
names, MSgt Strawderman worked for me for years and is a very
and
conscious guy and into documentation making sure that
APO
in
things are right. Be's a big trouble shooter, worked
flight. That's the guy We picked for the slot. All the other
people just floated into the other slots. That's basically how
that worked and then we kinda left it up to him to work with the
31

flight chiefs to get the right people in there.

Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q16: How did you feel about the experience level in phase? Did
you feel comfortable with it?
A: I'd hoped that we could have more phase experienced people
from Tonopah but it just didn't happen. They shipped the guys
off elsewhere, I think they tried up at Tonopah to get some of
the crews chiefs in there to get some more people qualified at
the end. Before they came down here. I felt pretty confident.
No big problems from my stand point.
Q17: Did you feel like you had any control over if you wanted
more people you could ask for more experienced people, or was it
above your level?
No. I know Major,
A: As far as people from Tonopah or just
my boss was frustrated that if he had his way, he'd asked a lot
more people to come down. I don't know how that was controlled.

32

TESTIMONY OF MSGT DONALD R. STRAWDERMAN

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
5N82-0801. The testimony was taken at Holleman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at 1430L.
Ql: Will you please state your name, rank, and organization?
Donald Ray Strawerman, Master Sergeant, 416th Fighter
Squadron.

A:

SMSgt Evans asked the following:

Q2: Could you tell us your maintenance background?
A: I started out on an F-4 many years ago. I worked on F-155
then a had one tour in Korea on F-16s. Then I came back to
Holleman for F-15s. I got selected in January to stay here with
the Stealth fighter. I thought a privilege myself to work on the
aircraft. It was a new experience. I was selected by Capt
Mueller to run the 416th phase dock. I've never been in a phase
dock, this is my first time ever being in one. Got my TAMS
training in March of this year. In April I went to Tonopah for
two weeks just for a little hands on experience on the aircraft.
Then I came back didn't start our first phase until, I believe
June, whenever 801 rolled in. I have very little experience on
the aircraft.
Q3: How do you like working the 117?
A: I like working with the F-117.
Q4: How were you informed about the accident of aircraft 8017
A: We were done with our shift for that day after aircraft
rolled out. We were doing like we normally do at night, we
always tell the super that were going home and we tell how things
are going in the phase dock at the moment. We called him up and
he came over and personally told us that 801 was down.
Q5: What training did you receive on the F-117 other than TAMS?
A: Besides the few hands on times, that's about it.
Q6:

Did you work on or inspect any items on aircraft 801?

A: Yes sir. I inspect whatever they work. Related to my shop.

33

Lt Col Holmes asked the following:

Q7: What shop is that?
A: I'm APG. I was originally engines. I'm APG only when they
done the rivet work force.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q8: What training program did you set up before getting your
first phase input which was 801?
A: My training program, I wanted to make sure I had a mixture of
experienced and unexperienced people, and recognize what items we
need to train on. Get them familiar with our working plan and
stuff.
Q9: You said you wanted to do that?
A: I didn't. I had an experienced man on the aircraft. The
people I got at the moment still have never worked phase dock.
My experienced phase dock troop is sitting in Saudi Arabia.
There was only one individual that came from Tonopah that was
experienced. He hadn't even hardly signed in on base and they
told him he had to go TDY to Saudi.
Q10: So you performed your phase with inexperienced people?
A: Yes sir. Hy highest ranking man at the time was a buck
sergeant besides myself.
Q11: Have you changed anything with you training program since
the accident?
A: Yes sir. I've got two staffs and a tech sergeant in there
now. One of the staff sergeants is real familiar with the
aircraft. He's never worked phase either, but he's worked a lot
on the airplane.
Q12: Did you attempt to go to either of the other squadrons to
receive help in phasing?
A: Yes sir. I asked if they had extra people, but they're short
also. Matter of fact one of the squadron still only working one
shift cause he can't get people either. I understand they've
only got one experienced troop in their squadron that experienced
on phase. The way I understand it, there's only three coming
down total that s ever worked a phase.
34

Q13: How much training prior to you getting your first phase?
Your inexperienced people?
A: They were flight line troops. They come from off the flight
line when I got them.
Q14: So they hadn't received any training on phase .....
Only the
A: Some of them has never had TAMS courses.
other
had
that
people
the
that's
and
experienced people I got,
flight line jobs.
Q15: So it was basically, you read the card and do it......
A: And if you need help ask the experienced people that knows
the airplane. If they don't we'd have to consult QA and tech
data. And we do a lot of consulting with quality assurance for
help if we need it. We did on that aircraft, we did a lot of QA
consulting on that aircraft.
Q16: You said the people that you've got, a lot of them have not
received TAMS training?
A: No sir. Matter of fact I got two, now I got two
doubles. At one time I had one.
Q17: Where you aware of any problems with the aircraft coming
out of phase?
A: No sir.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q16: You hands on training at Tonopah that you got for a couple
of weeks, was that in the phase dock or was that somewhere else?
A: In the phase dock sir.
Q19: Exclusively in the phase dock?
A: Yes sir. I wanted to get in the phase dock hands on cause I
knew I was going to be running phase dock down here

Q20: So that was pulling panels off and working on the airplane
or was that........
A: Yes sir. They showed me what they do.
35

Basically, I didn't

do much work cause I let them do the work cause they were the
experienced people.
Your roll here in the phase dock, is that mostly
Q21:
supervisory, or do you get a little hands on every now and then?
A: I get a little hands on every now and then. In case they
have troubles I go find the reliable source or some individual
that knows about that system.
022: How many people work for you in phase dock?
A: At the time when we had 801 it was 5 total counting me.
Q23: Who were those 5 people?
A: It was myself, Sgt Williams, SrA Perry, TSgt Roberts (who
went to Saudi), and Ann Posbrook.
Q24: How about Amp Thayer, who does he work for?
A: Oh yes sir. I forgot he went back to the flight line. When
I got my new people, I transferred him back to the flight line
and got some new people in.
Q25: Who made the decision to send the experienced guy to Saudi?
A: That was Major Kelly's idea.
426: Major Kelly.
A: Yes sir. He was originally
in Tonopah.

on the list when they made it up

Q27: Do know how the experience level in Saudi compares to the

experience level here at the time of July time frame?
A: When the people left, they took almost all experienced
personnel. Very little unexperienced.
Q28: You think he was necessary over there for phase? Was he
going over there to do phases?
A: Yes sir. They keep two phase troops in Saudi. They have to
have a phase troop cause they do a combat phase. On account the
phases are due every 150 hours.
Q29:

Did you voice any complaints about sending experienced,

36

since you were short?

A: No sir. I told them we needed the people, but the war
commitment comes over our training commitment. I can see why
they sent a qualified individual.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q30: Before the first phase started on 001, your individuals had
not been selected yet?
A: No sir. They said your first aircraft is rolling in two
weeks, and they said we have to get a phase crew set up. They
said we'll give you four people, two from each flight. The
flight chiefs themselves selected the individuals they sent me.
Q31: Did you know at the time, you had no part of the selection?
A: No sir.
Q32; When a leak check is required on an airplane, what is the
definition to you of a leak check? In this case, a leak check of
the bleed duct system.
A: Bleed duct sir. Use your hand and basically your hand feel
for hot air.
Q33: With what piece of equipment, do you get the air into the
duct? Is there anything in the TCTO that when you do a leak
ch eck. .......
There's no way to do a leak check without running the sir.
A:
Not on the EC5 ducts you're talking about. You got to run the
airplane.
04: If a leak check is conducted, it is done with the engines
running?
A: Yes sir. On the ECS system. We can do some checks like on
the hydraulic system, we can do them with a hydraulic mule.
That's about the only system we can check without the engine
running.
Q35: Could you possibly just check this system either just the
APU or a dash 60?
A: Don't know about the dash 60 sir. I don't know much about
the system. But I know they said there is low pressure air that
37

does go through the ECS system.

Q36: A leak check can not be done with the API)? Or should not
be done with the APU7
A: After the airplane went down I understood the way they were
telling me that when the ECS engine air comes in that there is a
high pressure spike that comes through the ECS system. But the
airplane was running at military power.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q37: After it came out of phase?
A: Yes sir. It's required.
Q38: When it's running military power is anyone doing any leak
checks or is it all buttoned up?
A: No sir. It's leak checked. You also got a fire loop right
there next to it. Basically installed for the ECS system itself.
For air leaks and things like that, in case you have ECS
troubles.
039: Are any weight on wheel switches de-energized?
A: Not at that time sir, it wasn't. We didn't know about that
check.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
440: Was any circuit breakers pulled at that time?
A: Don't know sir.

38

TESTIMONY OF SGT GERALD D. PERRY

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN82-0801. The testimony was taken at Rolloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at L.
Q1: Will you please state your name, rank, and organization?
A: Gerald Dawye Perry, Sergeant, 416th Fighter Squadron.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q2:

Could you tell us your maintenance background?

A: I worked F-48 for a little at Moody AFB, until they converted

to the F-16s. I worked on F-168 for about 3 or 4 months Then I
went into support. I also worked in the maintenance operation
center (MOC). Did about two years at Moody, then shipped over to
Korea. Did MOC for a year in Korea. Then I came here and worked
on the F-117 on the flight line before going into phase.
Q3:

Row long have you been with the F-117 program?

A: As of today about four months.

Q4:

How long have you been stationed at Holloman AFB?

A: About four months.

Q5:

How do you like working with the F-117?

A: I like it, it's different. It's a different aircraft.

Q6:

How did you get informed about the accident of 8017

A: Sgt Williams and Sgt Thayer informed me. They were at work
when it happened. They heard about it and they informed me.
Q7: What training did you receive prior to going into phase on
the F-117?
A: The only training I had was egress training. As far as any
formal training with the F-117, I haven't had any.
Q8: That means that you haven't even been to TAMS?
A: No sir.
39

Q9: Were you aware of any problems with aircraft 801 coming out
of phase?
A: No. Not coming out of phase. We found a few problems while
working in phase, but as far as coming out, no sir, there wasn't.
Q10: Do you feel that you are adequately trained to work on the
F-117 aircraft?
A: Yes I am
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q11:

What percentage of the work on 801 did you actually do?

A: I could assume maybe 10 or 15 percent. Something like that.

Q12: Was that you working by yourself, or was that with an
experienced person looking over your shoulder?
A: Sometime it was by myself and sometimes I had an experienced
person working over me. But everything I did was basically
double checked by an experienced person. That was more
experienced than I was, I can't say how experienced they were.
They had been working on the 117, working maintenance longer.
Q13:

What parts of the aircraft did you work on?

A: I did heat shields as well as the heat blanket. I also did a

TCTO or TCD on the intake that consists of removing 12 screws and
replacing them with stronger screws. As far as in-depth, that's
basically it. I did a lot of inspections, that was checked by
me, then by a 7-level.
Q14:

What level are you?

A: 5-level.
Q15: Do you feel like any work on the airplane was rushed at all
or do did people pretty much take their time because of the
experience level?
A: I don't think it was rushed. We had adequate time to do it.
We talked about it before, support was kinda slow. That made us
work, a few days we worked over 8 hours. Had to come in some
weekends, but as far as rushed No.
Q16:

Did you work at night at all?

40

A: Yes sir. We came in at our regular time, our regular time

was 1230 to 2100 and sometimes we worked until 2230 or 2300.
017: At night?
A: Yes.
Q181 Was it dark, was the airplane in one of the hangers? Was
it well lit?
A: Yes sir.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q19: When you get notified that you were going to be on the
phase dock?
A: You're looking for the exact date?
Approximately? How much in advance of the first airplane
Q20:
coming into phase did you know that you were going to be working
on the phase?
They asked for volunteers while I was working on the flight
A:
I volunteered. It was approximately a week, they asked
line
for volunteers on a Monday of Tuesday. That next Monday, we were
to get a jet in phase. By the time I got to phase, I don't think
we had a jet in until another week.
Q21: While you were doing the phase, did you have any chance to
help out with any of the leak checks any of the other personnel
were doing?
A: Yes.
Q22: The leak check in question for the ECS system, how was the
leak check done, or did you help with that one?
A: Well, they ran up the EPU and APU system, and that was just
basically check the lines and check the ducts for any leaks with
the hands.
Q23: So you're sticking your hands in the holes, the access
panel areas and checking for hot air?
A: Right.

41

924: And this was done strictly with the APU EPU system in the
airplane?
A: Yes sir.
Q25: Did you happen to do this during an engine run also or is
this just strictly........
A: No sir. This is AFL: EPU leak checks. I wasn't with them
when they did the full runs at the trim pad.
926: Do happen to know what the tech data says for doing a leak
check?
A: No sir, not all of the specifics, no sir.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q27: When you were performing the TCD for the intake, that's the
one for the screw and the spacers, were any other components
removed, did it go uneventfully?
A: No sir.
Q28: No other components had come out?
A: No sir, the engine was already out. That's the only thing
that's requited. You can do it with the engine out but you have
to have it borescope at the same time. As far as taking anything
else out, n
Q29: That right you were doing a double engine change on that
plane?
A: Right.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q30: Do you have anything else that might help us with the
investigation, that you're aware of that we didn't ask you?
A: Well as far as the leak checks, you were asking me about the
tech data. We did use the tech data, right now I can't recall
exactly what the tech data Bays. We did everything the tech data
says.

42

TESTIMONY OF SSGT TROY D. MATTHEWS

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN82-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at 1535L.
Q1: Will you please state your name, rank, and organization?
A: Troy Matthews, Staff Sergeant, 416th Fighter Squadron.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q2: Could you tell us your maintenance background?
A: I came in the Air Force in July 1983. I worked on C-130,
41st ECS squadron at Davis Mothan AFB Arizona. I went to
Strategic Air Command, Anderson AFB Guam, worked B-52s and KC135s. From there in February of 89 in signed in at Nellie AFB
Nevada I began working on the F-117A, I've been with it since
89.
Q3: What

your position?

A: My AFSC?
44: Yes.
A: Environmental is my original AFSC. Then I became an
electrician when we combined.
05:

Through the rivet work force?

Al Yee.
Q6:

How long have you been stationed at Holloman AFB?

A: I signed in here on 20th April of this year.

Q7: How do you like working on the F-117 aircraft?
A: I like working on the F-117. I've gone TDY quite a bit with
it. Static displays and stuff like that.
Q8:

How did you get informed about the mishap of aircraft 801?

A: I was riding in the launch truck the night that it happened.

I can't remember the date. They said that a jet went down,
43

wasn't sure if it was one of ours or Reds or what. Later on that

night they said it was one of ours. I wasn't sure of the tail
number.
Q9: What training did you receive in order to work on the 1-1177
A: People taking me out to the aircraft, doing specific tasks
and then getting signed off on my 623s. The people that I worked
with had to be signed off also. There were 7 of us pretty much.
Q10: One of the reasons the Colonel read you your rights is
because we've kinda pinpointed an area, and that area being
yours, environmental system. Did you perform any leak checks on
the ECS on aircraft 8017
I came out and signed off the red X. The
A: No sir, I didn't.
On Monday or
leak checks I believe were done on the weekend.
Tuesday or that Friday, because they like to do them all at the
same time, so they don't have to tow the jet out, cause you can't
run the APU in the hanger. When they ran the jet, I believe they
leaked checked it, whoever that might be.
Q11: So you don't know exactly how the leak checks were
performed, that they were performed with the APU running or with
the engines running?
A: No sir, I don't.
Q12: Going through the forms documentation, I ascertained that
you did sign off the red-X on the system that we zeroed in on.
A: Yes sir.
Q13: How long have you been on red X orders?
A: When I got here, I was waivered I believe because I was the
first individual to come from Tonopah from my AFSC. Everybody
else that was working here in the shop were 1-15 people. Me
having experience since 89 they decided to waiver me for red-X
orders.
Q14: The ECS system that I'm referring to, the bleed air
connection for the dash 60 in the right wheel well, that duct is
the one I'm referring to. In the right AMAD bay there's a clamp
that connects it with the bleed air system. Did you install that
clamp?
A: No sir.
44

Q15: Did you sign off the red X on that clamp?

A: Yes sir.
916: Did you install the boot that covers the clamp?
A: The boots are left off for leak check purposes.
917: And you did inspect that clamp prior to signing off the
red-X7
A: Yes sir, I did.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q18: What does an inspection, how do you do an inspection of
that area if your going to sign that off?
A: I would go to that area, it also had a bleed air loop on it
too that was not disconnected but unsecure, take the bleed air
loop, make sure the bleed air loop is secure. Make sure all
the bolts are in the dash 60 connection. Check the clamp, make
sure the clamp is on tight. Check for security and the rest of
the area in the AMA!) compartment.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q19: Did you check the location of the clamp? I know you check
for security. Do you check the location?
A:

Make sure the clamp is put on properly.

920: Around the flanges?

A: Around the flanges.
Q21: What time of day was it when you performed that?
A: I'd have say between twelve in the afternoon and 1900.
Q22: Did you do it coming in from the 109 panel or did you do it
looking up from below?
A: I was standing on the ground.
Q23: So you were looking up through the
A: Up through the AMAD bay. Well the panel wasn't on but
45

Q24: Did you use a flashlight at all?

A: Yes sir, I did.
Q25: Did you touch the clamp?
A: I touched the clamp physically, the duct, the overheat loops
and all the bolts that went into the dash 60 connection. They
have washers on them, if the bolts are loose on the dash 60
connection, the washer will spin. That was all good. The clamp
was good, the loop was good.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q26: Was panel 109-R removed, that the panel that gives you
access to the right hydraulic resevoir?
A: I'm not sure if it was on or not.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q27: How long would you say you took for that inspection?
A: I'd say between 2 to 5 minutes. I just red X
I know what clamps look like when on properly,
Installed properly, overheat loops are installed
say 2 to 5 minutes. I just don't go up there and
okay good. That goes with anything.

orders. I mean
and ducts are
properly. I'd
say, yeah it's

Q28: If a clamp was displaced by half an inch or so, towards the

aft or forward part of the airplane, would that catch your
attention?
A: Yes sir.
Q29: How would you know that it was........
A: Feel and you could see. Because the clamps are like half
moons with a hinge in the back. There's a bolt that goes up in
the front of it that clamps down that has got a little lip on it.
Than the nut goes on it. You can take the clamp off without
taking the nut off, that's how it was designed, so you can just
pop them off. When you go to put them back on you can just pop
them back on. You can tell by looking at the clamp that it was
on properly. I haven't tried to put one on wrong, I never have,
there was never a need.

46

Q30: Could a clamp be put on just around anywhere on the pipe

and be secure and be secure?
A: Not to my knowledge. To me it would be loose.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q31: You can't tighten it down far enough off those flanges to
make it tight in position?
A: Right. Again that would be with my experience. I have never
tried to do it. My guess would be loose and again it's like
looking up in there you could tell. If it was behind the flange
or crooked on the flange or not on at all.
Your view that clamp as your inspecting it from the ground
Q32:
level, I would think, and there was a pipe with two flanges, my
impression was that the flange would be up here and you'd be
looking at it
A: You'd be looking at it angled, You can move your head around
in there, you can move you arms around in there.
Q33: There's no way to directly view down the clamp?
A: No sir, not from that AMAD.

47

TESTIMONY OF AlC STEVEN L. FOSBROOK

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
6N82-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at 1605L.
Q1: Will you please state your name, rank, and organization?
A: Steven Fosbrook Junior , Airman First Class, 416th Fighter
Squadron.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q2: Could you tell us a little of your maintenance background?
A: I went to basic and then to tech school for F-16 then I came
here. I just basically learned hands on about the Stealth.
Q3:

How long have you been with the F-117 program?

A: Since June 8th of this year.

Q4:

How long have you been stationed on Holloman AFB?

A: Since June 8.
Q5:

How do you like working on the 1-117?

A: I like it. It's interesting. It's my first aircraft really

to work on.
Q6: Have you worked on any other Air Force aircraft since
joining the Air Force?
A: Just follow on training I worked on the F-16.
Q7: That was just in tech school?
A: Yes.
Q8: How did you get informed about the accident or the mishap of
aircraft 801?
A: I was told by Sgt Williams the night of the accident?
09: You were working that night?

46

A: We were working that night. When I got off work I wa s

walking to the chow hall and he then told me at the chow hall.
Q10: What training did you receive prior to working on the
aircraft?
Just hands-on on the flight line for about two weeks. Then
A:
they asked for volunteers for phase, I volunteered so I could
learn more about the aircraft.
Q11: Did you work on or inspect any items on aircraft 801 while
It was in phase?
A: I inspected the ISA bay, the inboard ISA bay. I worked on
the heat shields. I basically inspected the heat shields.
Q12: Did you sign anything off?
A: No. I might have signed something off but I'm not just going
to put my name to it as far as doing any work and signing it off.
Q13: Since the accident what training has there been an emphasis
on increasing in phase since the accident?
At We have gotten more qualified people to help us out. Before
we didn't have many qualified people, now we got TSgt and SSgta.
That's been more emphasis.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q14: You said you worked on the inboard ISA?
A: I didn't really work on it
back of me inspected it.

just looked at it. The one in

Q15: Right or left side?

A: Right side.
Q16: Who was working with you or inspecting with you?
A: I looked at it and then Sgt Perry I believe looked at it.
Someone might have looked at it after that, I don't know.
Q17: Did you work at all on the ECS system?
A: No.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
49

Q1B: When you got into phase, being a fairly young, what kind of
training program did they have for it. I.E. when they sent you to
do something with the jet, was somebody experienced going with
you or did you just take the tech data?
A: I basically just worked on the heat shields on the back, so I
went over to IRAN Shop, I got them to train me on the heat
shields. That's really all I did on the jet. Qualified IRAN
people trained me how to do that
Q19: Nobody told you to do that, you just felt that if you were
going to work on heat shields you should go over and talk to the
IRAN people.
A: Basically. They might have referred me to them I don't
remember. I just remember going over.
Q20:

Have you been through the TAMS class?

A: No I haven't.
Do you feel at present that the training that you've
Q21:
received on the 117 has been appropriate to do your duties?
A: As far as the whole aircraft, No, I don't feel I can do all
the duties. That I've been trained on, Yes I do. Basically I
work on the heat shields right now. I feel I'm very confident
with that.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q22:

Do you have a trainer assigned to you?

A: I believe it would be Sgt Yates, but he's not in phase. So

as far as a trainer assigned to me, No. I don't think so.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q23: Is there any kind of training program to bring you guys
through a phase of an airplane and train you as you learn?
A: I don't believe so.
Capt Sombower asked the following:
Q24: How are you expected to learn how to do a phase just
by
50

A: Asking questions and hands-on.

51

TESTIMONY OF SGT CRAIG G. SOWELL

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
5N82-0801. The testimony was taken at Holloman Air Force Base,
New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at 1650L.
Q1: Will you please state your name, rank, and organization?
A: Craig Gerald Sowell, Sergeant, 416th Fighter Squadron, 49th
Fighter Wing.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q2: Could you tell us a little of your maintenance background?
A: I've been in the Air Force for 7 years. The whole time in
maintenance. I started off in the reserve working 141s, which I
didn't really work with that much. Then I went to Langley AFB,
Headquarter TAC. I worked on F-15, when I got selected to go to
Tonopah test range. I worked in Tonopah for three years and upon
that I extended my enlistment to come to Holloman.
Q3: What is your position there?
A: I'm a technical electrical mechanical specialist. Electric
and environmental specialist. They change yearly.
Q4:

How long have you been with the 117 program?

A: Since February 1990.

Q5: How long have you been stationed at Bolloman?
A:
Q6:

I have been stationed at Holloman AFB since May 31st 1992.

How do you like working with the F-117 aircraft?

A: I like 15s better.

Q7: You said you worked F-15s and 141, 117s. Have you worked
any other aircraft since joining the AF?
A: I worked, well at Langley, we had transient alert jets.
fixed those sometimes,
Q8: What kind of airplanes were they?

52

A: I think I fixed a T-38 and one of them I don't even remember.

Q9: How did you get informed about the mishap?
A: Well when the plane crashed it was on the news. Somebody
called work to ask if it was one of our jets. Then later on
they found out it was one of our jets.
Q10: So you were at work that night?
A: Yes.
Q11: What training did you receive for working on the F-117
aircraft?
A: Since I was a 5-level already all I needed was upgrade
training on F-117, and environmental training to upgrade me for
my environmental status. Cause I came into the F-117 program
primarily as a electrician. But when they integrated our career
fields I had to learn environmental systems I had three years
learning that.
Q12: That was through the rivet work force?
A: Rivet work force. Yes.
Q13: Sgt Sowell we have narrowed our investigation down to your
system, the ECS system that caused the accident which caused the
accident of 801. We've also narrowed down that a clamp that you
installed could be the determining item. The clamp that I'm
referring to connects the bleed air system with the dash 60
hook-up.
A: The ground air connection. I understand that
Q14: You admit that you installed that clamp?
A: Yes sir.
Q15: What was the time of night that you installed that?
A: Okay, I think that week we were coming in at eight o'clock.
Q16: Eight o'clock at night?
A: Eight o'clock at night. That was the first job of the night,
so that must have been between about nine thirty and ten. It
takes a hour for us get out there.

53

Q17: After you installed the clamp, did you perform a leak
check?
A: We could not perform a leak check at the time. Cause for one
thing the jet was in phase. We could have done a dash 60 but
we'd of had to tow it out. And they were putting tail pipes in
it. They were doing work on the APU so we couldn't run the APU.
Anyway in phase you can't run the APU. So we could not do the
ops check at the time.
Q18: So you wrote the leak check up?
A: Yes.
Q19: How many tinies have you installed the ground start
connection?
A: Including the last time on aircraft 801, I recall at least
two other times. But the connection for the duct in question,
the clamp, I've been installing those clamps for the last three
years. I'd say at least once or twice a week. Most jobs you
have at least 4 to 6 clamps.
Q20: When you installed the clamp did you install it from the
AMAD compartment.
A: Yes.
Q21: So you were underneath the airplane reaching up.
A: Reaching up. The reservoir was in the way for me to go down
through the access panel that they had open on the top.
Q22:

The access panel on top was open, panel 109-1R, was open?

A: Yes they were working on some kind a line through there

Q23: Were you aware of any problems with the aircraft coming out
of phase?
A: No I was not.

Q24: Did you remove the clamp cover from

A: Yes I did, that's standard procedure so they can do the leak
check. You might not feel it as well when you got the cover an.
And if you have to adjust the clamp after installation, it would
be better to have the cover off then have to wait till the cover

54

cools down and all that. Cause the stainless steal will cool a
lot faster than that cover.
Q25: Did your install the cover?
A: No I did not. That should have been done after the leak
check.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q26: Now much lighting was there available for putting on that
clamp?
A: I had one ID-cell flash light, but it was right on the clamp.
Q27: Was somebody holding the flashlight or were they just
places somewhere?
No it was placed in the bay. Only one person can fit in
A:
there at a time. I was training that day so there were three of
us. I had to put the clamp on, come down and let the them see.
Let them feel around it and then come back out. Airman Seamen
and Airman Rasmussen were with me that day.
Q28: Row long would you say it takes to put on a clamp like
that?
A: The clamp would take, it's according to how the ducts line
up. Sometimes it's according to who does it too. I normally
take longer then everybody else so it takes about 15 minutes.
Q29: So it's a fairly significant job?
A: If it wasn't in that bay, if was just on engine bleed air
pact, it would be like a few minutes. But with it being in that
bay in the area it was in, it would take a little longer cause
it's harder to get in. First you got to get one arm then the
other. You're basically taking turns with your arms going in to
get the clamp seated and adjusted.
Q30: Are you standing on the ground the whole time your doing
that?
A:

No, I had a two step.

Q31: Your view of what your doing with your eyes.......

A: Well see I got a skinny little head so I can stick my head on
55

the side of the dash 60. All I had to do was take ATS duct out
which was already off. The exhaust duct to the ATS.
Q32: Your view while your working, can you look directly down
If the clamp is shaped like this can you
the clamp?
look
A: Oh no, your looking at it over a cable.
Q33: Always? There no way to look at it straight down?
A: No way at all.
Q34: If the clamp was misplaced an 1/8 of an inch or a 1/4 of an
inch along the pipe.....
A: That's where we found, that's where my confusion comes in.
There were three people up there during the time when we were
putting that clamp in. When you put the clamp on, you gotten put
the fire loops on. That's shaking the ducts right there. With
three people feeling their hands right there, the way that the
Safety board said that the clamp would have to be installed
improperly, the duct would move. It would open up, it would gash
or something. And when your putting the fire loops on you are
constantly moving the duct. You got them band clamps like the
ones on your radiator, and you got to open those up till you can
slide the fire loop bracket on there. You have about six of
these fire loop brackets. If that duct was shaking I would have
took it out and redid it at that point. It was pretty sturdy.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q35: Is there anything else that you would like to tell us?
A: No. The only thing that, I told the safety board all along....
Q36: Please don't refer to them.
A; I'm sure that the duct was installed properly. Now I don't
know if they had to go in there and remove it after to check a
line or something like that after they ran it. I don't know. I
would think that on an engine run that they would have caught
this. Cause there would be air coming through there. And with
that loop being so close, the fire loop is about this close to
that duct, you would get hot air. I've had ducts with clamps on
all the way and if they're not tight enough you'll get a bleed
air leak light from the leak. So I don't understand how he
wouldn't have gotten it on the engine run if it wasn't installed
56

properly.
Q37: Do you also do the leak checks normally?
A: Yes.
Q38: How would you no

ally accomplish a leak check?

A: They did it by engine run. If I did it personally, I would

do it by a ground cart cause that's what that duct is primarily
for. That system, I don't understand why the engineers didn't
put a check valve over there by the starter. They should have no
air in that particular duct after engine run. That's why it's so
hard to pull off. If you ever flew in a. 8-117, when they dash 60
and it takes all day for them to get the dash 60 connection, it's
cause they have air in that duct and there is no need for that.
Q39: Your normal leak check is to attach a dash 60, blow the air
in there and see if there's any air flowing through, leaking in
the system?
Az Yes. And see if it will run the pact and everything like
that. The check valve could have an obstruction or something
like that.
Q40: If you do a leak check on an engine run, do you do anything
special to get the engine developed air through the bleed air
system?
A: There's a cannon plug on the regulator shut off valve to the
engine pact. It runs right across the bottom of the engine. If
you disconnect this cannon plug you'll get, the engine will run
that bleed air through the pact will run at a higher percentage.
You'll get more bleed air going through that duct.
Q41: So by doing that, your getting engine bleed air versus APU
bleed air?
A: Yes.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q42: Do you remember what the reason was for them removing that
dash 60 connection?
A: I asked them why would they take that out. It was for some
kind of hydraulic leak or hydraulic TCD in that bay. That's all
they said. They didn't show me the line or nothing like that.
57

Q43: Do you remember how you wrote up the removal as far as the
bleed check being performed?
A: I think I just wrote it up as ape check due on the forms.
I'm not positive on that?
Q44: Leak and operational check due?
A: Yeah.
Q45: So your intent at that time was to have them perform an
operational check with the dash 60?
A: Yes. I think if you did it by the T.O., I cant' quote the
T.O., but the T.O. says to do it with a dash 60.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q46: When they did their engine run after everything was put
together, do you know if they disconnected that cannon plug? Is
that a procedure or just technique based on your experience?
That's a technique based on my experience. A lot of that
A:
stuff is not in the T.O. When you get there they start training
you, it becomes an unwritten law
Q46: And there'd be somebody in the cock pit obviously during
the engine run.....
They probably wouldn't even notice cause the pack would
A:
regulate the air going to them. The air going through the pack
would be a lot more volume of air. The pressure.
Q47: You didn't put the rubber seal or whatever it is, back
around the clamp after leak check?
A: I didn't do the leak check. What happened was, our problem
was we didn't leak check it until, I think we put it on a Tuesday
or Wednesday, and they didn't leak check it until like a
Saturday. Until the weekend.

58

TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY LEON LEDBETTER

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN82-0801. The testimony was taken at the Otero County Sheriffs
Office, Alamogordo, New Mexico on the 10th of September 1992 at
1855L.
Q1: On the night in question, where were you?
I was located on North Florida Ave., right near the
A:
intersection of North Scenic and North Florida, it's a T shaped
intersection. There a great big area out there. Its the old
Alamogordo water reservoir. That's were I was at. In fact I was
heading to my house.
Q2: From there, did you see the airplane before the explosion or
did you just see the explosion?
A: Well I saw what I thought was a rocket or a something from
the base, because growing up here you see them once in awhile,
you think there goes another rocket out on the range. This one
was different, it was low and it didn't look like anything I'd
seen before. It looked like a rocket.
Q3: Okay then after the rocket?
A: Well what it was, is all I could really see was there was a
bright red glow on the south side of the object. There was a
bright white glow located to the north of it. What it was doing
was heading north in the north direction across the north sky. I
was looking west and it was traveling north toward the La Luz
area. That's what caught my eye cause it didn't look right.
Q4: Did you see the aircraft impact?
A: I saw the impact also. It was very quick from the time I saw
it until the time of impact was just seconds maybe. As I was
watching it, a small red stream came out. What that stream did
was travel in a southwest looking direction. If the aircraft
were traveling directly north, this stream came out like on the
southwest, but it came down it didn't go up. It was parallel,
then it went towards the ground. At that time there was a real
bright quick flash in the air Just a split second later then it
impacted. Then it hit, then the fireball come up.
Q5: When you saw the fireball did you then go over to where the
explosion was?
59

I was rolling that way when I started watching it. When I

saw the flash in the air I knew something was wrong at that time.
I started heading that way. When it impacted that's when I
activated my emergency equipment.

A:

Q6: Were you one of the first ones in the area?

A: I was the first one. The first police officer there. It
took me about 4 and a half minutes to get there from where I was
at, to the impact site.
Q7: Were the La Luz fire units in the area yet?
A: There fire units were coming up behind me. They got there
shortly after. On my way down there, the Tularosa chief or
captain of the fire department, called me on the radio and asked
me if I wanted him to roll that way and I said yes. Go ahead and
send us a truck cause I didn't know what had happened. The
fireball was so great, I thought the damage was going to be
massive. It was very lucky. I've never seen an explosion like
it before.
Q8: Did you happen to see the pilot?
A: No. I did not see him. The only thing I thought might have
been the pilot was that red stream that came out of the airplane.
I thought it might be the ejection seat. The only reason I
thought that was cause my dad's worked at the base all his life.
I've been at the test track and watched the ejection seats come
out. The pilot was with Deputy House not with me. I asked him
to start checking for the pilot cause we had reports he was
tangled in some power line.
Q9: Between when you saw the first streak of light and the
aircraft impact, could you see the form of an airplane? Could
you see the lights or any of that?
No landing lights or anything like
A: No. I sure couldn't.
that. The bright white glow that I saw in front of the red, it
was too intense to be a landing lights. I think it was almost
like it was a fire. It was a real brilliant white. Like a real
hot fire looks. Until I got out there and looked at it, I didn't
know it was an airplane until after I got there. I figured it
was, but I didn't really know until I pulled up. Then I could
tell for sure that it was.

Q10:

Is there anything else that you think I should know about

60

the accident?
A: The only thing that, and I don't know why I feel this way, it
looked like that airplane was in trouble way back, as it came
over Alamogordo. Working nights I watch airplanes all the time
at night and I picked it up real early It looked like it was in
trouble at about Alamogordo as it was heading north. I don't
know if he took off from the base and circled or what he did. As
soon as I caught him going in the northerly direction something
was wrong with that airplane. It was either on fire or something
was wrong with it.
Q11: Did he seem to be flying closer to Alamogordo than normal?
A: No, not necessarily. It looked like he was out on the range
he was west of Alamogordo. Something about the airplane was
wrong.

51

TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY BEN HOUSE

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN92-0801. The testimony was taken at the Otero County Sheriffs
Office, Alamogordo, New Mexico on the 11th of September 1.992 at
0745L.
Ql: On the night in question, where were you?
I was at home north of Tularosa. My folks have a scanner
A:
which they monitor regularly. They advised me that there was an
airplane crash west of Tularosa. I contacted the sheriffs office
by telephone and asked them if they needed any assistance. The
dispatcher stated, Yes. Which time I proceeded to the area of La
Luz gate road and Hwy 54/70. I was to monitor traffic and try to
keep the roads clear for emergency vehicles. I was just west of
the railroad tracks when a call came in that the pilot was okay
and he was on his way out to our location there at the La Luz
gate road. I met the pilot there, he was brought out from the
point were he landed. He was brought out by private vehicle, I
didn't know who brought him out. At that time, we had the
volunteer fire department first responded type paramedics. They
looked him over. He had a pretty shot to the chin, had a little
blood. Other than that he seemed okay to them. He requested that
he be transported either by ambulance or for me to go ahead and
take him out to Bolloman. So I advised the sheriff at the scene
that I'd be transporting to Holloman AFB. The first thing he did
when he got in the car, his first concern was, did the aircraft
strike any civilians. That was his main concern was if everybody
was okay on the ground. I informed him, I didn't think it hit
any structures, but I guess it did. I didn't go down to the
crash site until later on. I informed him that everybody was
okay. That seemed to relieve his mind quite a bit. Then we just
started talking about the Alamogordo area, he said the pilots
like it. He seemed to relax a little bit. I started asking him
about safety. About ejecting out of aircraft. Just pretty
common questions. He informed me that it's pretty safe the way
things work. If a hazard does come up, you get into a certain
flight pattern for safety purposes. He says it's a big
rectangle. He says a hazard light did come on. He got into that
flight pattern. He did state that was environmental, something
to do with the environmental box. He didn't get into any
particulars. He said once the light came on he got into that
flight pattern, then multiple lights started coming on. He said
at that point he lost control of the airplane, it started
spinning.
Be says he lost all control so he ejected. He felt
like he ejected downward. I guess you can tell, I don't know,
62

I've never ejected out of an airplane. He was up high enough to

where his chute opened okay and everything. He said he was still
fairly dizzy, from being ejected. I guess from taking a shot on
the chin. He heard the plane crash, so he felt that the plane
after his ejection must have turned downward right away. That
was pretty much all we discussed. I didn't really want to push
him and he didn't get into particulars. I didn't know what kind
of concussion he'd received.
Q2: Did he seem coherent?
A: Yeah, seemed calm, cool.
Q3:

He didn't show any signs of shock?

A: No. He seemed fine. Almost too cool. I don't know if he

would have been in shock. I would have been in shock if I'd have
crashed. I was trying to razz him a little bit to ease him up a
little bit. I thought he'd be pretty stressed out, but he seemed
pretty cool. Be didn't seem upset. Be was concerned. We
started talking about he was lucky to be alive. Then he started
saying that the last two that crashed didn't survive. He felt
pretty lucky at that point.
Q4; Did he say that the airplane went out of control or that he
lost control?
A: He said the environmental light came on. He went into a
rectangular flight pattern. His safety flight pattern. Be said
is standard. He said multiple lights started coming on the box.
He said the airplane went out of control, whatever he did he
couldn't fly it. He said he couldn't gain control. He tried to
fly it and just had no control over the aircraft.
Q5: You said all this on the way back to the hospital?
A: Yeah, I was traveling from La Luz
Alamogordo back to Holloman gate. I was
hospital. When we got the gate, he called
let everybody know he where he was at. The
him from there on in to the hospital.
Q6:

Is there anything else?

A: No.

63

gate road through

to transport to the
in from the gate to
military police took

TESTIMONY OF CRAPPIE MARVIN

This is an investigation of a Class A Aircraft Accident, F-117A,
SN82-0001. The testimony was taken Holloman Air Force Base,
Alamogordo, New Mexico on the 11th of September 1992 at 0905L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Ql: On the night in question, where were you?
A: Sitting on the south side of my house with two guests and my
wife.
Q2: What did you hear and/or see that evening?
A: The south side of my house, I live north of Alamogordo, the
south side of my house faces Alamogordo. I was sitting initially
with my back to Alamogordo. When I heard this bang, which
sounded like a missile firing, I turned around and I looked. My
words at the time were what the ____
that. I looked up, and
I didn't see anything initially, but
all of the sudden I saw
what appeared to be an airplane with it's afterburner glowing.
That's what I thought. I said to myself that makes sense, so
what I heard was probably an P100 light. So I said he's probably
just trying to catch up with his leader. I said that to the
people sitting around the table
I said I don't think he is
going to catch his leader cause I think he's going to crash
And
about that time the airplane impacted the ground. That's just
about how long it was since when I first heard what appeared to
be a missile firing. By the way they shot sleds all the time,
they fire sleds all the time, so I'm accustomed to sitting
outside and hearing things that are a little bit strange. When
the airplane did crash, I went inside the house, this was about

9121 or 9:22 I believe. I called the command post, through the

operator because I didn't know the command post number, I called
the operator and said this is an emergency I identified myself
and I said give me the command post and at that particular time a
Captain with an Italian sounding last name came on the line and I
told him who I was where I was located and I had just witnessed
what was apparently an airplane crash. So he reaffirmed with me
my name and where I was and yes in fact this was not a hoax.
Then he put me on hold. I stayed on hold for about 12 minutes,
and finally I hung the phone up and I got in my truck and I
thought well if there's any assistance I could render then maybe
I could. So I got in my truck along with my wife and the other
two people who also witnessed the crash. We got in the truck and
we drove over to the accident site which was from my house on the

64

odometer right at one mile. So straight line from my house to

the crash site was less than a mile. We stayed there for a few
minutes but of course everyone and their mother was there, there
was nothing we could do and there were parts of the airplane
laying around so I decided hey they have enough help over here
and then we left. Things that I saw at the site was this one
trailer was spontaneously igniting and the Fire Department was
trying to put in out and what it was doing was it was actually
igniting through the cooler, that's where the flames were coming
out through the cooler that was sitting on top of it. The bird
site was still burning so there was enough light out that you
could actually see people identify people around the area so
that's how quickly I got there. From that point I came back and
I called the command post again and this time I talked to a Sgt
and I identified myself again I gave him my name and my phone
number my work phone number and I said if there was anybody who
wanted to contact me feel free to do so and that was pretty much
the extent of our conversation.
Q3: After the initial bang you said you looked over and thought
you saw an airplane with the burners cooking. Did you happen to
see the airplane itself before the impact?
A: Well, it was pretty dark you know it was nine something at
night so it was in fact pretty dark, you could see the outline of
the airplane but as far as being able to identify what kind of
airplane it was I was not able to identify what kind of airplane
it was and I think everyone just assumed at the table it was a
Stealth because they fly all the time at night its the only
airplane that really flies around the house there at night and
because the other airplane was circling, there was another
airplane circling we could identify that as a Stealth with them
being blacked out and he was circling the site we just kind of
you know after thought okay you say well we know what it was but
as far as being able to really see the airplane identified, no,
no not at that particular time.
Q4: OK. so you couldn't aee the angles or anything.
A: Oh yeah I could see the angle the airplane made when it
impacted the ground.
Q5: Well when it impacted the ground but not before the impact,
you couldn't see.
A: When I saw the airplane, not really. But I could tell you
that the airplane impacted the ground because of its flight path.
I could tell you angle that the airplane impacted at I can tell
65

you the speed that the airplane impacted the ground. I can tell
you that and I probably won't be off more than 10 degrees 20
knots. But as far as the aspect of the airplane as far as it
being wings you know 50 degree left bank. I didn't see that.
because it just happened too fast your plane impacted the ground
above 350 knots and I haven't talked with anybody to confirm it
just know based upon what I see when airplanes fly overhead. I
flew 38s here for three years. 5o when airplanes come back in
the pattern at 300 knots this airplane was faster than 300 knots.
And the way it impacted the ground he was probably 70 degrees
well maybe 60 to 70 degrees impact angle crosswind I mean it went
in just like a rocket and it was accelerating when it went in so
I think the power was probably still up. If the power was not
still up, I don't think it would have been accelerating the way
it was accelerating.
Q6: Okay was there a lot of engine noise?
A: There was engine noise, you could hear the popping, you could
hear things that were popping on the airplane and it was
sporadically you know the airplane was like pop pop pop pop
things like that. But there was no burner plume though which
really confused me at first I said you know there's no
afterburner plume. And I didn't realize at that particular time
now I know it was because it wasn't the afterburner I was looking
at it was actually the airplane on fire. The airplane itself.
Q7: The airplane was on fire before it hit the ground?
A: Oh yeah. Yeah it was on fire it was definitely because I
wouldn't have been able to see it and like I said I saw the
afterburner and it doesn't have an afterburner. So what I saw
was actually the airplane on fire. It was on fire.
Q8: That couldn't have been the ejection seat?
A: No, the ejection happened a long time, the ejection was
probably the first boom that I heard. The missile firing. I
think that's what called our attention to something being wrong.
And then of course you put 2 and 2 together because you think
well maybe this guy was out of position or something your lead
asks you to rejoin so he just lit the burners. So now I'm
thinking the noise we heard was a burner being lit because now I
see the airplane on fire so I'm thinking its the afterburner but
in fact it was not the afterburner. Definitely on fire before it
hit the ground.
Q9: You couldn't tell where the fire was coming from?
66

A: No. No, it was, from where I sat in the distance away and
because it was dark, If I had to guess I'd say the whole airplane
because I think the flight path the airplane took the sporadic
flight path that it was going on it was probably rolling which
meant and I never lost sight of it so if it was not the whole
airplane that was on fire it was enough fire that it made it
appear as if the whole airplane were on fire.
Q10: Did you ever see the pilot?
A: No, we talked about that by the way, as we left the crash
site because we were starting to kind of put 2 and 2 together now
because you know its an airplane now we confirmed yes in fact it
was an airplane because we saw it hit the ground you're not
totally sure you're hoping that its not an airplane you're
concerned with people on the ground we left, nobody on the ground
had gotten hurt we had confirmed that with people we had talked
to nobody was in the trailer was a guy and his wife and kid in
another trailer but they were pretty distance away and they
evacuated those guys and nobody had heard or seen of anybody on
the ground getting hurt BO now we started talking about the
pilot, we knew it was airplane so the four of us and we were all
hoping that the guy got out. So were talking about that on the
way back and I was saying I said to them you know the distance
that that airplane traveled from the time we first saw it this
guy was not going to still be in the airplane. He either died in
the airplane or he jumped out a long time before. He's not
going to be in the local area and I remarked then that he's
probably he could be over between here and half way to Alamogordo
closer to Alamogordo then to us because the first time I saw the
airplane the airplane was actually closer to Alamogordo than it
was to my house, my house is about three miles from Alamogordo so
the airplane came from the vicinity when I first saw it, it was
like maybe over the university somewhere between my house and the
University in that area on highway 54 I live right on the highway
so when I saw it it was actually a little bit to the east of
highway 54 from where I sat it appeared to be a little to the
east of highway 54 like I said it looked to me like he was trying
to catch his leader who was going to Tune Peak so he could turn
and land on runway 16 but now because you see airplanes all the
time you prefabricate things you make things work so that was my
rational for the guy having his burners lit and of course when
the airplane crashed it actually crossed from highway 54 which it
appeared like it was going to Tulle Peak and by the way Tulie
Peak is in fact a little bit north of my house but the flight
path of the airplane took him right into the ground a little bit
north of La Luz road and I sit right on La Luz road and highway
54 so I got a straight shot to where the airplane landed. I even
67

mentioned that the friends that I have living over there like
Bobby and Jerry Craft you know I said I hope it looks like they
hit right at their house well as it turns out about an eighth of
a mile from their house and I've got some other friends down
there two guys that are maintenance guys well we talked about
those folks so the flight path of the airplane I could pretty
much determine was in line between highway 54 and pretty much
Tulle Peak.
Q11: I can't think of anything, do you have anything else?
A: No.

6B

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN SENNA

Investigation of F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 820801 this
testimony was taken at Holloman AFB on the 11th of September 1 992
at 0930L.
Q1: Will you please state your full name, rank and organization
for the tape.
A: Philip M. Senna, Captain, 415th Fighter Squadron.
Captain Sembower asked the following:
Q2: What was your role the night of the accident?
A: I was the upgrading SOF.
Q3: Were you on a headset through the whole thing?
A: No, I wasn't.
Q4: Were you on a headset at all?
A: No, I wasn't.
Q5:

Do you remember what the pilot reported to the SOF?

A: I do
Q6: What can you say about what he reported?
A: First of all, we were discussing the SOF and I were
discussing the opening checklist and the rend file and the
control said SOF you got an emergency coming to you. So he gets
on there and he starts talking with the aircraft in question I
can't recall the call sign. Be goes okay you got an ECS light?
And now he's writing the stuff down and he goes you got a right
bleed duct and you've got an FCS light okay now you've got a
hydraulic light alright you got a right flight a right utility he
started reading of all these and at this time he throws Me the
dash one and he goes and I quote "This jet is fucked up Dog".
And I go okay well Ill give him a hydraulic checklist that seems
like the first one and I had gotten to the point where the
hydraulics he had, the SOF Major Papp had the checklist out and
he's writing all this stuff down I get open to the hydraulic page
and he's trying to confirm ordnance on board, the SOF is and he
can't talk to the guy and about that time he'd just gotten the
lights out and both the SOF and I were looking at each other and
69

I'm getting in the hydraulic checklist and the SOF is still

trying he made I think 2 or 3 calls to try and find out what the
ordnance was on board and at that time the head controller came
up on guard and said SHABA 67 this is Holloman tower on guard
please come up SOF frequency and Holloman tower out. I remember
her saying that and about that time we heard a ELT and she turned
around and said I think that's a fireball and we all looked over
there and sure enough it was a fireball.
Q7: Did Andy make any suggestions as to which should have
priority the ECS or the hydraulics?
A: No, because he never got reply in kind.
Q8: Be never really made any replies at all?
A: Not that I can tell because he was writing things down just
telling me get in the checklist and then he was running through
the checklist which asks can you confirm number souls on board
playtime and fuel and nature of emergency and ordnance. I don't
think he got to address any of the checklist actions.
Q9:

Were you watching the SHABA 67 takeoff at all?

A: Yeah I did I saw him because I just got into the tower and I
said who is that taking off? And they said oh that's SHABA 67.
And about five minutes later is as far as I can remember we just
got into the opening checklist and that's when we ran into the
problem. i.e.. He came up talking to the SO?.
Q10: Do you remember how much time he spent from being cleared
for takeoff until he actually started to takeoff roll?
A: No, because he was rolling as I came in the tower. He was
going by the tower I go who's that? And they said SHABA 67.
Q11: Do you remember off hand how far he extended going south if
you were watching him at all? Before he started his left hand
turn?
A: No, once he got airborne I turned around and started talking
to the SOF.
Q12: Did you see him at all on when he was heading north?
A: No I didn't.
Q13: You didn't see him go in at all did you?
70

A: No, I was looking then she goes I think that's a fireball I

had a hard time deciding if it was a fireball because it was
flat. It didn't look like a classic fireball and it did kind of
mix with the lights as you get out there to Alamogordo if you
look from the tower there just kind of really bright and then
they dissipate into a bunch of scattered lights and no kidding it
looked like a bunch of lights once you got in the binoculars you
could tell that it was pretty ugly out there.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q14: Could you hear the discussions between the SOF and the
pilot?
A: There wasn't really a discussion.
Q15: Could you hear the pilot's voice?
A: No
Q16: Were you given the impression that the pilot had done the
checklist or was asking the SOF to read the checklist?
A: No, I was given the impression that he was reading the lights
as they came up. Because the kept saying you've got this light
and this light and this light and the guy kept talking, he never
once that I can recall gave the SOP a chance to reply in kind as
to the checklist action. I mean as I got the one checklist, he
was giving us lights for another checklist BO I don't recall him
ever having the opportunity to go ahead and do any checklist
action or reply to the pilot as to what action to take.
Q17: Do you have anything else that you think we need to know
that happened that evening?
A: No, based on what he had Andy I looked at each other I said I
guess he did a good job. He walked away I mean as far as being
able to get out of an aircraft with
Q1B: One last question, the crash recovery or the one that
picked up the red phone and started all the crash response. Do
you know when the crash response team went out to the aircraft.
A: There was a bit of confusion there I wouldn't say on the
tower's part I would say on the recovery the crash recovery
problem. We had a hard time getting in touch with Colonel Huff
in fact we had to get on the radio and tell him hey Boss you may

have we tried to be as cryptic as possible but we had to indeed

71

let him know what was going on and I believe the first people on
the scene as far as we could tell we found out the pilot by him
calling into the squadron and then his squadron notified us hey
this is the guy this is the aircraft and this is what he had on
board. We said oh okay and they said local response teams have
arrived on station. To me it seems I guess they responded as
best as possible given the circumstances but there was a lot of
things going on there.
Q19: Do you happen to know or about when the Holloman response
team got to the crash site?
A: I would say about 15 minutes I can't really give you a real
accurate answer as far as I'm concerned because at that point
after it crashed Andy was running the crash checklist and I took
control of the local traffic to direct them full stop and stay
out of the way the one guy who had the foresight to fly over the
crash scene with his IRADS on that was pretty heads up I thought
but other than that was really busy I don't believe I think most
people were in shock that we just lost an airplane.

72

TESTIMONY OF MSGT MORSE

Investigation of F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 8 to 0801
this testimony was taken at Holloman AFB on the 11th of September
1992 at 0945L.
Ql: Please state your full name, rank and organization.
A: MSgt James Austin Morse, 416 Fighter Squadron
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q2: Sgt Morse could you tell me a little about your maintenance
background please?
A: I'm a Armament Systems mechanic by trade I keep my 9 level.
In Korea after making Master this is my second tour here at
Bolloman. All of my experience I've been in the service 15 years
I've been on the flightline for the whole part with the exception
of one year I did in armament shop while I was stationed at
Griffiss in New York. I've been a load crew chief, load crew
member flightline expediter for the weapons side and load
standardization crew member, crew chief, and NCOIC of the WSS and
also did a year as a APG flightline expediter with the F-15s here
and got promoted if you will to productions superintendent and F117s.
Q3: How long have you been stationed at Holloman AIR?
A: This tour since January of 1990.
Q4: And how long have you worked on the F-117 program?
A: Since June of this year, 1992.
Q5: You said that you're an armament systems specialist? But
the job you're performing now is generally performed by airplane
general APG people. You got a promotion and crossed that gap?
A: As a yeah as a production superintendent. I did get the
opportunity to cross over.
Q6: How do you like working on the F-117 aircraft?
A: I find it quite an interesting challenge actually. There's
a lot of new maintenance problems that would encounter that are
different from any other aircraft I've worked. So far I find it
73

pretty enjoyable.
Q7: How did you get informed about accident of aircraft 801?
A:
I was on duty on the 4th of August as productions
superintendent. We just launched 801 out and the MOCC called me
on the radio and asked me to give him a telephone call as soon as
possible and I went in and called him and they informed me that
aircraft 801 had gone down.
QB: During my research I see that you signed off the exceptional
release of 801 on the night that it was destroyed?
A:

Yes I did.

Q9: Can you tell me what that entailed?

A: My particular function on that was total form review of all
the four aircraft 781's and reviewed the 781's to verify aircraft
status for the day and make sure that there were no outstanding
checks or writeups that would have prevented the aircraft from
flying.
Q10: Okay so you reviewed the forms you didn't actually go walk
around the airplane?
A: Not a physical walk around no I did not.
Q11: The system that we feel that failed is a ECS system. Do
you know of anyone who remove the dash 60 hookup bleed air duct
clamp after the red X was signed off?
A: Not to my knowledge No.
Q12: As productions super did you work directly or have any
control over the phase dock?
A: No in essence MSgt Stawderman was the on site supervisor. My
main function during and throughout the phase was to periodically
check in with him and make sure that all the requirements that he
had to complete the Phase was accomplished and coordinate with
any back shop support that he may or may not need and also
supplement him with my own maintenance people if it was
necessary.
Q13: So in essence once it comes out of phase it's handed off to
you and the line and it's your airplane after that?

74

A: Yes sir.
Q14: The experience level of the people working on the airplane
on the line, once it came to you and was given to you and the
line folks what kind of experience level did you have working on
the airplane.
A: Are you asking on the day
Q15: On the day in question, yes.
A: To the best of my recollection we had to finish attaching the
Aztec panels or the panels over the tailpipes that morning that
start of the day. There were, the people that were physically
doing the work were very well experienced. The crew chief that
was crewing the aircraft that finished up the preflight though to
my knowledge, he doesn't have a lot of experience. He's
relatively new on the jet. He's qualified to do the preflight
and the launch but I don't think he came from Tonapah or anything
on the aircraft from Tonopah.
Q16: The airplane had an operational engine run during the last
part of phase. Did you provide any people to help for that
engine run?
A: To the best of my knowledge no sir. The engine run was done
completely by the folks that were assigned to phase at the time.
I retract that. I did supply an engine run man from the
flightline a SSgt Bees went to actually run the aircraft.
Q17: He would do nothing but run the airplane while other people
were doing different things?
A: Yes sir. The phase people were running the ground and took
care of all the ground operations in Sgt Bees was tasked to be in
the cockpit and run the engine.
Do you know of any training program for your new people
The ones that did not come from Tonopah upgrading them in
the 117 maintenance area?

Q18:

A: Yeah, On the AL'S level as far as I know they went through a

TAMS class at FTD I even went through the class we shut down with
F-15s to come up to speed on some of the systems and how they
operated. That is the only other than the OJT right on the line
the hands on part of it would be the only training that they
would get.

75

Q19: The OJT does that encompass an experienced person working

with the inexperienced person?
At Yes sir.
Q20:

Is that always done?

A: As much as humanly possible. To my knowledge there was up to

and before the point of 801 we didn't do any maintenance on my
shift there was not an experienced person I mean we wouldn't
allow an inexperienced person to get on airplane by themselves
and try to accomplish something unless they maybe install a screw
but there were no tasks that were done.

76

TESTIMONY OF SSGT BALDWIN

Investigation of F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 820801 this
testimony was taken Hallman AFB on the 11th of September 1992 at
0957L.
Ql: Will you please state your full name rank and organization
for our record.
A: Ryan P. Baldwin, SSgt, 415 Fighter Squadron
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q2: Sgt Baldwin on the 4th of August aircraft 801 went through
EOR and you working at EOR on that night?
A: Right
Q3: Did you notice anything different about 801 as it went
through EL?
A: Nothing out of the ordinary. There were two fasteners loose
in the AVTR panel. They were secured and it went on its way.
Q4: At EOR what are the procedures that the crew take. Just
explain to me what happens when the aircraft rolls into EOR.
What will that crew go out and do?
A: There's normally a two man crew. If there's a three man
we'll use three man. A man will marshal a jet in will bring up
to position will stop it do a quick tire check, check the cute
red cord wear if its good go ahead and roll it forward another
approximately foot to 2 foot do a rollover chalk it begin the
look phase of the inspection so B man take the main wheel wells
the engine compartments the exhaust area check for the drag chute
pin. A man checks nose wheel well at the front end of the
airplane everything's good it goes on its way.
Q5: On that night were you A man or B man?
A: I was in the supervisor position I was assistant NCOIC out
there.
Q6: Who was the B man?
A:

Ann Jenkins

77

Q7:

How long have you worked on the F-117?

A: Got to Tonopah in March of 90 to present date.

Q8: And how were you informed about the accident of aircraft
801.
A: I had suspicions when all the radio calls started happening
because we have a hand held radio we listen to the jets come out
then our boss Msgt Moore called me at approximately 1130 at night
to come back in to fill out a statement.
Q9: Okay so being in a supervisor position that night at EOR you
didn't really have anything to do with the jet?
A: I did because the A man whose SSgt Reilly asked me about the
fasteners on the AVTR panel. We got em good to go so it went in
the air.

78

TESTIMONY OF TSGT SWALLOW

Investigation of F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 820601 this
testimony was taken Holloman AFB on the 11th of September 1992 at
1005L.
Ql: Will you please state your full name, rank and organization
for the tape?
A: Steven J. Swallow, TSgt, 416 Fighter Squadron
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Q2:

Sgt Swallow what is your position at the 416th?

A: I'm a flightline expediter.

Q3: And what does that entail?
A: Getting the aircraft ready to fly, prioritizing jobs for the
crew chiefs and specialists, driving the trucks getting the crew
chiefs parts if they need, run them around etc.
Q4: So basically you coordinate all the actions between the
specialists, crew chiefs.
A: I try to the best of my ability.
Q5: On the night in question 4 Aug 92 were you at work?
A: Yes I was.
Q6: Did you have any dealings with the aircraft 801 prior to
flight?
A: Yes, I did.
Q7: And what ,were those actions?
A: Earlier that day setting the clam shell, marked spot 4. We
came in at approximately 12 o'clock. We had to do some paneling
up on the aircraft. Right Aztec E-bays if I remember right.
Towing the aircraft out onto the hard stand in front of the clam
shells. Pulling the forms. Crew chief had to pull the forms on
it. Getting the aircraft ready for flight that night.
Q8:

Your actions was to make sure that it all got accomplished,

79

you didn't physically touch the airplane in any way?

A: No I did not, but I did sign some Red-Xs off. I believe on
the right and left E-bays after installation for another guy.
Q9: How long have you worked on the F-117 program?
A:

Approximately two and a half years.

Q10: The system that we think malfunctioned is the ECS system.

Do you know of anyone who removed the Dash-60 hookup bleed air
duct clamp after the Red-X was signed off?
A: The Dash-60 hookup clamp. You talking about the hookup in
the right wheel well?
Right wheel well cooling areas, for your avionics?
A: No I do not.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q12: The experience level out on the line, the crew chiefs that
work for, what is their experience level?
A: At that point, I would say it was 25% experienced, 75%
unexperienced in the since they've only worked the aircraft maybe
two to three months. At that point in time we not that much
experience out there.
Q13: As an expediter, how do you ensure that your inexperienced
folks have somebody with them that is experienced?
A: Up until this point it was really hard to match the
experienced person up with the inexperienced person, basically
the flight chiefs assigns the jobs in the morning, then after
they get out to the aircraft, if I feel I need to re-prioritize
the jobs I'll move the people around where I need them. To
answer your question, at that point and time it was real hard to
put an experienced and inexperienced person together.
Q14: So it may not of always happened that somebody working on
an airplane, a young guy would have a readily available
experienced person to look over his shoulder.
A: Yes
Q15: Did you have any input to the selection of the phase crews?
80

A: No I did not.
Q16: Did you have any inputs of people to help out the phase,
the phase crews. I mean the airplanes in the phase dock, would
they come to you to request people to help them?
A: No, the flight chief would try to assign, the crew chief that
was assigned to that aircraft to go to phase that day. And the
crew chief on that aircraft, I can't remember what his name was,
I tried to get him over there every day to help out with the
aircraft.
Q17: You said you were involved in some installation the day of
the flight. In E Bays.
A: Yes Sir.
Q18: What exactly were you installing, just the panels on the
outside7
A: Just E-Bay racks being up and pinned, then we put the panels
on afterwards, we just signed off the Red X's. But I was
ensuring that the job was done correctly by the person that
actually did the work.
Q19: If the E Bays aren't installed properly, they're not
pinned, what happens, what could happen to the E Bays?
A: It's real hard not to, not to have them installed correctly,
cause there's, there's only two pins that hold either E Bay up.
And it's, you gotta have the pins in.
Q20: You guys go up mechanic or you just push them up?
A: You just push them up, yes sir.
Q21:

If you don't pin them they fall back down?

A: Yes

81

TESTIMONY OF SRA ABARCA

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0801
this testimony was taken Holloman AFB on the 11th of September
1992 at 1051L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Ql: Sgt Abarca could you tell me a little bit about your
maintenance background, please?
A: Well, straight out of tech school I went to Korea for 2 years
and I worked on F-16s, from there I came straight here to
Holloman.
Q2: How long have you worked with the 117 aircraft?
A: The 117 since, I would say, I got here in April so I would
say, May I started working on it.
3:

And what are your duties on the 1177

A: Basically as crew chief, just launch and recovery, you know

learning on it at this particular time. But like taking care of
anything that needs to be repaired or the maintenance of the
aircraft in itself.
4:

Have you attended the TAMS course yet?

A: Yes I have.
Q5: How were you informed about the accident of aircraft 8017
A: Well I had just finished launching the aircraft out, 801,
when I was inside working on the CAMS and I was informed by my
supervisor that I had to go take a urinalysis because an aircraft
had crashed.
Q6: What maintenance actions did you perform on 801 prior to it
being launched that night?
A: My maintenance actions were anything to launch it out, you
know just during the launch procedures, pretty much, and ah, see
if I remember correctly, I think I refueled, I helped the refuel.
Q7: Did you do any maintenance prior to that night on 8017

82

I hadn't seen the aircraft until that

A: No, not at all.
particular night. That day.
Q8: When you said that you did what was necessary, you know to
launch it, that means, doing hydraulic checks, cleaning the
panels up?
A: Right, you know like all, checking all your systems and
reservoirs and everything, all the engines running, storing the
pins, or anything of that nature, checking the tires make sure
that it is good to go.
Q9: Did you work on the airplane at all while it was in phase?
A: No, not at all.
Q10: The system that we feel failed, is the ECS system, do you
know of anyone who removed the Dash 60 hook-up bleed air duct
clamp after the Red-X was signed off?
A: I have no idea.
Q11: Do you know what I'm talking about, the Dash 60 bleed air
connector.
A: Yes, right, I'm well familiarwith that, but I have no idea
who took it off.
012: Being fairly new to the aircraft, and having gone through
TAMS as you said, how was your upgrade training conducted? Were
you just said this is an aircraft OJT, go for it, or was there
somebody experienced with you all the time?
A: When we first started off, there was somebody experienced
with me at all time. In fact, a couple of launches we had
somebody walk with me with the headset on and show me everything
that needed to be done. Several times before, they let me on
line, once I was confident enough to do the task.
Q13: If a leak check was required to be done to an airplane, in
this case, lets say the ECS leak check, would you be required to
do that as a crew chief, or would a specialist come in and do
It?
A: The ECS system I believe it would be the specialist.
Depending I think on where it's located, so I think it goes hand
in hand to both.

63

TESTIMONY OF AIRMAN JACKSON

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0801
this testimony was taken Holloman AFB on the 11th of September
1992 at 1035L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Q1: Amm Jackson, what is your position with the 416th7
I'm a crew chief, I'm a technical aircraft maintenance
A:
specialist.
Q2: What duties does that entail/
A: Recovering the jets, launching the jets, maintaining them,
pre-flighting them, all pretty much the mechanical side of the
aircraft maintenance.
Q3: And did you work on aircraft 8017
A: Yes sir, we did.
Q4: What functions did you perform?
A: Well that night, that morning, or that afternoon, I worked
swing shift. I came in at 9 at night, and about 3:30 or 4:00 in
the morning, the jet was still in phase dock and I was, I had to
preflight it and I didn't, first of all there was a lot of people
running around the jet, so I wasn't going to preflight it right
then cause there was to many hands on the jet. But phase gave me
turn over and I, I put the left outboard ISA, upper ISA panel on
and I put a, a AVTR fastener on the AVTR door. And when phase
was trying to lift the E-Bays, the electronic bays, they broke a
wire and they got electricians out there to fix that and then
later that morning I preflighted the jet.
Q5:

Bow long have you worked on the F-117 aircraft?

A: Approximately 6 months, since March 15th.

Q6: How do you like working on the airplane?
A: It's alright, I don't really have a preference
be working on the F-16.
Q7: When were you informed about the accident?
64

I'd rather

A: The following day when I came into work. Which is, I suppose
it was a Thursday night, it must have been. We come in earlier
on Fridays, usually I come in at 9 o'clock at night and Fridays I
come in around 4 o'clock and after the roll call we were all
outside, all smoking a cigarette and there was like rumors flying
around and then my flight chief came to me and told me that the
jet went down.
Q8:

Have you already attended the TANS course?

A: Yes Sir, I have.

Q9: What training in addition to the TAMS course did you receive
for working on the 117?
A: Just the training that I get, like OJT, being out on the
line, people showing me what to do, and just all the people
around and doing stuff myself that way. With someone supervising
me.
Q10: The system that we believe failed is the ECS system. Did
you work on the ECS system on aircraft 801?
A: No Sirs I did not.
Q11: Do you know anyone who removed the Dash-60 hook-up bleed
air duct clamp after the Red-X was signed off?
A: No Sir, I do not.
Q12. Did you have to go to phase and help out at all other than?
A: Yes sir, I believe maybe, I'm not really sure of the day, I
guess maybe a week before the jet came out. We went to phase and
helped them put an engine in. He and few of the guys from our
squadron helped them put the right engine in, install the right
engine.
Q13. And that was the extent of your maintenance on 801?
A: Yes sir, besides the preflight and putting the panel an.

85

TESTIMONY OF MAJ PHILLIPS

Investigation of an F-I17 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0801
this testimony was taken Holloman AFB on the 11th of September
1992 at 1200L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Q1: What was your role in the squadron the night of the
accident?
A: I am on G-Series orders as the Commander and I have been
since Col Merritt left in July and orders will be revoked when he
returns in October.
02:

Who works under you?

A: Pete Joyce is the OPS officer and Mills is going through EQT.
Q3: I'm trying to look at his MQT program see how it was going
through before the accident, and did you, I'm sure you reviewed
his grade book and everything but, what did you consider his
training program to be, just a normal progression training
program or any special supervision?
A: I'd say that he was average or slightly above average
requiring normal progression and normal observation.
Q4: Let me hand you his grade book, which I don't know if you
looked at it since the accident, this is the checklist of what
was or was not accomplished or was not logged off anyway during
the, after the equipment was impounded. Some things we noticed
that maybe you could help us out with was that a lot of the phase
briefs for flights that he accomplished phase briefs were not
logged off. And we were wondering if you had any information
about whether the phase briefs were accomplished and just not
logged off by John or were they maybe possibly not accomplished?
And specifically, he did a night air-refueling mission about 5
days before the accident and the night air-refueling phase brief
was not logged off and same for NSA and I think the NSAT also.
A: Not for a long time, I don't have any knowledge of that.
Q5: We don't have any information on his MQT acadsmics either so
that wasn't logged off. And do you have any information on if he
got any academics at all?

86

A: No I'm sure, I'm positive he did not have any MQT academics.
The first time they were conducted here by the wing was in
August, right after the accident.
Q6:

Is that required before flight or not?

A: No.
Q7: Who would know if he had MQT academics, would that be his
II', Kohntopp, or his flight commander?
A:
If he had the phase briefs? The one who gave it. Is the
best I can think right now.

Q0: Do you know who was giving those?

A: Any of the IPs are authorized to give the phase briefs.
Q9: How often would you review the grade book?
A: On about a weekly average, a week and a half.
Q10: We noticed in the grade book that he completed quite a few
days SAT X rights, versus, starting the MOT program in July. Can
you tell us why?
A: Yeah, we were forbidden to fly at night until the end of
July. So all of our MQT students flew nothing but days SAT X
rights until we started the night program.
Q11: After his night TR ride his was sent up on a night, in the
grade book it shows that he did a night 'FR ride and then I
believe his next ride was a NSA and then a night AR, airrefueling ride, is it normal to put a new guy in the airplane up
that soon for a night AR?
A: Let me clarify, we were forbidden because of the new
location, we wanted to have warm ups during the day before we
issued any night activity. Cause he had a day AR and significant
day flight activities, I assume the decision was made at the time
that there would not be a problem. I think in a normal MQT
problem a person wouldn't have that much day time prior going to
night yeah you would delay a little bit. But because of all our
MQTs assumes the time of flying a lot during the day and getting
more than one refueling I'm sure it wasn't considered a factor.
Specifically in this instance, I can't recall how that decision
was made.

67

912: Did you attend the brief that night?

A: Mass Brief?

Yes.

Q13: Did the mass brief go normally?

A: Yes
Q14: Was there any rushing from the mass brief to, for Capt
Mills that your know of, to his next brief with his Ii' and then
out to the airplane? Did he seem to be rush and did he?
A: No, not at all as a matter of fact, because the mass brief
occurred during that time period as we do now we only have one
mass brief. Except when duty day requires to have two. During
that time period we only had one so it occurred sometime in the
afternoon, my guess is, I don't recall, but probably around 1300
or so. He was flying night sorties so he had 6 or 7 hours before
he stepped. As a matter of fact between the time that he mass
brief and briefed with his IP, he also came down and sat with me
through an interview with Airman magazine so there was lots of
unrushed time there.
Q15: We noticed in the grade book that an EP oral examination
was done in July. I take it that's because the simulator was
down at the time.
A: Yes, we/I directed we do those with all the students.
016: For the oral examinations, what is normally covered?
A: While I can tell you what should be covered, all the boldface
exams and selected non-boldface.
Q171 In this case the non-boldface was and we can look if you
wish was fumes in the cockpit, and that was the only non-boldface, would that be out of the ordinary to cover just one nonboldface item?
A: I would think that more probably should have been covered
than just one.

88

TESTIMONY OF SGT WILLIAMS

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0601
this testimony was taken at Holloman AFB on the 11th of September
1992 at 1300L.
My NAME is Lt Col Frank Holmes. I am investigating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the aircraft accident that occurred on
4 August near La Luz, NM. I advise you that under the provisions
of Article 31, UCMJ, you have the right to remain silent, that
, to say nothing at all. Anything you do or say may be used as
evidence against you in a trial by court-martial or in other
judicial or administrative proceedings. I advise you also that
you have the right to consult with a lawyer, if you desire, and
to have a lawyer present during this interview. You may obtain a
civilian lawyer of your own choosing at no expense to the
government or, if you wish, the Air Force will appoint a military
lawyer for you free of charge. You may request a lawyer at any
time during this interview and if you decide to answer questions
without a lawyer present, you may stop the questioning at any
time. Do you understand your rights?
A: Yes, I do.
Do you wish to remain silent or will you answer our questions?
A: I'll answer the questions.
Do you want a lawyer?
A: Not at this time.
SMSgt Evans asked the following:
Sgt Williams, could you tell us a little about your
Q1:
maintenance background, please?
A: Come into the Air Force, I worked a little bit on the F-4, F16 for 2 years, and then come into the F-117 program. I've now
been working on it for a little over 2 years.
Q2:

What is your position?

A: Right now as a maintenance person in phase dock.

Q3: And you say you have been with the F-117 porgram for 2
years?
89

A: For over 2 years.

Q4:

How long have you been stationed at Holloman AFT?

A: At this time approximately 4 months.

Q5: Records show you signed off a leak check, on aircraft 801
and I'd like for you to review these set of 781a forms and tell
me if those are your initials and your employee number.
A: Yeah, those are mine.
Q6: When you performed the leak checks, how were they done?
A: With the back of my hand.
Q7: With the APU running or the engines running.
A: With the engines running.
Q8: And also in the forms here it states that a systems
operational check was due. Did you perform an operational check
in addition to the leak check?
A: Operational Check?
Q9: The 781 states system operational check due on bleed air
ground receptacle connection point, the corrective action leak
check is signed off.
A: I signed off the leak check, I didn't see the operational
check on there. No I did not do a operational check too, I
signed the leak check off.
Q10: Also on the right outboard bleed air duct it states that a
leak and operational check is due and you also signed off on a
leak check on that one.
,A: I saw that, that, to my knowledge there is no operational
check on a bleed air duct. Only thing I know is a leak check
due, on that duct.
Q11: What training have you received on the F-117 aircraft?
A: I've been to the TAMS class, up at Tonopah and OJT on the
flight line.

90

12:

Were you aware of any problems coming out of 801 phase?

A: None.
The section of the aircraft that we feel failed is the SCS
13:
system. The clamp that connects the Dash 60 ground cooling duct
to the bleed air system is the item that were looking at, the
leak checked that you performed was on that item, did you also
install the cover.
A: No I did not.
Q14: It's listed that you are the assistant dock chief. What
training did you give to the people that worked on 801 prior to
them working on it.
A: Mostly with Amn Posbrook and Sgt Perry showing them the heat
shields and heat blankets that we were going to replace for time
change. As for Amn pair and I, we were the only two experienced
in the dock. We were inspecting the bays, finding write-ups and
fixing them.
Q15: When you perform the leak check on 801 engines running,
were any circuit breakers pulled or was the right weight on wheel
switch energized
A: No they were not. There was no circ uit breakers to my
knowledge that were pulled.
Q16: How long have you been working phase?
A: Since we opened the phase dock here in the 416th, which has
been, 801 was the first aircraft.
417: So you, although you are experienced in the 117, you had
not been working phase before?
A: That's correct.

Q1B: How were you selected for the phase dock?

A: Volunteered.
Q19: Do you know who installed the plastic boot that's supposed
to cover the clamps on the bleed duct system.
A: No Sir, I do not.

91

Q20: You signed off the document here as leak check complete,
are you an ECS qualified person?
A: No I am not. But I do do leak checks on engines as far as
baroscope plugs, chip detectors, and even ECS packages that are
installed in the motors.
Q21: So that means that the whole system you said installed in
the motors , there's a bleed system under the motors where all
the air comes out. So when you do a leak check, you do a leak
check for the whole system as it runs through the aircraft then?
A: I check on the engines and I also check that specific ECS
duct that was removed.
Q22: Do you know why the ECS duct was removed?
A: Yes I Do. There was a drain line coming off the AMAD that
was going outboard in the right AMAD compartment, it was chafing
up against the rib, and we could not get to the line with
everything in the way. It was so far back, we needed some things
removed, they disconnected a line so we could adjust the way to
reach the line.
023: When you did your leak check, you said you used the back of
the hand, which door or opening in the aircraft panel did you go
into to do your leak check.
A: The right AMAD compartment, up the forward.
Q24: From underneath the airplane.
A: Yes, from underneath the airplane.
Q25: Did you do it just standing on the ground or did you use
anything to step on to get, to get up into the hole?
A: No, I just stood on the ground.

92

TESTIMONY OF MAJ PAPP

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0601
this testimony was taken Holloman AFB on the 11th of September
1992 at 1325L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Ql: That night of the accident, what was your contact with the
SHABA 677
A: Well, after takeoff, not very long after takeoff, a couple
of, a few minutes after takeoff he called me up and told me he
had a problem and wrote off the lights that, the associated
lights that he had with his problem. I wrote those down on a
piece of paper and confirmed them as I went along and tried to,
and that was basically all I got out of him
42:

what lights did he say he had?

A: Well, lets see, thinking back on it, he said he had a right

bleed duct light associated with an ECS caution light, he had
utility A and B caution lights, he had a right flight pump and a
right utility pump caution light, and of course master caution
light And that's as I remember it now that read my notes again.
Q3: Did he have flight control lights at all? FCS lights or
surface centering, centering lights or anything like that?
A: No, not that he said to me initially and now that, I have to
go back and read what my SOF report said. But I think he said
something about it. No actually he didn't. I heard that later.
Now that I think about it.
(74: Your actions were to write that down and get him the
checklist?
A: Yeah I wrote down all the lights that I had and then I turned
to the guy that was up there upgrading the SOF at the time Capt
Senna, I tossed him the Dash 1, said This jet's fucked up". I
started doing the emergency procedures stuff with the tower,
coordinating things.
Q5: Did you have time to offer him any, the pilot any advice on
what he might, what kind of actions to take. Throwing switches
Or....

93

A: No. When I started the emergency portion telling tower

everything, the tower supervisor asked me, does he have any
ordnance on board? And at the same time that I threw the Dash 1
to Capt Senna, I was also reaching for the Dash 1 checklist which
was one of 4 checklist that are up there, got it, started getting
it out, she asked me what's his ordnance on board. I called him
back, to verify his ordnance on board and was going to verify
basically what he'd done and had anything else occurred and there
was no more contact with him.
Q6: Did you see him at alllike visually looking out like 5
miles away?
A: I did not see him, however I saw the remnants of the fireball
after it occurred. The tower supervisor was the first to notice
the fireball which was preceded by a short ELT.
Q7: So you never saw him on his trip around the pattern?
A: No, not lights or visually or anything like that.
0: Did you notice from the time he got his takeoff clearance,
did he delay at all on the runway before taking off?
A: No longer than normal, I mean he rolled out there and
took off.
Q9: Did he give you the impression when he called you that he
had completed his checklist prior to talking to you?
A:

No.

Q10: Is that normal or abnormal?

A: Well, in my case, it would be abnormal, I would take care of
my problem first in my own mind. I would take care of my problem
first then I would call the SOF and tell him this is what I had,
this is what I've done, I view the SOF as somebody to back up
what the pilots doing and make sure he's doing it right.
Q11: As the SOF and he's describing all these different items to
you, that are broken on his jet and then the sequence he
described them to you, which were the more important items to
worry about first, in order?
A: Well initially the thing I'm thinking about, you know
thinking back on it with out coloring it with what I see now from
the board, not from the board so much, but the discussion
94

afterwards. What I was thinking at the time and what the other
guy up there with me at the time I think was thinking at the time
was the hydraulic portion of it. He's , he's got basically some
catastrophic hydraulic problems going on which is to me the
initial problem. If he loses all of his hydraulics ya know that
is going to be a major problem. The ECS thing being secondary
almost, ok. So initially that was what was keyed up in my mind.
As I went back over it, once everything was done, and because
once I tried to call him the second time I didn't hear him, we
saw the fireball we pretty much knew that now we're now on to a
different stage in the accident/emergency which is now an
accident. When i found out he was ok later and we went back and
looked at the stuff we're going, hey it sounds like maybe the ECS
did something that caused the hydraulic problem. But, initially
no, the hydraulics seem to be the pressing problem at the time to
me.
Q12: Once the crash response started, what was your part in the
crash response?
A: Well, initially I said okay everybody lets run the crash
checklist. I pulled it out and starting getting things
accomplished, the tower people did the same thing, tower
supervisor did an outstanding job controlling things, getting
things started. I tried to call Command Post, I called Command
I then tried
Post and said I believe we have an aircraft down.
to contact the Operations Group Commander and had difficulty
doing that both on the radio, on the brick, and also, it ended up
we had to talk on the phone about it, okay. But I had some
problems on the radio as in UHF radio and on the brick. Tried to
keep it as cryptic as I could, but didn't work very well.
Q13: Do you know when the crash response team left the base to
go out to the accident site?
A: Yeah, they left fairly soon after everything started, I don't
know the exact time, but it was fairly soon afterwards. I also,
one thing I did was I, we, I through the tower personnel, I
called up and got a helicopter response type of situation going
as in, I told them sit still we don't need it right now, per Col
Huff's orders, but; let's have one ready to go. The trucks
themselves seemed to move fairly quickly to me after the tower
personnel started everything rolling.
Q14:

Ok, but the helicopter was not launched?

That
A: No, not by me, and Col Huff asked me to hold on to it.
was basically, he said hold on to it after we had gotten a call
95

from the pilot.

Which was fairly soon after the crash.

Q15: Did you talk to the pilot at all after the next few days
after the accident?
A: No, I actually didn't see him until, a week later maybe a
week and a half and that was at the bar, I was in the bar and he
came in. I didn't see him at all.
Q16:

Did he describe what kind of roll the airplane did?

A: He didn't tell me, he didn't tell me over the radio, I'd

heard it from other guys in the squadron.
Q17:

Did he describe it as an aileron roll or a yawing roll?

I, well,
A:
somebody else
between. But
aileron roll.
was explained

well, I mean this is third person, I was told

who was told by him or possibly somebody else
I was told that it just basically started like
That's what it sounded like to me. That's what
to me but then again it was third person.

by
in
an
it

Q18: We understand that an aircraft overflew the accident site

fairly quickly after the aircraft impacted, did you designate
that airplane to go over there?
A: No, I heard about that later and I didn't tell him to go over
there. It was a guy in my squadron. I think that, well I don't
know who told him, could of been approach, but I don't know, but
I didn't say go fly over the site.

96

TESTIMONY OF CAPT MILLS

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0801
this testimony was taken Holloman APB on the 11th of September
1992 at 1403L.
My name is Lt Col Frank Holmes, and I am investigating the facts
and circumstances surrounding the aircraft accident that occurred
on 4 August near La Luz, NM. I advise you that under the
provisions of Article 31, UCMJ, you have the right to remain
silent, that is, to say nothing at all. Anything you do say may
be used as evidence against you in a trial by courtmartial or in
other judicial or administrative proceedings. I advise you also
that you have the right to consult with a lawyer, if you desire,
and to have a lawyer prersent during this interview. You may
obtain a civilian lawyer of your own choosing at no expense to
the government or, if you wish, the Air Force will appoint a
military lawyer for you free of charge. You may request a lawyer
at any time during this Interview and if you decide to answer
questions without a lawyer present, you may stop the questioning
at any time.
Do you understand you rights?
A: Yes.
Do you wish to remain silent or will you answer our questions?
A: I will answer questions.
Do you want a lawyer?
A: No.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Q1: First thing, looking through your grade book, you can look
through this too, we're trying to establish if you got proper
training. You flew a night air refueling mission, NSA and and
MAT in the week prior to the crash. It doesn't show you getting
phase briefs here for those or they're not logged off. Did you
get phase briefs? I noticed your grade book hadn't been updated
so I figured you either hadn't logged it off or hadn't been done,
but you got all those.
A: Yes, for all of them. Yes.

97

Q2: How many night flights have you had in the F-117 prior to
the accident?
A: I think we just went over it, but I believe it was three
my fourth flight is what I remember.
that
Q3: The flight prior to the accident the grade book just shows
the your AVTR didn't work and needed to he re-accomplished.
A: Right, I think I had a FLIR/DLIR malfunction also, I'm not
sure, I think it was a DLIR malfunction also so I was not able to
track at the end gain. Basically what happened is a, was when I
took off and turned on the VTR for the first time it stayed on
and would not shut off. So it burned up all the tape on the long
run and basically they were able to evaluate two targets which
were not players because I couldn't track cause FLIR wasn't
working.
Q4: But you flew the entire route, the normal mission, flew the
whole way.
A: Right.
Q5:

Who was you IP for the mishap?

A: I believe it was Kohntopp.

Q6: Was he was working/acting by himself,
have Kelly and Kohntopp working together?

know a lot of them

A: Ahh yeah, I think, to tell the truth I can't remember. No

actually, I believe Kelly was my IP and Kohntopp was overseeing
him. Is what I think it really was.
Q7:

Remember what time the briefing was that day?

A: The mass brief? No I don't. It's probably, it seems like we

were having them later then, than we are now. I would say it's
between 1 or 2 o'clock.
Q8: And did you get a separate briefing from your IP?
Yeah, we briefed about 30 minutes before I stepped.
A:
Essentially it was the same route I had flown the night before.
So, it wasn't anything I hadn't seen before.
Q51 : How early did you step prior to the plane taking off?

98

A: Easily 1 hour and 5 minutes.

Q10: What time did you start?
A: Lets see, I think, I believe I started, probably
till nine. Cause I called operations and told them I
new jet. And that I anticipated taking off at such
time. And I think it was around a quarter till nine
taxied around 9 o'clock I think, and then I think I
around 9:15pm.

a quarter
was in a
and such
cause I
took off

Q11: Did you have problems at all on the ground with the jet?
A: No, I think it failed a flight control test like the
time, you know you cycle the controls and everything and I went
and did it again and it passed it then,
y it failed the first time?

Q12: Do you remember what specif

A: No, 1 don't. Sure don't.

Q13: How much time did you spend in EOR, just?

A: I didn't, lets see, I went through EOR then taxied out from
there, Bo however long, so far as I remember, I was the only jet
taxiing in, cause it was late, so taxied in, armed me up and then
I taxied on to the runway and took off.
Q14: No delays, you weren't rushed or anything?
A: No, you know I usually pull out an arming slot and sit right
there for a second and make sure I've got everything done and
call tower, so I wasn't rushed no.
Q15: Did you get on time take off.
A: No, it was probably, like I said I can't remember if it was
a, what my exact takeoff time was. It was probably 55 is what I
was thinking that I took off at about 20 minutes late.
Q16: You were probably rushed to get out there, you weren't in a
hurry or anything.
A: No, cause I didn't have a TOT or anything, so I was just
going to go fly the route And it wasn't like I needed to take
off in any big hurry or anything.
Q17: No problems on the ground, no unusual noises from the ECS.
99

A: No, didn't notice anything at all. With the jet everything

was fine.
Q18: When you stepped to the jet did you know it had just come
out of phase? And hadn't flown yet?
A: I didn't realize that, I had noticed that it hadn't flown
that day. But I didn't realize that it was in phase no.
Q19: Not something you would normally know anyway?
A: Yeah, I don't know of anywhere that it says anything
different in there for me. I look at what I'm supposed to look
at and everything looked good.
Q20: What was your cockpit lighting set up at that night for
take off and for once you get airborne?
Yeah, well usually what I'll do, my vast experience in the
four flights at that point, is set everything at half way, flood
lights and whatever the center knob is are all the way down and
everything else is pretty much half way, taxi out to the arming
area and once again when I pulled forward to finish my checks and
everything, I reset the lights again. Is that what your asking?
I've got.

A:

Q21: Do you have eyebrow lights looking down?

A: Yeah, I don't use them a whole lot, but I do have them, I
turn them both up as bright as they'll go and then I push them
forward and I've got two of the square, rectangular flashlights
that I put on them each, elephant ear, or whatever you want to
call itQ22: Do you have the utility light up here, plugged on the side?
A: Usually on the side and facing at the stand-by ADI. And
turned way down pretty much.
Q23: Was it pointing at the stand-by that night?
A: Yeah, I believe so.
Q24: Kinda turned down?
A: Yeah, kinda turned down yeah, it's not very bright at all.
Just enough to where if all the lights go out I can turn it up if
100

I need to, but I.

925: Where do you keep, what all was hanging around the cockpit
as far as photos and checklists and kneeboards and all that?
A: Photos were stuck in the canopy crank, folded in half. Two
kneeboards on FM 70 and route of flight on the left one and my
checklist, my abbreviated checklist on the left one usually.
Q26: Just the one pager?
A: Right. And then over in the left and I didn't have a pubs
bag at that point, so I had everything, I had my checklist and my
in flight guide wrapped together with a strap, and then all the
pubs are sitting right there.
Q27: Was anything covering the surface centering lights, or any
warning lights?
A: No
928: They're all stuffed way back?
A: Yeah, it's stuffed it down in the little box there, in the, I
basically, I made my own pubs kit and just rubber banded them
together so I could stick them in there and not have to worry
about anything hanging out. So I had pubs and then the two
checklists essentially.
929: Did you spend any extra time on the runway prior to
takeoff?
A: I don't remember spending any extra time, no, I think I,
yeah, I, I think I was cleared to take off from the arming area.
So taxied out down to 22, pulled onto the runway, ran up engines
and then released.
Q30: Taxied back down to 22, how fax is hat, I've never taken
off on 16?
A: It's probably 1000 feet or so. If you come from that taxi
way. So it takes you a little while to get down there and you
know, being the fourth night flight and all and that was like the
second week I think we were flying nights. Everybody was told to
go very slow and make sure you did things right. So I pull out
on 22, go straight down the middle the runway to the numbers of
22, turn until I see the numbers of 16 and then turn the jet
around. And that's essentially how we were told to do it, that's

why I did it.

1Q31: When was your first indication of any problem with the
A: Put gear up and the ECS surged, probably took 10 seconds for
the tires to quit spinning like they do. And then probably I'd
say 5 to 10 seconds after that, I got a master caution light, and
could see it was a ECS and that was probably, I'd guestimate at
around 500 feet AGL. And I hadn't even switched to channel 3 yet
and called departure and I'd only, I usually don't come forward
and change the channels until at least 500 feet, so that's about
where it happened. I don't know if I did it the first time, or,
but the, as soon as I saw ECS I kinda glanced over and I saw that
it was a right duct overheating. So I don't know whether that
was at 500 feet or at 1000 feet before I made my turn. But.
Q32: Did you take any action right away or did you continue to
climb out and try to maintain control?
A: Yeah, I just tried to continue to climb out, cause you know,
all they brief us, oh, take off from the black hole, which is
still kinda black out here, I never flew at Tonopah so I didn't
see that. But it's still pretty dark, it's the first take off,
you know first, first roll of the night or whatever, it's 9:15 so
it's not sunset takeoff like we're doing now. So it's mostly
dark, and you know I concentrate on flying the jet at that point.
So I just didn't, I didn't do anything, only thing I did was
reach down, switch to departure, and say Hey departure whoever I
was SHABA 63, I've got an emergency I need to go talk to the SOF.
Q33: So you continued to climb out to about 1000 feet, and then
turned on your own power?
A: Yeah, and that's just habit pattern I guess from flying the
A-10 and everything, 1000 feet for turn out at night. And like
I said, that's probably the slowest your cross check is right
then, cause you,re just getting spun up. So, looking at flight
path markers making sure I have a good flight path going.
Q34: What kind of flight path marker or position do you use for
your first initial climb up to 1000.
A: Probably around 2 degrees, maybe, and then once, 2 degrees
until single engine climb speed and then from there probably like
3 degrees until like 250 and then from there I use it on up to
stop it at 300. Probably pretty much standard for summer time.
Q35:

What was your first reaction, I guess you talked to

102

departure and said you wanted to talk to the SOF? Did you throw
any switches at all on the ignition panel.
A: Yeah, I just, no, I knew that, I knew that I had something
that was going to make me come around and land, so I knew that
the mission was pretty much done And my first reaction was as I
flew the jet to 1000 feet and when I started to turn there, at
that point I, you know, the thing I was thinking, I, the thing
that I really remember from those emergencies, ECS emergencies,
is that, the only thing I could really remember was that you turn
the bleed air switch off. And I remember though that the was,
you know, the further down in the checklist, it wasn't the first
step and it wasn't the second step. And so, when I made the turn
out of traffic which was about 1000 feet AGL, and that was just
short of the 5 DNB, I think it was 4.8 or something like that.
Right when I made the turn there, I thought maybe I should reach
back and turn off the bleed air switch. And then I said no don't
do that, fly the jet, and so, and I didn't think of it again at
that point. And then also thought well, like I said I was
thinking, then I was going well, that's not the first or second
thing and it's probably not a good idea to do that until I'm,
cause I don't want to do anything I don't wanna. Is what I was
thinking.
Q36: When you turned left, what altitude did you roll out on or
did you have a planned out roll altitude?
A: Yeah, my intention was 7.3, 340 degrees and 7.3, 7,300.
Cause that's exactly what they give you on a radar climb out.
Q37:

Is that what you did?

A: Yeah. I did a 30 degree left bank turn, kept it climbing and

I rolled out at, on heading 340 and I was not quite to 7.3 then.
And I basically was in a 1 to 2 degree climb and then the only
thing other that I remember of that is a, I saw myself going
past 7.3, and I just said, I'm going to keep climbing because I
know once you get further down on down when at some point they
usually climb me up to 8 6 or something.
Q38: Auto pilot when did you put the auto pilot on if you did.
Never had it on?
A: Didn't put the auto pilot on. Usually I hand fly the whole
departure and then turn it on once I'm up at altitude is what
I've been doing.
Q39:

What airspeed were you, what was you plan on, what did you
103

do?
A: Obviously I was looking for 300 for the climb out. And,
other than that I really don't know what air speed I was at when
I rolled out. It was probably close to 300. But I don't
remember making any inputs to changing it or to you know, I don't
really remember what I did once I rolled out.
Q40: Remember what you did with the throttles, did you just
leave them parked in the middle or.
A: I don't know, I'd assume that, you know, I'm starting to
level off now, I'm pulling back some and that's, I'd guess I'd
pull them back. You know, kind of stand them up. And that's
just a guess, cause like I said, I really don't remember making
any big inputs on that.
041. Did hydraulics, I guess you got hydraulic lights from what
I've read, did you get those and ECS lights on at the same time
or how much delay was there between those?
A: Yeah, like I said the ECS light came on around 500 feet AGL,
did my turn out and basically just flew the jet at that point, I
was trying to contact the SOF. I rolled out on downwind, and
that was when I got a hold of the SOF. My plan right then was to
have him read me the checklist. And since I had called him few
times and he hadn't answered before, I was thinking if I roll
out, cause of the antennas on the Stealth, if I rollout and I
can't get in touch with him then I'll pull out my checklist. I
called him and I said, hey I got ECS light with right duct overheat, need you to read me the checklist. And at that point, I
got another master caution, with hydraulics and FCS single FCS I
guess it would be, I can't remember exactly what it says. Both
of them came on and right as soon as I'd asked him that question
and then I just, I kinda went ok, now I got a hydraulic flight,
and I got a FCS light and punched it off, I think punched it off
down here. And a, I looked at my gauges immediately and gauges
were good, and I come over here and started reading him the
lights, what that I had on the hydraulic panel.
Q42: Do you remember which ones you had?
A: Yeah, it was umm, I think it was right flight, right utility,
utility A.
Q43: So you got a flight control light, did you get any flight
control lights down here.

104

A: I told him that I, I thought I had reset, FCS reset was lit.
But I don't remember, exactly no. That wasn't my concern, I was
more concerned about the hydraulics at that point. But I thought
I, I told him I thought I could see some lights over there. But,
that was pretty much it.
Q44: Did those lights come on right after you rolled out or was
it another 10 miles down the road?
A: No, it was fairly quickly after I rolled out. And once
again, you know, when I rolled out I called the SOF twice, on,
I'd went to the manual by that time and he answered on the second
try. And I went through the radio calls just like I told you,
and got those lights, so yeah it happened fairly fast, after I
rolled out, I'd say within 20 seconds.
Q45: That's kind of the first I've heard of any FCS lights, we
kinda read transcripts from the tower and the SOF and there's no
mention of any FCS lights. Are you sure you had some?
A: Right. Yeah. That's what I remember and I believe that's the
I interviewed them, when I did it the first time. And obviously
it's been a month now. But, I remember having more than just
hydraulic lights and you know what I said to the SOF I don't
know, I haven't listened to the tape. So that's my memory.
Probably didn't check you fuel I guess.

Q46:

A: No. No.
447: Any fuel imbalances or fuel leaks you would have been aware
of?
A: No, I mean no, I may have glanced over at it but nothing
caught my eye on it. I didn't do a fuel check no.
Q49:

Did you ever get your checklist open?

At No.
449: It was still stuffed back there? Didn't have time to do it.
A: Yep.
Q50: No lights, no pubs covering your lights, so all the lights
would've been visible if they d been on?
A:

Right.
105

Q51: What was visibility like when you were heading 340.
A: It was pretty dark, but it was a clear night.
452: Was there a horizon, mountains visible?
A: Yeah, you could see the mountains. And that's once again,
kinda where I'd, at one point there right before I got out, I was
thinking I probably need to climb a little bit more. So, yeah I
was going that direction and I could see something out there.
Q53: Did you get any unusual noises or temperatures? Nothing?
A: No. Nothing. Jet seemed fine to me.
454: No ECS noises or anything?
A: No.
455: No heating of the cockpit?
A: No.
Q56: What did you think was wrong with the jet? Did you have
any idea?
A: FCS light I really didn't think was any big deal. And, you
know when I got the hydraulic lights, I remember thinking, I
looked at the gauges , gauges were good, looked at the lights,
and when I read the SOF the lights the first time I just kinda
went, no, I don't quite understand this, cause if I have these
lights, then something should be happening to my gauges. I
looked at the gauges again and I read him the lights again, and
that essentially was it. But the second time around I think
utility B was also on the list when I read it to him. And I was,
I was thinking that, some kind of short or something, I wasn't
thinking that there was any you know, the jet was flying fine , I
was just sitting there comfortable as I could be and I didn't
really think there was anything wrong with the jet.
Q57: Just a light problem? An ECS problem?
A: That's, that's, no kidding, that's what I was thinking, yeah.
Just a light problem.
Q58: Did you associate the FCS problem with the hydraulic
lights? Were the two separate or two simultaneous emergencies?
106

No clue or just to busy to think about it?

A: Yeah, I didn't know, no I didn't. It just, yeah it happened
really fast. And, like I said the hydraulics got my attention
because obviously we have a boldface that deals with hydraulic,
but I was much more concerned with the hydraulics than the ECS.
Q59: Which had priority hydraulics or ECS7
A:

Hydraulics.

Q60: Did you ever go to 100 percent oxygen or throw any bleed
air switches?
A: No.
Q61: You say you're not sure what you do with your throttles
since you say you might have parked them?
A: I probably stood them up.
Q62: Did you dump any fuel?
A: No, I never thought about it.
Q63: What were your hands doing? Were they stick and throttle
or were they? Whole time pretty much.
A: Stick and throttle, hand flying the jet. Yep.
Q64: See any dual FCS lights? Or surface centering lights?
A: No. Don't remember surface centering, no.
Q65: What was you first indication that the jet was, that you
needed to bail out, what was your first indication of a departure
basically? Or uncontrolled flight or whatever?
A: Like I said, I rolled out, call the SOY, he answered on the
second call. Told him I had the FCS problem, with a right duct
overheat, could he read me the checklist. And that point I got
the lights and I go oh, now I got hydraulics and maybe I didn't
say FCS light because I didn't think that was as big a deal as
hydraulics, but I thought I said ok now I got hydraulics and I
can see to myself, whether I said it or not I don't know, I got
ECS light and I got a, let me read you the hydraulics, and I read
him the hydraulics once and like I said , after I read them the
first time I looked at the gauges again and I go well I don't
107

understand why the gauges are good with these lights, there
should probably be something down. And at that point, somewhere
in there I thought I said something like ok, I've been a SOF
before and I've been up in the tower when the guys are reading to
you, and like I said I wasn't panicking, but it all happened that
quick. That I told the SOY that and I go ok let me read these to
you again. And so, I looked at the gauges again in between there
and I read him the lights again and I went , right flight,
whatever it was, right flight pump , right utility pump, utility
A, and then right about that time I don't know whether utility B
was lit and I read it the first time or whatever, but the last
thing I did was read the utility B, I was looking over to the
left and at the point the airplane did a very fast right roll.
And I looked forward and basically looked out the window there
and just watched it roll once and like I said it was extremely
fast, in my opinion, obviously it was night and I was out there
doing it, but.
Q66: How would you describe the roll, I mean how fast was the
roll?
A: I told them it was like a, it looked like a full deflection
aileron roll.
Q67: In a T-38 or in a F-117?
A: No, in a 117. Cause obviously I hadn't flown in anything for
about 6 months or whatever, I flew my last ride at Myrtle Beach
In the A-10 in probably March. And I didn't fly again till I
guess May and so this is all I've been doing. And I remember I
did, I think the only thing I did on the ABC rides was aileron
rolls. So I did two or three of them I think probably during my
training. And it looked like full deflection aileron roll to me.
And I was just sitting there, and like I said it happened so
fast, that I don't remember correcting, whether I did or not. I
don't know. But it rolled so fast and all I remember thinking,
ok there goes the horizon, that means it rolled once, and it
didn't slow down, and at that point I can, all I thought was, I'm
out of control, the jets going downhill, cause it was apparent if
you take a 117, you do an aileron roll in it, it was probably
going to end up 10 degrees nose low. And I felt, I felt like my
SA was 100 percent that I new where the jet was going, there was
no doubt in my mind. And like I said, I never thought, do I need
to eject, should I eject, or anything like that, at some point in
there I just basically reacted and grabbed the handles and
pulled.
Q68:

Ok, so the roll was probably at a rate about 120 to 180

108

degrees per second would you say?

A: Yeah, I would guess it would be faster than that, but I
haven't, I haven't, I flew the simulator the other day but I
forgot to check it out because I wanted to see what it looked
like. But it basically rolled so fast, like I said, I didn't
have time to do anything, when it came around that first time, I
kinda remember looking down at my hands and looking at the
throttle and going I didn't do anything, and it just, it was
rolling extremely fast. You know, like I said my own impression
was, it's out of control, and it's , it's not stopping it's
keeping rolling.
Q69: Did your head get banged against the side of the canopy at
all?
A: No, I told them you know, thinking, like if I'm describing as
a full deflection aileron roll, you've done them. It's not, it's
not that, it wasn't that fast. I mean it felt like it was
extremely fast to me, but I've never done an aileron roll at
night in a black jet, so. I didn't feel like I was under a lot
of G or anything. And I didn't have any problem that I remember
of grabbing the handles. But I was probably pretty excited then
too.
Q70: So it seemed like an unloaded, unloaded aileron roll?
A: Yeah.
Q71: Not a loaded up 5 G, like a?
A: No, no it didn't feel like there was any G on the jet, like I
said it felt like it just, if you were flying straight and level,
which I was straight and level at that point, and if you just did
an aileron roll and kept it going that's exactly what it felt
like, maybe a little faster. Maybe a little bit of barrel to it,
but I didn't, I didn't feel like it was, I didn't feel like I was
under a lot of G no.
Q72: What was your reaction to the to11, it sounds like you just
watched it and tried to you may have tried to correct?
A: Yeah, I didn't think anything basically until it rolled, went
through the horizon again and like I said it happened so fast
that I was just sitting there and I watched it roll, and I just
kinda went there goes the horizon. You know, oh shit. And then,
like I said the only thing I was thinking is that it's going down
hill and I haven't done anything with the stick. Then at some
109

point I grabbed the handles and the only other thing I remember
when I grabbed the handles is I can't believe I'm ejecting.
Q73: So your hands were on the stick and throttle when it
started to roll?
A: Yeah. Throughout the entire first roll. Cause like I said
after it rolled the first time, I thought I consciously made an
effort to look down and go, what the hell is going on here cause
I haven't moved anything and it's , and like I said it, you know,
it was just rolling.
Q74: So you did about one and a half rolls you think before you
bailed out?
A: Yeah. I felt like definitely that I got out going out upside
down, and the jet was still rolling in my opinion when I got out,
cause I , the wind blast blew my head over pretty good and I
could tell the next day my side of my neck was a lot sorer than
the other side.
Q75: Did you notice any flight control lights while you were
rolling?
A: No, didn't notice anything, the only thing I told them in the
simulator interview was , when it started to roll, if there had
been any red lights in front of me, dual ECS or fire lights I
think I would have seen them. Cause your looking, you know
you're looking into pure black there, and red lights, I think I
would have seen them. I didn't see any.
Q76:

You didn't look down at all?

A: No, not during the roll.

Q77: Did you get any horns, slow speed horns, gear lights, any
landing gear red lights, or bitching Betty saying unsafe attitude
or anything.
A: No. Not an OCIP jet, but no I didn't get any, like I said
the jet was flying smooth, in the next second it was rolling and
that was it.
Q78: And you were probably in a slight climb, you said you were
climbing to avoid (rising terrain)?
A: I thought, I was about in a 1 degree climb, 1 and half degree
climb.
110

Q79: What's your best guess of your air speed before that
started happening?
A: I thought I remembered seeing 8,000 feet and 325, but I can't
tell you that for sure. That's what I remember seeing. That's
the only thing I can recall from it, let's put it that way.
Q80: The, from the impact, I guess people investigating the
impact said the throttles or the engines appeared to be in idle
when it crashed, would you have pulled the throttles back before
bailing out?
A: I have no recollection of doing that, I didn't have time to
do anything except grab the handles.
Q81: Did you watch the jet go in once you bailed out?
A: No, it, when I was hanging in the chute it was already
burning on the ground, but when the chute opened the jet was
already burning on the ground in front of me.
Q82: And you had about 4,000 feet to go to get to the ground.
A: No I felt, I told them I estimated I was between 1,000 and
2,000 (feet) estimation dark out there at night, just jumped out
of an airplane.
Q83: Did you look for the airplane as soon as you felt you were
in a chute?
A: What I remember is, I remember hearing the jet blow when I
was still in a complete tumble in the seat is the way I describe
it. Cause I felt like I was out of control. You know once I
came out of it, I felt like I just in a, felt like its exactly
what it feels like when you did the simulator and they stop you
at the end and you get that tumbling effect. That's about how
bad it felt like when I was tumbling. Then the chute opened.
And obviously opened the shock and everything, I hadn't seen it,
been able to see anything up to this point. But I thought I
heard the jet blow. And then by the time my chute opened, the
first thing I could see was the jet burning at about left at 11
o'clock at what appeared to be about a mile, mile and a half in
front of me. And the chute was still swinging pretty good right
to left also. And when I, when I first saw the jet, it was all,
it looked like it had been burning, it hadn't just hit and blown
up. It looked like it was burning, just sitting there burning,
there was no big surges, it was a solid burn.
111

QB4: If you were guessing, from the way it was rolling, how
would you guess it would continue to fly after you got out to
impact?
A: I really have no idea, except that I know that, like I said it
was in a, it looked like a full deflection right aileron roll,
and I estimated that it was probably 10 degrees nose low as it
went through the first roll and it did another half roll before I
got out. And you know it seemed like to me at that point the jet
probably should have flown a little longer before it crashed.
Q85: Cause we're having a, we flew the simulator, trying to
recreate how it got from straight and level, at different air
speeds, at roughly 7500 feet to the impact angle of 70 degrees
at, it seemed to be 200 knots on the stand by airspeed indicator,
and we can't get it to input from here to there no matter what we
do.
A: I heard the only way that can happen is if you depart the
jet. And that's all, that's just what I heard.
Q86: Do you think it spun it or rolled in, it sound like it?
A:

I have no idea.

Q87: Didn't really get any side forces during the rolls?
A: Like I side, probably had pretty good adrenalin flowing
there, but the main thing I remember is I didn't feel like, I
didn't feel like I was pinned against the cockpit or anything
like that and I didn't feel like I had any problem grabbing the
handles once I went for them.
088: Didn't check you beta gauge prior.
A: No I missed that
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q89: Was your day rushed between your main briefing that day and
going out to the jet?
AI No, it was pretty lax actually, I think, I don't remember
exactly what I did, but I told them what I did and they wrote it
down, but, best I remember, I think we had a mass brief around 2
o'clock. I stayed around there till about maybe 5 o'clock or
4:30. I went home and ate, and sat around at the house probably
112

for 45 minutes, drove back out to the base and got out there at
about, about an hour, about 6 o'clock, so about 2 hours prior to
me having to step to the jet. Studied my photos some, but I'd
already studied them, it was the same exact route from the night
before. And I had seen it all, I just was unable to track it.
So, it wasn't anything new, and no nothing was rushed, I went out
to, you know to the first, I drove out there in the van and the
jet, they stopped the jet I was supposed to go to, which I think
was 786 or 798, something like that, and it didn't look like it
was ready and I basically opened the door of the van and asked
the guy is this jet ready to go and he said no. And one of the
supers said your going over to 801 or whatever. And, and I got
in 801 and, it, like I said I wasn't that concerned cause I
didn't have anywhere, I didn't have to be anywhere, I didn't have
a TOT or anything, but they weren't prepared, the weapons crews
had, I had to wart on weapons crews to come out and load. And
also had a problem with my helmet and they had to come out and
fix that. But, I was basically sitting around, in the cockpit
waiting.
490: Where were your feet just prior to ejection, do you
remember? You said you were hand flying the airplane, hands on
throttles, do you fly feet on the rudders or do you fly feet flat
on the floor.
A: At that point I probably had them on the rudders, once I get
up and start cruising sometimes I'll pull them back. But, I've
flown the A-I0 for 3 and half years prior to this, and it's the
same, actually 4 years, but it's the same seat, same body
position, and I do practice my body position so, I know when I
went out in my opinion that my body position was just like it's
supposed to be, my feet were right where they were, my elbows
were in, my hands both hands on the grip and I definitely had my
head back. Don't want to break the neck.
If you take an EP simulator, where do you put your
Q91:
checklist?
A: Usually I'll have it on my leg at that point.
Q92:

So it's a different place than you have it when you fly it?

A: Yeah. And usually when I do an EP simulator I will not, I

will leave it right there until I have an EP and then I pull it
out then I'll put it on my lap. So I kinda do the same thing I
do in the jet. Cause I'll still have my two kneeboards on and as
you know we have to much shit in this cockpit.

113

Lt Col West asked the following:

Q93: You went to a 24 hour history with the flight surgeon, and
I don't want you to tell me what you've told them but I want to
ask you questions that are very similar to what they were. Ok?
A: Ok.
Q94: In terms of just your eating history, was there anything
unusual or different in terms of the 24 hour period prior to?
A: No, it was, probably as good as I would do.
Q95: Do you remember what you had?
A: I think we had like chicken and potatoes, and green beans or
something like that that night.
Q96: In 24 hours to maybe 7 days before the flight was there
anything unusual or different in terms of where you ate, where
you went to eat, anything out the ordinary from just eating at
home?
A: No, no as far as eating. That I can remember.
Q97: How about alcohol consumption? Do you drink?
A: Yeah, I do, I probably drank like, 4 beers on Saturday night,
like 3 beers on Friday night and that was it. And you know, I
don't usually drink any beers during the week and so the weekend
prior would be about the same.
095: Do you take any over the counter medications for a stuffy
nose or anything along those lines?
A: No.

Q99: As far as sleeping habits, anything out of the ordinary,

what's normal for you and was there any difference?
A: Well, I just had a baby 3 weeks prior to that, but, just like
I told, I had slept and it was pretty funny cause when 1 filled
it out I had been sleeping like 10 hours a day for the whole week
prior. So, it was about as good as it could get. And my wife
was getting up and taking care of the baby so, and he, you know,
it nothing bothered me.
Q100: You just have the one child?
114

A: What's that, yes.

Q101: Just describe a standard day, what time you usually go to
bed, what time you usually get up, that, just so I know, what?
A: Well we've been night flying for about 2 weeks I think at
that point so, generally, we were going in I believe, I believe
at that time we were going in like at 2 o'clock, for a 1:50
brief, so I'd usually show up about a half and hour prior to
that. Brief, and I was usually night flying at those times, so
I'd stay until about 5:00, I'd go home and eat and I'd go back
and fly an usually it was around an 8:30 takeoff and maybe a 10
o'clock land or something like that. MQT by the time you debrief
and everything it was usually around 11 o'clock.
QI02: Ok, you come home from the base and you said you stay up
about an hour?
A: Yeah, so maybe at the latest, somewhere going to bed between
somewhere between midnight and 1 o'clock. And I usually sleep
until about 1000 and then get up at 1000 and just sit around for
about an hour and drink some coffee and read the paper. Take
care of my dogs and then sit around and play with my son about
the next hour and then the last hour is taking a shower and
getting ready to go and getting some lunch.
Q103: Does the baby sleep in the same room with you folks or
does he sleep in a separate room?
A: Yeah, he was at that point sleeping in the same room. So
basically whenever he would stir around and wake up, she would
just pick him up and carry him out, she was breast feeding him at
that point, out to the living room.
Q104: Does your wife work?
A: No, not here. We've only been here 3 months, but she's not
been working since we've been here.
Q105: Other than just the challenge of the new baby have there
been any other major changes in your life besides moving here
and just getting into a new jet?
A: No, it a, was a pretty laid back experience, cause, we were
day flying when I first got here, so I basically got quite a few
free rides in the jet really, to go out and just get used to it
some more. And it wasn't, being an MQT guy I didn't have any
115

additional duties or anything, so all I did was study for flying

essentially and that was it.
Q106: How about challenges of getting a h
A: No, we'd pretty much taken care of all that, I guess back in
May sometime, we'd put money down on a house and everything
worked out. We moved in on the 5th of June I think, and I came
up, down from Tonopah and helped move in, and everythings been
real smooth actually, like I said, nothing, nothing going on.
Q107: In terms of labor and delivery with the baby was there
anything?
A: No, the wife didn't really have any problems or anything, her
mother and her brother came up for, probably right before she had
it and stayed for 2 weeks and took care of us. So like I said,
everything was actually very smooth, it wasn't like I was doing a
lot of, didn't have that much to do. And, just kinda hanging out
really.
Q108: The baby was born here?
A: Hight.
4109: When was the last time you and your wife got away to just
blow off some steam?
A: It was probably when her mother was here, we were out, we'd
go to the movies and go out to eat a couple times and she'd stay
home and watch the little baby. So it was, it was actually, you
know, within 3 weeks prior to that A little over 3 weeks prior.
And they had just left probably a week and a half prior to that
so. Like I said everything was pretty smooth.
0110. How about the last vacation you guys got off together
before the baby was born.
A: Took like a week, end of last September, so the year prior,
and then Christmas probably almost a week and a half weeks to two
weeks off, and at Myrtle Beach, I was Jan - March at Myrtle
Beach. And things were pretty slow in my squadron, we went to
Saudi Arabia and so once again, it wasn't a, there wasn't a whole
lot going on there and I didn't have a whole lot of work to do.
I'm trying to think, / don't remember doing anything else, we
went to, I went up to Tonopah the end of March. Some point in
there I had a long weekend and my wife came up to visit me in
Las Vegas, stayed about 4 days with me there, we flew down here
116

for my T-38 training which was about only 2 days worth of stuff,
and we were down here a whole week and 50 we had that whole time
there to do stuff. And like I said, basically been pretty slack
here.
Q111: Prior to the accident what kind of confidence level did
you have in the 1-117, what was your feeling when you got into a
117 to fly it?
A: Really good, cause basically at that point I'd never had one
break on me really, you know, I think I had an INS despin in
flight one time and other than that, they were in good shape.

117

TESTIMONY OF CAPT KOHNTOPP

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0E101
this testimony was taken at Holloman AFB, New Mexico on the 14th
of September 1992 at 1450L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Ql: Please state you full name, rank, and organization?
A: Gus Allen Kohntopp, Captain, 416th Fighter Squadron.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q2: What was your position the night of the accident?
A: I was instructor pilot and also mission lead for the day.
Q3: So you were acting on a dual capacity?
A: Yeah.
Q4: Our records show that you were Mills' IF for five previous
flights.
A: Ah huh.
Q5: So you're pretty well versed in what he was doing?
A: Yeah.
Q6: Do you have any knowledge of him getting these phase briefs
that aren't logged off?
A: Yes, he had a combination phase brief for night air refueling
and night surface attack done by Capt Lazareki and Capt Kelly.
Capt Kelly was doing his upgrade and Capt Lazarski was watching
his IP. The NSAT brief was done on the, his first NSAT night
flight which would have been this one right here. The one right
before that when his VTR failed. That was done by Capt Kelly and
I watched him. Capt Kelly was doing IF upgrade at this time. He
did these did these three phase briefs with IP's watching him.
Those should have been logged off.
Q7: So you were also his IP for the night of the mishap. Did
you give him any special one-on-one briefing after the mass
briefing?
118

A: Yeah. What happened the night prior to that, was when he had
the exact same ride that he was supposed to be doing, his NSAT
one. We had given him the full brief that night. So what we did
the night of the mishap, after the mass brief, we got together
with him. Both Capt Kelly and I and went over the highlights of
the whole mission brief again, cause it was the exact same route
that he would have flown the night before when he had the VTR.
Then we went over the reviewed film with him for about half an
hour and talked it over.
Q8: Did you discuss any ECS or hydraulic,
problems?

flight control

A: The EP of the day was ECS failure. Actually it was the ECS
right, I don't know which bleed duct, but it was a bleed duct
overheat for the EP of the day. Standard with our mass briefs is
that we do all the EP and stuff like that in the mass briefs and
then in the initial brief for him is not anything on EP's or
anything like that is primarily what he's supposed to be doing
that night.
Q9: Were the checklist items read out in EP of the day for the
ECS problem?
A: Yeah, everything was, I can't remember who did it, if it.....
Q10: We have that.
A: I think it was Barry Brannon maybe.
Q11: That's right.
So he had gone through the checklist just like we do in the
A:
mass briefs.
Lt Col Holmes asked the following:
Q12: Did you use a standard briefing guide to do your individual
briefing?
A: Yes. We have a IP book that I have. It goes through all the
stuff that you need to go through. Primarily for his individual
briefing. It goes through all the ground ops type situations.
Making sure he's doing an eight minute retrim. If he needs it on
that ride or whatever. It goes down through detail what he needs
to accomplish that ride so it goes down on the grade sheet.
119

Q13: So this is not an AF training guide, this is your own that

augments the
A: This is one I got from guys up at Tonopah.
Q14:

We are going to need a copy of that.

A: Okay. For the NSAT phase brief, not the NSAT phase brief ,
but the NSAT ride.
Q15: Yes. How much time was there between the time you briefed
him and the time he walked out to his airplane?
A: In not sure exactly. Usually with my briefs I make sure
they have at least a full hour to step. Usually that gives them
enough time to get out there and look around the airplane real
well before hand. I can't say exactly what it was, cause I can't
remember the exact times.
Q16:

How strong a pilot do you consider Capt Mills?

A: He's strong. I flew A-10s with him at Myrtle Beach. I think

he is strong. He had no problems the night before. He had no
problems, his tape failed. I thought he was very alert and ready
to go the next night. Be is a motivated type guy. I don't think
he had any problems going into flight at all.
Capt Sembower asked the following:
Q15: Do you know what time the mass brief was?
A: Our mass briefs are normally 12150. I don't remember what
time he took off.

120

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR COUTURE

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0801
this testimony was taken at Holloman AFB, New Mexico on the 14th
of September 1992 at 1510L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Q1: Please state you full name, rank, and organization?
A: My name is Doug Couture, major, 49 OSS/OSOS
Q2: On the night of 4 August, you were at home?
A: Right.
Q3: Where is this?
A: 601 Sundown the last street heading east on 10th.
Q4: What did you hear or see on that evening?
A: My wife and I were sitting out in the back just talking. I
was watching some planes flying. There were some planes going
down to the municipal in Alamogordo. You could see guys on final
at Holloman. There was beacons around. You could see rotating
beacons even from 8 to 10 miles away. I knew being a scheduler
that there was something going on at White Sande that night, they
fire Patriots and stuff. I was looking at a rotating beacon off
to the north west. Something caught my eye. It was a white
flash. I told my wife, hey look at that. I thought it was a
Patriot hitting a drone. It was just a white flash, then the
white flash went away. Then I watched a red, I don't know if it
was a light or illumination. I don't know if it was the beacon.
It was a pretty serious decline heading toward the ground. I
lost maybe the last 10 degrees of it behind a house and some
trees. Then I saw this fireball. It was an amazingly big
fireball. I didn't think drones carried that much gas. I went
in and called the squadron talked to Major Joyce, the Ops
officer. I said Pete what's going on? Did something happen? I
told him what I saw. He said, No. It was just a Patriot hitting
a drone probably. Cause obviously he didn't know yet. It was
only a minute or so after it happened. Then I got a call at
around midnight, they were doing a recall, just to dispel the
rumor. He told me that they had lost one. I kind of realized
that, it was kind of obvious to me what it was. That's really
all that happened.
121

Q5:

This red light or whatever, could this have been a fire?

A: It's hard to say. It was steady. You could see the thing
from however many miles I'm away, just going straight down. It
didn't look like a beacons turn. It didn't look like anything
was turning. It could have been. It could have been a beacon.
It's really hard to say. It was more of a reddish, it would
It was red and it was going down. It
really stupid to
like a burning thing. It was just a
flame
yellow
a
wasn't
straight down. That's what I saw going
going
red
steady
steady,
of a dull but it was really hard
kind
was
It
down.
straight
it could have been a fire. But
back,
think
I
that
Now
to...
don't know. It was definitely
I
red?
burning
would a fire be
red glow not a flash at all.
Q6: Do you like it could have been the exhaust?
A: I mentioned that to someone and they said yeah, it could have
the bricks. How far away were you and I said about seven miles.
You can see them if your behind the thing within a few hundred
feet. But at seven miles, I seriously doubt it.
Q7: What was the angle of the decent? Was it straight down or
was it like at a 20 degree angle?
A: It's hard to say. It was going down very fast. From were I
was watching it, it's hard to say if it was coming at me or going
away from me. It was going down very fast. Maybe 5 seconds from
the time I saw it, what I thought was his ejection seat, maybe 5
seconds or so from the time it hit.

122

TESTIMONY OF MR. DELLACORINO

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0801
this testimony was taken at Holleman AFB, New Mexico on the 15th
of September 1992 at 0915L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Q1: Where were you on the night of the accident?
A: I was in my residence in proximity to where the aircraft
crashed. By my measurement, my front door is 210 feet from the
impact site.
Q2: Did you hear or see anything that night prior to the
aircraft impact?
A: Never visually witnessed anything, but I did hear it.
heard it on its descent and I heard it on impact.
03: Did it sound normal?
A: Well when I first heard it off in the distance it sounded
normal. I was aware that there was an aircraft out there, but I
didn't think anything of it. I didn't notice anything that
sounded different. Other people said that it was sputtering but
I never heard that. It sounded just like a normal engine noise,
that rush, just like a jet aircraft. Then soon after that I
became conscious that he was awfully low, the rushing became
louder. My thought was, he's awfully low for being in dark.
Soon after that I started to hear the scream of the engines, the
high pitch whine. It was about that time that there was no doubt
in my mind that something was going down. I didn't know what it
was. You could tell when the noise is coming right at you. Of
course I guess Doppler shift the pitch increases in frequency.
At about that time, it sounded like the engines went full throttle. There was a noticeable increase in pitch and then there was
a laud explosion. It happened fast, as soon as I had one
thought, the event had already occurred. It was that fast.
People told me that there were secondary explosions. To the best
of my knowledge there was not. There was one main explosion. At
that point I was stunned. My next thought was it hit, wreckage
is going to come plowing through the trailer, I've had it. I
heard glass breaking, I'm pretty sure I heard minor thuds and
bangs. About that time everything just turned a bright orange.
The next thought was, the trailer is covered with JP-4 and it's

burning on the outside. After that my only thought wae to get

the hell out of there. The cat had run under the dresser in my
123

bedroom. I ran in there and tipped that over. Re ran into the
kitchen I dived on him under the table. We stumbled out the back
door. Looked like you were stepping out into a raging inferno.
Your real disoriented when it happens. I can't say that there
was panic there cause it all happened so fast. I knew it was a
bad situation. The next day the flame damage didn't look that
bad. That night it looked like there was a wall of flames from
the impact site all the way down to me. As I was coming around
the trailer trying to assess the situation, there was a huge
fireball there. I remember on the way to the truck I heard 4 or
5 small pops that sounded maybe like large firecrackers. Maybe a
shotgun in the distance. Those are the only other explosions
that I heard. They said that they were the BDUs probably.
That's what I was told.
Q4: Did you at any time see the pilot?
A: No sir. Somebody else told me that the high pitched whine I
heard was the rocket motor on the ejection seat. I don't know
that I believe that cause if it was, he got out of there almost
simultaneously with the explosion.
Q5: Did any

of

the pieces of the aircraft end up in your yard?

A: Yes they did. I had a piece of landing gear door slice

through the rear bedroom. Had a hydraulic fitting come through
the front window. Three or four small scrape metal type damage
to the aluminum on the trailer. It broke 5 or 6 windows. I
think the ones that were cracked in back were from the concussion.
Q6: When you say you left there, did you go over to the accident
site or just physically.......
A: I physically got the hell out of there, cause I didn't know
what he was carrying. The thought after I was in the truck was
what if he's carrying ordnance. I went out onto the road way.
By that time there were people all over the place. The La Luz
fire department was on the scene. One of the storage trailers we
have was in flames already I told them don't worry about that,
save mine, cause the side of it was already starting to burn.
When it first exploded everything was bright orange. Then you
could hear a loud crackling sound. I really thought the structure was on fire. Come to find out it wasn't. I never did see
it crash. It happened to fast.
Q7: Do you live west of the accident site?

124

A: Yes I do. There was a tower right here. The plane hit
roughly right here. There's a trailer right here. I'm right
over here. I think this one, in fact this one was sitting there
plus it looked like he came pretty much nose in Probably what
saved me.

125

TESTIMONY OF SGT GANSEL

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 82-0801
this testimony was taken at Holloman AFB, New Mexico on the 14th
of September 1992 at 1855L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
Ql: Where were you on the 4th of August?
A: I was at the movies at the mall. I got out roughly at 9:30.
I really don't know what time it was. A couple of my friends and
I were standing outside in the parking lot deciding where we were
going to go after the movies. That night I did see a 117. I
seen it from the city lights basically. It was sort of dark out.
I seen it doing left aileron rolls. It was rolling to the left
wing over wing. They weren't harsh rolls, they were sort of slow
and easy going. I knew it was going left because the NAV lights
were green over red. I was looking at the bottom of the airplane
most of the time when it was rolling. He was only about 2,000
feet off the ground. I figured he was in the outside downwind.
I didn't know that he had a problem. I figured he was just going
up and coming in for a straight in. He did about three rolls to
the left. I did see a flash out of the airplane. This was just
northwest of the mall or north of the mall I should say. I
didn't put two and two together until after I thought about it a
little bit cause I know the 117 doesn't have an afterburner.
Basically I saw him punch. The aircraft was north bound. He was
on a nice edge from one of his rolls when I saw him flash. Which
I later put together was the ejection. From there the aircraft
appeared to be upside down and slowly started, from my position
looked like it was flying toward Tulie Peak, went in nose first.
After the aircraft went in, I turned around and told my friends
that aircraft is in trouble. Everybody turned around just as in
time to see the thing go into the ground and big flash, JP-4 and
everything burning out there We immediately ran to my truck and
high tailed it out there. I said that was the pilot that ejected. I had a general idea were he was at. We drove out there at
a high rate of speed. I turned left on this road that basically
dead ended at a rail road track. We started shouting for the
pilot cause we could see the chute. We didn't go to the actual
crash site cause my main concern was the pilot to see if he was
alright. Didn't find anything. On our way back we saw a cop car
with part of the ejection seat. Then it was my understanding
that the pilot was two doors down and had already called in. But
as far as the crash was concerned, he spun about three times.
Last time he stayed upside down. I saw the ejection about a
126

He was about 2,000

quarter of the way through his last spin.
feet off the ground. The only reason I know so much about the
air traffic control system is cause I was just withdrawn from air
traffic, so I had an idea what was going on.
Q2:

After the ejection, did the airplane continue to roll?

A: It continued to roll for about another 1/4 of a turn I guess

until it was completely upside down. It seemed like right before
the crash everything got bigger and you could see it. I couldn't
even tell you exactly were the NAV was, which side, what color
was on which side. I knew it was going down. From what I can
recollect, it was spinning to the left and he ejected like about
right here. I saw a little bit of the flash. It continued
upside down, then, it seemed to stabilize after he ejected. Then
it just nosed in and nose first.
Q3:

How close was it to the mall

area?

A: He was right over the mall, but he was probably a mile OE SO

away from me. He was close, you could see the plane, but he
wasn't over the mall, he was to the west of the mall.
Q4: Did you happen to notice any red glowing areas on the
airplane prior to ejection?
A: No. The only thing that was red that I remember seeing was
the rotating beacon and the NAV light.
Q5: Did you see the beginning of the roll
when you initially saw it?

as he rolling

A: He was already into a roll when I first saw him. Cause I saw
the dish side, the bottom side. I thought he was turning, but
he kept on doing the barrel aileron roll or whatever you what to
call it.
Q6: The only flash you saw was as you guessed later, was from
the ejection seat? You didn't see the canopy come off but you
saw what you decided later to be the ejection seat?
A: At that distance, the only thing I could see was the NAV
lights. I didn't see the canopy. I just saw the flash out of
the cockpit. I didn't know what it was at first until I started
to see the airplane go upside down. It was going in. It was
just a matter of less than a minute.
Q7:

How fast did he seem to be going?

127

A: I'd saw about 150 knots. He didn't seem to be going any

faster than a straight in approach. I straight in approach
seemed to be faster than what he was doing.
Q8: And you base this off of what you see everyday when you were
an ATM
A: Right. Well I didn't really work them that much when I was
in ATC, but what I see cause I pick up drag chutes everyday.
Basically from the angle from when they're coming in. He wasn't
going that fast.

128

TESTIMONY OF AGENT ELDRIDGE

Investigation of an F-117 aircraft accident to aircraft 62-0601
this testimony was taken at the Narcotics Division of Alamogordo,
New Mexico on the 16th of September 1992 at 0935L.
The witness was sworn and testified as follows:
QI: Where were you on the 4th of August?
A: I was at North Florida and the North Scenic extension just a
little ways east of the intersection of the streets. I just saw,
I couldn't see what it was because it was tremendously dark. I
just saw something streaking across the sky. It wasn't really a
fire but more like sparks coming out of a fire. I didn't know
what it was. A couple of seconds later I saw this horrendous
fireball. I picked up the mic to my police radio and called our
dispatcher and told them that we had something blow up. It
looked like it was on the La Luz base road. I told them that we
probably needed a fire truck. I headed that direction.
Q2: You didn't see any lights of an airplane or anything, you
just focused in on the sparking?
A: Right, I think the airplane was flying faster then where I
was seeing the sparks. The airplane was ahead of the sparks. I
never did see the airplane. I just called our dispatcher and
told her I was in route.
Q3:

You went out to the crash

A: It took me probably three to five minutes to get there. I

was running pretty fast and behind one of our marked units with
Deputy Ledbetter. I got there just seconds after him. When I
arrived, I still couldn't tell what it was. I knew the trailer
belonged to Don Scott. It was Scott's property whatever happened
was on. I got out of the car, I advised Deputy Ledbetter that I
was the senior agent. In fact I was the on scene commander at
the time of the fire. I was the most experienced officer on the
scene. People that lived in the area were already On the scene.
Some of them were walking around in the debris of the aircraft.
As soon as I got to were I could tell were it was, the only
reason I could tell what it was, was cause of the V-tail. I knew
right then it was an airplane. I went to tell Deputy Ledbetter
let's get these people out of here, we don't know what's on that
airplane. We need to get these people out of here before
somebody gets hurt real bad. We went real close to the smoke
129

from the airplane trying to get these people out. Could not get
them to leave. Finally got to just screaming at them telling
them we were going to arrest them if they didn't leave. There
was one or two pretty loud explosion. No fire came out of them
just loud explosions. That was another reason I wanted to get
those people out of there cause I didn't know what kind of bombs
were on the plane. We finally got the people backing up. The
volunteer fire department started arriving. I advised one of the
chiefs to send a truck up to start fighting the fire in the
trailer, and to keep all the rest of them back. That didn't
work. As all the other trucks started arriving from other fire
departments we had them park within 40 to 50 feet of the aircraft. Finally we just had to start giving them orders to get
back too. At that time Assistant Chief Perry, from the Holloman
fire department, arrived a short time after that. I turned the
scene over to him and I left.
44: You never saw the pilot them?
A: No sir, I didn't.

130

TAB W
TITLE

TAB

AWSLINE Report (AWS Forms)

W-1

HAFB Form 0-28

W-2

Radar Weather Observation (AWS Form 104)

W-3

Surface Weather Observation (MF 1-10)

W-4

Satellite Picture

W-5

Mission Route of Flight

W-6

Weather Slides Used for Mass Brief

W-7

Notams

W-13

AWSLJ

HE REPORT

RE PORTUIO UNIT INFORMATION

I.

RANK/NAME

2,

081 T4LOCATI ON

3.

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4,

DA E/TIME OF RECEIPT

S.

AU TOVO

NO

DATE/TIMEF OCCURRENCE

CAT

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A,

TYPE OF REPORT:
REPORT N UM BER

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SUSPENSE -

IS. Minot Reviews/Second Thoughts/And Remora

HAFB Form 0 20 (Roreno) FEB 92

. \

13. Commander Review

Notre

Hours Verified
inter Group Use&
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TAB X

TITLE

TAB

Medical Advisor Report

X-1

Toxicology Report

X-2

Copy of 1446 (Short Physical)

X-4

Copy of SF 98 (Long Fly Physical)

X-5

Copy of SF 88 (Long Fly Physical s/p mishap) X-7

Copy of EKG

X-9

TAB X
SUBJECT: Medical Advisor Report for AIR 110-14 Accident
Investigation Board
1. Capt John Mills was flying 117A SN 82-0801, 2117L, on
departure on 4 August when the airplane went out of control and
he ejected without incident.
2. Capt Mills was seen 20 Feb 92 for a short Flying Class
II physical and 10 Jan 91 for a long Flying Class II physical.
Blood pressures, hearing and corrected vision (he has an
indefinite waiver for excessive refractory error granted 17 Nov
86 HQ ATC/SG) were within normal limits. On physical exams on 6
Aug 92 (2 days post mishap) and 10 Jan 91, he was found to have
uncorrected 20/20 vision (near and far) and he is not required to
wear glasses during normal flying duties. All lab parameters
were reviewed on the long physical and no abnormalities were
noted. No recurrent or chronic medical problems were identified
on review of the medical record.
3. The toxicology report was negative on blood and urine
studies for any illegal or unauthorized drugs or alcohol (See
Attachment 1).
4. Physical exam done at 2230 at Holloman AFB hospital the
evening of the accident was unremarkable other than a small chin
laceration which was sutured in the emergency room. X-rays of
the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine were negative.
5. Capt Mills was medically qualified at the time of this
flight and no contributory medical or physical problems were
present.

KEVIN WEST, Lt Col, USAF

49 Med Group, Flight Surgeon

X-1

D"ARTM ENT OF DEFENSE

/kb\ EC FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON. VC 2030E-4000

PATIENT IDENTIFICATION

PLEASE USE SF* ACCt SSIOS

I HUMUS*

IN A:1 COW' SP

AFH AcCESSIONNHWEE;

2374003

00

S JOHN B.

AIRCRAFT AC"DEN

ATAL

DATE 12 AUG 92

Commander
833rd Air Division Hospital
ATIN: SGHL
&Homan APB. NM 88330-5300

_J

CONSULTATION REPORT ON CONT9IEU7 MATERiAL

AFIPOIAGNOsis:

REPORT OF TOXICOLOGICAL EXAMINATION

SPECIMENS RECEIVED: -Blood. urine and serum.

CONDITION OF SPECIMENS: Good.
DATE RECEIVED: 10 AUG 92
DATE OF INCIDENT: 04 AUG 92
CARBON MONOXIDE:
than 1% as determined by
The carboxyhemoglobin saturation In the blood was less
hemoglobin saturations of
Carboxy
1%.
of
atiou
quantit
of
spectrophotometry with a limit
ions above 10% are
Saturat
.
smokers
for
3-10%
and
kers
non-smo
for
d
expecte
are
0-3%
.
ography
chromat
gas
considered elevated and are confirmed by
ETHANOL:
The blond and urine were examined for the
none was found.

of ethanol at a cutoff of 10 mg/dL.

DRUGS:
a, amphetamine, antidepressants, antihistamines,
The urine was screened for acetamir .nolds,
chloroquine, cocaine, dextromethorphan,
barbiturates, benzodiazepines. Cr - ates. phencyc
phenothiazines, phenytoin,
lAdocalue. narcotics analgesics .... and verapamilidine,
chromatography, color test or
gas
by
l
salicylates, sympathomimettc
immunoassay. None of these drugs were found.

BARRY LEWNE PhD. DABFT

Chief, Forensic Toxicology Laboratory
Division of POEBOSiO Toxicology

AF915 Mat: C '

rtv
873

SECTION B CHAIN OF CUSTODY

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(TH/S FORM 18 uH1i_

EXAMINATION-FLYING PERSOrm) .
/0 THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974-USE BLANKE
DV F onn

INSTRUc11ONS
Items 112. Self explanates.
Item 49, Weght-We%h e xamine in rn,mom clothing and record
Rent 13. Flight Duty Performs-Enter rating and woo o(axcrsft, tot
rest pound or half ota kilogram.
example, Pliot/RC435,Radar NagigatorfiliS2.
Item 20 VIsual AcultyReco,d best uncorrected distant and near
Item 14. ASC-Enter current aviation mune code from AIM 300-4,
vision and best corrected distant and near Visi On,
Vol I.
Item 21 Auditory Acuity-Record pure bane threshold for each year
Item IS. Total Flying Hours-Enter total flying hours since entry into
at frequencies SOO. 1000, 2000, 30410. 40002 and 6000 Hz.
iodation service.
Item 22. Type of Instrument Used-Record type of instrument used
Item 16. Total Flying Hours Last Six Months-Enter total Flight hours
and its calibration standard.
during the last six months prior to this examination.
Item 23. History and Remarks-Enter Munificent history since last
Item It Self-explanatory.
complete medical examination and any other remarks the
Hem 18. Height-Record height to the nearest half inch or the nearest
examining Flight Surgeon feels are pertinent.
centimeter, with examinee in stocking feet.
Item 24 and 25. Self-explanatory.
I. PAPAS (Last Firn Mien& MIMI/
2. 5fl AOg
S. SSAN
11, ono IDay, ma, yr)
S. Ace

FAILS, JOHN B.

S. SEX

IRAtE

Mal e

CAFr

(Do not a

Caucasian

12 Feb 63

PAP

It. OATS Or EXAMINA11ONY. mo 5''J

35BPS

TAC

FACIL ITY

It, NAME AND UAfl OF AA I

20 Feb 92

354Op/SC?

29579-5300
!t,TOTAL FLYING HOUfl S
TSMONTWS

TO TAL

Pilot

l.A

BL000

$7.

LAS

1500

IL WEIGHT

P RESSURE

WflTOLIC

29
. M AJCDM

AGENCY

DIASTOLE

82

69

180

VISUAL ACUITY

20.

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LEFT

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DISTANT

YE
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CORR TO 2041 ''.

20/20

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CORR TO 20/ ..-.

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2000

69

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3000

4000

10

10

25

5000

0000

15
I

HIST ORYA ND REMARKS

Examinee denies, and review of med ical records fails to reveal any other
significant medical or surgical history since last exam - 10 Jan 91.

24, TYPS OR PRINT NAME OF MEDICAL

SIGNA TURE

1ARY R. KO, CART, USAF, MC, FS

A

446

(Me In Outpatient Retard)

VW SY

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100
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REPORT OF EDICAL EXAMINATION

CAPT
7.11`c,

Annus.
ASYSY

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1200 hrs
Cu

23 Vaisaiva normal bilaterally.

4 Small asympthmat.lc left hydr

Circumcised,
Knee without any

29

28

21

26

2.

23

21

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TAB Y

TITLE
Lt Col Holmes Appointment Letter
Lt Col West Appointment Letter
Capt Sembower Appointment Letter
SMSgt Evans Appointment Letter

Y-4

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

P.M.ACCOARTERS rwurrm MR FORCE IFCCI
BERGSTROM FIR FUCA FOSE. TEXAS

FROM: 12 AF/CS
Bergstrom AFB TX 78743-5002

24 AUG 1992

SUBJ: Investigation of Aircraft Accident, F-117A, 5N82-0801,

4 Aug 92, 49 FW (416 FS), Holleman AFB NM
TO: Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Holmes, Jr
12th Air Force
Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas 78743-5002
1. You are appointed, under APR 110-14, to investigate and
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding subject
aircraft accident.
2. You are authorized to interview personnel, take statements
or testimony, and examine records, files, and correspondence
relative to the accident which are within the control of the
Air Force, after they are released by the Safety Investigation
Board, as provided by AIR 110-14, paragraphs 2, 3, and 8, and
AIR 127-4, paragraphs 1-9a and 1-9c.
3. Your report will contain the originals or certified copies,
when specified by AFR 110-14, of all documents relevant to the
accident, including pertinent historical maintenance records of
the aircraft involved in the accident. Photographic or machine
reproductions may be used only if originals are not available.
In such a case, the reasons why the originals are not available
will be explained in your report. Your report will contain a
Summary of Facts, as described in Attachment 2, AFR 110-14, but
conclusions, or recommendations.
will not include opinions,
Prepare your report in an original and 10 copies, following AIR
110-14, Attachments 1 and 4, and using APR 120-3 as a general
guide. Do not furnish a copy to any other person or agency and
do not debrief the host commander without permission of this
headquarters
4. The 12 AF/JA will provide you with an initial briefing
before you leave for Holleman Air Force Base. Please report to
the 49 FW/JA upon your arrival at Holloman Air Force Base. The
49 FW/JA will provide stenographic assistance and such other
administrative support as you may need. Additional support, if
may be obtained from HQ 12 AF/JA Project Officer,
required,
Major Hinesley, DSN 685-2865.
FOR THE COMMANDER

cz?

cc: 12 AF/DO/SE/AOSP
49 FW/CC/JA
416 FS/CC

EBEN D. JOS
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff
-9-30t4FE I

fox Sitnitica.

11103 RN

FPO< NO: 369-45 ?, trt)

WP-03- ' 92 MU 16!

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

NS ACCIIARTERE IVEk Fl 14 pal FENIX 00C1

covarnow

JlI

rorce cum- mud

FROM: 12 AZ/CS
Bergstrom AYH TX 78743-5002

ra

12

SUBS: Investigation of Aircraft Accident:

4 Aug 92, 49 PW (416 FS), Holleman APB

2-0801,

TO: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin West

49 Ned ep
Holleman AFB NM 88330-5000
1. Under the provisions of Aft 110-14, paragraph 8a, you are
appointee to assist Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Holmes during
his investigation of subject aircraft accident.
2. You will review all pertinent medical records pertaining to
the iterate of subject aircraft. Your review will include a
determination an to Whether any medical factors effected
perfermance of the crew, relevant abnormal laboratory test
results, and any Other relevant medical records as appropriate.
You Will furnish Colonel Holmes with a written report detailing
any irregularities or deficiencies you find. if none, you
should so state. Your report should not include opinions,
Conclusions, or recommendations. You may also be required to
assist- Colonel Holmes in taking the testimony of, or
propounding questions to, witnesses during the course of the
investigation.
3. You will submit your written report to Colonel Holmes
within five duty days unless an extension is granted by him.
Include in your report factual comments on any matters that may
hove bearing on the accident or are of sufficient importance as
to require examinatioe. Originals of all revords reviewed, and
10 copies, will be submitted to Colonel Holmes with your
report. It engine's are not available, submit copies of the
records end explain why the originals are not included in your
report. Do not debrief anyone without permission of this
headquarters.
FOR THE ccam4ANDER

12 AZ/DO/SE
49 PW/CC/JA
416 113/CC
49 Ned Gp/Cc

HA% NU:Sb9-4SAII\

Ste-US-*4 IHJ lbfW'

11114.1 edd

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

NIALVIJISTIMI ?Ma FM & iCarg Or-CI
low nced lei FaMI tia66. %US

FRON: 12 fl/CS
Bergstrom AFT TX

78743

6002

SUMO: Investigation of Aircraft Accident: F-117A, 01102-0901,

4 Aug 92, 49 FW (416 FS), Rollonan APB NH
TO: Captain Greg Sunburst
515 FS
Bolloman Air Force Base,

0-5000

1. Under the previsions of AIR 110-14, paragraph Sdr

You are
el71744nted t61 A2918t Lieutenant Colonel Prank 4, nolmme during
his investigation of subject aircraft accident_
You will ascertain a complete history of the aircrew'
currency and aircraft qualifications, and should, at a minimum,
examine the sirnrew's training evaluation r000rde and the
individual training and flight reoorde. You will furnish
Colonel Holmes with a written report detailing any irregularities or defiCienciee you find. If none, you should so state.
four report chould not include opinions, conclusions, or recommervintions. You should also prepare a complete narrati
history of the flight summarizing UM events from briefing ve
tn
accident, You may also be required to assist Colonel Boleee in
taking the testimony of, or propounding questions to, witnesses
during the conree of the investigation.
3_ You will r.uhmit your written report tO Delete:1 Dolmen
gitnie Aiwa Sully Sam uni... -a
10 yranteo 07 cum.
InnInde in your report factual comnonto on any nutters that may
have bearing on the accident or are of sufficient importance an
to require examination, Originals of all records reviewed, and
10 copies, will be submitted to Colonel Balms with your
report. It originale are not available, submit copies of the
records and explain why the originals are not included in your
report. Do not debrief anyone without permission of this
headquarters.

co: 12 AF/00/68
49 7W/CC/JA
41b

ru/cc

425 FS/CC

grad g pourn fin cittsctica

Y-3

FAX NO.36 454a)

11l03 Pe3

DEPARTMENT OF THE MR FORCE

icr9VotITItiv nnial fal FORCE rACCI
ne MA ROAR WM,

MOM: 12 AY/CS

Bergstrom APE Tx 70743-5002

3 ED Me

SUBJ: Investigation of Aircraft Accident: P-117A, SH62-0601,

4 Aug 92, 49 aw (410 F$), Belloman APB UM
TO; senior Master Sergeant Richard F. Evans
41 PO
Hellman APB NM 86320-5000
1. Under the provisions mf Ant 110.14, pakkoraph ad, you are
appointed to eosin Liontonnnt Colonel Prank A. Dolece ;luring
his inyeotigstion of subject airoraft accident.
2. You will review the life aupport oystem and maintenance
records of subject aircraft covering the 60-day period
ismadiately preceding the accident. You will furnish colonel
Holmes with a written report detailing any irregularities or
deficiencies you find. IC none, you should so state. Your
report should not include opinions, conclusions, or recommendations. You may also ha required to assiet colonel Holmoo in
taking the testimony or, or propounding questiono to, witnesses
during the course of the investigation.
1. You will submit your written report to Colonel Holmes
within five duty days unless an ertension Is granted by him.
Include in your report factual Ogniaiite On any matters trier may
have bearing on cue accident or are of sufficient importance as
tn require comminatino, Originals of 1411 roctorde Penni/a end
10 Copies, will be submitted to Colonel Holmes with your
report. If origlnnlo arc net available, submil c gkaga of the
records and exploln why the originals are not included in your
report- Do not debrief anycme without permission of this
headquarters.
FOR RITE ODRHAIIDER

re: 12 AS/14/611
49 loW/CC/JA
416 PS/CC
415 PS/CC

TAB Z
TITLE

TAB

Bleed Air Duct with Misplaced Clamp

Z-1

Dash-60 End of Bleed Air Line

Z-2

Aircraft Side of Dash-60 Bleed Air Line

Z-3

Inside Surfaces of V Clamp

Z-4

Impact Marks on Clamp

Z-5

Staged Photo Correct Position of Clamp *

Z-6

Staged Photo--Incorrect Position of Clamp *

Z-7

* Photos taken from above (Panel 109)

Maintenance used right AMAD panel to gain access to this area
(photos taken from AMAD panel were not good enough to publish)

TAB AA
TITLE

TAB

416 FS Mass Briefing Slides

AA-1

Capt Kohntopp's Briefing Guide

AA-16

r:3!4

/
diar 1.

1/A (4p4flfl

REMARKS

416F8 HOSTRIDERS

2130

LAND MD TOT
.

MISSION LINE-UP (CONT)

110

1V WW 14t

USN* CALLSION PILOT

r

MIAS

1,110

Meact

'3

.4.
IN

(100

REMARKS

04.,;97:131PERS

'

'

,..

T/O . LAND MD TOT

SSIONILINE-UP
PILOT

4-

t
GJ
1
416F8 GHOSTRIDERS
PILOT INFORMATION
CURRENT:
SUBJECT:
CURRENTSUBJECT* SRF

CURRENT:
SUBJECT:

SPINS

ACC:
. 1 2AF:
49FW

922?
Mime

AcrAte r tu

416F

416F8 GHOSTRIDER
DECONFLICTION PLAN
0

40
ROUTE:

owe 04 litt V
/y 000
TOT:
MelarrtiMA-

416FS(2nd GO)
nee test
ROUTE:
CAS a A41 it 00
/ Woo
TOT-

. wriardatte

/Seco

Atom

TOT:

TOT

ALT:

ALT:

416F8 GHOSTRIDERS
SPATIAL DISORIENTATION

TRAIL DEPARTURES AND REJOIN

N/01-IT AERIAL REFUELING
TRANSITION FROM VWIC TO
TFIANSMONS FROM WELL LIT AREAS TO DA
TifFtli POWS WITH LARGE HEADING/ALTITUDE CHANGES
L c WON INCREASED PILOT WORKLOAD, OR WEATHER
ALITOPLOT FAILURES
PREVENTION
COOSSCHECK INSTRUMENTS FREQUENTLY
S. REDUCE COCKPIT LIGHTING
!TAY AHEAD OF AIRCRAFT, DECREASE WORKLOAD
S. suc*rcs3E LOSING S1TUATKR4 AINMENESS
RECOVER
100 AND GET ON THE GAUGES
do ye FARE INSTRUMEWIS, USE THE AUTOPILOT IF PEE
EJECT IF NECESSARY
"

41659 GHOSTRIDERS
CHANNELIZED ATTENTION

WHEN CAN IT OCCUR?

FORMATION
TANKER REJOIN
** TARGET AREA - SWITCHES / SD
EMERGENCIES / SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
WHAT CAN YOU DO ABOUT IT?

KEEP 'YOUR CROSSCHECK' 'GOING

KNOW IT CAN HAPPEN. TO YOU

**I

USE YOUR AUTOPILOT - BUT CHECK FLIGHT

OFTEN
"KNOCK-IT-OFF" IF THINGS GET TO INTENSE

M011

-J

CL

416F8 GHOSTRIDER
TRAINING RULES

WEATHER
VISIBILITY - 3NM DAY / 6NM NIGHT
CEILING - 600 ABOVE HIGHEST ALTITUDE USED
- NO LOWER THAN 2000'AGL DAY / 2600'AGL NIGHT
ALTITUDES - MINIMUtyi OF 1000 FT BETWEEN C;ONVERG NG AIRCRAFT

SA LOST
RADIO FAILURE
WING ROCKS,
NO TARGET ID

AT TACKa
CAMERA- NONE
NONE WITH HUNG ORDNANCE
NONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER HOT PASS / LASER UPDATE'
MASTER ARMSFE;LASER:OFF;IRADS:IR/IR;FUSING:SAFE
NO PICKLE ALLOWED IF CARRYING EXPENDABLE ORDNANCE
BOMBS - LR OR TA PRIOR TO RELEASE
- OPERATIONAL DLIR
LASE ONLY AUTHORIZED TARGETS
SWITCHES SELECTED WINGS LEVEL
IGHT
NIGHT

TERMINATE CRITERIA
- UNBRIEFED/UNSCHEDULED FLIGHT
- INABILITY TO COMPLY W/FORMATION RESP'S
WEATHER BELOW MINIMUMS
- DANGEROUS SITUATION DEVELOPING

416F8 GHOSTRIDERS
EP OF THE DAY

A JOKE,

TO TELL OPE-

JOKE OF THE DAY (OR A QUOTE)

TP13 PER

cz

1.1

416F8 GHOSTRIDERS
OBJECTIVES / GOALS

tool.tolits
Pateria Ao

pf

Soya/ P k su.,t5 MASS- Atirtag

IMO

0:0) (0,670410
416F8 GHOSTR1DERS
PREFLIGHT / GROUND OPS

FLASHLIGHT / DISCO BELT / CLEAR VISOR

CHECKLIST
CHECKIN
TAXI
TAKEOFF RUNWAY

40,

416F8 GHOSTRIDE
FUELS/ALTITUDES
PLANNED IA0 FUEL
CONTINUATION FUEL

AT POINT

1-1- AT POINT

BINGO FUEL

AT POINT

TANKER ABORT FUEL

DIVERT FUEL

AT POINT

2nd 00

DIVERT FUEL

as- 1
let GO

TERRAIN I CLEARANCE ALTITUDE

TAKEOFF FUEL:

CANNON

NOTAMS
K RTLAND`

A1A-

EL PASO

416F8 GHOSTRIDERS
HOLLOMAN

ROSWELL

DIVERT FIELDS

1111311118OPT

416F8 GHOSTRIDERS
CONTINGEN9IES
WRONG FUEL LOAD
*- SPARE AIRCRAFT / LATE. TAKEOFF

t-c

DEPARTURE OPTIONS ( VFR, 441133, ETC )

NO TANKER
FUEL LESS THAN EXPECTED ON ROUTE
!C1NG / WEATHER ALONG ROUTE
* RANGE CLOSED / NO CLEARANCE ON / MARSA
ALTERNATE TOT / TOT SLIP
MULTIPLE PASSES

* ALTERNATE MISSION

HUNG BOMB
1111014

416F8 GHOSTRIDE
NOTES

N6AT-1
INSTRUCTOR GUIDE
NOTE: This is a long briefing, so plan appropriately.
Preparation:
1. Review gradebook: initial last gradesheet, check for
unaecomplished tasks, ensure appropriate phase briefings done.
2. Review range availability and deconflict student's route.
- 3. Prepare form 70, and annotate bingo and continuation
4. File OD-175; provide route map, photo pack, and EPTM to
student.
Obiectives:
1. No switch errors,
2. Find at least 50% of all assigned DMPIs.
3. Begin working on tinin g.
Overview:
least 2 dirt and 2 cultural
1. On-range route
s if range restrictions permit'
targets (hot drops on d
se and fly elapsed times fron
2. Hack clock at brak
form 70
J. Perform a sensor updar
and non4. Pattern work:
precision approaches
tens:
pref 1
A ny questions
-8 minute retri
-Check status page, SMD
-Perform NUT on IRADS io
2. Any questions on taxi out, arming area, takeoff?
3. Form 70 review:
-Altitudes on each leg
-Airspeed on each leg -bank angles-fuels (include bingo and continuation fuel)
s-sensor update point ----ak.
-timing and winds -nearest diverts for each turnpoint
-stealth/destealth checks - vc 2-3mLfy'
4. Timing techniques: there is an article in the MOT Self
Study Book on this, but you should share some of your own
techniques with the student.
5. Sensor Update
-techniques:
--select level to reduce slant range to update
point
--use laser ranging or track ranging
--wait until you are directly Gver the update

Cnd'ic'

1.
7.
7.
4.

Iff)

Aircraft preflight,
aL ground operat.o.
If And departure.
' de tactical

vigat

pa
Weapons delivery swit
cholcgy.
Normal weapons delive
ry.
Use of offset(s).
No-MPI precision and
non-precincn approach
Landing.
e

Fdate, to minimize slant range

g, and the INS will track change,
accepting the sensor update for the next point.
-where to do one?
--on point with known good coords
--point should be within a couple of turn points
of the target (we often use the 74 nuc circle as an IP
for this reason)
-when to do one?
--after long flight over water
--when INS is degraded
--some pilots don't enter sensor updates when
small
5. Photo review: assist the student in formulating a game
plan for each DMPI. Tell him what sorts of things you look for
and how you use these to get in to the target area. Bear in mind
on subsequent rides he will be given less and less help until he
can develop his own plan with no help from the IP.
6. IRADS tuning: there is an article on this in the MOT Self
Study Book, but you should discuss this with the student tonight.
Your discussion should include:
_f
/04 SCfle,

-use of ALC
-initial gain settings for cultural and dirt targets
-reduction of gain as you approach the target
-level usually must increase as gain is decreased and
vice versa (too prevent the SD display from becoming
toc dark or too bright)
7. Switchology review
-camera attacks
-hot passes on range
B. Recovery
-quick transition from range work to the instrument
patterti, so be ready
-destealth, descent check
-no MDI precision approach
-no MDI non-precision approach
-Sim single engine
-full stop with everything on (no partial panel)
9. Any questions on landing/taxi tack?
la. The student should be prepared to brief you or, the
items:
-Weapons preflight (all GBU-tvce weapons)
-Weapons parameters (bomb trail, min altitu
considerations)
-Fuel considerations
-Weather onsiderations

TAB AS
TAB

TITLE

Mishap Wreckage Release from spa

HAL for F-117A (51182-0801) access
Inventory

of

Documents from SIB

AB-2
AB-3

SIB Witness List

AB-5

SOF Activity Report

AB-7

Radar Plot Data (WSMR Radar)

AB-10

416 FS S.E.P.T. Accomplishment Log

AB-29

416 FS Daily Recap Sheet for standup

AB-30

Capt Kohntopp's Mission Lead Checkout Checklist

AB-32

Disaster Preparedness (49 CES/CEAD) Crash Response Log

AB-33

49 FW/CP Events Log -- 5 Aug 92

AB-35

49 FW CES/CEF Events Log -- 4 Aug 92

AB-40

Survival Gear Inspections and Training Dates

AB-42

T.O. 1F-117A-1 APU and ECS Systems

AB-46

T.O. 1F-117A-1, Chap 3, Page 3-36 ECS Emergencies

AB-49

Bleed Air System Diagrams (T.M. 1F-117A-2-21G8)

AB-50

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORLE

CACOU A PITCH II dlIPIN FIGHTER WPC ACC I
NOLLOM APi AIR FORCF BASE. POW !MEXICO

FROM: 49 FW/SIB

1 Sep 92

SUBJECT: Mishap Wreckage Release

TO Lt Col Holmes
Wreckage of aircraft 82-0801 stored and secured in hanger 868 is
released to Lt Col Frank Holmes, President, AFR 110-14 Accident
Investigation Board.

Colonel, USAF
Board
stigation
nv
Safety
President,
1st Ind, Lt Col Holmes
TO: Col Goslin
Acknowledge receipt of wreckage release.

0,a

FRANK A. HO
President, AFINllO 14 Boa rd

FROM: AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Board

SUBJECT:

9 Sep 92

EAL to Accept Security Responsibility for F-117A

Storage

TO: 49 SPS/SPOS
These personnel are authorized to secure and accept
1.
responsibility for F-117A aircraft in building 868 Bay 1.
RANK NAME
lt Col Holmes, Frank A. Jr.
Lt Co]. West, Kevin B.
Sembower, Greg L.
Capt
SMSgt Evans, Richard F.

SSAN

111.11I'

DUTY TITLE
RASA
Investigating Officer
Med Advisor
G15810
Ops Advisor
J086251
Meant Advisor
J020590

2. These personnel are authorized to secure and accept security

responsibility for building 868 Bay 1. These personnel will
provide escort for all other personnel that enter Hanger 868,
Bay 1.
SAME AS LISTED ABOVE.
3. After duty hours contact for the following building 868, Bay
1, is Lt Col Holmes, Home Phone 479-6131 extension 5107.
4. This letter ie effective on 9 September 1992. It will be
superseded by another letter when personnel listed no longer
require access or be rescinded 45 days from the effective date.
5. If you have any questions, please contact Lt Col Holmes at
extension 5840.

USAF
cer

INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS
TURNED OVER TO AFR 110-14 BOARD, F-117A, AIRCRAFT MISHAP 82-0801
Results of A/C 801 flight control system recorder download
Part 1 safety investigation formal report
Copy of photo proof sheets (39 pages)
Crash net recording
Transcript and 5 1/4" floppy disk - tower, rapcon, SOF, and
cassette tape
6. Weather package
7. Mission preparation and planning documents:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

flight plan DD Form 175 from ATC

Notams (6 pages)
flight plan DD Form 175 (carbon copy)
nighthawk mission request
mission lead checklist
AFORMS TAC Form 326 (4 pages)
416 FS supt accomplishment log (2 pages)
F-117A critical action procedures
FCIF card TAC Form 109
416 TFS career times and AFORMS printout (9 pages)
airspace schedule (4 pages)
416 TES aircraft statue log (11 pages)
daily recap sheet for standup (3 pages)
copy of mass brief slides (15 pages)
photo pack and map of night mission (22 pages)
example form 70 (8 pages)
8. Pilot's flight records
9. Life support records
10. Radar plot from WSMR
11. Pilot's FEE
12. Pilot's gradebook
13. TAC Form 93 (15 Jul and 16 Jul A/C 801)
14. Fuel sample results (4 pages)
15. STEMS printout
16. Oxygen sample results
17. W&B handbook #801
18. 344169 oil analysis records DD Form 2027 (4 pages)
19. 344148 oil analysis records DD Form 2027 (5 pages)
20. Survival kit record AFTO Form 338
21. Parachute repack inspection and component record AFTO Form
392
22. Documented maintenance computer printout (2 pages)
23. 7th AMU manning (18 pages)
24. 8th AMU manning (18 pages)
25. 49th Logistics Group manning study Aug 92 (6 pages)
26. 9th AMU manning (18 pages)
27. 82-0801 AMU CAD/PAD and inspection documents (6 pages)
28. pulled aircraft forms
29. aerospace vehicle flight report and maintenance document
82-0801

30. CAMS #38 documented maintenance

31. 0801 old forms (15 pages)
32. Maintenance history report (9 pages)
33. Planning requirements inspection and time change forecast
(5 pages)
34. ROC history for 41 (15 pages)
35. 416 phase record
36. maintenance evaluation/inspection TAO Form 30 (4 pages)
37. Equipment review report (150 pages)
38. Serial number detail listing (4 pages)
39. Automated records check (5 pages)
40. 82-0801 eccordian file with aircraft records
41. F-117A air show tasking (16 pages)
42. A0801 #2 phase inspection documents (27 pages)
43. Flight control system recorder data (65 pages)
44. Capt Mills tapt#2 aircraft VTR (Secret)

/44,
5'

Son.477 6, n r

CaPT L.1,4c

ys

PPCie

Re-4

itnesses interviewed by the 1-11721

The following is a list of
ger
Safety Investigation Board ai craft 82-0801t They are no lon
required and are released to the AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Board.
SOF 415 FS
Maj Andy Papp
416 FS
Maj Doug Couture
416 FS/CC
Maj James Phillips
416 FS/DO
Maj Joyce
SOP 415 FS
Capt Mike Seena
Pilot
Capt John B. Mills
416 FS Maintenance Supervisor
Capt Mueller
416 FS
Capt Kohntopp
416 IS
Capt John Masser
Aest Maintenance Super
416
1Lt Clark
FS Maintenance Superintendent
416
CMSgt Mercer
416 FS Production Supervis
MSgt Morse
416 FS Special Flight Chie
MSgt Anderson
416 FS Phase Dock Chief
MSgt Strawderman
416 FS Expediter
TSgt Swallow
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TEgt Ronald Harty
FOR
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FOR
SSgt Baldwin
SSgt Yolanda P. Rank ATC
SSgt Douglas Massingill ATC
ECS/ElectricE
Sgt Sowell
416 FS Asst Crew Chief
Syt Slaughter
416 FS Phase Worker
Sgt Perry
416 FS Asst Dock Chief
Sgt Williams
ECS/Electrics
Sgt Matthews
416 FS Asst Crew Chief
SrA Abarca
ATC
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SrA William
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Ammons
SrA Kimberly
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SrA Grant L. Ulmer
FS
416
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416
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416 FS Phase Worker
Amm Foebro
416 FS Phase Worker
Amm Thayer
William Meyers
Tom Dellacorino
Ted Eldridge
Rita Kyle
Lt James Reilly
Jackie Bookout
Russel/Walter Jergin
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Todd E. Gansel

Wayne Glidden
Ben House
Leon Ledbetter
Al Gorby
Paul Houston
ILL. Massey
Leff Gillen
Robyn M. Trujillo

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ROBERT L. WARREN, Capt, USAF
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NAME

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2135

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TASK / COORDINATION
TARGET PHOTOS WITH WWI'S

MISSION DATE:

"I

AGENCY

TIMING(NLT)

TARGETS

1 DAY PRIOR
8 HRS PRIOR
TO LAST T/O

FPLAN DISK OR HAND WRITTEN COMPUTER

OPERATOR
COPY OF ROUTE, TO INCLUDE
REFINED COORDS FROM TGTS
x5309

1 DAY PRIOR
3 HRS PRIOR
TO LAST T/0

NIGHTHAWK MISSION REQUEST

FAXED TO: MOAC
CON (505) 023-0654
VIA KIRTLAND AFB AV244-0011

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I DAY PRIOR
PRIOR TO
LAST T/O

NIGHTHAWK MISSION REQUEST

FAXED TO MOS
COM (817) 858-7389
VIA CARSWELL AFB AV739-1110

FTW CTR

I DAY PRIOR
PRIOR TO
LAST T/0

HMN WX
OVERALL ROUTE MAP WITH
DIVERT ELLIS AND BRIEF TIME X3924
FAXED TO WX. FAX: X3279.
"CHK NEXT DAY WX".
GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFO:
1. RANGE TIME (BLOCK)
2. CALLSIGN
3. ROUTE (ENTRY PT, ALT,
1 PASS, RTB SPRINGS, ETC.)
CONFIRM RECEIPT OF FAX,
ANSWER Q'S / CONFLICTS
W/MOAC(MIL OPS ACT CTR)
CONFIRM RECEIPT OF FAX,
ANSWER Q'S / CONFLICTS
W/MOS (MIL OPS SPEC)

I DAY PRIOR

CHEROKEE
CLASS A
DIAL
670-0000

DAY OF !ISSN
3 HRS PRIOR
TO let T/0

ABQCTR

DAY OF MSSN
4 HRS PRIOR
TO let T/0

AVBB8 - 1780

FTW CTR
AV885 -1371

DAY OF MSSN
4 HRS PRIOR
TO let T/0

FILE FLIGHT PLAN

FAX x3279
"CONFIRM RECEIPT"

BASE OPS DAY OF MSSN

x 5411
3 MRS PRIOR
TO let T/0

COMPLETE WEAPONS FORM

271's

DAY OF MSSN
let T/O

MP DISK I
"MLCKLST"

F117 CRASH RESPONSE

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS (49 CES/CEAD)

***** 04 AUG 92 (Tuesday) *****

2120
7135
2150
2155
2155
2155

F117 crashed.
CEAD recall.
Capt Connors arrived CEAD.
Capt C & MCP arrived Base Ops.
HSgt Campbell arrived Base Ops.
SSgt Zerfcwski activated DPCC,
DCG forming at Base Opt.
IRT responding to site.
2157 Crash Phone - Flash and explosion north of mall towards Tulerosa.
073 at 8.
One BDU. (Later info - four BDU)
2201 DPCC-Weather - temp 82', winds 110/01.
2207 TSgt Landin arrived at office, went to Base
2216 T5gt L arrived Base Ops.
DPCC-All - watch Comm and OPSEC.
2223 Majority of DCG at Base Ops. Most will go to EU.
SSgt Odden arrived DPCC.
2231 SHSgt Herrera-DPCC - ensure DP had been notified.
-4 2238 MCP and convoy departed Base Ops.
2245 DPCC-CP - get SE, BIO, and SVS reps for DCG.
2250 DPCC-MCP - SE, BIO, and SVS reps are being dispatched to EC?.
2258 Convoy exited La Luz gate.
2259 OSC tasked four light-alls from MS.
2305 DPCC-Weather - 77', winds from 100 at 01.
- 2308 Convoy arrived ECP.
2326 MCP-DPCC-CP - locate JA rep.
MCP-DPCC - JA rep arrived ECP
2335 MSgt C released SSgt 0 (class scheduled next morning)
2347 MCF-DFCC - BIO at ECP.
2352 DPCC shut down. DCC will support MCP.

***** 05 AUG 92 (Wednesday) **" 4

0300 Mgt C left EC?, went to DPCC, picked up radio & portable cellular.
0345 TSgt L left KCP.
0700 DPCC activated.
DFCC-Capt C - office-SSgt O.
0703 MCP-DPCC - contact SSgt Gm, verify DCC is up.
SSgt Cow - DCC run from her desk. DPCC informed Capt C.
0800 MSgt C arrived ECP.

1000 Copt C left for home.

MSgt C and SSgt Z at ECP.
TSgt L on way to office.

SSgt 0 in office.

F1170892.WFF

15 September 1992

1215
1230
1245
1400
1430
1615
1700
2030
2230

TSgt
TSgt
MSgt
SSgt
SSgt
SSgt
Capt
TSgt
SSgt

L departed DFCC for ECF.

L arrived RCP.
C left ECP.
NBC Marking Nits (metal stakes).
Z went to 805 for chairs
Z returned to EC?.
plastic sheeting to cover side of trailer.
2-805 for field tables
C and SSgt Z arrived ECP with tables, plastic, and duct tape.
L and SSgt Z left ECP.
O arrived ECP.
***** 06 AUG 92 (Thursday) *****

1030
0145
0400
0430
0500
0600
0645
0850
0900
0905
0905
0925
0930
0950

MS rep checked fuel levels.

CE Power Pro checks generator.
Mgt C arrived ECP.
SSgt 0 left ECP with SP.
Moved MCP to beside trailer - SP requested.
Maj Correra arrived ECP. Site Commander.
Col Weyermuller called for Maj C
Inflight
Inflight terminated
Survey Team 1 arrived ECP.
Generator powering trailer died.
Inflight
Capt C arrived ECF.
Col W - have hats been delivered? Mai C - no hats.

1300
1315
1145
1400
1400

Capt C, MSgt C, MCP, and U-drive departed ECP.

Capt C turned in U-drive truck to TRANS.
Capt C-Capt Wickliffe - we loaned BPS our portable cellular phone
MCP arrived ECP.
MSgt C departed BC?.

F1170892.WPF

15 September 1992

ge3 - 3

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03*AUG 92
F-117
EGRES
DRILL
L221
COD
920690
NODATE
921231
920630
920890
920690
920930
920690
920229
920731
920831
920630
920891

NAME
ADAIR DAVI
BACHMAN JO
COUTURE DO
DANIELS, J
EILAND, AN
ENGEMAN, M
HILTON MIC
HUNT JAMES
JOYCE PETE
KELLEY MIC
KOHNTOPP,
LA2ARSKI A
LEEK, KEVI
&MEE JOB :win
MERRITT MI 920630
'MILLS JOHN 921130
NEWTON LLO ?IODATE
PHILLIPS J 920490
POPE, MARK 920630
REGAN, JOH 921231
SHOAF, TAO 920830
SILVIA JOH 820930
VEEDER, TI 920531
WRIGHT, RI 920391

/-

HANG
HARES
L522
CDD
920630
NODATE
920430
920630
920630
920630
920930
920830
920229
920731
920831
921231
920831
921130
920630
921130
921031
920430
920830
NODATE
820630
920930
920591
920931

WET
DRILL
LS25
CDD
930331
930131
920830
920731
921231
920791
930331
921231
920631
920731
930131
921291
921031
920791
921231
990531
NODATE
920990
820731
NODATE
921291
930331
920531
930131

CW W F-1I7 LOCAL LIFE

ET DR CWEGR SRVL
SPT
ACM)
ILL
DRILL
L524
L601
LS10
LS18
CDD
CDD
CDD
CDD
990331 NODATE 990228 930228
990131 NODATE NODATE 930630
820930 990830 921130 921190
920791 921231 921130 921130
921231 921.231 820531 920591
920731 921231 921190 921190
930391 990331 930331 930391
921231 NODATE 921231 921231
920831 NODATE 921190 921190
920731 930191 930228 930228
930191 930228 930226 890226
921231 921231 930228 920591
921091 930228 930226 990228
920731 NODATE 921130 921130
921231 921231 930228 921231
930531 MODATE 930591 930531
NODATE NODATE NODATE NODATE
920930 NODATE 921190 921190
920791 921291 990630 930228
NODATE NODATE NODATE NODATE
921231 921291 990228 930228
990991 930391 930331 990391
920591 921130 930228 830228
930131 NODATE 990228 990228

CW
HANG
HARES
LS29
CDD
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
821231
921231
921291
930331
NODATE
NODATE
930131
930228
921231
930228
NODATE
921231
930591
990490
NODATE
921231
NODATE
921231
990331
921130
NODATE

CST
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990228
NODATE
921130
921130
NODATE
921130
930331
NODATE
921190
930228
930228
990228
930228
921190
930220
990531
NODATE
921130
930228
NODATE
930228
930331
990228
930228

CW
EQUIP
FAH
L602
COD
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
NODATE
930630
930690

TO 1F-1 I 7A-1

reading agree,
readings agree va
Check that fug

Advance throttles to maximum power, c

ments and release the brakes. Monitor en
merits for proper indications- (See Append
2, Figure A2-2 for minimum fan rpm for tali
At rotation speed, apply aft stick to attain an 8 W9
pitch attitude for takeoff at computed lift-off sixed
Retract the landing gear when airborne. (Refer to
Appendix A, Part 3, (or takeoff performance information.)

TAKEOFF
g

tract
NOTE

Noticeable increased airflow through the

environmental control system is due menglue bleed air valves opening when thx
landing gear retracts.

uantityand
hawing

I. Net - Check quantityhransfer/distramtion

2. Oxygen system - Check
Cockpit pressurization - Check
3.
4.

Engine insu-umenLs - Check

The standby altimeter (AM./ -34) is designed to trip from ELECT mode to PNEIJ
mode due to large pitot-static errors at
high airspeeds. U the suindby altimeter in
the PNEU mode is used as the altitude reference, altitude correction factors indicated on the charts in Appendix A must be
applied to obtain actual altitude. Mode
switch/aver points, are shown in Figure
A1-3.

Attempted takeoffs at speeds below the

recommended lift-off speed reduces or
' gle-engine flight capabilIn no case should the rotation speed
40 KCAS. (See Section V for
C limits).
Nosewheel steering is used for directionM control
throughout the takeoff run. The aircraft exhibits a
strong weather-cocking tendency into the wind during crosswind takeoffs and NWS is very effective in
maintaining directional control. Al speeds above 70
KCAS. where the fins and elevons begin to be effectiveapply lateral stick into the crosswind to prevent
the g of the upwind wing and overloading the
main gear tire.

, TOT plus

5.

Altimeter - Check

AIR REFUEUNG PROCEDURES

Refer COTO 1-1C-1 for refueling standard terminology and to TO 1-1C-1-3 for coordinated tanker/receiver general air refueling procedures (Mission
Planning, etc) when refueling from KC-135 aircraft
and TO 1-1C-I-33 when refueling from the KC-10
aircraft.
Refer to F-117A-1-6. Air Refueling Procedures with
KC-U.5 and KC-I0A Utility Flight Manual Supplemends) for additional information.

INSTRUMENT FUGHT PROCEDURES

Refer to Adverse Weather Operating Procedures,
Section VII.

2. Anti-ice equipment - AUTO, or as desired

Sass

CIJMB TECHNIQUES
Theoptimum climb speed schedule is 340 KCAS/0.78
Mach at maximum power.

CUMB/CRUISE CHECKS
At frequent intervals, check aircraft systems, engine
instruments. cockpit pressure, and oxygen flow indicator and system operation. Monitor individual fuel
tanks to verify that fuel is transferring properly by rotating the five-position fuel quantity selector and
checking that the sum of the fuselage tanks and SUS

DESCENT/BEFORE LANDING
1.

Armament safety check - Complete

2.

LDG LT/TAXI LT switch - LOG IT

3, Antennas - Emend, as required

4.
TACAN/ILS - Set and monitor
5.

A/R selector switch - CLOSED

6.

Master Arm switch - SAFE

!RADS selector - IR OPER or STBY

7.
K LASER selector - OFF
9.

Altimeter - Set

10. Radar altimeter - Set

2-11

TO 1F-117A-1

COCKPIT PRESSURIZATION SCHEDULE

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COCKPIT ALTITUDE 1000 FT

FIGURE 1-13
engine and the respective isolation solve will illuminate the associated DUCT OVHT light. A leak in
the crossbleed manifold, between the isolation
valves, will trigger both L/R DUCT 0V1-IT lights.
Enginc bleed air to the affected duct should be shut
off by placing the L or R ENGINE BLEED AIR
switch to the OFF position; thiX closes the left or right
bleed air shutoff valve, the left or righc crossbleed
shutoff t-alve, and the left or lig,ht AFU isolation
valve.

supply temperature is governed by a cockpit temperature sensor, regardless of the engine or flight condition. One of the engine bleed au switches must be
In the NORM position, and the ECS mode selector
must be set to NORM to select a cockpit temperature
in either the MAN or AUTO positions.
ENGINE BLEED AIR SWITCHES
71ro two-position (NORM-OFF) engine bleed air
switdies, placarded ENO BLEED AIR L and R, are
located on the ECS panel (see Figure 1-12) These
switches, when set to the NORM position, permit the
flow of engine bleed air to the ECS s'stem after takeoff, when the landing gear is retracted. Engine bleed
air is inhibited when on the ground except during engine start. The engine START/AMAD RUN
switches (when selected to START)have priority control and will open the engine bleed air valves, overriding the weight-on-gear (WOG) switch.

ECS OVERHEAT LIGHT

An ECS overheat red wanting light, placarded ECS
OVIIT, is fixated on the ECS panel (see Figure
1-12). This light comes on whenever an overheat
condition, caused by a duct leak downstream of the
ECS shutoff valve, occurs in the airconditioning bay.
If light remains on, position both the Land R Engine
Bleed Air switches to OW Set the ECS mode selector to the ALL RAM position.

LEFT AND RIGHT DUCT OVERHEAT LIGHTS

'Two left and right duct overheat red warning lights,
placarded LIR DUCT OVID' are located on the ECS
panel (seeFigure 1-12). These lights come on whenever an overheat condition, caused by a duct leak, occurs. A leak in the right or left manifold between the

FAN LIGHT
An amber FAN caution
panel (see Figure 1-12
the avionics cooling fan

22
-

is located on the ECS

light comes on when
o operate.

nvironmentat conuvlsystem ground

unit (EPIJ) operation,
airframe-mounted accesair from the presto start the
seconds If
h APU in flight.
u

AVIONICS AIR HOT UGHT

An AVN MR HOT amber caution light, located on
the ECS panel (see Figure 1-12), comes on when the
air being supplied to the avionics equipment is excessive, lb reduce the temperature, set the ECS mode
selector to the ALL RAM position.
DEFOG CONTROL
Refer to Windshield Anti-ice System, this section, for
defog system inforniation.
DEFOG HOT LIGHT
Refer to Windshield Anti-ice System, this

ECS LIGHT
The ECS amber (resettable)caution light on the annunciator panel (see Figure 1-12) and the master
CAUTION light come on to indicate that a malfunction in the ECS system ha.s occurred. The 'RCScaution Light cannot be reset during ground operations
with weight on-wheels The appropriate light on the
ECS panel comes on to indicate the specific malfunction.
ECS MODE SELECTOR
A four-position (NORM-CKFTOFF-CKFT RAMALL RAM) ECS mode select o r is located on the ECS
panel (see Figure 1-12). When NORM is selected,
conditioned air is supplied to the cockpit and avionics
equipment. When CKFT OFF is selected, conditioned air to the cockpit is shut off while conditioned
air is nth supplied to the avionics equipment. During
airborne operations when C1CPT RAM is selected,
is supplied to the cockpit while conditioned air
ied to the avionics equipment. When
ed in the air, rain air is supplied
lrol computer. the navigation
computer, the air data computer.
and converters. The DEFOG control supplies t air for defogging the mmopy in all
ECS males except ALL RAM, The SNGL FCS fail
light on the annunciator panel and the FCS RESET
light on the FCS panel may illuminate briefly when
the mode selector is positioned to ALL RAM in the
air; however, if selected during ground operations,
these lights will remain on, indkating that the differential pressure switch in the duct senses too small a
pressure differential and that insufficient air is being
supplied to the FCS computer for cooling purposes.

A hydraulically operated MU exhaust door is installed to optimize airborne starting of the MU. If
the MU fails to airs-tart, the exhaust bypass door is
not commanded to close and no indication is provided
in the onckpie however, the door can be blown dosed
by accelerating the aircraft above 350 KCAS to overpower the over-center door springs. Once closed,
the springs will hold the door in the dosed position.
lithe MU exceeds temperature limits, the API) will
shut down automaticaLly. If the EPU has been activated automatically (both generators off the line). or
if the PASS bottle is recharging, the automatic API)
shutdown feature is inhibited and the APO will run
until it fails. If the EPU has been activated manually,
the automatic shutdown feature remains in effect.
An amber caution light on the annunciator panel indicates API) shutdown. In addition, an API) fuel
cutoff (MU, PUSH/ON) switchlight is located on
the upper right center instrument panel adjacent to
the FIRE warning lighL When an APU overheat occurs. the FIRE light and the API), PUSH light conic
on. Pressing the switch will shut down the MU.
Fuel for the ATTU is supplied by the APU boost pump
in the right fuel manifold. Controls for the API) are
located on the EPIJ/APIJ panel on the left console.
The cockpit battery switch must be turned on prior to
attempting a start from either the cockpit or the
ground external control panel.

APU CONTROLS AND INDICATORS

APU FUEL

swn-cm

The two position (guarded OPEN-CLSD) APU Fuel

switch located on the EPU/APU panel on the left
console (see Figure 1-14), controls the API) shutoff
valve in the APU fuel supply line. When the switch
is placed in the CUD position, the shutoff valve is
dosed and the AFL! and API) compartment are isolated from the API) fuel supply soma. The APU
shutoff valve is also dosed when the API) fuel cutoff
switchlight is pressed.
APU START SWITCH

nit (API.)) is a gas turbine en

to operate up to 37,0D3 feet
e APU provides pneumatic power for en-

The two-position (ON-OFF) APU start switch, located on the EPU/APU panel on the left console (see
Figure I-14), electrically actuates or shuts down the
API) through the electronic control unit (ECU) of
the APU. When the switch is placed to the ON position, the ECU allows the pressurized sir sten system

/75-L1

1-23

AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU)

TO IF-117A-1
Be prepared for larger sideslips associated with
gear onerudon and be prepared to keep sideslips
near zero with rudder paint inputs.
No ram air will be
IMU, RIS. or for cockpit pr
Loss of INS can be expected with
lines depending on ambient
temperature.

NOTE
The automatic yaw trim function of the
FLCC is inoperative with the gear down.

soon as p
e-End Arrestment - Perform
tire end barrier engagement
Ut to the high landing speed.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

(ECS) EMERGENCIES

5.
6.

Anwthrottle - Off (OCIP)

Avid high power settings

7.

Land as in as possible

SMOKE OR FUMES IN COCKPIT

I. Oxygen - 10398 OXYGEN
2. Maintain al or below 25,003 ft MSL (18 000 fu
MSL, if conditions permit)
3.

ECS mode select - CKFT RAM

If smoke is still excessive:

ECS mode select - ALL RAM
4.

SINGLE BLEED AIR DUCT OVERHEAT (ECS

ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT ON)

The L ot R DUCT OVHT warning light comes on

when a bleed air leak is sensed along either eng ine

bleed air duct.
I. Oxygen - IOU% OXYGEN

No ram air will be available to the INS,

IMU, RI-S, or for cockpit pressurization.
Loss of INS can be expected within I to 15
minutes depending on ambient air
temperature.

2. Maintain at or below 25,000 ft MSL (18,030 ft

MSL, if conditions permit)
L or R ENG BLF_ED AIR switch - OFF
If I. or R

Ducr OVHT light remains on:

4.

Mitothrottle - Off (OCIP)

5.

5.

Avoid high power settings

6.

6.

Land as soon as possible

Land as soon as Feasible

Canopy-lettison (if necessary) - 203 KCAS
maximum
NOTE

DUAL BLEED AIR DUCT OVERHEAT (ECS

ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT ON)

200 KCAS maximum recommended

because of wind blast.

L and It DUCT OVHT lights are on:

I. Oxygen - 100% OXYGEN
2.

Maintain
* at or below 25,000 ft MSL (18,0)0 ft
MSL, if conditions permit)

DEFOG OVERHEAT (ECS ANNUNCIATOR

MKT ON)

3.

L and 12 ENG BLEED AIR switches - OFF

Illumination of the DEFOG HOT light is an

indication that the temperature of rbefog air is
excessive. Continued operation of the defog system
could result in cancTry damage. Addidonally, when
this condition odsts, smoke or fumes may be noticed
in the cockpit or an automatic ECS shutdown may
occur.
_. Olygen - 100% OXYGEN
Maintain at or below 15.000 ft MSL (l8,000 It
MSL, LE conditions permit)

NOTE
Bleed air for engine erosableed starts is not
available if the bleed air 'with-Insert in the
OFF position.

4.

ECS mode select - ALL RAM

/
j

*13-10
SAVSSAISSAISSSO

MINENSISakail

IF-117A-2-21GS

RICHT
CROSSIILEED
SHUTOFF VALVE

TO AIR
CONDITIONING BAY

RIGHT FORWARD MANIFOLD

FROM
API/

LEFT
CROSS
SHUTFF VALVE

LEFT STARTER
AIR VALVE

ton

LET FORWARD MANIFOLD

M81 ).14l05 -101

Figure 1-2, Bleed Air System (Sheet 3 of 5)

1-7