Author(s): Robert Borofsky, Fredrik Barth, Richard A. Shweder, Lars Rodseth, Nomi Maya
Stolzenberg
Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 432-446
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
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ESSAYS
ROBERTBOROFSKY
Studies
International
Program,
Anthropology
HawaiiPacificUniversity
Kaneohe,HI 96734
FREDRIKBARTH
of Anthropology
Department
BostonUniversity
Boston,MA 02215
RICHARDA. SHWEDER
Committeeon HumanDevelopment
Universityof Chicago
Chicago,IL 60637
LARS RODSETH
of Anthropology
Department
of
University Utah
SaltLakeCity,UT 84112
NOMI MAYA STOLZENBERG
TheLawSchool
Universityof SouthernCalifornia
Los Angeles,CA 90089
Introduction
RobertBorofsky
How does one get one's hands,conceptuallyspeaking,
aroundthe culturalconcept?It seems so definite-a term
referredto againandagainin boththe anthropologicaland
popularliterature.And yet, as one examinesthe concept,it
appearsincreasinglyillusive. Differentpeople perceiveit
in differentways, and, perhapsnot unexpectedgiven its
popularity,the conceptoftencarries-in its differentrenditions-various politicalovertones.
Withculture,the devil oftenappearsin thedetails.Many
peopleembracethe conceptin the abstract.But they argue,
sometimesheatedly,over what the term actuallymeans.
As Hatch writes: "Even though the term has been discussedin countlessbooks and articles,thereis still a large
degree of uncertaintyin its use-anthropologists employ
the notionin fundamentallydifferentways"(1973:1).
Take for example Kroeberand Kluckhohn'sfamous
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions
ing on this, cultureis sometimesportrayedas the evolutionaryproductthatmakeshumans,broadlyspeaking,human (see, e.g., Geertz 1973:33-54; White 1949:33; cf.
Hallowell 1955:2-13). But what is progress?The definer
often framesthe answerin termsof a hierarchywith,to no
one's surprise,his or herperspectiveon top.
A second usage views cultureas antagonisticto certain
historicaldevelopmentscenteredin Europe.Christopher
Herbertnotes:"theidea of cultureappearson the scene as
the centralelementof a long, closely knitEnglishtradition
of social criticismdirectedagainstthe disintegratingand
(1991:22). Culture
debasing effects of industrialization"
(or cultures),in this sense,involves styles of life andlearning that run counterto the negative effects of modernization.This perspectiveremainscommon amonganthropologists: cultureis often portrayedas the beliefs and/or
behaviors people retain despite interaction with the
"West."Sahlins, for example, refers to "culturalism"as
"the claim to one's own mode of existence ... in opposi-
tion to a foreign-imperial
presence"(1994:379).Culture,in
this sense, conveys resistanceto alien or alienatinglifeways. Or as he famouslyphrasesit: "localpeopleintegrate
the World System into somethingeven more inclusive:
theirsystemof the world"(1994:384).
A thirdsense of culture(or cultures)is still morepolitical and is often associatedwith Germannationalism.Norbert Elias writes, "the Germanconcept of Kulturplaces
A CONVERSATIONABOUTCULTURE
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434
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A CONVERSATIONABOUT CULTURE
435
and purpose.In view of the complex and poorly understoodinterplayof thesemanyaspects,it mustsurelybe unwise to concentrateour attentionon that one abstraction,
culture,andelevateit to a positionas the definingobjectof
our inquiry,therebytaking a very restrictiveposition on
what needs to come under our intensive scrutiny.No
doubt,an analogousrestrictionhas long been successfulin
defining the object of linguistics. But that comparison
merelysuggeststhatthe idea of a code of communication
may happento define an objectmore readilyand systematicallyseparablefromthe rest of life thandoes the nebulous rangeof ideasevokedby the wordculture.
Attemptsto resolve this by clarifying and sharpening
our definitionof culturehave repeatedlyfailed and can
serve as just one more exampleof our tendencyto return
endlesslyto old perplexities.Ourethnographicexperience
shouldmakeus acknowledgethatwhatwe abstractby any
definitionof cultureis only manifestin empiricalevents
composedof many,various,andvariableotheraspectsbesides the cultural.A decontextualizedaccountof the culturalaspect will then captureonly fragmentsof events,3
with a questionablepotentialfor systemicmodeling.As an
empiricaldiscipline,anthropologyneeds, on the contrary,
to have a robustobservationalbase in phenomenathatare
simply identified, sufficiently separable, and internally
connectedin orderto be felicitousfor the discoveryof interconnectionsand determinedconstraints.Culture detachedfromthe contextsof humanactionin whichit is embeddedcannotsatisfythisrequirement.
We needdatathatcan offerresistanceto ourdeepestassumptionsandconventions.If we thinkof the objectof anthropologyas acting subjects,or in a simpler language,
"people,"we better secure the benefits of an empirical
study-that we shall be able to critiquetheoreticalassertions by confrontingthem with the simple objection:"But
look what these people do." Our primaryempiricaldata
needto be locatedas muchas possibleoutsideor beforewe
performourmajorabstractions,analyticaltransformations,
and interpretations
so as to give us that crucialchanceto
transcendour establishedways of understandingand test
the powersand limits of ourconcepts.It seems to me that
too muchpreparatory
abstractionhasbeeninvestedin what
we call "culture"for it to servetheseneeds.
Our second majorrequirementis that the definitionof
ourobjectof studyshouldbe fruitfullylinkedto a practicable epistemology.Here any study of humanphenomena
with rigorousand objective ambitionsmeets its greatest
challenge.The objectivityof positivist science-i.e., describingonly thosefeaturesthatcan be directlyestablished
by replicableobservations-does not providethe methodology we need,given the very constitutionof humanlives.
Since people interpretthe worldand act on those interprein the sense
tations,we need to access theirinterpretations
of their subjectivelyexperienced world-the meanings
they ascribe, the purposes they embrace-to
know even
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(4) not to glorify the diaspora, and (5) not to join the highly
individualistic and migratory multinational, multiracial but
(in many ways) monocultural cosmopolitan elite are real
2000).
Of course, Fredrik Barth is far more evenhanded and
less extreme than many other critics of the culture concept.
Nevertheless, as far as I can judge there is nothing in the
Redfield/Kroeber and Kluckhohn idea of culture that
should lead him to be anticulturalat all. Indeed, one of the
ironic features of Fredrik Barth's essay is that it expresses
views that are not totally unlike those of Clifford Geertz.
Be interpretive, not positivistic in your understanding of
behavior. Do not study ideas in isolation from practice.
Place a premium on "accurate,rich, and systematic empirical descriptions" (Barth p. 436). Be sensitive to context.
The essay could easily be read as a call for "thick description."
That is not to deny that there have been some notorious
cultural anthropologists who have either treated "culture"
as everything or have placed a taboo on the study of anything that is not "cultural,"or have failed to understandthat
the study of culture is compatible with the study of human
agency. Yet why should we conflate their misappropriation, misunderstandings, and exaggerations of the culture
concept with the idea of culture itself? There is more than
enough that is "cultural"to go aroundand to supply anthropology with a worthy and distinctive object of study. If I
was a cynic I might suggest that with enemies like Fredrik
Barth, the culture concept does not need friends. Instead allow me to conclude more enthusiastically, with a hopeful
eye on the future. The time is right, I believe, for anthropologists to stop beating up on the culture concept. Perhaps
it is even high time for us to make use of (some of) Fredrik
Barth's suggestions to put the idea of culture to the good
uses she deserves.
A CONVERSATIONABOUTCULTURE
441
in the earlyworksof Mintz,Wolf, Bailey, andTurner(reviewed in Vincent 1990: chap. 5). Yet these anthropolopositions
gists were stakingout theirown "anti-structural"
in the discipline,andtheyknew it.
In the 1960s, it was FredrikBarthwho took the lead in
developingan action-orientedanthropologythatpromised
for a while to restore agency to the theoreticalagenda
(Barth1966, 1967, 1969). Yet Barth'sapproachachieved
at best a subalternstatus,helpingto establishwhatOrtner
(1984:144)called a "minoritywing" in a field still dominatedby systems-and-structures
approaches(see also Vincent 1990:357-362). Throughoutthe 1970s, the lingering
influenceof Parsoniansociology andFrenchstructuralism
ensuredthattherewouldbe no Barthianrevolution,at least
not within the anthropologicalmainstream.In Wolfs
(1982) assessment,anthropologyin the early 1980s was
still hauntedby the myth of the primitiveisolate,the idea
of non-Westernculturesas neatlyboundedunits,internally
coherentand historicallyinert.By the time Ortner(1984)
drew attentionto the growing influence of "practicetheory,"an action-orientedapproachcould be depictedas a
radicallynew departurefor anthropologists-andone that
was initiated,accordingto Ortner'saccount,almost entheoristssuch as Bourdieu,Gidtirelyby poststructuralist
dens,andFoucault.
WhatI have sketchedis, of necessity,an oversimplified
version of anthropological history, yet it is much closer to
reality,I would argue,than the revisionistaccountsprovidedby ShwederandSahlins.The pointis thatanthropology was dominatedfor a very long time-from about1940
to about1980-by a clusterof traditionsemphasizingculturaldeterminismandholism to the neglectof agencyand
variation(cf. Lewis 1998).Fromthis perspective,thereare
good reasonsfor FredrikBarthand othersto criticizethe
way culturehas been conceptualizedand studied,and it
will notdo simplyto cite a few pastanthropologists,
orpast
definitionsof culture,thatseem to have buckedwhatwas
the prevailingtrendin the field for nearlya half century.
Eventoday,thoughmostethnographers
arelikelyto recognize individualagency and variationamong the people
they study, the idea of each cultureas a bounded,integratedwhole, perhapswith its own specialVolksgeist,has
hardlybeen eliminatedfrom anthropology-or from the
minds of the public,where severalgenerationsof American anthropologists
helpedto plantandnurtureit.
Thiskindof culturalessentialismdoes indeedhavedeep
roots in Americanthought,but so does the Sapirianalternative advocated by Barth (1992, 1993, 1994) and a
numberof other recent culture theorists (e.g., Borofsky
1994; Hannerz1992;Mannheimand Tedlock 1995;Rodseth 1998). Beyond Sapir-in fact, beyond anthropology
altogether-Barth'sapproachfinds a still deepersourcein
Americanpragmatism,the philosophicalmovementthat
influencedthe social sciences of the early twentiethcentury in much the way that postmodernismdoes today.
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Notes
1. In an effort to enlargethe conversation-reaching out to
the borderlandsanthropologyshares with ot her disciplines
(cf. Keesing 1994:307-310; Shore 1996:311-373)-I purposely included Stolzenberg,who specializes in legal studies
ratherthananthropology.
2. Or in some schools of anthropology,"Society."This alternativeusage makes surprisinglylittle differenceand can be
criticizedin very similarways.
3. And indeed,probablyonly a disorderedassemblyof modalities of cultures,cf. Barth1995.
4. Wikan cites the urgingof Balinese acquaintancesduring
fieldwork and emphasizes the need for the person to create
resonance within herself by opening up for the other's situation, intentions, thoughts, and feelings and going "beyond"
the other's words. We seem indeed to be dealing with the
other side of the same dynamicsthatG. H. Mead identifiedas
the way a person's own awarenessof self is produced.
5. Compare Paul, who draws a clear distinction between
informationand semiotic systems, on the one hand,and meaning and purposiveaction, on the other:"Agency, the initiation
and execution of goals andpurposes,which is the basis of motivationand hence of meaning,is somethingthat can be attributed only to persons.It cannotbe in culture,or symbols, or society or history, since these are not open, self-governing
feedback systems with goal-setting abilities and the skills to
act on them and monitorthe results"(Paul 1990:445, emphasis added).
6. I set out some of these substantiveand ontological arguments at greaterlength in Barth 1993, especially chapter10.
7. I'd like to thank HerbertS. Lewis of the University of
Wisconsin, Madison, for (re-)introducingme to American
pragmatism.
8. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Justice
Potter Stewart's concurringopinion). For analysis, see David
Cole, "Playing By Pornography'sRules: The Regulation of
Sexual Expression," 143 U. Penn. Law Rev. 111 (1994);
James Lindgren,"Defining Pornography,"141 U. Penn. Law
Rev. 1153 (1993).
9. On privacy, see Ruth Gavison, "Feminismand the Public/PrivateDistinction,"45 StanfordLaw Rev. 1 (1992).
10. I confess I have more doubts than Richard Shweder
does aboutadoptingan "agency"-centeredview.
11. CompareWilliams's analysisof how the meaningshistorically associated with "culture"were transferredto "ideology" (Williams [1981] 1982:26-30).
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