US VS PONS

Facts: "The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte
with the crime of illegal importation of opium, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring
together and plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on
board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins
containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency.
On motion of counsel, Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately.
(Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for
the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000 to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of
the costs. The same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was
sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his
appeal
and
the
judgment
as
to
him
has
become
final.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the
last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was
the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be
punished if found guilty was not passed or approved on the 28th of February
but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The
validity
of
the
Act
is
not
otherwise
questioned.
Issue: Whether Act 2381 was passed on 28th of February or March 1 of that
year.

Held: For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
costs.
So
ordered.

Ratio: Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authentic of laws
should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They should

be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be

permanent, that rights acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared
to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by
facts
resting
only
in
the
memory
of
individuals."
In the case from which this last quotation is taken the court cited numerous
decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule
therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date
where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative
journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is
modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states we do not
hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The
journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914.
This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these
journals.

In
view
of
when
the
Legislature
adjourned
On the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have
indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and
that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous
evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative
journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to
understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and
character
of
the
evidence
thus
involved.
But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock
was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination
of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the
clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment
apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the
expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress
of
July
1,
1902.

In
view
of
the
probative
value
of
the
Journal
If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be

slight as compared with that of alteringthe probative force and character of

legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon
entertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect
on account of the treachery of memory.
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a
congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto." The petitioners contend that their vote were not taken into
consideration in requiring that in amending the constitution, the law requires 3/4
of the votes of the member of the Congress thus arriving in the question of
constitutionality of the said resolution.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction and whether or not the
journals can be investigated against the conclusiveness of the enrolled bills.
HELD: Petition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind the
enrolled bills which were already authenticated and to investigate the journals
amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal and independent
department of the state, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the
members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which
must lead to confusion in the administration of the law. Duly certified copies shall
be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and the due enactment thereof.
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, ET AL.
Facts:
House bill No. 9266, defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of
Manila became a law under RA 4065 after both houses and the President signed
it. However, it was later on found out that the said law was not the same as the
version approved by the Senate as it was going thru its revision. With this finding,
the Senate President and the President himself sent out a statement saying they
are withdrawing their signatures from the House Bill No. 9266, therefore, it
should not be considered as a law.
Issue:

WON the petition for mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be granted and compel the respondents to
comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate
Presidents' signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266, therefore it did not
become a law. The temporary restraining order was also made permanent.The
intent of the law making body based on its journals prevailed over technicality of
the legal process of enacting a bill.
People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980
FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar,
individually and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential Decree
No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the
motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima
and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar,
issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash or dismiss the
informations on a common ground Lack of essential elements to constitute an
offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute
the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed,
blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended
to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of
the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended
that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent
of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the
possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but
also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not
an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope
of
PD
No.
9
(3)
correct?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to
penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081
and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet
lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9
also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is

the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine
what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.

Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato,
and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA
4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for
electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in
the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province
of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel
of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to
Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by
correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of
the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive.
The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This

constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is

imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the
case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local
application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new
Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without
subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact
is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it
creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the
towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it
also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao
del Sur.
5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the
law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill.

Mirasol Vs Ca Case Digest

351 SCRA 44 G.R. No. 128448
February 1, 2001

Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National
Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975
under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a
Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's
sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine

Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and
authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that
whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.
Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored.
Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded
withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle
their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB
real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a
deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said
proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB
remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to
account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar
pertained to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance,
and damages against PNB.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute

unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have
agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order.
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial
Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the
Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing
the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such
notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress
that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not
limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself
provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving
declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule,
there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a

statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor

General is mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for
violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private
property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its
power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this
power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have
standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.

VICTORIAS
MILLING
COMPANY,
INC
vs.
SOCIAL
SECURITY
COMMISSION
Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22
requiring all Employers in computing premiums to include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other
media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling
Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect
protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated
October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation
of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions.
Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of autho

rity on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the
approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No.
22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to
how the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule
or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is
entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates
rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid
law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may
be enforced by a penal sanction provided therein. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted
with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are
the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise
employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the
law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and
that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the
Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolution appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines
issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be
disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It
seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the
executive orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the
President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has
been vested in the legislative department.
RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers
of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as
well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to
the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does
not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or
to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives
the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and
the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by
the municipalities referred to.
ALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL
FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each

Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were not

required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also
required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at
each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative
thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico
Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions
of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court
ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that
the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
HELD:
The Postal Law does not allow any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind".
The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a
lottery nor a gift enterprise but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift
exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling.
The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize;
and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of
consideration, cannot be deemed al lottery. The rules of the contest made no
mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly
for the chance to draw a prize. The term gift enterprise also could not embrace
the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the
chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is
open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the
appellee's products.
By virtue of noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon
although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical
that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than
that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence,

if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest
indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.