Persons and Family Relations

(Waiver of Rights and

Interpretation or
Application of Laws)
Submitted to:
Judge Evelyn Nery

Submitted by:
GROUP 3
Adante, Carmela
Alipayo, Queen Anne
Castilla, Mishel Caren
Convocar, Marieve
Fernandez, Joseff Anthony
Jardin, Greg Anthony
Lopecillo, Merichris
Maboloc, Jeff Emmanuel
Mindalano,
Saligumba, Ivan
Vitorillo, Alphons

WAIVER OF RIGHTS
ARTICLE 6. RIGHTS MAY BE WAIVED , UNLESS THE WAIVER IS CONTRARY TO
LAW, PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC POLICY, MORALS, OR GOOD CUSTOMS, OR
PREJUDIAL TO A THIRD PERSON WITH A RIGHT RECOGNIZED BY LAW.
DEFINITIONS
Right - the power or previledge given to one person and as a rule
demandable of another; denotes an interest or title in an object or property.

Waiver - the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right or such

conduct as warrants an influence of the relinquishment of such right. Thus, a
waiver may be express or implied.

GENERAL RULE
Generally:
Rights may be waived
Except:
When the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs;
When the waiver is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
REQUISITES OF A VALID WAIVER
The person waiving must be capacitated to make the waiver.(Hence, a waiver of
a minor or an insane is voidable)
The waiver must be made clearly, but not necessarily express.
The person waiving must actually have the right which he is renouncing;
otherwise, he will not be renouncing anything.
In certain instances, the waiver, as in the express remission of a debt owed in
favor of the waiver, must comply with the formalities of a donation.
The waiver must not be contrary to law, public policy, public order, or good
customs.
The waiver must not prejudice others with a right recognized by law
EXAMPLE OF RIGHTS THAT CANNOT BE RENOUNCED
Natural rights like the right to life
Alleged rights which really do not exist yet like future inheritance
EXAMPLE OF RIGHTS THAT MAY BE RENOUNCED
The right of the accused to be helped by counsel
The right granted to prepare at least two days before trial

INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF LAWS

ARTICLE 10. IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF
LAWS, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LAWMAKING BODY INTENDED RIGHT AND
JUST TO PREVAIL
DOUBTFUL STATUTES
The judge should presume that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. Afterall, It is said that we should interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by
the spirit that giveth life.
COMMENT OF THE CODE COMMISSION
Article 10 is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the
law is doubtful or obscure. It will strenghten the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.

GUY V. CA (COURT OF APPEALS) Case Digest

G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006
FACTS:
1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei
(a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are
the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed
for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate
may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint
motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been
signed by Remedios and not by counsel.
3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a
Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational
assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate
of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion
ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she
could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to
the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the
lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards
RULING:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must
necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by
the court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents
could not have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as
illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have
waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs, the court is not precluded to
receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is
for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral
and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship
included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in

one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance. ( Briz v.
Briz)
AUJERO V. PHILCOMSAT
G.R. No. 193484, January 18, 2012

FACTS:
It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) as an accountant in the latters
Finance Department. On August 15, 2001 or after 34 years of service, the petitioner
applied for early retirement. His application for retirement was approved, effective
September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to
one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner
was Philcomsats Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of P274,805.00.

On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in
Philcomsats favor, following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of
P9,439,327.9. Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for
unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is
P14,015,055.00 and the P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed
settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to
declare his quitclaim as null and void. According to the petitioner, he had no choice but
to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof and was all set to return to his
hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as no single
centavo would be released to him if he did not execute a release and waiver in
Philcomsats favor.

The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount of his retirement benefits,
which is equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service, is
provided under the Retirement Plan that Philcomsat created on January 1, 1977 for the
benefit of its employees.

ISSUE: Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsats favor is valid,
thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat.

HELD:
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are
inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade
their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a
laborers claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the
parties. Considering the petitioners claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to
be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.

While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the
release and waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his allegation self-serving
and inutile to invalidate the same. That no portion of his retirement pay will be released
to him or his urgent need for funds does not constitute the pressure or coercion
contemplated by law.

In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astroga Garcia,

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astroga Garcia. He prayed that the childs middle name Astroga be changes to Garcia,
her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir,
and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and

hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her
mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
HELD:
Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by the Republic Act no. 9255, (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what
middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) a legitimate child by virtue of
her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother.

Ang v. Ang Case Digest

G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
FACTS:
On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the
amount of US $300,000.00 from Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). The
respondents executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioners wherein they
promised to pay the latter the said amount, with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. A
demand letter was sent to the respondents asking them to pay their outstanding debt
which, already amounted to US $719,671.23, inclusive of the 10% annual interest that
had accumulated over the years. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents
still failed to pay the petitioners.
On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California,
USA, executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor of Attorney Eldrige
Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the

respondents. On September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a
Complaint for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the
respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aceron, being a mere representative of the petitioners, is
not the real party in interest in the case.
HELD:
The petition is denied. Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact is not a real party
in interest of the case. It is stated in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
It is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest as he does not stand to be
benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the
petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the
complaint against the respondents and in his personal capacity does not have the right
to file the complaint against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in
behalf of the petitioners the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be
enforced in the case belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an
attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest.
Thus, his residence is immaterial to the venue of the filing of the complaint. The
petitioners complaint should have been filed in the RTC of Bacolod City, the court of the
place where the respondents reside, and not in RTC of Quezon City. The rules on the
venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their
witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an
action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter is cohabiting a man in the name of Luciano Quilapio
not her legal husband. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or to her
common law partner, notwithstanding, he filed a case against Escritor believing in the
premise that as a court employee, one must be moral and must conform to the rule of
law ( given the Revised penal code prohibits concubinage) so as not to taint the image
of the court.
Respondent Escritor said that she was already a widow when she entered the Judiciary
in 1999, and that her legal husband died in 1998. Her cohabitation with Quilapio having
known the latter has a subsisting marriage, is a fact that she admits. In her defense
after ten years of cohabitation they executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness on
the 28th of July in the year 1991 to conform to their beliefs as members Jehovahs
witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society to make their conjugal

arrangement morally acceptable, which also signifies their sincerity that when Quilapios
existing marriage should end then they would make it official under the rule of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge
of "gross and immoral conduct."
HELD:
Here, the court is faced with a dilemma in interpreting the NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION CLAUSE, should be the respondent found guilty of the administrative charge
of gross and immoral conduct?
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for
exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including
religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so
the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode
the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a
showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
The court dismissed the administrative complaint.
In the end, the court decided in favor to Escritor given her cohabitation with Quilapio
was illicit and immoral, both under the Revised Administrative Code, and the Revised
Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v NOEL TUDTUD AND DINDO BOLONG

G.R. NO. 144037, September 26, 2003
FACTS:
Sometime in the months of July and August, the Toril police station received a report
from a person of Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtod. According to Solier, his
neighbors and friends told him that Tudtud is responsible for the prolification of
marijuana in their area. The police acted and conducted a five-day surveillance to
confirm the report, but it turned out that they did not catch him plying his illegal drugs,
instead, gathered an information from unidentified assets.
On August 1, 1999, Noel Tudtud had gone to North Cotabato to sell pairs of Levi's
pants, which was his sideline . At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he returned to Davao
City by bus. Upon reaching Toril, Davao City, appellant along with other passengers, got
down the bus. Suddenly, a man pointed a .38 caliber to the appellant, who identified
himself as police officer and told him not to run. Appellant raised his hands and ask

what was that all about. The police inspected the plastic bag that Tudtud was carrying
by asking him to open it, which revealed to be several pairs of pants. Again, the man
who introduced himself as a police, instructed or directed appellant to open a carton
box, some two meters away, appellant denied that it wasnt his and it was already there
when they embarked the bus, but still, he proceeded to open it out of fear after the man
pointed out again his revolver at him. When opened, Tudtud discovered pieces of dried
fish and underneath was something wrapped in cellophane. Unwrapped, the police
uttered that it was marijuana, immediately, the police handcuffed and arrested Tudtud
and this another man named Dindo Bolong, who simultaneously, was pointed with a gun
also by another police. The appellants did not resist when they were asked to come and
were brought to the police station. Even without search and arrest warrant was
presented.
For that reason, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bulong were subsequently charged before the
RTC of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, which both pleaded not
guilty because they cried for frame -up.
The only basis of Solier for his report to the police are the statements of his neighbors,
in other words, he has no personal knowledge about the matter. Reason why PO1
Floreta uttered during the cross examination that he doubted the reliability of their
informant. Therefore, the real reason for the ommission to obtain a warrant was their
belief that they lacked sufficient basis to secure the same. And that they have no claim
to personal knowledge because all they had was a hearsay.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid waiver of rights by the accused during the
warrantless search and seizure
HELD:
The Supreme Court said that there was no valid waiver of rights by the accused during
the warrantless arrest and seizure because the prosecution failed to establish the
second and third requisites of a valid waiver, to wit:
1. it must appear that the right exist;
2. the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right;
3. said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.