Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146683

November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL,
SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA,
LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA,
RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and
ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil
Case No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter
vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her
favor and its subsequent resolution3 denying
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife
Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot
No. 437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now
Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue)
in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of
the lot was 418 square meters.4 After the death of
Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-inlaw, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the
latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of
the property to Francisco.5 On June 27, 1916, Francisco
registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. 6
Having no children to take care of him after his
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia
Bellosillo,7 the latter's cousin, Luzviminda

Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to

take care of his house, as well as the store inside.9
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of
the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia
Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they
slept in the same room,10 while Erlinda
Tabancura,11another niece of Francisco, claimed that the
latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress.12 On the
other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could
enter the master's bedroom only when the old man
asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old
for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse. 13
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were
married, only Cirila was left to take care of
Francisco.14 Cirila testified that she was a 34-year old
widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when
she began working for the latter; that he could still walk
with her assistance at that time; 15 and that his health
eventually deteriorated and he became
bedridden.16 Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's
sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot
near the public streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular
cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her
family with food and lodging.18
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death,
Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot
437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square
meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation
was being made in consideration of "the faithful services
[Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10)
years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya,
Sr.19and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner . 20
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children.
In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had
a market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of
P28,550.00.21
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint
against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and

damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews

and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged
that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is
void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct
or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment
in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under
this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached
this conclusion based on the testimony of Erlinda
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature
of one "Cirila Comille." The documents were (1) an
application for a business permit to operate as real estate
lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the
signature "Cirila Comille";22 (2) a sanitary permit to
operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate
showing the signature "Cirila Comille" in black ink; 23 and
(3) the death certificate of the decedent with the
signature "Cirila A. Comille" written in black ink. 24 The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed
by the late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7;
Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial
Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A " to the
Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the
house and lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs
within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and
finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the
sum of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this
appeal. As already stated, the appeals court denied
reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the
testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of
documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's
surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning
payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law
wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular
cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been
committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
was the common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is
not correct and is a reversible error because it is based
on a misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the
chain of circumstances detailed by the totality of the
evidence, its findings being predicated on totally
incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere
speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in
Quiason, Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions, 1993
ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of
evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes,
39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908,
and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.26
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case. After a review of the records,
we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,

surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is

manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 27 It
appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on
evidence presented by both parties, the general rule
should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation"
or "living together as husband and wife" means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual
intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than
sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is
already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At
the very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a
man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling
together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves
out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights
clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do
not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely
meretricious.29In this jurisdiction, this Court has
considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship
the stipulations between the parties,30 a conviction of
concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife?
Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one
roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two
consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave
Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept
in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public
conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship
of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners
akin to husband and wife.

Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle

told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other
indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law
spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents
apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille."
As previously stated, these are an application for a
business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a
sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a
health certificate,34 and the death certificate of
Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself
as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would
not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed
by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs.
Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case
No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred
to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco."
Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco
a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not
simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common
law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash
wage under the law.36 It is difficult to believe that she
stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure
beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the
conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of
evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De Batocael
GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001
FACTS: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima
Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died
in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed

a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights,

where the latter waived her share consisting of of the
property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not
have any children to take care of him after his retirement,
he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda
and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow
and took care of Franciscos house as well as the store
inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers
since they slept in the same room. On the other hand,
Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed
that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.
However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere
helper who could enter the masters bedroom when
Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for
her. She denied having sexual intercourse with
Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was
then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who
was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any
wages as househelper though her family was provided
with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated
and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that
Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from
his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he
executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos where he
ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m.,
together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same.
The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name.
This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful
services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the
deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute
owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot
received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and
assessed value of P28,550. The decedents nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that
Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos
executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid.
HELD: The court in this case considered a sufficient proof
of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.
The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura
and certain documents bearing the signature of Cirila

Comille such as application for business permit, sanitary

permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the
fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication
that she was not simply a caregiver employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and may
no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women
holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE;
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES
DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses
during the marriage", policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals
decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679)
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code
speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of

that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other

consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se
engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han
de consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl,
LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore
invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason
to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials.
For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the danger that the law
seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum,
fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should
subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains
the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage
should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING
SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE
WIDOW. The lack of validity of the donation made b~
the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena,
the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as
the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this
litigation. We are called upon to decide whether the ban
on a donation between the spouses during a marriage
applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now
appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased
Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while
he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to
defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court,
after noting that it was made at a time before defendant

was married to the donor, sustained the latters stand.

Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in
character, this Court not having had as yet the
opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of
Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice
J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that
year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should
be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a
donation between common-law spouses falls within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public
policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this
Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court,
after stating that in plaintiffs complaint alleging absolute
ownership of the parcel of land in question, she
specifically raised the question that the donation made
by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was
null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code
and that defendant on the other hand did assert
ownership precisely because such a donation was made
in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take
place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for
trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts
which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant
assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and
stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned
the property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena
executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in
question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was
accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the land
to the defendant which took effect immediately was
made during the common law relationship as husband
and wife between the defendant-done and the now
deceased donor and later said donor and done were
married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix
Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5)
That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being
the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the
deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was
adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation
under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if

made between the spouses during the marriage. When

the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of
the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes
and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time
they were not spouses. They became spouses only when
they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed
of donation had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the
Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of
the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply
to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954
Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8
speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of
that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se
engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han
de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI,
LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore
invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason
to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such
irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger
that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32
ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such
donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who
incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage." 9

2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence

of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion
cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the

framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable

rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be
distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated,
the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted
notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified
if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with
disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a
legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach.
If there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it.
Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal
provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may
be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the
language used must be remedied by an adherence to its
avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El
espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar
a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the
deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena,
the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she
is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff,
as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23,
1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The
questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of
plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the
property in question recognized. The case is remanded to
the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the above opinion. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Matabuena v.s. Cervantes
Facts: In 1956, Felix Matabuena, the brother of the
plaintiff, donated a property to his common-law spouse,
Petronila Cervantes. In 1962, six years after the donation
of property, Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes got
married. In the same year, after five months, Felix
Matabuena died. Being the only sister and the nearest
collateral relative of the deceased, Cornelia Matabuena
filed a claim over the property. The lower court of
Sorsogon then declared that the donation was valid as

long as it happened before Felix Matabuena and Petronila

Cervantes got married. This decision was in accordance
with the Article 133 of Civil Code which states that
donation made between spouses is null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the ban of donation between
spouses applies to a common-law relationship.
Rulings: Supplying the legislative omission, the court
ruled that the ban of donation between spouses applies
to a common-law relationship. However, the lack of
validity of the donation of Felix Matabuena to Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result to plaintiff having
exclusive rights to the disputed property. Because
Petronila and Felix Matabuena were legally married
before Felix died, Petronila is his widow. Hence, she is
entitled to 1/2 of the property of the deceased. The other
half would be given to Felix Matabuenas sister, Cornelia
Matabuena.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178044

January 19, 2011

ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
DECISION

Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio

(respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts.
They started living together in 1984 until they decided to
separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent
decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they
were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias
City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her
marital obligation to give love and support to him, and
had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with
her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and
would at times become violent and hurt him.

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 18

October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254
(trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts

The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence
presented, petitioner was able to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even
without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the allegations
in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand,
clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity
against respondent. The trial court found that respondent
committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner
and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her
under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also
ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she
obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon

respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition,
was already living in the United States of America.
Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file
an answer to the petition within the reglementary period.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition
for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner,
which was granted by the Superior Court of California on
25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October
2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor

found that there were no indicative facts of collusion
between the parties and the case was set for trial on the
merits.

2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of

property.

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the

marriage.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist,

submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since
her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted
the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M.
DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14,
1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID
from the beginning; and

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall

only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51
of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the
Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City
Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration

questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of
property and the ruling that the decree of annulment
shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially
granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006
Decision as follows:

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that

a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not
apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M.
DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14,
1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID
from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of
property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be
issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar
of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.5

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102,

Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case
before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

of the other, until after the termination of their

cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry
each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is
no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred
when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties

acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in

ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section
19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of
the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the

Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of

Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in
Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply
in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute
community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified
of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their
property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either or both of the parents; but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section

19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation
where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus
we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is
a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to
voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid
until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent
court in an action for annulment.12 In both instances
under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed
either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal
partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a

void marriage during the period of cohabitation is

governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.16The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court
with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the
trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
ALAIN M. DIO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO
FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got
married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent
citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become
violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their
marriage void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it
to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall
be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD: The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v.

RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in
the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:

liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner

and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage

1.The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry

each other;

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]

2.They live exclusively with each other as husband and

wife; and
3.Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is
no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and
45 are governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE

CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the
validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now
the subject of the controversy between the two Susans
whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to set aside the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto
the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario,
he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20,
1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter
referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the
second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent
Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary

tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,

under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical
and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able
to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00
from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).[4]
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the
instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as death benefits which she
(petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial
court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of,
the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only
at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To
bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears
no marriage license number;[5] and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage
license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and
SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on
June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number
from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan
Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve.[6]

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of

respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which
was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from
the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF
THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS
GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
[8]
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.[9]
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so

long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

[10] In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void.[11]
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage,[12] and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions,[13] renders the
marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court
held that such a certification is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of
a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that
they secured the required marriage license. Although
she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to

refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case

in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition,
however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits
under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would
also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity
of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence,
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased
is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage
is the separation of the property of the spouses according
to the applicable property regime.[16] Considering that
the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed
by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man,[17] ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money,

property, or industry shall be owned by them in common

in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong
to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children
and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage
then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in
order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig,
and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies earned by the
deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said
that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are
not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no
right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said death benefits of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being
the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs.
This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties

acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article,
wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal
shares and will be divided equally between them, even if
only one party earned the wages and the other did not
contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed
death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to
share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad
faith in the present case, both parties of the first
marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, onehalf of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall
go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass
by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System,[20] where the
Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the
second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership

established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has

the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive
him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an
interest in the husbands share in the property here in
dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration
of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this
case would be to recognize the right of the second wife
to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her
and her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.[21]
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited
decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior
and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
This is the reason why in the said case, the Court
determined the rights of the parties in accordance with
their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court,
construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a
prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is
an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage
void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void.
The same rule applies even if the first marriage is
patently void because the parties are not free to
determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry,
like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All
that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial
or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon,
the court, if material to the determination of the issues

before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved

and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in
accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,[23] the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in
Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the
sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
NICDAO CARIO VS YEE CARIO
G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001
[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union
Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on Coownership regarding polygamous/bigamous
marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage]
FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in
1969 without marriage license. They had two children. He
then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with
whom he had no children in their almost 10 year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans
filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao

collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of

P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money
acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death
benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4
took place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage
between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that
she became aware of the previous marriage at the
funeral of the deceased.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and

void for the same has been solemnized without the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage,
he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring
the first marriage void, before he or she could contract
said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage
would be void. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao

appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount
acquired by Nicdao.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159521
FRANCISCO L. GONZALES, Petitioner, v.
ERMINDA F. GONZALES,Respondents.

RULING: No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and

Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code,
which refers to the property regime of bigamous or
polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a
police officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due
to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired
with the deceased through their actual joint contribution.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common
by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased
alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee,
not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a
valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death
benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute
thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage,
she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and
the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by
intestate succession.

Promulgated: December 16, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the
reversal of the Decision dated April 2, 2003 and
Resolution dated August 8, 2003, both issued by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66041, entitled,
Erminda F. Gonzales, plaintiff-appellee versus Francisco
L. Gonzales, defendant-appellant.
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and
Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started living as husband
and wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979,
they got married. From this union, four (4) children were
born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria Angelica
and Marco Manuel.
On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City, for
annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente
lite, docketed as Civil Case No. 32-31111. The complaint
alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her

for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her,

and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During
the time they lived together, they acquired properties.
She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its
development. She prays for the declaration of the
nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains.

8.

White Plains

5.

Corolla 92 model

9.

Corinthian lot

6.

L-300 90 model

7.

Mercedes Sedan 79 model

P 10,000,000

8.

Pick-up 89 model

In his answer to the complaint, petitioner averred that it

is respondent who is psychologically incapacitated. He
denied that she was the one who managed the pizza
business and claimed that he exclusively owns the
properties existing during their marriage.

5,000,000

9.

Mercedes wagon 80 model

18,000,000

10.

Nissan Sentra 89 model

2,500,000

11.

8Tamaraws

In her reply, respondent alleged that she controlled the

entire generation of Fiesta Pizza representing 80% of the
total management of the same and that all income from
said business are conjugal in nature.

30,000,000

None

10,000,000

7,000,000

12,000,000

P 6,000,000

10,000,000

80,000

5,000,000

150,000

23,000,000

500,000

Valuation of respondent

2,000,000

180,000

(Record,

24,000,000

350,000

15,000,000

220,000

10,000,000

100,000

None

300,000

The public prosecutor, in compliance with the directive of

the trial court, and pursuant Section 48 of the Family
Code,[1] certified that no collusion exists between the
parties in asking for the declaration of the nullity of their
marriage and that he would appear for the state to see to
it that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Each party submitted a list of the properties with their
valuation, acquired during their union, thus:

p. 110)

Valuation of petitioner (Record,

p. 111)

None

1.

Acropolis property

2.

Baguio City property

3.

Nasugbu, Batangas property

Personal Property (Vehicles)

4.

Corinthian house and lot

1.

Galant 83 model

5.

Sagitarius condominium

2.

Toyota Corona 79 model

6.

Office

3.

Coaster 77 model

7.

Greenmeadows lot

4.

Pajero 89 model

120,000

200,000
Evidence adduced during the trial show that petitioner
used to beat respondent without justifiable reasons,
humiliating and embarrassing her in the presence of
people and even in front of their children. He has been
afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder
characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger

manifested by his indiscriminate womanizing.

court found that:

The trial

A. 1) Plaintiffs share of real properties:

P 1,150,000

1. Corinthian lot -------------------- P 12,000,000

The evidence adduced by plaintiff was overwhelming to
prove that the defendant by his infliction of injuries on
the plaintiff, his wife, and excessive and promiscuous
hunger for sex, a personality disorder called satyriasis,
was, at the time of the celebration of marriage,
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage although such
incapacity became manifest only after its solemnization.
The defendants evidence, on the other hand, on the
psychological incapacity of plaintiff did not have any
evidentiary weight, the same being doubtful, unreliable,
unclear and unconvincing.
On February 12, 1997, the trial court rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage contracted by and between
FRANCISCO L. GONZALEZ and ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO
solemnized by Rev. Fr. Alberto Ampil, S.J. on February 4,
1979, at the Manila Hilton Chapel, Nuestra de Guia
Parish, Ermita, Manila, NULL and VOID ab initio with all
legal effects as provided for under applicable laws;
2) Awarding the custody of minors Maria Andrea and
Marco Manuel to the plaintiff, and Carlo Manuel and Maria
Angela with rights of visitation given to both parties
under an arrangement mutually acceptable to both of
them;

2. Acropolis property -------------

6,000,000

3. Baguio property -----------------

10,000,000

4. Nasugbu property --------------

5,000,000

5. Greenmeadows property -----

12,500,000

6. Sagitarius condominium ------

2,250,000
P 47,750,000

2) Personal:
1. Pajero 89 model ---------------

500,000

2. L-300 90 model ----------------

350,000

3. Nissan Sentra 89 model -----

200,000
P 1,050,000

6) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in cash the

amount of P2,196,125.
7) Ordering the defendant who has actual possession of
the conjugal properties to deliver to plaintiff her share of
the real and personal properties, including four (4)
Tamaraws, above-described, and execute the necessary
documents valid in law conveying the title and ownership
of said properties in favor of the plaintiff.
Not satisfied with the manner their properties were
divided, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. He
did not contest that part of the decision which declared
his marriage to respondent void ab initio.
In its Decision dated April 2, 2003, the Appellate Court
affirmed the assailed Decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied in an Order dated July 23, 1997.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

B. 1) Defendants share of real properties:

1. Corinthian house and lot ----

P 20,500,000

2. Office -----------------------------

27,000,000
P 47,500,000

2) Personal:

3) Ordering the parties to deliver the childrens legitimes

pursuant to Article 50, in relation to Article 51 of the
Family Code;

1. Galant 83 model --------------2. Toyota Corona 79 model ----

80,000

4) Ordering the defendant to give monthly support to

Maria Andrea and Marco Manuel in the amount of Forty
Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos within five (5) days of each
corresponding month delivered at the residence of the
plaintiff staring January 1997 and thereafter;

3. Coaster 77 model --------------

150,000

4. Corolla 92 model --------------

180,000

5. Mercedes Sedan 79 model ---

220,000

5) Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of

gains and dividing the conjugal properties between the
plaintiff and the defendant as follows:

6. Pick-up 89 model --------------

100,000

7. Mercedes wagon 80 model

300,000

8. Four (4) Tamaraws -------------

120,000

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the court of

Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be
divided equally between the parties.
Let it be stressed that petitioner does not challenge the
Appellate Courts Decision declaring his marriage with
respondent void. Consequently, their property relation
shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the
Family Code quoted as follows:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For

purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in

the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household."
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the
property relations between spouses shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man
and woman capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman
live together under a void marriage. Under this property
regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them
in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties
acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been
acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further
provides that a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from
the proceeds of the pizza business, petitioner himself
testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and
that she helped him in managing the business. In his
handwritten letter to her dated September 6, 1989, he
admitted that Youve helped me for what we are now
and I wont let it be destroyed.

law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this

Court.[2] Factual findings of the Appellate Court are
generally binding on, especially this Court, when in
complete accord with the findings of the trial court,[3] as
in this case. This is because it is not our function to
analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.[4]
WHEREFOR, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66041, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the

trial court which was later affirmed by the CA.
Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the
provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code.
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the
property relations between spouses shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man
and woman capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman
live together under a void marriage.

SO ORDERED.
GONZALES VS GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article 147Property Regime of void marriage]
FACTS: After two years of living together, Francisco and
Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were born
from this union. During the time they lived together, they
acquired properties, and Erlinda managed their pizza
business.
In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of
their marriage based on Mario's alleged psychological
incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. During the time they lived together,
they acquired properties. She managed their pizza
business and worked hard for its development. Mario
denied she was the one who managed the pizza business
and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties
"existing during their marriage."

It appeared that before they started living together,

petitioner offered respondent to be his partner in his
pizza business and to take over its operations.
Respondent started managing the business in 1976. Her
job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the
business; (2) manage the personnel; and (3) meet people
during inspection and supervision of outlets. She
reported for work everyday, even on Saturdays and
Sundays, without receiving any salary or allowance.

In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its

judgment and ordered the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties
between Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the
manner their properties were divided, Francisco appealed
to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of

RULING: No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are

co-owners of the properties in question. The marriage of

ISSUE: Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the

properties existing during their marriage.

Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties

acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and
will be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties
acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been
acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further
provides that a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil
Code, Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner,

vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P.
DELA CRUZ, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled
"Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia
P. Dela Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving the
ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the
cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent's
legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16,
1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or
Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman
Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the
wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii.
Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was
born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the
Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of
his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his
brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The
trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel
had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. 1 When he
returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private
respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel
contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 Two months earlier, on
May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the
Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural
land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an
area of 10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was
issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise
purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda

as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said

property was later issued in her name.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered

On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang

executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the
latter. 3 The parties therein agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their
only child, Herminia Palang. 4

1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;

Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son,

Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In 1979,
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon
Carlina's complaint. 5 Two years later, on February 15,
1981, Miguel died.

3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of

that piece of agricultural land situated at Balisa, San
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080
square meters and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736, Lot
1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;

On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter

Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents
sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot
both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner.

4. Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance

from his deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-half
(1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in
the name of Miguel Palang, provided that the former
(Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this decision
becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever
renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to
Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of
her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang,
dated October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of
deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another
separate action;

Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the

riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is registered in their
names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her
half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She
added that the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120
is her sole property, having bought the same with her
own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from
claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its
decision on June 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint after
declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the
subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to
provide for the intestate shares of the parties,
particularly of Kristopher Palang, Miguel's illegitimate
son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads.

2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay

of the residential lot located at Poblacion, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B
including the old house standing therein;

5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED. 6
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's
decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on
July 22, 1994 with the following dispositive portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed
decision in hereby REVERSED and another one entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the
properties in question;

2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the

properties in question to herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and
to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the
name of plaintiffs-appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs. 7
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale
covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in
favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the
second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone. Second,
petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred
in not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palang's
illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel's
estate. Third, respondent court erred, according to
petitioner, "in not finding that there is sufficient pleading
and evidence that Kristopher A. Palang or Christopher A.
Palang should be considered as party-defendant in Civil
Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No.
24199. 8
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as
the pertinent provisions of law and jurisprudence, the
Court denies the petition and affirms the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two
pieces of property subject of this action. Petitioner assails
the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same
parcels of land. There is no dispute that the transfer of
ownership from the original owners of the riceland and
the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses
Cespedes, respectively, were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in
favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are notcapacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without

the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While

Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973,
said union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and
unaffected by the latter'sde facto separation.

Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership

with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland
should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert
to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of

the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It
must be stressed that actual contribution is required by
this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary
or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of
the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and
no presumption of equal shares. 9

Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina

previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court
erred in holding that the decision adopting their
compromise agreement "in effect partakes the nature of
judicial confirmation of the separation of property
between spouses and the termination of the conjugal
partnership." 12 Separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is
an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. 13 The
judgment which resulted from the parties' compromise
was not specifically and expressly for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her

testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and
sell and had a sari-sari store 10 but failed to persuade us
that she actually contributed money to buy the subject
riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around
twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixtyfour and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude
that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in
the purchase price of subject property, 11 there being no
proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two
months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In
the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was
intended to exclude their case from the operation of
Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date
when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not
having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that
the riceland was purchased even before they started
living together. In any case, even assuming that the
subject property was bought before cohabitation, the
rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual
contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed
money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan,

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly

bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the
notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty.
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided
the money for the purchase price and directed that
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. 14
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel
to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent
by express provision of law because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly
provides that the prohibition against donations between
spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, 15 for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union. 16
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status
and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's
estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's
correct assessment that the trial court erred in making

pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and

filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of
the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and
the determination of the estate of the latter and claims
thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court
or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and
cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action
which is for recovery of ownership and possession." 17
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that
Kristopher Palang should be considered as partydefendant in the case at bar following the trial court's
decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not
been impleaded as party defendant but theorized that he
had submitted to the court's jurisdiction through his
mother/guardian ad litem. 18 The trial court erred gravely.
Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore,
not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda cannot
be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in
the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for
Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is
illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid multiplicity of
suits. 19 Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the
preceding paragraph where the need for probate
proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's estate
and Kristopher's successional rights has been pointed
out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ERLINDA AGAPAY VS CARLINA PALANG
G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997
FACTS; Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with
whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his second
marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son.
The couple purchased a parcel of agricultural land and
the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She
also purchased a house and lot in Binalonan, where the
property was later issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina
executed a Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of

land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a

complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.
Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the
riceland and house and lot allegedly bought by Miguel
during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the
complaint and ordered the respondents to provide for the
intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Erlinda's
son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties from Miguel's
second marriage be granted to Erlinda.
RULING: No. SC held that the agricultural land and
house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article
148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. The marriage of
Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and
unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It
must be stressed that actual contribution is required by
this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary
or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.

Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is

unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property, there
being no proof of the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
bought the same for P20,000.00 when she was only 22
years old. The testimony of the notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be
placed as the vendee.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money
to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no basis to
justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by
the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel
to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition against donations
between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
As regards to the donation of their conjugal property
executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of their daughter,
was also void. Separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is
an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The
judgment which resulted from the parties compromise
was not specifically and expressly for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169698

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her

testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and
sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC
that she actually contributed money to buy the subject
riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, when she was only around 20 of age and
Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S.

LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner

- versus YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent.

Promulgated: November 29, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition
for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated April 29,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
69797, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of September 16,
2005, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action for
Judicial Partition of Real Property thereat commenced by
the herein petitioner Lupo Atienza against respondent
Yolanda de Castro.
The facts:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then
the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the
services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between
Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being
a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together
in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of
their union, two children were born. However, after the
birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour
until they parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati
City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition
between them of a parcel of land with improvements
located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint, docketed in said
court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the
subject property was acquired during his union with
Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the
property is co-owned by them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the
property in question was acquired by Yolanda sometime

in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title

thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name
without his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose
any objection thereto because at the time, their affair
was still thriving. It was only after their separation and
his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her new
live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he
demanded his share thereat as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations.
According to her, she acquired the same property for Two
Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00)
using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it
thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman.
In a decision[3] dated December 11, 2000, the trial
court rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the
contested property as owned in common by him and
Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in
equal shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City
to be owned in common by plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and
the defendant YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO share-and-share
alike and ordering the partition of said property between
them. Upon the finality of this Decision, the parties are
hereby directed to submit for the confirmation of the
Court a mutually agreed project of partition of said
property or, in case the physical partition of said property
is not feasible because of its nature, that either the same
be assigned to one of the parties who shall pay the value
corresponding to the share of the other or that the
property to be sold and the proceeds thereof be divided
equally between the parties after deducting the expenses
incident to said sale.
The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the defendant.

with her own money. She maintained that the documents

appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the best
evidence to prove who actually bought it, and refuted the
findings of the trial court, as well as Lupos assertions
casting doubt as to her financial capacity to acquire the
disputed property.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in
its decision[4] of April 29, 2005, reversed and set aside
that of the trial court and adjudged the litigated property
as exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The
subject property is hereby declared to be exclusively
owned by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De Castro. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively
owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled that under the provisions
of Article 148 of the Family Code vis--vis the evidence
on record and attending circumstances, Yolandas claim
of sole ownership is meritorious, as it has been
substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo
failed to overcome the burden of proving his allegation
that the subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru
his exclusive funds.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the CA in its Resolution of September 16, 2005,[5]
Lupo is now with this Court via the present recourse
arguing that pursuant to Article 144[6] of the Civil Code,
he was in no way burdened to prove that he contributed
to the acquisition of the subject property because with or
without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed
a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article 484[7] of
Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either
or both of them during their extramarital union, such
property would be legally owned by them in common and
governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in
default of contracts, or special provisions.

SO ORDERED.
We DENY.
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went
on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein
arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that
she purchased the disputed property in her own name

It is not disputed that the parties herein were not

capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo
Atienza was validly married to another woman at the

time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their

property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148[8]
of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions ...[9] Proof of actual contribution
is required.[10]
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of
property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only
be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares
shall be presumed to be equal.[11]
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the
parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof
applies because this provision was intended precisely to
fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.[12]
Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there
was no provision governing property relations of couples
living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even
if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.[13]
The applicable law being settled, we now remind
the petitioner that here, as in other civil cases, the
burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as
plaintiff below is not automatically entitled to the relief
prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations
in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only
after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the

plaintiff warrant such relief.[14] Indeed, the party

alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.[15]
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent,
having no financial capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of
his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed
therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are
burdened by the fact that his claim to the property
contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to
Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of
Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and
between the respondent and the vendor of said property,
to the exclusion of the petitioner. As aptly pointed out by
the CA:
Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court,
[Lupo] failed to overcome this burden. Perusing the
records of the case, it is evident that the trial court
committed errors of judgment in its findings of fact and
appreciation of evidence with regard to the source of the
funds used for the purchase of the disputed property and
ultimately the rightful owner thereof. Factual findings of
the trial court are indeed entitled to respect and shall not
be disturbed, unless some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance have been overlooked or
misinterpreted that would otherwise materially affect the
disposition of the case.
In making proof of his case, it is paramount that
the best and most complete evidence be formally
entered. Rather than presenting proof of his actual
contribution to the purchase money used as
consideration for the disputed property, [Lupo] diverted
the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by painting
her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the
capacity to purchase any property. Instead of proving his
ownership, or the extent thereof, over the subject
property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere attack
on the financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented
documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar
accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately
failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of
the said property. The fact that [Yolanda] had a limited
access to the funds of the said corporations and had
repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts
for their behalf do not prove that the money she used in

buying the disputed property, or any property for that

matter, came from said withdrawals.
As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily
rested on the apparent financial capacity of the parties.
On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain and the
President and General Manager of two corporations and
on the other is [Yolanda], a Certified Public Accountant.
Surmising that [Lupo] is financially well heeled than
[Yolanda], the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that
[Yolanda] had taken advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the
court a quo is in error. (Words in brackets supplied.)
As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in
the disputed property is without basis because not only
did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the
purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents
pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds
to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from
his mere say so and voluminous records of bank
accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the
petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof.
Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply
stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it;
mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in
the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property covered thereby may be
under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or
that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent
to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as
already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his
claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the
trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under
the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast
to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein
respondent was able to present preponderant evidence
of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no coownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase
the property from her earnings, not only as an
accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in
foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry
retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory
notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She
also presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial

capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject

property.
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA
committed no reversible error in rendering the herein
challenged decision and resolution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and
the assailed issuances of the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Atienza v. De Castro
Property Relationship In A Void Marriage
FACTS: In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No.
169698, November 29, 2006, Lupo, a married man
cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their
coverture, they allegedly acquired a real property and
registered it under the name of Yolanda. Their
cohabitation turned sour, hence, they parted. He filed an
action for partition contending that they owned it in
common under the concept of limited co-ownership.
Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she
acquired it thru her own savings as a businesswoman.
The RTC declared the property subject of co-ownership,
but the CA reversed it as he failed to prove material
contribution in the acquisition of the same. On appeal, he
contended that he was not burdened to prove that he
contributed in the acquisition of the property because
with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner
adding that under Article 484, NCC, for as long as they
acquired the property during their extramarital union,
such property would be legally owned by them in
common and governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is
the contention correct? Explain.
Held: No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were
not capacitated to marry each other because Lupo
Atienza was validly married to another woman at the
time of his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property
regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationship, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, only the

properties acquired by both of the parties through their

actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. (Cario v. Cario, 351 SCRA 127
(2001)). Proof of actual contribution is required. (Agapay
v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302).
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of
property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only
be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares
shall be presumed to be equal. (Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil.
474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April
12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718; Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro,
G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006).
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the
parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof
applies because this provision was intended precisely to
fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. (Saguid
v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA
678). Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted,
there was no provision governing property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article 256,
F.C.).
The applicable law being settled the burden of
proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as
plaintiff below is not automatically entitled to the relief
prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations
in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only
after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the
plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a

fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is

not evidence.
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent,
having no financial capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of
his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed
therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are
burdened by the fact that his claim to the property
contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to
Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of
Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and
between the respondent and the vendor of said property,
to the exclusion of the petitioner.
The claim of co-ownership in the disputed
property is without basis because not only did he fail to
substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase
thereof but likewise the very trail of documents
pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds
to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from
his mere say so and voluminous records of bank
accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the
petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof.
Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply
stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it;
mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in
the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property covered thereby may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate or
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already
stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is
either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial
courts finding that the disputed property falls under the
purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to
petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein
respondent was able to present preponderant evidence
of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no coownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase
the property from earnings, not only as an accountant
but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She
presented her clientele and the promissory notes

evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also

presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial
capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
property.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743

were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,

Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing
the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the
September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent

Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian
at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He
had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing
at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that
the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued
to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of
the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was

Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He

further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds
and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar
San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because
this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo
from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled
that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification
was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting

Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador

S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive

portion of which states:

petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous

marriage.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan

on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying
their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not
state the facts and law on which it was based.

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and

January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the

petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x 33

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an

Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was
re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73

of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode
of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to

submit their respective position papers on the twin issues
of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his
previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on
June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found
that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines
and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal

capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that
the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article
26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph
2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227,
there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual
view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that
"Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the
basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and
effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x
have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this
reason, the marriage between the deceased and

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for

reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the
instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later
filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage
to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife
of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly
laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the

petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In
the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence
as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length
of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The
rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between
"residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence"
for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as

synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent

residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under
the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented
billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and
Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988
to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling
cards 49stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident
of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in
the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed
on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still
a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated
in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal

personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether
a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively
apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art.
26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not
valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that
his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the
alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by
the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which

validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose

decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the
Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. IbaySomera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held
that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the
adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated
that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
the other." 56
57

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated

that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the
development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a
mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the

validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse.

In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation
to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the
historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article
26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving
a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code
and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage,
being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is
the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of
this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court
stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its

results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably,
the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must
not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice
"as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when
it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to
it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of
its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the

present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.

However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court
for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.

A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then
she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that
the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of
both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating the property relations of couples
living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated
to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing
the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to

marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as

husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during
said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we
ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition
of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature
of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance
must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x
x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
San Luis vs. San Luis
Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse
who predeceased him, then married again to an

American citizen who divorced him, then remarried

again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the
children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the
3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous
since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law
(can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with
FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other
jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd
marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien
spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd
marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was
remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further
evidence on this.

Facts:

---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to

MTD, showing evidence of the ff:
Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in
Alabang - to prove proper venue
Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to
sue
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside
Place of residence should be understood in as the
personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was
properly filed

FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:

Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to

remarry under Philippine law

VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in

1963

Issue: WON Venue properly laid? YES

MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced

him before Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973

-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election

cases.

FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a

Presbyterian Church in California n 1974, lived with him
until he died for 18 years in their Alabang residence

-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes

of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of
a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.

-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF
FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration
before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for
2 grounds:
Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in
Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang,
decedent's residence at the time of his death)
No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code
provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would
impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256,
FC)

WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES

As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van
Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently provides the legal
basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien
spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases
which were in Ma'am's book)

-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it

was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a
divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again
---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo
now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as the
marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not
sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC
Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still
petition for a letter of administration as an "INTERESTED
PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating that
she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by
persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is
void.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45418 October 30, 1980
TEOFISTA P. TINITIGAN, EFREN TINITIGAN, ELSA
TINITIGAN and SEVERINO TINITIGAN,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
SEVERINO TINITIGAN, SR. and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45574. October 30, 1980.*

PENTEL MERCHANDISING CO., INC. and TEOFISTA

PAYURAN TINITIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PEDRO C.
NAVARRO, CHIU CHIN SIONG and SEVERINO
TINITIGAN SR., respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Two petitions are herein filed to review on certiorari the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 1, 1976 in
CA-G.R. No. 05387- SP docketed as L-45418 and L-45574
respectively, affirming the order of respondent Judge
Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Pasig, Branch II in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September
29, 1975. On March 25, 1975, petitioners Pentel
Merchandising Co., Inc. (Pentel for short) and Teofista
Payumo Tinitigan (Payuran for short) entered into a
contract of lease of a residential house whereby for a
term of four years Payumo shall lease to Pentel the
premises at 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15923, at a rental of
P1,500.00 per month with option to buy the same within
the term of the lease for P350,000.00 [pp. 13-16, rec].
On April 22, 1975, Payumo and her three children, Efren,
Elsa, and Severino Jr., all surnamed Tinitigan, leased to
United Electronics Corporation a factory building together
with the portion of land on which it is erected covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160998 situated in
Banwag, Paraaque, Rizal (pp. 17-20, rec., L-45418).
In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr.
(Tinitigan for short), husband of Payumo and private
responded herein, was not secured. Consequently, on
May 22, 1975, Severino Tinitigan Sr., as conjugal partner
and shareholder of Molave Development Corporation
which is a family corporation filed a complaint captioned
"Annulment of Ownership and Contract of witness PreInjunction" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig,
7th Judicial District (pp. 23-27, rec.). This case docketed
Civil Case No. 21277 and which was assigned to Branch II
presided by the Honorable Judge Pedro C. Navarro
principally sought to annul the contract of lease executed
by Payumo in favor of United Electronics Corporation The
property involved in this contract is entirely different
from that leased to Pentel with option to buy.

The complaint, however, was later amended with leave of

court granted by order of August 20, 1975, to include in
the prayer the following:
... 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff
from encumbering or disposing properties in the name of
the Molave Development Corporation or those in the
name of Severino Tinitigan Sr. and Teofista Payuran; ...
In the same order, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II enjoined
petitioner from doing any "act to dispose, mortgage or
otherwise encumber the properties described in
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint" and set the case
for hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction on
September 5, 1975. Paragraphs 7 and 8 pertain to the
factory building and the land on which it is erected
covered by TCT No. 160998 (p. 151, rec.).
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction the issue of
the contract of lease of lot covered by TCT 160998 which
was the main object of the complaint was settled
amicably. Severino Tinitigan Sr., however, on September
17, 1975, filed a motion seeking judicial approval of sale
of a two-storey residential house and a lot which are
conjugal properties located at 205 Loring St., Pasay City,
covered by TCT No. 15923 (pp. 28-34, rec.). The house is
tenanted by Quintin Lim Eng Seng (Quintin Lim for short)
who is President and General Manager of Pentel. Tinitigan
contends that the proposed sale of the property for
P300,000.00 to Quintin who was given priority right to
purchase, was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal
obligations that were overdue in the amount of
P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure of
mortgaged conjugal property. Earlier, the same property
had been leased by Payumo to Pentel with an option to
buy for P350,000.00.
On September 29, 1975, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II issued
an order granting Tinitigan "authority to sell the house
and lot at No. 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by TCT
No. 15923 in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino
citizen, for P300,000.00" (pp. 35-37, rec.,).
An urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by
Payumo and children alleging among others that the sale
would result in substantial and tremendous losses
because the property sought to be sold is a suitable

condominium and/or hotel site and would, therefore,

command a higher price (pp. 56-57, rec.).

and there being no further issue left between the parties

(pp. 72-73, rec.).

On October 9, 1975, merely two days after the motion for

reconsideration of the September 29, 1975 order was
filed in the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, the wife Payumo filed
against her husband Tinitigan a complaint for legal
separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4459-P before Branch XXVIII of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City presided
by the Honorable Judge Enrique A. Agana (pp. 17-21,
rec.).

By a deed of absolute sale dated January 16, 1976 (pp.

38-44, rec.). the husband Tinitigan apparently sold for
P315,000.00 the Pasay property not to Quintin Lim as
contained in the order of the court in Civil Case No.
21277, but to herein private respondent Chiu Chin Siong
(Chiu for short) who obtained a title thereto. Pursuantly,
TCT No. 20031 was issued cancelling TCT No. 15923.

On October 29, 1975, the Pasay Court after noting that

"the parties had agreed to the continuation of the
administration of said conjugal properties by plaintiff
(wife) Teofista P. Tinitigan," appointed her administrative
of the conjugal properties subject to the following
conditions:
1) that all and any disposition and/or encumbrance of the
real estate belonging to the conjugal partnership shall be
subject to the approval of the court;
2) that all rentals accruing from the properties in Angeles
Civil shall be collected by the defendant Severino
Tinitigan for his subsistence and support; and
3) that the disposition of the property located at Loring
St., Pasay City, shall be subject to the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal" [P.
22, rec.].
In Civil Case No. 21277 however, the CFI of Rizal, Branch
II, presided by respondent Judge issued an order denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the September
29, 1975 order for lack of merit. Further, the court stated
that "the defendants (petitioners) have not even shown
that there are offers from other sources willing to buy the
property for more than P300.000.00 (p. 92, rec.)
On November 22, 1975, a notice of appeal was filed by
petitioners Payumo and children appealing the order of
November 3, 1975, it being allegedly final in nature in so
far as the disposition of the Pasay property is concerned

On February 23, 1976, a motion for the approval of the

sale to Chiu was filed by respondent Tinitigan in the CFI
of Rizal, Branch 11 (pp. 203-205, rec.).
On March 3, 1976, the said court issued an order
approving the sale executed by Severino Tinitigan Sr. in
favor of Chiu covering the parcel of land at 206 Loring
St., San Rafael District, Pasay City, for and in
consideration of the sum of Three Hundred Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P315,000.00) [pp. 206-207, rec.).
In a decision dated April 8, 1976, the same court denied
the appeal filed by petitioners Payumo and children on
the ground that the order appealed from is merely
interlocutory and cannot, therefore, be the subject of
appeal. Furthermore, it stated that "the sale in favor of
Chiu Chin Siong is a right pertaining to the plaintiff under
Article 171 of the Civil Code and the exercise cise of said
right is justifiable to relieve the rest of the conjugal
properties from mortgage obligations which are in danger
of foreclosure" (p. 90, rec.).
On May 17, 1976, Payumo and children filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondents
Tinitigan and the Honorable Pedro C. Navarro in the Court
of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 05387 assuming the
orders of respondent Judge and praying that a restraining
order be issued immediately enjoining respondent
Severino Tinitigan Sr. from selling or disposing of the
disputed property and if already sold to declare the sale
null and void. Petitioners likewise prayed that the order of
the lower court dismissing the appeal based on the
grounds aforestated be declared a nullity and that the
appeal be given due course (pp. 45-49, rec.).

On June 1, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered its

decision upholding the orders of respondent Judge,
particularly, the orders of September 29, 1975 approving
the sale of the conjugal property in Pasay City, to quote:
The ground for opposition to the sale is a claim that the
property is a 'choice lot' within 'the tourist belt and its
potentials for a hotel or condominium site is very
promising' (Ibid. p. 4). It does sound good but too
abstruse to meet the immediate need for the liquidation
of a big conjugal liability and to avoid foreclosure and
loss of the properties mortgaged. Besides the sale to
liquidate the conjugal liability finds support from the
provisions of Articles 161 and 171 of the Civil Code. We
also see from the record before us that petitioner Teofista
P. Tinitigan has filed a complaint for legal separation and
dissolution of the conjugal partnership in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVIII in Pasay City, under
Civil Case No. 4459-P. Private respondent agreed to the
appointment of petitioner Teofista P. Tinitigan as
administrative on certain conditions, which was approved
by the Court (Ibid., p. 30). One of these is that the
disposition of the property in question shall be subject to
the decision of the CFI of Rizal, Brapeh II in Pasig (Ibid., p.
30). As stated above, respondent Judge, presiding over
Branch II of the CFI of Rizal appellant proved the sale of
the conjugal property in question to liquidate certiorari
conjugal obligations (Ibid., pp- 17-19). ...
But the petitioners would, nevertheless compel us to
allow their appeal from the order dated September 29,
1975 approving the sale of the conjugal property in Pasay
City in order to liquidate certiorari conjugal obligations
(Ibid., p. 17) on the ground that the order dated
November 3, 1975 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order dated September 29, 1975 is
already final (Ibid., p. 4, par. 14). But the respondent
Judge hold the questioned order as merely interlocutory
(Ibid., p. 57). We sustain the respondent Judge. ... The
fact that what was resolved by the respondent Court was
a mere motion for judicial authority to sell conjugal
property to liquidate certiorari conjugal obligations (Ibid.,
p. 8) indicates that the order granting the motion (Ibid.,
p. 17) is interlocutory. The rationale underlying the rule
that an interlocutory order is not appealable is basically
the avoidance of multiplicity of appeals in a single case
which could considerably delay the final disposition of the

case (People vs. Rodriguez 24 SCRA 163, 167) [pp. 93-97,

rec.).

Petitioners assigr. the following errors as grounds for the

allowance of writ, to wit:

Thereafter, on July 19, 1976, private respondent Chiu

filed before the City Court, Branch III, at Pasay City,
presided by judge Pablo M. Malvar, a compliant for
unlawful detainer seeking an order to compel defendant
therein, Quintin C. Lim to vacate the premises in question
(pp. 331-335, rec.).

(1) The questioned order authorizing Severino Tinitigan

Sr., to sell the property in question is void because

On July 26, 1976, Quintin C. Lim filed his answer with

motion to dismiss denying that he 'was the lessee of the
properly and moving to dismiss the detainer action for
lack of jurisdiction, the issue of ownership not being
capable of decision without resolving the issue of
ownership pending in other courts (pp. 346-352, rec.).
On January 5, 1977, a petition for review docketed as L45418 was filed with this Court by Payumo and her three
children praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari
directed to the Court of Appeals, and commanding it to
send to this Court for review and determination the
records and proceedings of Civil Case No. 21277
assigned to the CFI of Rizal in Pasig, Branch II, presided
by respondent Judge Navarro. The main allegations of the
petition are: lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower
court since it did not have judicial authority to authorize
the sale of the conjugal property in Civil Case No. 21277
considering that the complaint in the said case referred
to other properties to the exclusion of the one authorized
to be sold; and abuse of discretion in dismissing the
appeal since the order authorizing the sale of the Loring
property was not merely interlocutory but one that was
final and appealable.
On February 15, 1976, another petition was filed with this
Court, this time by Pentel and Payuran, against
respondents Court of Appeals. Honorable Pedro C.
Navarro, Chiu Chin Siong and Severino Tinitigan Sr. The
petition, docketed as L-45574, seeks to review
on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 05387-SP dated June 1, 1976 and order of
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 21277 dated
September 29, 1975 on the ground that the said decision
and order are void.

(a) Tinitigan Sr. had no authority to sell the premises,

they being under the administration of Payuran;
(b) Respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over
the premises and could not grant Tinitigan authority to
sell them;
(c) The sale of the property was expressly authorized in
favor of Quintin Lim, not respondent Chiu;
(d) Pentel, whose President and General Manager is
Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the premises; and
(2) The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in
denying Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale
of the property here involved.
On February 23, 1977, this Court, after deliberating on
the petition filed in case G.R. No. L-45574 resolved
without giving due course thereto to require the
respondents to comment and to take up L-45574 with L45418 since both involve the same Court of Appeals
decision (p. 107, rec.).
During the pendency of these petitions, the Pasay Court
in the legal separation case (Civil Case No. 4459-P),
issued an order dated August 29, 1977 dissolving the
conjugal partnership between Tinitigan and Payumo and
approving the partition of their properties pursuant to an
agreement (pp. 319-325, rec.). The Loring property was
adjudicated in favor of the wife Payuran.
In consequence, defendant-respondent filed a motion to
exclude TCT 15923 from the list of properties that should
belong to Payumo (pp. 208-210, rec.). An amended
motion was subsequently filed on October 25, 1977
praying that the order of August 29, 1977 be amended in
such a way that the award of the Loring property be
conditioned upon the final outcome of the cases pending
before this Court (pp. 326-328, rec.).

Pursuant to said motion, the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXVIII,

Pasay City issued an order dated November 22, 1977 in
part stating that the "award of the Loring St., Pasay City
property under TCT No. 15923 in favor of the plaintiff in
the order of the court dated August 29, 1977 is
understood to the subject to the outcome of the cases
now pending before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L45418 and G.R. No. L-45574" (pp. 329-330, rec.).
Notwithstanding these proceedings, the City Court of
Pasay, Branch III in the unlawful detainer case, presided
by Judge Malvar, issued a decision dated January 18,
1978 ordering the defendant Quintin Lim and all persons
claiming under him to vacate the premises in question
and to pay the corresponding rentals thereof to the
plaintiff Chiu at the rate of P1,500.00 per month from
January 16, 1976, until the defendant and all persons
claiming under him actually vacate the said premises
(pp. 367-371, rec.).
For this reason, Payuran, on February 14, 1978, filed a
motion for leave to apply for a writ of injunction to enjoin
execution of the decision of Judge Malvar in the unlawful
detainer case and to prohibit further proceedings therein
(pp. 259-273, rec.).
This Court, on February 22, 1978, issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Malvar from conducting
further proceedings and from executing the decision
dated January 18, 1978 (pp. 372-374, rec.).
The issues in both L-45418 and L-45574 related primarily
to the question of validity of the challenged order dated
September 29, 1975 issued by respondent Judge Navarro
of the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, in Pasig and the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals.
WE pursue our discussion on the merits of the case as
predicated on grounds raised in the assignment of errors.
Petitioners argue that the order authorizing Tinitigan to
sell the Loring property is void; firstly, because Tinitigan
had no authority to sell the premises, they being under
the administration of Payuran. This contention is without
legal basis. Article 165 of the New Civil Code decrees that
"the husband is the administrator of the conjugal

partnership." This is the general rule. Although Article

168 of the same Code provides that "the wife may by
express authority of the husband embodied in a public
instrument, administer the conjugal partnership
property" and scattered provisions in the Code likewise
speak of administration by the wife pursuant to a judicial
decree, the said provisions are not applicable in the
instant case. The judicial decree dated October 29, 1975
appointing Payumo as administrative of the conjugal
partnership cannot be treated as an exception because it
was issued only after the CFI of Rizal, Branch II had
granted Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property.
Besides, the appointment of Payumo as administrative
was not absolute as it was made subject to certain
conditions agreed upon by the parties. Although the
claim by Payumo that she was actually administering
their conjugal properties even prior to this controversy
may have some color of truth in it; legally, however, such
fact is not enough to make her administratix of the
conjugal partnership for absent a public instrument or a
judicial decree, administration still pertains to the
husband as explicitly set forth in Article 165 (supra).
As held in the case of Ysasi vs. Fernandez (23 SCRA
1079, 1083 [June 25, 1968]).
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. This is a right clearly granted to him by law.
More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is
not entitled as of right to joint administration. The
husband may even enforce right of possession against
the wife who has taken over the administration without
his consent. And the wife may be punished for contempt
for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets. She
may be required to render full and complete accounting
of such properties.
Necessarily, the conclusion is that Tinitigan Sr. had not
ceased being the administrator of their conjugal
properties at the time the motion for judicial approval of
sale was granted. Being administrator, however, does not
give him outright authority to alienate or encumber
conjugal assets. This kind of transactions requires the
express or implied consent of the wife subject to certain
exceptions. Thus, Article 166 of the New Civil Code
provides

Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos

mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is
confined in a leprosarium the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
give her conscience the court may compel her to grant
the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the
conjugal partnership before the effective date of this
Code (Emphasis supplied).
This was precisely the reason why respondent Tinitigan
Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of the Loring property.
The filing of the said motion was, in fact, directed by a
legal provision since it became almost impossible for
private respondent to obtain his wife's consent to the
sale which transaction has not proven to be fraudulent.
As the evidence warrants, the sale was necessary to
answer for a big conjugal liability which might endanger
the family's economic standing. Actually, this is one
instance where the wife's consent is not required and
impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary. According
to Article 171 of the New Civil Code, "the husband may
dispose of the conjugal partnership for the purposes
specified in Articles 161 and 162." In general, these
articles deal with the obligation of the conjugal
partnership. Specifically, Article 161, paragraph 1
provides that "the conjugal partnerships shall be liable
for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
case where she may legally bind the partnership."
It must be noted that Payumo did not dispute the
existence of these conjugal liabilities. What she
questioned, in reality, was the propriety of the sale of the
disputed property, which, according to petitioners, has
bright prospects of development and market value
appreciation in the future. It was a 'choice lot' as termed
by them. Nevertheless, the sale was the surest and the
most practical means resorted to by respondent Tinitigan
Sr. to save them from a serious financial setback. This
consideration cannot be sidestepped by speculative
allegations. Moreover, petitioners offer no acceptable and
practical solution to remedy this contingency.

Secondly, petitioners contend that the questioned order

is void because respondent Judge had not acquired
jurisdiction over the premises and could not grant
Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell them. They would seem to
capitalize on the fact that the complaint in Civil Case No.
21277 particularly mentioned only the lot covered by TCT
No. 160998 leased to United Electronics Corporation.
Petitioners failed to note, however, that in the amended
complaint, respondents prayed among others "to restrain
the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering
or disposing properties in the name of the Molave
Development Corporation or those in the name of
Severino Tinitigan Sr, and Teofista Payuran." This, in
effect, brings the Loring property by TCT No. 15923
within the jurisdiction of the court which issued the order.
Certainly, a motion in relation thereto is but proper.
Furthermore, it is worth repeating that the said motion to
seek judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent
amounts to compliance with legal requirement delineated
in Article 166, supra. The issuance of the order dated
September 29, 1975 was, henceforth, pursuant to a
validly acquired jurisdiction, in keeping with a wellentrenched principle that "jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein - a matter that can be
resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may
the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely
upon the defendant. But it is necessary that jurisdiction
be properly involved or called into activity by the firing of
a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading.
Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter. None of the parties to the litigation can
enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall be removed.
That power is a matter of legislative enactment which
none but the legislature may change" (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1970 ed., pp. 37-38).
In addition, records further disclose that the action for
legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership
was filed almost right after the order of September 29,
1975 in Civil Case No. 21277 was issued. As can be
gleaned from the facts, the filing of Civil Case No. 4459-P
was apparently a tactical maneuver intended to frustrate

the order of September 29, 1975 issued by respondent

Judge Navarro granting Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the
Loring property. Aptly, however, the order of October 29,
1975 made the appointment of Payumo as administrative
subject to the condition "that the disposition of the
property located at Loring St., Pasay City shall be
subeject to the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal Branch II, Pasig, Rizal." There can be no clearer
indication of the validity of the questioned order, as far
as jurisdiction is concerned, than the latter court's own
recognition of the jurisdiction priorly acquired by the
court issuing it. The well-settled rule that "jurisdiction
once acquired continues until the case is finally
terminated" is hereby observed (Republic vs. Central
Surety and Ins. Co., 25 SCRA 641[1968]). "The
jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of facts
existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction
once attaches to the person and subject matter of the
litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although
they are of such a character as would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first innocence, will not
operate to oust jurisdiction almdy attached" (Ramos vs.
Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565, 583
[1971]).
Consequently, there is no merit in the assertion of
petitioner that it is the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
Pasay City, Branch XXVIII which should have assumed
jurisdiction over the disputed property upon the filing of
the complaint for legal separation and dissolution of
conjugal partnership To permit this would result in the
disregard of the order of September 29, 1975 issued by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Pasig, Branch II. Not
even the court whose jurisdiction is being invoked
sanctions this seeming attempt to contravene sound
doctrines and long-standing principles.
Thirdly, petitioners question the validity of the order
appellant proving the sale of the Loring property on the
ground that the sale was expressly authorized in favor of
Quintin Lim and not respondent Chiu. Obviously, this is
but a collateral issue. It is noteworthy that the motion
was filed in order to secure judicial approval of sale in
lieu of marital consent as Payumo would not grant the
same. The order, therefore, was not intended to vest
Quintin Lim exclusive right to purchase the Loring
property but rather it was intended to grant Tinitigan Sr.
authorized to sell the same. To construe otherwise would

defeat the purpose for which the motion was filed. The
fact that Quintin Lim was favored as buyer is merely
incidental, it having been made pursuant to the desire of
respondent Tinitigan Sr. premised on the former's interest
over the disputed property as tenant therein. Quintin
Lim, however, did not manifest his ability and willingness
to buy the property. He had practically every opportunity
prior to the sale in favor of Chiu to exercise his preemptive right but he failed to exercise the same for one
reason or another. The urgency of the need to settle
pressing conjugal obligations prompted respondent
Tinitigan Sr. to look for other buyers who could
immediately pay for the property Chiu, to whom the
property was subsequently offered, immediately paid the
full amount of P315,000.00 upon the court's approval of
the sale in his favor on March 3, 1976. This March 3,
1976 order is a reaffirmation of the order of September
29, 1975.
Fourthly, petitioners assail the validity of the order on
purely circumstantial ground that Pentel whose
President and General Manager is Quintin Lim, had the
option to buy the premises. While this may be so,
petitioners seem to have neglected that the contract of
lease between Payumo and Pentel with option to buy has
been entered into in violation of Civil Code provisions. A
close scrutiny of the facts would reveal that Payumo has
contravened the law by encumbering the disputed
property as well as other conjugal properties without her
husband's consent. Article 172 of the new Civil Code
provides that "the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband's consent, except in
cases provided by law." Granting arguendo that she is the
administrative still her act of leasing the lots covered by
TCT No. 15923 and TCT No. 160998 is unjustified, being
violative of Article 388 of the new Civil Code which states
that "the wife who is appellant pointed as an
administrative of the husband's property cannot alienate
or encumber the husband's property or that of the
conjugal partnership without judicial authority."
Consequently, Payuran's unauthorized transaction cannot
be invoked as a source of right or valid defense. True, the
contract may bind persons parties to the same but it
cannot bind another not a party thereto, merely because
he is aware of such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof (Manila Port Service vs. Court of
Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214, 1217). So goes the "res inter
alios acta nobis nocet, nec prodest," which means that a

transaction between two parties ought not to operate to

the prejudice of a third person.
Finally, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals
erred as a matter of law in denying Payuran's petition to
enjoin or set aside the sale of the Loring property. This
argument, however, is unsubstantiated. The facts as
when as the evidence presented by both parties leave no
other recourse for the respondent Court of Appeals
except to apply the pertinent legal provisions respecting
the matter. Whether the order authorizing the sale of the
Loring property is interlocutory or not, becomes of no
moment in view of the conclusion aforesaid.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE
PETITIONS IN THESE TWO CASES ARE HEREBY DENIED
AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED
JUNE 1, 1976 AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1975 ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED.
WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN BOTH CASES.
SO ORDERED.

Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan

Facts: Payuran and her 3 children leased to United Elec
Corp a factory building with the land. The consent of
Tinitigan Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured.
Consequently he filed a complaint for Annulment of
Ownership & Contract of Lease at CFI Rizal. The
complaint was later amended to include restrain
defendants from encumbering or disposing property in
the name of Molave Development Corp & those in their
name as husband and wife. Te court enjoined Payuran
from doing any act to dispose the property. The case was
then set for hearing primarily on the the issue of
preliminary injunction. The contract of lease was settled
amicably. However Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval
of sale of 2 rented house and lot which are conjugal
which was tenanted by Quintin Lim. The court granted.
An MR was filed by Payuran because allegedly the Loring
property is suitable for condo site therefore command a
higher price. Two days thereafter, Payuran filed a legal

separation case at CFI Pasay. The parties agreed to the

continuation of the administration of the conjugal
property by Payuran subject to certain conditions, one of
which the Loring property shall be subject to the decision
of CFI Rizal. Meanwhile Judge of CFI Rizal denied
petitioners MR for lack of merit. They appealed but was
denied on the ground that the order appealed from is
merely interlocutory. Payuran and children then filed a
petition for certiorari at the CA which affirmed the same,
hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the court where respondent Judge
(judge of CFI Rizal) sits did not acquire jurisdiction over
the Loring property hence cannot grant authority to sell.
Held: CFI Rizal did acquire jurisdiction over the Loring
property. The amended complaint prayed among others
to restrain defendant from encumbering or disposing of
the property. This in effect brings the Loring property
under the jurisdiction of the court (CFI Rizal). Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is
determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
It cannot be made dependent upon the defenses. The
Filing of the legal separation case after the order of
denial is a tactical maneuver to frustrate the order. The
administration of property is given to Payuran but such is
not absolute. It was subject to a condition. The CFI Pasay
even recognized the jurisdiction primarily acquired by CFI
Rizal. Jurisdiction once acquired continue until the case is
finally terminated.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN,
LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO
SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN, petitioners,
vs.

HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

ROMARICO HENSON, respondents.
Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioners.
Benjamin Dadios and Bausa, Ampil, Suarez, Paredes &
Bausa for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for
review on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the
execution of a decision in an action for collection of a
sum of money may be nullified on the ground that the
real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are
the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not
participate in his wife's business transaction from which
said action stemmed.
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina
Pineda on January 6, 1964. 1 They have three children but
even during the early years of their marriage, Romarico
and Katrina had been most of the time living separately.
The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in
Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971,
Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in
Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L.
Henson 2 with money borrowed from an officemate. His
father need the amount for investments in Angeles City
and Palawan. 3
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina
entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the
latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale
valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars or
P321,830.95. 4 When Katrina failed to return the pieces of
jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan
demanded payment of their value.
On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita
Chan a check for P55,000 which, however, was
dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged
with estafa before the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV. 5 After trial, the
lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on
the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but
civil in nature as no estafa was committed by the
issuance of the check in payment of a pre-existing
obligation. 6

In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband

Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband
Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of
money also in the same branch of the aforesaid
court. 7 The records of the case show that Atty. Gregorio
Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only in
behalf of Katrina. When the case was called for pre-trial,
Atty. Albino once again appeared as counsel for Katrina
only. While it is true that during subsequent hearings,
Atty. Expedite Yumul, who collaborated with Atty. Albino,
appeared for the defendants, it is not shown on record
that said counsel also represented Romarico. In fact, a
power of attorney which Atty. Albino produced during the
trial, showed that the same was executed solely by
Katrina. 8
After trial, the court promulgated a decisions 9 in favor of
the Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to
pay the Wongs HK$199,895.00 or P321,830.95 with legal
interest from May 27, 1975, the date of filing of the
complaint, until fully paid; P20,000 as expenses for
litigation; P15,000 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the
suit.
A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon
were four lots in Angeles City covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 30950, 30951, 30952 and 30953
all in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina
Henson. 10
The public auction sale was first set for October 30, 1977
but since said date was declared a public holiday, Deputy
Sheriff Emerito Sicat reset the sale to November 11,
1977. On said date, the following properties registered in
the name of Romarico Henson "married to Katrina
Henson" were sold at public auction: (a) two parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950
and 30951 with respective areas of 293 and 289 square
meters at P145,000 each to Juanito L. Santos, 11 and (b)
two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 30952 and 30953 with respective areas of 289
and 916 square meters in the amount of P119,000.00 to
Leonardo B. Joson. 12
After the inscription on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
30951 of the levy on execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 2224, the property covered by said title was
extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Porac,
Pampanga on account of the mortgage loan of P8,000
which Romarico and Katrina had obtained from said bank.
The property was sold by the sheriff to the highest bidder
for P57,000 on September 9, 1977. On September 14,
1978, Juanito Santos, who had earlier bought the same

property at public auction on November 11, 1977,

redeemed it by paying the sum of P57,000 plus the legal
interest of P6,840.00 or a total amount of P63,840.00. 13

for annulment of a final and executory judgment or order

rendered by another court of first instance or of a branch
thereof (Gianan vs. Imperial, 55 SCRA 755)." 18

About a month before such redemption or on August 8, 1

978, Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the
decision in Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the writ of
execution, levy on execution and the auction sale therein
in the same Court of First Instance. 14 Romarico alleged
that he was "not given his day in court" because he was
not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul
appeared solely for Katrina; that although he did not file
an answer to the complaint, he was not declared in
default in the case; that while Atty. Albino received a
copy of the decision, he and his wife were never
personally served a copy thereof; that he had nothing to
do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not
authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that
the properties levied on execution and sold at public
auction by the sheriff were his capital properties and
therefore, as to him, all the proceedings had in the case
were null and void.

On whether or not the properties lenied upon and sold at

public auction may be reconveyed to Romarico, the
court, finding that there was no basis for holding the
conjugal partnership liable for the personal indebtedness
of Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance in view of the
jurisprudence that the interest of the wife in the conjugal
partnership property being inchoate and therefore merely
an expectancy, the same may not be sold or disposed of
for value until after the liquidation and settlement of the
community assets. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

On November 10, 1978, the lower court issued an order

restraining the Register of Deeds of Angeles City from
issuing the final bill of sale of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 30950 and 30951 in favor of Juanito Santos and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30952 and 30953 in
favor of Leonardo Joson until further orders of the
court. 15On January 22, 1979, upon motion of Romarico,
the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the sheriff from approving the final bill of sale of the land
covered by the aforementioned certificates of title and
the Register of Deeds of Angeles City from registering
said certificates of title in the names of Santos and Joson
until the final outcome of the case subject to Romarico's
posting of a bond in the amount of P321,831.00. 16
After trial on the merits, the lower court 17 rendered a
decision holding that Romarico was indeed not given his
day in court as he was not represented by counsel nor
was he notified of the hearings therein although he was
never declared in default. Noting that the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced at the trial in said case
do not show that Romarico had anything to do with the
transactions between Katrina and Anita Chan, the court
ruled that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224 "is devoid
of legal or factual basis which is not even supported by a
finding of fact or ratio decidendi in the body of the
decision, and may be declared null and void ... pursuant
to a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to the
effect that the Court of First Instance or a branch thereof,
has authority and jurisdiction to try and decide an action

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against all
the defendants, as follows:
(a) The Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV, rendered in Civil
Case No. 2224, entitled "RICKY WONG, ET AL. vs.
KATRINA PINEDA HENSON and ROMARICO HENSON", is
hereby declared null and void, only as far as it affects
plaintiff herein Romarico Henson;
(b) The Writ of Execution, levy in execution and auction
sale of the conjugal property of the spouses Romarico
Henson and Katrina Pineda Henson which were sold at
public auction on November 11, 1977, without notice to
plaintiff herein, by Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat, are
likewise declared null and void and of no force and effect;
(c) Defendants Emerito Sicat and Conrado Lagman, in
their official capacity as Sheriff and Register of Deeds,
respectively, are enjoined permanently from issuing
and/or registering the corresponding deeds of sale
affecting the property;
(d) The aforementioned buyers are directed to reconvey
the property they have thus purchased at public auction
to plaintiff Romarico Henson;
(e) As far as the claim for reimbursement filed by Juanito
Santos concerning the redemption of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 from
the Rural Bank of Porac, which foreclosed the same
extrajudicially, is concerned, plaintiff Romarico Henson
may redeem the same within the period and in the
manner prescribed by law, after the corresponding deed

of redemption shall have been registered in the Office of

the Registry of Deeds for Angeles City;
(f) Defendants Spouses Ricky Wong and Anita Chan are,
with the exception of the defendants Juanito Santos,
Leonardo Joson, Sheriff and Register of Deeds, are
ordered jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
Romarico Henson the sum of P10,000.00, corresponding
to the expenses of litigation, with legal interest thereon
from the time this suit was filed up to the time the same
shall have been paid, plus P5,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees, and the costs of suit; and
(g) The counterclaims respectively filed on behalf of all
the defendants in the above-entitled case are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court. In its decision of January 22, 1985 19 the
said court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court.
It added that as to Romarico, the judgment in Civil Case
No. 2224 had not attained finality as the decision therein
was not served on him and that he was not represented
by counsel. Therefore, estoppel may not be applied
against him as, not having been served with the decision,
Romarico did not know anything about it. Corollarily,
there can be no valid writ of execution inasmuch as the
decision had not become final as far as Romarico is
concerned.
On whether the properties may be levied upon as
conjugal properties, the appellate court ruled in the
negative. It noted that the properties are Romarico' s
exclusive capital having been bought by him with his own
funds. But granting that the properties are conjugal, they
cannot answer for Katrina's obligations as the latter were
exclusively hers because they were incurred without the
consent of her husband, they were not for the daily
expenses of the family and they did not redound to the
benefit of the family. The court underscored the fact that
no evidence has been submitted that the administration
of the conjugal partnership had been transferred to
Katrina either by Romarico or by the court before said
obligations were incurred.
The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court but the same was denied
for lack of merit on February 6, 1985. 20

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the Henson
spouses were duly represented by Atty. Albino as shown
by their affidavit of August 25, 1977 wherein they
admitted that they were represented by said counsel
until Atty. Yumul took over the actual management and
conduct of the case and that Atty. Albino had not
withdrawn as their counsel, the lower court "did not
commit an error" in serving a copy of the decision in Civil
Case No. 2224 only on Atty. Albino. Moreover, during the
2-year period between the filing of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2224 and the public auction sale on November
11, 1977, Romarico remained silent thereby making him
in estoppel and guilty of laches.
Petitioners further aver that there being sufficient
evidence that the auction sale was conducted in
accordance with law, the acts of the sheriffs concerned
are presumed to be regular and valid. But granting that
an irregularity consisting of the non-notification of
Romarico attended the conduct of the auction sale, the
rights of Santos and Joson who were "mere strangers who
participated as the highest bidders" therein, may not be
prejudiced. Santos and Joson bought the properties
sincerely believing that the sheriff was regularly
performing his duties and no evidence was presented to
the effect that they acted with fraud or that they
connived with the sheriff. However, should the auction
sale be nullified, petitioners assert that Romarico should
not be unduly enriched at the expense of Santos and
Joson.
The petitioners' theory is that Romarico Henson was
guilty of laches and may not now belatedly assert his
rights over the properties because he and Katrina were
represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 2224. Said
theory is allegedly founded on the perception that the
Hensons were like any other ordinary couple wherein a
spouse knows or should know the transactions of the
other spouse which necessarily must be in interest of the
family. The factual background of this case, however,
takes it out of said ideal situation.
Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when
Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong.
Thus, when that business transaction eventually resulted
in the filing of Civil Case No. 2224, Romarico acted, or, as
charged by petitioners, failed to act, in the belief that he
was not involved in the personal dealings of his
estranged wife. That belief was buttressed by the fact
that the complaint itself did not mention or implicate him
other than as the husband of Katrina. On whether
Romarico was also represented by Atty. Albino, Katrina's
counsel, the courts below found that:

... Atty. Albino filed an Answer with Counterclaims dated

July 25, 1975 solely on behalf of defendant Katrina
Henson. The salutary statement in that Answer
categorically reads: ... COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT
KATRINA HENSON by and through undersigned counsel,
in answer to plaintiffs' complaint respectfully alleges: ... .
That Answer was signed by GREGORIO ALBINO, JR., over
the phrase COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON.
Again, when Civil Case No. 2224 was called for pre-trial
on November 27, 1975, before then Presiding Judge
Bienvenido Ejercito, it is clearly stated on page 2 of the
day's stenographic notes, under "APPEARANCES that Atty.
Albino, Jr. appeared as COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT
KATRINA HENSON". And when the case was called, Atty.
Jose Baltazar, Sr. appeared for the plaintiffs while Atty.
Albino categorically appeared "FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA
HENSON".
It might be true that in subsequent hearings, Atty.
Expedito Yumul 'appeared as counsel for the defendants,'
but the whole trouble is that he never expressly
manifested to the Court that he was likewise actually
representing defendant "ROMARICO HENSON", for it
cannot be disputed that Atty. Yumul only entered his
appearance in collaboration with Atty. Albino (see p. 2
tsn, January 26, 1976, Espinosa), who in turn entered his
initial appearance during the pre- trial, and through the
filing of an Answer, for defendant KATRINA HENSON. As a
matter of fact, the Power of Attorney which Atty. Albino
produced during the pre-trial was executed solely by
defendant KATRINA HENSON. Accordingly, as
collaborating counsel, Atty. Yumul cannot, by any stretch
of the imagination, be considered as duly authorized to
formally appear likewise on behalf of defendant
ROMARICO HENSON for whom principal counsel of record
Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. never made any formal
appearance. On this score, it is not amiss to state that "A
spring cannot rise higher than its source:.
Now, what about that statement in the aforementioned
joint affidavit of the spouses KATRINA HENSON and
ROMARICO HENSON, to the effect that our first lawyer in
said case was Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr., and sometime
later Atty. Expedito B. Yumul took over ...
That statement which plaintiff ROMARICO HENSON was
made to sign by Atty. Yumul on August 25,1977, after the
filing of this case, allegedly for the purpose of dissolving
the writ of execution, as claimed in paragraph XIV of the
complaint herein, and is satisfactorily explained by both

plaintiff herein and his wife, while on cross-examination

by Atty. Baltazar, Sr., and We quote:
Q So, the summons directed your filing of your Answer
for both of you, your wife and your good self?
A Yes, sir but may I add, I received the summons but I did
not file an answer because my wife took a lawyer and
that lawyer I think will protect her interest and my
interest being so I did not have nothing to do in the
transaction which is attached to the complaint.' (TSN,
Jan. 14, 1980, pp. 52-53).
That plaintiff never appeared in Civil Case No. 2224, nor
was he therein represented by counsel was impliedly
admitted by defendants' counsel of records thru a
question he propounded on cross, and the answer given
by Katrina Pineda, to wit:
Q How about your husband, do you remember if he
physically appeared in that Civil Case No. 2224, will you
tell us if he was represented by counsel as a party
defendant?
A No, sir, he did not appear.
Q You are husband and wife, please tell us the reason
why you have your own counsel in that case whereas
Romarico Henson did not appear nor a counsel did not
appear in that proceedings (TSN, Feb. 25,1980, pp. 6-7).
xxx xxx xxx
A Because that case is my exclusive and personal case,
he has nothing to do with that, sir. (TSN, Feb. 25, 1980, p.
9). (Rollo, pp. 17-20)
Hence, laches may not be charged against Romarico
because, aside from the fact that he had no knowledge of
the transactions of his estranged wife, he was also not
afforded an opportunity to defend himself in Civil Case
No. 2224. 21 There is no laches or even finality of decision
to speak of with respect to Romarico since the decision in
Civil Case No. 2224 is null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction for failure to observe the
notice requirements prescribed by law. 22 Failure to notify
Romarico may not be attributed to the fact that the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2224 acted on the presumption
that the Hensons were still happily married because the
complaint itself shows that they did not consider
Romarico as a party to the transaction which Katrina

undertook with Anita Wong. In all likelihood, the plaintiffs

merely impleaded Romarico as a nominal party in the
case pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court.
Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued
against Romarico as he has not yet had his day in
court 23and, necessarily, the public auction sale is null
and void. 24 Moreover, the power of the court in the
execution of judgments extends only over properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. 25
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved,
however, the Court disagrees with the appellate court
that the said properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage,
they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership 26 even though Romarico and Katrina had
been living
separately. 27
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties
subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to
prove that the properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. 28 While there is proof that Romarico acquired
the properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to
repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the
money is part of the conjugal assets 29 and not
exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount
importance considering that in the determination of the
nature of a property acquired by a person during
covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of the
money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding,
Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her
obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be
one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. 30In
addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are
merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her
authority to incur such indebtedness had not been
alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial. 31
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind
the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family or when she
borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things
necessary for the support of the family if the husband
fails to deliver the proper sum; 32 when the

administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred

to the wife by the courts 33 or by the husband 34 and
when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. 35 Having failed to establish that any of these
circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the
conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal
obligation to them.
Petitioners' contention that the rights of Santos and Joson
as innocent buyers at the public auction sale may not be
prejudiced, is, to a certain extent, valid. After all, in the
absence of proof that irregularities attended the sale, the
same must be presumed to have been conducted in
accordance with law. There is, however, a peculiar factual
circumstance that goes against the grain of that general
presumption the properties levied upon and sold at the
public auction do not exclusively belong to the judgment
debtor. Thus, the guiding jurisprudence is as follows:
The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor
acquires no higher or better right than what the
execution debtor has in the property levied upon. The
purchaser of property on sale under execution and levy
takes as assignee, only as the judicial seller possesses no
title other than that which would pass by an assignment
by the owner. "An execution purchaser generally acquires
such estate or interest as was vested in the execution
debtor at the time of the seizure on execution, and only
such interest, taking merely a quit-claim of the execution
debtor's title, without warranty on the part of either the
execution officer or of the parties, whether the property
is realty or personalty. This rule prevails even if a larger
interest in the property was intended to be sold.
Accordingly, if the judgment debtor had no interest in the
property, the execution purchaser acquires no interest
therein." (Pacheco vs. Court of Appeals, L-48689, August
31, 1987, 153 SCRA 382, 388-389 quoting Laureano vs.
Stevenson, 45 Phil. 252; Cabuhat vs. Ansery, 42 Phil.
170; Fore v. Manove, 18 Cal. 436 and 21 Am. Jur., 140141. Emphasis supplied.)
Applying this jurisprudence, execution purchasers Santos
and Joson possess no rights which may rise above
judgment debtor Katrina's inchoate proprietary rights
over the properties sold at public auction. After all, a
person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell
and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no more
that what the seller can legally transfer. 36 But, inasmuch
as the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 is void only as far
as Romarico and the conjugal properties are concerned,
the same may still be executed by the Spouses Wong
against Katrina Henson personally and exclusively. The
Spouses Wong must return to Juanito Santos and
Leonardo Joson the purchase prices of P145,000 and

P119,000 respectively, received by said spouse from the

public auction sale.
The redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure
proceeding against Romarico and Katrina Henson filed by
the Rural Bank of Porac, should, however, be respected
unless Romarico exercises his right of redemption over
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
30951 in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the
lower court in Civil Case No. 28-09 are hereby AFFIRMED
subject to the modifications above stated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Wong vs. IAC
GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
FACTS: Romario Henson married Katrina on January
1964. They had 3 children however, even during the
early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most
of the time living separately. During the marriage or on
about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land
in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed
from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina
entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter
consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at
P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the
20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their
value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check of
P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The
spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for
collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her
husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was
only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the
Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued
upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the
lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the
other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such
redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of
the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of
the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal
property.

HELD: The spouses had in fact been separated when the

wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The
husband had nothing to do with the business transactions
of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The
properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage
with unclear proof where the husband obtained the
money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to
belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of
proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and
even though they had been living separately. A wife may
bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for support of the family. The writ of
execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the
execution of judgments extends only over properties
belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal
properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she
exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her
husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the
family. There was also no evidence submitted that the
administration of the partnership had been transferred to
Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were
incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so
far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned,
Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina,
personally and exclusively.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102692. September 23, 1996]
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJO M. VINLUAN,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a husband be held liable for the debts of his wife
which were incurred without his consent and which did
not benefit the conjugal partnership? May a judgment
declaring a wife solely liable, be executed upon conjugal
property, over the objection of the husband?
These are the main questions raised in the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which seeks nullification of the Decision[1]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 19178 of the Court of Appeals,[2] the
dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant

petition is hereby GRANTED, and the orders dated July
24, 1989 and October 4, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 137, in Civil Case No. 4186, as well as
the notices of levy issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
dated February 8, 1989, are hereby declared null and
void and set aside. No costs."
The Facts

complaint (Annex 'A') on June 8, 1983 against defendant

spouses Vinluan, for collection of the principal obligation
plus interest, with damages. Filed before the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4186.
After trial on the merits, on February 5, 1985, the
respondent court rendered its Decision (Annex 'C'), the
dispositive portion of which reads:

This case was initiated in the trial court by a complaint[3]

filed by petitioner against spouses Delilah A. Vinluan,
owner of Vinluan Enterprises, and her husband Capt.
Alejo M. Vinluan (the private respondent before us), for
collection of a sum of money with damages, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4186 and tried in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137.[4] The respondent
appellate Court found the antecedent facts, to be as
follows:[5]

'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing

the defendant DELILAH A. VINLUAN to pay plaintiff
Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc., the sum of P242,482.40,
with interest and penalty charges at the rate of 2% per
month from 30 January 1983 until fully paid, and the sum
of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs.

"The plaintiff-respondent Johnson & Johnson (Phils.),

Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as the corporation)
is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of various
cosmetics, health, and body care products, as well as
medical drugs. On several occasions in the year 1982,
the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of the
plaintiff-respondent corporation, as she was also engaged
in the business of retailing Johnson products, among
others. The defendants, under the name and style of
'Vinluan Enterprises,' thus incurred an obligation of Two
Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty
Pesos and Eighty-Nine (P235,880.89) Centavos, for which
she issued seven (7) Philippine Banking Corporation
checks of varying amounts and due dates. When
presented on their respective due dates, however, the
checks given in payment of the obligation bounced and
were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds.

In arriving at the sole liability of defendant Delilah A.

Vinluan, the trial court found after "meticulous scrutiny
and careful evaluation of the evidence on record" that
there was "no privity of contract, whether direct or
indirect, between plaintiff and defendant-husband
regarding the obligations incurred by defendant-wife."
According to the trial court, "(i)n fact, the acts performed,
and the statements made, by defendant-husband, and
from which plaintiff derived the notion that said
defendant is a co-owner of VINLUAN ENTERPRISES, took
place after the obligations involved in this action had
been incurred or contracted by the defendant-wife, albeit
without the husband's knowledge or consent, as there
was no allegation in the complaint that said obligations
were incurred by defendant-wife with her husband's
consent, or that it was incurred for the benefit of the
family. x x x."[6]

Several demands thereafter for payment were to no

avail, despite the accommodations given by the plaintiffrespondent corporation by granting several extensions to
the defendant spouses to settle the obligation. It was
only on January 5, 1983 that the defendants made a
partial payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos,
there by reducingt heir principal obligation to
P230,880.89. When no further payments were made to
settle the obligation despite repeated demands, the
plaintiff-respondent corporation was constrained to file a

Defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of

sufficient merit.

The trial court also found that private respondent never

intimidated in his conversations or meetings with, or in
any of his letters to, petitioner that "he was a co-owner of
VINLUAN ENTERPRISES, much less did he represent
himself as such co-owner, to the plaintiff and to plaintiff's
counsel x x x." When private respondent personally
negotiated with petitioner and proposed a settlement of
the subject obligations, these actuations were not to be
considered as admission of co-ownership of VINLUAN
ENTERPRISES for "(a)fter all, common sense and our
inborn mores of conduct dictate that a husband must

give aid and comfort to his distressed wife."[7] The trial

court further held that the defendant spouses had
sufficiently established that the defendant wife was sole
owner of the business venture, that the conjugal
partnership never derived any benefit therefrom, and
that the same closed due to continued losses. In sum,
the court a quo held that private respondent could not
legally be held liable for the obligations contracted by the
wife.
Thus, the court below issued a writ of execution[8]on
February 3, 1989, directing the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
to execute the judgment on the properties of the
defendant-wife. However, the two notices of levy on
execution[9] issued on February 8, 1989 covered not only
her exclusive or paraphernal properties, but also the real
and personal properties of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Vinluan. The next day, her husband (herein
private respondent) filed a third-party claim[10] seeking
the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties, followed
by another third-party claim reiterating the same
demand with threat of possible law suit. Subsequently,
petitioner corporation filed a motion dated February 14,
1989 asking the court to fix the value of the properties
levied upon by the sheriff. In response to the third-party
claims of private respondent, a comment and/or
opposition dated March 6, 1989 was filed by petitioner.
Private respondent moved on July 1, 1989 to quash the
levy on execution on the ground that the notices of levy
on execution did not conform to the final decision of the
court and to the writ of execution. As expected,
petitioner opposed the motion. On July 24, 1989, the trial
court issued the first assailed Order fixing the value of
the levied personal properties at P300,000.00, and
denying the third-party claim and the motion to quash
the levy on execution. Citing the last sentence of Article
117[11] of the Civil Code, the court a quo ruled that:[12]
"Since Alejo Vinluan did not seek the intervention of the
Court to air his objections in his wife's engaging in
business, coupled by the fact that he made several
representations for the settlement of his wife's account,
Alejo Vinluan's consent thereto became evident. As
such, even his own capital may be liable, together with
the conjugal and paraphernal property (I Paras 363, 1978
ed., p. 6; Art. 6-10, Code of Commerce). Withal, Article
172 of the New Civil Code categorically declares that -

'The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without

the husband's consent, except in the cases provided by
law.'
Granting arguendo that Alejo Vinluan did not give his
consent, expressly or impliedly, the paraphernal and
conjugal property may still be held liable but not his
capital (I Paras 363, 1978 ed.)."
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
abovequoted first order (on the ground that it directly
contravened the decision itself which had already
become final and executory) was denied via the second
contested Order dated October 4, 1989, where the trial
court ruled:[13]
"The Court finds untenable movant-defendant's assertion
that Art. 172 of the New Civil Code is not in point. The
consent of the husband is indeed vital in determining
what properties shall be subsidiarily liable in the event
the paraphemal properties of Delilah Vinluan should turn
out to be insufficient to cover the judgment debt, as fully
explained in the Order dated 24 July 1989.
Art. 122 of the Family Code which partly provides that --

Vinluan engaged in been a success, all profits would have

been considered conjugal; it is therefore but fair that the
risks of the business should be borne by the conjugal
partnership (Miravite, Bar Review Materials in
Commercial Law, 1986 ed., p. 89; J. N. Nolledo,
Commercial Law Reviewer, 1985 ed., pp. 6, 7; U.P. Law
Complex, Answers to Bar Questions in Commercial Law,
1986 ed., pp. 174, 175; Vitug, Commercial Law Reviewer,
1984, ed., p. 5).
There is a wide-embracing oversight when movantdefendant asserted that to hold the conjugal partnership
property liable for the indebtedness incurred solely by his
wife would in effect modify the Decision dated 5 Feb,
1985 which is now final and executory. As aforediscussed, the conjugal property is subsidiarily liable."
As indicated above, the private respondent elevated the
matter to the respondent appellate Court, charging the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively
reversing its own final judgment. The respondent Court
upheld the private respondent in its now-assailed
Decision, and denied herein petitioner's subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner is now
before us seeking review under Rule 45.

'Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by

the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

The Issues

xxx

"1.
Whether or not the decision of the honorable
trial court dated February 5, 1985 exonerating (sic)
defendant husband, private respondent herein, from the
obligation contracted by the wife in the pursuit of her
business also absolves the conjugal partnership from
liability.

xxx

x x x.'

is not applicable in that -'This Code (Family Code) shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws (Art. 255, Family Code; underscoring supplied).'
Plaintiff (petitioner herein), having acquired a vested
right prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, said code
is not a propos (sic). Even granting arguendo that the
same is befitting, movant defendant failed to realize that
although Delilah Vinluan suffered losses in her legitimate
business, the experience she has gained redounded to
the benefit of the family, and as such, the conjugal
partnership must bear the indebtedness and losses (I
Paras 464, 1981 ed.). Moreover, had the business Delilah

Petitioner raised the following "Issues of law" for

consideration of this Court, to wit:[14]

2. Whether or not the subsequent order of the honorable

trial court dated July 24, 1989 and October 4, 1989 is a
reversal of its own original decision as found out by the
honorable public respondent."
The pivotal issues in this case may be re-stated thus:
whether or not the order of the trial court denying private
respondent's third-party claim and motion to quash levy
on execution in effect amended the dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision which had long become final and

executory, and if so, whether same is proper or not.

These issues shall be ruled upon together.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner contends[15] that the purpose of impleading
private respondent as co-defendant in petitioner's
complaint was to bind not only the defendant-spouses'
conjugal partnership but also private respondent's
capital. The trial court resolved that it was not necessary
that private respondent (as husband) be joined as partydefendant in the suit below. Inasmuch as it appeared
from the allegations in the complaint that private
respondent may be a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises,
the trial court nonetheless did not exclude private
respondent but passed upon the issue of such coownership to determine whether he may be held liable in
the same manner as his wife. Petitioner insists that the
trial court in its decision merely made a finding that the
private respondent husband was not a co-owner of the
business venture of his wife, which conclusion
("exoneration") only exempted his capital from the
adjudged liability, but not the conjugal properties of the
spouses. Petitioner further argues that nowhere in the
trial court's decision can there be found any
pronouncement absolving the conjugal property from
liability, contrary to the findings of the respondent Court.
Also, petitioner reasons that the enforcement of the
decision against the conjugal property is merely
compliance with law, and that this Court in a long line of
cases[16] held that a judgment is not confined to what
appears upon the face of the decision but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.[17]
Additionally, petitioner pleads that the trial court's order
did not modify its final and executory decision but only
clarified an ambiguity in the decision as to What
properties are liable. As authority, it cites Republic vs.
De los Angeles.[18]
Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
Respondent Court correctly ruled that the trial court
cannot, in the guise of deciding the third-party claim,
reverse its final decision. Commenting on the trial
court's very patent "about-face" on the issues of consent
of the husband, benefit to the family, and the husband's
liability for obligations contracted by his wife, the
appellate Court held, and we quote:[19]

"We see in these stark contradictions an attempt by the

respondent Court to reverse itself, even when the
decision sought to be executed had already become final.
The respondent Court has no authority to modify or vary
the terms and conditions of a final and executory
judgment (Vda. de Nabong vs. Sadang, 167 SCRA 232)
and this attempt to thwart the rules cannot be allowed to
pass. Even if the respondent Court feels that it needed
to reverse its findings to correct itself, the decision,
whether erroneous or not, has become the law of the
case between the parties upon attaining finality (Balais
vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37). The respondent Court has no
choice but to order the execution of the final decision
according to what is ordained and decreed in the
dispositive portion of the decision (National Steel Corp.
vs. NLRC, 165 SCRA 452).
The dispositive portion of the decision charges the
defendant Delilah Vinluan alone to pay the plaintiff
corporation, having already declared that the defendanthusband cannot be held legally liable for his wife's
obligations. Perhaps, when it was later discovered that
the defendant Delilah Vinluan did not have sufficient
property of her own to settle the obligation, the conjugal
properties of the defendant-spouses became the object
of the levy. But in order to bind the conjugal partnership
and its properties, the New Civil Code provides that the
debts and obligations contracted by the husband (or the
wife) must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
(Article 161, par. 1); and that the husband must consent
to his wife's engaging in business (Article 117).
Thus, we see a belated effort on the part of the
respondent Court to reverse itself by declaring that the
obligations incurred by the defendant wife redounded to
the benefit of the family and that the defendant husband
had given his consent, in order to bind the conjugal
partnership.
As We stated earlier, this cannot be done because the
decision, along with the respondent Court's original
findings, had already become final and indisputable. The
respondent Court already found that the defendant
husband did not give his consent; neither did the
obligation incurred by the defendant wife redound to the
benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal partnership, as
well as the defendant husband, cannot be held liable. As
originally decreed by the Court, only the defendant wife
and her paraphernal property can be held liable. Since

the power of the court in execution of judgments extends

only to properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone (Republic vs. Enriquez, 166 SCRA
608), the conjugal properties and the capital of the
defendant husband cannot be levied upon."
The settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence
may no longer be modified in any respect except only to
correct clerical errors or mistakes -- all the issues
between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to
rest.[20] This is meant to preserve the stability of
decisions rendered by the courts, and to dissuade parties
from trifling with court processes. One who has
submitted his case to a regular court necessarily commits
himself to abide by whatever decision the court may
render. Any error in the decision which has not been
considered in a timely motion for reconsideration or
appeal cannot be impugned when such error becomes
apparent only during execution. This rule applies with
more force in the case of the deciding judge who has
limited prerogative during execution of the judgment.
For as correctly held by herein public respondent, aside
from ordering the enforcement of the dispositive portion
of the decision, the trial judge can do nothing about the
errors in the ratiocination of the decision or even alter
the dispositive portion by mere order issued subsequent
to the finality of the decision. The issues having been
laid to rest, the court cannot on the pretext of
determining the validity of the third-party claim and the
motion to quash levy on execution alter the scope of the
dispositive portion of the decision sought to be
implemented.
Petitioner's arguments notwithstanding, the trial court's
order cannot be said to be merely clarificatory in nature.
There is no ambiguity at all in the decision, for it
categorically declared defendant Delilah A. Vinluan solely
liable, without any recourse provided against her
husband. Thus, the case of Republic vs. Delos Angeles,
[21] holding that doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to
have a reasonable intendment to do justice and avoid
wrong, does not apply here. As was later held in Filinvest
Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[22] "(w)here
there is an ambiguity, a judgment shall be read in
connection with the entire record and construed
accordingly. In such a case, it is proper to consider the
pleadings and the evidence." (Italics supplied). But the

text of the trial court's decision points to no other person

liable but Delilah Vinluan, and in fact made a rather
lengthy discussion on the exemption from liability of the
conjugal partnership; hence, there can be no ambiguity
to speak of in the decision. And even more clearly, the
body of the decision of the trial court expressly exempted
private respondent from liability by categorically ruling
that "the defendant-husband cannot, together, with codefendant, legally be held liable for the obligations
contracted by the wife.[23] Further, the trial court
expounded:[24]

date fixed by law. And this is better observed if the court

executing the judgment would refrain from creating
further controversy by effectively modifying and altering
the dispositive portion of the decision, thus further
delaying the satisfaction of the judgment. No matter how
just the intention of the trial court, it cannot legally
reverse what has already been settled. Holding the
conjugal partnership liable in the order after the finality
of the decision is evidently not just correcting a mere
clerical error; it goes into the merits of the case. And this
is prohibited by the rules and jurisprudence.

"x x x. What is more, it is an admitted fact that the

subject obligations had partially been paid by the
defendant-wife herself. Thus, plaintiff implicitly averred
that 'defendant Delilah Vinluan, doing business under the
name and style of VINLUAN ENTERPRISES is one of the
various customers of the plaintiff's products' (Cf. p. 1,
Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief); that 'Delilah Vinluan x x x
purchased different Johnson products x x x, thus incurring
an obligation of P235,880.89' (Cf. par. III, Complaint); that
'defendant Delilah Vinluan tried to pay (her) obligations x
x x when she issued Philippine Banking Checks x x x, but
which checks upon presentment to the Bank were
dishonored for the reason 'Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds' (Cf. par. V, id.); that 'x x x x, defendant Delilah A.
Vinluan appealed to the company and also represented
that she be given an opportunity to settle the
accountability' (Cf. par. VI, id.); that 'defendant sent a
letter to the company where she alleged that payment
cannot be made because they are 'victims of some bad
practices in the trade and that they are working on some
means to settle their accounts and all that they ask is
time to settle.' (Cf. par. VI, id.)."

We have elsewhere ruled that "should judgments of lower

courts -- which may normally be subject to review by
higher tribunals -- become final and executory before, or
without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too,
become inviolable, impervious to modification. They
may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified
directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or
department of Government."[26]

We take this occasion to reiterate the ruling of this Court

in an early case[25]that litigations must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to
the effective and efficient administration of justice that
once a judgment has become final, the winning party be
not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Hence, courts must guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result, for,
constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Furthermore, public policy and sound practice demand
that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final and irrevocable at some definite

Furthermore, '(a)ny amendment or alteration which

substantially affects a final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.[27]

"' x x x (N)othing is more settled in the law than that

when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The
only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical
errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course,
where the judgment is void.'

The respondent Court also commented on the sheriffs

actuations as follows:[28]
"Furthermore, it is the duty of the sheriff to ensure that
only that portion of the decision ordained and decreed in
the dispositive part should be the subject of the
execution (Cunanan vs. Cruz, 167 SCRA 674). The writ
of execution itself states that only the properties of the
defendant wife were to be levied upon. There was no

mention even of conjugal properties. Hence, in levying

on the properties that did not exclusively belong to the
judgment debtor, the notices of levy failed to conform to
the decree of the decision, and are, therefore, irregular
and contrary to the Rules (Canlas vs. CA, 164 SCRA
160)."
It Is a rule firmly established in our jurisprudence that a
sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not
belonging to the judgment debtor.[29] A sheriff even
incurs liability if he wrongfully levies upon the property of
a third person.[30] A sheriff has no authority to attach
the property of any person under execution except that
of the judgment debtor. The sheriff maybe liable for
enforcing execution on property belonging to a third
party.[31] If he does so, the writ of execution affords him
no justification, for the action is not in obedience to the
mandate of the writ.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
herein petition is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the
respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Johnson & Johnson vs CA GR No. 102692,

September 23, 1996
FACTS Delilah Vinluan purchased products from
petitioner for her retail business under the name of
Vinluan Enterprises incurring an obligation of
P235,880.89 for which she issued seven checks of
varying amounts and due dates that bounced and were
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. Partial payments were made after several
demands. When no further payments were made to
settle the obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the
spouses for collection of the principal obligation plus
interest with damages. RTC rendered decision in favor of
J&J and found that there was no privity of contract
between J&J and defendant husband Alejo Vinluan
regarding the obligations incurred by the wife. Husband
was made a co-owner of the enterprise afer the
obligation involved in this action has been incurred. The
court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff
to execute judgment on the properties of the wife.
However, the 2 notices of levy on execution covered not
only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the

properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

This led the husband to file a third-party claim seeking
the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial
court denied the third-party claim since Alejos consent
became evident when he did not seek the intervention of
the Court to air his objections in his wifes engaging
business coupled by the fact that he made several
representations for the settlement of his wifes account.
Thus, even his own capital may be liable aside from the
conjugal and paraphernal property. Private respondent
elevated the matter to CA, charging the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own

final judgment. CA upheld private respondent. Hence

this petition by J&J.
ISSUE: WON a husband may be held liable for the debts
incurred by his wife without his consent and did not
benefit the conjugal partnership?
HELD: SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that
the trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding the thirdparty claim, reverse its final decision. Only the wife and
her paraphernal property can be held liable. And since
the power of the execution of judgment extends only to
properties belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the

conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot

be levied upon. In any event that Delilahs paraphernal
properties are insufficient, in order to bind the conjugal
partnership properties, the debts and obligations
contracted by either the husband or the wife must be for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the
husband must consent to his wifes engaging in business.
The respondent court already found that the husband did
not give his consent neither did the obligation incurred by
the wife redound to the benefit of the family.