Finals Cases 1 For Consti

CASE 28: BAYAN VS ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
1. Bayan vs Zamora
Case Digest by Justine Mae Sales
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved
it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and
not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
Held:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense,
however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and
for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of
the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed
2. BAYAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements
of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by
(2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for
such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
senate.
ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in section
25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
3. I.
THE FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and
was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the
Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.
II.
THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
xxx
xxx
xxx
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the
United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as
the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as
long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further
to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.
4. Facts:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further
strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any
external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified
the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of
the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens
and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of
discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be
allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it
must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for
such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
Ruling:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members
of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP
and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the Senate by the other contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a wide
variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines,
regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to
be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases,
troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact
that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its
concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.
Case 29: Pimentel Vs De Leoz
EN BANC
[A.M. No. P-02-1620. April 1, 2003]

MELINDA F. PIMENTEL, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court, Naga City, Branch 27,
complainant, vs. PERPETUA SOCORRO M. DE LEOZ, Court Stenographer, Regional Trial Court,
Naga City, Branch 27, respondent.
[A.M. No. P-02-1621. April 1, 2003]
ROLANDO P. ORANTE, PERPETUA SOCORRO M. DE LEOZ, and MARIA LEONORA S. PUTO,
complainants, vs. ATTY. AMELIA B. VARGAS, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Naga
City, Branch 27 and MELINDA F. PIMENTEL, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court, Naga City,
Branch 27, respondents.
[A.M. No. P-02-1622. April 1, 2003]
ATTY. AMELIA B. VARGAS, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Naga City, Branch 27,
complainant, vs. PERPETUA SOCORRO M. DE LEOZ Court Stenographer, Regional Trial Court,
Naga City, Branch 27, respondent.
[A.M. No. P-96-1194. April 1, 2003]
PERPETUA SOCORRO M. DE LEOZ Court Stenographer, Regional Trial Court, Naga City, Branch
27, complainant, vs. MELINDA F. PIMENTEL, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court, Naga City,
Branch 27, and ATTY. AMELIA B. VARGAS, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Naga
City, Branch 27, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court are administrative matters which involve specific charges and counter-charges filed by
the personnel of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27. Principally involved are Perpetua Socorro
M. De Leoz, Court Stenographer, on one hand; and Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Amelia B. Vargas and Legal
Researcher Melinda F. Pimentel, on the other.
The factual antecedents of these cases are as follows:
1. A.M. No. P-02-1620 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 95-37-P)
In a sworn complaint,[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated July 28, 1995, Melinda F. Pimentel, Legal Researcher
of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27, charged her co-employee, Court Stenographer Maria
Perpetua Socorro M. De Leoz, with violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 5-88.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] The
complaint alleged that De Leoz was engaged in the private business of selling undergarments and
cosmetics as a result of which she incurred frequent absences during the months of May and June 1995.
Pimentel further declared that De Leoz was a registered JOCKEY Sales Executive of Finchley Design, Inc.
(Jockey Phil. Inc.) and a sales distributor of the House of SARA LEE.
In her verified comment/answer [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] to the complaint, De Leoz denied the allegations
of Pimentel saying that as an employee of the court, she had served with utmost dedication, honesty,
punctuality, and competence. De Leoz likewise denied that she was a sales agent of Finchley Design, Inc.,
(Jockey Phils. Inc.) attaching in support of her denial, an affidavit [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] of Ms. Merit R. Nollase,
Network Director of Finchley Design, Inc. She further denied working as a sales distributor for the House of
SARA LEE, submitting an affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] of Ms. Rosal Vergara Aton, Sales Dealer of the House of
SARA LEE to that effect.
In their joint complaint[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] dated July 26, 1995, three (3) employees of the RTC of
Naga City, Branch 27, namely: Rolando F. Orante, Perpetua Socorro M. De Leoz, and Maria Leonora S. Puto
charged their co-employees, Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Amelia B. Vargas and Legal Researcher Melinda F.
Pimentel with Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Falsification of Official Documents allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the period of April 1 to August 14, 1994, the above-named respondents conspiring and
confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously made it appear that
Ms. Melinda F. Pimentel had reported for work during that period by submitting duly accomplished and
signed daily time records (DTRs), duly verified and also signed by Atty. Amelia B. Vargas, Branch Clerk of
Court, RTC Branch 27, Naga City, when in truth and in fact she had not reported for work/office as she was
then reviewing for the 1994 Bar Examination as the result of which Melinda F. Pimentel received her
salaries, allowances and other benefits for said period to the damage and prejudice of the government.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
In their verified answer,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] Atty. Vargas and Pimentel denied the allegations and prayed for
the dismissal of the instant case. They averred that complainants had malicious motives in filing the
aforecited complaint. Respondent Pimentel admitted that she had attended a Pre-Bar Review Course at the
University of Nueva Caceres, but stressed that said review classes were held only after office hours.
In their reply, complainants declared that they inquired from the Leave Section, Supreme Court if
respondent Pimentel had gone on leave from April to August 1994. The Leave Section disclosed that as
evidenced by her DTRs, duly verified and signed by respondent Vargas, Pimentel reported for work from
April 1 to August 14, 1994, and applied for vacation leave from August 15 to September 16, 1994. [if !
supportFootnotes][9][endif]

In a sworn complaint[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] dated July 28, 1995, Atty. Amelia Vargas charged Perpetua Socorro
M. De Leoz with falsifying entries in her DTRs for May and June 1995 by making it appear that she reported
for work from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. during said months, when actually
she was either late or absent.
In her answer,[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] De Leoz denied the allegations of Atty. Vargas, claiming that the latter
only filed this case to harass her in view of the administrative case, A.M. No. P-02-1621, which she and her
co-employees had filed against Atty. Vargas and Pimentel.
4. A. M. No. P-96-1194 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 95-73-P)
In a letter[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), dated August 28, 1995,
Perpetua Socorro M. De Leoz reported that the entries in the DTRs of Melinda F. Pimentel for June 19, 20,
22, 26, and 30, 1995, and for July 6, 7, 10, and 17, 1995 were false. De Leoz alleged that during those
dates, Pimentel merely inserted her signature with the corresponding time in and time out to make it
appear that she was present on those days. Then respondent Atty. Amelia B. Vargas certified corespondent Pimentels entries on said dates in these DTRs by affixing her own signature thereto, according
to complainant.
In our Resolution of March 13, 1996,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] we resolved to treat the said letter as an
administrative complaint for falsification of official documents and required the respondents to comment
thereon. The Court likewise resolved to consolidate A.M. No. P-02-1620, A.M. No. P-02-1621, A.M. No. P-021622, and A. M. No. P-96-1194.
On August 31, 1996, Pimentel, Orante, De Leoz, Puto, and Atty. Vargas sent a sworn letter [if !supportFootnotes][14]
[endif]
to the Chief Justice stating that they had finally settled their differences, had reconciled, and were now
in a state of harmonious relationship. The parties then prayed that the administrative cases filed against
each other be considered closed and terminated.
On November 17, 1997, we resolved to refer these consolidated administrative cases to Executive Judge
Antonio N. Gerona of the RTC of Naga City for a thorough investigation, report, and recommendation. [if !
In his Report and Recommendation[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] dated January 15, 1998, Judge Gerona disclosed that
Perpetua Socorro M. De Leoz had applied for optional retirement effective October 1, 1997, and was
already residing in the United States. Judge Gerona concluded that inasmuch as De Leoz was no longer
present to testify and present evidence in the aforementioned cases, A.M. No. P-96-1194, A.M. No. P-021620, and A.M. No. P-02-1622 should be dismissed. Judge Gerona likewise cited the joint letter of all the
parties in all these cases requesting that A.M. No. P-02-1621 be considered dismissed or withdrawn in view
of their having reconciled their differences and misunderstandings. Judge Gerona then requested that the
Court issue an order directing him to continue his investigation in A.M. No. P-02-1621 only.
In our Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] of November 25, 1998, we denied the recommendation of Judge
Gerona, and directed that the records of all these cases be referred back to Executive Judge Jose T. Atienza
of the RTC, Naga City for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In his Report[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] dated June 30, 1999, Judge Atienza, like his predecessor, found that De
Leoz has left the country permanently and could no longer be investigated with respect to A.M. No. P-021620, A.M. No. P-02-1622, and A.M. No. P-96-1194. Judge Atienza then proceeded with the investigation of
A.M. No. P-02-1621. The evidence presented by the parties at various hearings conducted at various dates
from February 23 to June 21, 1999, led Judge Atienza to conclude that Pimentel had indeed falsified her
DTRs for the period April 1 to August 14, 1994 and that Atty. Vargas had not only tolerated but had abetted
the falsification. Judge Atienza then recommended that Atty. Vargas and Pimentel be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of benefits for dishonesty and falsification of a public document.
In its Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] of January 19, 2000, this Court expressed its dissatisfaction with
Executive Judge Atienzas report and recommendation to dismiss A.M. No. P-02-1620, A.M. No. P-02-1622,
as well as A.M. No. P-96-1194 and once more referred back said cases to the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Naga City, for a more thorough investigation.
In her Report[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] dated January 15, 2002, Executive Judge Corazon A. Tordilla came up with
the identical finding that De Leoz had already permanently moved to the United States and cannot be
served with notice anymore. Executive Judge Tordilla concluded that evidently, she was no longer
interested in pursuing A.M. No. P-96-1194. Hence, said case should be dismissed. Judge Tordilla also
recommended that A.M. No. P-02-1620 and A.M. No. P-02-1622 be dismissed. Anent A.M. No. P-02-1621
she concluded that the thorough investigation conducted by Judge Atienza was in order.
On March 4, 2002, we resolved to refer the report of Executive Judge Corazon A. Tordilla to the OCA for
evaluation, report, and recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
In its memorandum dated June 3, 2002, the OCA observed that a more thorough investigation of A.M. No.
P-02-1620 and A.M. No. P-02-1622 would be an exercise in futility, because respondent De Leoz is no
longer residing in the Philippines. Any further investigation in her absence would deprive her of due
process, as she would be denied the opportunity to defend herself. Hence, said cases must be resolved on
the basis of the evidence already submitted. With respect to A.M. No. P-96-1194, where the allegations of
De Leoz are the same as those raised in A.M. No. P-02-1621, the former case should be deemed included in
the investigation of the latter. The OCA then concluded that its evaluation should thus be limited to A.M.
No. P-02-1620 and A.M. No. P-02-1622 only.
The OCA found that the filing of A.M. Nos. P-02-1620 and P-02-1622 were retaliatory acts on the part of
Atty. Vargas and Pimentel against De Leoz for filing an administrative case against them. The OCA noted
that not only were the charges against De Leoz made in bad faith, they were likewise unsubstantiated. The
OCA then recommended that said cases be dismissed.
Regarding A.M. No. P-02-1621, the OCA memorandum adopted the findings and conclusions of Executive
Judge Atienza, but found the recommended penalty of dismissal too harsh. Instead, the OCA proposed that
Pimentel and Vargas be suspended for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.
On July 29, 2002, this Court resolved to re-docket these cases as regular administrative matters.
For our resolution now are the following matters: (1) the propriety of dismissing A.M. No. P-02-1620 and
A.M. No. P-02-1622; (2) the correctness of the finding of guilt on the part of Atty. Amelia B. Vargas and
Melinda F. Pimentel for falsification of official documents; and (3) the appropriateness of the penalty to be
imposed, if any.
On the first matter, we note that after A.M. No. P-02-1620 and A.M. No. P-02- 1622 were consolidated, they
were referred not just once but thrice to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Naga City for investigation,
report, and recommendation. Each of the investigating judges found that Perpetua Socorro M. De Leoz, the
respondent in A.M. No. P-02-1620 and A.M. No. P-02-1622, had left the country to reside permanently in
California, and could no longer be served summons, notices, or other papers. In their respective reports,
said investigators recommended that these cases be dismissed since a thorough investigation was no
longer possible in view of the absence of respondent De Leoz.
The disciplinary power of this Court over its erring personnel, in general, cannot be terminated just
because one of the parties involved is now residing abroad. It is true, however, that to allow an
investigation to proceed against one who could no longer be in a position to defend herself would be a
denial of her right to be heard, our most basic understanding of due process. [if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] But even
in the absence of respondent De Leoz, if there were sufficient records available, and other witnesses that
could have been called to testify, investigators could have utilized those records and those witnesses to
come out with a judicious recommendation based on the merits, rather than a recommendation to dismiss
based solely on the absence of De Leoz.
Disciplinary proceedings like these administrative matters, in our view, involve not merely private interest,
nor just the redress of private grievances. More important, they are undertaken and prosecuted for the
public welfare, i.e., to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies
and instrumentalities. Hence, as far as feasible, they should proceed for the purpose of determining
whether or not a respondent had erred, and if so, to impose the proper sanction. Otherwise, this Courts
concern that every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity and honesty [if !supportFootnotes][23]
[endif]
would be hollow.
Nevertheless, after carefully reviewing the records of A.M. No. P-02-1620 and A.M. No. P-02-1622, we agree
with the observation of the OCA that the charges against De Leoz were filed with malice aforethought. Said
cases were initiated by Atty. Vargas and Pimentel two (2) days after De Leoz and her co-employees had
taken steps to file A.M. No. P-02-1621 against Atty. Vargas and Pimentel for dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and falsification of public documents. Moreover, nowhere in the records do we find substantial evidence to
support the allegations of Atty. Vargas and Pimentel, particularly with respect to the charge that De Leoz
was engaged in selling undergarments and cosmetics during office hours. We find, instead, that De Leoz
submitted convincing evidence to support her defense, which Atty. Vargas and Pimentel failed to rebut.
These evidentiary matters include: (1) the 1st Indorsement dated October 16, 1995 by then Executive
Judge David Naval of the RTC of Naga City to the Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Supreme Court,
recommending that her services from May to September 1995 be considered as evidence of her service as
Court Stenographer III for said period; (2) the certification of Merit R. Nollase, Network Director of Finchley
Design, Inc.; (Jockey Phils. Inc.) that she is not a sales agent of Jockey Phils. Inc.; and (3) the affidavit of the
Rosal V. Aton, Sales Dealer of the House of SARA LEE attesting that De Leoz is not a sales representative of
the House of SARA LEE.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find sufficient bases to hold that A.M. No. P-02-1620 and A.M. No. P-021622 are contrived and unsubstantiated. The charges were made in bad faith. They ought to be dismissed
for lack of merit.
On the second matter, the investigation of Judge Atienza with regard to the culpability of Pimentel and Atty.
Vargas in A.M. No. P-02-1621 yielded the following findings, which were concurred in by the OCA, to wit:
(1) In their letter of April 28, 1995, complainants Orante, Puto, and De Leoz inquired from Mrs. Rowena
Castro-Benipayo, Chief, Leave Section, OAS, Supreme Court if Pimentel was on leave from April 1 to August
14, 1994 and if she submitted her DTRs for the period concerned as she did not report for work. On May
16, 1995, Mrs. Benipayo replied that Pimentel did not file any application for leave of absence for the
period April 1 to August 14, 1995 and accordingly, submitted her DTRs for said period;
(2) Judge Jose R. Panday, presiding judge of the RTC of Naga City, Branch 27, stated that from April to
August 1994, he did not assign any research work to Pimentel, the Legal Researcher of Branch 27 as she
was reviewing for the 1994 Bar Examinations and no longer reporting for work;
(3) At around 9:30 a.m. of August 3, 1995, Remedios Genorga, Stenographer III of RTC of Naga City, Branch
27, discovered that the courts attendance logbook, where the employees recorded their daily ins and outs
was missing. Said disappearance was reported to the Naga City police the following morning; and
(4) Before the filing of A.M. No. P-02-1621, the personnel of Branch 27 uniformly wrote 8:00 a.m. and 1:00
p.m. as their time in and 12:00 noon and 5:00 p.m. as their time out. After said case was filed, however,
Atty. Vargas required them to write down their actual time of arrival and departure from the office.
In view of the foregoing findings the investigator, Judge Atienza, concluded and the OCA concurred that
both Atty. Vargas and Pimentel should be held culpable for dishonesty and falsification of official
documents.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] In A.M. No. P-021621, we agree that the evidence adduced by the complainants at the hearing conducted by Judge Atienza
was more than sufficient to hold respondents Pimentel and Atty. Vargas administratively liable for
dishonesty and falsification of official documents.
We note that during the investigation conducted by Judge Atienza, several witnesses for the complainants
testified that Pimentel either (1) did not report for work; or (2) did not regularly go to the office from April 1
to August 14, 1995, but she would stay only for a few minutes or an hour. [if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] Judge Panday
categorically declared that he did not assign any research work to Pimentel as she was then on leave to
review for and take the 1994 Bar Examinations.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] As against these positive statements, all
that Pimentel could offer was a denial. She claimed that she was reporting for work during said period
doing research work at the University of Nueva Caceres, as the court lacked the necessary materials. [if !
Pimentel, however, failed to substantiate her claim. She could not even remember what
cases she was working on or the books she borrowed. Nor could she explain why Judge Panday testified
that he did not assign her any research duties from April to August 1994 as she was then on leave and
reviewing for the 1994 Bar Examinations. Yet there is no showing in the evidence that Pimentel had applied
for or had gone on official leave for said period. In a letter, the Chief of the Leave Division, OAS, Supreme
Court, categorically attested to the fact that Pimentel submitted her DTRs for the months of April to August
1994. It thus appears that while Pimentel was reviewing for the Bar Examinations, she was credited for
work done on official time for which she was duly compensated.
Pimentels submission of DTRs to make it appear that she was religiously reporting for work during said
period is an act of falsification, a gross and blatant act of dishonesty. Not only does it reveal her deplorable
lack of candor, it disturbingly shows her disregard of office rules. Her duties and responsibilities required
her presence at her workplace, not outside. Moreover, she unjustly enriched herself by receiving her
salaries, allowances, and other benefits during said period without rendering the requisite services.
Perforce, we must sustain the recommendation of the OCA that respondent Pimentel be found liable for
dishonesty and falsification of official documents.
As for Atty. Vargas, her signature on the falsified DTRs submitted by Pimentel is mute but eloquent
evidence of her own role in acts of dishonesty. Note that by signing said DTRs, Atty. Vargas attested to the
truthfulness of the entries therein despite her knowledge of their falsity. Not only did Atty. Vargas tolerate
or turn a blind eye to the acts of dishonesty and falsification committed by respondent Pimentel, she in
fact abetted the accomplishment thereof. We find particularly glaring the failure of Atty. Vargas to testify in
her defense at the investigative hearings conducted by Judge Atienza. Surely a person innocent of the
charges pressed against her would strive hard and seize every opportunity to prove her innocence and
clear her name. Her actuation appears contrary to that expected of a truly innocent person, a matter that
could not escape the investigators attention.
The judiciary, like other branches of government, adheres strictly to the policy of the State promoting a
high standard of ethics in the public service. No less than the Constitution mandates that a public office is
a public trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. [if !
We have held that the conduct and behavior of a person connected with the dispensation
of justice, from the presiding judge to the humblest clerk, is circumscribed by the heavy burden of
[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
responsibility.
Her conduct should at all times be characterized by propriety and
decorum, and be like Caesars wife, beyond suspicion. As Clerk of Court of Branch 27, Atty. Vargas is a
ranking officer of the judiciary, performing delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] As administrative assistant to the presiding judge, a Clerk of
Court occupies a delicate and confidential position, which should be honored rather than betrayed. She is
required to be a person of competence, honesty and probity. Her responsibility includes safeguarding the
integrity of the court and its proceedings, to earn respect therefor, to maintain the authenticity and
correctness of court records, and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. [if !
As Clerk of Court, Atty. Vargas has the duty to see to it that the data in the DTRs certified by her office and
submitted to the Supreme Court is true and accurate. By abetting the acts of falsification committed by
Pimentel, she acted in disregard of her sworn duties and obligations. She fell short of the exacting
standards for public office. Her failure to live up to these standards of responsibility, uprightness, and
honesty surely warrants disciplinary action. For this Court cannot countenance any conduct, act, or
omission on the part of those involved in the administration of justice which will violate the norms of public
accountability and diminish, or tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the judicial system. [if !supportFootnotes]
[32][endif]
Coming now to the imposable penalties, Judge Atienza, in his report, recommended that both Pimentel and
Vargas be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of benefits. The OCA, however, finds the penalty of
dismissal too harsh and recommends that Pimentel and Atty. Vargas be suspended for six (6) months and
one (1) day without pay. Considering the nature and circumstances of this matter, we are constrained to
agree with Judge Atienzas recommendation.
The tampering of DTRs constitutes acts of falsification of official documents, [if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] as well as
dishonesty and duplicity, which deserve appropriate sanction from this Court. [if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] Under
Section 23 (a) and (f)[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292,[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] falsification of official documents is a grave offense punishable
by dismissal from the service even for the first offense. This Court has not hesitated to dismiss an erring
employee of the judiciary found guilty of falsification of DTRs. [if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] In recommending a lighter
penalty, the OCA has not cited any reason or basis for its recommendation. We find that the penalty as
recommended by the OCA applies to frequent unauthorized absences, provided for in Section 23 (q) [if !
of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
We note, however, that in A.M. No. P-02-1621, the complaint against respondents Pimentel and Atty.
Vargas was not for unauthorized absences but for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of
official document.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] In the report of Judge Atienza concurred in by the OCA, both Pimentel
and Atty. Vargas were found culpable not for unauthorized absences, but for dishonesty and falsification of
official documents. Harsh as the penalty may be, it is the penalty provided for the offense by law and this
Court has no option but to apply the law which calls for dismissal.
WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. P-02-1621, entitled Rolando F. Orante, Perpetua Socorro M. De Leoz,
and Maria Leonora S. Puto v. Atty. Amelia B. Vargas and Melinda F. Pimentel, respondents ATTY. AMELIA B.
VARGAS, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27, and MELINDA F. PIMENTEL,
Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27, are found GUILTY of dishonesty and
falsification of official documents, and are hereby ordered DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with forfeiture of
all benefits except accrued leave credits; as well as with prejudice to reemployment in the government
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
In A.M. No. P-02-1620, entitled Melinda F. Pimentel v. Perpetua Socorro M. De Leoz, and A.M. No.
P-02-1622, entitled Atty. Amelia B. Vargas v. Perpetua Socorro M. De Leoz, the complaints are DISMISSED
for lack of merit. In A.M. No. P-96-1194, entitled Perpetua Socorro M De Leoz v. Melinda F. Pimentel and
Atty. Amelia B. Vargas, the complaint is likewise DISMISSED, for failure of complainant to pursue her
complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Case 30: Endencia Vs David
93 Phil. 699 Political Law The Judiciary Te Legislature Separation of Powers
Statutory Construction Who May Interpret Laws
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and
Justice Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which
provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation
this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal
Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent
and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their
salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was
rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to
interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already
encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase: payment of which [tax] is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This is
a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring
to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory
of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the
legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby
tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given
in a case by the highest court of the land.
2.
Case Digest
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVID
G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
Facts
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and
Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant
Collector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received
favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion
in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
Issue(s)
Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 constitutional?
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather exhaustive and well
considered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income taxes from the salaries
of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes. On the issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is
constitutional, the court believes that this is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiat
as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial
officer is not a decrease of compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by
the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere;
otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The court reiterates the
doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax
on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Further, the
court holds that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature
may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially
when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed,
that Section 13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall
be considered not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law,
constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, the court is of the
opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principles underlying
the separation of powers. In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries, dissenting
opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected to the Income Tax
Law prevailing. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision
in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
Hence, court affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue of imposing income tax on judges
salaries.
3. 93 Phil 696 August 31 1953 [Salaries of Judges Tax Exemption]
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugos salaries. A
case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial
officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries
from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is
considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation
shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary
received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of
RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.
4. Endencia, M.P. and F. Jugo vs. D. Saturnino, as collector of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
En Banc
Facts:
After the ruling of Court of First Instance of Manila declaring R.A. 590 unconstitutional and thereby ordering
the respondent David Saturnino to re-fund Justices M. Endencia and F. Hugo of the income taxes decreased
from their salaries, the petitioners in joint appeal questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act 590. The
lower court, citing the case Perfecto vs. Meer, exhaustively declared that the collection of income taxes is a
violation of the Philippines Constitution. The Solicitor General on the side of the defendant stated that the
legislative body were not in favor of the Courts decision over Perfecto vs. Meer and immediately enacted
R.A. 380 thereby imposing taxes to the Judicial Officers. The Court in the case questioned the legal basis of
the Act.
Issue:
Whether or not sec. 13 of R.A. 590 can justify and legalize the collection of income taxes on the salary of
Judicial officers.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision, citing sec. 9 Art. 8 of the Constitution, declared R.A. 590
unconstitutional. It construed that the law is clear in its provision that compensation of Judicial officers
shall not be diminished in their continuance of their office and the imposition of the taxes on their salaries
is a clear diminution of the salary. It held that when a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature, it is the duty of the court to declare it unconstitutional.
It further explained that the action of the legislative body as stated by the Solicitor General is a violation of
Separation of Power among branches of the government. The enactment of the statute because the
legislative congress is not in favor of Supreme Courts decision shows that the former also interpreted the
Act. It was ruled by the court that it is only the Supreme Court that has the power to interpret the Law and
Congress shall not interfere as the latters function is to enact the law.
5. G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
FACTS
Collector of Internal Revenue Saturnino David ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice
Fernando Jugos compensation pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which states that SEC. 13. No salary
from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed
by the Constitution or by law. According to Solicitor General Juan R. Liwanag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro
on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra,
was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590. The Solicitor General also reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in
the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE
Whether Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional or not.
HELD
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial
officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section
9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass
any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a
term. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal
Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High
Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The
independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing
their salaries.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that
the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said
statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
6. PASTOR M. ENDENCIA AND FERNANDO JUGO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS.SATURNINO DAVID,
AS COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.G.R. NO. L-6355-56
AUGUST 31, 1953
Facts:
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias
and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec13 of RA590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary
from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be adiminution of his compensation fixed
by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant
Collector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, was not received favorably by
Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.590. To bring
home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower
House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
Issue:
1. WON the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to adiminution?
2. WON Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 constitutional?
Held:
On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather exhaustive and well
considered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income taxes from the salaries of
Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered
there fund of said taxes. On the issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is constitutional, the
court believes that this is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of
compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion
of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized
elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was
before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as
used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be
usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The court reiterates the doctrine laid down in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a
diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Further, the court holds that the interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the
judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of
the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed, that Section13, Republic Act 590 in so far
as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered not to be adiminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law, constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction
of the judiciary. In this sense, the court is of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a
transgression of the fundamental principles underlying the separation of powers. In the light of the issue
on imposing income tax on judges salaries, dissenting opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens
and thus their salaries are subjected to the Income Tax Law prevailing. The debates, interpellations and
opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the
Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to
make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping
with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effe.
Dispo:
Court affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue of imposing income tax on judges salaries.
Case 31: Perfecto vs Meer
1. FACT
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
upon his salary as member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted an
action in Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. It
provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution.
HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution thereof.
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution,
whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by
taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge
as a part of his income is a violation of the Constitution.
2. Gregorio Perfecto, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Bibiano Meer, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendantappellant G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950. 85 Phil 522
Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required plaintiff-appellee to pay income tax upon his
salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted this action in
the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable
for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax
Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", salaries of judges are not included in
the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be
indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable
"income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was
the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here;
and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against
diminution off the judges compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial
salaries really im
3. Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552
GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER
[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]
Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he
instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his
salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included
in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be
indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable
"income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was
the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ;
and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against
diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial
salaries really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying
gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay
taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the
tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that
the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries
is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon
legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
4. REGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER
[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]
Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
upon his
salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this
action in
the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable
for the
reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included
in the
word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated,
to wit:
First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include
salaries
of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the
United
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine
Constitutional
Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal
principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying
gasoline, or
cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes
thereon. And
on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged
directly on
their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend
that the taxation must be resisted as an

infringement of the fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments
upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere
privilege
of judges
personal and therefore waivable
but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed

in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
5. Gregorio Perfecto, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Bibiano Meer, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendantappellant.
Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required plaintiff-appellee to pay income tax upon
his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted this action
in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution
thereof.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature approves an amendment to the
Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", salaries of judges are not
included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may
additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913,
taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution.
That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been
transplanted here; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the
prohibition against diminution off the judges compensation, the Federal principle was known that income
tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.
CASE 32: EDENCIA VS DAVID
SEE DIGESTS ABOVE
CASE 33: UNKNOWN

CASE 34: KMU LABOR CENTER VS GARCIA
1. CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Garcia
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
FACTS :
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a
range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others,
that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an
indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range."
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC
allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first
having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare
increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of
bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of
plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%)
percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
HELD:
Yes.
xxx
Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service
Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory
body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x
However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB
alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.
2.
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Jesus Garcia, Jr., LTFRB, Provincial Bus
Operators Association of the Philippines (PBOAP)
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
public utilities privately owned and operated businesses whose service are essential to
the general public; enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and
conducive to their comfort and convenience
DOTC Sec. issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman allowing
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15%
below the LTFRB official rate for a period of 1 year
PBOAP pursuant to Memo. Cir. it filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-theboard increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of
provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare range of fifteen (15%) percent over and
below the proposed basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare
range applying only to ordinary, first class and premium class buses and a fifty-centavo
(P0.50) minimum per kilometer fare for aircon buses, was sought
respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase in accordance with a
specified schedule of fares on a straight computation method

DOTC Sec. issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the
regulation of transport services. It provides inter alia that Passenger fares shall also be
deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service (normally third class
passenger transport) for which the government will fix indicative or reference fares.
Operators of particular services may fix their own fares within a range 15% above and
below the indicative or reference rate.
LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the
implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, which provides, among others,
that:
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The
presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while
burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositors.
The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial
buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized
fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare
range
PBOAP - availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus
operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having
filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a
fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares
KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares.
ISSUE:
WON the above memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the DOTC and the LTFRB
which, among others, (a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or
decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and
without hearing and approval thereof by said agency is in violation of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146,
and in derogation of LTFRBs duty to fix and determine just and reasonable fares by
delegating that function to bus operators, and (b) establish a presumption of public need in
favor of applicants for certificates of public convenience and place on the oppositor the
burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation not only
of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that
fares should be just and reasonable
3. An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details
which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. However, nowhere under the
aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies authorized to delegate that power to a common
carrier, a transport operator or other public service.
4. KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND
TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
5. FACTS :
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a
range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others,
that The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an
indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC
allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first
having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare
increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of
bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of
plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%)
percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
HELD:
Yes.
Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service
Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory
body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x
However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB
alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.
CASE 35: ARANETA VS DINGLASAN
1. ARANETA v. DINGLASAN
84 PHIL 368
FACTS:
The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental question. Antonio Araneta is
being charged for violating EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
Another case is of Leon Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of his
manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds
pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated funds to hold
the national elections. They all content that CA 671 or the emergency Powers Act is already inoperative
and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect
HELD:
CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought for in its
nature, object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the Constitution. Article
VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be for a limited period. It is
presumed that CA 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law
repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its power. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law. In a regular session, the power if Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations
imposed by the organic law.
2. Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:
Facts:
[if !supportLists]1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No.
671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized
the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix
the duration of its effectivity.
[if !supportLists]2.
[endif]EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The
petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays
for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.
[endif]EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks
a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of
Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the
ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.
[endif]EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during
the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.
[if !supportLists]5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the
national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked
the Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or
any part of it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
YES.
1
The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met
during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first
special session after it.

Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December
24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the
operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for
election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after
Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is
based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers
of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or
other causes brought on by the war.
3. As the issue is of transcendental importance,
technicalities or procedure, particularly petitioners
personality or sufficiency of interest and the question
whether prohibition lies, was brushed aside.
Petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of

the President issued in virtue of the Emergency Powers
Act (CA No. 671)
o
L-2044 and L-2756: Petitioner is under prosecution
in the Manila, CFI for violation of provisions of EO
No. 62 (regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings) and prays for the issuance of
the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city
fiscal.
o
L-3055: Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to permit the
exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Respondents
refuse to issue the required export license on the
ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by EO No. 192 (aims to
control exports from the Philippines)
o
L-3054: Petitioner, as a tax-payer, an elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a
writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing E.O. No. 225
(appropriates funds for the operation of the
Philippine Government during the period from July
1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes)
o
L-3056: petitioner, with reference to EO No. 226
(appropriates P6M to defray the expenses in
connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of
the national elections to be held in Nov. 1949), asks
this Court to prevent "the respondents from
disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that
amount or any part of it."
As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of

Act No. 671 in their oral argument and memorandum
(they rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the
CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect),
constitutionality of said act will be taken for granted.
Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is an

act declaring a state of total emergency as a result of
war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines and
authorizing the president to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet such emergency, pursuant to Art.
VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution. The problem is, CA

No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
effectiveness
Issue:
WON CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and
effect
Held and Ratio
YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law

passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited
period." "Limited period" as used in the Constitution
means restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to
justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be
temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency.
It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved

with this limitation in view as the opposite would make
the law repugnant to the Constitution, and contrary to
the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers.
The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal
the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution
either
4. 84 Phil. 368 Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta
appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO
62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the
EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe
exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to
him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant
to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national
elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already
inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio
vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of
the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider general
legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to
the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be
made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early
repeal.
CASE 36: RODRIGUEZ SR VS GELLA
1. ARTICLE VII DELEGATION OF POWERS
Eulogio
Rodriguez
, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners
v. Vicente
Gella
, ETC., ET AL., respondents
(92 PHIL. 603 [Feb. 2, 1953])
Ponente: Paras, C.J.:
Facts:
Petitioners herein seek to invalidate E.O. Nos. 545 and 546
issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum
of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the
second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the

provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, drought,
earthquakes and other calamities. E.O.s were issued by virtue
of C.A. No. 671 The Emergency Powers Act.
Issue:
WON E.O.s Nos. 545 and 546 are valid?
Held:
NO. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that
in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may by law authorize the President, x x x to
prescribe/promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy. The said powers are limited in the
prescribed period. It cannot be exercised at any time as the
President may want to be
2. Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C.J.:
Facts:
[if !supportLists]1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on
November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works,
while EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons,
floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the
national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers
in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the
existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry
out the national policy declared in section 1."
[if !supportLists]3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the
President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally
declare the termination of the emergency powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative
NO.
[if !supportLists]1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has
since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government,
public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must
be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from
the President.
[endif]CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed
that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has
not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated
to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.
[if !supportLists]3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations,
none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he
cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to
that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even
assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make
new appropriations.
[endif]The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would
lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers
as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since
liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any
residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
[if !supportLists]5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in
allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other
national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping
with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency
in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in
the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/rodriguez-v-gelladigest.html#sthash.3jrnDUZ9.dpuf
3. RODRIGUEZ v. GELLA
G.R. No. L-6266; February 2, 1953
FACTS:
On August 26, 1949, the court passed upon the status of CA No. 671 approved on December 16, 1949. Five
members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality when the Congress convened in special
session. Herein petitioners seek to invalidate EO Nos. 545 and 546 appropriating the sum of P37, 850, 500
for urgent and essential public works and setting aside the sum of P11, 367, 600 for relief from typhoons,
floods and other calamities. Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but was vetoed by
the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are still operative
HELD:
Act 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency whereby the consent of the agent is necessary
only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal
cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or the will of the agent. The logical view consistent with
constitutionality is to hold that the power lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last world
war. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated
by the members of the National Assembly. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President
should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and
for the welfare of the people because we have the Constitution designed to establish a government under
a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, and since our government is based on the system of separation
of powers. Wherefore, EO Nos. 545 and 546 are declared null and void.
CASE 37: Magtajas v Pryce Properties Corp.
1. Magtajas vs Pryce
Posted on October 19, 2012
.entry-meta
.entry-header
G.R. No. 111097
July 20, 1994
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casinos opening and enacted
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to
the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of
the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police
power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.
Held:
No.
CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. However, ordinances
should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government.
Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it
cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
2.
MAYOR MAGTAJAS & CITY OF CAGAYAN v. PRYCE PROPERTIES & PAGCOR
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same,
and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection
and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city
legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.
On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize
and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid
Held:
No
Ratio:
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for
the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under
what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
***Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential
to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that
the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot
be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED
3. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994]
En Banc, Cruz (J): 12 concur
F
acts:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created
directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines (the
constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gambling
Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with
the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16. Its
SangguniangPanglungsod derives its powers, duties and functions under Section 458 of said
Code. In 1992, following its success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations
to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its
casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the SangguniangPanlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353
(An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business
permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof
for the operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An
Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the
writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of the decision was denied on 13
July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the SangguniangPanlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit the establishment of
a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.
Held:
The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It
is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit
some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law.
Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not
indeed more so. The suggestion that the Local Government Code (LGC) authorize Local
Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between
these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of legislature.
Ordinances should not contravene a statute as municipal governments are only agents of the
national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
4. Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties
FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro
City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he
reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7,
1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance
No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of
Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was
not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the
public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION,
FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro
City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he
reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7,
1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance
No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of
Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was
not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the
public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Facts
The case at bar involves two ordinances issued by Cagayan de Oro City which prohibits issuance of
licenses and/or business permits for establishments used for the operation of casinos as well as penalizes
the operation of the same within its jurisdiction.
Issue
W/N Ordinance Nos. 3355 and 3375-93 are valid.
Decision
The court ruled in favor of respondents. The questioned ordinances are invalid.
Ratio
The morality of gambling is not prohibited by the constitution. Such discretion is given to the legislature.
In this case, PD 1869 allows the existence of legal forms of gambling. The will of the national legislature
cannot be subservient to local ordinances. Ordinances must conform to the following requirements for it to
be considered valid: (CUPPGU)
o Must not contravene the constitution
o Must not be unfair or oppressive
o Must not be partial or discriminatory
o Must not prohibit but it may regulate
o Must be general and consistent with public policy
o Must not be unreasonable
CASE 38: Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc. v JAC Liner Inc.
1.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs.
JAC LINER, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
Respondent JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to
and from Lucena City, assailed City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on
the ground that these constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of
private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
Ordinance No. 1631
AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC.,
A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND
MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF
LUCENA
Ordinance No. 1778
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF
ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND
FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND
ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995
The above-mentioned ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years,
renewable for another twenty five years, to Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its
successors or assigns, for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney
terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly
aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the
existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.
Further, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals
within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one
common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to
petitioner. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled
to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner.
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by
the ordinances.
The petitioner via petition for review, sought the wisdom of Supreme Court, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted City
Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778
2. LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and
out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to
proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary
terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this
ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of
the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the
same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful
subject and lawful means.
Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the
City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for
the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the
means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably
necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized
by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally,
since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees,
rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What
should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights
are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is
its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a
law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen
to be effective.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and
out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to
proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary
terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this
ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of
the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the
same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful
subject and lawful means.
Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the
City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for
the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the
means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably
necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized
by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally,
since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees,
rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What
should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is
its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a
law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen
to be effective.
Lucena Grand Terminal vs. JAC Liner
Facts: Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from
Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction[1] against the City of Lucena, its Mayor,
and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City
Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an
invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies
Issue: Is Lucena Ordinance no. 1631 a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling:Yes, City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the
City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to
construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.
452 SCRA 174 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so
that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights.
FACTS: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of
alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney
terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of
Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while
declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review
under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it
has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial
court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via
petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its
professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals
HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject
ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already
existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the
franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are
thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena.
are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to
societal problems.
From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod
had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers
by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the
proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright
proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered
as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack
adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead
of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with
permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is
so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are
barred from operating at all.
The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the
establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of
which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion,
however, must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.
CASE 39: Lagcao v Labra
1.
Case 24
G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004
Lagcao vs. Labra
FACTS:
In 1965 petitioners purchased a lot (1029
) on installment basis from the province of
Cebu. Consequently, the province through the City of Cebu tried to annul the sale which
prompted the petitioner to file civil action in the court of first instance.
On July 9, 1986, the court of first instance ruled that the province execute a deed of sale
in favor of the petitioner. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court wherein this ruling was affirmed by the CA.
After the title was acquired, petitioners discovered that the property was occupied by
squatters which prompted them to institute ejectment proceedings. In this regard, The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on
April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCC's decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition
The writ of execution and order of demolition was suspended for 120 days when Cebu
City Alvin Garcia wrote a request for the deferment of the ejection order on the ground
that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. During the effect of
the suspension order, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cebu City passed a resolution and
an Ordinance on Feb 22, 1999 and June 30, 1999 respectively, which identified lot 1029
as part of the socialized housing in pursuant of RA 7279. On July 19, 2000, Ordinance
No. 1843 was enacted authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings on petitioners property.
Issue:
Whether or not Cebu City Ordinance No. 1843 contravenes the Constitution and other
applicable laws
Ruling:
The enactment of Ordinance 1843 contravenes the Constitution and other applicable
laws.
First, Ordinance 1843 contravenes the constitution because condemnation
of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random
expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or
squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by
the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the
convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public
Second, the ordinance is violative of the petitioners right to due process since petitioners
had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of
their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality,
with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial
court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a
relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during
the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the
expropriation of petitioners' lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple.
Third, RA 7160 itself explicitly states that local appropriation of property must comply
with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Relatively, RA 7279 mandates
that local expropriation of property must comply on the order of the priorities on the
expropriation of property under section 10 for which private property ranks last in the
order of priorities provided under section 9.
DIOSDADO LAGCAO
,
DOROTEO LAGCAO and
URSULA LAGCAO,
Petitioners
vs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF CEBU,
Respondents
G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004
Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots,
including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul
the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the
province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
The court
a quo
ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final
deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the
squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution and order of
demolition.
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin
Garcia wrote two lettersto the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground
that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors
request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for petitioners,
during the suspension period, the
(SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for
being unconstitutional.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their
property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of
public use contemplated in the Constitution.
Ruling:
Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, local
legislative power shall be exercised by the
of the city. The legislative
acts of the
in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated
ordinances.
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local
government units the power to expropriate.
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot was enacted by the SP
of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the
City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social problems of the
country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of
eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain
is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must
comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws
CASE 40: Dela Cruz v Paras
1. Title of the Case:
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ
, et. al., petitioners,
vs.
The Honorable
EDGARDO PARAS
, et. al.,
respondents
G.R. No. & Date:
L-42571-72. July 25, 1983
Ponente:
FERNANDO, J.
Doctrine/Topic:
Legislative Process Requirements as to Titles of
Bills; Subject shall be expressed in the title
Facts of the Case:
1. Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is an
owner of clubs and cabarets in Bulacan.
2. Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club ownerpetitioners assailed the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as a
prohibition and closure ordinance which was
based on Republic Act No. 938 as amended (but
was originally enacted on June 20, 1953).
3. The said RA is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS
THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS."
4. Its first section reads: "The municipal or city board
or council of each chartered city shall have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs,
cabarets
and other similar places of

amusement within its territorial jurisdiction
.
5. Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was
amended to include not merely the power to
regulate, but likewise "prohibit."
6. The title, however, remained the same. It is
worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938.
7. On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition
with preliminary injunction were filed on the
grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null and void
as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a
lawful business, occupation or calling; (2)
Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners'
right to due process and the equal protection of
the law, as the license previously given to
petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing; and (3)That under Presidential Decree
No. 189 (as amended, by Presidential Decree No.
259 the power to license and regulate touristoriented businesses including night clubs, has
been transferred to the Department of Tourism.
8. The respondent Judge issued a restraining
order on November 7, 1975. Then came on
January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No.
84 and dismissing the cases. Hence, this
petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibit
the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night
clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses
HELD
A. Decision:
The SC held that municipal corporations cannot

prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.
The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of

the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed,
set aside, and nullified.
Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the

Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and
unconstitutional.
B. Rationale:

Since there is no dispute as the title limits the
power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result
in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night
club was prohibited.
A refusal to grant licenses, because no such

businesses could legally open, would be subject
to judicial correction. That is to comply with the
legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to
appropriate regulations.
It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only

the above portion of the Act were considered, a
municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the
operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the
appealed decision is not devoid of support in law.
Additionally, the title was not in any way altered,
as the exact wording was followed. The power
granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
There is thus support for the view advanced by

petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938
as allowing the prohibition of the operation of
night clubs would give rise to a constitutional
question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof
2. Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84,
Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to
promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of
the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify
under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should
and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
3. Dela Cruz v Paras
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
Fernando, CJ:
Facts:
[if !supportLists]1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs.
Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of
power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to
them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
[if !supportLists]2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act
Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance
and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power
to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
[if !supportLists]3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal
council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It
was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation,
not prohibition.
[if !supportLists]4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would
give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance
No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but
an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
[if !supportLists]1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not
prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the
operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power
"to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of
the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.
[if !supportLists]2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the
other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather
than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
[if !supportLists]3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It
would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses,
because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply
with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of
an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.
[if !supportLists]4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but
an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/dela-cruz-v-parasdigest.html#sthash.j4dr9mci.dpuf
CASE 41: White Light Corp v City of Manila
1. On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be
nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It
also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation
or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for
wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash
up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less
subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare.
2. White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila
G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009
J. Tinga
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed that the Ordinance
be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.
Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC.
MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC.
On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing
the Ordinance.
On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals.
The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Local
government code and the Revised Manila charter.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance is constitutional.
Held: No, it is not constitutional. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly
restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification
3. FACTS:
The City Mayor, Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 which is entitled, "An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" on
December 3, 1992.
petitioners in this case filed a case before the RTC praying that the ordinance be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. RTC eventually rendered its decision declaring the said ordinance null and void. It was
then elevated to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutional of the ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Ordinance is null and Void
RULING:
Yes, though the goal of the ordinance According to the Supreme Court, is to eliminate and if not, minimize
the use of covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals by
themselves are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State.
However, the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the
political majorities animated by his cynicism.
The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as police
power measure. It must appear that the interest of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of
particular class, require an interference with private rights and that the means employed be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of the private rights
can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purpose of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
4. White Light Corporation et. al vs City of Manila

.entry-header
G.R. No. 122846
January 20, 2009
Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development
Corporation
Respondent: City of Manila
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint
for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the
prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta.
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and
desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a
petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response as the conditions warrant.Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.Police power has been used as justification
for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals,
by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is
subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to
take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
4. Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled
An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes
in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila
(the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and
charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will
affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right
to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all
ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held
that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually
limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The
common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of
regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could
be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the
police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to
its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that
they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also
recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those
persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and
the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom
from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary
for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These
measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the
rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance
may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as
their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous
intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
CASE 42: US v Nag Tang Ho
1. In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG
issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at
which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro
Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO.
The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said
EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He
appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order
fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place
of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other
appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
Johns, J.
2. US v. Ang Tang Ho
Issue:
whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Held:
Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes
the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes
the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures
for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and
emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake
to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any cause, and leaves the question as to what is any
cause to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or
define what is an extraordinary rise. That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act
also says that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, is authorized to issue and
promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does
not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules
or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the
Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the
sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is
or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is
valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be
sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have
been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an
emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and
rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of
the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left
to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix the maximum sale price that the industrial or
merchant may demand. The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and
different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different
prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative
power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their
deputies, who are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the
Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above
regulations in their respective localities. The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was
the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words,
the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not any
cause for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,
rice or corn, and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without
regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether
or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was any cause, or what was an extraordinary rise in the
price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation
should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made
a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not
say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale of
one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive order No. 53.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
3.
US v Ang Tang Ho
GR L-17122
February 27, 1922
Johns
Facts:
The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1,
authorizing the governor-General fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the
Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang
Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than
that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of
the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Issue:
Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Held:
Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the
Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the
law. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what
conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states for
any cause. It also failed to define extraordinary rise that such proclamation by the
Governor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General
CASE 43: Ynot v IAC
1. Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659
J. Cruz
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the station
commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a carabao or
carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained
the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright
confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president under
Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of
instruction that had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply,
to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative
authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due process
clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of
an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to
every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to its
interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as
such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts proved and fact
presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both restrains and is
restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter
of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be said that it complies
with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical only
due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice with the
accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method toconfiscate carabos
was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense and
punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
2. Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST
Facts
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O.
626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the
court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in
asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said
that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make
it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was
not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
3. FACTS:
Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued
for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for
lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that the present
condition demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers
who rely on them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second requisite for a valid
exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method." The reasonable connection between
the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed to conserve
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To
justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
4.
Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987
FACTS:
In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no
carabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.
On January 13, 1984, Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in
violation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ for
replevin
, challenging the constitutionality of said
EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity
of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.
Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not police power is properly enforced
HELD:
NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the
power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. As long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare,
its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. In the case at bar, E.O.
626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribio
case) but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
5. G.R. No. 74457
20 March 1987
Ponente: Cruz, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of E.O. No. 626 (except when the carabo is seven years old if male, and eleven years old if
female). The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries, thus denying due process.
RULING:
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently resilient for due
process is not an iron rule. Flexibility must be the best virtue of guaranty. The minimum requirements of
due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they
are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the question of measure is missing. Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being
an outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old
guaranty of elementary fair play.
To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was
not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional,
and the superseceas bond is cancelled.
6. ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00.
Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court
sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions:
1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright
2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court.
3. Measure should have not been presumed
4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.
HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:
1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency showing to justify
the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President
2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destrcution
3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power
4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was
immedeiately condemned and punish
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as
well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate
to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it
violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A
to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as
to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the
other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend
himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found
that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in
the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
CASE 44: DAR v Sutton
1. DAR represented by Secretary Jose Mari Ponce vs. Delia Sutton, et. al.
G.R. No. 162! "ctober 1#, 2$
Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in Masbate devoted exclusively to cow
and calf breeding. Pursuant to the agrarian reform program at the time, they made a
voluntary offer to sell their holding to DAR to avail of the incentives in !"#.
$n !"", a new law, %AR&, too' effect, which included farms used for raising livestoc'
under its coverage. $n light of the
%u& 'ar(s rulin),

the Suttons filed a formal re(uest
to withdraw their )*S as their land was outside the coverage of %AR&. +he DAR
ignored their re(uest.
$n !! the DAR issued A* !-!!, which provides that only lands used for raising
livestoc', poultry and swine are outside the coverage of %AR&. And in !!, the DAR
ordered a part of the Suttons/ landholdings to be segregated and placed under
%ompulsory Ac(uisition.
$SS012 %onstitutionality of the assailed A*
31&D2 0nconstitutional.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature,
i.e.,
the power to
ma'e rules and regulations. +hey have been granted by %ongress with the authority to
issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rulema'ing has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing
complexity and variety of public functions. 3owever, while administrative rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from 4udicial review
+hey may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate
the %onstitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the
administrative body concerned.
*o be valid, ad(inistrative rules and re)ulations
must be issued by authority of a
law and
(ust not contravene t+e provisions o t+e -onstitution. Nor can it be used
to enlar)e t+e poer o t+e ad(inistrative a)ency beyond t+e scope
intended. -onstitutional and statutory provisions control it+ respect to +at
rules and re)ulations (ay be pro(ul)ated by ad(inistrative a)encies and t+e
scope o t+eir re)ulations.
+he raising of livestoc', swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. $t is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise
is in the form of industrial fixed assets.
&ands devoted to raising of livestoc', poultry and swine have been classified as
industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR
argues that, in issuing the impugned A.*., it was see'ing to address the reports it has
received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural
lands to livestoc' farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find
neither merit nor logic in this contention.
*+e undesirable scenario +ic+ petitioner
see/s to prevent it+ t+e issuance o t+e A.". clearly does not apply in t+is
case.
Respondents/ family ac(uired their landholdings as early as !5". +hey have
long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly 'nown as the
cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact.
$ndeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have 4ust recently engaged in
or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the %AR& that
may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. $t must be
stressed that what the %AR& prohibits is the
conversion o a)ricultural lands
or non0
2. DAR vs Delia Sutton
FACTS:
2
3
4
5
6
7
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform
program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their
VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of
the CARL.
MARO inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He
recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
DAR ignored their request
DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used
for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of
8
9
10
the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz:
1:1 animal-land ratio.
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from
the coverage of CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding
should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.
Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void
for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the
land reform program of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for
owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.
HELD:
Assailed AO is unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultry- raising.
CASE 45: Solicitor General v MMA
1. SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (1991)
Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held
that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the
sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only
under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It
was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However,
petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of
license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never
authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license
plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing
the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the contradiction between the
Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant
to the power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen
expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a
delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605,
which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged
impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC
Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To
test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid
ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a
municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the
first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not
allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the
Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of
such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise
discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that
is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least
allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case
of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila,
including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not
violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is
called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in
question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect
of a statute. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and
so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing
additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of
vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to
deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but
the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to
the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually
prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We here
emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an
exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation
to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including
those here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of
motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic
violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend
the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision.
At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition
against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits,
they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It
is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions,
either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in
Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the
confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of
driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
2.
Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority
Cruz, 1991
FACTS:
In
Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong
, the SC ruled that (1) the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that
could
be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2) even the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to
be
imposed by the Commission.
Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses
and
removal of license plates for alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not among those that may be
imposed under PD 1605.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the
license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
o
The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the decision and
the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.
o
The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented
an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and so
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila.
ISSUE & HELD:

WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)
RATIO:
The problem before the Court is not the validity of the

delegation
of legislative power. The question the SC must
resolve is the validity of the
exercise
of such delegated power.
o
A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for
traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the Metropolitan
Manila
Commission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such sanctions.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the
national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is
conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at
all times
the will of their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail
against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions
the
decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.
There is no statutory authority for
and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against
the imposition of
such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed
by the
challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
NOTE:
SC emphasized that the ruling in the
Gonong
case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is
an exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to
punish
violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those
here questioned.
CASE 46: Boie-Tekada Chemicals, Inc v De La Serna
1.
Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. de la Serna
228 SCRA 329, Dec. 10, 1993
Facts:
P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. Under Sec. 1 of said law, all
employers are required to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more than P
1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, and such should be paid on
December 24 of every year. The Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 contained
provisions defining 13-month pay and basic salary and the employers exempted from
giving it and to whom it is made applicable. Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople which inter alia set items of
compensation not included in the computation of 13-month pay. (overtime pay, earnings and
other remunerations which are not part of basic salary shall not be included in the
computation of 13-month pay). Pres. Corazon Aquino promulgated on August 13, 1985 M.O.
No. 28, containing a single provision that modifies P.D. 851 by removing the salary ceiling of P
1,000.00 a month. More than a year later, Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the
13-month pay law was promulgated by the then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon, among other
things, defined particularly what remunerative items were and were not included in the
concept of 13-month pay, and specifically dealt with employees who are paid a fixed or
guaranteed wage plus commission or commissions were included in the computation of 13th
month pay)
A routine inspection was conducted in the premises of petitioner. Finding that
petitioner had not been including the commissions earned by its medical representatives in
the computation of their 1-month pay, a Notice of Inspection Result was served on petitioner
to effect restitution or correction of the underpayment of 13-month pay for the years, 1986 to
1988 of Medical representatives. Petitioner wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice
of Inspection Results, and expressing the view that the commission paid to its medical
representatives are not to be included in the computation of the 13-moth pay since the law
and its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or BASIC salary and therefore exclude all
remunerations which are not part of the REGULAR salary. Regional Dir. Luna Piezas issued an
order for the payment of underpaid 13-month pay for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. A
motion for reconsideration was filed and the then Acting labor Secretary Dionisio de la Serna
affirmed the order with modification that the sales commission earned of medical
representatives before August 13, 1989 (effectivity date of MO 28 and its implementing
guidelines) shall be excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay.
Similar routine inspection was conducted in the premises of Phil. Fuji Xerox where it
was found there was underpayment of 13th month pay since commissions were not included.
In their almost identically-worded petitioner, petitioners, through common counsel, attribute
grave abuse of discretion to respondent labor officials
Hon. Dionisio dela Serna and Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano.
ISSUE:
Whether or not commissions are included in the computation of 13-month pay
HELD:
NO. Contrary to respondents contention, M.O No. 28 did not repeal, supersede or
abrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from the language of MO No. 28, it merely modified
Section 1 of the decree by removing the P 1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month
pay as envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and while
entitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basic
salary of not more than P 1,000.00 said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the basic
salary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given to
the term basic salary was defined in PD 851 applies equally to basic salary under M.O. No.
28. The term basic salary is to be understood in its common, generally accepted meaning,
i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such additional payments as
bonuses and overtime. In remunerative schemes consists of a fixed or guaranteed wage plus
commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently the basic salary for this is what the
employee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for extra efforts
exerted in consummating sales of other related transactions. They are, as such, additional
pay, which the SC has made clear do not from part of the basic salary.
Moreover, the Supreme Court said that, including commissions in the computation of the 13th
month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the
CASE 47: United BF Homeowner's Assoc. v Home Insurance and Guaranty Corp
1. UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. BF HOMES, INC. G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999. BY
CY
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. BF HOMES, INC. G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999.
Administrative case. digested by C Y the great.
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, ET AL. vs. BF HOMES, INC. G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999
Facts.
1.In 1988 because of financial difficulties, the Securities and exchange commission place respondent under
receivership to undergo a10 year rehabilitation
program appointing attorney Orendain as receiver.
2. Preliminary to the rehabilitation, attorney Orendain entered in to tripartite agreement with the Bf
Paranyake homes owners association and the confideration
homes owners association which resulted in the creation of the united home owners association and was
registered with the Home insurance guaranty corporation.
3. Respondent through its receiver turn over to the petitioner the administration and operation of the
subdivision clab house at 37 Pilar street and a
strip of open space in Concha Cruz garden row.
4. On 1994, the first receiver was relief and a new committee of receivers was appointed and based on the
Bfis title on the main road, the newly appointed
committee of receivers sent a letter to the different Home owners association informing them that they are
now responsible for the security of the subdivision
as a basic requirements. For its rehabilitation.
5.Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with a preliminary injunction with the Higc against the
respondent who issue a temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondent from taking over the clubhouse at 37 Pilar street.
6. Respondent filed a petition for prohibition for the issuance of the temporary restraining order and to
enjoin the Higc from proceeding with the case
Before the Court of Appeals who grant the petition and all denied the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner.
7. Petitioner filed a petition for certitorari before the supreme court.
Issue:
Whether or not, the Higc was correct in promulgating the rules of procedure in the settlements of the home
owners dispute.
According to the Supreme court, the Home insurance guaranty corporation went beyond its authority as
provided for by the law when it promulgated the revised
rules of procedure because an administrative agency cannot amend
An act of congress.
So the supreme court denied the petition for certiorari.
2.
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
BF HOMES, INC.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999
Facts:
United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI) is the sole representative of all homeowners of BF Homes
while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) is
the owner- developer of the subdivision.
Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was placed under receivership by SEC for 10 years under Atty. Orendain
for 10 years.
Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI. Preliminary to the rehabilitation,
Atty. Orendain entered into an
agreement with the two major homeowners' associations, the BF Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc.
(BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BF
Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative homeowners'
association and the setting up of an integrated
security program that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision.
Subsequently, this tripartite agreement was
reduced into a memorandum of agreement, and was amended.
Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC),
6
and
recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the subdivision.
Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation
of the subdivision's clubhouse and a
strip of open space respectively.
The first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHI's board of
directors was appointed.
9
Based on BFHI's title to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the
different homeowners' association in the
subdivision informing them that as a basic requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be
responsible for the security of the
subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation of squatters. On the same day,
petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a

petition for
mandamus
with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging that the committee of receivers illegally
revoked their security
agreement with the previous receiver.
The HIGC issued ex parte a TRO which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking over the clubhouse, securing
all entry and exit points, impeding or
preventing the execution and sale of properties and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or
agreement or petitioner with the BFHI.
Without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for prohibition
for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding
with the case.
14
The HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for preliminary
injunction, until such time that respondent
BFHI's application for prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20)
effectivity of the temporary restraining
order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the
status quo
.
15
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition. Motion for
reconsideration by the petitioners was denied.
Hence this petition.
Issues: whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the case as provided for in s
ec1(b) rule II of HIGC
s rules of procedure.
Ruling:
HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Originally, administrative supervision was vested by law with the SEC but pursuant to PD902-A, this
function was delegated to the HIGC. As stated
in PD92A, HIGC was given the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide homeowners disputes arising
out of the followin
g intracorporate relations: 1. Between and among members of the association; 2.Between any and/or all of them
and the association of which they
are member; and 3.In so far as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity,
between the association and the state.
When HIGC
adopte
d its revised rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners disputes, it added the phrase
between the association and the
state/general public or other entity.
The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of
procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly
expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A.
The inclusion of the phrase
GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY
is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do . The rule-making power of a public
administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority
given it by Congress or the Constitution or
to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute."
26
If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails.
Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an
express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authoritygranting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by
an administrative body to legislate. "A

statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their
just and reasonable execution
3. UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY
CORPORATION,
vs.
BF HOMES, INC.,
G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999
Facts:
United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI) is the sole representative of all homeowners
Inc (BFHI) is the owner- developer of the subdivision.
Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was placed under receivership by SEC for 10 years under Atty. Orendain
for 10 years.
Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI. Preliminary to the rehabilitation,
Atty. Orendain entered into an
agreement
Confederation of BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative
homeowners' association and
the
Subsequently, this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of agreement, and was
amended.
Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC),
6
and recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the subdivision.
Respondent
clubhouse and a strip of open space respectively.
The first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHI's board of
directors was appointed.
9
Based
association
responsible for the security of the subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation
of squatters. On the same
day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for
the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver.
The HIGC issued ex parte a TRO which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking over the clubhouse, securing
all entry and exit points,
impeding or preventing the execution and sale of properties and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any
contract or agreement or
petitioner with the BFHI.
Without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for
prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from
proceeding with the case.
14
The HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for preliminary
injunction, until such time that
respondent BFHI's application for prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved. When the twentyday (20) effectivity of the
temporary restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the
15
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition. Motion for
reconsideration by the petitioners was
denied. Hence this petition.
Issues: whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the case as provided
procedure.
Ruling:
HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Originally, administrative supervision was vested by law with the SEC but pursuant to PD902-A, this
function was delegated to the
HIGC. As stated in PD92-A, HIGC was given the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
homeowners disputes arising
out of the following intra-corporate relations: 1. Between and among members of the
and the association of which they are member; and 3.In so far as it concerns its right to exist as a
corporate entity,
association
the phrase
The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of
procedure. There was a clear
attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A.
The inclusion of the phrase
of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the
authority given it by Congress
or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute."
26
If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to
carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the
effect of extending, or which
conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but
constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may be necessary for
their just and reasonable execution
CASE 48: Lupangco v CA
1. Lupangco VS CA GR NO 77372 April 21 1988 CASE DIGEST
Facts On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission
to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive
any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination
day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the
Rules and Regulations of the Commission
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with a
prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter
from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution
In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and
enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found
to be unconstitutional
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
Held: It is not Constitutional.
the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and
purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional
infirmities
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to
how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking
all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They
have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be
allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth
2.
Lupo Lupangco vs CA G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 160 SCRA 848
Action
: petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
Issue
: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it
cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter.
Commission lawfully prohibit the examines from attending review classes, receiving handout materials,
tips, or
the like three (3) days before the date of the examination?
Facts:
Oct 6, 1986, (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 "Additional Instructions to Examines," to all who will take the
licensure examinations in accountancy.
any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like
or
any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions
during the three days immediatel
y proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the
Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
Oct 16, 196, petitioners et al, filed an injuction suit against PRC, in the RTC
RTC Held:
that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and
giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
PRC to CA
Appeal
CA HELD
: RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No.
105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial
Court
are co-equal bodies.
That the petitioner Prof
essional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial
Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each
other's acts. 3
Lupangco to SC:
SC HELD: RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from
enforcing its resolution.
RE: Reso 105:
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without
any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore,
it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee
during the three days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in
the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22
3.
Lupangco v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all
those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution
embodied the following pertinent provisions:
any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination
day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.
III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed
on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the abovementioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of
October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to
be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petition was granted in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13, 1987.
I
SSUE:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation
Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can
this Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, receiving handout
materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination?
HELD:
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated
as its basis that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are coequal bodies.
The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Professional Regulation Commission in the same category. As already mentioned, with respect to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that
need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law
providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
Professional Regulation Commission.
Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be
reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo,this
rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
I
n so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there should be no question
but that the power of judicial review should be upheld
4. LUPANGCO vs. CA
Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific
situation . This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative
body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was
adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations
CASE 49: Romualdez-Marcos v Comelec
1. acts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent
Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification,
alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended
her COC, changing seven months to since childhood. The provincial election supervisor refused to
admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC
with Comelec's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the
amended as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos
and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed
this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the
the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.
election.
But
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days
before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days
before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election
of members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
11
12
13
Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the
time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?
Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?
Held:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the
necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives
for the following reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family
back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of
her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the
husbands domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her
domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the
rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean
"actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation
therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and
only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to
the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin
(assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in
her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate
(our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos family to
have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident
that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.
3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET
at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976,
September 18, 1995)
- See more at: http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/07/romualdez-marcos-vs-comelecdigest.html#sthash.4p8jzNBK.dpuf
2.
Author: Czar Paguio
Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec (1995)
Petition:
Appeal by certiorari
Petitioner:
Imelda Marcos
Respondent:
Comelec and Cirilo Montejo
Ponencia:
Kapunan
DOCTRINE:
If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of
the residence requirement, the 1 year period is irrelevant because
wherever he is, he is a resident of his domicile of origin. Second, if a
person reestablishes a previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year
requirement must be satisfied. (Bernas book)
FACTS:
1.) Imelda Marcos established her domicile in Tacloban City, which
was her fathers hometown, in 1938 when she was 8 years old. She
pursued her studies (GS,HS, College) in the aforementioned city and
subsequently taught in the Leyte Chinese School. In 1952, she went
to Manila to work in the House of Representatives. Two years after,
she married Pres. Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman in Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. In
1959, her husband was elected a Senator and they lived in San Juan,
Rizal where she again registered as a voter. And in 1965, she lived in
the Malacanang Palace when her husband became the President.
This time, she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. After their
exile in Hawaii, she ran for President in 1992 and indicated in her
CoC that she was a resident and register voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
2.) Marcos filed her CoC for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte.
3.) The incumbent Representative, Montejo, filed for her
disqualification alleging that she did not meet the 1 year
constitutional requirement for residency.

4.) Apparently, she wrote down in her CoC in item no.8, which asked
for the number of years of residency, that she had been a resident
for 7 months.
5.) Ma
rcos filed an amended CoC changing 7 months to since
childhood, claiming that it was an honest misinterpretation that she
thought she was being asked for her actual and physical presence in
Tolosa, and not her domicile.
6.) The COMELEC found the petition for her disqualification
meritorious and cancelled her amended CoC. For them, it was clear
that Marcos has not complied with the 1 year residency
requirement.
In election cases, the term residence has always been

considered synonymous with domicile. This is the
intention to reside in the place coupled with the personal
presence.
When she returned after her exile, she did not choose to
go back to Tacloban. Thus, her animus revertendi
(intention to return) #JudgePrincess points to Manila.
Pure intention to reside in Tacloban is not sufficient, there

must be conduct indicative of such intention.
7.) The COMELEC denied her motion for reconsideration but issued a
resolution allowing for her proclamation should she obtain the
highest number of votes. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and directed the suspension of her proclamation.
8.) Marcos found out that she was won by a landslide in the said
elections and prayed for her proclamation. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of
the First District of Leyte for a period of one year.
RULING + RATIO:
The case at hand reveals that there is confusion as to the application
of Domicile and Residence in election law.
Originally, the essential distinction between residence and
domicile lies in the fact that residence is the PHYSICAL presence
of a person in a given area and domicile is where a person
intends to remain or his permanent residence. A person can
only have a single domicile.
It was ascertained from the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution that residence for
election purposes
is
synonymous with domicile.
It cannot be contested that the petitioner held various residences in
her lifetime. The Courts reiterate that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if she has maintained different residences for
different purposes. None of these purposes pointed to her intention
of abandoning her domicile of origin.
The Courts ruled in favor of Marcos because of the ff reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became
Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law wh
en her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law
* does not mean the same

thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.
*Civil Code kasi sa Art 110: The husband shall fix the residence of the
family. Sobrang distinguished yung residence at domicile sa Civil law.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She
even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
DISPOSITION: COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte
3.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
Leyte First District. On March 2, !""#, private respondent $irilio Monte%o, also a candidate for the same
position, filed a petition for dis&ualification of the petitioner 'ith $OM(L($ on the )round that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional re&uirement for residency. On March 2", !""#, petitioner filed an amended
certificate of candidacy, chan)in) the entry of seven months to *since childhood+ in item no. in said
certificate. o'ever, the amended certificate 'as not received since it 'as already past deadline. he
claimed that she al'ays maintained /aclo0an $ity as her domicile and residence. /he econd Division of
the $OM(L($ 'ith a vote of 2 to ! came up 'ith a resolution findin) private respondent1s petition for
dis&ualification meritorious.
ssue:
hether or not petitioner lost her domicile of ori)in 0y operation of la' as a result of her marria)e
to the late 3resident Marcos.
!eld:
For election purposes, residence is used synonymously 'ith domicile. /he $ourt upheld the
&ualification of petitioner, despite her o'n declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided
in the district for only 4 months, 0ecause of the follo'in)5 6a7 a minor follo's the domicile of her parents8
/aclo0an 0ecame petitioner1s domicile of ori)in 0y operation of la' 'hen her father 0rou)ht the family to
Leyte8 607 domicile of ori)in is lost only 'hen there is actual removal or chan)e of domicile, a 0ona fide
intention of a0andonin) the former residence and esta0lishin) a ne' one, and acts 'hich correspond 'ith
the purpose8 in the a0sence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of
ori)in should 0e deemed to continue8 6c7 the 'ife does not automatically )ain the hus0and1s domicile
0ecause the term *residence+ in $ivil La' does not mean the same thin) in 3olitical La'8 'hen petitioner
married 3resident Marcos in !"#9, she :ept her domicile of ori)in and merely )ained a ne' home, not a
domicilium necessarium8 6d7 even assumin) that she )ained a ne' domicile after her marria)e and
ac&uired the ri)ht to choose a ne' one only after her hus0and died, her acts follo'in) her return to the
country clearly indicate that she chose /aclo0an, her domicile of ori)in, as her domicile of choice
4. Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency
requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELECs head
office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an honest
misrepresentation and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejos
petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original
certificate cancelled.
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on
April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to the office should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes. However, this was reversed
and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she did win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the said
Congressional election.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district
of Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement (as intended by the framers of the constitution)2. The confusion of the honest mistake
made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is
immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the
candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed
to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and
Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences
incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voters
registration in these cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that
she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further
contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to wherever
he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wifes domicile
of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she
wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their
farm in Olot, Leyte.
(2)
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies
would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a
given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs.
Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not
lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.
(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the
petitioners qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members
of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
5. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the
Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the
Constitution
Decision:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for
a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the
qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided
in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents;
Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to
Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with
the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner
married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
6. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v COMELEC
FACTS:
The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate to contest elections to the House of
Representatives in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative of the constituency of Leyte, Cirilo
Roy Montejo (a candidate for the same position) applied
to Commission on Elections [COMELEC] to have Imelda Romualdez-Marcoss application rejected on the
grounds that it did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The constitutional requirement
for residency for election purposes stated that in order to contest a position, the candidate must have
resided in the location for which they are standing for a period of one year or more. The purpose of the
provision was to prevent the possibility of strangers or newcomers who were unacquainted with the needs
of a community standing for office. In her original application form, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos had stated
that she had resided in Leyte for seven months. In response to the complaint fled by Cirilo Roy Montejo she
amended the time of residency in her application from seven months to since childhood. She claimed
that the entry of the word seven in her original Certifcate of Candidacy was the result of an honest
misinterpretation, which she now sought to rectify. She further stated that she had always maintained
Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or residence. COMELEC, after considering the petition of
Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim
meritorious and refused the petitioners original application for candidacy and her amended version.
COMELEC rejected the petitioners application for candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed that
she did not intend to make Tacloban her domicile, that she had registered as a voter in different places,
and on several occasions had declared that she was a resident of Manila. COMELEC stated that although
she spent her school days in Tacloban she had abandoned residency when she chose to stay and reside in
other places. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting a
declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of
one year at the time she applied to contest the 1995 elections.
She argued that the meaning of residency in the Constitution, which designated the requirements for
candidacy for election purposes, was that of domicile. She argued that she had domicile in Leyte because
that was her place of original domicile and she had not acted to replace that domicile with another. She
also argued that her marriage and changes of residency alongside her husband when he changed
residency did not result in a change in her place of domicile. In support of that argument she claimed that
section 69 of the Family Code 1988, which gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family
domicile, illustrates the intent of the Philippines Parliament to recognize the rights of women. She claimed
therefore that since she had domicile in Leyte she automatically fulfilled the requirements for a one-year
residency for election purposes.
The respondents argued the meaning of residency in Article 110 of the Civil Code 1950 was the meaning
that should be applied to the constitutional requirement for a one-year residency prior to qualifying for
candidacy for the elections. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they argued, had changed her residency to that of
her husband upon her marriage and at the same time automatically gained her husbands domicile. After
returning to Leyte she had resided there for only seven months and she therefore did not satisfy the one
year requirement for candidacy.
HELD:
14
15
16
The majority of the Supreme Court (eight judges in favor, four against) held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary
residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. The
Court held that the term residence in the context of qualifying for certain elected positions is
synonymous with the term domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends
to return after an absence. A person can only have a single domicile, although they can abandon one
domicile in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must demonstrate three (3)
requirements:
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and one must act in accordance with that intent.
Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements have been met will the residence of
origin be lost, otherwise residency will be deemed to continue.
The Court held that the meaning of residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code, which states that the
husband shall fix the residence of the family, is different therefore to the meaning of residence in the
Constitution. The term residence may have one meaning in civil law (as under the Civil Code) and another
different meaning in political law as represented in the election requirements identified in the Constitution.
Residency is satisfied under the Civil Code if a person establishes that they intend to leave a place when
the purpose for which they have taken up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be for
pleasure, business, or health and a person may have different residences in various places. However,
residency in the Constitution as opposed to the Civil Code means domicile and therefore the key issue is to
determine the domicile of the petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. The Court held that Article 110 does
not create a presumption that a wife automatically gains a husbands domicile upon marriage. When the
petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in 1954, she was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of
the Civil Code to follow her husbands actual place of residence as fixed by him. The right of the husband
to fix the residence was in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. It
recognised the fact that the husband and wife bring into the marriage different domiciles and if the
husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in
order that they may live together. However, the term residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code does
not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile as a result
of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The Court also held that it would be
illogical for the Court to assume that a wife cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her
husband, if she has not positively selected a new one during the subsistence of the marriage itself.
The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced to replace the Civil Code, confirmed the
petitioners argument that marriage does not automatically change a wifes domicile to that of her
husband. The Family Code replaced the term residence (used in the Civil Code) with the term domicile.
Article 69 of the Family Code gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile. The
provision recognised revolutionary changes in the concept of womens rights in the intervening years by
making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. The provision
recognised the right of women to choose their own domicile and removed the automatic transfer of a
husbands domicile to his wife.
7. FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and
was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in
San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for
the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also
a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite
her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the
purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one
only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she
chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports
the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
CASE 50: People v Jalosjos
1.
PEOPLE v. ROMEO JALOSJOS (2001)
Facts
Rape is a crime against human dignity, punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death, particulary odious when committed against a minor. There were six other
cases where the Jalosjos was acquitted of the charges of acts of lasciviousness for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Eleven year
old Rosilyn Delantar accused Romeo G. Jalosjos of sexual impropriety against her on
the dates of June 18 & 20, 1996, at the Ritz Towers, Makati City. The rest of the
information provided for lascivious conduct only. Allegedly, he paid Php10k, Php5k
& Php5k on different dates. She was pimped by her homosexual adopted father
Simplicio Delantar since the age of 9 (she was born in 1985) and first met Jalosjos in
February 1996. He let her stay nights in his condominium unit and repeatedly kept
trying to have sex with her, saying, After all, I am your daddy until, on the dates
mentioned, he succeeded. This went on for some months until Rosilyn ran away in
August 1996, when she was taken to DSWD and the NBI conducted an investigation
into her rape claims.
Jalosjos claimed that it was his brother Dominador who Rosilyn met and he
was in the province allegedly at the time the sexual advances took place. This issue
was allegedly crafted by his political enemies to put him at a disadvantage.
chadosorio
He was found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and Php50k for
each count of rape (2), and reclusion temporal and Php20k damages for each count
of acts of lasciviousness (6).
Issues
1.[Main Case] Is the reliance of the trial court on the witnesss credibility
sufficient to hand him such sentence? chadosorio
2.[Offshoot Case] Can a legislator perform his duties thru legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite having been incarcerated due to a nonbailable offense?
Decision
(Ynares-Santiago,
ponente
)
1.Is the reliance of the trial court on the witnesss credibility
sufficient to hand him such sentence?
Petitioner:
"Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus
(false in part, false in
everything). The fact that the trial court accepted his alibi means that Rosilyns
story was concocted in part, and therefore her whole testimony falls. Plus, its not
2. 324 SCRA 689
FACTS: While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, a Congressman was confined
at the national penitentiary. Since he was reelected to his position, he argued that he should be allowed to
attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings, because his confinement was depriving his
constituents of their voice in Congress.
HELD: Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraints of general law.
Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House of Rep is privileged from arrest only
if offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. Confinement of a congressman charged
with a crime punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional foundations. If allowed to attend the
congressional sessions, the accused would be virtually made a free man. When he was elected into office,
the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom of action. Congress can continue to function even
without all its members being present. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement.
3. Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in
Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of
Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was
eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC.
Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate
and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by
operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate
the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been
staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the
Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his
residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented
house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things:
actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish
pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including
local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or
wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court
will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in
his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
4. People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
08
OCT
.date
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant
as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of
the sovereign will.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws., this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The
Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests
are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.
5. PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of
its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that
of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
CASE 51: Trillanes v Pimentel
1. TRILLANES vs PIMENTEL Case Digest
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING

JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military
soldiers surrendered that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup dtat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in
detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders
of the RTC.
17
18
19
ISSUES:
Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his
mandate as senator
Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who
are held without bail
HELD:
No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon.
Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed
to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006,
file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senatorelect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the
trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior
grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
2. TRILLANES VS. PIMENTEL
GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Facts:
July 27, 2003- more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President
and key national officials.
Later that day, Former President GMA issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces
to suppress the rebellion.
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with
coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
June 30, 2007 - petitioner, who has remained in detention, won a seat in the
Senate
June 22, 2007 - petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an
"Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests" (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the
Senate
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or
opinions to the press or the media
(e) To be allowed to receive reporters and other members of the media
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of
the Senate and related activities
July 25, 2007 - the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs
(b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.
- September 18, 2007 - trial court just the same denied the motion, citing the
Jalosjos case
Trillanes petitioned for certiorari on the following grounds
- The jurisprudence cited by the honorable court is inapplicable
a. The accused in the Jalosjos case was already convicted. He was not,
therefore he still enjoys the presumption of innocence
b. Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude. He was
charged with "coup d'etat," a political offense
3. Trillanes vs. Pimentel
Antonio Trillanes won a seat in the Senate while being under detention for staging an alleged
coup detat. Before the commencement of his term, his fellow opposition Senators filed a
motion to allow him to attend Senate sessions and perform his duties as senator. It was
argued that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the
type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which
demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos. Trillanes posits that his election provides the legal
justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity,
elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing
him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the peoples will,
repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the mandate of the people. Moreover, he
pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also
been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend social functions. Are the contentions of
Trillanes tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The SC ruled that the distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in
Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup detat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. (visit fellester.blogspot.com) Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political
complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. The high court also denied Trillanes
assertion that he was not a flight risk since he voluntary surrendered to authorities. The incident at the
Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati showed him to be a flight risk. xxx The performance of legitimate and
even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. xxx Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. (Trillanes vs.
Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008)
CASE 52: Jimenez v Cabangbang
1. Freedom of Speech & Debate

Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study
by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists
have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup
dtat to place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under
their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet
such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then
filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said
that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. The
publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the
same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress
or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as
planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise,
added that it is of course possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge. In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they
may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to
Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed
Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief
of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as planners
include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.
2. FACTS:
Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban they are the persons mentioned in the open letter of
Cabangbang to the President
Bartolome Cabangbang member of the HOR and wrote the letter to the President
A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the CFI of Rizal for recovery of several sums of
money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Cabangbang.
The letter contains information that:
1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build up
2. There is a planned coup dtat
3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in a effort to rally
the officers and men of the AFP behind General Arellano.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.
2. Whether or not it is libelous.
HELD:
1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the publication:
a. was an open letter,
b. the Congress was not in session
c. it was not a discharge of an official function or duty
2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the planners but
merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part.
The order appealed is confirmed
3. Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee
on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed
to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious
study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such
strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was
planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,
among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general
circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be
dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is
covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the
same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress
or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
CASE 53: Nacaytuna v People
1. SANTOS NACAYTUNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171144 November 24, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Santos L. Nacaytuna, who was then Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur
appointed his wife, the private complainant Marydole V. Nacaytuna as Municipal Health Officer. In the
course of her employment, Marydole drafted a letter of resignation dated April 7, 2000 which petitioner
purportedly received on even date. In May 2001, Marydole left the conjugal home and lived separately
from petitioner. Sometime in April 2002, a certain Marly Prieto informed Marydole that petitioner has
accepted her resignation effective at the end of April 2002. Marydole questioned the acceptance of her
resignation before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Office of the Ombudsman claiming that she
never tendered the resignation letter to which the CSC declared the acceptance of Marydole's resignation
illegal. With the recommendation of the Ombudsman, an information was filed against petitioner for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Sandiganbayan found Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 as
charged, hence this petition.
2. NACAYTUNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest
SANTOS NACAYTUNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171144 November 24, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Santos L. Nacaytuna, who was then Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur
appointed his wife, the private complainant Marydole V. Nacaytuna as Municipal Health Officer. In the
course of her employment, Marydole drafted a letter of resignation dated April 7, 2000 which petitioner
purportedly received on even date. In May 2001, Marydole left the conjugal home and lived separately
from petitioner. Sometime in April 2002, a certain Marly Prieto informed Marydole that petitioner has
accepted her resignation effective at the end of April 2002. Marydole questioned the acceptance of her
resignation before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Office of the Ombudsman claiming that she
never tendered the resignation letter to which the CSC declared the acceptance of Marydole's resignation
illegal. With the recommendation of the Ombudsman, an information was filed against petitioner for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Sandiganbayan found Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 as
charged, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt violating
Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
HELD: Yes. Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of the following facts:
1.)The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged
in conspiracy with them; 2.) The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his
official duty or in relation to his public position; 3.) The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and 4.)His action caused undue injury to the Government or
any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.
Petitioner, as Municipal Mayor, was a public officer. His acceptance of Marydole's resignation was done in
the performance of his official duty. It was also proved that Marydole never tendered the resignation letter
hence petitioner was evidently acting in bad faith when he made it appear that it was submitted. Worse,
he accepted the same knowing that it was never tendered in the first place. Petitioner's actuations caused
undue injury to Marydole because it resulted to her removal from office and the withholding of her
salaries.
Resignation is the "act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces
the further right to use it. It implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of
the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and its acceptance by competent and lawful
authority." To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an
intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper
authority.
In the instant case, the intention to relinquish and the act of relinquishment are clearly absent. While
Marydole admits having written and prepared the resignation letter dated April 7, 2000, the evidence
shows that she did not actually tender the same and refrained from pursuing her intention to resign.
As observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's account of how he received the resignation letter is rife
with inconsistencies. Before the CSC, he claimed that Marydole's resignation letter "reached him not
through the normal course of transmitting written communications" because protocol is not strictly
observed between them as husband and wife.
Otherwise he could have just asked the complainant if she was resigning or not, but he failed to do so.
Such failure and his belated acceptance of the complainant's untendered resignation, which may have
been motivated by their apparent marital problems, are clear indications of evident bad faith.
CASE 54: Adaza v Pacana
1. Adaza v. Pacana
135 SCRA 431
FACTS:
Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office
expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and
respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the governor. Petitioner
has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom, claiming to be the lawful occupant of the
position.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can exercise the
functions of both simultaneously; and 2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of MP but
lost, can continue serving as vice governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if said office
is vacated.
HELD:
Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any
other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations
and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions on his holding of more
than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which
provides that governors, or members of sangguniang or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position
of vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.
2.
Consti I
Adaza v Pacana, G.R. No. 68159, March 18, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected Governor of Misamis Oriental during the
1980 elections. His Vice-Governor, herein respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., was
likewise qualified and assumed officed during their oath on March 3, 1980. Under
the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.
Pacana and Adaza filed their certificates of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan
Pambansa elections on March 27, 1984 and April 27, 1984 respectively. Petitioner
won and took his oath as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 9184 and respondent
likewise took over the vacancy as Governor and took his oath of office on July 25,
1984.
Petitioner contends Pacanas unlawful occupancy of the Governors office, hence
this petition for prohibition with a writ of parliamentary injunction and/or restraining
order was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Homobono Adaza can exercise and discharge his
functions as Mambatas Pambansa and Provincial Governor simultaneously.
Ruling:
No. Under Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, a Member of the National
Assembly (now Batasan Pambansa) shall not hold any other office or employment in
the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of
prime minister or member of the cabinet. Petitioner Adaza, being a public officer is
subject to the regulations and conditions as the law may impose and cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more
than one office.
Upon taking his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa, petitioner
subsequently operated to vacate his former post and he can no longer continue to
occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions which makes respondent to
reassume the position of Vice-Governor and later on take oath of office as Governor
for the unexpired term in lawful accordance with the Local Government Code
3. Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the
law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his
certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984.
In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza
took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the
functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental
before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the
lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He
argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the
province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the
parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the
position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original
position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office
or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member
of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices
abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than
one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a
private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume
the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against
BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials
shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code.
4. FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their
respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the
ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his
oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions
of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful
occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues
that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the
province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the
parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the
position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original
position and as such can, by virtue of succession, taeke the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office
or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member
of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices
abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than
one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a
private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP.
697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials
shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.
CASE 55: Puyat v de Guzman
1. In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries.
The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were
not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And
during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the
parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat
objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone)
before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from
appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for
him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting
Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case
without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such
courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is
still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he
presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution
he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act
after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.
Read full text
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither
shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or
jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative
bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts
martial and military tribunals, being administrative agencies, are included.
(From https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/terms.asp, accessed 09/17/2014)
2. Puyat v. De Guzman (113 SCRA 31); Digest
Puyat vs De Guzman
on January 4, 2012
Political Law Appearance in Court
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The
election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were not properly
counted hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25
May 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And during a conference
held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to have the parties confer with each other,
Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body
(such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He
instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel
but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The
SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved
to question the Commissioners action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case
without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such
courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is
still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he
presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution
he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act
after the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.
Other alternative digest:
Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one
group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the
election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on
Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counselbefore any administrative body, and
SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent
Acero.
Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero.
Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for interventionin the
SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted
leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares.
Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case
without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution
Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership
of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the
SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of directors,
after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the
case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter
under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been
an indirect appearance as counsel before anadministrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The
intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other
capacity.
3. PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982 Case Digest
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of respondent
Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr.,
granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC Case.
FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private
corporation, was held six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat
Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in
control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the election.
Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the
appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel
for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an
administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.
When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on
15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May
1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10
IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC
Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as counsel,
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
RULING:
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He
had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May
1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed, and one day
before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene,
he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by
petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
"intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an
afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act
which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition
contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez
leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.
4. FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of
the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the
Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner
to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech entitled A Message to Garcia
wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the Presidents administration selling pardons. For refusing to
provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15 months for the serious
disorderly behavior.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioners words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speech
and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.
HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
as stated in the provision that xxx shall not be questioned in any other place.
2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the
judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House
knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power.
3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the
suspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done by
unanimous consent.
4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

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CASE 28: BAYAN VS ZAMORA

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

[A.M. No. P-02-1620. April 1, 2003]

3. A.M. No. P-02-1622 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 95-45-P)

that the taxation must be resisted as an

personal and therefore waivable

but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed

CASE 33: UNKNOWN

special session after it.

Petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of

As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of

Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is an

VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution. The problem is, CA

YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law

It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved

second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

and other similar places of

The SC held that municipal corporations cannot

The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of

Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the

A refusal to grant licenses, because no such

It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only

There is thus support for the view advanced by

4. White Light Corporation et. al vs City of Manila

January 20, 2009

Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.

%u& 'ar(s rulin),

ISSUE & HELD:

The problem before the Court is not the validity of the

There is no statutory authority for

and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against

petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a

an administrative body to legislate. "A

constitutional requirement for residency.

In election cases, the term residence has always been

Pure intention to reside in Tacloban is not sufficient, there

* does not mean the same

of Tolosa in said months.

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING

Related Requests" (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

1. Freedom of Speech & Debate

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