Case: 13-13951

Date Filed: 02/03/2015

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13951
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00001-MW-GRJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SHAWN EMMANUEL CASTOR,
a.k.a. SHAWN EMANUEL CASTOR,
a.k.a. SHAWN E. CASTOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(February 3, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, DUBINA and GILMAN, * Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting
by designation.

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Appellant Shawn Castor appeals his convictions for: (1) possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C)-(D); (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and (3) possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e). On
appeal, he argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his
statements and physical evidence seized from his residence. He contends that:
(1) prior to reading him his Miranda 1 rights, Detective Fred Melaragno of the
Gainesville (Fla.) Police Department repeatedly told him that he could keep Castor
out of jail if he cooperated; (2) Melaragno told him after reading him his rights that
he could not charge Castor with any additional drugs; and (3) after he admitted that
he had hidden additional marijuana, officers searched his home pursuant to a
search warrant and seized marijuana, cocaine, and a firearm. Castor concedes that
he was in custody and waived his Miranda rights, but he contends that his
confession was involuntary and that due process compels the suppression of the
evidence derived from it.
In reviewing a district courts ruling on a motion to suppress, we review
factual findings for clear error and the application of law to those facts de novo.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

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United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2013). We construe the
facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. at 1295-96.
We conduct a two-part inquiry when determining the admissibility of a
post-arrest statement. United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1317-18
(11th Cir. 2010). First, we decide whether the law enforcement officer complied
with Miranda. Id. at 1318. If so, we determine whether the confession was
voluntary. Id.
Miranda protects a defendants Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination by requiring that law enforcement officers advise the person
subject to custodial interrogation of certain rights and to respect the persons
invocation of those rights. A defendant may waive his Miranda rights if the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Voluntariness requires
that the waiver must be the result of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, deception, or coercion. The waiver must be made with full awareness
of the nature of the rights being waived and the consequences of that decision. A
court may conclude that a person waived his Miranda rights only if the totality of
the circumstances demonstrates both a free choice and the requisite level of
comprehension. The government must prove that a defendant voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
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In United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2010), the defendant,
Lance Lall, challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence on the
grounds that his incriminating statements were made involuntarily and physical
evidence from his bedroom was seized pursuant to his admissions. Detectives
from the North Miami Police Department responded to an emergency call
regarding an armed robbery at Lalls residence. One of Lalls siblings told
detectives that the robbers were looking for Lall because Lall was involved with
credit card fraud. When Lall returned home, a detective informed him of his
Miranda rights. Detective Michael Gaudio took Lall to Lalls bedroom with two
or three other officers to try to collect any evidence that might help the police find
the robbers, but Gaudio refused to allow Lalls family to enter the bedroom.
Gaudio assured Lall and his family that any information Lall shared would not be
used to prosecute him. Lall then identified the equipment that he used to commit
identity theft, and the detective seized this evidence from Lalls bedroom.
Although Gaudio did not arrest Lall, he alerted the Secret Service. Several days
later, Gaudio told Lall to come to the police station with his father, and again
assured him that he wasnt going to be charging him with any of this. Gaudio
re-read Lall his Miranda warnings, and Lall gave another statement. The Secret
Service arrested Lall. The district court denied Lalls motion to suppress. Id. at
1280-82.
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Lall argued that Gaudios promises of nonprosecution undermined the

Miranda warnings that he had been given. Conversely, the government contended
that Lall was not in custody in his bedroom, and his confession was voluntary. Id.
at 1282-83. We first evaluated whether Lalls Miranda waiver was voluntary. Id.
at 1283. We examined Hart v. Attorney General of Florida, 323 F.3d 884 (11th
Cir. 2003), where an officers statement to a suspect that honesty wouldnt hurt
him contradicted the Miranda warning that anything you say can be used against
you in court. Lall, 607 F.3d at 1283. The officer in Hart thus misled the suspect
regarding the consequences of relinquishing his right to remain silent. We
explained that Harts decision to waive his rights and confess was the product of
the officers deception, and Hart did not truly understand the nature of his right
against self-incrimination or the consequences of waiving it. Therefore, Harts
waiver was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In Lall, we held that Gaudios
statement, that he would not pursue charges against Lall, also contradicted the
Miranda warning that anything Lall said could be used against him. Id. at 128384. Accordingly, Hart compelled us to conclude that Lall did not truly
understand the nature of his right against self-incrimination or the consequences
that would result from waiving it. Id. at 1284 (quoting Hart, 323 F.3d at 895)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We explained that, under the totality of the
circumstances, including that Lall was kept from his family during questioning and
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told that the investigation related to the armed robbery, Lalls waiver of his
Miranda rights was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id.
Second, we observed that, even if Lall was not in custody and Miranda was
not required, we were required to determine the voluntariness of his confession
pursuant to the Due Process Clause. We thus examined whether Gaudios
deception rendered Lalls confession involuntary under the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 1285-86. Gaudios misrepresentationthat anything Lall
said would not be used to prosecute himwas one of law, and an officers
misrepresentations of law are much more likely to render a defendants
confession involuntary. Id. at 1285. In fact, a law enforcement officers promise
not to use a suspects incriminating statement may be the most significant factor
in assessing the voluntariness of an accuseds confession in light of the totality of
the circumstances. Id. at 1286 (quoting United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024,
1030 (3d Cir. 1993)). And an involuntary confession is inadmissible in a federal
prosecution even if it was improperly coerced by state law enforcement officers.
Id. at 1287 (emphasis added). We explained:
It is inconceivable that Lall, an uncounseled twenty-year-old,
understood at the time that a promise by Gaudio that he was not going
to pursue any charges did not preclude the use of the confession in a
federal prosecution. Indeed, it is utterly unreasonable to expect any
uncounseled layperson, especially someone in Lalls position, to so
parse Gaudios words.
On the contrary, the only plausible
interpretation of Gaudios representations, semantic technicalities
aside, was that the information Lall provided would not be used
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against him by Gaudio or anyone else. Under these circumstances,

Gaudios statements were sufficient to render Lalls confession
involuntary and undermine completely the prophylactic effect of the
Miranda warnings Gaudio previously administered.
Id.
We then held that the physical evidence could not have been obtained
without the confession; thus, the Due Process Clause compelled the suppression of
the physical evidence as the fruit of the coerced confession. Id. at 1291.
Here, Castors waiver and subsequent admissions were not voluntary.
Although the government argues that his statements were voluntary under the
totality of the circumstances, it does not address Melaragnos statements that he
could not charge Castor for additional drugs. The government correctly points out
several facts indicating that Castors statements were voluntary: (1) detectives read
Castor his Miranda warnings twice; (2) Castor appeared willing to cooperate by
asking if a detective would be waiting to speak to him at the police station;
(3) Castor acknowledged that he had not cooperated before, but circumstances
were different now; (4) the interview began around 7:00 p.m. and was not lengthy;
(5) Castor was not handcuffed; (6) detectives did not physically threaten Castor;
(7) only two detectives were present during the interview; (8) Castor was an adult
and was not intoxicated; (9) Castor was familiar with the criminal justice system;
and (10) detectives told Castor that they could not promise him anything in

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exchange for his statement. 2 However, when evaluating the totality of the
circumstances, a law enforcement officers promise not to use a suspects
incriminating statements may be the most significant factor in assessing the
voluntariness of a confession. Id. As in Lall, an uncounseled layperson such as
Castor would reasonably interpret Melaragnos assurances to mean that the
information Castor ultimately provided would not be used against him by
Melaragno or anyone else. See id. at 1287. Thus, Melaragno misled Castor
regarding the consequences of relinquishing his right to remain silent when he
assured him that he could not charge him with any other drugs. Therefore,
Castors decision to waive his rights and confess was the product of Melaragnos
deception, and Castor did not truly understand the nature of his right against
self-incrimination or the consequences of waiving it. See id. at 1283-84.
Accordingly, Castors waiver was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and thus
violated Miranda. Moreover, the physical evidence seized from Castors residence
could not have been obtained without the confession. It should therefore have
been suppressed as the fruit of the coerced confession. See id. at 1291.

Although Melaragno told Castor that [a]t no point in time will I promise you
anything, he made that statement while discussing whether he could keep Castor out of jail, and
it does not appear to relate to his four statements that he could not charge Castor with additional
drugs.
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For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the district courts order denying
Castors motion to suppress, vacate Castors convictions, and remand this case to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED in part, VACATED AND REMANDED in part. 3

Castors motion to file a reply brief out of time is GRANTED.

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