Page: 1 of 17
Case: 14-13468
Page: 2 of 17
Case: 14-13468
Page: 3 of 17
Cayton called for back-up and returned to his patrol car. After exiting the
car, Perrier walked to the back of the car and opened the trunk. The trunk opened
approximately 18 inches before Cayton rushed over and slammed it shut. While
the trunk was open, Cayton saw what appeared to be the butt of a gun and a
freezer machine, or vacuum sealer, which can be used to package marijuana to
conceal its scent.
Eventually, the car was searched for drugs based on a drug dog alert. In the
trunk, officers found the vacuum sealer and two bags, one black and one red,
which contained contraband. In the partially open black bag, officers found some
clothing and two loaded handguns. In the red bag, officers found a vacuum-sealed
plastic bag containing 440 grams of marijuana, a magazine for ammunition, two
mason jars, a set of digital scales, and a box of plastic baggies. In the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, officers found three receipts for money orders in
amounts of approximately $2,000 each, a receipt for a package mailed to
Sacramento, California, a receipt for the rental car in the name of David Fergusson,
a roll of cash totaling around $3,000, and several prepaid debit cars.
II.
In a superseding indictment, Perrier was charged with possession of a
firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (Count 1), and
Case: 14-13468
Page: 4 of 17
possessing a firearm was admissible to show intent and knowledge, which were at
issue because Perrier had pled not guilty. The court agreed that the prior firearmpossession conviction was relevant to intent and admissible under Rule 404(b).
After Cayton and other officers testified about the traffic stop and search of
the rental car, the government moved to admit Perriers 1992 firearm-possession
conviction under Rule 404(b). Over Perriers objection that the conviction was
unduly prejudicial and way too old, the district court admitted a certified copy of
the conviction, which was then read before the jury.
The district court ultimately excluded the other two convictions from trial.
4
Case: 14-13468
Page: 5 of 17
After the government rested its case in chief, Perrier moved for a judgment
of acquittal on both counts under Rule 29, Fed. R. Crim. P. The district court
denied the motion, and Perrier rested without presenting any witnesses or
testifying.
arguments that the government had not proved Perriers knowing possession, the
prosecutor cited the 1992 firearm-possession conviction as evidence of Perriers
intent, highlighting [t]hat the defendant previously was convicted of this exact
same crime.
The jury deliberated for an hour and a half before reporting a stalemate on
Count 1 (felon-in-possession offense) and a unanimous verdict on Count 2
(marijuana offense). The district court sent the jury home for the evening with
instructions to come back in the morning and continue deliberations. The jury
resumed deliberations the following morning and, after a little more than an hour,
returned a unanimous guilty verdict on both counts. The district court sentenced
Perrier to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 262 months on Count 1 and 60
months on Count 2.
On appeal, Perrier argues that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the extrinsic offense evidence under Rule 404(b). He also challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
III.
5
Case: 14-13468
Page: 6 of 17
Case: 14-13468
Page: 7 of 17
prejudice, given the age of the conviction and the absence of any evidence showing
that the circumstances of the prior offense were similar to the instant offense. The
government responds that the prior conviction was critical to showing Perriers
knowing possession, which was the central issue at trial, and that any error in
admitting the conviction was harmless.
Rule 404(b) prohibits [e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act . . . to
prove a persons character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Other crimes
evidence may be admissible, however, for other purposes, such as to prove intent,
knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. We have explained that Rule
404(b) is one of inclusion which allows extrinsic evidence unless it tends to prove
only criminal propensity. United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Circuit applies a three-part test for determining the admissibility of
evidence under Rule 404(b). United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2003).
defendants character. Id. (quoting Miller, 959 F.2d at 1538). Second, there
must be sufficient proof so that a jury could find that the defendant committed the
extrinsic act. Id. Third, the evidence must possess probative value that is not
Case: 14-13468
Page: 8 of 17
substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice, and the evidence must meet the
other requirements of Rule 403. Id.; see Fed. R. Evid. 403.
The first prong is met in this case. We have found that there is a logical
connection between a convicted felons knowing possession of a firearm at one
time and his knowledge that a firearm is present at a subsequent time (or, put
differently, that his possession at the subsequent time is not mistaken or
accidental). Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1281. Thus, the fact that [Perrier] knowingly
possessed a firearm . . . on a previous occasion makes it more likely that he
knowingly did so this time as well. Id. at 1282 (emphasis omitted). Moreover,
when a defendant does not admit or stipulate to knowingly and intentionally
possessing a firearm as a felon, the government may seek to admit evidence of a
prior knowing possession of a firearm to prove the mens rea element of the
offense. United States v. Taylor, 417 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005). Perriers
arguments to the contrary on these points are unavailing.
The second prong also is satisfied. At trial, the government introduced a
certified copy of Perriers prior conviction, which is sufficient proof that Perrier
committed the prior act. Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1282.
That leaves the third prong: whether the probative value of the extrinsic
offense was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Extrinsic evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inherently prejudicial to the defendant, and may
8
Case: 14-13468
Page: 9 of 17
entice the jury to draw the prohibited inference that a defendant previously
convicted of a crime likely committed the same crime again. Sterling, 738 F.3d at
238 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the third prong of the test calls for
balancing the incremental probity of the evidence . . . against its potential for
undue prejudice. Id. (quoting Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914).
In making this determination, courts should conduct a common-sense
assessment of the circumstances of the extrinsic offense, including prosecutorial
need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, as well
as temporal remoteness. United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1332 (11th
Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc)2).
Here, the evidence was important to the governments case.
Perriers
knowing possession of the firearms was the only 922(g)(1) element at issue, and
the governments other evidence of Perriers intent was circumstantialrequiring
the jury to infer knowing possession based on Perriers presence in the car where
the guns were found. In addition, although we do not know the underlying facts of
the extrinsic offense, it is clearly similar enough under our precedent to be
probative of Perriers knowledge in this case. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1281-82;
see also United States v. Delgado, 56 F.3d 1357, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995) ([W]hen
2
We are bound by all former Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
9
Case: 14-13468
Page: 10 of 17
other crimes evidence goes to intent rather than identity, a lesser degree of
similarity between the charged crime and the uncharged crime is required.).
However, temporal remoteness depreciates the probity of the extrinsic
evidence. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 915. Thus, a conviction may be too remote for
proper consideration. Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1332; see, e.g., United States v.
Carter, 516 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1975) (ten-year gap rendered extrinsic
offense evidence too remote to be probative); United States v. San Martin, 505
F.2d 918, 922-23 (5th Cir. 1974) (nine- and ten-year old offenses too remote to be
probative). But we have not adopted a bright-line rule for when a conviction is too
old to be admissible because the determination is very fact specific. United States
v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005). Generally, an appellant bears
a heavy burden in demonstrating an abuse of the courts broad discretion in
determining if an extrinsic offense is too remote to be probative. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Under the specific circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district
court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of this particular 22-year-old prior
offense. Despite its importance to the governments case, the probative value of
the extrinsic offense evidence was substantially diminished by the passage of time.
See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 915; Carter, 516 F.2d at 435. The age of the prior
offense in this case is similar to that in Sanders, where we held that the district
10
Case: 14-13468
Page: 11 of 17
11
Case: 14-13468
Page: 12 of 17
Although the district court gave limiting instructions to the jury on the use of the
extrinsic evidence, see United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that
jury instructions may limit unfair prejudice), we do not find the instructions sufficient to dispel
the prejudice in this case. Notably, the court did not instruct the jury on the limited use of such
evidence at the time the evidence was admitted, and the government put on additional witnesses
after introducing the evidence. In addition, the limiting instruction did not advise the jury that it
could consider the age of the prior act in determining whether it was probative of intent.
Although the instruction given was, understandably, the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury
12
Case: 14-13468
Page: 13 of 17
In sum, we conclude, under the specific circumstances of this case, that the
district court abused its discretion by implicitly determining that the probative
value of Perriers firearm-possession conviction was not substantially outweighed
by unfair prejudice.4
Nonetheless, we review evidentiary errors for harmless error. United States
v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1109 (11th Cir. 2010). The government bears the
burden of showing that an error was harmless. Id. An error is harmless unless it
affected the defendants substantial rights. United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322,
1329 (11th Cir. 1999). Therefore, [w]e need not reverse [Perriers] conviction if
the error had no substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient evidence
uninfected by error supports the verdict. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted);
see Phaknikone, 605 F.3d at 1109 (reversal is not warranted unless there is a
substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict). We review the entire record
in determining harmlessness. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d at 1109.
To sustain a conviction for a violation 922(g)(1), the government must
have proved that (1) the defendant was a convicted felon, (2) he knowingly
Instruction, under the specific circumstances here, where the conviction was 22 years old and
Perrier had specifically objected to its admission on that basis, and the age of the prior conviction
affected its probative value, we conclude that some additional instruction would have been
advisable.
4
The district court did not make specific findings balancing probative value and
prejudice under Rule 403, but, given that it responded to and rejected Perriers arguments on
these points, we conclude that the court implicitly conducted the requisite balancing.
13
Case: 14-13468
Page: 14 of 17
possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce.
United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). Perrier stipulated
to the convicted-felon and interstate-nexus elements, leaving only whether Perrier
knowingly possessed the firearms found in the trunk of the rental car. To prove
knowing possession, the government need only show constructive possession
through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the government has not shown that the error was harmless. While the
evidence may have been sufficient to support a guilty verdict without admission of
the prior conviction, the evidence was not overwhelming. See Phaknikone, 605
F.3d at 1109-11 (finding an evidentiary harmless where there was overwhelming
evidence of guilty). And [a]n error may substantially influence an outcome and
thus warrant reversal even if the evidence, had no error occurred, would have been
sufficient to support the conviction. Hands, 184 F.3d at 1329.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the error had a substantial and
injurious influence on the outcome of the jury verdict. See id. Notably, despite
contending that any error was harmless, the government asserts in its appellate
brief that the extrinsic offense evidence was critical (or vital) to establishing
Perriers knowledge of the firearms, the only element in dispute. The jurys
actions likewise indicate that the other evidence of Perriers knowledge was not
strong. Specifically, after deliberating for an hour and a half, the jury reported a
14
Case: 14-13468
Page: 15 of 17
In these
Case: 14-13468
Page: 16 of 17
Case: 14-13468
Page: 17 of 17
In sum, the district court abused its discretion by admitting Perriers 1992
conviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, and the error was not
harmless. Therefore, we vacate his conviction on Count 1 and remand for further
proceedings. We affirm Perriers conviction on Count 2.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
17