Hegemony Good

_________________________________
**Heg Good: Uniqueness Topshelf**

Heg High Now: Topshelf F/L
FIRST, US power surpasses that of all other states, no one will challenge usstar this ev
Campbell
Craig, "American Power Preponderance and the Nuclear Revolution," REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES v. 35, January 2009, pp. 27-44.
Power
Preponderance contends that balancing is not occurring because the US has achieved
hegemonic domination over the system , making such a policy a losing proposition to
any nation that might try it.8 Brooks and Wohlforth list three main reasons for this
development. First, the gap in military power between the US and any potential rival has
passed, or is approaching, the threshold where balancing becomes a practical
impossibility. Rival states look at the distance between themselves and the US and
conclude that it will be impossible to catch up. Second, geography reduces the threat
potential rivals feel from American power, magnifies the rivalries among themselves,
and causes them to worry that an attempt to contend with American power will only
antagonise their neighbours. Third, the US emerged suddenly after the end of the Cold
War as a unipolar hegemon fait accompli, rather than a revisionist state aiming to overturn
and take over the system. Rivals that might otherwise have been caught up in a race with the
US for preponderance are now inclined to reconcile themselves to the American-led
status quo.9 In addition, a history of international politics that looks beyond the past few centuries of Europe reveals clearly that balance-of-power
Reacting to this theoretical crisis, William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks have developed a new theory, Power Preponderance, that provides a deep Realist explanation of unipolarity.
systems are unusual.10 Most international systems throughout world history were hegemonic and unipolar, rather than balanced; the European balance-ofpower system, Wohlforth and several co-authors show, was highly exceptional, dependent upon the emergence of several large states on a contiguous
Why, then, should large states then be expected to balance against the US today,
when it is not waging war against them, is separated from them by great oceans, wields
far greater relative power than did even the greatest of European and Asian states
and when balancing is the exception in international history rather than the rule ?
continent.11
SECOND, the US will remain the greatest world power even if their predictions come true
Stephen G.
Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Professors, Government, Dartmouth College, "Reshaping the World Order," FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 88 n. 2, March/April 20 09, ASP.
"Measured in
any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power than any
other country in history."4 That statement was as accurate when it was written in 2006
as it would have been at any time after 1991, and the primacy it describes will long
persist, even if the most pessimistic prognostications about U.S. economic, military,
and technological competitiveness come true. For most scholars of international relations, what really changed after 2003 were estimates of the
What accounts for this sudden shift in assessments of American power? For most observers, it was not new information about material capabilities. As Robert Jervis observes,
political utility of America's primacy. Suddenly, scholars were impressed by the fact that material preponderance does not always translate into desired outcomes. For many, theories of international relations
(IR) that explain constraints on the use of power were vindicated by American setbacks in Iraq and elsewhere.
THIRD, we have overwhelming hard power

LAYNE (Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M) 07 [Christopher, American Empire: A Debate , P. 61-2]
American hegemony today is an objective fact, reflecting the absence of other great powers (what
U.S. strategists call "peer competitors") and U.S. hard power. The Soviet Union's collapse, of course, removed from the geopolitical equation the one state capable of acting as
a counterweight to American power. No other state has stepped up to fill this geopolitical vacuum created by its downfall. Indeed , the sheer magnitude of U.S.
power makes it difficult- and possibly dangerous-for other states to emerge as countervailing
power centers. Militarily, American power is awesome. The United States spends more on defense than the rest of the world combined. And
U.S. superiority is qualitative, not just quantitative. Presently, no state can compare with the U.S. military skills in high-tech
conventional warfare. The United States enjoys a commanding advantage in the use of stealth aircraft, precisionguided munitions, the integrated use of computer systems and reconnaissance and communications satellites , and longrange power projection capabilities. Moreover, the United States enjoys a commanding
advantage in nuclear weapons. Indeed, the United States has a first-strike capability against China and may have a similar advantage over Russia.
Economically, the story is the same. The U.S. economy remains far and away the largest economy in the world (far ahead of number two Japan, and even
farther ahead of fast rising China).
FOURTH, the US leads in all categories and has the will to sustain leadership
BRZEZINSKI
(Former National Security Adviser)
07 [Zbigniew, Second Chance, P. 192]
America has a monopoly on global military reach, an economy second to none, and peerless
technological innovation, all of which give it unique worldwide political clout. Moreover, there is a widespread, if unspoken, practical
recognition that the international system needs an effective stabilizer, and that the most likely
short-term alternative to a constructive American world role is chaos . An intelligent Global Leader IV should still be
able to exploit that feeling to tap what's left of the reservoir of goodwill toward America. Though hostility toward the United States has risen to unprecedented levels
and has not yet crested, an America aware of its responsibilities, measured in its presidential rhetoric, sensitive to the complexities of the human condition, and
consensual rather than abrasive in its external relations (in brief, entirely different from its recent emanation) is an America that much of the world would still like to
see at the global helm.
Heg High Now: Topshelf S/L

American primacy is unchallenableextend the 1nc layne evidence. The us is light years
ahead of the world in all categories of military, economic and political power.
And, this status will remain true even if every single prediction they make about American
decline is truethats Wohlforth
And, no other power will challenge us because our lead is too great and the cost is too high
for potential competitorsthats Craig
Additionally, extend the brzezinski ev. This is predictive for the long-term: there will be no rival
that can ever overtake us and the us will stay politically engaged
This means we control the uniqueness debatethey will not win that power is going away in
the status quo unless of deliberate policies like the plan.
Hegemony high military, economic, political and ideological power
Giacomo Chiozza, (Prof., Political Science, Vanderbilt U.), ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER,
2009, 32.
Few commentators, if any, dispute the primacy of the United States in all the dimensions that define the
power status of a country: military, economic, political, and ideological. Even the doomsayers
predicting a rapid collapse of America's dominant position in the international state system concur that the United States towers over the
world with its military might, its economic wealth, its political influence, and its ideological
appeal.
US continues to dominate the world

Walter Russell Mead, (Sr. Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar/Apr 20 10, 160-161.
These days, it is fashionable to speak of a "post-American world"; discussions of the United States' decline fill the pages of many leading publications. Yet U.S.
Obama dominates the world stage as few historical figures have, and the United States
appears destined to play a unique role in the international system for many decades to come .
Schake, who is distinguished chair in international security studies at West Point, not only explains why
this role appears to be so resilient ; she also offers advice for extending the United States' run as the leading world power. Even though this
President Barack
collection was originally prepared for that usually forgettable genre--advice to an incoming administration--the lively analysis and sensible recommendations make it
an important resource for anyone who agrees that U.S. power, not U.S. decline, is the true issue of the day.
American power is unrivaledhegemony in all categories

THAYER (Professor of Strategic Studies @ Missouri State) 07
[Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 1-2 //wyo-tjc]
While all states have grand strategies, they differ in their means to advance their interests in the face of threats. France has
greater means than Bangladesh. The United States has the greatest means. In fact, the United States
finds itself in a special position in international politics: by almost any measure-economic,

ideological, military-it leads the world. It is the dominant state, the hegemon, in international politics. If you
stop and think a moment, it is really remarkable that 6 percent of the world's population and 6 percent of its land mass has
the world's most formidable military capabilities, creates about 25 to 30 percent of the gross world
product, and both attracts and provides the most foreign direct investment of any country. If it were a
person, it would have the wealth of Microsoft chairman Bill Gates or entrepreneur Donald Trump; its military would have the
punch of a heavyweight boxer like Muhammad All or Mike Tyson; its charisma and charm would equal those of a movie star
such as Cary Grant or George Clooney; and it would have as many friends, hangers on, and potential suitors as Frank
Sinatra did at one time or as Oprah or Britney Spears do now.
U.S. power is so great that the constraints they identify will not be able to contain it. prefer our
policymaker-specific evidence
Stephen G. Brooks
and William C. Wohlforth, Professors, Government, Dartmouth College, "Reshaping the World Order,"
FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 88 n. 2, March/April 2009, ASP.
The purpose of this book is to undertake a systematic evaluation of the external constraints that scholars have highlighted
and thereby gain a better understanding of the United States' global role. This entails answering four questions: Does the
United States face the imminent prospect of having its power checked by a balancing
coalition of other great powers? As it has become increasingly exposed to the international
economy, has the United States become more vulnerable to other actors' attempts to
influence its security policies? Is the United States tightly bound by the need to maintain a
good general reputation for cooperation in international institutions? Does the U nited States
need to adhere to existing rules to sustain legitimacy and thus maintain today's
international institutional order? Our answer to each of these questions is noa finding that overturns the
scholarly conventional wisdom, according to which these factors strongly constrain U.S. security policy. On the
contrary, the unprecedented concentration of power resources in the United States generally
renders inoperative the constraining effects of the systemic properties long central to
research in international relations. Given the likely longevity of American primacy, this
general finding has important repercussions for thinking about international relations
scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. In the concluding chapter, we outline a new research agenda to address the
analytical challenge of American primacy, and identify an important and heretofore neglected grand strategic alternative for
the United States.
Heg High Now: Economy F/L

Economic heg is high now despite the economic crisistechnology and dollar strength prove
R. Nicholas Burns, Professor, Practice of Diplomacy and International Policies, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, "The
Ascension," NATIONAL INTEREST, January/February 2009, ASP.
despite the fact that the American

economy is in a downward spiral, and that even worse days could be ahead of us, the United
States will remain the largest global economy for years to come. Our economic weight and
fate are still the most important factor in global prosperity and stability. The dollar, though
weakened, remains the single, most important world currency. Furthermore, as Fareed Zakaria points
out in his excellent new book, The Post-American World, the United States is the undisputed leader in two
key areas where international economic competitiveness may play out in the future-nanotechnology and biotechnology. And we are well positioned to maintain our lead in
science and technology if President Obama launches aggressive government support for a new era of green
Economically, America is of course in a far more tenuous position. But
technologies.
US is the unsurpassed economic leader. Not even the EU can overtake it

[Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 20 //wyo-tjc]
In order to demonstrate this argument, we have to examine the aggregate economic strength of the United States versus
the economic power of other countries. Table 1.4 captures the relative economic might of the United States. It provides a
comparison of the world's top twenty economies as estimated by the Central Intelligence Agency, the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, and the World Bank. For the United States, the data are consistent using any of the major tools
economists employ to estimate economic might (the CIA's GDP-PPP, GDP for the IISS, and GNI for the World Bank). The
data show that the United States is clearly the world's most powerful economy in both absolute
and relative terms. Indeed, if we consider economies, only the twenty-five-member-nation European Union
(EU) possibly surpasses American economic might, and if it does, it is not by much . In 2004, the
EU's economy was $11.05 trillion, in contrast to the $10.99 trillion U.S. economy in 2003, according to the CIA.26 If we
recognize that the CIA estimates the EU had 1 percent real growth in 2004, and the United States had 3.1
percent real growth in 2003, it is the case that the economies are really the same size.
Additionally, as I will describe below, the U.S. economy is much more efficient and better primed for
continued economic growth than is the EU's sclerotic and moribund economy.
Heg High Now: Economy S/L

NEXT, the economy
We are light years ahead economically now even with the financial crisis, and will remain so
long into the future because of our vast tech lead and development potential and because the
worlds use of the dollar as a reserve currency allows us to finance all our debts with ease
thats Burns
And, the fundamentals of our economy are stronger than that of any of our competitorsthats
Thayer
Economic downturn boosted investment in the dollar
Barry Eichengreen, (Prof., Economics, U. Cal., Berkeley), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sep/Oct 2009, 53-68.
The only problem is that, for
all the talk about change, the dollar's importance to the world has not
diminished. In the foreign exchange market, the dollar actually strengthened following the
outbreak of the crisis. When investors fled to safety, they fled to U.S. Treasury bills . In the face of
spreading illiquidity, U.S. and foreign investors alike sought refuge in the most liquid market, the market
for U.S. government debt securities. Since then, the dollar exchange rate has fluctuated, but there has
been no dollar crash. And there is no evidence of a massive loss of confidence .
Most foreign exchanges are in dollars

Barry Eichengreen, (Prof., Economics, U. Cal., Berkeley), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sep/Oct 2009, 53-68.
64 percent of all identified official foreign exchange holdings were

in dollars at the end of 2007, down only marginally from 66 percent in 2002-3 and still considerably higher than
during the first half of the 1990s. (The dollar represented 71 percent of all identified holdings in 1999, but this unusually high number reflected the one-time
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
destruction of Germany's French franc reserves and France's deutsche mark reserves; these became domestic-currency-denominated claims when the euro was
created.) IMF data on the composition of international reserves are incomplete, since some countries, notably China, do not report theirs. One way of inferring those
countries' dollar reserves is to look at the U.S. Federal Reserve's custodial holdings of U.S. Treasuries on behalf of foreign central banks. These show that
foreign authorities have continued to accumulate dollars , and even accelerated their purchases in
the first half of 2009.
Hegemony high economic power

Josef Joffe, Marc and Anita Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow at
Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 9/1/09, The default power: the false prophecy of America's
decline, Foreign Affairs, Factiva, umn-rks
In all instances of declinism, economic failure serves as Exhibit A. But current figures show the
U.S. economy to be worth $14.3 trillion, three times as much as the world's second-biggest economy,
Japan's, and only slightly less than the economies of its four nearest competitors combined --Japan,
China, Germany, and France. Never before in modern history have the gaps between great powers been so wide. On the
eve of World War I, the key players in the European balance of power were more or less evenly matched. The German economy, with a GDP of $237 billion, had just
eclipsed the British economy, then $225 billion; France's GDP was $144 billion, and Russia's was roughly $230 billion.
America possesses economic hegemonyleads in competiveness

Despite problems, the American economy is both huge and robust, and it continues to grow at healthy
rates. Depending on how one counts the numbers, the U.S. economy accounts for between 20 to 30 percent of world GDP.
More- over, the United States is the world's most productive country and still leads the world in
innovation according to the World Economic Forum (WEF), an organization that measures the competitiveness of
countries around the world. Each year, it publishes a ranking of each country's economic competitiveness. This is
comprised of the quality of the macroeconomic environment of given country, the health of its public institutions, and its
technological sophistication. Traditionally the United States is ranked first or second. In 2004, it was ranked second of 104
countries, behind only Finland (China is 46th). According to the World Economic Forum, the United States
"is ranked second, with overall technological supremacy, and especially high scores for such
indicators as companies' spending on R&D [research and development], the creativity of the scientific
community, personal computer and internet penetration rates."29 Also in 2004, the United States was first in the WEF's
rankings for business competitiveness (China is 47th) and technological innovation (China is 104th) a critical indication of
long-term prosperity. Nor is the 2004 ranking an aberration; the United States historically ranks first in
those categories of global competitiveness.
Heg High Now: Hard Power F/L

The U.S. remains the dominant military powerit accounts for half of global military spending
Stephen G. Brooks
conventional wisdom
is that the world is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the U nited States
as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows that this view understates
U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire exaggerated it. That the United States weighs
more on the traditional scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is
as true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer proclaimed the advent of a "unipolar
moment" in these pages nearly two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half
the world's defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output . Some of the reasons for
Only a few years ago, pundits were absorbed in debates about American "empire." Now, the
bearishness concern public policy problems that can be fixed (expensive health care in the United States, for example),
whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such as the greater demographic challenges faced by
the United States' potential rivals).
The U.S. will remain the global military hegemon for years to come
Despite the conventional gloom and doom about America's current standing in the world,
Obama will actually begin his presidency with some rather significant advantages . As he sits
down with Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, Bob Gates and Jim Jones to assess the basic health of U.S. foreign policy, they will
undoubtedly note the strengths of America's international position, and not just the
weaknesses. To start with, the United States is still the single, strongest global power. It will
remain so for decades to come. Consider American power by any metric . Militarily, Commander
in Chief Obama can count on the continued supremacy of U.S. forces worldwide. During his time in office, we will still
spend more on our national defense than the next ten countries combined . We will still be the only
country capable of projecting force on a global basis and sustaining troops in faraway
theaters for years at a time. We will remain the only country that leads powerful multinational
military alliances in both Europe and Asia--a crucial underpinning of America's global power. And, we will retain
the remarkable capacity of our armed forces that have demonstrated their quality and competence
in the interventions of the last fifteen years in Bosnia and Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Heg High Now: Hard Power S/L

NEXT, hard power
We have a massive lead and no one can catch upwe spend as much on the military as the
rest of the world combined, plus we have the economic output to support itthats Brooks
AND, we have an overwhelming military lead by any metricwe can sustain power anywhere
in the world for any amount of time, and no nation can match it--Burns
Hegemony high military spending proves
The gaps become exorbitant in the realm of military power, where the United States plays in a league of its
own. In 2008, it spent $607 billion on its military, representing almost half of the world's total military
spending. The next nine states spent a total of $476 billion, and the presumptive challengers to U.S. military supremacy--China, India,
Japan, and Russia--together devoted only $219 billion to their militaries . The military budget of China , the
country most often touted as the world's next superpower, is less than one-seventh of the U.S. defense budget. Even if one
includes among potential U.S. adversaries the 27 states of the EU, which together spend $288 billion on
defense, the United States still outweighs them all--$607 billion compared to $507 billion.
Hegemony high military power

Kori Schake, (Research Fellow, Hoover Institution), MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 200 9, 116-117.
By any conceivable measure, America is the world's premier military power. Whether the metric is
spending, expeditionary capability, weapons technology, innovativeness, or caliber of personnel,
the American military stacks up at least as well as any military in the world. Cumulatively, these
advantages make it impossible that any country or organization could believe they could fight a
conventional or nuclear war and defeat our military.
American hard power is unrivaledextremely high

The U.S. military is the best in the world and it has been so since end of World War II. No country has deployed
its forces in so many countries and varied climates-from the Arctic to the Antarctic-from below the sea to outer space. No
country is better able to fight wars of any type, from guerrilla conflicts to major campaigns on the
scale of World War II. No country or likely alliance has the ability to defeat the U.S. military on the
battlefield. Thus, measured on either an absolute or relative (that is, comparing the U.S. military to the
militaries of other countries) scale, American military power is overwhelming . Indeed, it is the greatest that it
has ever been. This is not by accident. The United States has worked assiduously, particularly since 1940, to produce the
best military. The causes of American military predominance include extensive training and professional education, high
morale, good military doctrine, frequency of use, learning from other militaries in the right circumstances, exceptional
equipment and sound maintenance, and high levels of defense spending.
Hegemony high naval strength

Nor can any other great power boast the United States' naval strength, a measure of a state's ability
to project power quickly and over great distances. In 2005, as Robert Work, a defense analyst and now undersecretary of the U.S.
Navy, has shown, the U.S. Navy commanded a naval tonnage exceeding the world's next 17 fleets
combined. This is a dramatic shift from 1922, when the Washington Naval Conference tried to set the rules for a balance of power at sea. The three top
competitors--the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan--were allowed navies in the ratio of 5:5:3. At the time, the United Kingdom, the world's greatest
Today,
India, Japan, Russia, and the EU put together could not conduct a major war 8,000
miles from their shores, as the United States has done twice in Iraq and once in Afghanistan in recent years.
maritime power, had a total naval tonnage of 525,000 tons. Germany, France, and Russia also had navies capable of fighting halfway around the world.
however, China,
US accounts for of the worlds military expenditures

Doug Bandow, (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), BATTLING THE BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS FOR WAR, Mar. 15, 2010.
Retrieved Apr. 5, 2010 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/battling-the-bipartisan-c_b_498681.html.
Another cost is financial. Direct military outlays this year will run over $700 billion.
Iraq is ultimately likely
cost $2 or $3 trillion. Washington spends more on "defense," adjusted for inflation, today than at any point during the Cold War, Korean War, and Vietnam War. The
U.S. accounts for nearly half of the globe's military expenditures .
US spends what the rest of the world spends on defense

Ahmed Rashid, (Pakistani Journalist based in Lahore), DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
FAILURE OF NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA, 200 8, L.
The wars after 9/11 gave the Pentagon even more power and money. In 2001 the U.S. defense budget was $293 billion--still
more than the aggregate budget of the next fifteen ranked countries in the world, including all the European powers and China. In 2003 the defense budget reached
In 2008 it reached $647 billion,

by which time the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were expected to have cost more than $1 trillion.
By now the U.S. defense budget was equivalent to what the entire rest of the world spent on
defense.
$360 billion, and in 2006 it topped $427 billion, growing by a phenomenal 40 percent in the five years since 9/11.
US spends what the rest of the world spends on defense

Doug Bandow, (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), OVERSPENT AND OVEREXTENDED, Jan. 7, 200 9. Retrieved Jan. 11, 2010
from www.cato.org.
The U.S. dominates the globe militarily. America's reach exceeds that of the Roman and British
Empires at their respective heights. The threats facing the U.S. pale compared to its capabilities . So why is
Washington spending so much on the military? The military budget is the price we pay for the nation's foreign policy.
The U.S. currently is spending nearly as much as the rest of the world. In real terms, Washington is spending more
today than at any time during the Cold War, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.
US military spending massively increasing

Doug Bandow, (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), OVERSPENT AND OVEREXTENDED, Jan. 7, 200 9. Retrieved Jan. 11, 2010
from www.cato.org.
But America
spends more dollars on the military today than in 1986 or at any other point since World
War II. The numbers are striking. Using 2000 for constant dollars, the U.S. devoted $774.6 billion to the military in 1945, the last year of World War II. In 1953, the
last year of the Korean War, military outlays ran $416.1 billion. Peak expenditures during the Vietnam War hit $421.3 billion in 1968. In contrast, in 2010, before the
Afghan surge and other unplanned expenditures, the administration expected to spend $517.8 billion ($700 billion including Afghanistan and Iraq). That is more than
during two large, hot wars. More than during a lengthy, often warm Cold War. And two-thirds as much as during the worst conflict in human history.
Expenditures as a percentage of GDP have fallen because the U.S. economy has grown, not
because military outlays have dropped. The 2010 GDP (in 2000) will run about $11.7 trillion. That is almost twice as much as in 1986 (also
in 2000 dollars). That's more than three times the U.S. GDP in 1968. It is nearly six times America's GDP in 1953. And 6.6 times the GDP of 1945.
US hard power is unparalleled:

1) more resources than any other nation
2) is more specialized than any force in history
3) can project power to any corner of globe
COHEN (Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies ) 04
[Eliot, History and the Hyperpower, Foreign Affairs, July/August, asp // wyo-tjc]
U.S. military power is of a different order entirely. The United States now accounts for between
40 and 50 percent of global defense spending, more than double the total spending of its European allies
(whose budgets are so riddled with inefficiencies that, aside from territorial defense, peacekeeping, and some niche
capabilities, the European pillar of NATO is militarily irrelevant). In virtually every sphere of warfare, the United
States dominates, an unprecedented phenomenon in military history. On and above the earth
and on and below the sea, U.S. military technology far surpasses that of any potential opponent.
No other power has the ability to move large and sophisticated forces around the globe ; to
coordinate and direct its own forces and those of its allies; to keep troops equipped, fed, and healthy; and to support those
troops with precision firepower and unsurpassed amounts of information and intelligence.
Viewed from within, of course, the picture looks very different. U.S. soldiers know all too well their own deficiencies and
vulnerabilities: they grouse about aging trucks, jammed rifles, and intermittent data links. Viewed from the outside, however,
the world has seen nothing like the U.S. military. British infantrymen in 1900 shot more accurately than their
continental European counterparts but did not differ all that much from them in terms of equipment and unit skills (and the
Tommies found themselves inferior to Boer citizen-soldiers equipped with German-made rifles). Today, an average
U.S. battalion has better kit--from body armor to night vision devices--than any comparable unit
in the world; with a few exceptions (mostly allies of the United States), it trains more effectively in the
field; and it has officers and sergeants groomed by a military schooling system more thorough
than any in history.
This qualitative advantage looms even larger at the higher levels of the armed forces. No other
military has the B-2 bombers or the satellite constellation, the aircraft carriers or the long-range
unmanned aircraft afforded by a $400 billion defense budget or the accumulated military-industrial capital of years of
spending on construction and infrastructure. No other research establishment can match that of the United States, which
receives more money than the entire defense budget of its largest European ally.of the U.S. Navy and Air Force . No other
country is remotely close to having the resources.
U.S. military power greatly outstrips that of all rivals

Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science, MIT, Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy, ORBIS v. 51 n.4,
2007, pp. 561-567.
Any grand strategy must address the global
distribution of military power. Typically this is measured in

terms of gross domestic product, defense spending, military manpower, and major items of
military equipment. By most indicators, the United States is by far the greatest military
power in the system and arguably has the longest global reach of any power in history. This
situation, a result of the Soviet Union's collapse, quickly came to be seen as natural by many in the U.S. political elite, so
much so that reflection on the remaining limits to U.S. military power was rarely seen.2 A qualitative assessment of U.S.
military power relative to others is also necessary. Broadly speaking, the United States enjoys what I have
called command of the commons.3 The United States commands the sea, the air at altitudes
above 10,000 feet, and space. If it wishes, it can drive others from these media. There is little
that others can do about it. Competition in this realm depends on areas of great U.S.
superioritymilitary research and development, extensive economic resources, highly
skilled military professionals. It is plausible that U.S. command of the commons has been an important enabler of
globalization.
U.S. military might is overwhelming and eclipses even European capabilities

Mitchell B. Reiss, Restoring Americas Image: What the Next President Can Do, SURVIVAL v. 50 n. 5, October 2008, pp. 99-114.
Kennedy actually underestimates the extent of American military might. American defence
spending is now larger than the rest of the world's military spending combined. Europe
collectively cannot come close to duplicating US military power. Although the non-US
members of NATO have 1.25 million men and women under arms and another 1 m in
reserve, they have only 55,000 readily deployable troops . As we have seen in Afghanistan, the
Europeans lack advanced equipment, the means to transport troops to battlefields beyond
Europe's borders, and the independent intelligence and other assets to support the troops
they do deploy. This relative military weakness is certainly not because of a shortage of courage
or martial spirit. Rather, it reflects a conscious decision by European officials to allocate public
funds elsewhere. But one result of this choice is that Europe retains only a modest ability to
shape international affairs, which leads to resentment of the United States .
Heg High Now: Soft Power F/L

The U.S. still wields enormous political influence--involvement in multiple international
disputes proves
Politically, the United States shall remain , as Madeleine Albright said during her tenure as secretary of state,
the world's "indispensable country." While anti-Americanism is pervasive in many parts of
the globe, foreign governments still count on us to lead on the toughest problems . In the
Middle East, Palestinians and Israelis still see Washington as the crucial intermediary for peace. In South Asia, we hold, for
better or worse, the key to the future of Afghanistan. In Africa, the United States is well respected and many
governments desire more American involvement on their continent, not less. In Europe, the United
States is still considered by most as the one continental power critical to preserving and
safeguarding the peace--a role that has taken on renewed importance with the resurgence
of an aggressive Russia. In Asia, we find ourselves called upon to referee tensions between
China and Taiwan, and to lead the multinational effort to deal with rogue regimes such as Burma. In
our own hemisphere, we are the hub of an axis of market democracies from Canada and Mexico to Brazil,
Colombia and Chile that is still a much more attractive model than the one offered by Hugo Chvez and the Castro brothers.
The political and diplomatic reach of the United States will be one of President Obama's principle
weapons in negotiating the dangers of twenty-first century global politics .
Obama's international popularity helps bolster U.S. leadership

R. Nicholas Burns, Profesor, Practice of Diplomacy and International Policies, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, "The
When Barack Obama steps into the Oval Office for the first time as president, he will be in
the unique position of having earned the support not just of Americans who chose him in a
historic and dramatic election but of millions around the world who would have voted for
him if they could have. It has been widely observed that on November 4 the United States held the
first-ever world election and Obama was the clear winner . No other American president in
memory will have started in office with such broad public support overseas. His
international star power will help to recover some of America's credibility and trust lost
during the past decade due to Iraq, Guantnamo and Abu Ghraib. And, it will allow Obama and his team
to more easily negotiate the treacherous foreign-policy waters ahead in their first months in office.
Heg High Now: Soft Power S/L

SOFT POWER
Its high now for multiple reasonsfirst, we are strongly engaged in both the market and
global institutions, which increases our standing and bolsters our diplomatic credibility
thats Burns the first
Second, Obama ensures that soft power will remain high because of his enormous personal
popularityour second Burns card says that this will actually reverse much of the damage
done by the Bush administration
Soft power high Obama
More recently, in 2008, it
was the United Kingdom and the United States--rather than the G-20--that took the lead in battling
the global financial crisis, with massive stimulus measures and injections of liquidity. The speed with which Barack Obama
captured hearts and minds around the world after his election in November 2008 represented a rare moment in
the annals of the great powers--a moment of relief at having a U.S. president who made it possible for the
world to love his country again.
US has extensive soft power

David Calleo, (Prof., International Studies, Johns Hopkins U.), FOLLIES OF POWER: AMERICAS UNIPOLAR FANTASY,
2009, 67.
The U.S. certainly has abundant soft power. Its high culture can scarcely be considered inferior to
anyone else's -- in the arts and sciences or in higher education and research -- not least because
the polyglot U.S. has historically been a refuge for persecuted talent from around the world .
Soft power is available in abundance at present

2009, 4-5.
On the one hand, the existence of an underlying set of values and institutional norms that elicit the approval of foreign publics dampens the contestation of the
the attractiveness of American values , political

institutions, and popular culture is often credited with the ability to shape the policy preferences
of foreign publics. Joseph Nye, in particular, has argued that the United States has a unique reservoir of
soft power that enhances U.S. ability to exercise global leadership. The argument in this book partially concurs with
the soft power thesis. I show that foreign publics find plenty to admire in the United States .
normative basis of the American world order. On the other hand,
Soft power high education

Of the world's top 20 universities, all but three are American; of the top 50, all but 11 are located in the United States. By
contrast, India's two best universities are tucked away in the world's 300-10-400 tier. China does a bit better, its top three--Nanjing University, Peking University, and
Shanghai University--are in the 200-10-300 group of the world's 500 best. Harvard and Stanford are not quaking, and neither are Cambridge and Oxford.
China's public spending on education, meanwhile, has been in the range of 2.0-2.5 percent of GDP
over the last quarter century--this for a population four times as large as the United States' and an economy four times as small. In the United States,
average spending has been close to six percent, higher than that of India, Japan, Russia, and the EU. The same pattern
holds for research and development (R&D) outlays, with the U.S. rate almost twice as high as China's--again as a
fraction of a vastly larger GDP.
US has recovered soft power lost during the Iraq war
2009, 198.
Three decades ago, an
unpopular war severely taxed America's international standing. But, as Joseph Nye
points out, "When the policy changed and the memories of the war receded, the United States
recovered much of its lost soft power." In times of crisis that generated no less anguish and no less condemnation than has
the current one, the United States was able to reassert itself as a symbol and an aspiration. The road
back from the abyss might be strenuous, but it has been traveled before.
Despite problems in the war on terror, the US retains a positive global image
2009, 201.
The image of the United States is not as tarnished as is often dreaded nor is it as shiny as is occasionally dreamed.
The unfolding of the diplomatic crisis over the war in Iraq and the torture scandals at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have definitely exacted a heavy toll on the image
the United States still exerts considerable attraction among ordinary people .
the ones that received the most
empirical support were those that linked the popular opinions about the American people and
President Bush to the overall attitudes towards the United States. Factors that would indicate a
broader syndrome of denigration, such as the imputation of ulterior motives to U.S. foreign
policy, and factors that would indicate a structural basis for anti-Americanism , such as a reaction to the
overwhelming power of the United States, played at most a marginal role in the formation of popular opinion. This
finding indicates that current anti-Americanism might be less enduring and less deep-seated than is often
declared.
of the United States. Nonetheless,
Of the five hypotheses I tested to evaluate the potential for persistence of anti-American sentiments ,
Obama has undertaken many specific measures to increase soft power

Matthew Williams, (Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, U. of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast), AMERICAS WAR ON
TERROR, 2009, 261-262.
The Obama Administration has certainly deployed
a number of soft power tactics thus far. For example, President Obama
made a personal appeal to the Muslim world on Al Jazeera, the predominant news network in the Middle East. In
addition, he has promised to close Guantanamo Bay Prison, he has denounced torture--a serious allegation
popularly waged against the preceding Bush Administration--he has re-engaged diplomatic efforts with Iran, and invited
further nuclear disarmament talks with Russia, while promising an end to American occupation
in Iraq. At the same time however, Obama appointee, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, has promised to continue American targeting in Pakistan. President
has
Obama has promised increased troop deployments within Afghanistan and has urged closer cooperation with NATO and the broader EU to enhance international
security--all actions clearly aimed at maintaining and enhancing US hard power.
Soft power remains high--we have extensive global influence

Culturally, we are, as Harvard professor Joe Nye has said, the world's most effective practitioner of soft
power. Our most successful companies are still the single, greatest exporter of American
influence in an increasingly integrated global market. Microsoft supplies the nerve center for millions of
computers worldwide; Starbucks and McDonalds are in every global capital; and Boeing is still the dominant force in
international air travel. As Zakaria noted, we still attract the greatest number of foreign students to what is arguably our most
successful global brand--our colleges and universities. This pervasive American soft power is a real factor
in determining the global balance of power and it helps to augment American strength in the
short- and long-term.
Heg High Now: A2 "Bush Dooms" 2NC

The U.S. will be able to recover legitimacy-a transition from Bush policies and strong power
base preclude counterbalancing
Stephen G. Brooks

Of course, the ability of the United States to weather such crises of legitimacy in the past hardly guarantees that it can lead
the system in the future. But there are reasons for optimism. Some of the apparent damage to U.S.
legitimacy might merely be the result of the Bush administration's approach to diplomacy
and international institutions. Key underlying conditions remain particularly favorable for
sustaining and even enhancing U.S. legitimacy in the years ahead . The United States
continues to have a far larger share of the human and material resources for shaping global
perceptions than any other state, as well as the unrivaled wherewithal to produce public
goods that reinforce the benefits of its global role. No other state has any claim to leadership
commensurate with Washington's. And largely because of the power position the United States still
occupies, there is no prospect of a counterbalancing coalition emerging anytime soon to
challenge it. In the end, the legitimacy of a system's leader hinges on whether the system's
members see the leader as acceptable or at least preferable to realistic alternatives. Legitimacy
is not necessarily about normative approval: one may dislike the United States but think its leadership is natural under the
circumstances or the best that can be expected.
Heg High Now: A2 "European Economic Power" 2NC

US trumps the eu because it is still more powerful economically and military advantages
translate to political superiority
BRZEZINSKI (Former Sect. Of State) 04
[Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Perseus, New York // wyo-tjc]
The level playing field is a reality only between the United States and the European Union . When
the two agree, together they can dictate to the entire world the rules governing global trade and finance. When they
disagree, it becomes truly a heavyweight contest . At one point, for example, the EU mounted a charge that
U.S. Internal Revenue codes were prejudiced in favor of American business interests. The United States at first simply
disregarded the issue, but when the EU threatened to impose countermeasures and to suspend concessions in excess of
$4 billion, the United States promptly requested WTO arbitration. Even when contending with the EU, however,
the United States can play up its relationship with its Asian trading partners as leverage to obtain
greater European accommodation of American desires.
Thus the level playing field is slanted whenever American interests are at stake, Moreover,
Americaunlike the EU, its economic peerpossesses massive military assets, and the
combination of military and economic prowess generates unmatched political influence. That
influence can then be engaged to advance American interests in a manner that blends a
commitment to economic globalization (because it is economically convenient) with strong insistence on
American state sovereignty (whenever politically expedient). Power permits America, right or wrong, to
transcend the apparent inconsistency. [P. 148]
Heg High Now: A2 "Financial Crisis" 2NC

Turn: the crisis helps US relative powerchallengers have to refocus energy domestically
Mead (the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World. Lauren Gottlieb provided
research assistance for this article.) Only Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America. The New Republic. 2/4/ 09: http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?
Walter Russell
id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system,
centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United
States. After more than 300 years, it seems reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by
themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it of leading capitalist
powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial
crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development.

Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems
to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the
impoverished periphery. Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most
successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch,
crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries
marginalize and impoverish developing ones.
Setting aside the flaws in both these overarching theories of capitalism, this analysis of economic crises is fundamentally
sound--and especially relevant to the current meltdown. Cataloguing the early losses from the financial crisis, it's hard not to
conclude that the central capitalist nations will weather the storm far better than those not so central. Emerging markets
have been hit harder by the financial crisis than developed ones as investors around the world seek the safe haven
provided by U.S. Treasury bills, and commodity-producing economies have suffered extraordinary shocks as commodity
prices crashed from their record, boom-time highs. Countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, which
hoped to use oil revenue to mount a serious political challenge to American power and the
existing world order, face serious new constraints. Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad must now spend less time planning big international moves and think a little bit
harder about domestic stability. Far from being the last nail in America's coffin, the financial
crisis may actually resuscitate U.S. power relative to its rivals .
The capitalist distribution of power is reinforced with crisesit weakens others more and
cripples their economic potential
Walter Russell
id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic,
for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too,
has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the postcold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former
Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly
because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped
to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly
capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look
for alternatives.
So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that
have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time
goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and
Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals
who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of
religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal
capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these
societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more
established firms in wealthier societies.
As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots
tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably,
it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the
global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again.
Financial crisis did not destroy U.S. leadership--other states accept its necessity
In the early autumn as the financial storms hit Wall Street, countless foreign journalists wrote the same script--the American
Century was over and American power permanently weakened. But, while American power in the world has
indeed been diluted by the financial crisis, all of the other significant powers in the world
have been hurt too. And while some, like Russia's Vladimir Putin, may harbor dreams that the crisis will lead to a
permanent diminution of American power, most countries still want the United States to lead . They
accept that no other country can guide a return to global stability. President Obama will thus
take over leadership of a government that will unquestionably remain the world's most
influential during his time in office and well beyond . In the final analysis, Obama's success may well come
down to this--can he convince the world that America has a positive and unifying message and policy that will improve the
human condition? This is not as Olympian a task as it may seem. And, Obama is perfectly positioned in
temperament, style and policy to be one of the rare American presidents who manages to
inspire the world and thereby make America again a moral compass .
Financial crisis doesnt threaten US hegemonywill hurt Europe a lot more

Noam Chomsky, MIT Professor, Chomsky: Economic Crisis Will Not End US Hegemony, Press TV, interviewed by Afshin Rattansi,
World News Daily Information Clearing House, 101408, www.informationclearinghouse.info/article21011.htm, accessed 11-7-08.
Press TV: We've had politicians in Europe and Russia talking about the end of US hegemony. Even if the US cannot pay its
bills it still has the largest military on earth. You have written about the power of that military. Doesn't that military in itself
confer power? Chomsky: Oh sure, and I don't agree with the conclusions about loss of US
hegemony. I mean, first of all this financial crisis is very likely going to hit Europe even
harder than the United States. Several European countries have already declared official
recession, which the US has not. Banks are collapsing rapidly in Europe. The immediate problem,
not the deep problem, the immediate one is toxic assets and mortgage-based securities. We do not have the details,
it's all not very transparent, but the general estimate is that about half of them are held in European
banks. One country, Iceland, is practically on the verge of declaring bankruptcy because of its enormous exposure to the
tides of financial globalization.
Financial crisis helps the US: it increases Middle East influence

Walter Russell
Only Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America. The New Republic. 2/4/09: http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?
research assistance for this article.)

id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran
also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as
falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms
on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the
Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime
on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007,
according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months
as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein
in its expansionary fiscal policy.

All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative
merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other
diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United
States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as
they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the
Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming
administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and
Syria) from a position of enhanced strength .
Heg High Now: A2 "Iraq" 2NC

Iraq and Afghanistan do not disprove American power the US is still the global hegemon
Stephen G. Brooks
the United
States' successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting
unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower's performance . From 1999 to 2003,
So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that
seemingly easy U. S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what
no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time
before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in
Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced
the United States as the world's leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the
militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better . The United States did not cease to be
a superpower when its policies in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the
United States remains the sole superpower today.
Heg High Now: A2 "Obama" 2NC

Obama is committed to preserving hegemony
Christopher Layne, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, George H.W. Bush School of
Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony--Myth or Reality?"
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 34 n. 1, Summer 2009, p. 148.
Unipolarity has preoccupied American international relations scholars, policymakers, and
foreign policy analysts since the Cold War ended and the unipolar moment was proclaimed.1 Unipolarity has
two aspects. On the one hand, it describes the post-1991 international system in which U.S. military and economic power
has dwarfed that of all other states. Unipolarity also has a policy dimension: since the Soviet Unions downfall, the
maintenance of the United States preeminence in a unipolar system has been the overriding grand strategic goal of every
administration beginning with that of President George H.W. Bush.2 Early indications are that Barack Obamas
administrationthe key foreign policy positions of which are largely staffed by veterans of the
Bill Clinton administrationwill be just as equally wedded to preserving U.S. hegemony .3
Heg High Now: A2 "Others Have Economic Power" 2NC

Relative economic power is meaninglessno one can go toe-to-toe with the us militarily
HIRSH (Fmr Editor of Newsweek) 02
[Michael, Bush and the World, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
Today's unilateralism, in other words, has less to do with the peculiarities of Bush's "cowboy" mindset or even
exceptionalism than with the sheer inequality in hard power between the United States and the rest of the world -- especially
Europe, which is where most of the complaints come from. America behaves unilaterally because it can, and it is always at
moments of national crisis when this impulse is strongest. This fact of life is not going away anytime soon. The Europeans
are learning during the war on terror what the Japanese learned in the Persian Gulf War: vast economic power gives
you leverage mainly in economics, unless the will exists to turn it into something more. Europe
can be a big dog at WTO talks and on issues such as antitrust, harrying giant U.S. multinationals
such as ge and Microsoft. But as Japan found out upon Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in
1990, global security is another matter. Tokyo proved during the Gulf War that it was not ready, it
turned out, to be the new Rome of the "Pacific Century." And in this now-critical realm of hard power, Europe
has, like Japan, been shown to be a "pygmy," to quote the rueful words used by NATO Secretary-General George
Robertson.
Strong economy does not ensure soft-powerneed to have political will to lead
FERGUSON (Prof of Financial History at NYU) 2003
[Niall, Power, Foreign Policy, Jan 2003, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
Not necessarily. It's tempting to assume that power is synonymous with a large economy -that big GDP
equals big power. Hence many analysts point to China's huge economy and rapid growth as evidence that the country will
soon gain superpower rank, if it hasn't already. Just project forward the average annual growth rates of the past 30 years,
and Chinese GDP will equal that of the United States and exceed that of the EU within just two decades.
But GDP doesn't stand for great diplomatic power. If institutions aren't in place to translate
economic output into military hardware-and if the economy grows faster than public interest in
foreign affairs-then product is nothing more than potential power. The United States overtook Great
Britain in terms of GDP in the 1870s. But it was not until World War I that the United States finally overtook the British
Empire as a global power.
Hegemony Brinks: General

Global leadership is on the brink--financial crisis and other factors
Zbignew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor, "Major Foreign Policy Challenges for the Next U.S.
President," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 1, 2009, pp. 53-60.
appears as a new president assumes office in the United States. He does so in the middle
of a widespread crisis of confidence in Americas capacity to exercise effective leadership in
world affairs. That may be a stark thought, but it is a fact. Though American leadership over the decades that
have passed since the United States replaced Great Britain as the Great Power of the world has been essential to
global stability and to global development, the cumulative effects of national self-indulgence, of
financial greed and irresponsibility, of an unnecessary war of the countrys own choice, falsely
justified, and of ethical transgressions have discredited that leadership. Making matters worse is
the global economic crisis. The resulting international challenge that now confronts the new US President
is compounded in its complexity by the fact that it is occurring in the context of two
simultaneous, and interacting, transformational developments on the world political scene.
This article
________________________________
**Heg Uniq: Sustainability Debate**
Heg Sustainable (General): F/L
SUSTAINABILITY
FIRST, dominance in all power areas mean that heg is sustainable
Heg is sustainable US has dominance in all areas of power and its not going anywhere
Brooks and Wohlforth 08, Associate Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and Professor of
Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government (Stephen and William, World Out of Balance, pg 27- 31)
Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing, historian Paul Kennedy observes: I have returned to all of the
comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation
comes close. Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood
broadly to include economic,
technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are

concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the
modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United
spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those
powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological
requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S.
capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply . Military research and development
(R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in
military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan,
France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been
sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on
military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis--vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth
United
States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally.
This capacity arises from command of the commons that is, unassailable military dominance
over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It
allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic
and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies . Command of the commons also helps
the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance. Command of the commons
provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy
than any other offshore power has ever had. Posens study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedys emphasis on the historical
importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that
sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system.
Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers
on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that
century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the
matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France
and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained
The United States

share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history ,
with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S
economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in
2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70,
and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, Being Number One at great cost
overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia.
is one thing; being the worlds single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.
SECOND, egemony is sustainable no challengers

Conrad Blank, writer, 2/18/10, The U.S. is in Decline -- But It's Still Leading, AINA,
http://www.aina.org/news/20100218115056.htm, umn-rks
It has become a clich to say that the
U.S. is in decline. It is certainly true, but need not be irreversible, and the country
has been there before. It was in decline when the Watergate debacle destroyed a successful presidency and the long and costly enterprise in Vietnam
ended terribly on the helipad on the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. But 15 years later, the country was at a unique pinnacle as the world's only superpower. Not
even the Roman Empire enjoyed such eminence, though its rivals, Persia and China, were (unlike their current status) too distant to be seriously bothersome.
What is unusual now is that all
the Great Powers are in decline, except China -- and that country's rise is at least a
third composed of a public-relations flim-flam job, of the kind that always recruits the credulous in the West, as Hitler, Stalin, and
Japan Inc. did. Western Europe has failed as a coherent force. The Lisbon Constitution is a shambles, and the new leaders of federal Europe are such nebbishes,
chosen for their inoffensive unassertiveness, that not 5 percent of Europeans could recall their names.
Europe has been harder hit than the U.S. by the economic crisis , and is mired in spurious rhetoric, much of it in French,
limning an illusory social-market variant to "cowboy capitalism." This is like the Holy See's ancient but sporadic search for a third way between socialism and
capitalism. It is a vain pursuit of an economic system diluted by the imposition of self-indulgent European cultural fatigue, masquerading as gentility.
Russia is a fraud. Its population is in steep decline and chronically afflicted by alcoholism. The
governmental system is authoritarian and corrupt, allied with protgs who have been given monopolistic concessions and who
repay their rulers with obscene kickbacks. Except for a few areas that have survived from the USSR's expertise in some defense industries, Russia's
manufacturing is continuing to wither, and its economy depends almost entirely on the
exportation of natural resources, especially oil. It is not an efficient producer of anything, and
commodity prices are always vulnerable .
Japan, which only 20 years ago was making more confident noises than China is today about surpassing the United States economically, is now
sluggish and geriatric. It has a new government even more bumptious and inept than
Washington's. And its vaunted genius at sophisticated manufacturing has been undermined by
the widespread product-quality problems at Toyota, so soon after it became the world's largest automobile manufacturer -- displacing
General Motors, which, after the pause that refreshes in Chapter 11 to shed unsightly debt, may be starting to recover. Japan is torn between reinvigorating the
alliance with the U.S. and detaching from it to appease China.
It now seems clearer than ever that China is manipulating the North Korean nuclear threat to rattle Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, while retaining, in a
barbarous Beltway phrase, plausible deniability. The U.S. U-turn on missile defense and the production of F-22 Raptors has increased Japan's temptation. But if it
departs the U.S. alliance to nuzzle with China, it will be through as a Great Power.
India is a nascent Great Power, about ten years behind China in building a capitalist economy, but with the advantages of
reasonably democratic and partially functioning legal systems . Its influence will grow, but does not extend far beyond , or even
into, the Indian Ocean now.
The rise of China is not without limits. It still has 900 million peasants living much as they did thousands of years
ago. Half the population has little or no exposure to medical care, education and other social services are spotty, corruption is rife, and there are important relics of
the command economy still in place. GDP is deemed to be increased whenever an expense or investment is approved, not as the decision is implemented. Parallel
indicators such as electricity production are not consistent with economic growth rates on the scale claimed. It is not clear that the Chinese public will buy consumer
goods that are not being exported, and although the country now has huge foreign-currency reserves, its financial system is much more opaque than was Japan's
when it plunged into stagnation 20 years ago. The enforced population-restraint policy ensures an aging population.
China has managed one of the great economic modernizations of world history, but it is not a
naturally rich or particularly skilled country (though higher education is making great strides), and it has a dominant
public sector that cannot be relied upon over time to perform better than central planners traditionally have. And the
United States is ceasing to ship it millions of jobs and to accept the dumping of billions of dollars of cheap, and often defective, merchandise.
THIRD, the foundation of leadership remainstheir ev only describes blips in short-term

indicators
Kori N. Schake Managing American Hegemony: Essays of Power In a Time of Dominance Reuters 4/21/ 09
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS241420+21-Apr-2009+BW20090421
Questions about the about the United States` position of power in the 21st century are examined in depth in Managing
American Hegemony: Essays on Power in a Time of Dominance, by Hoover research fellow Kori Schake (Hoover Institution
Press, 2009). Among the many compelling questions she addresses are "Why is the United States` power so threatening?"
"Is it sustainable?" "Does military force still matter?" "How can we revise current practices to reduce the U.S. cost of
managing the system?" "What accounts for the United States` stunning success in the round of
globalization that swept across the international order at the end of the twentieth century?" Schake`s insightful study
focuses on why U.S. power is so predominant in the international order, whether it`s likely to remain so, and how to revise
current practices to reduce the U.S. cost of managing the system. She also offers suggestions on issues the next president
should focus on to build an even stronger foundation of U.S. power. Schake writes candidly about the challenges facing
the United States, noting that U.S. power as a commodity is "substantially undervalued and that the
market does not yet seem to have noticed. Why is that? Partly because the short-term
indicators look dicey." Some of those indicators include the long-term slide in the might of the dollar, the rising flood
of government debt, U.S. choices on responses to terrorism (which have often shocked allies), and lack of clarity about the
direction for the military. She concludes that the United States has succeeded internationally for
reasons deeply rooted in the political culture of the country, namely, tolerance of risk and
failure, veneration of individual initiative, encouragement of immigration, fewer constraints
on social and economic mobility than most other countries, and critically a malleable,
absorptive definition of itself.
FOURTH, inevitability is irreleventtermination now would global chaos and wars. the
eventual drawdown will be smoother if we hold up heg now
History is a record of change, a reminder that nothing endures indefinitely. It can also remind us, however, that some things
endure for a long time, and when they disappear, the status quo ante does not reappear. So it will be with the current
American global preponderance. It, too, will fade at some point, probably later than some wish and
earlier than many Americans take for granted. The key question is: What will replace it? An
abrupt termination of American hegemony would without doubt precipitate global chaos, in
which international anarchy would be punctuated by eruptions of truly massive destructiveness.
An unguided progressive decline would have a similar effect , spread out over a longer time. But a
gradual and controlled devolution of power could lead to an increasingly formalized global
community of shared interest, with supranational arrangements increasingly assuming some of
the special security roles of traditional nation-states . [P. 2]
Heg Sustainable (General): S/L

The sustainability debate
The US is so far ahead in all categories that a) no other state will rise to challenge us, which is
the only viable scenario for a hegemonic transition, and b) we can use our current power lead
to shore up the military and economic base of our power, ensuring that it is sustainable. The
costs of countering the US are too high and the benefits of going along with the American
system are so great that no powerful country will opt out of the international current
international orderthats Brooks
Hegemony is sustainable no other country can challenge even if US power is in decline,
only our evidence is comparative to other nations US power is still far ahead of the rest of
the world, all other great powers are in decline as well thats Blank
And, even some measures of US power have taken a hit because of Iraq or the financial crisis,
these are only short-term blips that do not alter the fundamentalsyou should prefer our longterm, predictive evidence--Schake
And, if you think theyre ahead on this debate, it doesnt matter
A) the timeframe is laughabletheir business wont happen for another forty years according
the thayer and
B) the brzezinski evidence proves that the consequences of withdrawing now are far worse
than waiting for an eventual declinewe win a much faster impact
AND, US dominance of global institutions and the fact that those institutions are structured to
promote US power means that leadership is sustainable indefinitely
Strong global institutions sustain global leadership: they follow the hegemons goals
Stephen G. Brooks
Even a ruthlessly self-interested United States should want a robust framework of

international institutions, which include not just formal organizations and treaties but also
informal rules and standards of legitimacy. Why? Because institutions facilitate the United
States' own global leadership. Clearly, it is far easier to manage the world economy with an effective World Trade
Organization (WTO). Less obvious but just as significant are the manifold ways that international institutions help
the United States advance its security interests . Marshaling "coalitions of the willing" is an inefficient
approach. Each new coalition requires striking a new set of bargains with different partners and offering them new carrots
and sticks. Within an established institution, in contrast, states develop habits for working together. Having an
institution in place to facilitate cooperation on one issue also makes it easier for the
participating states to rapidly achieve cooperation on a related issue. NATO'S intelligencesharing network was designed in the Cold War to gather information on the Soviet Union,
for example, but later was quickly adapted to deal with the unforeseen issue of global
Islamist terrorism.
US will dominate the international order for at least 50 more years

Kori Schake, (Research Fellow, Hoover Institution), MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 200 9, 3.
American success is, not surprisingly, resented by states and societies that have not found ways to preserve what they value. Societies with "better" but less popular
The equation that makes the United States

so successful is not difficult to discern, but difficult to put into practice, especially if societies clamor for the
economic enrichment, innovation, and durable social peace of American society without wanting to endure
its fractiousness, economic insecurity, and permeability. For these reasons, despite the near-term shortcomings , American
power is likely to dominate the international order for at least another half century .
attributes feel affronted that the accessibility of American society and culture has such broad appeal.
U.S. hegemony is sustainable multiple reasons
Singh 8 - School of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London (September 2008, Robert, "The
Exceptional Empire: Why the United States Will Not Decline -- Again," International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, Pg. 571)
But despite Iraq, anti-Americanism and more, on the key dimensions of hard and soft power, Washington's exceptional empire remains remarkably robust in terms of
First, in spite of
the US military
remains far and away the world's largest and best, unique in its capacity to project force rapidly
around the globe and peerless in its superiority in conventional warfare and command of the global commons.
The official annual US defence budget is now well in excess of $500 billion , excluding the supplemental
its preponderant power. There remain five reasons to step back from current US woes and to treat the 'new declinism' with a degree of caution.
Iraq and the immense stresses that the occupation has imposed on its volunteer personnel and National Guard units since 2003,
appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan (over $100 billion). The global presence of US overseas bases, personnel and bilateral training programmes is without
precedent. At
just over 4% of US GDP, not only is such a budget much lower in proportionate terms
than during the Reagan build-up of the 1980s (still less the Cold War's height under Truman and Eisenhower) but it is also
sustainable in economic and political terms over the long haul. Indeed, one important consequence of Iraq has been to
consolidate a broad bipartisan consensus in Washington endorsing the further expansion of the US Army and Marine Corps by a minimum of 6% over current
personnel levels and a substantial year-on-year increase in the Pentagon budget into the 2010s. In 2008, serious presidential candidates competed not for 'peace
The ramifications
of this military supremacy and its underlying political consensus are profound. Not only does
further expansion of the armed forces increase even more America's singular capacity to meet
rising global security challenges (whether 'hard' or 'soft') but it also augurs a multiplier effect on the
existing technical and logistical superiority of the US military. In the context of competing powers that are either cutting or
dividends', as in 1992, but as to exactly how much more needed to be devoted to defence to wage the global war on terror effectively. 1
not increasing their defence budgets and military personnel or that, as in China's case, are increasing them at a steady but comparatively modest level, the fact of
American military supremacy through the 2010s remains unchallenged. There has never existed a nation-state with such preponderant global military power at such
low financial cost. Second, but related, while
serious concerns about 'overstretch' now exist among the uniformed military
there is minimal prospect of US forces being required to mount
another major occupying war in the mode of Iraq. The challenges confronting America that
plausibly will demand military action during the next decade -- from the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands and possible 'failed
states' in both, through Iran's nuclear programme to Chinese threats to Taiwan -- are serious and urgent, but they do not point to
an 'Iraq Mk II'. Moreover, although they have mostly turned against the Iraq war, it is difficult to depict Americans as exhibiting a new 'post-Iraq' pacifism.
and mainstream Democrats and Republicans alike,
Even in the midst of the worst of the Iraq occupation in 2006, Americans of both parties evinced more belief in the utility and justice of military force than did
Europeans, by decisive margins (Kagan, 2006a). Among critics of Bush, the most forceful case against Iraq was not a pacifist opposition to war in principle but rather
the pragmatic case that the invasion was a distraction from the war that the US should have been completing emphatically in Afghanistan. History confirms that a
'defeat-phobic' American public is not synonymous with a peaceful one. America consistently remains true to its historical pedigree, as more a 'dangerous nation' than
a docile one (Kagan, 2006b). Less than one decade after peace was reached on the Korean peninsula in 1953, for example, a Democratic president, John F.
Kennedy, initiated America's prolonged and costly commitment to Vietnam. Five decades after the respective conclusions of their wars, tens of thousands of US
troops remained in Germany, Japan and South Korea. Five years after America's first and worst military defeat in south-east Asia, Americans elected Ronald Reagan
to the presidency to restore and reassert US strength against an 'evil empire'. More recently, no nation has gone to war so frequently in such a short time frame as
the US since the Cold War's conclusion. Between 1989 and 2003, America engaged in military interventions nine times: in Panama in 1989, Somalia in 1992-1993,
Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995-1996, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq three times (1991, 1998, 2003) -- an average of one major action every 18 months
(Daalder and Kagan, 2007, 1). It is therefore difficult to herald the Iraq war -- whatever its ultimate course -as the last major US conflict of the early 21st century.
The likelihood is not whether there will be further US military interventions after Bush but rather
where, when and how. Moreover, such wars will likely continue to be waged through 'coalitions of the
willing' rather than through formalized multilateral organizations , the limits of which Afghanistan now attests to in
addition to Kosovo previously. The costs of military action in a unipolar world, and the incentives towards it, are mightily different from the bipolar Cold War.
Beyond this, the superiority of US forces and technology -- with a growing 'interoperability gap' even with Washington's
closest allies -- ensures that a unilateralism of necessity, not choice, is now a fact of life for many American
military interventions. Whether or not the war on terror provides a macro-securitization paradigm comparable to the Cold War, the historical record is
not one that suggests that the US will indefinitely refrain from violence in support of its interests and ideals. Third, and despite Iraq, America's
extensive network of global alliances remains formidably impressive. As Bradley Thayer
observes, 'Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide
bandwagoning with it' (Layne and Thayer, 2007, 106-107). Of 192 nations in the world, Thayer identified only
five as 'opposed' to America: China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Eighty-four states are
US allies, comprising most major economic and military powers, including 25 members of NATO, 14 major non-NATO allies, 19 Rio Pact members, seven
Caribbean Regional Security System members, 13 members of the Iraq coalition not in the other categories, along with Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia,
The brute reality remains

that most countries wish to align with the US, actively do so, and benefit directly from its security guarantees, open
Tajikistan and Tunisia. A ratio of 17 to 1 (84 to 5) represents a rather positive outcome for the world's primary power.
markets and international trade. Even -- especially -- in relation to rising powers such as China and India, national interests typically point in the direction of either
actively supporting or passively acquiescing in the American-led international system rather than challenging it. Iraq was an aberration, not a norm, in this regard.
Simply put, there
has been no hard balancing against Washington of consequence since the end of
the Cold War. Despite the setting-up of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Sino-Russian hostility to the US has not produced a concerted balancing
effort, limited as it is by mutual distrust and suspicion, traditional great power rivalry, divergent capacities and strategic goals and -- in Beijing's case -- dependence on
the critical US market for its exports and growth. Such hard balancing as has occurred has been aimed not at Washington but Moscow and Beijing: by, respectively,
East European and other EU states and Japan, Australia, India and South Korea. America may be unloved in parts of the world, if opinion surveys are to be believed.
Fourth, contrary to Cox's claim, it is not the case that American economic indicators are
universally and intractably negative. Not only is the US the world's largest (estimates vary between 20 and 30%
of world GDP) and most efficient economy but also the dollar remains the world's reserve currency
despite the euro's rise. The Bush years have seen America continue to experience historically low levels of inflation, unemployment and interest rates
and -- until this year -- strong rates of growth. The twin deficits of the federal budget (at some $250 billion) and current account (6% of
GDP) do make the US the world's leading debtor, as it was previously at the end of Reagan's two
terms as president. But the economic health of both China and Japan relies heavily on their
continuing to purchase dollars and securities based on the dollar to keep their currencies weak and the US market for their exports
But it is not generally opposed.
strong. The US economy remains huge, robust and the world's most productive, competitive and innovative (not least in information technology), just as its research
institutes and universities dominate those of other nations. American takeovers cause a tremendous productivity advantage over non-American alternatives for firms
outside the US 'as if the invisible hand of the American marketplace were somehow passing along a secret handshake to these firms' (Van Reenen et al. , 2007).
America's strength rests on the fundamental soundness, openness and innovative energy of its
dynamic economy. Consequently, as the end of the first decade of the 21st century approaches, the enormous, productive and flexible US economy
remains central to the international economic system, the dominant source of its operating rules, and the best positioned to take advantage of coming changes
Fifth, if these hard power resources of the US remain potent,

those propelling the rise of its potential rivals are by no means clear, coherent or reliable. Much
of the commentary on America's principal competitors effectively assumes their linear rise and
an inevitable disharmony with US interests (and ideals) accompanying a concomitant erosion of American predominance. But such
assumptions are not necessarily well founded.
precisely because it is so consistently adept at adjusting.
Hegemony will be sustained. No one can match or challenge us and foreign will check
isolationism
In the end, however, the applicability of a particular term (debates about empire tend to degenerate into semantic
squabbles) does not matter. The fact of the overwhelming power of the United States does. No
potential adversary comes close to it, and, for the moment, there is no question of a
countervailing coalition to block, let alone replace, it. Its roots lie in a growing and
extraordinarily productive population, a stable political system, and a military that is
unsurpassable in the foreseeable future. And the United States will not, as some hope and others fear,
bind itself to an international institutional and legal order that will domesticate and restrain it. I f
nothing else, domestic politics would prohibit it. No U.S. leader in the next decade or two will call for a dramatic reduction in
defense spending or deny that this country must be the strongest in the world, ready to exert its power globally and act
unilaterally if necessary.
The "Age of Empire" may indeed have ended, then, but an age of American hegemony has
begun. And regardless of what one calls it or how long it will last, U.S. statesmen today cannot ignore the lessons and
analogies of imperial history.
These trends will continue for several decades

The United States has the ability to dominate the world because it has prodigious military capability,
economic might, and soft power. The United States dominates the world today, but will it be able to do
so in the future? The answer is yes, for the foreseeable future-the next thirty to forty years.'7 Indeed, it
may exist for much longer. I would not be surprised to see American dominance last much
longer and, indeed, anticipate that it will. But there is simply too much uncertainty about events far in the future to
make reliable predictions. In this section of the chapter, I explain why the United States has the ability to dominate the
world for the predictable future, if it has the will to do so. There are two critical questions that serve as the foundation for this
debate: "Can America dominate international politics?" and "Should America dominate international politics?"
Strong international institutions strengthen the U.S.'s ability to address global problems
Stephen G. Brooks
Institutions are no panacea. They do not obviate the need for tough negotiating between states. But they do tend to
center the bargaining on how the burden of cooperation should be shared rather than on
whether cooperation should occur at all--a focus that is preferable for the United States. The
United States maybe frustrated that other members of NATO are not contributing more to
the mission in Afghanistan, but it is far better to have this particular conversation than to
debate whether countries such as France and Germany should make any contribution at all .
As interdependence among countries intensifies and the list of global problems that the
United States cannot resolve on its own grows, the benefits of international institutions will
increase. Many current problems require continuous attention rather than one-shot solutions.
To prevent terrorism, for example, the world will need to establish a reliable and efficient set of controls for monitoring
borders. Such an effort will work only if appropriate standards are widely adopted and cooperation in implementing them
becomes routine. Even if it turns out that the United States is less vulnerable than other states
new global problems-- such as the augmented threat of infectious diseases and greater flows of refugees from
conflicts in Africa--it is clearly better off in a world with institutional structures that establish
to
standards to address them.
Obamas soft power will succeed

Chris Dolan is an Examiner from Philadelphia The Obama doctrine: how much change? The Examiner. 5/22/09
http://www.examiner.com/x-11663-Lebanon-County-Democrat-Examiner~y2009m5d22-The-Obama-doctrine-how-much-change
But when it comes to Obamas emphasis on the benefits of soft power (diplomacy, image,
persuasion, and multilateral cooperation), the outlook is quite positive . By sheer fact that Obama is
now president- and more importantly Bush is not- anti-Americanism could be on the decline. In
the 1990s, American soft power was based on more than goodwill; it was based on economic and ideological hegemony.
There was only one widely accepted path to prosperity--deregulated, American-style capitalism. And there was one central
destination for a poor country seeking the investment and aid it needed to travel down that path: Washington. The U.S. and
its allies could appeal to the global community by offering large economic incentives to get countries to do what we wanted.
The united states will enjoy unrivaled unipolarity for at least 20 more yearssoft balancing is
irrelevant
THAYER (Professor of Strategic Studies at Missouri State) 03
[Bradley, Pax Americana and the Middle East, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, Dec. 2003, p. online //wyo-tjc]
The United States stands at the pinnacle of its influence in international politics for three
reasons: the unique position of the hegemony of the United States in the international system, the
regional allies of the United States, and the power of U.S. military and intelligence community . First,
since the end of the Soviet Union there is no peer competitor in the international system. In the future, a new peer
competitor surely will arise, most probably China, and it will use its power to balance against the interests
of the United States. But for the foreseeable futurethe next twenty yearsthe United States will
dominate the international system without an equal or near-equal to offset its power. To be sure, other
forms of balancing against the United States are certainly possible, such as the soft balancing
conducted by four European statesBelgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourgas it pushed for war against Iraq. This
case is illustrative precisely because such a coalition was not strong enough to prevent the United States from taking the
action it wished. Such soft balancing coalitions may develop in the future as a tangible expression
of a group of countries displeasure with a course of action taken by the United States, but the
result will effectively be the same.
American economic and military power increasing

Kevin Cooney, (Prof., Political Science & International Relations, Union U.), THE RISE OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, 2009, 38.
The data would indicate that overall
American military power along with its economic power are not only not in
in ascendancy. The global discourse about the "rise of China" (whether one views
it positively or negatively) results in a false impression that a hegemonic shift is about to take place. It is not.
This hegemonic shift argument fails to account for the overall global political and economic context .
decline, but rather that they are still
No evidence that the US is declining

Kevin Cooney, (Prof., Political Science & International Relations, Union U.), THE RISE OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, 2009, 50.
there is no conclusive
empirical evidence of American hegemonic decline. The only evidence of imminent American decline is
anecdotal. Rather the empirical evidence would indicate that American power is still in overall
ascendancy. The American economy is currently the largest in the world (with the exception of the combined nations of
While many scholars may lament (or rejoice depending on one's perspective) in the seeming decline of American power,
the European Union). It is currently growing at 4.9 percent for the year 2007. This means that the American economy will grow by nearly $700 billion by 2007. China
on the other hand is growing at the rate of 9-12 percent annually. Using the larger figure of 12 percent the Chinese economy will grow by $310 billion in 2007.
Using an average growth rate of 4 percent for the United States and 10 percent for China, China will pass the United States in
the year 2036. The major problem with this type of economic projection is that it is linear. The
real world is not linear; there are economic ups and downs and constantly changing variables .
Historically there has never been a correct 50 year linear projection of GDP for any nation.
American political culture and US economic strength make hegemony resilent

Kori Schake, (Research Fellow, Hoover Institution), MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 200 9, 135-136.
Pessimistic analyses place too much weight on the present setbacks in Iraq and difficulties of the current
administration. The fundamental strengths of American political culture and the American economy
give us much greater resiliency than they credit. Other states and societies would have to be
more resilient, faster adapting, more magnetic, more capable along a wide range of political,
cultural, economic, and social factors than we are for the United States to decline. It merits repeating that the United States came
to dominate the international order as globalization advanced because the very things that make one successful domestically in America are the things that make one
successful in the political, economic, and cultural milieu of a globalizing economy. Our
power is so enormous because we dominate
through attraction and innovation, and the elements of our power reinforce each other. The time
and transition costs are substantial for other states and societies to catch up, and their succeeding would
require America's failing to adapt during prolonged competition, which is unlikely.
US will remain the largest single aggregation of power

Richard Haas, (President, Council on Foreign Relations), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY, 2010, 27.
the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power. It spends
more than $500 billion annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -and boasts land, air, and naval forces that are the world's most capable. Its economy, with a GDP of some
$14 trillion, is the world's largest. The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and television),
information, and innovation.
In this world,
Heg Sustainable (Economy): F/L

Even in crisis, capitalism supports US power
Walter Russell
research assistance for this article.) Only Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America. The New Republic. 2/4/ 09:
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial
crises on balance reinforce

rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries . Since capitalism first
emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor
in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval,
and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and
legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military
and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever
more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate,
dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of
modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast
productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence
around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and
preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and
what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social
forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework
are relatively strong.
Cost of hegemony are sustainablevery low relative amount of gdp and its even easier than
during the cold war
And it is affordable. While the amount of U.S. defense spending certainly is a large sum, it is only
about 4 percent of its gross domestic product, as Table 1.3 illustrates. An examination of the data in the table is
remarkable for four reasons. First, U.S. defense spending is about half of the world's total defense spending. Second, the
United States spends more than almost all the other major military powers in the world combined, Of course, most of those
major military powers are also allies of the United States. Third, U.S. defense spending is very low when measured as a
percentage of its economy, about 3.7 percent of its total economy. Fourth, defense spending at that level is easily
affordable for the United States into the future. In fact, in absolute real terms, the United States
spends about 10 percent more on defense than it did during the Cold War . If we examine the history of
defense spending during the Cold War, only in fiscal years 1946, 1951-1953, 1967-1969, 1983-1990 did the United States
spend more on defense when measured in fiscal year 2005 dollars.2 And because the U.S. economy was
smaller, the defense spending burden was greater in those years; it is much less now . Nor is the
burden of military service too great for the American people to bear. As Table 1.3 demonstrates, there are only about 1.5
million people in uniform, out of a population of 300 million, or approximately 0.5 percent of the population. In comparison,
during World War 11, when the U.S. population numbered some 140 million, about 13 million people, or nearly 9 percent of
the population, were in uniform.
Traditional overstretch arguments dont applyus primacy operates on an entirely different

playing field**
Thus, the economy is well placed to be the engine of the American Empire. Even the leading proponent of the "imperial
overstretch" argument, Yale Uni- versity historian Paul Kennedy, has acknowledged this. Imperial overstretch occurs when
an empire's military power and alliance commitments are too burdensome for its economy. In the 1980s, there was much
concern among academics that the United States was in danger of this as its economy strained to fund its military
operations and alliance commitments abroad. However, Kennedy now acknowledges that he was wrong when
he made that argument in his famous book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, because of the robustness of
American economic and military power. Indeed, if there is any imperial overstretch, it is more
likely to be by China, France, Britain, India, Russia, or the EU-not the United States. Reflecting on the
history of world politics, Kennedy submits that the United States not only has overwhelming
dominance but possesses such power so as to be a historically unique condition: "Nothing has
ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and
military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other
nation comes close," not even an empire as great as the British, because "even the Royal Navy was equal only
to the next two navies. Right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime
supremacy."32 Moreover, Kennedy recognizes that the steady economic growth of the American economy, and
the curbing of inflation, means that "America's enormous defense expenditures could be pursued at a far
lower relative cost to the country than the military spending of Ronald Reagan's years," and that
fact is "an incomparable source of the U.S. strength."33 When Kennedy, who was perhaps the
strongest skeptic of the economic foundation of America's power, comes to acknowledge, first,
that no previous empire has been as powerful as America is now; and, second, that its strength
will last because of the fundamental soundness of its economy, then, as Jeff Foxworthy would say, "You might be an
empire...And it is one that will last a considerable amount of time . As with its military might, the economic
foundation of the American empire is sound for the projected future.
Heg Sustainable (Economy): S/L

Hegemony is economically sustainable even with the financial crisisour economic system is
the most resilient in the world and we will weather the crisis in better shape than our rivals,
and that system will continue to put us on topthats Mead
Second, there is no risk of u.s. economic overstretchextend our thayer evidenceour
security commitments arent even 4% of gdp. Not only is that less than the cold war, but it
leaves a large margin for expansion if necessary. Its sustainable now and in the future.
Third, second, extend the second thayer card on this questioneven the person who invented
the overstretch argument, paul kennedy, thinks it doesnt apply to the us. The difference in
power is so radical that no historical examples can apply to american power
And us military spending is sustainable- accounts for less than 5% gdp
BROOKS AND WOHLFORTH (asst. & Assoc. Profs, Dept. Govt @ Dartmouth) 02
[Stephen & William, American Primacy in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug 2002, ln //mac-tjc]
TO UNDERSTAND just how dominant the United States is today, one needs to look at each of the standard components of
national power in succession. In the military arena, the United States is poised to spend more on
defense in 2003 than the next 15 -- 20 biggest spenders combined. The United States has
overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world's dominant air force, the only truly blue-water navy,
and a unique capability to project power around the globe . And its military advantage is even more apparent
in quality than in quantity. The United States leads the world in exploiting the military applications of advanced
communications and information technology and it has demonstrated an unrivaled ability to coordinate and process
information about the battlefield and destroy targets from afar with extraordinary precision . Washington is not
making it easy for others to catch up, moreover, given the massive gap in spending on military
research and development (R&D), on which the United States spends three times more than the next
six powers combined. Looked at another way, the United States currently spends more on military R&D than
Germany or the United Kingdom spends on defense in total.
No state in the modern history of international politics has come close to the military
predominance these numbers suggest. And the United States purchases this preeminence with
only 3.5 percent of its GDP. As historian Paul Kennedy notes, "being Number One at great cost is one
thing; being the world's single superpower on the cheap is astonishing."
Heg Sustainable (Military): F/L

Unipolar Hegemony is almost certainThe military cant be balanced or equaled
Hingorani, Micky.
The American Superpower: A Reappraisal of the United States Based on a Changing World Dynamic
AllAcademic. copyright 2004 allacademic URL subject to change based on page (53 total)
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/2/0/pages73201/p73201-51.php
Huntington's analysis makes sense, but despite what labels academics give to the structure of world order, the defining
characteristic is a superior United States. The actual retreat of America into a multipolar world seems
almost absurd. American dominance in all sectors continues unabated . Not only is the military is
unparalleled, but Bush has made clear in his national security strategy that America would continue to build its military
stronger so that it would be inconceivable to balance against. Economically, the United States is still strong and
the dollar remains the currency of choice. Overall America still commands respect and the ability to produce
credit. Unipolarity therefore, seems all but guaranteed. Perhaps another state could surpass the U.S. in
the strength of their economy. Japan may be able to do it, or the European Union as they further integrate and make more
efficient use of their combined resources. Still, neither, in the foreseeable future will be able to inspire the same confidence
in their abilities as the United States may due to their experience in handling the world economy. The military, however, will
undoubtedly remain unrivaled. To assume that multipolarity will occur in respect to defense is
preposterous. It requires realist thinking and the associated assumption that other nations will attempt to
counterbalance. All the major nations of the world would need to come together in an alliance
and accelerate their military programs drastically to even approach the U.S. over the next few
years, assuming that Washington does not further ramp up its defense capabilities in response. Clearly then, America still
has hard power, and will remain to do so for the years ahead, but these are the hallmarks of a superpower.
Our strong Navy gives us unshakable hegemony

Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science, MIT, Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy, ORBIS v. 51 n.4,
2007, pp. 561-567.
U.S. naval power is a key enabler of either primacy strategy that the United States could
choose. Given the trends in U.S. politics, the capabilities on hand will likely prove as attractive to the
next administration as they are to the present one. The trouble in Iraq has put the primacy strategies under
an unflattering light, but there is still little evidence that U.S. elites have learned much. Continuity is more likely. We will be
able to see, however, the likely direction of U.S. grand strategy in the event of higher costs in Iraq, or reverses elsewhere
restraint. A strategy of restraint would also include many familiar roles for the U.S. Navy. That
said, presuming that future administrations maintain a positive view of globalization, the
Navy will also have to deal with some of its negative consequences . Globalization is socially
disruptive and makes enemies for the United States. These enemies can take advantage of the relative improvement in the
ease of moving people and materiel around the world to do real, if limited, harm to the societies of democratic countries.
The Navy may find a crucial mission in watching over the peacetime sea lines of
communication to reduce the prospects for those who would use them to harm us and our
friends.
Heg Sustainable (Military): S/L

AND, military power
It is sustainable because no nation can challenge us for the foreseeable futurewe are too
strong and too far aheadthats Hingorani
AND, specifically, the strength of our navy means that other states would be fools to take us
onthats Posen
Heg Sustainable (Political): F/L

Setting down the hegemonic dream will take at least a generation
Edward A. Kolodziej, Director Center for Global Studies: University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Is the U.S. a Global Power in
Decline? Jun 8, 2009 http://www.ips.illinois.edu/iecp/global.pdf
Jettisoning the misguided and mischievous belief that the United States is a superpower, capable of dominating others, will
not be easy and take time, upwards of a generation. Absent that change in thinking by political leaders and the American public, the
United States risks going the way of failed empires whose reach was beyond their grasp.
America will continue to pursue hegemony regardless. Better make it successful with the plan
Ashley J. Tellis GLOBAL ASIA Vol.4, No. 1 Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States GLOBAL ASIA The
Debate 2008/09 page online
the limitations on US power witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq will produce a

more phlegmatic and accommodating United States over the longer term, despite the fact that the traditional US
pursuit of dominance understood as the quest to maintain a preponderance of power,
neutralize threatening challengers, and protect freedom of action, goals that go back to the foundations of the republic is unlikely to
be extinguished any time soon. Precisely because the desire for dominance is likely to
remain a permanent feature of US geopolitical ambitions even though how it is exercised will certainly change in comparison to
In all probability, it is much more likely that
the Bush years the central task facing the next administration will still pertain fundamentally to the issue of US power.
American public wont draw inwardsrealizes it must stay engaged globally

On the whole, the public understands that the new security threat to America dramatized by 9/11
will be a lasting one. The countrys wealth and economic dynamism make a defense budget of 3
4 percent of GDP relatively tolerable; this burden is considerably lower than it was during the Cold War, not to
mention World War II. In the meantime, globalization contributes to such interweaving of American
society with the rest of the world that American national security is becoming increasingly
blended with issues of global well-being.[P. 4-5]
Third, theres no risk of isolationismseptember 11th regalvanized foreign policy consensus

TUCKER (Prof. American Foreign Policy @ Johns Hopkins) 02
[Robert W., One Year On, Foreign Affairs, Fall, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
Seen from a year's distance, September 11 dramatically narrowed the contradiction between the ends,
or purposes, of U.S. foreign policy and the means available to achieve them. What happened on
that day refocused the American people's attention on foreign policy as few events could . A crisis
had arisen in which we were seriously and directly threatened. By comparison, even the crisis leading to the Gulf War was
not in the same category. September 11 has gone a long way toward restoring something resembling
the pre-Vietnam consensus over foreign policy, with its deference to the judgment of the
president in determining what our vital interests are and when a threat to these interests justifies
the use of force. A willingness to approve the means necessary to wage the war on terrorism, as
President Bush conceives the meaning of that war, is the visible result. In turn, this result cannot
be easily distinguished from a readiness to grant the means necessary to pursue the larger
purpose of American power, that of providing order to a fractious world . Indeed, the administration
considers the two purposes inseparable, the terrorist threat simply being, in its view, the greatest threat among many to
order in the world today.
Heg Sustainable (Political): S/L

Political sustainability
We will maintain the will to leadit will take at least a generation for any slippage to occur
thats Kolodziej, meaning their timeframe is waaay too long
Second, leadership is hardwired into the American psyche and system, meaning there is no
political reason that we will disengagethats Tellis
And, the stakes mean we will stay engagedour leaders, both public and private, have read
our impact scenarios--Brzezinski
And, 9/11--the cohen evidence proves that policy makers will always stay engagedits even
more likely with the wake-up call of septmember 11th.
Obama will be an interventionistbudget spending proves that allies will still be wary
Kagan Obama the Interventionist 2007 Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, writes a monthly column
for The Post. His latest book is "Dangerous Nation," a history of American foreign policy. He has been advising John McCain's presidential campaign on an informal and unpaid basis. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042702027.html
It's not just international do-goodism. To Obama, everything and everyone everywhere is of
strategic concern to the United States. "We cannot hope to shape a world where opportunity outweighs danger unless
we ensure that every child, everywhere, is taught to build and not to destroy." The "security of the American people is
inextricably linked to the security of all people." Realists, call your doctors. Okay, you say, but at least Obama is
proposing all this Peace Corps-like activity as a substitute for military power. Surely he intends to cut or at least cap a
defense budget soaring over $500 billion a year. Surely he understands there is no military answer to terrorism. Actually,
Obama wants to increase defense spending. He wants to add 65,000 troops to the Army and
recruit 27,000 more Marines. Why? To fight terrorism.
he believes that "the ability to put boots on the

ground will be critical in eliminating the shadowy terrorist networks we now face." He wants to ensure that we continue to have "the
He wants the American military to "stay on the offense, from Djibouti to Kandahar," and
strongest, best-equipped military in the world."
Obama never once says that military force should be used only as a last resort. Rather, he
insists that "no

president should ever hesitate to use force -- unilaterally if necessary ," not only "to protect
ourselves . . . when we are attacked," but also to protect "our vital interests" when they are "imminently
threatened." That's known as preemptive military action. It won't reassure those around the world who
worry about letting an American president decide what a "vital interest" is and when it is "imminently
threatened."
Obama wont set down hegemonyhistory proves

Gary J Schmitt, To Be, or Not to Be . . . an Empire Book Review. American Enterprise Institute, June 2007 www.aei.org/outlook/26387
It is possible, of course, that in 2008 we may see the election of a president who will take the nation in a direction
substantially different from that of his pred-ecessors. But if recent history is any guide--and if the world remains as
it is--it will be difficult for a new president, regardless of his wishes, to lay aside the mantle of
American leadership. Both George W. Bush and Bill Clinton entered office hoping to reduce
America's profile in the world, creating a more modest foreign policy; both will have left understanding just
how difficult--if not impossible--a task that is.
Heg Sustainable: Demographics

U.S. hegemony is sustainable global aging provides a unique advantage
Haas 7 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Summer 2007, Mark L., "A Geriatric Peace? The
Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations," International Security)
Global population aging will influence U.S. foreign policies in five major ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will be a
potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance , both economic and military. Aging
populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states' economic growth at the same time that
governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care . This
double economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources
necessary to overtake the United States' huge power lead. Investments designed to improve
overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these
difficulties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the
economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health
care) will be significantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not
only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States'
economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the
United States. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and
some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S.
power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects
make such an outcome unlikely. 6 Second, global aging increases the likelihood of continued
peaceful relations between the United States and the other great powers. Studies have shown
that the probability of international conflict grows when either the dominant country anticipates a
power transition in favor of a rising state or states, or when such a transition actually takes place. 7 By adding substantial
support to the continuation of U.S. hegemony, global aging works against either outcome from transpiring . An aging world
therefore decreases the probability that either hot or cold wars will develop between the United States and the other great powers. Third, the effects of
global aging will likely increase the United States' unilateral foreign policy tendencies. The aging
problem in the other great powers is so severe that these states will have tremendous difficulty maintaining the extent of their international commitments.
Consequently, when the United States engages in major international undertakings in the future,
the other major actors in the system will be able to offer less help than they can today. Fourth, although
the United States is in better demographic shape than the other great powers, it, too, will confront massive new costs created by its own aging population. As a result,
it will most likely be unable to maintain its current international position. Thus while the United States will be even more secure from great power rivalry than it is
today, it (and its allies) will be less able to realize other key international objectives, including preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
funding nation building, engaging in military humanitarian interventions, and mitigating the effects of local security problems. Global aging, in short, is likely to result in
a great power "geriatric peace," but this same phenomenon may threaten other important U.S. international interests, including by facilitating international conflict in
non-great power relations. Fifth, as the costs created by the United States' aging population grow, the saliency of neo-isolationist or "offshore balancing" grand
8
strategies is likely to increase. In a time of fiscal austerity brought on by social aging, these strategies are likely to become more compelling because they mesh with
the need to reduce spending. An aging world therefore increases the likelihood that the United States will withdraw from the international system even more than
budget constraints dictate.
Global aging will sustain U.S. hegemony

Population aging in the great powers will be a potent force for the
prolongation of U.S. power dominance in the twenty-first century for three principal reasons. First, the
massive costs and probable slowdowns in economic growth created by aging populations will
inhibit the other major powers from increasing military expenditures anywhere close to matching
U.S. defense spending; these factors are even likely to push many of these states to reduce their
military expenditures from current levels. Second, with aging populations and shrinking workforces, the other great powers will
have to spend increasing percentages of their defense budgets on personnel costs and military
pensions at the expense of purchasing the most technologically sophisticated weaponry. The more money that states spend on military personnel and
pensions as opposed to weapons, the lower the likelihood will be of these countries challenging U.S. military dominance. The third factor
reinforces both of the previous points. Although the U.S. population is aging, it is doing so to a
lesser extent and less quickly than those of the other great powers (even India's population, though it will remain
younger than that of the United States for the first half of the twenty-first century, is aging significantly faster than the U.S. population). As a result, the
pressures pushing for the crowding out of military spending in favor of elderly care and the
increasing substitution of labor for capital within defense budgets will be considerably smaller
for the United States than for potential great power competitors, to the great benefit of its relative power position in coming decades. In 2005 the
United States spent more than $478 billion on defense. This figure was nearly $290 billion more
than the next largest military spender (China), and roughly equal to the combined military spending
of China, France, India, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Global aging significantly decreases the likelihood of
potential competitors closing this huge spending gap. The principal contention of this section is that there is likely to be a strong negative
relationship between the magnitude of a state's aging crisis (the independent variable) and the level of its
Global Aging and the Continuation of U.S. Primacy
44
45
military expenditures (the dependent variable). With aging populations, governments will be under such pressure to pay for massive new expenditures
for the elderly (and most likely in the context of slowing economic growth) that all other discretionary spending will likely be affected. High levels of
aging crisis, at a minimum, are likely to be a powerful force inhibiting states from significantly
increasing defense spending and, at a maximum, will tend to result in reductions in existing levels of military expenditures.
46
Demographically, the U.S. has fiscal advantage compared to other potential powers
There are only four principal ways to pay for the massive new expenditures required by states'
aging populations: increased taxation, deficit spending, reductions in benefits (including raising the retirement age), and spending cuts in other
areas. None of these solutions offers an easy way out of the monumental fiscal challenge that the
governments of these states will face in coming years. Paying for hundreds of billions of dollars
of new expenditures by raising taxes will not only be challenging politically, but perhaps selfdefeating as large tax increases may suppress economic activity and thus governmental revenue. Paying for new social
22
expenditures through additional taxation will prove particularly problematic for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, where the tax burdens are already high
Deficit spending is also not a viable option to pay for the growing needs of
the elderly, especially in the long run. First, the funds needed to care for the aged over the next thirty years are greater than the entire savings of the Group of
Eight states. Funding all projected old-age benefits by deficit spending would, as a result, consume all of the developed world's savings. Second, if the
costs of social aging are paid for by deficit spending, the great powers will relatively quickly
exceed a debt-to-GDP ratio of 150 percent, which until recently is roughly the highest level any developed country has reached in
(more than 30 percent of GDP).
23
24
peacetime. 25 (For context, the United States' public debt accrued during World War II was 125 percent of GDP; Britain's was 200 percent). 26 Such high levels of debt,
especially when they are occurring throughout the developed world and will continue for many decades, are likely to have significant negative economic
Solving the fiscal challenge

created by social aging through benefit reductions will also most likely prove extremely difficult .
Surveys conducted in 2005 have reported that 58 percent of U.S. workers older than 55 have accumulated less than
$100,000 in savings. 28 The situation is even worse in Europe, where 56 percent of all
households claim to have virtually no savings. 29 Seniors in China, India, and Russia are even
less financially independent. A key implication of these low savings rates is that retirees are heavily dependent on
their governments to maintain reasonable standards of living and health care . In both France and Germany,
consequences, most notably a major rise in interest rates and the consequent crowding out of investment.
27
30
for example, more than 60 percent of senior citizens' after-tax income comes from governmental spending of some variety. Among industrialized great powers, the
U.S. government in 2000 provided the smallest percentage of income for the elderly, but even this number was nearly 35 percent. 31 Moreover, a significant
percentage of the elderly in these developed states would be pushed into poverty if their governments cut benefits spending by only 10 percent. In both France and
Germany, a 10 percent reduction in benefits would increase poverty rolls among the elderly by more than 5 percent. 32
Heg Sustainable: Timeframe

Even if they win collapse inevitable we should retain hegemony as long as possible
Thayer, 07 Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A.,
American Empire, Routledge, page 105)
Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or
facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as
long as possiblejust as know-ing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning
your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health,
Americans and most of the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible.
We dont have to win total dominance in every realm Just that we do most of the time
Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 Americas
Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation p. 11-2
the United States. To be sure, my claim is not

that the United States comes out ahead in every imaginable situation but that it benefits
disproportionately most of the time, and as a direct result of structural advantages . The challenge for me is
In this book, I understand American hegemony as being broadly beneficial and especially beneficial for
to devise appropriate measures for disproportionality and to uncover the mechanism through which the United States promotes its interests. While the United States
has declined relative to some states, and it is inevitable that it will one day lose its dominant position, its ability to extract unequal gains implies that the shape of its
power curve is a lot more irregular than the debate about its superpower status suggests.
Relative decline just increases US power well use others as our fopo tools
Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation 51-3
In todays debate on American decline redux, scholars continue to assume a substitute relation
between economic and political power. Bacevich, for instance, sees the United States as a global enforcer that uses new advanced
means to practice old-style gunboat diplomacy, a development he laments and sees as more or less irreversible.48 Ferguson the mores and practices in other
countries is seen as especially devastating for its dominance. While Mann too sees the United States as a military giant, he does not think military power is of much
Johnson
describes the proliferation of American bases around the world, the resentment they create, and
how it might provoke decline.51 The French analyst Emmanuel Todd indicts the United States for outright banditry, the mugging of Europeans
use, and disparagingly calls it an economic backseat driver.50 Mann clearly sees the United States as a power in decline. In two books, Chalmers
by Wall Street, but does not believe the United States has the military wherewithal to ensure that it can continue to reap disproportionate economic benefits, or that it
is capable of the kind of political (non-discriminatory) rule that attracts dependable followers. 52
Not everyone has been convinced that

the United States has declined in any meaningful way. As several authors have pointed out, the relative
ascendancy of Europe and Japan was not only to be expected, but an explicit aim of American
policy after the war.53 Critics charged that those who believed that the United States had declined in
significant ways had failed to grasp important changes in the international economy and the
prominent role played by multi-national corporations. 54 To appreciate the full extent of Americas reach one had to take into
account the functioning of the world economy, the vitality of the American economy, the diversity of its population, and its military preponderance. Samuel Huntington
was particularly prescient in identifying what kept America on top and in spelling out challenges to its lead position. He saw the countrys multi-dimensional power
base as difficult for others to replicate and understood that the dynamism of the American economy would take a blow if consumer overstretch got out of hand, even
though he believed that the most serious challenge to American power would come from a coalition of European states.55 While Huntington correctly perceived that
Americas preeminence is anchored across a wide range of issue-areas, he did not connect these different sources of power. In elaborating an alternative way of
various forms of power mutually reinforce one another as the

hegemon travels up and down the power ladder. As I have already suggested, the consequences of relative
decline are potentially favorable to the hegemon and can in some circumstances activate power
thinking about the hegemons power arc, I show how
Heg Sustainable: A2 Asia Decline

US power and influence have not declined in Asia
Robert Sutter, (Prof., Asian Studies, Georgetown U.), THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA, 2009, 282.
U.S. ability and

willingness to serve as the Asia -Pacific's security guarantor and its vital economic partner
remain strong and provide a solid foundation for continued U.S. leadership in the region . According to
Asia-Pacific officials interviewed in 2004-2007, overall American power and influence in the region have not
declined.
The U.S. image in the Asia-Pacific has declined in recent years, and U.S. foreign policy continues to be widely criticized. Nevertheless,
US will lead in Asia for years

Robert Sutter, (Prof., Asian Studies, Georgetown U.), THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA, 2009, 282.
It appears that whatever
new order is emerging in the Asia-Pacific region will have the United States as
its leading power for many years to come. This forecast rules out some of the possible outcomes for the Asian regional order noted in
the first paragraph of this chapter. Thus, China's dominance is precluded. Moreover, the U.S. role in any
condominium, competition, or collective concert of powers in the Asia-Pacific would be that of
its leading power.
Heg Sustainable: A2 "Costs Will Increase in the Future" 2NC

First, weve already answered that- our thayer evidence assumes that and concludes we have
major room for expansion if costs go up
Second, empirically deniedthe us spent a great deal more of its gdp on defense at the height
of the cold war and survivedno reason to think we cant do it this time, especially if theres
not a global challenger
Third, command of commons makes force projection easy, keeping costs low
[Bradley, In Defense of Primacy, National Interest, Dec, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the
"global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project
its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a
consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the
robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.( n2) This is not
an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.
Current gap is so high no one could close it

DAALDER & LINDAY (Sr. Fellows at the Brookings Institution) 03
[Ivo & James, The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century, BROOKINGS REVIEW, v. 21 n. 1, Winter 2003, pp. 12-17. Available from the
World Wide Web at: http://www.brook.edu/press/review/winter2003/daalder.htm, accessed, 4/23/04]
But is America's exalted position sustainable? Militarily, the vast gap between the United States
and everyone else is growing. Whereas defense spending in most other countries is falling, U.S.
defense spending is rising rapidly. This year's requested increase in defense spending is greater than the entire
Chinese defense budget. Most remarkably, America can afford to spend more. Defense spending takes
a smaller share of the U.S. gross domestic product than it did a decade agoand even the Bush
administration's projected increases will produce an overall budget equal to only about 3.5
percent of GDP, about half of Cold War highs. There is little prospect of any country or group of
countries devoting the resources necessary to begin competing with the United States militarily ,
let alone surpassing it.
Heg Sustainable: A2 Dollar Decline

The dollar will remain the global currency-multiple reasons
Carla Norrlof ( Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 Americas Global Advantage US
Hegemony and International Cooperation Cambridge University Press http://magbooks.org/post-9334/americas-globaladvantage-us-hegemony-and-international-cooperation
Acquiring key currency status is often seen as harder than holding on to it, however, because factors like inertia, scale economies, and network externalities
contribute to the incumbents resilience. 3 The
incumbency advantage is particularly strong in areas where gains

can be made from reducing information costs as in foreign exchange trading where the dollar is
predominantly used, whereas it is less strong in areas where gains can be made from spreading risk as in portfolio optimization. 4 The dollar
persists because investors are risk averse (inertia), because transaction costs are lower for the
dollar (scale economies), and because the more the dollar is used the more it makes sense for
additional investors to use it (network externalities). The liquidity of the dollar the ease with which it can
be exchanged for goods, services, and assets in any part of the world creates a bias to
continue using it for commercial and financial transactions. Barriers to switching from one key
currency to another exist because, for the most part, investors prefer to use whatever they have
used in the past. These self-reinforcing advantages will tend to favour the international currency
in use, in this case the dollar. Despite these incumbency advantages, there is clearly some point at which the euro could start to seem more
attractive than the dollar.
Heg Sustainable: A2 "Economy" 2NC

No one will surpass the U.S.
Carla Norrlof ( Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 Americas Global Advantage US
Hegemony and International Cooperation Cambridge University Press http://magbooks.org/post-9334/americas-globaladvantage-us-hegemony-and-international-cooperation
the United States has consistently had the highest share of GDP . Second, its share
of GDP has been declining, although not steadily, since shares actually increased between 1977
and 1983 and then again between 1995 and 2001. Third, while countries like Japan and China
have improved their relative position, in terms of GDP shares , vis--vis the United States, they only
command a third of the United States share. Consequently, there is no single competitor around
to oust the United States from its number one position. The only existing challenger in this domain is the euro area, and a
One notices three things. First,
whole chapter is dedicated to analyzing the prospects for euro-zone countries to replace American hegemony. The next size measure, world trade shares, is on
display in tables 2.3 and 2.4. As can be seen in table 2.3, the United States was clearly the largest exporter in 1965 but was only the third largest exporter in 2008
the United States has maintained its lead as the worlds

largest importer. These statistics get to the heart of the argument in this book, which is that commanding
large import shares is more relevant for hegemonic status than commanding large export shares .
behind Germany and China. From table 2.4, we see, however, that
As I will also argue in chapters 4 and 5, importing more than one exports, i.e., sustaining trade deficits, is desirable as long as negative consequences in the form of
an unmanageable buildup in external liabilities can be avoided. In gauging the relative size of the United States capital market, I use the selected indicators from
which the IMF derives capital market size. Table 2.5 takes into account a countrys stock-market capitalization, its bond market, and its bank assets, which are all
As can be gleaned from the table, the United States has a

stronger lead in equities and bonds than in bank assets. I will return to this observation in chapter 7, in talking about the
added up to arrive at a single measure for capital market size.
financial crisis and in thinking about how it will affect the pattern of financial power. From table 2.5 it is also clear that, in 2008, the size of Americas closest rival,
These figures suggest that no single

country can challenge the United States dominance in the financial field, although, as with world trade shares, we
Japans, capital market, was significantly lower than what it was in 1995 (see columns 10 and 12).
need to consider to what extent the group of countries that now constitutes the euro area is a threat to American hegemony (see chapter 7).
Laynes econ argument ignores proportional spending and the cost of balancing.
And speaking of money, Layne's argument about looming imperial overstretch is itself a stretch. Even with all the
problems in Iraq, a war in Afghanistan, and an emerging hedging strategy vis--vis China, the defense
burden is still barely over 4 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. The United States has
had
far higher defense burdens in the past while still retaining its status as the world's
economic juggernaut. There may be plenty of reasons to worry about the U.S. economy, but "guns over butter" is
not one of them.
Moreover, while pulling back from a forward-leaning defense strategy would undoubtedly save money, offshore
balancing would still require the United States to have a major military establishment in
reserve if it wanted to be capable of being a decisive player in a game of great power balancing. Is the $100
billion or so saved--or, rather, spent by Congress on "bridges to nowhere"--really worth the loss in global influence that
comes from adopting Layne's strategy?
Heg Sustainable: A2 Future Entitelment Programs

Undermine Hegemony 2NC
Even with future budget crunches, america can afford full engagement
[Michael, At War With Ourselves: Why America is Squandering its Chances to Build a Better World, Oxford University Press, New York //wyo-tjc]
I have drawn a picture of perhaps unsettling complexity here. But the landscape of the Permanent Quagmire is not entirely
bleak. In the end this is an optimistic book-it's still good to be the king, after all, in Mel Brooks's immortal words. Indeed,
one of the chief arguments of this book is that we Americans can afford a more expansive
engagement. We can muddle through. Powered by a still-dominant economy, a fully engaged
America can both fight wars and keep the peace. We can combat terror with one hand and build
international institutions with the other (using them in turn to get others to help us maintain stability). Even the
latest surge in defense spending will amount to a paltry, very manageable 3.3 percent of GDP,
one-half of what it was at the height of the Cold War, and a pittance compared to militarized
Germany (23.5 percent) and Japan (28.2 percent) in the late 1930s . Yes, we face a budget crunch
in decades ahead as baby boomers become senior citizens and our economy grows top- heavy
with Social Security and Medicare recipients. But Newt Gingrich, the former leader of the "Republican
revolution" of the `90s, estimates that if America were to aggressively embrace all the tasks of the war on
terror- including an occupation of Iraq-it would still only cost the nation about 5 percent of
GDP.2' The real problem is not "imperial overstretch"-Paul Kennedy's phrase-but that America is
suffering from "understretch~' to quote another historian, Niall Ferguson. America can do much
more. Per- haps the "greatest disappointment facing the world in the 21st century," Ferguson
writes, is "that the leaders of the one state with the economic resources to make the world a
better place lack the guts to do it."22-23
Heg Sustainable: A2 Great Britain Proves 2NC

American power will be more enduring than britainhas larger home economy and softpower. Will prevent resistance to hegemony
NYE (Dean of Harvards JFK School of Government) 02
[Joseph, The Paradox of American Power: Why the Worlds Superpower Cant Go it Alone, Oxford University Press, New York //wyo-tjc]
Pax Britannica in the nineteenth century is often cited as an exam ple of successful hegemony,
even though Britain ranked behind the United States and Russia in GNP. Britain was never as superior in
productivity to the rest of the world as the United States has been since 1945, but as we shall see in
chapter 5, Britain also had a degree of soft power. Victorian culture was influential around the globe, and Britain gained in
reputation when it defined its interests in ways that benefited other nations (for example, opening its markets to imports or
eradicating piracy). America lacks a global territorial empire like Britains, but instead possesses a
large, continental-scale home economy and has greater soft power. These differences between
Britain and America suggest a greater staying power for American hege mony. Political scientist
William Wohlforth argues that the United States is so far ahead that potential rivals find it dangerous to
invite Americas focused enmity, and allied states can feel confident that they can continue to
rely on American protection. Thus the usual balancing forces are weakened. [P. 16]
Heg Sustainable: A2 Historic Trends Prove 2NC

Claims of decline are empirically wrong
Every ten years, it is decline time in the United States. In the late 1950s, it was the Sputnik shock, followed by the
"missile gap" trumpeted by John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential campaign. A decade later, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger sounded the
dirge over bipolarity, predicting a world of five , rather than two, global powers. At the end of the 1970s, Jimmy Carter's
"malaise" speech invoked "a crisis of confidence" that struck "at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will." A
decade later, academics such as the Yale historian Paul Kennedy predicted the ruin of the United States, driven by
overextension abroad and profligacy at home. The United States was at risk of "imperial overstretch," Kennedy wrote in 1987, arguing that
"the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously." But
three years later, Washington dispatched 600,000 soldiers to fight the first Iraq war--without
reinstating the draft or raising taxes. The only price of "overstretch" turned out to be the mild recession of 1991.
US will be the hegemon for the next 40-50 years

If American advantages remain durable as globalization advances, we and the rest of the world will be stuck with
America as hegemon for another forty or fifty years . It may not be what many states and societies want, but absent a
catastrophic discontinuity, the vectors of power will continue to deliver it. In fact, rather than becoming more like
other states as we struggle to overcome our internal problems and other challengers rise, it may well be that America becomes more
successful than, and more different from, other states. The slope of the lines representing our power and
that of other states may diverge further than at present, increasing our power relative to others .
US will avoid the hegemons historical fate because:

1) no nation or force can mount a semi-credible challenge
2) it is far richer in population and resources than predecessors
3) its cultural influence is unparalleled
Put thus, U.S. military power seems to invite hubris. But again, viewed from within the picture appears different. Generals and admirals fret over forces stretched too
thin, anticipate threats from unconventional and irregular opponents who will avoid U.S. strengths and seek out weaknesses, and worry that their political masters will
succumb to the intoxication of great power or their fellow citizens will fail to understand the commitment of money and blood that any war requires. Such leaders
understand better than their civilian superiors the fragility of great military strength. But that does not undermine the basic fact of U.S. predominance. Augustus lost
his legions in the Teutoburger Wald, Disraeli his regiments at Isandhlwana--in both cases, succumbing to primitive opponents inferior in weaponry and, according to
the imperial powers, culture as well. Not even in Vietnam, where the odds of such a debacle's occurring were highest, did U.S. forces suffer a similar defeat.
Today, the legions of the United States have no match, and the gap between them and other
militaries is only growing. No empire, of course, can sustain itself by raw military power alone. It
requires, at the very minimum, sufficient resources to generate power. Here, too, the contrasts
between the United States and its imperial predecessors are striking . Rome was a city, Britain a set of
moderately sized islands on the periphery of Eurasia. The United States spans a vast, rich continent . In the
middle of the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom's population numbered only slightly more than half that of France and
considerably less than those of the rising powers--Germany, the United States, and Russia. Its once impressive economic
lead over the rest of Europe had dwindled everywhere but in the area of finance. By the end of the century, it had fallen
behind Germany in the production of steel and electrical power. The United States, in contrast, is the third most
populous country on the planet and, unlike most developed countries, has a birth rate at or near
replacement rate. It accounts for just under a third of the world's economic production. It does
not live off plunder or accumulated finance or the farming of large estates. Its economy remains
the largest, most productive, and most dynamic on the planet. The might of Rome and Britain
depended on ideas as much as on power or resources : imperial power resided in science, literature, and
education. Gauls learned Latin, and Indians learned English. Yet the United States can claim greater influence
in the realm of ideas as well. In the ancient world, Greek was the language of philosophy; in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, German was the language of science. Today, English is the lingua franca of the planet for
everything from air traffic control to entertainment. U.S. universities dominate in higher education, while lowand middle-brow American culture floods a planet that simultaneously loathes and embraces Spielberg, Starbucks, and
MTV. American music, food, idiom, work styles, and manners are inescapable .
American hegemony will be sustainedthe sticky effects of institutions make this period of
power uniquely different, tempering realist tendencies to change the status quo

America has a unique opportunity to thwart history's most ruthless dictate: that nations are
ever fated to return to a state of anarchy and war. It has a unique opportunity do what no great
power in history has ever done-to perpetuate indefinitely the global system we have created, to
foster an international community with American power at its center that is so secure that it may
never be challenged. But this can be done only through a delicate balancing of all our tools of
power and influence. And it can be done only by bridging the ideological gulf that continues to divide Americans over
our place in the world. The beginning of getting from here to there is to understand that this is a brand-new challenge.
There never has been a moment like this in recorded history, with one power so dominant, an
international system so all-encompassing, and an array of secondary but rising powers so coopted by that system. One reason is America's extraordinary military dominance , as described above.
Another reason is that, as the scholar James Richardson points out, the global economic order policed by institutions such as the World Trade Organization is also "without historical precedent; earlier attempts to
establish international order relied mainly on political and military means ."14 As we will see in
subsequent chapters, the overall prosperity provided by this worldwide economic system has
created, despite the inequities of globalization and occasional resurgences of protectionism, a
powerful and enduring motivation for nations to become part of the global system . That's especially
true in an era when so many leaders are elected and must maintain popular support (and therefore prosperity) in order to
survive. That is why America's new role also means accepting the necessity of continuity: of
perpetuating a century's worth of institution building that has secured and advanced this economic system and, one by one, brought other great powers into the fold of a new international
community: Germany, Japan, Great Britain, possibly Russia, and, if we play our cards right,
perhaps China and the Islamic world as well. It is a historically lucky accident that the two
powers with the greatest potential for causing America trouble in the twenty-first century-China
and Russia-are both permanent members of the UN Secu- rity Council and are proud of that fact .
For that reason alone, it is worth America's time to support and promote the UN . While some authors see the rise
of a rival great power in the European Union, and others project that China will play this role, the
evidence is to the contrary: there is virtually no evidence these entities are gearing up to
challenge American primacy. 11-12
Heg Sustainable: A2 Multipolarity Inevitable

No shift to a multipolar world US holds power
Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the
German Marshall Fund, August/September 2007, End of Dreams, Return of History, Hoover Institution,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html, umn-rks
The world has become normal again.
The years immediately following the end of the Cold War offered a
tantalizing glimpse at a new kind of international order, with nations growing together or disappearing altogether, ideological
conflicts melting away, cultures intermingling through increasingly free commerce and communications. But that was a mirage, the hopeful
anticipation of a liberal, democratic world that wanted to believe the end of the Cold War did not end just one strategic and ideological
conflict but all strategic and ideological conflict. People and their leaders longed for a world transformed. 1 Today the nations of the West still
cling to that vision. Evidence to the contrary the turn toward autocracy in Russia or the
growing military ambitions of China is either dismissed as a temporary aberration or denied
entirely.
The world has not been transformed, however. Nations remain as strong as ever, and so too the nationalist
ambitions, the passions, and the competition among nations that have shaped history. The world is still unipolar,
with the United States remaining the only superpower. But international competition among great
powers has returned, with the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Iran, and others
vying for regional predominance. Struggles for honor and status and influence in the world have
once again become key features of the international scene . Ideologically, it is a time not of convergence but of divergence. The
competition between liberalism and absolutism has reemerged, with the nations of the world increasingly lining up, as
in the past, along ideological lines. Finally, there is the fault line between modernity and tradition, the violent struggle of Islamic fundamentalists
against the modern powers and the secular cultures that, in their view, have penetrated and polluted their Islamic world.
Layne concedes multipolarity not inevitable

Christopher Layne, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Summer 2009, The Waning of U.S. HegemonyMyth or Reality?,
International Security, Volume 34, Number 1, Project Muse, umn-rks
These trends, however, do not conclusively demonstrate that the international system is becoming
multipolar. Projections of future GDP alone do not mean that states such as China (or India, Russia, Japan, or the EU)
will become new poles of power in the international system. International relations theory still has not
produced a unified theory of great power emergence, notwithstanding that some scholars have made important contributions
that enhance understanding of this geopolitical phenomenon.55 We do know, however, that great power emergence results from the complex interplay of structural
constraints (concern for security) and unit-level decisions (rising states must decide to convert their increasing wealth into hard power and geopolitical [End Page
163] influence). Moreover, merely
aspiring to great power status does not assure success . Mobilizing and
converting economic and social resources into military power and diplomatic influence is not
easy, and states often are plagued by what David Baldwin called the paradox of unrealized power.56 Here, the
issue of state capacitythe effectiveness of the states administrative and political machinery, and quality of its leaderscomes to the forefront.57
Assessing the prospects for multipolarity or bipolarity is further complicated because measuring state
power is hard.58 Consider, for example, the spectacularly wrong widespread belief in the 1970s and
1980s that Japan would overtake the U nited States as the worlds dominant economic power and possibly become a full-fledged
superpower.59 Proponents of this view missed the important factors that ultimately held Japan back ,
including the Japanese economic bubble; insufficient state capacity and political corruption; and adverse demographic trends.
The rise of China school could be wrong for similar reasons. Although China experienced
annual growth rates in the double digits from the mid-1980s through 2006, this does not necessarily mean that it can sustain
similar growth over the next two decades.60 Straight-line projections of present growth rates into the future may
be wrong. Moreover, the long-term effects of the current global financial and economic crisis are an
important wild card, and it is unclear how the relative growth rates of the U nited States and China will
be affected. Opinion is divided on the question of which country is more likely to gain relative advantage.61 Finally, other factorsfor example,
domestic political instability, environmental degradation, public health issues, and demographic
trendscould derail Chinas ascent to great power status .62 If, [End Page 164] however, China remains on track (as all the
publications reviewed herein except for World Out of Balance predict), it soon will be both a potent military and economic force in the international system. In that
event, based on what history and offensive realist theory tell us, we should expect to see an increasingly wealthy China convert its economic strength into military
muscle and to seek hegemony in Asia.63
Heg Sustainable: A2 Strategic Overstretch 2NC

First, they have no scenario for overstretch happeningamericas engagements havent and
wont expand exponentially all of a sudden.
No overstretch now even if so, global leadership outweighs it.
Schmitt 7 (Gary, dir of the Programon Advanced Strategic Studies and Ph.D from U of Chicago, June 3,
[http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=7620] AD: 7/8/10)
And speaking of money: Layne's argument about looming imperial overstretch is itself a stretch. Even
with all the problems in Iraq, a war in

Afghanistan, and an emerging hedging strategy vis-a-vis China , the defense burden is still barely
over 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product . The United States has certainly had far higher defense burdens in the
past, while still retaining its status as the world's economic juggernaut. There may be plenty of reasons to worry about the
country's economy, but "guns over butter" is hardly one of them. Moreover, while pulling back from a
forward-leaning defense strategy would undoubtedly save money, offshore balancing would still require the United States
to have a major military establishment in reserve if it wanted to be capable of being a decisive
player in a game of great power balancing. Is the $100 billion or so saved--or, rather, spent by Congress on "bridges to
nowhere"--really worth the loss in global influence that comes from adopting Layne's strategy?
No overstretch even if Iraq was a failure, the U.S still retains its primacy.
Schmitt 7 (Gary, dir of the Programon Advanced Strategic Studies and Ph.D from U of Chicago, June 3,
[http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=7620] AD: 7/8/10)
The reality is, a

doesn't rest on success in Iraq . It may tell us how prepared or unprepared we are as a government for that role, but
it doesn't necessarily vitiate the strategy's general validity . That said, having a strategy dedicated to
maintaining primacy does, in fact, put a premium on preemption--not necessarily or even primarily military preemption, but
certainly a strong impetus to use all the tools of statecraft to shape both the security
environment and other states' behavior. As such, it is an inherently active and somewhat openended strategy that
requires heading off challenges before they become threatening ones .
First, in response to Layne's argument that Iraq has been an unmitigated disaster, Thayer tries too hard to put a happy face on the problem.
strategy of primacy
internventions are inevitableearly us action under a hegemonic strategic keeps them less
costly than letting them develop into full blown threats
KAGAN & KRISTOL (CEIP & Editor of Weekly Standard) 2K
[Robert & Bill, National Interest and Global Responsibility, Present Dangers: Crisis & Opportunity in American Foreign & Defense Policy, ed. Kagan & Kristol, Encounter
Books]
It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on American hegemony, and on the
blending of principle with material interest, may in fact mean fewer, not more, overseas inter ventions than under the vital interest standard. Had the Bush administration, for example, realized early on
that there was no clear distinction between American moral concerns in Bosnia and Americas national interest there, the
United States, with the enormous credibility earned in the Gulf War, might have been able to put a stop to Milosevics
ambitions with a well-timed threat of punishing military action. But because the Bush team placed Bosnia
outside the sphere of vital American interests, the resulting crisis eventually required the
deployment of thousands of troops on the ground. The same could be said of American
interventions in Panama and the Gulf. A passive worldview encouraged American leaders to
ignore troubling developments which eventually metastasized into full- blown threats to
American security. Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein were given reason to believe that the United States did not
consider its interests threatened by their behavior, only to discover that they had been misled. In each case, a broader
and more forward-leaning conception of the national interest might have made the later, large
and potentially costly interventions unnecessary. The question, then, is not whether the United
Sates should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans need to make is
whether the United States should generally lean forward, as it were, or sit back. A strategy aimed at
preserving American hegemony should embrace the former stance, being more rather than less
inclined to weigh in when crises erupt, and preferably before they erupt. This is the standard of a global
superpower that intends to shape the international environment to its own advantage. By contrast, the vital interest standard
is that of a normal power that awaits a dramatic challenge before it rouses itself into action. [P. 13-14]
Heg Sustainable: A2 Technological Diffusion Undermines

Hegemony 2NC
Not trueamerica has exploited the most and will continue to gain from the RMA
Other trends, however, strengthen the already powerful. As I argued in chapter i, information
technology has produced a revolution :n military affairs. Space-based sensors, direct broadcasting, high
speed computers, and complex software provide the ability to gather, sort, process, transfer, and disseminate information
about complex events that occur over a wide geographic area. This dominant battle space awareness along
with precision guided weapons produces a powerful advantage . As the Gulf War showed, traditional
assessments of balance-of-weapons platforms such as tanks or planes become irrelevant unless they include the ability to
integrate information with those weapons. That was the mistake that Saddam Hussein made (as well as those in Congress
who predicted massive American casualties). Many of the relevant technologies are available in
commercial markets, and weaker states can be expected to purchase many of them. The key,
however, will be not possession of fancy hardware or advanced systems but the ability to
integrate a system of systems. In this dimension, the United States is likely to keep its lead . In
information warfare, a small edge makes all the difference. The revolution in military affairs will not diminish
and may, in some circumstances, even increase the American lead over other countries [P. 65-66]
Heg Sustainable: A2 Trade Deficits 2NC

Trade deficit wont cause heg collapse
Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation p. 5
In sketching my argument, I will show that the
United States gains both materially and in terms of policy autonomy from running
persistent deficits because of its multi-purpose power base. It gains economically by absorbing
more capital and goods from the rest of the world and through capital and exchange rate gains
on the international investment position (IIP).2 It also gains in terms of policy autonomy. Because foreigners have a wide
range of incentives to invest in dollardenominated assets (in the United States) and, when necessary, help softland the economy, the United States can adjust imbalances over a longer time horizon . The gain in policy
flexibility means it can adjust imbalances using its preferred policy instruments, and that its policy
error threshold is higher than it is for other countries. Therefore, it can more easily avoid the kind of shock therapy that is
normally associated with a consistent pattern of trade deficits and high external liabilities.
______________________________________________
**Heg Uniq: Counterbalancing Answers (General)**
Heg High Now: Counterbalancing F/L
No balancing--States simply accept American power as normal without struggle-American rise
was fait accompli
Campbell Craig, "American Power Preponderance and the Nuclear Revolution," REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES v. 35,
January 2009, pp. 27-44.
The second factor which Brooks and Wohlforth argue contributes to unipolarity is the sudden and
non-violent emergence of American preponderance in the 1990s, following the demise of the USSR.
Whereas great powers often fiercely sought to balance against their rivals in previous eras, so determined to prevent them
from achieving preponderance that they were willing to resort to major war, the accomplished fact of American
dominance means, Brooks and Wohlforth write, that the familiar obstacles to balancing will be
dramatically magnified. . . . Classical balancing coalitions were always vulnerable to the
collective action problem, as members would seek to ride free on the efforts of others.
These challenges would be multiplied in any attempt to counterbalance the United States
today.41 The point made here is a subtle one. In previous competitive balance-of-power systems, states would be more
tempted to balance actively against rivals rather than ride free because balancing offered the real prospect of attaining
great-power status. Today, the fact that American preponderance was simply presented to
potential rivals as an existing reality after the end of the Cold War, that there was nothing
they could do about it, discourages states from being the first to embark upon the
enormously expensive and dangerous project of balancing against the US , especially when they
would prefer to ride free on the back of another state doing so. The collective action problem the tendency of actors to
want others to deal with a common problem and so enjoy the benefits without cost is one thing, Brooks and Wohlforth
suggest, in a dynamic and competitive system, and another entirely in a system as imbalanced and uncompetitive as
unipolarity today.
No balancing-The US is so far in the lead that no other state can even try to compete
January 2009, pp. 27-44.
The third, and most evident factor stressed by Brooks and Wohlforth in their case for Power Preponderance is
the vast gap in capabilities between the US and any potential rival . If the fait accompli factor
emphasises the sudden emergence of American primacy and the absence of a balancing spiral, the power gap
stresses more simply that the distance between the US and all other states is so great that
potential rivals regard the prospects of serious balancing as too formidable to be worth
commencing. Even had the US begun the race for preponderance with these other states at the same time, to present
the issue metaphorically, it is so many laps ahead now that states have no other choice but to
conclude that they can no longer compete. The basis of the power gap argument presented
by Brooks and Wohlforth is simple: cost. The US is so far ahead in terms of military
capabilities and advanced technologies that potential rivals understand that a campaign of
serious balancing is likely to require decades of onerous military expenditures . What is more,
the US is not a garrison state like the Soviet Union was during the Cold War, spending a large percentage of its wealth on its
military and ignoring its domestic economy. Instead, despite its recent profligacy, the US spends, in historically relative
terms, a fairly small percentage of its wealth on its military, and could easily spend much more if it wanted to pull away from
an approaching rival. Not only is the US several laps ahead, but it still has petrol left in its tank
And, there is no uniqueness for thismost of the world is aligned with us

THAYER (Professor of Strategic Studies @ Missouri State) 07 [Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 106-108 //wyo-tjc]
countries want to align themselves with the United States. Far from there being a backlash
against the United States, there is worldwide bandwagoning with it. The vast majority of
countries in international politics have alliances with the United States. There are approximately
192 countries in the world, ranging from the size of giants like Russia to Lilliputians like Vanu- atu. Of that number, you can count with one
hand the countries opposed to the United States-China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela . Once the leaders of Cuba
and Venezuela change, there is every reason to believe that those countries will be allied with the United
States, as they were before their present rulers-Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez-came to power. North Korea will collapse someday, removing that threat, although not without significant
danger to the countries in the region. Of these states, only China has the potential power to confront the United States. The
potential power of China should not be underestimated, but neither should the formidable power of
the United States and its allies. There is an old saying that you can learn a lot about someone by looking at his friends (or enemies). It maybe true about people, but it is certainly true of the United
Third,
. Of the 192 countries in existence, a great number, 84, are allied with the United States, and
they include almost all of the major economic and military states . This includes twenty-five members of NATO (excluding the United StatesStates
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem- bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak ia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom); fourteen major non-NATO allies (Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Jordan, New Zealand, Argen- tina, Bahrain, Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan); nine- teen Rio Pact members (excluding Argentina
and Venezuela-The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Para- guay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay); seven
Caribbean Regional Security System members (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Gre- nada, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grena- dines), and thirteen members of the Iraq coalition who are not captured
by the other categories: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fiji, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Singapore, Tonga, and Ukraine. In addition, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and
Tunisia are now important U.S. allies. This is a ratio of almost 17 to 1 (84 to 5) of the countries allied with the United States against those who are opposed to it. And other states may be added to the list of allies. For example, a country like Nigeria
is essentially pro-United States although there is no formal security arrangement between those countries. This situation is unprecedented in international politics- never have so many countries been aligned with the dominant state in modern
history. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, it is a big change from the Cold War when most of the countries of the world were aligned either with the United States (approximately forty-five) or the Soviet Union (about twenty-four countries), of the Soviet
Union, as captured by Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 illuminates the ratio of states aligned with the United States to those opposed to it in the post-Cold War period. So, while we are entitled to our own opinions about international politics, we not entitled to
our own facts. They must be acknowledged. In the post- Cold War world, the United States is much better off-it is much more powerful and more secure-than was during the Cold War.
Heg High Now: Counterbalancing S/L

First, there is no counter-balancing happeningour craig and brooks evidence shows that the
majority of the world is aligned with the united states and trends indicating balancing are
thrown off because it is actually just rhetorical posturing
Second, the vast majority of your ev cites historical examples, but Brooks answers this:
A) unique factorsthe us is an insular, offshore balancer that is not threatening enough to
induce balancing and regional balances would prevent it from getting fullblown
B) the us is a status quo powerbalancers try to check ascendent powers, not a status
quo hegemon.
Too many barriers to balancing against the United States
Walt 9 (Stephen M., professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Alliances in a Unipolar World, World Politics - Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, pp. 86-120)
Even if other states now worry about the unipoles dominant power position, the condition of
unipolarity also creates greater obstacles to the formation of an effective balancing coalition. When
one state is far stronger than the others, it takes a larger coalition to balance it, and assembling
such a coalition entails larger transaction costs and more daunting dilemmas of collective
action. In particular, each member of the countervailing coalition will face greater incentives to free
ride or pass the buck, unless it is clear that the unipolar power threatens all of them more or less equally and they are able to develop both a high
degree of trust and some way to share the costs and risks fairly. Moreover, even if a balancing coalition begins to emerge, the
unipole can try to thwart it by adopting a divide-and-conquer strategy: punishing states that join the opposition while
rewarding those that remain aloof or support the unipole instead. These structural obstacles would exist regardless of who
the single superpower was, but a counterhegemonic alliance against the United States faces an
additional nonstructural barrier. The United States is the sole great power in the Western
hemisphere, while the other major powers are all located on the Eurasian landmass . As a result, these
states tend to worry more about each other; furthermore, many have seen the United States as the
perfect ally against some nearby threat. Accordingly, they are even less likely to join a coalition against
the United States, even if U.S. power is substantially greater. Assembling a vast counterAmerican coalition would require considerable diplomatic virtuosity and would probably arise
only if the United States began to pose a genuine existential threat. It is unlikely to do so, however, in part because
this same geographic isolation dampens American concerns about potential Eurasian rivals.
history, and it remains an important asset today.
30
Americas geopolitical isolation has been an advantage throughout its
31
Other countries dont think the US is a threat to their interests

POLICY, 2010, 29.
The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime
soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior, which has not stimulated such a response. This is not
to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. Bush has not alienated other nations; it surely has. But it has not, for the most part, acted
in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their
vital national interests. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy are pervasive, but this has tended
to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance.
Countries dont want to challenge the US because it threatens their interests

POLICY, 2010, 29.
A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are
dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. They do
not, accordingly, want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. Those interests are
closely tied to cross-border flows of goods, services, people, energy, investment, and
technology -- flows in which the United States plays a critical role. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power
competition and conflict.
Its against other countries own interests to contain the US
2009, 39.
"Who's afraid of Mr. Big?" asked Josef Joffe while reflecting on the absence of strategic balancing against the power of the United States. The tone was humorous, as
Lesser powers, Joffe claimed, might resent the overwhelming clout of

America and might dream of institutional rules to harness its power and might even enjoy the bad-mouthing of the less refined styles of the pragmatic
Americans . But when it comes to containing the United States, as the balance-of-power logic would predict, no one volunteers,
because the United States, as the primary provider of the international public goods, is essential to
their own interests.
befit the summer of 2001, but the argument was serious.
Containing the US threatens the well-being of other countries

The "rising powers as threats" argument undervalues the extent to which the structure of the
order benefits rising powers that buy into it in ways benefiting the United States as well as themselves. In this period of globalization,
it is almost inconceivable to envision a state becoming prosperous without adopting the
American order. That order has generated and survived the recovery of decimated World War II
economies, the rise of global competitors, the recklessness of the American political system,
and economic shocks of considerable magnitude, and yet it has produced the longest period of
sustained growth we have known.
Most foreign powers do not wish to balance against the US

Robert Lieber, (Prof., Govt., Georgetown U.), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2010,
41.
Other countries understand the unique nature of American power -- if not wholly selfless, not entirely selfish, either -and its role in underpinning global stability and maintaining a decent world order. This helps to
explain why Europe, India, Japan and much of East Asia, and important countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have no
use for schemes to balance against the United States. Most would rather do business with America or be
shielded by it.
And, threats of balancing are mere rhetoric

BROOKS & WOHLFORTH (asst. & Assoc. Profs, Dept. Govt @ Dartmouth) 02[Stephen & William, American Primacy in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug 2002, ln //mac-tjc]
THE CONCLUSION that balancing is not in the cards may strike many as questionable in light of
the parade of ostensibly anti-U.S. diplomatic combinations in recent years: the "European troika" of France, Germany, and Russia; the "special relationship" between Germany and Russia; the
"strategic triangle" of Russia, China, and India; the "strategic partnership" between China and Russia; and so on. Yet a close look at any of these arrangements
reveals their rhetorical as opposed to substantive character. Real balancing involves real economic and political costs, which
neither Russia, nor China, nor indeed any other major power has shown any willingness to bear.
Advanced techn means America absorbs counterbalancing--wont change power structures

Parag Khanna World To America: Who Cares? Forbes, 9/26/08. Page: http://www.paragkhanna.com/2008/09/world_to_america_who_cares.html
Zakaria himself, meanwhile, believes that the US political system, captured by money, special interests, a sensationalist
media and ideological attack groups, is dysfunctional. Like the well-travelled Khanna, he is exasperated by jingoistic
politicians such as Mitt Romney, who wants to double the size of Guantnamo. But where Khanna points to high income
inequality, corporate fraud, anti-immigrant hysteria and an obsession with guns and incarceration as symptomatic of
Americas insuperable self-delusion and irrevocable decline, Zakaria is all smooth reassurance: the American
economy remains dynamic, and the US is as competitive and technologically innovative as

any European country. The politicians in Washington may be know-nothings, but the
countrys major research universities are still the best, attracting talent from all over the
world. Besides, the rise of the rest is a consequence of American ideas and actions. It follows that countries
such as India, Brazil and China want to become responsible stakeholders in a USdominated international system. Zakaria argues that the US can accommodate these countries by
offering them membership of clubs like the G8. China may remain a prickly challenger but
with the right kinds of inducement the democratic giant next door can be turned into an ally . Zakaria believes that
the nuclear agreement the Bush administration offered New Delhi, which aroused fierce opposition from both left and rightwing parties in India, will alter the strategic landscape, bringing India firmly and irrevocably onto the global stage as a major
player.
Counterbalancing is wrongcompetition is coopted by cooperation

Nina Hachigian (Senior vice President: Center for American Progress) 4/18/08 United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics
CFR http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html
In our book, Mona Sutphen and I lay out a new paradigm for thinking about what we call the pivotal powers, China, India,
Russia, the EU and Japan. America need not fear their strength. In fact, in order to keep Americans safe and prosperous,
we need to work with these powers as never before. If America leads abroad and tackles its problems at home, we
will continue to thrive in a more crowded world. Importantly, pivotal powers now want what we
wanta stable world with open markets. None are true ideological adversaries. Though hot spots
remain, no intractable disputes divide us. Nation states seeking order are on the same side against the forces
of chaosterrorists, climate change, disease, and proliferation. Only together can they defeat these rotten fruit of
globalization. For instance, China allows American agents into Chinas ports to help screen outbound shipping containers
for smuggled radioactive devices. A climate crisis will come unless all the big emitters act. Nevertheless, near panic
dominates the debate about emerging powers, especially inside the Beltwaythey are taking our jobs,
luring away R&D, giving solace to enemies and reducing democracys appeal. There is truth in some of these claims. But
remedies to these problems, more often than not, begin with domestic policy. For example, more innovation in
China and India benefits America, as long as innovation continues here. That requires investments in math and
science education. Thinking of big powers principally as competing rivals is not the right
paradigm. Companies compete for profits. Countries do not. Nor is there a vast zero-sum
head-to-head battle for influence. Policymakers need to shed the us against them Cold-War mindset. We
advocate strategic collaboration with the pivotal powers. The biggest challenge America faces is not their
growing strength. It is convincing them to contribute to the world order regimes and institutions
that will tackle shared challenges like economic stability and nuclear proliferation. America still has to lead, but in a new way
that encourages others to take responsibility. Of course, we have to be prepared in case a hostile hegemon ever emerges.
But weve been notoriously bad at predicting which powers will rise and which will fall, and we have little control over their
trajectories. We should strengthen the country we do controlour ownand seek the cooperation that
will keep Americans safe and prosperous.
There are no external constraints that will limit American power for years to come
Stephen G. Brooks

This book reveals that the
first assumption underlying conservatism has no basis. As we show,

systemic constraints on U.S. security policy do not rise with American power; there is no
reason to expect that for the next two decades external constraints will meaningfully
impede U.S. efforts to revise the international system . It then becomes clear that the second
assumption at the root of conservatism is debatable , and ought to be debated. Our concluding chapter
addresses the pressing need to begin a serious discussion of the potential security benefits of revising the system. That
debate would both provide helpful guidance to policymakers and lead to a better
understanding of the true security environment in today's unipolar system and how U.S. policymakers are likely to respond to it.
Power preponderance theory true- its bolstered by the role of nuclear deterrence
Campbell Craig, "American Power Preponderance and the Nuclear Revolution," REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES v. 35, January 20 09, pp. 27-44.
The general relevance of these messages to American unipolar preponderance is clear. At
the great power level,

rising states are unlikely to regard major war as a suitable means for overturning the
international system and overthrowing American preponderance. The classic means of
systemic change hegemonic war will not be an attractive option to any state hoping to
survive, and the very existence of nuclear arsenals will make all states cautious about
provoking conflict with nuclear rivals, especially the heavily armed US.35 Moreover, advanced
smaller states know that they can provide for their own security, if they come to believe that
it is endangered, not by embarking on large military build-ups or forming alliances with
larger states, but by developing a small and invulnerable nuclear arsenal, or at least
preparing the way to obtain such an arsenal quickly. This means that small states have a far
greater ability to defend themselves from, and therefore be less afraid of, American predation today
than comparable states facing dominant powers in previous eras.36 The main effects of the nuclear
revolution, then, bolster the general claim of Power Preponderance that unipolarity is
enduring. To support their claim, Brooks and Wohlforth specify three factors that dissuade would-be rivals to the US from
balancing against it in traditional military terms: the effect of Americas relative geographical isolation from these potential
rivals; the fact that American preponderance happened as a fait accompli about which no other nation could do anything;
and the vast and growing power gap between the US and all other rivals. The next section will describe each factor, and
show how the nuclear revolution specifically reinforces each of them.
Your ev assumes historical trendsmultiple features of american hegemony buck the trend
BROOKS & WOHLFORTH (asst. & Assoc. Profs, Dept. Govt @ Dartmouth) 02[Stephen & William, American Primacy in Perspective, Foreign Affairs,
July/Aug 2002, ln //mac-tjc]
MANY WHO ACKNOWLEDGE the extent of American power, however, regard it as necessarily self-negating. Other states traditionally band together to restrain potential hegemons, they say, and this time will be no different. As German political
commentator Josef Joffe has put it, "the history books say that Mr. Big always invites his own demise. Nos. 2, 3, 4 will gang up on him, form countervailing alliances and plot his downfall. That happened to Napoleon, as it happened to Louis XIV and
the mighty Hapsburgs, to Hitler and to Stalin. Power begets superior counterpower; it's the oldest rule of world politics." What such arguments fail to recognize are the
features of America's post --
Cold War position that make it likely to buck the historical trend.
Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north
and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, meanwhile -- China, Russia, Japan, and Germany -- are in the opposite
position. They cannot augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot
of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly
When analysts refer to a historical

pattern of balancing against potentially preponderant powers, they rarely note that the cases in question -- the Hapsburg ascendancy, Napoleonic France, the Soviet
Union in the Cold War, and so forth -- featured would-be hegemons that were vulnerable, threatening, centrally located ,
help contain them, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat .
and dominant in only one or two components of power. Moreover, the would-be hegemons all specialized in precisely the form of power -- the ability to seize territory -- most likely to scare other states into an antihegemonic coalition.
American capabilities, by contrast, are relatively greater and more comprehensive than those of
past hegemonic aspirants, they are located safely offshore, and the prospective balancers are close regional
neighbors of one another. U.S. power is also at the command of one government, whereas the putative balancers would face major challenges in acting collectively to assemble and coordinate their military
capabilities.
No balancingdifference between an established hegemon and an emergent one

BROOKS & WOHLFORTH (asst. & Assoc. Profs, Dept. Govt @ Dartmouth) 02[Stephen & William, American Primacy in Perspective, Foreign Affairs,
July/Aug 2002, ln //mac-tjc]
Previous historical experiences of balancing, moreover, involved groups of status quo powers seeking to contain a
rising revisionist one. The balancers had much to fear if the aspiring hegemon got its way. Today, however, U.S. dominance is the status
quo. Several of the major powers in the system have been closely allied with the United States for decades and derive substantial benefits from their
position. Not only would they have to forego those benefits if they tried to balance, but they would have to find some way of putting together a durable, coherent alliance while America was watching. This is a profoundly important point, because
although there may be several precedents for a coalition of balancers preventing a hegemon
from emerging, there is none for a group of subordinate powers joining to topple a hegemon
once it has already emerged, which is what would have to happen today.
And, counter-balancing wont happen:

Band wagoning solves it
America isnt as threatening as past hegemons
Balancers will be contained wihtin the region
NYE (Dean of Harvards JFK School of Government) 02 [Joseph, The Paradox of American Power: Why the Worlds Superpower Cant Go it Alone, Oxford University Press, New York //wyo-tjc]
countries sometimes react to the rise of a single power by
bandwagoning that is, joining the seemingly stronger rather than weaker sidemuch as Mussolini did when he decided, after several years of hesitation, to ally with Hitler .
Proximity to and perceptions of threat also affect the way in which countries react. The United
States benefits from its geographical separation from Europe and Asia in that it often appears as
a less proximate threat than neighboring countries inside those regions. Indeed, in 1945, the United States was by far the strongest nation on
In my view, such a mechanical prediction misses the mark. For one thing,
earth, and a mechanical application of balancing theory would have predicted an alliance against it. Instead, Europe and Japan allied with the Americans because the Soviet Union, while weaker in
overall power, posed a greater military threat because of its geographical proximity and its lingering revolutionary ambitions. Today, Iraq and Iran both dislike the United States and might be expected
to work together to balance American power in the Persian Gulf, but they worry even more about each other. Nationalism can also complicate predictions . For example, if North Korea and South
Korea are reunited, they should have a strong incentive to maintain an alliance with a distant power such as the United States in order to balance their two giant neighbors, China and Japan. But in tense nationalism resulting in opposition to an American presence could change this if American diplomacy is heavy-handed. Non-state actors can also have an effect, as witnessed by the way
cooperation against terrorists changed some states behavior after September 2001. [P. 14-15]
Heg High Now: Power Preponderance Ext

The U.S. is so strong that it can bear the 'costs' of unilateral policies
Stephen G. Brooks

The final long-lerm policy issue our analysis bears upon is the costs of unilateralism.4* IR scholars invariably see going it
alone as costly, particularly for the United States today. Stanley Hoffman's warning, that "nothing is more
dangerous for a 'hyperpower' than the temptation of unilateralism," is typical of scholarly

assessments.17 The general argument is that unilateralism is prohibitively costly because it
augments systemic constraints: enhanced efforts to balance U.S. power, re duced legitimacy
of the U.S.-lcd international order, and a damaged American reputation that will curtail
prospects for cooperation in international institutions. Our finding, that for the United States
systemic constraints are generally inoperative, thus undermines the scholarly consensus
on the high costs of unilateral policies.
There will be no balancing--states have too strong of incentive to adapt to a world of American
power
January 2009, pp. 27-44.
Kuhns paradigm model encourages us to see why Power Preponderance is going to replace balance-of-power neorealism
and become the dominant brand of American IR Realism for the foreseeable future.12 Unipolarity is too central of a
problem for neorealism to finesse, especially as confident predictions of its early demise have
been proven wrong and the gap between the US and other rivals continues to grow . Theory abhors
an explanatory vacuum, and Power Preponderance is filling it. The essence of Power Preponderance is its
claim that would-be rivals have strong incentives to accept the status quo of American
primacy rather than to attempt to overturn the unipolar order, and that these incentives are
dictated by structural and geopolitical factors. The argument therefore distinguishes itself
from deterministic claims made by some structural realists that a balance of power is
certain to recur even if states manifestly regard balancing as unnecessary or even
detrimental to their security interests, while at the same time retaining the structural
emphasis upon objective factors such as geography and material capabilities .13 This latter
emphasis allows Brooks and Wohlforth to avoid subjective and ideational, or unit level explanations for American primacy,
such as the neoconservative view that the world ought to accept American ideological domination, for example, or the liberal
argument that democratic states are disinclined to fight against one another. By excluding such subjective explanations,
Power Preponderance is able to retain a theoretical and structural attitude toward American
primacy, and avoid the inconsistencies and parochial biases of more normative analyses.
Heg High Now: Power Preponderance (Nuclear Deterrence)

Ext
Nuclear weapons and distance make a war between the U.S. and other great powers
unthinkable
January 2009, pp. 27-44.
As John Mearsheimer has argued, the
geographical isolation of the US with respect to its potential

rivals in Eurasia is decisively shaped by what he calls the stopping power of water .37 As it
is far more difficult to launch campaigns of military conquest overseas than it is across
land, the vast oceans discourage would-be world conquerors from waging global war . So even
though the US is not much further away from France in terms of simple mileage than is Russia, the Atlantic Ocean provides to France a kind of security from America
that it does not possess on its east. Though Mearsheimer deduces from this observation a far different conclusion than do Brooks and Wohlforth, they agree on a key
the oceans play an important role in persuading both the US and its key rivals that a
major war of conquest between them is unlikely. The nuclear revolution clearly reinforces
this persuasion. The vast distance between the US and its rivals, together with the stopping
power of water, not only discourages them from considering wars of conquest; it also leads
them to conclude that a global conventional war between them is untenable . Before the nuclear era, the
point:
oceans made as Mearsheimer shows a true global war of conquest practically impossible, as a sustained campaign across the Atlantic or Pacific was too
formidable even for the most powerful state.38 With the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 1950s, this barrier was surmounted, but only if the attacking
state was willing to wage nuclear war.
Power gaps are only enforced by nuclear deterrence, encourage states to free ride instead of
balance
January 2009, pp. 27-44.
The power gap factor the emphasis upon the insurmountable costs required to contend with the US is even
more obviously reinforced by the nuclear revolution . To understand why this is so, it is necessary to clarify
what one means when one speaks of the costs associated with balancing. Balancing is not done simply for the
sake of it, not just to win a race. Rather, it is done to prepare for major war. States pursue a
balance of power by building up their own military capabilities, and/or by forming alliances with
other militarily strong states. John Mearsheimer has defined this activity as the determination of states to
seriously commit themselves to containing their dangerous opponent. In other words, they are willing to
shoulder the burden of deterring, or fighting if need be, the aggressor .47 Randall Schweller states
simply that balancing requires that states target their military hardware at each other in
preparation for a potential war.48 According to standard Realist theory, the point of balancing is to build
up military power, by oneself or in alliance with others, in order to contend with powerful rivals by
presenting them with the ultima ratio of major war . When Wohlforth and Brooks identify the absence of
balancing among potential rivals to the US, this is what they are describing. Thus, the costs of balancing are not only, or
even primarily, the economic expenditures required to keep up militarily. Balancing means preparing for major
war, a war that may lead to devastation and defeat. Why have nations so often tried to ride free
on the backs of others balancing against a dangerous rival? Economic costs have certainly
been one key reason, but another is that riding free offers the prospect of avoiding bearing
the brunt of a major war should it occur. If smaller nations have declined to balance in the past not just to save
money, but also to avoid dangerous military confrontation with a powerful rival, then it is easy to discern how the
nuclear revolution reinforces the logic of the power gap in todays international setting. In the
past, military confrontation with a powerful state raised the possibility of sustained major
war and conventional defeat. Now, it portends nuclear war. As we have seen, a general war between
the US and a Eurasian great-power rival would likely escalate to general nuclear war, given the difficulties of waging
conventional war across the oceans and of keeping nuclear war limited. What is more, the US deploys a massive
nuclear arsenal, one that can easily be used to destroy the major cities and government
apparatus of any hypothetical rival over the foreseeable future.50 The US is so far ahead in
the balancing race that it is true other nations might still have concluded that it was no use
trying to catch up even had nuclear weapons never been invented .51 However, when the realworld purpose of balancing preparing for major war against a dominant nuclear power is
added to this calculation, the power gap disincentive becomes overwhelming .
Heg High Now: A2 Anti-Americanism

Anti-americanism wont preclude hegemony moral authority empirically is irrelevant
In every area except likability, U.S.
power has increased rather than decreased. And the likability index is notoriously volatile in the
who claim that American moral authority can never recover from the degradation of Guantanamo
detentions and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal ought only to review the record on similar claims made at the time of
the McCarthy hearings or of the National Guard's enforcement of school desegregation,
Eisenhower's denial of U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union in 1958 as Khrushchev paraded captured CIA pilot Gary Powers for TV
cameras, Watergate, the Watts riots, or the fall of Saigon. American moral authority has never been
as unalloyed as those who bemoan its loss purport. It has always been a struggle , and an unsuccessful one
short-term. Those
at times, to live up to our aspirations and claims.
Anti-Americanism benign and shallow

2009, 4.
My analyses demonstrate that popular
anti-Americanism is mostly benign and shallow . It is far from being a

prejudice or an ingrained view of ideological opposition, as we often hear among scholars and
practitioners of international politics. Periods of strong opposition often do occur. In different times and contexts, the balance between
positive and negative elements changes . A particular action, policy, or aspect of the United States can capture
public opinion and tilt the cognitive balance into the negative zone . A deep-seated ideological
opposition to the United States certainly exists, and tragically so. But it is usually the aberration
of a minority of people in few quarters of the world.
Anti-Americanism is tempered
2009, 4.
As publics balance likes and dislikes about the United States, they end up tempering the anger,
resentment, and displeasure they occasionally feel towards the United States with ideas about U.S. freedoms,
prosperity, and popular culture. Like a cubist painting where the image is broken into small multifaceted areas that represent the plural
viewpoints of our vision, my theoretical account of anti-Americanism portrays the multiple sides of the
United States that simultaneously shape popular attitudes . In Part 1, I present the theoretical underpinnings of this
argument, which I call the dimensions of America theory, and place it within the bounds of a theory of public opinion formation.
Anti-Americanism has been exaggerated for decades

2009, 13-14.
When we read that anti-Americanism is "in the air the world breathes," as Charles Krauthammer wrote, we are left to wonder whether attitudes towards the United
The overcharged tones in which

some people speak of a widespread anti-American sentiment convey the idea that popular
opposition to the United States has attained new heights. However, historically, concerns over
world opinion of America have recurrently emerged, attracted the attention of scholars and
pundits, and then quietly subside.
States have acquired new polemical dimensions that they did not have when the Cold War was raging.
Anti-Americanism doesnt translate into terrorism

2009, 40.
Simple connections cannot be drawn between the existence of an ideological climate in which
America is vilified and its policies despised and the willingness to hurt the country and its
people, as the literature on terrorist mobilization shows. Terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw has made this point very clear.
Moreover, not all the forms of anti-Americanism are even remotely tainted with murderous intentions
or criminal complacency. Investigating popular anti-Americanism, nonetheless, potentially offers a double contribution to the conditions for American
security: it sheds light on the existence of fringes of sympathizers with whom the actions of the
extremists could resonate, and more broadly it potentially shows the extent to which the rest of
the world endorses the American leadership and respects the creed embodied in its political
institutions.
Heg High Now: A2 "Benign Hegemony is False" 2NC

First, this argument is ridiculouslast several decades proves the us exercises lots of
restraint compared to its capabilities, which disarms traditional calculations that the hegemon
is a threat.
Second, benign hegemony isnt a mythtrack record demonstrates america is more
concerned with global interest than self-interest
KRAUTHAMMER (journalist) 03
[Charles, The Unipolar Moment Revisited, The National Interest, Winter 2002/3, ASP]
Less can be said about the destiny of unipolarity. It is too new. Yet we do have the history of the last decade, our only
modern experience with unipola rity, and it was a decade of unusual stability among all major powers. It would be foolish to
project from just a ten-year experience, but that experience does call into question the basis for the claims
that unipolarity is intrinsically unstable or impossible to sustain in a mass democracy. I would argue
that unipolarity, managed benignly, is far more likely to keep the peace. Benignity is, of course, in
the eye of the beholder. But the American claim to benignity is not mere selfcongratulation. We
have a track record. Consider one of history's rare controlled experiments. In the 1940s, lines were drawn through
three peoples-Germans, Koreans and Chinese-one side closely bound to the United States, the other to its adversary. It
turned into a controlled experiment because both states in the divided lands shared a common culture. Fifty years later the
results are in. Does anyone doubt the superiority, both moral and material, of West Germany vs. East Germany, South
Korea vs. North Korea and Taiwan vs.
China?11 Benignity is also manifest in the way others welcome our power. It is the reason, for example, that the Pacific Rim
countries are loath to see our military presence diminished: They know that the United States is not an imperial power with a
desire to rule other countries-which is why they so readily accept it as a balancer. It is the reason, too, why Europe, so
seized with complaints about American high-handedness, nonetheless reacts with alarm to the occasional suggestion that
America might withdraw its military presence. America came, but it did not come to rule. Unlike other hegemons and
would-be hegemons, it does not entertain a grand vision of a new world. No Thousand Year
Reich. No New Soviet Man. It has no great desire to remake human nature, to conquer for the
extraction of natural resources, or to rule for the simple pleasure of dominion. Indeed, America is
the first hegemonic power in history to be obsessed with "exit strategies." It could not wait to get out of
Haiti and Somalia; it would get out of Kosovo and Bosnia
today if it could. Its principal aim is to maintain the stability and relative tranquility of the current
international system by enforcing, maintaining and extending the current peace.
Heg High Now: A2 "Challengers (General)" 2NC

Cross-apply the 1nc brzezinski evidenceto match us power, all adversaries would have to
work years to catch up. Simply not possible for any state to challenge hegemony
US cooperation means states wont challenge
Realism predicts an eventual ganging up by all other states against the hegemon. The theory
considers hegemony inherently unstable, with other powers cooperating to prevent the
strongest from achieving its goals until it is whittled down to a more equal status with that of other states. But this assumes that
what the hegemon wants is naturally objectionable to other states, when the genius of American
power in the twentieth century has been setting and enforcing rules of participation by which all
who opt into the system can be successful.
And, heg is high and will remain so:

1) sheer power is unmatched
2) no balancing coalition can replace it
3) foreign policy will emphasize preponderance
In the end, however, the applicability of a particular term (debates about empire tend to degenerate into semantic
squabbles) does not matter. The fact of the overwhelming power of the United States does. No
potential adversary comes close to it, and, for the moment, there is no question of a
countervailing coalition to block, let alone replace, it. Its roots lie in a growing and
extraordinarily productive population, a stable political system, and a military that is
unsurpassable in the foreseeable future. And the United States will not, as some hope and others fear,
bind itself to an international institutional and legal order that will domesticate and restrain it. If
nothing else, domestic politics would prohibit it. No U.S. leader in the next decade or two will call for a dramatic reduction in
defense spending or deny that this country must be the strongest in the world, ready to exert its power globally and act
unilaterally if necessary.
The "Age of Empire" may indeed have ended, then, but an age of American hegemony has
begun. And regardless of what one calls it or how long it will last, U.S. statesmen today cannot ignore the lessons and
analogies of imperial history.
Heg High Now: A2 "Challengers (General)" 2NR

No risk of a hegemonic challengerno one in the world can go toe-to-toe with america
The contemporary world may not like American preeminence may distrust it, resent it, even at times
conspire against it. But as a practical matter, it cannot oppose it directly. The last decade has seen
occasional attempts at such opposition, but to no avail . The Chinese and the Russians flirted
with a strategic partnership to promote global multipolarit y, a term easily decoded as anti-hegemony?
Not much came of that, given Russias relative weakness vis--vis China, as well as Chinas pragmatic recognition
that right now, most of all, it needs foreign capital and technology. Neither of these would be forthcoming if Chinas relations
with the United States were antagonistic. In the last year of the twentieth century, the Europeans , and
especially the French, grandly announced that Europe would shortly acquire an autonomous global
security capability? The war in Afghanistan quickly revealed this commitment to be reminiscent
of the once famous Soviet assertion that the historical victory of Communism is on the horizon
an imaginary line that recedes as one walks toward it . [P. 2]
U.S. power unrivaled, no emerging hegemonic threats

The success of American policy over the past decade means that no power not Russia, not
Germany, not a united Europe, and not China or Japantoday poses a hegemonic threat to
Eurasia. In this new era, American foreign policy will no longer pivot on geography. Instead, it
will be defined by the combination of America's unrivaled power in world affairs and the
extensive and growing globalization of world politics. The Sole Global Power The United States is today the
only truly global power. Its military reachwhether on land, at sea, or in the airextends to every point on the globe. Its
economic prowess fuels world trade and industry. Its political and cultural appealwhat Joseph Nye has called soft power
is so extensive that most international institutions reflect American interests. America's position in the world is uniqueno
other country in history has ever come close.
Heg High Now: A2 "Challengers (Layne) 2NC

Laynes understanding of democratic interactions is wrong and mostly vituperative.
Its biggest problem, however, lies in Layne's dyspeptic analysis of current policy opponents. Rather than
taking the opposing argument as seriously as Thayer takes his, Layne resorts to unsubstantiated
claims about "neocons," White House lies, and cabals (the "Blue Team") trying to foment a "preventive" war
with China.[4] Similarly, his dismissal of the democratic peace theory is equally over-the-top .
Even if one thinks that the theory is at times oversold, to claim that it has absolutely no merit leaves readers with the sense
that there is as much anger as argument in Layne's case .
Laynes offshore balancing really works badly:

a)
He cant explain it
b)
No domestic support
c)
Worse competition
d)
Delayed response worsens crises
An additional problem, perhaps tied to the way the book is structured, is that Layne spends the majority of his
time criticizing the argument for primacy without giving the reader much of a handle on the
particulars of his own preferred strategy. As a result, we do not know whether his model of "offshore
balancing" is more British in style--that is, fairly active in playing the decisive power broker among the other
competing states--or more passive in content, such as the United States in the 1920s and 1930s.
If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of
statecraft than the United States has ever had. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger
to carry it out, would the American people really let their government play this particular game of
international politics, shifting partners based on power relations rather than on the character of the states themselves? The
disappearance of the United States as a security guarantor is likely to lead to more

competition among states and to the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international
environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role in its day, finding itself in numerous conflicts regardless.
If the latter, the passive offshore balancing approach leads to the question of whether such a
strategy results in putting off a security challenge until it may be far more difficult to deal
with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the
way, other powers would naturally begin to meet the challenge. It is possible, but doing so might
create even more destabilizing competition among other regional powers or lead those same
powers to acquiesce to China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them.
The history of international relations suggests that most great crises result from neglecting to address
more minor ones early on. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to nip these threats in the bud to than wait for
them to become full-blown security crises.
Heg High Now: A2 "Resentment" 2NC

Recognition of American indispensibility means other countries will not act on their
grievances
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor, Johns Hopkins University, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLD'S
GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, p. 195
Their awareness, sometimes dim and almost never explicitly spelled out. of the political, military, and
economic dangers that would come with the retreat of American power causes other
countries to refrain from combining to try to displace the United States from its place at the
center of the international system. Virtually all ol them harbor some grievance or other against the twenty-iirstcentury international order, but none would welcome the absence of any order at all, which is what
the collapse of American power might well bring. Grudgingly, tacitly, silently, other countries support the
American role as the worlds government out of the well-grounded fear diat while the conduct of die United Slates maybe
clumsy, overbearing, and even occasionally insufferable, the alternative would be even worse, perhaps much worse.
Resentment is inevitablestrong leadership checks the consequences**

Books //wyo-tjc]
It is fair to ask how the rest of the world would respond to a prolonged period of active American hegemony. Those regimes
that find an American-led world order inhospitable to their existence will seek to cut away at American power. They will form
tactical alliances with other dictatorships or "rogue states" for the common purpose of unsettling such an order, and they will
look for ways to divide the United States from its allies. China's recent proliferation of weapons and selling of weapons
technologies to Iran, its provision of financial support to Milosevic, and its attempt to find common ground with Russia
against American "hegemonism" all represent opportunistic attempts to undercut American dominance. Russia can similarly
be expected to look for ways to weaken U.S. political, diplomatic and military preponderance in the world.
All this is part of the price for American global preeminence. It does not, however, add up to a convincing argument against
preserving that preeminence. The main issue of contention between the United States and most of those who express
opposition to its hegemony is not American "arrogance." It is the inescapable reality of American power in its
many forms. Those who suggest that these international resentments could somehow be
eliminated by a more restrained American foreign policy are engaging in pleasant delusions.
Even a United States that never again intervened in places such as Kosovo or expressed
disapproval of China's human rights record would find itself the target of jealousy, resentment
and, in some cases, even fear.
The question, then, is not whether the United States should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans
need to make is whether the United States should generally lean forward, or whether it should adopt a posture of relative
passivity. A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to
important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability will
attempt to alter the status quo in their favor. It might even deter them from undertaking
expensive efforts to arm themselves for such a challenge.
An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt, on the other hand, can only
encourage such challenges. In Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East, the message we should be
sending to potential foes is: "Don't even think about it." That kind of deterrence offers the best
recipe for lasting peace, and it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should
we fail to create such a deterrent.
Heg High Now: A2 "Resentment" 2NR

First, extend the kagan and kristol evidence we read on this pointresentment is not a
product of our foreign presence but our sheer power. Even if they win that the us no longer
exercises hegemony, it would still possess immense power, invoking jealous and backlash
Second, any reason why resentment is bad is a reason we need hegemonyonly strong
leadership and capabilities allows the us to diffuse threats or prevent them from materializing
into something more destabilizing, which is also an argument in the kagan evidence.
Heg High Now: A2 Rise of Other Nations

No challengers to US dominance
A) Aging
Kurlantzick 10 (Joshua, Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, Dazzled by Asia, The Boston Globe, February 7,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/02/07/dazzled_by_asia/?page=full)
Yet there are many good reasons to think that Asias rise may turn out to be an illusion. Asias
growth has built-in stumbling blocks.

population is aging rapidly: According to one
comprehensive study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think
tank, by 2040 China will have at least 400 million elderly, most of whom will have no retirement
pensions. This aging poses a severe challenge, since China may not have enough working-age people to support its elderly. In other words, says CSIS,
China will grow old before it grows rich, a disastrous combination. Other Asian powers also are
aging rapidly - Japans population likely will fall from around 130 million today to 90 million in 2055 - or, due to traditional preferences for male children, have
Demographics, for one. Because of its One Child policy, Chinas
a dangerous sex imbalance in which there are far more men than women. This is a scenario likely to destabilize a country, since, at other periods in history when
many men could not marry, the unmarried hordes turned to crime or political violence. .
B. Political instability and nationalism

Looming political unrest also threatens Asias rise. China alone already faces some 90,000
annual mass incidents, the name given by Chinese security forces to protests, and this number is likely to grow as
income inequality soars and environmental problems add more stresses to society. India, too, faces
severe threats. The Naxalites, Maoists operating mostly in eastern India who attack large landowners, businesses, police, and other local officials, have caused the
death of at least 800 people last year alone, and have destabilized large portions of eastern India. Other Asian states, too, face looming unrest, from the ongoing
insurgency in southern Thailand to the rising racial and religious conflicts in Malaysia. Also, despite predictions that Asia will eventually integrate, building a European
Asia has not tamed the menace of nationalism, which Europe

Even as China and India have cooperated on
climate change, on many other issues they are at each others throats. Over the past year, both
countries have fortified their common border in the Himalayas, claiming overlapping pieces of
territory. Meanwhile, Japan is constantly seeking ways to blunt Chinese military power. People in
many Asian nations have extremely negative views of their neighbors - even though they
maintain positive images of the United States. More broadly, few Asian leaders have any idea
what values, ideas, or histories should hold Asia together. The argument of an Asian century is
fundamentally flawed in that Asia is a Western concept, one that is not widely agreed upon [in
Asia], says Devin Stewart, a Japan specialist at the Carnegie Council for Ethics and
International Affairs. Even as Asias miracle seems, on closer inspection, less miraculous ,
Americas decline has been vastly overstated.
Union-like organization, the region actually seems to be coming apart.
and North America largely have put in the past, albeit after two bloody world wars .
C. Military
To become a global superpower requires economic, political, and military might, and on the last two counts, the United States remains leagues ahead of any Asian
rival. Despite
boosting defense budgets by 20 percent annually, Asian powers like India, China, or
Indonesia will not rival the US military for decades, if ever - only the Pentagon could launch a war in a place like Afghanistan, so
far from its homeland. When a tsunami struck South and Southeast Asia five years ago , the regions
nations, including Indonesia, Thailand, and India, had to rely on the US Navy to coordinate relief
efforts. America also has other advantages that will be nearly impossible to remove. With Asian nations still squabbling
amongst themselves, many look to the United States as a neutral power broker, a role America
plays around the world. German writer and scholar Joseph Joffe calls the United States today the default power: No one in the world trusts anyone
else to play the global hegemon, so it still falls to Washington.
D. Economy
Even in the economic realm, the United States remains strong. As Zakaria admits, the United States accounted for 32 percent of global output in 1913, 26 percent in
1960, and 26 percent in 2007, remarkably consistent figures .
The United States remains atop nearly every ranking of

economies according to openness and innovation. While Asias centrally planned economies
can build infrastructure without worrying about public opposition - China has built impressive networks of airports and
highways - they are less successful at nurturing world-beating companies, which thrive on risk-taking
and hands-off government. Compared to Intel, Google, or Apple, Chinas major companies still are state-linked behemoths that do little innovation
of their own. The leading corporations in most other Asian nations (with the exception of Japan and South Korea) also are either giant state-linked firms or trading
companies that invest little in innovation. And censorship or tight government controls alienate the most innovative firms - Google is now threatening to pull out of
China entirely. As
Asia throws up barriers to immigration, in the United States immigration helps

ensure long-term economic vitality. Chinese and Indian immigrants accounted for almost one-quarter of all companies in Silicon Valley,
according to research by AnnaLee Saxenian at the University of California-Berkeley. According to the most comprehensive global ranking of universities, compiled by
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, American schools, powered by immigrants and flush with cash, dominate the top 100, with Harvard ranked first. Asia has no schools in
the top 10.
E. Global appeal
Most important, the United States is a champion of an idea that has global appeal, and Asia is
not. During the opposition protests in Iran, demonstrators look to the United States, not China or
Indonesia or even India, to make a statement. In a reversal of the Iranian regimes rhetoric, some protestors even chant Death to
China because of Beijings support for the repressive government in Tehran. As long as protestors in places like Iran, or Burma
or Ukraine, call out for the American president, and not Chinas leader or Indias prime minister,
the United States will remain the preeminent power. To be the global hegemon requires military, economic, and political might,
but it also means offering a vision for the world. As Mahbubani admits, during Britains imperial period, elites in places like Malaya, India, or the Caribbean wanted to
study in England, or read British authors and philosophers, because they believed that the ideas Britain had imparted - the rule of law, the Westminster political
system, an idea of fair play, a meritocratic civil service, evidence-based scientific exploration - had merit for the entire world. Even men and women who, ultimately,
became some of the biggest thorns in Britains side, like Jawarhal Nehru, cherished their British studies and their links to British culture. So, too, since World War II
the United States has been, for many foreign publics, the nation looked up to in this way. Even
at the worst moments, such as the

period after 9/11 in which the Bush administration created the prison at Guantanamo Bay and
allowed torture and other questionable tactics, I have rarely met anyone, in any country, who
wanted to move to China, or India, or even Japan, rather than the United States. Foreigners may
want to spend a few years in China or India or Indonesia, to see the dynamism of these places,
but few, if any, have plans to become Chinese, Indian, or Indonesian citizens. Perhaps one day
China or Indonesia or India will draw these migrants, who would come seeking the same dreams
and openness as they do today in the United States. But it wont be soon - and it might not even
be this century.
Heg High Now: A2 "Soft Balancing" 2NC

There is not soft balancingthe behavior of states has other, rational explanations
Stephen G.
So far, the soft-balancing argument has only been asserted. In this article, we conduct the rst rigorous evaluation of soft
balancing by performing four tasks. First, we show how the high stakes involved in this debate are closely linked to its
underpinnings in balance of power theory. We demonstrate the core conceptual components that a theory of soft balancing
must have to yield the soft-balancing argument that is so often applied to the United States today. Second, we address the
principal analytical aw in the arguments of softbalancing proponents: their failure to consider alternative explanations for
the state behavior they observe. Other states obviously sometimes take actions that make it harder
for the United States to advance its foreign policy goals, including its military security. Yet
just because other states actions periodically constrain the United States does not mean
that soft balancing explains their behavior. Analysts failure to address alternative
explanations for the constraint actions undertaken by other states biases the discussion in
favor of the soft-balancing argument.We remove this bias by putting forward four obvious
but nevertheless overlooked alternatives to soft balancing: economic interest, regional
security concerns, policy disputes, and domestic political incentives . Third, we redress an equally
critical weakness in the case for soft balancing: International Security 30:1 74 6. Walt, Can the United States Be
Balanced? p. 17. the absence of a careful empirical analysis of the phenomenon. We compare the strength of soft
balancing to alternative explanations in the four most prominent cases that soft-balancing proponents have highlighted:
Russian assistance to Iranian nuclear efforts; Russias strategic partnerships with India and especially China; enhanced
military coordination among members of the European Union; and opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq. In the fourth
section, we show why it is crucial to distinguish policy bargaining from balancing.
There is no empirical evidence for soft balancing hypothesis

Stephen G.
We conclude that although
states do periodically undertake actions that end up constraining the

United Sates, the soft-balancing argument does not help to explain this behavior. There is
no empirical basis for concluding that U.S. power, and the security threat that potentially
inheres in it, has inuenced recent constraint actions undertaken by the other major powers.
Our examination therefore provides further conrmation of the need for analysts to move beyond the familiar but misleading
precepts of balance of power theory. Instead, new theorizing is needed that is more appropriate for understanding security
relations in todays unipolar era. Beyond the theoretical stakes, our analysis has repercussions for the debate over U.S.
foreign policy. Put simply, soft balancing is not a compelling argument for U.S. restraint. The
champions of the soft-balancing perspective uniformly oppose the recent new

unilateralist turn in U.S. foreign policy.7 Although we agree with their main recommendationthat the
general disposition of the United States ought to be restrainedwe do not agree that this recommendation can be derived
from any variant of balance of power theory.8 We find no evidence to support the expectation that the
coordinated actions of other major powers will compel the United States to be restrained .
Instead, the case for restraint will hinge on convincing U.S. foreign policy makers that it serves the United States long-term
interest.
There is no soft-balancing--behavior is simply old-fashioned diplomatic bargaining

Stephen G.
Although this incentive for enhancing capabilities concerns security and is directly connected to U.S. policy, it has nothing to
do with balancing. Balancing, whether hard or soft, is about protection from the security threat
emanating directly from a potential hegemon. If it means anything, the softbalancing

argument must predict that less U.S. power and lower involvement will reduce incentives for
other states to gain relative power. If bargaining rather than balancing is in play, however,
then there is no reason to believe that shrinking either U.S. power or the level of its global
engagement would reduce other states incentives to build up their capabilities . On the contrary, a
precipitous U.S. withdrawal from the worldas neo-isolationists are now calling forcould generate new security dynamics
that produce much greater incentives for other powers to increase their capabilities. Ultimately , what appears new
about the behavior analysts are calling soft balancing is not its signicance, but its
perceived prominence on the agenda. What used to be considered standard diplomatic
bargaining is now likely trumpeted as balancing because real balancing of the kind that has
appeared so often throughout historycompeting great-power alliances, arms buildups, brinkmanship crises,
and the likewas cleared off the international agenda in 198991 with the end of the Cold War. Importantly,
the concept of balancing rose to prominence in a world in which great power security relations were dominated by the direct
threat that they posed to each other. Today, by contrast, the likelihood of great power war is
exceedingly low. Weak states and nonstates pose the main security challenge, and the great
powers argue primarily over the best way to address them. Balance of power theory has no
utility in explaining great power relations in this world.
There is no soft balancing now, policy tweaks can allow the U.S. to manage any risks
Stephen G.
This article shows that the
soft-balancing argument has no traction. The only reason some

analysts have concluded otherwise is because they have failed to consider alternative
explanations. If it were reasonable to equate soft balancing with great power policy bargaining, then balancing would
gure as a contributor, but not a driver, in at least the Iraq case. As we have demonstrated, however, there are critical
analytical costs to equating these two phenomena. Once the distinction between soft balancing and
bargaining is recognized, the strict conclusion is that soft balancing plays no discernable
role in any of the four cases we examine. None of this should be interpreted to mean that Washington can
safely ignore the views of the other major powers. The further one looks beyond the immediate short term, the clearer the
issues becomeamong them, the environment, weapons of mass destruction, disease, migration, and the stability of the
global economy. The United States cannot effectively address these issues on its own; all of
them will require repeated dealings with many partners over many years. It is also clear that
other states can take actions that end up constraining the United States, sometimes
signicantly. These constraint actions, however, are not an outgrowth of balance of power dynamics and cannot be
explained by the soft-balancing amendment to that theory. The current practice of using balance of power concepts to
describe and explain this behavior is costly in theoretical and policy terms.
___________________________
**Heg Uniq: China Answers**
China Won't Challenge: F/L
First, china isnt ascendent:
A) aging demographics
THAYER (Professor of Strategic Studies @ Missouri State) 07 [Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 32-33 //wyo-tjc]
, China faces major problems that will hinder its ability to replace the United
States as the world's hegemon. The first of these is a rapidly aging population beginning in 2020. Nearly 400 million Chinese will be over sixty-five
years old by 2020. This could be a source of unrest and economic stagnation . Younger generations will be pressed to care for the older population. There
Although its continued economic growth is impressive
will be a great discrep- ancy between the numbers of young people and the elderly, and China lacks the pension and health care infrastructure characteristic of Western societies. Many Chinese will have to work far into old age and will not be able to
As we see with Japan, economic productivity will peak. This

situation is the direct result of the "one child" policy adopted in 1979 to halt explosive population growth. When China took its first countrywide cen- sus in 1953, its population
care for themselves should they fall sick or be too old to earn a wage.
was 600 million. By 1970, it was approximately 800 million. As a result of the "one child" policy, the Chinese birthrate has fallen from 5.8 children per woman in 1970 to fewer than 2 per woman in 2000. The "one child" policy is believed to have
A second big problem
is the imbalance between the sexes.
resulted in 300 million fewer Chinese.

stemming from the "one child" policy
Por social and
economic reasons, if only one child is permitted, most Chinese parents will choose a son. This has led to widespread abortion, female infanticide, and female adoption out of China. Simply put, there are too few females in China. The normal
worldwide divergence between the number of boys to girls is about 103 males to 107 females. In China, about 119 boys are born for every 100 girls. In rural areas, where the preference for Sons is the strongest, the imbalance is even greater, about
133 to l0O.'~ There are an estimated 40 million more men than women in China's population.
B) internal domestic/economic constraints

THAYER (Professor of Strategic Studies @ Missouri State) 07 [Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 33 //wyo-tjc]
declining birth rates that flow from this will hinder economic growth in the long run. China eventually
will face other major economic and social problems as well, including those related to the economic
fragility of its financial system and state-owned enterprises , economic malaise brought on by widespread corruption ,
ubiquitous environmental pollution, HIV!AIDS and other epidemic diseases like SARS, and the high energy costs, which stifle
The
economic growth. In addition, unlike the United States, China is not a model for other countries. Chinese political values are inferior to those of the United States
because China is repressive. The Chinese do not respect human rights, including religious and political freedom. There is also the wildcard of potential conflict over
The fact that China has -so many

territorial and other disputes with its major neighbors, Japan, India, Russia, and Vietnam, means that many
countries see it as a threat and will want to ally with the United States against Chinese power. The rise of China is
Taiwan. A war with Taiwan would retard China's economic progress and scare neighboring states .
ripe for potential conflict with its neighbors, and this constitutes a big danger in international politics.
Second, no impact if they do ascend-- wont affect our power or risk war
ART (Professor of Intl Relations at Brandeis) 07 [Robert, Agreeing to Agree (and Disagree), National Interest, June, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
IF THE United States can do little to thwart China's rise, what does that portend for the United States? The record of three clashes between rising and dominant powers--Germany versus Britain before World War I, Germany versus Britain before
China does not present the type of security threat to the

United States that Germany did to Britain. In World Wars I and II, the German threat was clear: If it conquered the continent and harnessed its economic-industrial resources, then it
World War II and the Soviet Union versus the United States during the Cold War--is instructive.
could build a military machine to crush Britain. China cannot do that to the United States. It must first cross the Pacific to attack the United States, but America's nuclear forces could swiftly "nuke" any invading Chinese armada, and China would
commit national suicide if it dared to attack the United States with its strategic nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons alone protect the United States from a powerful China in a way that Britain could never be secure from German hegemony.
Moreover, China does not constitute the same type of geopolitical threat to the United States that
the Soviet Union once did. The Soviet geopolitical (as opposed to the nuclear) threat was twofold: to conquer and dominate the economic-industrial resources of western Eurasia and to control the oil
reserves of the Persian Gulf. Europe (including Britain) constituted one of the four industrial-military power centers of the world during the Cold War--Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States being the other three. The Persian Gulf contained
the bulk of the world's proven oil reserves. If the Soviet Union had succeeded in dominating Europe and the Persian Gulf through either conquest or political-military intimidation, then it would have controlled two of the four power centers of the world
If China ends up dominating the Korean peninsula and a

significant part of continental Southeast Asia, so what? As long as Japan remains outside the Chinese sphere
of influence and allied with the United States, and as long as the United States retains some naval footholds in Southeast Asia-such as in Singapore, the Philippines or Indonesia--China's domination of eastern Eurasia
cannot present the same type of geopolitical threat to the United States that the Soviet Union did. As long as Europe, the Persian Gulf,
and the largest proven oil reserves. That would have been a significant power shift.
Japan, India and Russia remain either independent power centers or within the U.S. sphere of influence, Chinese hegemony in eastern Eurasia will not tip the world balance of power. The vast size and central position of the Soviet Union in Eurasia
, the Sino-American
competition appears well-placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible because either or both
governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the
potential cost of nuclear conflict restrains both actors, minimizing miscalculation. Moreover, the
high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between the two help reinforce the pacific
effects mutually assured destruction induces. Apart from Taiwan, then, it is hard to figure out how to start a war between the United
constituted a geopolitical threat to American influence that China cannot hope to emulate. If judged by the standards of the three rising-versus-dominant great-power competitions of the last century
States and China.
China wont rise all signs arent sustainable

China -- and that country's rise is at least a third composed of a

public-relations flim-flam job, of the kind that always recruits the credulous in the West, as Hitler, Stalin, and Japan Inc. did. Western Europe has
What is unusual now is that all the Great Powers are in decline, except
failed as a coherent force. The Lisbon Constitution is a shambles, and the new leaders of federal Europe are such nebbishes, chosen for their inoffensive
unassertiveness, that not 5 percent of Europeans could recall their names.
Europe has been harder hit than the U.S. by the economic crisis, and is mired in spurious rhetoric, much of it in French, limning an illusory social-market variant to
"cowboy capitalism." This is like the Holy See's ancient but sporadic search for a third way between socialism and capitalism. It is a vain pursuit of an economic
system diluted by the imposition of self-indulgent European cultural fatigue, masquerading as gentility.
Russia is a fraud. Its population is in steep decline and chronically afflicted by alcoholism. The governmental system is authoritarian and corrupt, allied with protgs
who have been given monopolistic concessions and who repay their rulers with obscene kickbacks. Except for a few areas that have survived from the USSR's
expertise in some defense industries, Russia's manufacturing is continuing to wither, and its economy depends almost entirely on the exportation of natural
resources, especially oil. It is not an efficient producer of anything, and commodity prices are always vulnerable.
Japan, which only 20 years ago was making more confident noises than China is today about surpassing the United States economically, is now sluggish and
geriatric. It has a new government even more bumptious and inept than Washington's. And its vaunted genius at sophisticated manufacturing has been undermined
by the widespread product-quality problems at Toyota, so soon after it became the world's largest automobile manufacturer -- displacing General Motors, which, after
the pause that refreshes in Chapter 11 to shed unsightly debt, may be starting to recover. Japan is torn between reinvigorating the alliance with the U.S. and
detaching from it to appease China.
It now seems clearer than ever that China is manipulating the North Korean nuclear threat to rattle Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, while retaining, in a
barbarous Beltway phrase, plausible deniability. The U.S. U-turn on missile defense and the production of F-22 Raptors has increased Japan's temptation. But if it
departs the U.S. alliance to nuzzle with China, it will be through as a Great Power.
India is a nascent Great Power, about ten years behind China in building a capitalist economy, but with the advantages of reasonably democratic and partially
functioning legal systems. Its influence will grow, but does not extend far beyond, or even into, the Indian Ocean now.
The rise of China is not without limits. It still has 900 million peasants living much as they did thousands of years
ago. Half the population has little or no exposure to medical care, education and other social
services are spotty, corruption is rife, and there are important relics of the command economy
still in place. GDP is deemed to be increased whenever an expense or investment is approved, not as the decision is implemented. Parallel indicators
such as electricity production are not consistent with economic growth rates on the scale
claimed. It is not clear that the Chinese public will buy consumer goods that are not being exported, and although the country now has huge foreign-currency
reserves, its financial system is much more opaque than was Japan's when it plunged into stagnation 20 years ago. The enforced population-restraint policy ensures
an aging population.
China has managed one of the great economic modernizations of world history, but it is not a
naturally rich or particularly skilled country (though higher education is making great strides), and it has a dominant
public sector that cannot be relied upon over time to perform better than central planners traditionally have. And the
United States is ceasing to ship it millions of jobs and to accept the dumping of billions of dollars of cheap, and often defective, merchandise.
China Won't Challenge: S/L

Multiple factors will keep the us well ahead of china and prevent any challenges:
First, internal barriersour two thayer cards cite things like demographics and economic
vulnerability
Second, theres no impact to this argumentthe ross evidence is greateven if they
dominated east asia, we could contain them and multiple factors prevent a chance of war
erupting, even over taiwan
Third, even if Chinese power is increasing, its not sustainablethats Blank
China is not trying to counterbalance U.S. global leadership
Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and
Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. xxi
China does not seek to displace the United States as the predominant global power. Its elites do
not currently want China to be a global leader on par with the United Statesa peer competitor.
They view their domestic challenges as too great to assume the risks and responsibilities
associated with such a role, and they recognize that they lack the material resources to do so.
They also fear that such a global role would diver t much needed resources from national
development and could foster regional backlashes against China . To be sure, Chinese leaders welcome a more
multipolar world, one in which multilateralism reigns and U.S. power is constrained. Chinese leaders also want China to be eventually recognized as a great power
although that aspiration has very general attributes and is not well defined. Chinese leaders aspire to such a status as external validation of Chinas achievements,
but they are also wary of the burdens and costs associated with it.
Chinas inhibited by too many domestic factors to challenge us

Singh 2008 Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International
Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, The exceptional empire, ProQuest)
But, like the EU, China's continued rise
is not inevitable. Some analysts assume that, with a military that

does not approximate America's and an overarching interest in economic growth, Beijing's dominant
incentive is to avoid conflict. As the appeal of communism ebbs still further into the distance, however, the
attraction of nationalism as a last unifying force suggests potential dangers and conflict, not least given the salience of on-going
territorial disputes with Japan, Russia, India and Vietnam. The possibility of war over Taiwan is also a constant (Bush and O'Hanlon, 2007). The likelihood
that China, Japan and India expend more energies and resources preoccupied with their own
rivalry, rather than in challenging or constraining the US, is one accorded too little attention by
proponents of American decline (Emmott, 2008). Asia is as much divided against itself as against the West or America. In addition, an aging
population, an acute gender imbalance caused by the 'one child' policy, declining birth rates,
corruption, high energy costs, epidemics like SARS and HIV/AIDS, and the fragility of its financial system together pose major
challenges to the Chinese state and society. A simple linear rise in Beijing's geo-political heft is possible but far
from foreordained.
U.S. will remain the global leader; China cant challenge the US
Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 216-7
A further consideration is that even as Chinese capabilities and influence grow, the costs of confronting the United States will remain high and the benefits of doing so
will remain unclear, if not low. U.S.
economic and military power will not remain static over the next 20 years,
even if the gap in relative capabilities narrows. And the United States is not likely to take an overtly confrontational strategy toward
China, which would fundamentally alter Beijings cost-benefit calculus in its international behavior. The United States will continue to
remain important (but not as central as before) to Chinese perceptions of their external security environment
and the structure of the international system. Even assuming that the world becomes distinctly
more multipolar, the U.S. economy and military will continue to cast a long shadow over Asian
and global affairs.
China not counterbalancing the U.S

Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 56
To be sure, countercontainment is not the primary objective in Chinese global diplomacy or in

Asia. If it were, Chinese diplomacy would likely be far more confrontational with the United
States and its regional allies; for example, China would actively try to pull and prod U.S. allies
away from the United States by proffering China as an alternative security partner. Rather,
Chinese diplomacy has focused on economic opportunism and expanding its multilateral
cooperation. In particular, it has been seeking to create new and expand existing multilateral organizations in which the United States has a limited role but
also as a way to develop a regional order in East Asia in which U.S. influence is diluted. And China seeks to do this gradually so as not to appear to directly oppose
Thus, countercontainment is a distinct Chinese objective, but it does not

manifest itself in a confrontational set of policies that emphasize defense cooperation and zerosum interactions. This objective may receive greater expression in the future if U.S.-China
relations become more competitive, if Chinas regional influence grows, and if Beijing sees itself
as less dependent on stable relations with Washington.
the United States or its allies.
Chinas partnerships are not designed to counterbalance the U.S.

Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 87
China has used its strategic partnerships with major powers, such as with Russia,
France, and the EU, to broaden its economic relationships, to foster the development of other power centers in global
politics, and to seek support for its vision of a multipolar global order. These major power partnerships do not amount to
building an anti-U.S. coalition to balance against U.S. power. However, these partnerships allow China greater options and
help it to foster an environment that could be used to constrain U.S. unilateral actions, especially if that power is directed at Chinese interests.30 There is no
overtly anti-U.S. element in such Chinese diplomacy, but Chinas discomfort with perceived U.S. unilateralism is one of the
To varying degrees,
drivers of its strategic partnerships. These themes and motivations were readily apparent in the 2003 EU-China Joint Statement, which founded that strategic
partnership during a period of trans-Atlantic tension, as well as in the Russia-China Joint Communiqu and the SCOs summit statement in July 2005. Chinas
strategic partnerships with these major powers are bounded by two considerations that limit their potential to be potent mechanisms for balancing U.S. power. First,
Chinas interests with all of these major powers, especially Russia and India, both converge and
divergeon different issues and to different degrees. There is no single, dominant political or strategic logic to any of these
strategic partnerships that could serve as the basis for collectively and consistently countervailing U.S. power. Indeed, most of Chinas strategic
partners are not interested in creating a de facto coalition to balance U.S. power, with the possible exception
of Russia. These nations have numerous interests in positive relations with the United States . Also,
although there are many cooperative dimensions to Chinas strategic partnerships, they are also fraught with tensions on both economic and security questions. For
Russia and China may have common interests related to constraining U.S. influence
globally and in Central Asia, but they diverge on economic issues and security questions
revolving around access to Central Asian energy supplies and Chinese influence in Russias Far
East.31 Also, for China, Russia has shown itself to be an unreliable partner in the past. Chinas unwillingness in summer 2008 to endorse the Russian position on
example,
the independence of the Georgian enclaves exemplifies the limits of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. A second major consideration is that, historically, China
has not favored or relied on alliances (or even strong bilateral partnerships) in its diplomacy. Chinas historic disposition in favor of independence and against relying
on alliances calls into question the extent to which it can or will rely on them now. Although China has formed alliances in the past (e.g., the ChinaSoviet Union
alliance of the 1950s), it was never entirely comfortable with them. Beijing prefers, instead, greater autonomy to maximize its leverage and maneuverability.32 This
enduring predisposition is evident in the intensifying concerns among Chinese elites about the economic and security vulnerabilities that have resulted from Chinas
global interdependence and the globalization of national security challenges.33 Chinas historical predispositions were further confirmed in 2001 when Russia shifted
away from its emerging anti-U.S. cooperation with China and turned back toward greater rapprochement with the United States, even before 9/11. Specifically, Russia
These events, thus, suggest a third possible

constraint on the scope of Chinas strategic partnerships: Most major powers have more
interests at stake in their relations with the United States than with China . Some states may not
be willing to jeopardize their ties with the United States to coordinate with China in an effort,
implicit or explicit, to constrain the United States.
abandoned China in their joint opposition to U.S. missile defense policies.
military/geopolitical barriers block rise

Brooks & Wohlforth (asst. & Assoc. Profs, Dept. Govt @ Dartmouth) 02 [Stephen & William, American Primacy in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug 2002, ln //mac-tjc]
Most analysts looking for a future peer competitor to the United States, therefore, focus on China, since it is the only power with the potential to match the size of the U.S. economy over the next
, the gaps in the two states' other power

capabilities -- technological, military, and geographic -- would remain .
several decades. Yet even if China were eventually to catch up to the United States in terms of aggregate GDP
Since the mid-1990s, Chinese strategists themselves have become markedly less bullish about their country's ability to close the gap in what they call "comprehensive national power" any time soon.
in 2020 the country will possess between slightly more than a third and
half of U.S. capabilities. Fifty percent of China's labor force is employed in agriculture, and relatively little of its economy
is geared toward high technology. In the 1990s, U.S. spending on technological development was more than 20 times China's. Most of China's weapons are
decades old. And nothing China can do will allow it to escape its geography , which leaves it surrounded by
countries that have the motivation and ability to engage in balancing of their own should China start to build up
The latest estimates by China's intelligence agency project that
slightly more than
an expansive military force.
Chinas rise wont challenge the status quo: they prefer the current world order
Timofeev, Oleg Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA - ABRI JOINT INTERNATIONAL MEETING, Pontifical Catholic
University, Rio de Janeiro Campus (PUC-Rio), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Jul 22, 20 09 <Not Available>. 2009-07-01
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p381195_index.html>
China successfully maintains the profile of a country that is on a peaceful rise in the format
of the existing order. This explains why Washington finds it much more problematic to find grounds for and
implement an uncompromising course at Chinas containment than in Russias case, even in the presence of concerns over
the astounding rise of Chinas strength. Beijing skillfully lifts its partners concerns over the growth of
Chinas economic and military capability, and persistently profiles itself as a friendly
country that is trying to build a harmonious world. Russia in its tern, could learn from the Chinese the
intricate overtones of public diplomacy, even though it recognizes its own difference as a political player.
Chinas unsustainable growth will fall: Urbanization, political dissent and environmental
pressures
Richard N. Haass A Conversation with Richard Haass [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service] April 29, 2008. CFR.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16146/conversation_with_richard_haass_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html
Let me say a few things about China. One is, I believe it is unrealistic to project that China's economic
growth will continue at its current pace. I believe it is unsustainable. More important, I believe the
Chinese leadership believes it's unsustainable. So there'll be some tapering there.
They've also got massive challenges in terms of urbanization. They still want to transfer
hundreds of millions of people from rural areas to urban areas . They've got a political system
that is clearly, at the moment, unable to accommodate many of the pressures that are associated with
and produced by high economic growth; hence the 85,000 or so protests of meaningful scale that we saw last
year. Environmental questions are beginning to kick in.
So I simply do not project that China's growth is going to be double figures ad infinitum. It's just not going to happen. I also
believe that one should not dismiss the possibility for political discontinuities in China ; that at
some point there will have to be a political adjustment to deal with some of the tensions that are associated with growth.
Plan solves: US engagement pulls China and other Asian countries towards cooperation and
more Hege
John J. Tkacik, Jr. Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Stud ies Center at The Heritage
Foundation. China's Quest for a Superpower Military The Heritage Foundation. May 17, 2007.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2036.cfm
America could engage and strengthen the current robust trans-Pacific alignment, knitting
the democracies of the Americas with their counter parts along the Western Pacific Rim, or a
disengaged America could allow a Sino-centric axis to crystal lize as ASEAN, Taiwan, Korea, and
eventually Japan, Australia, and South and Central Asia band wagon with China. The latter would make
Leninist-mercantilist China the rule-maker in Asia, not just for transnational trade and financial structures, but
also for a new Asian security architecture and a new ideology of authoritarian state-mercantilism that defends
repressive "development models based on national conditions." Over the next few years, the choices made
in Washington, both in the White House and on Cap itol Hill, will be a bellwether to the capitals of
democratic Asia for their own geopolitical decisions. How Washington manages the
emerging Chinese superpower will determine not only the direction of Asian democracy, but the prospects
for global freedom in the 21st century.
China Won't Challenge: A2 "Economic Engagement Hurts

Heg" 2NC
Chinese power not a threat continued strategic engagement furthers chinese dependence on
us, bolsters economic and political leadership and creates cooperation between the two
powers
GILBOY (research affiliate at the Center for International Studies) 04
[George, The Myth Behind Chinas Miracle, Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug, asp // wyo-tjc]
, Washington should pursue a policy of strategic

engagement with Beijing. The purpose of this policy would be to bolster U.S. technological,
economic, and political leadership, while helping China become more prosperous, stable, and
integrated into global economic networks. Pursuing it will require simultaneously strengthening the basis for U.S. technological and manufacturing mastery in the United States and
Rather, recognizing both the challenges and the opportunities presented by Chinas industrial landscape
promoting U.S. exports, investment, and liberal values abroad. The United States should revitalize manufacturing at home, for example. Tax cuts are no panacea; the United States needs focused policies to strengthen R&D, reduce legal and health
care costs, and improve education. Innovation is critical to growth, but R&D spending in the United States has declined in relative terms from 60 percent of world R&D in the 1960s to 30 percent today. Meanwhile, although U.S. manufacturing
productivity has risen by 27 percent in the last five years, health care premiums have risen by 34 percent and litigation costs by about 33 percent, according to the National Association of Manufacturers. To maintain its lead abroad, the United States
should push its products into the portal opened by its investment "snakeheads" in developing markets. It currently lags behind competitors in doing so: while Japan and the EU exported $79 billion and $49 billion in goods to China last year, the
United States exported only $37 billion. Both the U.S. government and U.S. industry must do more to help small and medium-sized U.S. firms reach out to Chinas markets. The United States must accept that China is a work in progress and cannot
yet meet all of the standards common in advanced industrialized economies. But focused bilateral sanctions, WTO complaints, and multilateral diplomacy should be vigorously pursued if China undertakes unfair trade practices that challenge core
U.S. interests. The United States should prioritize carefully, however, focusing on the issues that pose the greatest threats and present the greatest opportunities. These include Chinas recent attempts to impose technical standards on foreign firms
in China, such as for DVD players, wireless communications, and mobile telephones, or to tax imported goods such as integrated circuits (a policy tantamount to a domestic subsidy and prohibited by WTO rules). Washington should also urge Beijing
Continued engagement of this kind will help

the United States consolidate the benefits it already reaps from the current relationship, ensure
Chinas continued prosperity and stability, and encourage China to play by global rules. Working
with its allies to further incorporate Chinas economy in international trade and industrial
networks, the United States can reinforce the technological leadership of the advanced
industrialized democracies, while diminishing the scope for Chinese technological and
economic mercantilism. The paradox of Chinas technological and economic power is that China
must implement structural political reforms, not simply freer markets or greater investment,
before it can unlock its potential as a global competitor. But if it were to undertake such reforms,
it would likely discover even greater common interests with the United States and other
industrialized democracies. Pursuing strategic engagement is thus a way for the United States to
hedge its bets: to preserve its competitive edge while encouraging China to continue developing
its economy and liberalizing its politics. Chinese political reform is in the long-term interest of both Beijing and Washington. Unfortunately, the burden of a long history of fragmentation
to curb investments in excess manufacturing capacity, as they could threaten key industries such as automobiles and semiconductors .
and authoritarian rule weighs heavily against China's successfully completing this final modernization.
Us/sino economic engagement good allows the us to set terms for chinese economy, china
operates huge trade deficits, and wto is avenue for cooperation, not competition
GILBOY (research affiliate at the Center for International Studies) 04
[George, The Myth Behind Chinas Miracle, Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug, asp // wyo-tjc]
RECENT DEBATES about U.S-China trade overlook the fact that the U.S. economic relationship
with China is largely favorable and that it is conducted largely on U.S. terms. In particular, the
focus on Chinas currency as a source of unfair trade advantage is misplaced , as economists Jonathan Anderson of UBS and
Nicholas Lardy and Morris Goldstein of the Institute for International Economics have shown . Even a moderate appreciation of the yuan would make little
difference to most U.S. firms and workers. Meanwhile, the currency issue obscures the
significant economic and strategic benefits the United States now enjoys in its relations with
China. According to Morgan Stanley, low-cost Chinese imports (mainly textiles, shoes, toys, and household goods) have saved U.S. consumers (mostly middle- and low-income families) about $100 billion dollars since Chinas reforms
began in 1978. (Cheaper baby clothes from China helped U.S. families with children save about $400 million between 1998 and 2003.) U.S. industrial firms such as Boeing, Ford, General Motors, IBM, Intel, and Motorola also save hundreds of
millions of dollars each year by buying parts from lower-cost countries such as China, increasing their global competitiveness and allowing them to undertake new high-value activities in the United States. In an effort to save 30 percent on its total
global sourcing costs, Ford imported about $500 million in parts from China last year. General Motors has cut the cost of car radios by 40 percent by building them from Chinese parts. And although global sourcing can cause painful employment
adjustments, the process can also benefit U.S. workers and companies. A recent independent study sponsored by the Information Technology Association of America found that outsourcing to countries such as China and India created a net 90,000
China is not just an exporter; it imports more

than any other state in northeastern Asia. Although it had a $124 billion trade surplus with the
United States in 2003, it had significant trade deficits with many other countries : $15 billion with Japan, $23 billion with
new U.S. jobs in information technology in 2003 and estimated that outsourcing will create a net 317,000 new U.S. jobs by 2008.
South Korea, $40 billion with Taiwan, and $16 billion with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Most significantly, China is a large and growing market for domestically consumed imports (ordinary trade that excludes
imported goods that are processed and reexported). Chinese imports for domestic consumption rose to $187 billion in 2003, from $40 billion in the mid-1990s. Discounting the processing and reexport trade, China ran a $5 billion trade deficit in 2003,
compared to a $20 billion surplus just five years earlier. In industries it classifies as "high tech," including electronic goods, components, and manufacturing equipment, China has averaged a $12 billion annual deficit for the last decade.
Unlike other U.S. trading partners in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, which spurned U.S.
imports and investment for decades, China is also a large, open market for U.S. products.
Although total U.S. exports have stagnated in recent years, U.S. exports to China have tripled in
the last decade. They increased by 28 percent last year alone (whereas overall U.S. exports went up by only 5 percent). In particular, China has become a staple market for advanced U.S. technology products. According to
U.S. government data, U.S. aerospace exports to China were valued at more than $2 billion in 2003--about 5 percent of total U.S. aerospace exports and nearly as much as comparable exports to Germany. U.S. firms exported $500 million of
Furthermore,
China allows foreign firms to invest in its domestic market on a scale unprecedented in Asia.
Since it hunched reforms in 1978, China has taken in $500 billion in FDI, ten times the total stock
of FDI Japan accumulated between 1945 and 2000. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, U.S. firms have invested more than $40 billion in more than 40,000
advanced manufacturing equipment to China in 2003, more than they exported to France. And U.S. chip makers exported $2.4 billion of semiconductors to China in 2003; the same amount they exported to Japan .
projects in China. Given its openness to FDI, China cannot maintain its domestic market as a protected bastion for domestic firms, something both Japan and South Korea did during their periods of rapid growth. Instead, it has allowed U.S. and
other foreign firms to develop new markets for their goods and services, especially high-value-added products such as aircraft, software, industrial design, advanced machinery, and components such as semiconductors and integrated circuits .
Thanks to this appetite for imports, powerful domestic coalitions, particularly Chinas growing
ranks of urban consumers and its most competitive firms, will continue to favor trade openness .
Chinese consumers pride themselves on driving foreign-brand cars and using mobile phones and computers with circuits that were designed and manufactured abroad. Many Chinese firms resist protectionism, because they need to import critical
components for their domestic operations and fear retaliation against their exports. For example, in the 1990s, Chinas machine tool and aircraft industries failed to secure effective state protection in the face of opposition from domestic firms that
preferred imports, and they suffered significant decline as a result.
As an open economy and a large importing count, China could be an
ally of the United States in many areas of global trade and finance. Already, Beijing has displayed
a willingness to play by WTO rules. It has charged Japan and South Korea with unfair trade
practices--markets the United States has also long sought to crack open . China initiated 10 antidumping investigations in 2002 on
products with import value of more than $7 billion, and another 20 investigations in 2003. China is now a leading promoter of regional trade and investment regimes, including a free trade zone with ASEAN and a bilateral free trade agreement with
The final benefit

the United States enjoys from China's global economic integration is in the long-term, patient
battle to promote liberalism in Asia. Foreign trade and development have spurred advancements
in Chinese commercial law, greater regulatory consultation with Chinese consumers, slimmeddown bureaucracies, and adherence to international safety and environmental standards. Although it
Australia, one of the United States' closest allies in the Pacific region. Already, Beijing's proposals on regional economic cooperation seem far more relevant to most Asian nations than do Washington's .
is still limited, the people's freedom to debate economic and social issues has increased, especially in the robust financial media. This process of liberalization is
incomplete and uneven, but it is in the interest of both China and the United States to see it continue.
China Won't Challenge: A2 "Economy" 2NC

Chinese growth support US hegemonyfuels its growth, checks dangerous anti-globalization
efforts
Wang Yiwei, Center for American Studies, Fudan University, Chinas Rise: An Unlikely Pillar of US Hegemony, HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW v. 29 n. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 60-63.
Combating Regionalization
It is important to extend the discussion beyond platitudes regarding "US decline" or the "rise of China" and the invectiveladen debate over threats and security issues that arises from these. We must step out of a narrowly national mindset and
reconsider what Chinese development means for the United States.
One of the consequences of globalization has been that countries such as China, which
depend on exporting to US markets, have accumulated large dollar reserves. This has been
unavoidable for these countries, as they must purchase dollars in order to keep the dollar
strong and thus avoid massive losses. Thus, the United States is bound to bear a trade
deficit, and moreover, this deficit is inextricably tied to the dollars hegemony in todays markets. The artificially high dollar
and the US economy at large depend in a very real sense on Chinas investment in the dollar. Low US inflation and interest
rates similarly depend on the thousands of "Made in China" labels distributed across the United States. As Paul Krugman
wrote in The New York Times, the situation is comparable to one in which "the American sells the house but the money to
buy the house comes from China." Former US treasury secretary Lawrence Summers even affirms that China and the
United States may be in a kind of imprudent "balance of financial terror." Today, the US trade deficit with China is US$200
billion. China holds over US$1 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and US$350 billion in US bonds. Together, the
Chinese and US economies account for half of global economic growth. Thus, a fantastic
situation has arisen: Chinas rise is actually supporting US hegemony.
Taking US hegemony and Western preeminence as the starting point, many have concluded that the rise of China presents
a threat. The premise of this logic is that the international system predicated on US hegemony and Western preeminence
would be destabilized by the rise of a second major power. But this view is inconsistent with the phenomenon of one-way
globalization.
The so-called process of one-way globalization can more truly be called Westernization. Todays globalization is still in large
part driven by the West, inasmuch as it is tinged by Western unilateralism and entails the dissemination of essentially
Western standards and ideology. For example, Coca Cola has become a Chinese cultural icon, Louis Vuitton stores crowd
high-end shopping districts in Shanghai, and, as gender equality progresses, Chinese women look to Western women for
inspiration. In contrast, Haier, the best-known Chinese brand in the United States, is still relatively unknown, and Wang Fei,
who is widely regarded in China as the pop star who was able to make it in the United States, has less name-recognition
there than a first-round American Idol cut.This sort of globalization must change; otherwise it will be replaced by a system
marked by a number of autonomous, regional free trade areas. Regionalization, which is encouraged by cultural diversity
and political ambitions in addition to economic reasons, is more efficient than globalization in coming to agreements and
improving international competitiveness. Nascent free trade areas have already been established and have also promoted
regional security integration goals. The effect of this has been that after the Cold War a once-united world has parted to
follow separate paths. The World Social Forums slogan "Another World Is Possible" has been taken up by some Latin
American countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia. Bolivia has proposed the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
(ALBA) in opposition to the American Free Trade Zone. Thus, regionalization is a prominent trend in the post-Cold War
world.
The perception of globalization as a one-way process has generated a great deal of resistance, which has found an outlet in
the creation of regional free trade areas and blocs. Because of this, global hegemony is becoming less and less feasible. If
this trend of regionalization continues, the United States, while it will remain the preeminent North American power, will
begin to have an increasingly less influential voice in world politics. The "concert of democracies," NATO, or a trans-Atlantic
free trade association (TAFTA) cannot fundamentally reverse this trend.
Thus, for the United States to remain powerful on a global scale, a more traditional
international system must be preserved, as opposed to a system that emphasizes regional
alternatives. China, because it is providing an additional focal point to the West in a
globalizing world, is assuaging disgruntled anti-globalizationalists and thus, rather
paradoxically, supporting the traditional international order of a globally interconnected
world and market, rather than a system of autonomous regional blocs. In this way, China is
providing, rather than destabilizing, the foundations of US hegemony.
Chinas economy will falterkilling its ability to challenge the US

Walter Russell
Only Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America. The New Republic. 2/4/ 09: http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-

92e83915f5f8
The damage to China's position is more subtle. The crisis has not--yet--led to the nightmare scenario that
China-watchers fear: a recession or slowdown producing the kind of social unrest that could challenge the government. That
may still come to pass--the recent economic news from China has been consistently worse than most experts predicted-but, even if the worst case is avoided, the financial crisis has nevertheless had significant effects. For one thing, it
has reminded China that its growth remains dependent on the health of the U.S. economy. For
another, it has shown that China's modernization is likely to be long, dangerous, and complex rather
than fast and sweet, as some assumed. In
the lead-up to last summer's Beijing Olympics, talk of a Chinese

bid to challenge America's global position reached fever pitch , and the inexorable rise of China is one
reason why so many commentators are fretting about the "post-American era." But suggestions that China could grow at,
say, 10 percent annually for the next 30 years were already looking premature before the economic downturn. (In late 2007,
the World Bank slashed its estimate of China's GDP by 40 percent, citing inaccuracies in the methods used to calculate
purchasing power parity.) And the financial crisis makes it certain that China's growth is likely to be much
slower during some of those years. Already exports are falling, unemployment is rising, and the
Shanghai stock market is down about 60 percent.
First, chinese economic growth wont threaten the uss positionin relative terms america will
still be far ahead
, the American economy is about

twice the size of Chinas. If the American economy grows at a 2 percent rate and Chinas grows at 6 percent, the two economies would be equal in size sometime around
2020. Even so, the two economies would be equivalent in size but not equal in composition. China
would still have a vast underdeveloped countrysideindeed, assuming 6 percent Chinese growth and only 2 percent American growth, China
Nonetheless, China has a long way to go and faces many obstacles to its development. At the beginning of the twenty-first century
would not equal the United States in per capita income until somewhere between 2056 and 2095 (depending on the measures of comparison). In terms of political power, per capita income provides
a more accurate measure of the sophistication of an economy. The Asian Development Bank projects Chinese per capita income will reach 38 percent of that of the United States by 2025, about the
since the United States is

unlikely to be standing still during that period, China is a long way from posing the kind of
challenge to American preponderance that the kaisers Germany posed when it passed Britain at
same level relative to the United States that South Korea reached in 1990.60 That is impressive growth, but it is a long way from equality. And
the beginning of the last century. [P. 19-20]
Second, most of this growth will be in manufacturingthe us will still have a corner on hightek markets that translate into military supremacy
Third, chinese economic growth will be domestically destabilizingwill have to worry about
its homefront before it can challenge the us
linear projections of economic growth trends can be misleading . Countries tend to pick the low-hanging fruit as they
the Chinese
economy faces serious obstacles of transition from inefficient state-owned enterprises, a shaky
financial system, and inadequate infrastructure. Growing inequality, massive internal migration,
an inadequate social safety net, corruption, and inadequate institutions could foster political
instability. Coping with greatly increasing flows of information at a time when restrictions can hinder economic growth presents a sharp dilemma for Chinese leaders. As the Harvard
Moreover,
benefit from imported technologies in the early stages of economic takeoff, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development. In addition,
economist Dwight Perkins points out, Much of the early success of market reforms. . . resulted from the basic simplicity of the task. The process of creating a rule of law and adequate institutions in
the economic area will be measured in decades, not years or months. Indeed, some observers fear instability caused by a collapsing rather than rising China. A China that cannot control population
growth, flows of migration, environmental effects on the global climate, and internal conflict poses another set of problems. Politics has a way of confounding economic projections. [P. 20]
Growth is key to Chinese reformsensures a peaceful rise that bolsters US hegemony

So, when considering the risks and opportunities of Chinese development, one must consider not only strength and intent,
but global power structures and the macro-level implications of change in economic arenas. China presents a
successful model for other developing countries to follow, not to fight but to embrace
globalization in order to bring about a more just, reasonable, and harmonious international
order and to avoid isolation. Regionalization cannot be sustainable in the long run, and
could result in a far more unstable world than one marked by a power-sharing arrangement
between China and the United States.Thus, the greatest threat to the continuation of the
stable world order of the present is not a rising China, but the failure of China to develop
further. US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson described the situation well: "the biggest risk we face is not
that China will overtake the United States, but that China wont move ahead with the reforms
necessary to sustain its growth and to address the very serious problems facing the
nation." And China intends to use reform and liberalization to realize its peaceful rise . Despite
regional quibbles and the occasional ruffled diplomatic feathers, it is Chinas risethrough peace and for
peacethat promises to sustain US global hegemony.When it comes to building the future
world order, the unraveling of the traditional order is the most significant problem for China .
Contention over how to build this future world order is likely to be the biggest obstacle for future Sino-US relations. A
continued misrepresentation and misunderstanding of China and its economic progress would be a strategic mistake for the
United States and would likely throw Chinas peaceful development off-kilter for many years to come.
Chinas economy is doomed: financial crisis will plunge growth and cause turmoil
Walter Russell

id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
At the same time, Beijing
will have to devote more resources and more attention to stabilizing

Chinese society, building a national health care system, providing a social security net, and
caring for an aging population, which, thanks to the one-child policy, will need massive help from the government
to support itself in old age. Doing so will leave China fewer resources for military build-ups and foreign adventures. As the
crisis has forcefully reminded Americans, creating and regulating a functional and flexible financial system is difficult.
Every other country in the world has experienced significant financial crises while building
such systems, and China is unlikely to be an exception . All this means that China's rise looks
increasingly like a gradual process. A deceleration in China's long-term growth rate would postpone
indefinitely the date when China could emerge as a peer competitor to the United States. The
present global distribution of power could be changing slowly, if at all .
The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too
far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle . In the worst-case
scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic
downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private
enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a
country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property
markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include
dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar
Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse,
instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the
country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid
economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody
knows what will happen if the growth stops.
Chinas economy is too small to counterbalanceseveral decades away

Albert Keidel China and the Global Financial Crisis Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. U.S.-China Business Council,
October 16, 2008 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=22324&prog=zch
China's economy is too small to be a major factor in the needed global recovery, but it can help -- especially if its
import growth can remain strong. China should also lighten up its criticism of the West for causing this crisis. Such crises
are the way the world's systems improve, in a learning-by-crisis effort at the frontier of institutional modernization. Only in
several decades will China finally be at a stage in its modernization when it will need to
study the lessons of this crisis. Until then, its major job is still catch-up in both economic
growth and institutional sophisitication. Its current healthy status indicates it can do a very good job of such
catch-up in the immediate future and for a long time to come.
Chinese economic power is limitedsmall GDP per capita, investment limits

Rethinking the Implications of Chinas Rise There are two common views regarding Chinese development: first, that it will
result in the revitalization of the Chinese nation, and second, that it is a consequence of globalization. The former is often
called nationalism by Western alarmists, and has been called so since the imperial powers applied this moniker to China
following the Opium War of the 1840s. The latter holds that China correctly implemented liberalization and reform policies
and embraced globalization and market liberalization. One could say that Chinese development is a result of successful US
policies to bring China into the world market. Regardless of whether the main catalyst was Franklin D. Roosevelts
construction of an international order based on a police force of "the Big Four" or Nixons conception of an order based on a
balance between the five great powers, the fact is that today the United States is Chinas principal trading partner and
investor, and more importantly, Chinese reform and liberalization was conducted in an international system supported by US
hegemony. Objectively, then, the United States is aiding Chinese development and helping China achieve a new position of
significant power. But how should we measure this power? Economically, GDP is not useful as a measure
of overall Chinese economic strength. This is not only because Chinese per capita GDP is
ranked 110th in the world, but also because there is little Chinese investment abroad and a
great deal of foreign investment in China. Thus, in comparison with other developed
countries, there is a large amount of "hidden wealth" in China that skews the GDP
calculation. Chinas foreign currency reserves are huge because foreign investment in
China must be made in RMB. Because of this, China is not able to make full use of its own
economic strength.
China Won't Challenge: A2 "Japan Flashpoint/Alliance" 2NC

China accepts american hegemony because they fear japanese resurgence more
Given the foregoing risks, the Chinese will very carefully assess the evolution of the U.S.-Japanese connection and its
impact on the historically competitive Chinese-Japanese relationship, it may turn out. Paradoxically, thatwith the
gradual waning in China of the communist ideology, and with the pragmatic recognition of Chinas stake in a
relatively stable relationship with the United StatesJapans growing military potential may
actually prompt the Chinese to more highly appreciate continued Japanese dependence on the
United States. The practical value of a genuinely stable American-Chinese-Japanese rap prochement would then outweigh the earlier Chinese inclination to view the world in doctrinally
influenced dichotomous categories.
There are indications that such a change is already taking place. Lately, some Chinese experts
have been arguing in public that a sophisticated Chinese policy, alert to the sensitive realities of
the American-Japanese connection, might do more than impede the emer gence of the ominous
scenarios outlined above, It could foster a broader sense of Asian identity within Japan itself, preventing the
permanent American-sponsored detachment of Japan from Asia, Such detachment, the Chinese
fear, could result from the ongoing American efforts to transform Japan from an Asian country
into a Pacific Ocean equivalent of the United Kingdom: a country guided by a distinctive insular noncontinental identity, serving as Americas privileged military partner in the Pacific Ocean, with its key mission being to help
America contain the China threat, To encourage Japan to identify its future with Asia instead, as one Chinese foreign
affairs specialist put it, the most ideal result of improving the China-Japan relationship for China is benign, equilateral, and
interactive progress in the China- US-Japan relationship.~
To that end, Beijing has been making increasing efforts to improve its relations with both the
United States and Japan, the latters military buildup notwithstanding . The important strategic lesson this
Uift implies is that a gradual, carefully calibrated upgrading of Japans security role actually increases the Chinese stake in
maintaining a state and cooperative relationship with the United States, in favoring continued American-Japanese ties, and
in sustaining a balanced Chinese-Japanese-American triangle. [P. 114-115]
China Won't Challenge: A2 "Latin America" 2NC

China wont balance with Latin Americano intent and Latin American nations reject China
Tyler Bridges China makes its move as U.S. falls back in Latin America McClatchy. July 8,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/turmoil/story/71510.html
9/09 2009
China generally has been investing little money in Latin America, however. This has prompted criticism that it's
simply tapping into the region's vast raw minerals, just as colonial powers did for centuries.
Although China has become a major player over the past decade, trade between the United States and Latin
America still dwarfs China's trade with Latin America. Beyond trade, China suddenly is rivaling the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank as a major lender to Latin America, at a time when China is flush with cash and
many companies can't get access to bank loans. Petrobras is borrowing $10 billion from China, to be paid off by shipping
150,000 barrels of crude per day to China this year and 200,000 barrels per day for the next nine years, said Erico Monte, a
Petrobras spokesman. Ecuador is borrowing $1 billion from China to finance investments by its state oil company and
another $1.7 billion to build what would be the country's largest hydropower dam. Venezuela is buying high-tech oil-drilling
platforms from China and is sending some 380,000 barrels of oil there per day as Chavez diversifies Venezuelan exports
away from the United States, his chief nemesis. "But China has shown little enthusiasm in becoming
entangled in Chavez's larger goal of counterbalancing U.S. influence in the hemisphere ," Dan
Erikson, a Latin American expert at the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan research center on Western Hemisphere
affairs, wrote recently. Erikson said China was especially attractive to Latin American leaders because of its no-questionsasked foreign policy. "The United States talks about the need for a battle against corruption, the need for transparency and
improved human rights," Erikson told McClatchy. "China is less ideological in its approach to Latin America than the U.S. is."
Still, China uses its aid as a strategic tool to get countries to shift their diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the communist nation.
After Costa Rica became the first Central American country to establish ties with China, the communist country bought $300
million in Costa Rican bonds. More important to average Costa Ricans, China is spending $74 million to build a new
national soccer stadium in San Jose. It's scheduled to open in 2011. Not everyone in Latin America welcomes China's
growing presence. Chinese companies are taking business away from Mexican firms that exported
clothes to the United States. Peruvians have tried to block the expansion of a Chinese mining project
near the border with Ecuador that they say would pollute local rivers. China has angered Brazilian companies
by taking their place as the biggest exporter of clothing and textiles to Argentina. Whether it's seen as a friendly uncle or a
ruthless competitor, China's continued expansion in Latin America seems inevitable. EBX is expanding its port in Rio de
Janeiro state to handle Brazil's iron ore exports to China and has signed an agreement with China's Wuhan Iron and Steel
to build a mammoth steel plant next to the port. In May, Lula made his third trip to China, spotlighting the fact that China has
become Brazil's biggest trade partner. The development surprised Rodrigo Maciel, the executive secretary of the BrazilChina Business Council, based in Rio. "We weren't expecting China to pass the U.S. as China's biggest trading partner until
2011 or 2012," Maciel said.
Chinas rise will be purely soft balancing. It wont upset the world order
Li Hongmei People's Daily Online China's embrace of multilateral institutions: from a have-to to an active diplomacy June 23, 20 09.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/96417/6684316.html
Likewise, China's interest in multilateral diplomacy and multilateral institutions has correspondingly grown with its elevation
of national strength and confidence. In 1950s through to 1960s, China mainly adopted bilateral diplomacy as the core of its
foreign policies, for the new republic then was economically backward, remained skeptical to multilateral institutions and
therefore stayed away from them for the sake of its national security. The policy of reform and opening up adopted in late
1970s not only brought about a major change to the country's political skyline, but to its diplomatic facets as well. Little by
little, China has since embraced multilateral diplomacy. And in recent years, with the globalization and market
internationalization, China is getting more active than ever in participating in the multilateral
system, which it deems a decisive step to go global, and has thus far been admitted to more
and more international or regional economic institutions .
That said, China is still seen reluctant to join in the multilateral security and political
institutions, considering its domestic pressure for economic growth and a desirable
need for a peaceful outside environment to ensure the fulfillment of its development
goals. That explains why for years China has invariably remain neutral in dealing with international affairs, as a high-profile appearance would possibly perch it at the heart of confrontations, and
China at the time could not afford to derail off the track endeavoring to regain its status as a world power.
China Won't Challenge: A2 "Revisionist Power" 2NC

Internal link flip: Chinese rise supports the world ordergrowth patterns and government
strategic choice prove
More broadly, in everything I read by the Chinese leadership that they put out, all my meetings with them over the years, I do not believe that China, to use Henry Kissinger's phrase when he wrote about
I do not believe that China is a revolutionary power. I do not believe that China aims
to overthrow the international order. I believe that China has largely decided that its own best
interest is to largely integrate into the international order; hence all the economic
involvement and integration that we've seen. Now, I don't want to overstate it. I don't believe that China agrees with all aspects of international relations as they currently
Germany in the 19th century,
exist. Just to choose one area, China obviously holds a view of sovereignty which is more absolute, if you will, than our approach. China does not buy into things like the responsibility to protect. They're
obviously worried that any infringement of sovereignty will be used against them, whether it's Taiwan, Tibet. It's just simply how they manage their own society. So I believe that there are important
the
Chinese leadership has made, for some time now, a strategic decision to work with the existing
international order, to work with the United States to produce a largely stable
environment in which they can continue to emphasize economic growth, political adjustment and adaptation, and they do not want to either trigger
events or even see events come about which would fundamentally threaten that pattern . So I think, for the
next generation or two, China is on that path .
distinctions when it comes to views of international relations between, say, the United States and Europe, on one hand, and China, on the other. But, all things being equal, I believe
China is not a revisionist power--should lock them into global norms and institutions
There is a
growing American consensus that while we will continue to have major differences with
China on human and religious rights, on trade and intellectual property and on Beijing's
rising military budget, the best way for us to handle an increasingly powerful China is
to engage it in a web of interlocking global responsibilities . Then-Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick's challenge to China
in 2005 to be a global "stakeholder" is still surely the right prescription for a stable U.S.-China relationship in the future. This is especially true in light of our
increasingly symbiotic economic and financial relationship, which the recent crisis has
made all too clear. China, the great saver in global finance today, has consistently
bailed out the United States, the world's great spender, by investing in our markets. China has become our most important creditor. It is hard to see how the United States
It is now increasingly clear, however, that those in the United States who see in China a twenty-first century reincarnation of the Soviet threat from the twentieth are in the minority.
can recover from the global financial collapse without continued Chinese investment. Thus, keeping China close and cooperative will be the primary American challenge.
China Won't Challenge: A2 "Taiwan Flashpoint" 2NC

First, our art evidence answers thisvarious things like deterrence and interdependence will
continue to prevent intentional war or miscalculation
Second, this deterrence relationship will persist for several decades at least
ROSS (Professor of Political Science, Boston College) 02
[Robert, Navigating the Taiwan Strait, International Security, Fall, p. asp// wyo-tjc]
The United States can continue to deter China from initiating war in the Taiwan Strait for many
decades. In the absence of a Taiwan declaration of independence, China prefers to maintain the status quo and an
international environment conducive to economic and military modernization. Moreover, Chinese analysts
understand that China is vastly inferior to the United States in nearly all facets of international
power and that it will remain so for a long time. One analyst estimated that Chinese military
technology is fifteen to twenty years behind that of the United States . n90 More important, Chinese
analyses of "comprehensive national power," which takes into account the military, technological, educational, and economic
bases of national strength, estimated in 2000 that China would catch up to the United States in 2043 if Chinese
comprehensive national power grew at a rate of 6 percent per year and U.S. comprehensive national power grew at 3
percent per year.n91
During the Cold War, the most pessimistic U.S. civilian and government analysts insisted that only if the United States
possessed war-winning capabilities and/or escalation dominance could it deter the Soviet use of force in Europe. n92 In
the twenty-first century, the United States possesses escalation dominance in the Taiwan Strait.
At every level of escalation, from conventional to nuclear warfare, the United States can engage
and defeat Chinese forces. Moreover, it can do so with minimal casualties and rapid deployment,
undermining any Chinese confidence in the utility of asymmetric and fait accompli strategies.
Chinese military and civilian leaders have acknowledged both U.S. resolve and its superior warwinning capabilities.
Third, china wont provoke the usthey know they cant hang militarily
Most importantly, the Chinese know better than anyone that they lackand will continue to lack for
some timethe power to afford serious military provocations. Any military scenario that gener ates a collision with the United States would be a calamity for China. The United States could
blockade China at willand thus completely halt Chinas foreign trade and oil imports . Even short
of that, as already noted, a serious conflict in the region could generate yet another nightmare for China: a militarily
advanced and politically aroused Japan that is detached from the United States. [P. 118]
___________________________
**Heg Uniq: Europe Answers**
Europe Won't Challenge: F/L
The U.S./E.U. military gap will remain enormous, regardless of what they do in the immediate
future, the gap wil likely continue to widen
Stephen G. Brooks
Moreover, the
EU will be unable to measurably narrow the overall gap in military power vis-vis the United States in the foreseeable future . Only seven of the 1,500-man battle groupsintended for
smaller stability operations along the lines of the EUs Operation Artemis in the Congoare projected for 2007. After six
years of effort, the 60,000-man rapid reaction force still faces major hurdles: an independent task force of the
EUs Institute for Security Studies identies eight key strategic deficiencies, ranging from
deployability and sustainability to interoperability and strategic decisionmaking .44 When this
force will be able to operate independently from U.S. transport, communications, and other forms of logistical support
remains unclear. Both the rapid reaction force and the battle groups are not standing forces but rather pools of national units
on which the EU can draw if the Council decides unanimously to use military force. And as Robert Cooper points out, There
is no member state for which EDSP is central to its security policy.4 Even if all currently envisioned forces
materialize according to plan, they will do little to create any serious ability to constrain the
United States. Indeed, generating a usable force for peace enforcement may work against
the development of such a potential check on U.S. power. Unless Europeans assume a much greater
willingness to pursue higher defense expenditures, investments toward making the rapid reaction contingent into a credible
force will have to come at the expense of developing advanced systems capable of competing with or displacing those
wielded by U.S. forces. In the opinion of most military analysts familiar with developments on both sides of the Atlantic, the
most likely trajectoryeven if all goes well for the EUs current plansis a widening of the
gap in high-intensity military capabilities in favor of the United States.46 Over the past three
decades, the United States has spent three times more than all of the EU members
combined on military research and development. This gap will affect the development of
assets and capabilities for decades to come.
First, barriers to ascension:

A) costs of expansion
In addition to the political reasons, there are three major socioeconomic reasons why the EU will not be
able to challenge the United States. These are (1) the costs of expansion; (2) the different approach to work and the related costs of
generous social welfare programs in the EU; and (3) the aging EU workforce and the risks of Muslim immigration to the EU's identity.
The first factor
retarding economic growth is the costs involved in the further expansion of the European Union.
Expansion is hindered by the fact that Brussels has only a fraction of the structural funds (aid to regions or countries where GDP per capita is below 75 percent EU
average, such as Portugal, Greece, Spain, and the former East Germany) needed to bring new members up to the standard of living found in the rest of the EU.
there is too little

money for too many new members (already about 35 percent of the EU budget goes to the structural and cohesion funds). This situation
Additionally, new members will receive no cohesion funds, which are given to build a country's infrastructure. The simple fact is that
stands in stark contrast to the 1970s and early 1980s when Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece joined. At that time, the number of rich members and the small
the EU will be tiered: wealthier old

members will continue to receive generous structural and cohesion funds, while new members
occupy a second, poorer tier. The Common Agricultural Policy also hinders economic growth in
number of new members meant that the funds were well focused. That is not true today. As a result ,
the European Union. Almost half (about 45 percent) of the EU's budget is spent on agriculture-mostly payments to farmers. The EU provides about $120 billion in
agricultural subsidies. In contrast, the U.S. government provides about $40 billion annually in agricultural subsidies. Each cow in the United States gets about $120 a
These subsidies are an enormous drain on the

EU economy but are perpetuated because EU members do not want to lose them.
year in federal subsidies. Each European cow gets $600 per year from the EU. 47
B) social welfare programs

The second economic reason is that EU is based on a different socioeconomic model than the United States. The American economy is as close as it gets to raw
capitalism. You have to work to feed, house, and clothe yourself in America. The social safety net does have large gaps in comparison to Europe, and there is great
disparity in wealth-a smaller number of people have control over more of the wealth of the country than in Europe. America is a great place to be rich. It is in Europe
as well, but less so due to high taxes and greater income equality. The ratio between what the top tier of American CEOs earn and what the average manufacturing
employee earns is 475:1. In Europe, the ratio is 24:1 in Britain, 15:1 in France, and 13:1 in Sweden. On the other hand, the American economy is fluid, so the guy
who invents the better mousetrap is able to market it and make a million. There is relatively little government intervention in the economy, and capitalism is warmly
America is the epitome of free market capitalism. The European economy does not work
that way. In contrast to America, there is much more government intervention in the economy-laws that govern
embraced.
business practices and protect workers and the environment-and there is great ambivalence toward capitalism. Europeans prefer a closer distribution of wealth so
that there is not an enormous gap between the richest and the poorest. In the United States, about 20 percent of adults are living in poverty-, while the numbers are
Europeans strongly prefer a social

safety net. A system of cradle-to-grave welfare programs exists to help Europeans receive an
education and to shelter people from the storms of life , even if they are tempests that affect health, housing, or employment.
about 7.5 percent for France, 7.6 percent for Germany, 6.5 percent for Italy, and 14.6 percent for Britain .
Euro- pean unemployment rates are consistently higher than those in the United States because the costs of being unemployed are much lower due to the social
safety net than in the United States, where modest unemployment benefits soon are exhausted. Americans also work much harder than Europeans. In 2003,
Americans worked an average of 1,976 hours. German and French workers averaged about 400 fewer hours per year. One American in three works more than 50
hours a week. It is the rare European who matches those hours. Vacations are generous for Europeans, about 5 weeks, as are holidays. Employees have 23 paid
holidays in Britain, 25 in France, and Sweden has 30. In the United States, depending in which state you reside, you get 4 to ~0 holidays.48 In sum, Americans work
But social welfare is expensive. It requires high taxes to support generous

government spending. This, in turn, hinders economic growth. So, too, does maintaining tight income equality If you tell someone
much harder than Europeans.
that he will be able to earn only a certain amount, and no more than that, he does not have an incentive to work hard (although he does have an incentive to move
Slow economic growth and high unemployment is known as

"Eurosclerosis," and the disease shows no signs of being cured anytime soon . The lack of
to America, where he can become rich).
economic growth results in a lack of funds for research and development in comparison to the United States. And so, the
problem feeds upon itself.
C) demographics
The third reason for the EU's inability to challenge the United States is that the EU states suffer
from an aging and changing workforce, and both elements have the potential to hobble its
already slow economic growth. The major European economies of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy will need several million new workers
over the next fifteen years to fill positions vacated by retiring ones. Presently, those workers do not exist because fewer Euro- pean women are having children, and
In fact , declining
Enropean birthrates are affecting Europe as profoundly as any event in the past, even the Black
Death of the 1300s or the World Wars. Simply put, Europeans are not replacing themselves. Europe's total fertility rate is about 1.4, far below the 2.1 births per
this "baby bust" ultimately will make it impossible to sustain the generous welfare benefits provided by European governments.
female necessary to sustain a population (what demographers call the replacement level). In fact, no West- ern European country has a replacement-level birthrate.
In 2004, Germany's birthrate was 1.3, Italy's 1.2, Spain's 1.1, and France's 1.7 (and France's high birthrate was largely due to its Muslim population).49 The
difference between replacement-level birthrates and those of Germany, or Italy, or Spain is the difference between a stable population size and one that decreases
Nothing like this has occurred in Europe absent wars or plagues . It is truly
Consequently, present welfare benefits are unsustainable given the population growth estimates for European states. In Europe, there are now thirty-five people of retirement age for every one hundred of
by one-third with each generation.
without parallel in history.
working age and-based on current trends-there will be seventy-five pensioners for every one hundred workers-by 2050.~ As Table 1.6 shows, the United Nations
estimates that by 2015, Europe's population will decline by more than 11.3 million, and if Europe's current fertility rate persists until 2020, this will result in 88 million
fewer Europeans by the end of the century.5
Ethnic Europeans are dying out.
Third, they still like us hegemonyfear the alternative

At the same time, Europe faces significant limits on its degree of unity. National identities remain
stronger than a common European identity, despite fifty years of integration, and national
interests, while subdued in comparison to the past, still matter. Integration ~~as driven for years by the engine of Franco-German
cooperation. Europe was for Germany (in light of its history) both a goal and a substitute for a more assertive foreign policy. For France, there were few contradictions
between Europe and an assertive French foreign policy so long as it had Germany in its pocket. As Germany grew with reunification, developed a more normal
foreign policy, and insisted on more weight in votes on European issues, French attitudes toward EU institutions became more cautious. As French prime minister
Lionel Jospin put it, I want Europe, but I remain attached to my nation. Making Europe without unmaking France, or any other European nation, that is my political
Moreover, the continuing enlargement of the European Union to include Cen tral Europeans
means that European institutions are likely to remain sui genenis, but tending toward the
confederal rather than the federal end of the spectrum. The prospects for a strong federal
Europe may have disappeared when the original six countries agreed upon expan sion that
included Britain and parts of Scandinavia. On the question of whether the EU is becoming a state, Harvard political scientist Andrew
choice.
Moravscik summarizes succinctly: Most informed observers prefer to speak of a postmodern polity in which the EU rules alongside, rather than in place of, national
governments.
None of this is to belittle European institutions and what they have accomplished. Legal integration is increasing, with European Court verdicts compelling member
legislative and
executive branch integration has lagged. The European Parliament plays a use ful but limited
role, and turnout for its elections is lower than for national elections. When the fifteen member countries held a summit in Nice in December
countries to change practices, and the number of cases before the court has been growing by io percent per year. On the other hand ,
2000 to revamp institutions and prepare for the possible entry of twelve new countries, the members were reluctant to strengthen the
European Commission or Parliament. While majority voting was extended to cover additional issues in trade, tax and social security policy
remained subject to national vetoes. The integration of foreign and defense policy has been especially
contentious. In 1999, the EU created a position for a high-ranking official to coordinate foreign policies, and agreed to create a force of sixty thousand troops
for crisis intervention backed by the necessary command staff, intelligence, and decision-making authority. But French ambitions to create an independent forceplanning structure that would have duplicated NATO capabilities were not accepted. Other European countries wanted to make sure that the new force did nothing to
weaken NATO and the American commitment to Europe. The idea of a modest European force that was separable but not separate from NATO could actually
strengthen the alliance by allowing for a better sharing of burdens through improved European capacity to deal with minor intra-European conflicts. Some American
The first to
scream if American troops upped and left Germany would be the French because of their
lingering fears of German hegemony. [P. 31-32]
defense officials were skeptical of the new force, but even French attitudes were ambivalent. As Karl Kaiser, a German political scientist, noted,
Eruope Won't Challenge: S/L

There are insurmountable obstacles to a european hegemon challenging the united states
the wall of thayer evidence proves they could never become a unified power. Economic and
demographic barriers will keep it weak.
Second, they lack the ability to be a strategic power. Thayer and brooks and wohlforth prove
that they are politically divided and lack any meaningful military power, much lesss on that
could challenge the us any time.
Finally, they like american leadershipthe nye evidence proves that nationalist sovereignty
stops this because people will put their states sovereignty ahead of a united europe. Nye also
proves theres too many security challenges, making american leadership preferred
EU is screwed No chance they balance multiple constraints
Singh 2008 Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International
Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, The exceptional empire, ProQuest)
Aside from its elusiveness currently, however, this multipolar vision also has grievous normative problems. Prior balances of great powers have rarely been either
stable or benign (think of the years preceding WWI and during the 1920s and 1930s leading to WWII). Even were some new concert of major powers to be thrashed
out, however, it is doubtful that such a set of rival powers would resolve the humanitarian crises, ethnic cleansing, genocides, failed states and Islamist movements
potential rival powers to the US are

themselves inhibited by all manner of problems ranging from energy needs and environmental decay
to the threat of pandemics, acute socio-economic inequalities and demographic stresses. In each, the internal
tensions and strains of social, economic and political change may be as likely to retard as to advance the various emerging
powers' routes to great or superpower status. The EU, for example, faces acute demographic problems that
deeply complicate the still unresolved institutional and political dilemmas shaping its development. Generous welfare spending, inflexible
labour markets, a rapidly aging workforce, a diminishing tax base, a declining fertility ratio and the
problems of a growing but alienated Muslim population pose powerful hindrances to sustaining positive growth rates.
However large its economy, the EU likewise remains a relatively minor global actor: In the near future, the European Union ( EU) will be a
structurally-crippled geopolitical actor. It has expanded too fast and speaks in 23 tongues. Too
much of the leaders' time is spent on discussing how Europe should make its decisions . The patchwork accords
reached under the German presidency in June 2007 have not solved the fundamental problem. It would only be a mild exaggeration to
say that the perpetual European discussions on seating arrangement are akin to re-arranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic. The geopolitical environment around Europe has worsened while the EU has focused inwards: it faces a
more troubled environment in North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and even
vis-a -vis Russia. This is a pretty dismal record. (Mahbubani, 2007, 203-204)
that together threaten the contemporary international system. At least as pointedly, the main
EU states not unified enough to challenge the US

the euro has not supplanted the dollar as a

reserve currency. EU states are not unified enough to make a run at U.S. power, and European
publics last year sent a warning shot to their leaderships that they do not consider Brussels sufficiently accountable.
Both the Dutch and the French rejected the EU constitution , and for reasons that suggest we may have seen the high water
Differing responses to the role of the European Central Bank are a major reason
mark of institutional collusion in the EU.
No European unity
The lack of unity, unwillingness to guarantee the order, and struggle with identity make the EU an
unlikely challenger to American hegemony. Even if unity were achieved, it is unlikely to be
attained on the basis of a more broad-shouldered, assertive EU that will police the international order. The
heady days of European triumphalism have given way to a lack of confidence by Europeans in
their ability to succeed in the emerging order. It is evident in their efforts to preserve an eroding status quo, both economically and
politically.
The EU does not act as a nation-state
POLICY, 2010, 29.
the EU does not act in the unified fashion of a nation-state,

nor is it able or inclined to act in the assertive fashion of historic great powers . Japan, for its part, has a
The EU's GDP is now greater than that of the United States, but
shrinking and aging population and lacks the political culture to play the role of a great power. Russia may be more inclined, but it still has a largely cash-crop
economy and is saddled by a declining population and internal challenges to its cohesion.
US remains stronger than Europemilitary, homogeneity

Noam Chomsky, MIT Professor, Chomsky: Economic Crisis Will Not End US Hegemony, Press TV, interviewed by Afshin Rattansi,
World News Daily Information Clearing House, 101408, www.informationclearinghouse.info/article21011.htm, accessed 11-7-08.
The US is also the only country right now that has rejected an official world court decision. It had been joined earlier by
Albania and Libya, but they have since accepted them. So this isolation is consistent. As for US hegemony, it is based on
objective factors. One is what you mentioned, the military view, the US military is approximately at the scale
of the rest of the world combined, and far ahead technologically. But it's also a very rich
country with plenty of resources and it is homogenous unlike Europe. Europe is roughly on
the same scale economically but it is not homogenous. You could see that in the reactions to the
financial crises, in the United States they're uniform taken by the federal government and in Europe they are national and
not consistent. For about 35 years it has become clear. I've written about it and so have others, that the world is
becoming more diverse. It is becoming what has been called tri-polar, with three major
economic centers and only one military center. The economic centers are North America based in the US,
Western Europe based mainly in Germany and France and the northeast Asia based in Japan, increasingly China and
South Korea is a major industrial power these three centers differ substantially in their characteristics. And to some
extent, in my opinion, the Asian center is increasing in its role in world affairs and we can see it in this crisis.
Europe's prevailing ideologies render it incapable of replacing American leadership

Michael Mandelbaum, Professor, Johns Hopkins University, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLD'S
GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, p. 217-218
In providing to the world as a whole the kinds ol services that governments within countries supply to the people they
govern, the EU, for all its virtues, has remained largely on the sidelines. In this way Europe
has
lived up to its nineteenth-century designation as, in contrast to North America, the Old
World. It resembles .1 retired person: still possessed of a lively mind, hill of opinions based on long and rich experience,
and ready, on the basis of that experience, to offer advice, much of it sound, on how the world should be organized and
managedbut not available actually to do the work of organiza tion and management. For better
or for worse, therefore, the world has, in the first decade of the twcnty-tirst century, no
substitute for the United States as the provider of governmental services to the international
system. Rather than being home alone, the United States is, in this sense, abroail alone. Insofar as American foreign
policy is unilateral, this is by default as well as by choice. The American government and the American
public can, and will, decide whether, how tar. and for how long to sustain the policies that
amount, collectively, to bearing the burden ot global governance . They will not have the option thai,
all other things being equal, they might well prefer: sharing that burden with others.
Second, no strategic threat

A) no unified strategic voice
Even if the EU solves its economic and immigration problems, it remains hindered by its
cumbersome decision-making process that retards united and collective action. There are strong
tensions between centralized decision making in Brussels and the respective capitals of the
member states-Berlin, Lon- don, Madrid, Paris, or Rome. The interests of individual countries often do not
overlap with Brussels's interests, and this is a major source of friction . Too much centralized decision making leads
to a "democracy gap" in the EU-the key decision-making bodies in the EU are not directly elected by European citizens. In 2005, the overwhelming votes against the
proposed EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands are indications of a major disconnect between Brussels and the European people. Increasingly, Europeans
do not want to be told what to do by Brussels; Poland did not escape the grip of Moscow's leaders to have it replaced by those in Brussels. But too little central
control leads to disorganization, repetition of efforts, and policy confusion.
B) no military capability
Some might argue that the European Union is an exception to the big-or-rich rule. It is true that if Brussels were to develop impressive military capabilities and wield
creation of an autonomous and unified

defense and defense-industrial capacity that could compete with that of the United States would
be a gargantuan task. The EU is struggling to put together a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force that
is designed for smaller operations such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and crisis management , but it still lacks military essentials
such as capabilities in intelligence gathering, airlift, air-defense suppression, air-to-air refueling,
sea transport, medical care, and combat search and rescue -- and even when it has those
capacities, perhaps by the end of this decade, it will still rely on NATO command and control and
its latent collective power like a state, the EU would clearly constitute another pole. But the
other assets. Whatever capability the EU eventually assembles, moreover, will matter only to the extent that it is under the control of a statelike decision-making body
with the authority to act quickly and decisively in Europe's name. Such authority, which does not yet exist even for international financial matters, could be purchased
only at the price of a direct frontal assault on European nations' core sovereignty. And all of this would have to occur as the EU expands to add ten or more new
Europe is unlikely to emerge as a dominant

actor in the military realm for a very long time, if ever.
member states, a process that will complicate further deepening. Given these obstacles,
Neither China nor the EU can replace the U.S. on the world stagetheyre too inwardly
oriented
David P. Calleo, University Professor, Johns Hopkins University, "Unipolar Illusions," SURVIVAL v. 49 n. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 73-78.
If the United States retreats, can anyone else pretend to the hegemonic role? At present, no
substitute seems probable. China, for all its explosive growth, is still too self-centred and
undeveloped. European states perhaps have remnants of an imperial mentality, but to focus
its power the EU would have to turn itself into a tightly run federation, which it shows scant
inclination to do. And with ecological constraints preventing growth on a scale sufficient to close the gap between Asia
and the West, markets alone cannot be expected to provide a harmonious future. In short, this
new century seems fated to a plural international order, with little prospect either of inner
harmony or Hobbesian hegemony. In such a world, liberal imperialism leads to a dead end.
Europe Won't Challenge: A2 "ESDP" 2NC

European military efforts are complimentary--there is no risk of balancing
Stephen G. Brooks
Hence, far
from sacricing other preferences to create capabilities that might constrain the
United States, the Europeans may be sacricing limited resources that could potentially be
useful for countering U.S. power to create capabilities that largely complement those of the
United States.47 Why then do leaders in Europe sometimes use balancing language when describing these new
forces? To begin, the overwhelming majority of the rhetoric is about building up capabilities for
reasons other than balancing the United States; indeed, much of this rhetoric is about trying
to be a better partner of the United States, not a competitor . Sometimes, however, politicians do use
balancing language to describe their aims for EU military strengthening, in part because increasing EU military capabilities
involves nancial and other costs that many member states seem very reluctant to bear. To the extent that this force is
portrayed as a means of checking U.S. power, some of this hesitance may be reduced, if only because adopting a more
independent EU foreign policy is popular among the public in Europe. Paying for such independence,
however, is unpopular in Europe, which is why EU aggregate defense spending has steadily
declined even as European politicians rhetoric about defense has escalated. The result is a
crescendo of calls for enhanced EU military capabilities and an alphabet soup of new
organizational initiatives but relatively limited operational output on the ground. In sum, the
evidence indicates that regional security needs, not soft balancing, are the principal driver
of EU defense cooperation. To this point, there is also no indication of European willingness to
pay the economic costs to take the necessary steps to develop military capabilities that
could meaningfully reduce the gap with the United States.
Europe Won't Challenge: A2 "European Integration Good"

2NC
Freestanding european force bad would lead to us unilateralism in new parts of the world
and decreased cooperation b/w europe/america
MORAVSCIK (Prof of European Affairs, Harvard) 03
[Andrew, Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain, Foreign Affairs, Jul/August 2003, asp// wyo-tjc]
Interestingly, given their supposedly "Venusian" tendencies, many Europeans find defense
cooperation attractive. Nearly 75 percent of the European public favor the notion, and politicians from Tony Blair to
Jacques Chirac and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer have reasons to advocate it. The governments of Belgium,
France, Germany, and Luxembourg -- the same group that impeded NATO support to Turkey -- recently called a summit to
discuss the creation of a group to coordinate European defense procurement, establish a common military headquarters,
and construct a unified force. Little has come of schemes for a powerful European military, however --
and little will. A common European force with the capacity to wage high-intensity, low-casualty
war around the globe remains a pipe dream. Whatever they may tell pollsters, European publics will not tolerate
the massive increases in military spending required to come anywhere near the American level, and more efficient use of
current European resources, although desirable, will achieve only modest gains. Even if Europeans could agree on
the funding and the mission for such a unified force, moreover , new transport aircraft, satellites, and
soldiers would not add up to a viable European alternative to U.S. unilateralism. For what would
the Europeans do with their new power? Deploy it against the United States? Launch prepreventive interventions? Even if they sought simply to reduce European dependency on U.S.
security guarantees, the result would only be to encourage the redeployment of even more
American forces outside of Europe. In the end, the best way for Europe to play a world role is to play with, not
against, the United States.
Independent european intergration is bad: leads to hegemonic rival that will confront the us
With the EUs economic potential already matching Americas and with the two entities often
clashing on financial and trade matters, a militarily emergent Europe could become a formidable
rival to America. It would inevitably pose a challenge to Americas hegemony . To form a truly equal
partnership between the two superpowers would not be easy , because any such adjustment would require
a dramatic contraction of Americas preeminence and an equally dramatic expansion of Europes. NATO would have to
cease being an American-led alliance, or maybe even cease being . If America has been occasionally
discomfited by Frances posturing as a great power_and has been able to dismiss it as a quirky but inconsequential
manifestation of vain ambitionsa Europe that actually did do enough in defense would inescapably
give America an acute case of post-hegemonic discomfort.

Amilitarily self-reliant Europe, a comprehensive global politicaleconomic power like America, would confront
the United States with a painful choice: either to disengage from Europe altogether or to fully
share with it the responsibilities of worldwide policymaking . Disengagement of American power from the
western periphery of the Eurasian continent would be tantamount to an abandonment of Eurasia to new and unpredictable
conflicts among the principal Eurasian competitors. But power-sharing in a symmetrical global partnership would be neither
easy nor pain-free. [P. 90-91]
An integrated europe would crowd the us out of its engagements in the middle east and latin
america
Apolitically powerful Europe, able to compete economically while militarily no longer dependent
on the United States, would inevitably contest American preeminence in two regions that are
strategically vital to America: the Middle East and Latin America . The rivalry would be felt first in
the Middle East, given not only its geographic proximity to Europe, but especially Europes
greater dependence on its oil. Given Arab resentment of U.S. policies, European overtures would find a sympathetic
reception while Israel would stand to lose the privileged position it has enjoyed as Americas favored client state,
AEuropean challenge in Latin America would likely come next . The Spaniards, Portuguese, and French
have long-standing historical and cultural connections with Latin American societies, Latin American nationalism would be
quite responsive to intensified political, economic, and cultural ties with an assertive Europe, which would diminish the
traditional U.S. domination of the region. Thus a Europe that became simultaneously an economic giant
and a militarily serious power could confine the scope of U.S. preeminence largely to the Pacific
Ocean. [P. 91]
Europe Won't Challenge: A2 "France" 2NC

France doesnt oppose us power in a realist mannerits merely posturing rooted in their
political tradition
OWEN (Asst. Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs @ Univ. Virginia) 01
[John, Transnational Liberalism and US Primacy, International Security, December, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
If French elites are complacent about U.S. primacy, why do they pronounce so about American hyperpower and routinely
call for a multipolar world? With liberal bona fides as strong as those of any nation (in political if not economic affairs),
French elites are nonetheless rhetorically different from their German, British, and Japanese counterparts concerning U.S.
military power. Most outspoken among French government officials has been Hubert Vdrine, the foreign minister, who has
called on Europeans and others to steady and persevering work in favor of real multilateralism against unilateralism, for
balanced multipolarism against unipolarism, for cultural diversity against uniformity.[92] Other French elites, including
President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, have made similar statements.[93]
The French are following a Gaullist tradition of anti-Americanism that perennially irks and baffles those on the receiving end.
During the Cold War France insisted upon an independent foreign policy, developing its own nuclear force, withdrawing from
the integrated military command of NATO, and pursuing dtente with communist countries even as it remained in the
Western camp.[94] This independent tradition predates Charles de Gaulle by many centuries: Medieval popes contending
with Gallicanism, the notion that the Church in France should be directed by the French king rather than Rome, would
recognize France's current behavior. French discontent with U.S. primacy, then, may result from a historic attachment to
national independence stronger than that of most nations. Students of French politics note the nation's unusually acute fear
that its culture is being supplanted by that of the United States. They also note that France, like the United States, has long
seen itself as having a mission civilitrice, a quasi-religious duty to bring liberty and culture to the rest of the world; perhaps
the world is only big enough for one such mission.[95] Put succinctly, French foreign policy may be less pro-American than
that of other liberal countries because French liberals, like their American counterparts, are more nationalistic than other
liberals.[96] That France and the United States are so alike may account for their differences.
Notwithstanding their chafing at U.S. primacy, it is not at all evident that French elites fear that the United States will use its
power to impose its will upon them, as realism predicts they should do in an anarchical international system. The most
telling sign of fear would be advocacy of policies that would help correct the imbalance of power that the United States
enjoys. Apart from French aspirations for the EU's tiny Rapid Reaction Force, such advocacy has not materialized.
Europe Won't Challenge: A2 "Rapid Reaction Force" 2NC

The EUS rapid reaction force does not signal counterbalancingisnt directed against the US
OWEN (Asst. Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs @ Univ. Virginia) 01
[John, Transnational Liberalism and US Primacy, International Security, December, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
The formation of the EU's Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 British, French, and German troops could be
interpreted as a step toward counterbalancing American power, particularly in light of French
assertions that the force will be independent of NATO. Thus far, however, that interpretation is
difficult to sustain. The impetus behind the emergency force was the Europeans' inability to
handle the Balkan crises of the 1990s without U.S. leadership. In particular, that atrocities continued while the
Europeans and Americans dithered,[89] and that once NATO did take action in Kosovo, approximately 80 percent of the
munitions were delivered by U.S. aircraft and missiles,[90] motivated European elites to develop a better way
to handle such crises.[91] A major cause of the EU force, then, is the need to carry out liberal
foreign policy more efficiently. Certainly the British and Germans show little desire to
counterbalance the United States and are at pains to make clear that they intend for NATO to
remain supreme in Western Europe. There remains, however, the matter of the French.
_____________________________________
**Heg Uniq: Other Challengers Answers**
India Won't Challenge: F/L
India is bandwagoning, not balancing, against the US
Robert Lieber, (Prof., Govt., Georgetown U.), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2010,
39.
India, too, has adopted a far more positive and intimate commercial, political, and security
relationship with Washington than at any time since its independence in 1947. During the Cold War, India, although formally nonaligned, had
tilted toward the Soviet Union. India's substantial shift toward the United States, made partly in response to China's awakening, offers
another example of "bandwagoning" with us rather than balancing against us.
India cant riseinternal challenges, economic ceilings, and infrastructure lacking

QUESTIONER: Richard, would you say the same thing about a country like
week.
India vis-a-vis its galloping economic growth? You were there last
And to piggyback on that, is the rise of India or the hype over the rise of India -- if it's for real, because I know the nuclear
deal is in deep freeze -- but does a country like India need to allies with a country like the U.S. in terms of a strategic
relationship as dependent for its growth? HAASS: I would think in India's case, the challenge to India's
continued economic growth -- whatever it is these days -- 8 percent plus or minus -- is more than anything else
going to be India's -- Indian politics. And it's factionalism, to use a word that our founders used, at the national
level. And it's the tension between the central level and the periphery. And India just has so
many fault lines within its parties and between and among its parties -- in between national and regional,
if you will, institutions. That to me is the biggest question. Whether India's political system can essentially overcome some
of these divisions and rivalries. By the way, just as an aside -- if I may plug another article in this magazine -- that's
essentially the question Fareed Zakaria raises about the United States -- whether the increasingly factionalized American
political system can accommodate globalization and the challenges that we face. It's interesting, because we're two large
democracies. And I think it's interesting. Now, India on top of that has the fact that it's only 60 years old and has
enormous infrastructure limitations that anyone traveling from any airport in India to any city in India can attest
to. It obviously faces the enormous challenge of still hundreds of millions of people living
below poverty levels, real problems in rural areas and so forth. But I think India's challenge is fundamentally
different. I don't -- in terms of India -- use words like alliance. Indeed, I believe that alliances in the future will play less of a
role this era of history -- that I've described as non-polarity -- than they have in the past, because what alliances tend to
require are clear, predictable threats in predictable places and clear sets of obligations about what's to be done about them.
I believe we're entering a period of history where tat's not going to be the case. NATO is the perfect example -- take a slight
detour. NATO for the first 40 years of its existence was a traditional alliance. In NATO parlance, focused on Article 5 -collective defense against the common enemy: The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, essentially in the confines of Europe.
NATO in its current incarnation is really a collective security organization that deals with threats everywhere but Europe, for
the most part, and it's really an Article 4 organization, which in NATO's parlance deals much more with the choice rather
than obligations of members. And I think that sort of flexibility or uncertainty is much more characteristic of this era. And the
good news is that on occasion the Chinese or the Russians or others could be limited partners to deal with certain threats.
The not-so-good news is we can't count on, quote-unquote, "traditional allies" as much as we could in the previous
geopolitical context in which there were fewer centers of power that were easier to characterize. I do think this is a more
fluid period of history. So for India, the real question, again, is continued economic integration, which it's having. But the
real question, I think, is internal for India. And that will be, if there's ceilings on India's emergence as a major
power, I think -- really think it's largely internal. The one exception, I'd say, is the state of Pakistan. I actually think
Pakistan is a real potential liability for India in the sense that if Pakistan were ever to become -- I'm not
predicting it -- but if it ever were to become a failed state or if Indo-Pakistani relations once again deteriorated to where they
were in the not-so-distant past, that could be a real limit and a real distraction and a real absorber of Indian energies and
resources. And that would be a tragedy not just for Pakistan, but for India as well.
India wont challenge: internal politics and economic shortcomings

Walter Russell

id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
India's future is also a question. Support
for global integration is a fairly recent development in India,

and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted
many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger
are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's
attitude toward the United States and global economic integration . The violent Naxalite insurrection
plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims
could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud.
India Won't Challenge: Ext

India wont challenge the united stateseconomic and political factors prevent emergence as
great powerit will concentrate on balancing china
India too is sometimes mentioned as a future great power, and its population of a billion people
is four times that of the United States. For decades, India suffered from what some called the Hindu rate of
economic growth, that is, a rate of I or 2 percent, but in the last decade that has changed and growth rates have
approached 5 to 6 percent. India has an emerging middle class of several hundred million, and English is an official
language spoken by some 50 million to 100 million people. Building on that base, Indian information indus-
tries are beginning to play a transnational role. In addition, India is a military power, with several
dozen nuclear weapons, intermediate- range missiles, 1.2 million military personnel, and an annual military
expenditure of nearly $n billion. In terms of soft power, India has an established democracy and was long regarded as a
leader of nonaligned countries during the Cold War. India has an influential diaspora, and its motion picture industry is the
largest in the world in terms of the number of films produced yearly, competing with Hollywood in parts of Asia and the
Middle East.
At the same time, India remains very much an underdeveloped country, with hundreds of
millions of illiterate citizens living in poverty. Despite rapid economic growth, more than half a
billion Indians will remain in dire poverty. Harnessing technology to im prove agriculture will be
Indias main challenge in alleviating poverty by 2015. Moreover, the widening gulf between have and have-not regions
and disagreements over the pace and nature of reforms could be a source of domestic strife. Indias GDP of $1.7 trillion is
less than half that of China and 20 percent of U.S. GDP. If the United States grows at 3 percent and India at 6 percent, it
would take India until 2077 to reach the overall size of the American economy. And the gap in per capita income is even
more dramatic, with the United States at $33,900 and India at $i,8oo. At a 3 percent difference in growth rates, it would take
India until 2133 to reach parity with the American economy. Indias military capabilities are impressive in
South Asia but not in the larger Asian context, where its equipment is less sophisticated and its
expenditures only about half those attributed to China . RAND projects that if Indian economic growth
continues at 5.5 percent and it continues to spend 4 percent of GNP on defense, in fifteen years its military capital stock
would reach $314 billion, or 62 percent of Chinas (compared with 48 percent today).
India is unlikely alone to become a global challenge to the United States in this century, but it
has considerable assets that could be added to the scales of a Sino-Russian-Indian coalition.
And yet the likelihood that such a coalition would become a serious anti-Ameri can alliance is
small. Just as there is lingering suspicion in the SinoRussian relationship, so there is a similar rivalry between India and
China. While the two countries signed agreements in 1993 and 1996 that promised peaceful settlement of the border
dispute that led them to war in 1962, it is also worth noting that Indias defense minister labeled China as Indias potential
enemy number one just prior to Indias nuclear tests in March 1998. Rather than becoming an ally, India is
more likely to become part of the group of Asian nations that will tend to balance China . [P. 28-29]
Islamic World Won't Challenge: F/L

No risk of an islam v. The west scenario
KUPCHAN (Professor of International Relations @ Georgetown) 02
[Charles, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21 st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York //wyo-tjc]
Despite the rhetoric of Osama bin Laden and his fellow travelers, the ongoing struggle between
the United States and Islamic radicals does not represent a clash of civilizations. On the
contrary, the central cleavage fueling the terrorism spawned in the Middle East is within the
Islamic world itself, not between the United States and Islam . The illegitimacy of governing
regimes, clan and factional rivalries, large income inequalities , pervasive poverty a sense of having been
left behind by historythese are the root causes of the disaffection within Islamic society Extremist
groups and religious zealots then prey upon this discontent, turning it into hatred of the United States and the V\Test. But
the underlying source of alienation is homegrownpolitical and economic stagnation and the social cleavages it produces.
That the Islamic world has no monopoly on anti-American sentiment adds to the strength of this
interpretation. Resentment of the United States may run deeper in the Middle East than
elsewhere, but anti-American protests are no stranger to France, Russia, China, and many
countries in Latin America. The core of the problem is not Americas culture, but its power. As with
all hegemons throughout history primacy evokes pique. States at the top are always a popular target of discontent,
especially in countries that are poor or in which the hegemon exercises a particularly heavy hand. This resentment,
however, rarely proves strong enough to offset the internal cleavages that have consistently kept clashes within civilizations
more potent than clashes among them [P. 70]
No risk of islamic counter-weight: publics and governments will remain largely divided
FERGUSON (Professor of Finance and History @ NYU) 04
[Niall, A World Without Power, Foreign Policy, July/August, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
With birthrates in Muslim societies more than double the European average, the Islamic
countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East are bound to put pressure on Europe and the
United States in the years ahead. If, for example, the population of Yemen will exceed that of Russia by 2050 (as
the United Nations forecasts, assuming constant fertility), there must either be dramatic improvements in the Middle East's
economic performance or substantial emigration from the Arab world to aging Europe. Yet the subtle Muslim
colonization of Europe's cities--most striking in places like Marseille, France, where North Africans populate whole
suburbs--may not necessarily portend the advent of a new and menacing "Eurabia." In fact, the
Muslim world is as divided as ever, and not merely along the traditional fissure between Sunnis
and Shiites. It is also split between those Muslims seeking a peaceful modus vivendi with the
West (an impulse embodied in the Turkish government's desire to join the EU) and those drawn to the
revolutionary Islamic Bolshevism of renegades like al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Opinion polls from
Morocco to Pakistan suggest high levels of anti-American sentiment, but not unanimity . In Europe,
only a minority expresses overt sympathy for terrorist organizations; most young Muslims in England clearly prefer
assimilation to jihad. We are a long way from a bipolar clash of civilizations, much less the rise of a new caliphate that might
pose a geopolitical threat to the United States and its allies.
Islamic World Won't Challenge: Ext

Clash of civilizations is mistakenzero evidence to collaborate the theory
[Charles, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York //wyo-tjc]
Huntingtons map of the world has several weaknesses. To begin, there is scant evidence to
support the claim that other cultures will clash with the Westeven though the conditions for
anti-American gangs to form have over the past decade been about as good as they could get.
With the United States at the peak of its power, and the advanced democracies benefiting from
globalization much more than most other parts of the world, resentment toward the West ought
to be fueling countering coalitions among non-Western civilizations. That these coalitions are
not forming delivers Huntingtons vision a potent blow .
Consider what 1999 looked like from an Orthodox, Confucian, or Muslim perspective. America was flexing its military muscle
just about everywhere. It expanded NATO despite Moscows strident objections, intensifying the sting of Orthodox Russias
loss of empire. The United States led NATO into battle against Serbia, another affront to the world of Orthodox Slays.
Furthermore, NATO acted without the approval of the United Nations, contravening the letter of the law, even if not the spirit.
In the middle of the conflict, precision- guided bombs from U.S. warplanes turned a wing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade into rubble, with Washington all the while chastising Beijing because of the regimes repressive ways and its
threats against Taiwan. Halfway around the globe, American aircraft were regularly striking Iraqi targetsand had been
doing so for most of the decade. And Washington was standing behind, albeit without much enthusiasm, the right-wing
Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu as it made a mess of the peace process with the Palestinians. This was a
veritable recipe for invoking the collective ire of the Orthodox, Confucian, and Muslim peoples.
But did these aggrieved civilizations come together in an angry anti-American alliance? Did the rest sharpen their swords for
battle against the West? Nothing of the sort. The Russians barely lifted a finger for their Serb brethren and in the end lent
America a helping hand by pressuring Milosevic to withdraw his army from Kosovo. A few short months after the end of the
conflict, both Moscow and Beijing were working to put relations with Washington back on a good track. And most Arab
countries, far from organizing a jihad against America, kept their distance from Saddam Hussein and did little to help their
Palestinian brethren.
If Huntingtons map of the world were the right one, this would be the time for cultural gangs to form against America for
another reason: developing regions of the world are no longer the object of East- West rivalry During the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union played regional states off one another. Saudi Arabia against Syria. Iraq against Iran.
North Korea versus South Korea. Japan versus China. Ethiopia versus Somalia. The Cold War often scuttled any chance for
cohesion among neighboring countries with similar cultures. Both Washington and Moscow followed the same dictum-divide
and rule.
With the Soviet Union gone, the United States has been using its good offices to resolve regional disputes, not to inflame
them. Especially during the Clinton administration, U.S. diplomats were involved in mediating conflicts in almost every
quarter of the globe. Nonetheless, many regional disputes continue to fester, the appeal of cultural affinity demonstrating
little pacifying or unifying effect. The Korean peninsula remains divided. Political rivalries and ethnic tensions still plague
many parts of Africa. The Islamic world shows no signs of greater cohesion, with states in the Middle East frequently at odds
with each other. In short, despite the end of the Cold War, there remains much more trouble within civilizations than among
them. [P. 68-69]
Security competition overrides civilizational alliances

[Charles, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York //wyo-tjc]
The striking absence of reconciliation and cohesion within civiliza tions has a primary causethe
divisive effects of concern about power and security usually trump the potentially unifying
effects of cultural and ideological affinity Most of the worlds disputes tend to take place between
neighboring states. The reason is that neighbors, by virtue of their proximity, often threaten each
others well-being, overwhelming the sense of affinity that their shared culture or ethnicity might
otherwise engender. Threat is a stronger determinant of how a nation identifies enemies and selects allies than is
either culture or ideology.
Potential partnerships among states with cultural similarities have time and again foundered on
the shoals of security competition. Pan-Arab aspirations led Syria and Egypt in i958 to form the United Arab
Republic. The Syrian government then backed out in 1961, sin- easy with the growing influence of Egyptian President
Gamal Abdel Nasser. Islamic unity has similarly been no match for the strategic rivalry between Iran and Iraq. A sense of
kinship hardly stopped Saddam Hussein from plundering Kuwaits wealth. Pakistan for years supported the rrlib regime in
Afghanistan, but changed course in a matter of days when it faced the prospect of allying itself with Americas war on
terrorismand reaping the economic and strategic benefits.
The same logic applies in other regions. Japan and China have cul tural ties that go back
centuries. But these ties currently do little to ameliorate the political divide between East Asias
two major nations. In similar fashion, the tendency for geopolitical concerns to prove stronger
than cultural affinity is precisely why a rising Europe and its American offspring are likely to
engage in strategic rivalry Huntington is right that competition will abound, but such competition will take place
among power blocs, not civilizations. [P. 70-71]
Japan Won't Challenge: F/L

Japan cant rise stagnated economy
Japan, which only 20 years ago was making more confident noises than China is today about surpassing the United States economically, is now
sluggish and geriatric. It has a new government even more bumptious and inept than
Washington's. And its vaunted genius at sophisticated manufacturing has been undermined by
the widespread product-quality problems at Toyota, so soon after it became the world's largest automobile manufacturer -- displacing
General Motors, which, after the pause that refreshes in Chapter 11 to shed unsightly debt, may be starting to recover . Japan is torn between
reinvigorating the alliance with the U.S. and detaching from it to appease China .
No risk of a resurgent japan or russia in the status quo

FRIEDBERG (Professor of International Politics/Affairs @ Princeton) 2K
[Aaron, Asian Allies: True Strategic Partners, Present Dangers: Crisis & Opportunity in American Foreign & Defense Policy, ed. Kagan & Kristol, Encounter Books //wyotjc]
After
more than forty years as a loyal, if sometimes reticent Amer ican ally, Japan is in many respects
an even less plausible candidate for regional hegemon in Asia than Germany is in Europe. The Japanese
governments ability to harness the nations considerable economic and technological potential
for military purposes is constrained by complex legal and political restrictions, and the countrys
culture is at least as hostile as Germanys to anything that smacks of militarism or imperialism .
In Asia, since the end of the nineteenth century, Japan and Russia have been the two main pretenders to regional dominance .
Japan is not embedded in the same kind of regional institutional structure as Germany, but is hemmed in nonetheless by the lingering
suspicion and animosity of many of its neighbors. Because Japan faces more obvious potential threats than Germany, it is easier to imagine
how some or all of these conditions might change in the years ahead. But in the absence of a fundamental break with
the United States (and even with one), another Japanese bid for Asian dominance is probably not in
the cards.
The efforts of Russia (and later the Soviet Union) to exert a preponderant influence in Asia have
historically been complicated by geography. Russias easternmost outposts must endure harsh
and inhospitable conditions for much of the year and are a very long way, by land, air, or sea,
from the main centers of Russian power. The Soviet Union was able to offset these weaknesses, to a degree, through
massive investments in transportation and communication infrastructure, and by using ideological appeals and offers of military and economic
assistance to cultivate local clients.
Todays Russia has all the traditional liabilities of the Soviet Union and none of its advantages .
Having discarded its universal ideology, and with a greatly weakened military and a moribund
economy, Russia lacks the means with which to project power into Asia . On the contrary, there are real
questions about Moscows ability in the long run to keep a grip on its eastern provinces. Russias position in Asia is, if anything, even weaker
than its position in Europe; it is as weak as at any time since Japan sank the czars fleet at the Tsushima Strait in 1905 . Recovery is
not impossible, but neither is it imminent. [P. 198-199]
Japan wont move to alter the status quobenefits far too much from hegemony now
Japan too will eventually come out of its economic slump and re emerge as a global player.
Especially because of its estranged relationship with China, Japan is likely to stick by its alliance with the
United States and follow Washingtons lead on matters of defense . But even within Japan there have been
restless stirrings and initial signs that a change of course might be in the offing. Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister who took office in April
2001, from the outset shrouded himself in both populist and nationalist symbols. He proposed constitutional revisions that would eliminate
provisions limiting the role of Japans military He selected as his initial foreign minister Makiko Tanaka, a fellow populist who proceeded to
skip numerous meetings with visiting dignitaries, including one with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the first high-level U.S.
official to pay a visit to the new government. In August 20w, he visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial that pays homage to Japanese heroes
from World War II. Koizumi also stood by the decision of the Ministry of Education to approve new history textbooks that gloss over the
countrys wartime atrocitiesprovoking outrage in China and South Korea.
Japan is not about to make a dramatic change of course and delib erately act as a counterweight
to the United States anytime soon. But an ascendant Asia looms on the distant horizon. And coupled with various
uncertainties, including the trajectory of North Korea and the fate of Indonesia, the region as a whole will confront both America and Europe
with new strategic challenges. By 2025, America and Europe may both be spending much more time worrying about the rise of Asia than
about each other. [P. 158-159]
Russia Won't Challenge: F/L

Russia is not a rising powerits population and infrastructure are collapsing
Parag Khanna, Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, NEW YORK TIMES, January 27, 2008,
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html, accessed 4-5-09.
In exploring just a small sample of the second world, we should start perhaps with the hardest case: Russia. Apparently
stabilized and resurgent under the Kremlin-Gazprom oligarchy, why is Russia not a superpower but rather the ultimate
second-world swing state? For all its muscle flexing, Russia is also disappearing. Its population
decline is a staggering half million citizens per year or more, meaning it will be not much
larger than Turkey by 2025 or so spread across a land so vast that it no longer even
makes sense as a country. Travel across Russia today, and youll find, as during Soviet
times, city after city of crumbling, heatless apartment blocks and neglected elderly citizens
whose value to the state diminishes with distance from Moscow . The forced Siberian migrations of
the Soviet era are being voluntarily reversed as children move west to more tolerable and modern climes. Filling the
vacuum they have left behind are hundreds of thousands of Chinese, literally gobbling up,
plundering, outright buying and more or less annexing Russias Far East for its timber and other
natural resources. Already during the cold war it was joked that there were no disturbances on the Sino-Finnish border, a
prophecy that seems ever closer to fulfillment.
Russia cant challenge the US: domestic strife

Walter Russell
id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
The biggest loser of the financial crisis thus far seems to have been Russia, a country that stormed
into 2008 breathing fire and boasting of its renewed great-power status. After years of military decline, it put its strategic
bombers back in the air; sent its fleet to the Caribbean; and reintroduced displays of martial power to Kremlin parades.
Petrodollars filled government coffers, and political dissent at home had largely disappeared. Russia's troubles had been
eased by the effective suppression of the Chechen insurgency, while America's troubles remained severe, with the U.S.
military mired in two wars. When its troops invaded Georgia, Russia seemed once again to be acting like a great power-and not a very nice one.
But the Georgian invasion may have been the high point of Putin's "New Russia" rather than a portent of
things to come. Historically, Russian power has rested on four legs. Its immense agricultural
territory made it a granary of Europe. Timber, fur, and other products gave Russia a profitable niche
in world trade. Its enormous territory, stretching from the remote steppes of Asia well into Europe, brought it
into the heart of continental politics. Its enormous population--as recently as 1989, greater than that of the
United States--gave it awesome military potential.
Today, a much-diminished Russia cannot realistically aspire to fill the shoes of czarist
Russia, much less those of the Soviet Union. In Europe, the post-cold war loss of the Baltic republics, most of
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and above all Ukraine has pushed Russia back to its boundaries at the time of
Ivan the Terrible, leaving Russia shorn of half its population and most of its agricultural
potential. Now Russia is struggling, with only partial success, simply to maintain its Soviet-era infrastructure and
educational system, unable to build the base for a modern economy. Pushed from the center to the far
fringes of European geography, lagging well behind Western norms in economic and social productivity, and challenged
by the rising powers to its east, Russia retains only shards of the power potential that once
made it a credible rival of the United States.
Russia cant maintain its military or economystrong political stance is only a bluff
Walter Russell
id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
The Georgia invasion itself had already spooked

foreign and domestic investors into pulling their money out of Russia . That capital flight
only accelerated as the price of oil and gas fell by more than two-thirds . Soon it became apparent
It was in this context that the financial crisis hit last fall.
that Russia's vaunted economic recovery rested on little more than the high price of petrochemicals. In 2007, oil, fuel, and
gas exports accounted for 65 percent of Russia's export revenues. With its currency falling, its export earnings crashing,
and its foreign exchange reserves melting away, an increasingly cash-strapped Russian state now faces
enormous difficulties in maintaining its military spending . The assertive foreign policy
propounded by Putin and Dmitry Medvedev was presented as the consequence of a rising
Russia; in actuality, it was a high-stakes bluff by a ruling elite which knows that its power
base continues to erode. During Bush's second term, Russia had a rare opportunity: The prices of oil and gas were
rising; the United States was, apparently, bogged down in a losing war in Iraq and needed Russian help at the Security
Council to deal with Iran; and the gap between Europe and the United States was wider than at any time since World War II.
With the future looking bleak, Russia chose to assert itself at this moment of maximum strength.
Russia Won't Challenge: S/L

First, this argument is laughablecross-apply the brzezinski uniqueness cardrussias crash
put them too far behind to ever catch up to the us.
Economic crisis has limited Russia's power--forced to bolster its economy, limits its influence
Roger C. Altman, "A Geopolitical Setback for the West," FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 88 n. 1, January/February 20 09, ASP.
Much of the rest of the world, however, has been hit hard by the crisis . The damaged Western
banks, which had consistently supplied credit to businesses in the developing world, have abruptly stopped providing it. As
foreign capital has been withdrawn, currencies, local banking systems, and stock markets in already poor states have
weakened sharply. Eastern European countries that had been running exceptionally large current account deficits and had
built up substantial foreign debts are particularly hurting. Hungary, Latvia, and Ukraine are prominent examples, and
Hungary and Ukraine have already secured emergency loans from the IMF. In Russia, the plunge in oil and
other commodity prices has caused a near collapse of the ruble and of local share prices.
The government of President Dmitry Medvedev has been spending huge amounts, perhaps $200
billion so far, to prop up the currency, Russia's financial system, and several highly
leveraged state-controlled enterprises. With $500 billion in foreign exchange reserves, Russia remains in a
strong financial condition even after these rescue efforts. Yet these sobering events will make some of its
renewed geopolitical ambitions harder to achieve . In theory, this could permit a thaw in U.S.-Russian
relations if Obama were to make an overture. Before that happens, however, Moscow might try the "get tough" approach
that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev used with U.S. President John F. Kennedy in Vienna in 1961.
Russia cant rise decreasing population, unstable government, and failing economy
Russia is a fraud. Its population is in steep decline and chronically afflicted by alcoholism. The
governmental system is authoritarian and corrupt, allied with protgs who have been given monopolistic concessions and who
repay their rulers with obscene kickbacks. Except for a few areas that have survived from the USSR's expertise in some defense industries, Russia's
manufacturing is continuing to wither, and its economy depends almost entirely on the
exportation of natural resources, especially oil. It is not an efficient producer of anything , and
commodity prices are always vulnerable .
Russia faces too many domestic constraints to balance

Lieber 2008 professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown (Robert, World Affairs Journal, Falling
upwards: Declinism, the box set, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Summer/full-Lieber.html)
Farther East, and despite
its economic recovery and the restoration of central power under Putin, Russia remains
overwhelmingly dependent on the current boom in energy and commodity pricesand correspondingly vulnerable in the event of
their decline. The country suffers from pervasive corruption, with a ranking from Transparency
International that puts it at 121 among 163 countries in this category. Its population, already less than half that
of the U.S. and plagued with alcoholism, chronic violence, a decrepit health-care system, and a male
life expectancy of fewer than 60 years of age (lower than that of Bangladesh), shrinks by some half a million people per year. And its
army, while bidding for attention and resources, remains weak and in disarray. As The Economist recently summarized Putins Russia, it has
become one of the most criminalized, corrupt and bureaucratized countries in the world. True, the Putin regime plays to its domestic base
with strident nationalism and xenophobia. In doing so, it has actively opposed and occasionally subverted American policies on some issues
while providing a degree of cooperation on others. Instances of the former include opposition to NATO enlargement and to the stationing of anti-missile systems in
Poland and the Czech Republic, the use of oil and gas resources as leverage against neighboring countries, overt and covert pressure against former Soviet
Republics, and arms sales to Syria and Iran. Yet Moscow grudgingly collaborates where it has shared concerns , as with
North Korea and combating terrorism. Russia presents a problem for the United States, but its erratic behavior, its priorities at home, and its own internal decline put it
well short of being a major power challenger.
Russias economy and expansionism will be a victim of the economic decline

Walter Russell

id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
But now the Russian economy looks shakier than ever; foreign investors have lost faith in
the country's legal and financial systems; Washington has drawn closer to European
capitals; the United States appears headed for an honorable and timely exit from the war in Iraq; and rising European
concern over Iran may enable the United States to address its nuclear program without Russian support at the United
Nations. The fall in oil prices, Chavez's own political troubles at home, and the economic
troubles in Cuba make the Russian fleet's presence in the Caribbean a curiosity rather than
a threat of any kind. Russia has or can develop additional opportunities, perhaps in Ukraine, but its weak
economic base and dismal future prospects suggest that the natural limits of its power are
easily reached. The much touted "Russian renaissance" is likely to be counted a casualty of the
Panic of 2008.
Russian military power has decayed, any increases in spending are only attempts to right the
ship
Stephen G. Brooks
and William C. Wohlforth, Professors, Government, Dartmouth College, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing,"
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 30 n. 1, Summer 2005, pp. 72-108.

In short, pragmatic regional cooperation is the chief driver of the SCO, with soft-balancing rhetoric sometimes providing a
convenient focal point for rallying greater collaboration. The real core of Russias relationships with India and China,
however, is not the diplomatic partnerships but extensive military coproduction arrangements and major arms sales. Yet
Russias interest in these exports is not driven by the need to counterbalance U.S. power
but rather by a desperate need to slow the inexorable decline of its military industrial
complex. Between 1992 and 1998, Russia experienced what was probably the steepest peacetime
decline in military power by any major state in history .28 Weapons procurement and
spending declined dramatically after 1991, and by 2000 only 20 percent of Russias operational weapons stocks
were modern, compared with 6080 percent in NATO countries.29 Maintenance and training are dismal; personnel
problems are dire and getting worse.30 Unable to subdue the Chechen rebels, the Russian military is beset
by
so many problems of such magnitude that experts agree that major reforms entailing huge
expenditures are critically necessary simply to forestall its continued decline . Increased
budgetary outlays and intensied reform efforts are thus driven by deep problems of decay that are unrelated to
counterbalancing U.S. power.
Russia/China Won't Challenge: F/L

Russia and China are not acting in concert to balance the U.S.
Stephen G. Brooks

In some respects, Russias
strategic partnerships with India and especially China represent the

strongest case of soft balancing.19 These are treatygoverned relationships that have resulted in a net shift in the
distribution of military power against the United States. Russias own military is presently unable to use
most of the output of its defense industry. To the extent that its strategic partnerships with
India and China permit the transfer of some of this output to militaries that can use it
effectively, the net effect is a shift in relative power. Moreover, Russia-China cooperation
includes the creation and promotion of a regional security organization that excludes the
United Statesthe Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In the end, however, each of the three elements that
make up the much-touted Asian trianglethe diplomatic relationships, the SCO, and the arms salesdees a softbalancing interpretation. Although Russian, Chinese, and (to a lesser extent) Indian leaders
periodically describe their diplomatic partnerships as an expression of their preference for a

multipolar world, there is little evidence that balancing U.S. power is a driving force behind
them. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the policies are crafted precisely to avoid the need for any
of the parties to face a trade-off between their mutual partnerships and their key bilateral
relationships with the United States.
Lack of economic ties undermine possibility of Russia-China alliance against the U.S.
Stephen G. Brooks
This reluctance to
jeopardize relations with the United States is not surprising to experts on

all three countries. Russia, China, and India are pursuing grand strategies that highlight
economic and institutional modernization, a goal that requires cordial relations with the
United States and the global economic institutions over which it has such a strong inuence .
The strategy has yielded high growth rates for all three countries in recent years. Moreover, in all three cases, policymakers
have explicitly reoriented their strategic priorities to emphasize regional security issues such as terrorism and weapons
proliferation on which they tend to have roughly similar preferences to those of the United States.21 A signicant
constraint on the development of deep Russia-China security ties is the nature of their
economic relationship: trade between the two countries remains anemic; they do not have
complementary economies from which high levels of trade can develop; and both are
dependent to a large degree on inward ows of capital and technology, which come mainly
from the West. Even more important, Russias willingness to commit to its Asian partnerships is limited by its perceived
weakness in the region.22 Russians remain wary of Chinas growing economic and diplomatic
clout, and express a general preference for diversifying Russias Asian relationships .
Suspicions plague both countries, stemming partly from mutual fears that each is using the other only to gain leverage over
Washington. Many Russian analysts regard their countrys partnership with India as a hedge against rising Chinese power
in Asia. Russia tends to sell India more advanced weapons systems than it exports to China, and the agreements on the
joint design and production of weapons that Russia has signed with India also tend to be deeper and more comprehensive
than the arrangements that Moscow has made with Beijing. Russian ofcials are quick to cite these facts when questioned
by domestic critics who accuse them of mortgaging Russias security through the arms transfers to China.
Russia/China Won't Challenge: Ext

Russo/sino balance not a threat: both remain too tied to us interests and lack true challenges
to us dominance
Consider the Sino-Russian "strategic partnership," the most prominent instance of apparent
balancing to date. The easy retort to overheated rhetoric about a Moscow-Beijing "axis" would
involve pointing out how it failed to slow, much less stop, President Vladimir Putin's geopolitical
sprint toward Washington in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. More telling, however, is
just how tenuous the shift was even before it was thrown off track. At no point did the
partnership entail any costly commitment or policy coordination against Washington that might
have risked a genuine confrontation. The keystone of the partnership -- Russia's arms sales to China -reflects a symmetry of weaknesses, rather than the potential of combined strengths. The sales
partially offset China's backward military technology while helping to slow the decline of
Russia's defense industries. Most of the arms in question are legacies of the R&D efforts of the
Soviet military-industrial complex, and given Moscow's paltry R&D budget today, few of these systems will long
remain competitive with their U.S. or NATO analogues.
Even as the two neighbors signed cooperative agreements, moreover, deep suspicions continued
to plague their relationship, economic ties between them remained anemic and unlikely to grow
dramatically, and both were highly dependent on inflows of capital and technology that could
come only from the West. Russian and Chinese leaders highlighted their desire for a world of reduced U.S. influence
not because this was a goal toward which they had actually started moving, but because it was one general principle on
which they could agree.
No risk of a russo/sino alliancethey each fear each other too much

RODMAN (Dir. National Security Programs at Nixon Center) 2K
[Peter, Russia: The Challenge of a Failing Power, Present Dangers: Crisis & Opportunity in American Foreign & Defense Policy, ed. Kagan & Kristol, Encounter Books
//wyo-tjc]
To be sure, some prominent Russians worry that their government is playing with fire. Fears are sometimes vented
in the Russian popular media that China is more of a threat to Russia than a partner. The
hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of legal and illegal Chinese immigrants pouring into
the Russian Far East raise a specter in some Russian minds of Chinese penetration if not
eventual annexation of the area. In the context of Yeltsins 1996 visit to Beijing, Russian officials took pains to
reassure an anxious parliament and public that China does not pose any threat to Russia in the foreseeable future.
So it is not 1950 all over again. The Sino-Russian relationship today lacks the global scope and
ideological impetus of the alliance period and, even more than that alliance, contains the seeds
of its possible future undoing. As that Sino-Soviet alliance fell apart because of Chinese fear of
Soviet power, this strategic partnership is vulnerable because of Russian fears of growing
Chinese power. [P. 87]
Too many obstacles check russia/sino alliance

WEITZ (Sr. Staffer, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis) 03
[Dr., Naval War College Review, Autumn, www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/art3-a03.htm]
Since the Cold Wars end, many analysts have expected China and Russia to cooperate
vigorously to counter U.S. geopolitical superiority.1 Although Chinese and Russian leaders have
collaborated on some issues, substantial obstacles have impeded their forming an antiAmerican bloc. This failure of the two strongest countries with both the capacity and (arguably)
incentives to counterbalance U.S. power and influence in world affairs suggests why the United
States continues to enjoy unprecedented global preeminence . This article analyzes why Russia and China
have not allied against the United States and offers policyrecommendations on how to avert such an anti-U.S. bloc in the
future.
No risk of sino/russian allianceus policies like the war on terror more likely to increase
relations among all three
Russia and China will continue to work together to pursue common goals, but if the events of the
last few yearsespecially the U.S. military interventions in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraqhave
not galvanized them to form an anti-American alliance, it is hard to envisage what will. The global
war on terrorism should if anything improve relations among China, Russia, and the United
States because their governments all consider radical Islamic terrorism their most pressing
security threat. Just as fears of a revanchist Russia or an expansionist China have faded in official Washington during
the past year, so policy makers in Moscow and Beijing have become preoccupied with problems other than potential
American hegemony. If a new great power alliance emerges in Eurasia, the United States will more likely be its member
than its target.
Russo/sino cooperation is tenuous at best- counterbalancing alliance unlikely

Cooperation between China and Russia has remained limited, episodic, and tenuous. The two
countries support each other on some issues but differ on others. Thus far, their fitfully
improving relationship has not presented a major policy challenge to the United States or its
allies. Russian arms sales have not been of sufficient quantity or quality by themselves to enable
China to defeat the more technologically advanced militaries of Taiwan or Japan . In fact, China has
imported less military equipment in dollar terms than either of those countries. The PLA typically buys small quantities of
advanced weapons in order to learn about their technologie s and how to counter them.90 As a result of this practice of
selective modernization, only a few pockets of excellence exist within the PLA. Most of the Chinese military still relies on
pre-1970s Soviet defense technology. Chinas ability even to maintain its complex, imported weapons systems or make the
doctrinal and organizational changes necessary to employ modern military technology optimally in
combined arms operations remains questionable.91 The expected increase in the quality of Chinas defense industries, the
continued decline of Russias military-industrial complex, and Russias stated refusal to sell its most advanced weapon
systems to a modernizing PLA could decrease the importance of the Sino-Russian arms trade in the future.
__________________________________
**Unipolarity Good/Multipolarity Bad**
Unipolarity Good: F/L
Unipolarity key to international peacepower advantage checks military competition, creates
economic openness and increases international norms
GRIFFITHS (School of Political and International Studies @ Flinders Univ) 03
[Martin, Self-Inflicted Wounds: United States Grand Stategy and the War on Terror, Oct., p. online //wyo-tjc]
As long as a hegemon maintains a preponderance of power, other states are inclined to accept
its leadership (though much also depends on the hegemons legitimacy, a concept which will be discussed later), since
challenging a hegemon can be a risky venture. However, historical change dictates shifts in power
preponderance over time. Other states begin to rise in power, due to uneven rates of economic growth and technological
advance, and the hegemon declines, relatively or absolutely. When a rising power or powers sees an
opportunity to challenge and displace an existing hegemon, the risk of major war is high (Gilpin
1981, 1994). Thus, when British hegemony declined in the face of the rising challenge from Germany, the stage was set for
the First World War. The theory of hegemonic stability was developed in the 1970s and 1980s by American scholars from
the realist tradition who identified the distribution of power among states as a central factor in explaining the openness and
stability of the international economy (Grunberg 1990). A powerful state with a technological advantage over other states will
desire an open trading system as it seeks new export markets. Large states are less exposed to the international economy
than small ones. A hegemonic state will allow other states to free ride on the benefits that the
hegemon provides to the international economy in the form of public goods (Conybeare 1984, Gowa
1989). These are the kind of goods where exclusion of consumers is impossible and consumption of the good by one actor
does not exhaust its availability for others. In international economic affairs an open trading system, well-defined property
rights, common standards of measures including international money, consistent macroeconomic policies, proper action in
case of economic crisis, and stable exchange rates are said to be public goods. In international society, an
established hegemony helps the cause of international peace in a number of ways. First, a
hegemon deters renewed military competition and provides general security through its
preponderant power. Second, a hegemon can, if it chooses, strengthen international norms of
conduct. Third, a hegemons economic power serves as the basis of a global lending system and
free trade regime, providing economic incentives for states to cooperate and forego wars for
resources and markets. Such was the nature of British hegemony in the nineteenth century, hence the term Pax Britannica.
After World War Two, the U.S. has performed the roles Britain once played, though with an even greater preponderance of
power. Thus, much of the peace between democracies after World War Two can be explained by the
fact that the political-military hegemony of the United States has helped to create a security
structure in Europe and the Pacific conducive to peaceful interaction. Today, U.S. hegemony is
tolerated by many states in Europe and Asia, not because the U.S. is particularly liked, but
because of the perception that the absence of a U.S. presence might result in aggression by
aspiring regional hegemons. However, Chalmers Johnson (2000) has argued that this is a false perception
promoted from Washington to silence demands for its military withdrawal from Japan and South Korea.
Unipolarity Good: S/L

Unipolarity is critical to international stability. Our griffiths evidence gives three reasons:
A) Removes competitionmultipolarity means states have to jockey for position. In a world
of us primacy, competition is useless because the hegemon is so far ahead, increasing
likelihood of bandwagoning
B) Builds interdependencethe stability afforded by hegemony allows for greater trade,
increasing the costs of military competition
C) Binds actorsus internationalism has fostered a global network of international norms
that help the us while discouraging challenges to hegemony
Unipolar primacy solves great power conflicts: solves both hegemonic rivalry and
miscalculation thats inherent to balance of power**
WALT (JFK School of Government, Harvard Univ.) 02
[Stephen, Naval War College Review, Spring, www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm]
A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level
of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer
important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American
primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is . For most of the
past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and
occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed
over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant
limits on the possib ility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that
because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to
challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a hegemonic war (because there is
no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the
overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more
likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can
convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however,
the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.
Multipolarity Bad: F/L

First, shifting towards multipolarity risks great power warsdistribution of power more easily
shifts
FRIEDBURG (Princeton University) 94
[Aaron, International Security, Winter, p. 8, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
The answer to these questions comes in two parts. First, at the level of structure, multipolar systems do seem
prone to certain pathologies. Systems in which power is distributed at the outset more or less evenly
among a substantial number of states do not remain indefinitely in peaceful equilibrium. As, inevitably,
the distribution of power among states shifts, wars tend to break out. The history of the European
state system before 1945 is a story of multipolarity; it is also a story of war , and not only small wars for
limited ends, but big, system-shattering struggles. The mere existence of an assortment of potential
alliance partners has not always guaranteed the prompt formation of countervailing coalitions, as
advocates of multipolarity suggest that it should. In other words, the balance has not always balanced, or
balanced quickly enough to deter an aggressive state or alliance .
Second, these go nuclear

KHALILZAD (Rand Analyst, Envoy to Afghanistan) 95
[Zalmay, Losing the Moment, Washington Quarterly, Spring, ln// wyo-tjc]
Finally, and most important, there is no guarantee that the system will succeed in its own terms. Its
operation requires subtle calculations and indications of intentions in order to maintain the
balance while avoiding war; nations must know how to signal their depth of commitment on a given issue without
taking irrevocable steps toward war. This balancing act proved impossible even for the culturally similar
and aristocratically governed states of the nineteenth-century European balance of power systems. It will be
infinitely more difficult when the system is global, the participants differ culturally, and the
governments of many of the states, influenced by public opinion, are unable to be as flexible (or
cynical) as the rules of the system require. Thus, miscalculations might be made about the state
of the balance that could lead to wars that the United States might be unable to stay out of . The
balance of power system failed in the past, producing World War I and other major conflicts. It
might not work any better in the future -- and war among major powers in the nuclear age is
likely to be more devastating.
Multipolarity Bad: S/L

A return to global balances of power would be devestating: our friedburg and khalilzad cards
give 3 key warrants:
A) Leadership vacuumthis causes a return to self-help conditions and thus competition
B) Rivalrycompetitions for influence in a world without the us will accelerate collisions for
power
C) Miscalculationstates will misread each-other, leading to power wars.
Second, without a unipolar hegemon to exert stability, regional balances of power will escalate
to major power wars that the us would be sucked into, risking deterrence failures and nuclear
war.
A2 Powers Will Balance 2NC

First, there is no reason to believe power will balancethe only historical experience with
multipolarity caused the largest wars ever known.
Second, balance of power does not ensure peacehistory proves it leads to more war and
cant risk it in the nuclear age
Americas powerhard and softis only part of the story. How others react to American power is equally important to the
question of stability and governance in this global information age. Many realists extol the virtues of the classic
nineteenth-century European balance of power, in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions
of any especially aggressive power. They urge the United States to rediscover the virtues of a balance of
power at the global level today. Already in the 197os, Richard Nixon argued that the only time in the history of the
world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is when one nation
becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitors that the danger of war arises. But whether such
multipolarity would be good or bad for the United States and for the world is debatable. I am
skeptical. War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of
power. The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the
independence of most countries, but there were wars among the great powers for 60 percent of
the years since ~ Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a
dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear . [P. 12-13]
A2 Curent Peace Solves Violence 2NC

Leadership vacuum wouldnt be peacefulcurrent stability only exists because of the united
states
KAGAN (Professor, History, Yale University) 97
[Donald, Orbis, Spring, p. 188-189, ASP]
The last three-quarters of the twentieth century strongly suggest the opposite conclusion: major war is more likely to
come when satisfied states neglect their defenses and fail to take an active part in the
preservation of peace. It is vital to understand that the current relatively peaceful and secure situation
is neither inevitable nor immutable. It reflects two conditions built up with tremendous effort and
expense during the last half century: the great power of the United States and the general
expectation that Americans will be willing to use that power when necessary. The diminution of
U.S. power and credibility, which would follow on a policy of reduced responsibility, would thus not be a
neutral act that would leave the situation as it stands. Instead, it would be a critical step in
undermining the stability of the international situation . Calculations based on the absence of visible potential
enemies would immediately be made invalid by America's withdrawal from its current position as the major bulwark
supporting the world order. The cost of the resulting upheaval in wealth, instability, and the likelihood of war would be
infinitely greater than the cost of
continuing to uphold the existing international structure.
A2 Unilateralism Bad 2NC

US unlikely to intervene in countries any time soon
Robert Gates, (U.S. Secretary of Defense), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2009, 29.
The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan -- that is, forced regime
change followed by nation building under fire -- anytime soon.
Iraq failure constrains the US

If the lessons of Iraq cause American leaders to be more selective in determining when military
force can accomplish our national objectives, it stands to reason we will probably fight fewer
wars than currently projected.
US wont attack North Korea or Iran

Michael Mandlebaum, (Prof., International Relations, Johns Hopkins U.), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, 2010, 5.
The countries that are now plausible targets for a preventive war -- North
Korea and Iran -- differ from Iraq in ways that make

such a campaign extremely unattractive. North Korea is more heavily armed than Iraq, and in a war
could do serious damage to America's chief ally in the region , South Korea, even if North Korea lost. Iran has a larger
population than Iraq, and it is less isolated internationally. The United States would have hesitated before attacking either one of these countries even if the Iraq
operation had gone smoothly. Now, with the occupation of Iraq proving to be both costly (some $251 billion and counting) and frustrating, support for repeating the
exercise elsewhere is hard to find.
Obama opposes unilateralism

Zachary Karabell, (Ph.D., Harvard U.), SUPERFUSION: HOW CHINA AND AMERICA BECAME ONE ECONOMY AND
WHY THE WORLDS PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT, 2009, 290.
Not surprisingly, much of the commentary about the future of the United States has focused on the changing nature of American power relative to the rest of the
world. Some have seen the glass half full and emphasized the "rise of the rest" as Fareed Zakaria put it, while others have painted a bleaker picture of an America in
The election of Barack Obama as president in many ways represented a collective

acknowledgment that the relative status of the United States in the world has shifted. Unlike the Bush
administration, Obama has explicitly acknowledged that the United States can neither manage the
problems of the world unilaterally nor solve its own issues in a vacuum .
retreat and in decline.
______________________________
**Heg Good: Transition Debate**
Transition/Drawdown Bad: A2 "Isolationism Impossible"
The U.S. public is vulnerable to isolationist sentimentsit would be a disaster
Mitchell B. Reiss, Restoring Americas Image: What the Next President Can Do, SURVIVAL v. 50 n. 5,
October 2008, pp. 99-114.
when the United States retreats from the world, bad things happen. The
United States rejected the League of Nations and turned inwards in the 1920s and 1930s,
contributing to the Great Depression and the onset of the Second World War . After the Vietnam War, a
weakened and inward-looking America prompted some Asian countries to start their own
nuclear-weapons programmes, emboldened Islamic fundamentalists to attack American
interests, and encouraged the Soviet Union to occupy Afghanistan. While there are some who say this couldn't happen today,
that America couldn't pull up the drawbridge and retreat behind the parapets, recent opinion polls in the United States reveal a
preference for isolationism not seen since the end of the Vietnam War. It is hard to imagine any
scenario in which an isolated, disengaged United States would be a better friend and ally to other
countries, better promote global prosperity, more forcefully endorse democracy, social justice
and human dignity, or do more to enhance peace and security.
The history of the last century demonstrates that
Transition/Drawdown Bad: A2 "Should Transition Early" F/L

First, you cant win a transition would happenhegemons maximize power. They would
never adopt self restraint
SCHWELLER (Assoc. Professor Political Science @ Ohio State) 01
[Randall, The Problem of International Order Revisted, International Security, Summer, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
First, although hegemonic decline may be inevitable, it is not self-evident that a policy of strategic
restraint better serves the hegemon's longrun interests than simply taking advantage of its
power position to grab immediate gains. Indeed there is no a priori reason to conclude that instant postwar benefits (e.g., increases in
the size of the new hegemon's territorial boundaries, spheres of influence, colonial possessions, etc.) will not continue to accrue significant future gains and thereby
better serve to arrest the pace of hegemonic decline than Ikenberry's alternative of a constitutional peace settlement. Because one can make an equally impressive
logical case to support either position, theoretical arguments alone will not tell us whether the choice to transform is more likely to benefit the hegemon over the long
In practice, there has been a strong relationship

between the growth in power of a state and its desire to extend its territorial control, political
influence, and domination of the international economy.[25] Great powers have tended to expand when they can. They have
run than is the decision to dominate. It is ultimately an empirical question.
done so not necessarily to satisfy an innate lust for power, prestige, and glorythough history is replete with such casesbut rather because
anarchy compels states to enhance their security and influence over others and their environment whenever it is possible and pragmatic for
them to do SO.[26] Hegemonic postwar junctures are precisely when great powers, especially the leading state, can be expected to expand,
not bind, their power. Because nature and politics abhor a vacuum, the victors will move quickly to fill the political vacuums left behind by the
defeated great powers. This is predictable behavior because, when presented with such an extraordinary opportunity to expand the state's territory and influence,
political leaders can be said to act under external compulsion rather than in accordance with their preferences:[27] That is, their actions are driven by irresistible
temptation. Second,
even if decisionmakers believe that hegemonic decline is inevitable, there are

plenty of reasons why they would not and should not act on that belief. First, leaders have few if
any domestic incentives to abandon policies of autonomy and unilateralism in favor of
multilateralism and self-restraint. The incentive structure of elites, even foreign policy ones, is primarily a function of domestic,
not international, politics. No matter how much internationalists may champion multilateral solutions, elected officials must answer to a
domestic audience, and unelected bureaucrats must serve and promote the autonomy and interests of the bureaucratic organization to which
they belong. Second, Ikenberry's claim rests on an unrealistic assumption about the time horizons of democratic leaders. Even if we concede
the point that the creation of a constitutional order is a wise long-term investment for the new hegemonic state, history records few
decisionmakers who acted in such a farsighted manner. This is particularly true for leaders of democratic states, because the primary goal for
most elected officials is to ensure reelection. Why, then, should we expect democratically elected policymakers of a newly hegemonic state to
forgo immediate gains for long-run payoffs that may or may not be reaped decades laterlong after they have left office? Finally, the
deliberate choice to restrain the exercise of power now because of the possibility (but not
certainty) of exerting relatively less power later is like committing suicide for fear of death. The
key question for postwar leaders is not whether but when decline will come a nd how much deterioration
can be expected. Had American policymakers, for example, been persuaded by the chorus of scholars in the 1970s to late 1980s proclaiming that U.S. power was
in terminal decline, the Cold War might have continued for decades longer; and it surely would noth ave ended in total victory for the West. Thankfully, instead of
constraining American power and preparing for inevitable decline, the Reagan administration began ramping up U.S. power capabilities in the 1980s, arresting
America's relative decline through bold policy choices.[28] Consequently, as Ikenberry himself acknowledges, American power in the 1990s is without historical
precedent (p. 270).
Second, the inevitable death of us hegemony your evidence assumes is not a smooth
withdrawalits is a collapse into violent multipolarity that generates nuclear war
In any case, the eventual end of American hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity
among the familiar major powers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will
it yield to another dominant hegemon that would displace the United State s by assuming a similar political,
military, economic, technological, and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last century are too
fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. It is noteworthy that since 1880, in a comparative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their economic strength, military budgets and assets, populations, etc.), the top five slots at sequential
twenty-year intervals have been shared by just seven states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and China. Only the United
States, however, unambiguously earned inclusion among the top five in every one of the twenty- year intervals, and the gap in the year 2000 between the top-ranked
The former major European powersGreat Britain, Germany, and

Franceare too weak to step into the breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the
United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before,
European Union will become sufficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete
with the United States in the politico-military arena, Russia is no longer an imperial power , and its
central challenge is to recover socioeconomically lest it lose its far eastern territories to China . Japans population is aging and its
economy has slowed; the conventional wisdom of the 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next superstate now has the ring of historical irony .
China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal
political stability both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still con strained by an
impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide. The same is
true of India, which additionally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity. Even a coalition among
the abovea most unlikely prospect, given their historical conflicts and clashing territorial claims would lack the cohesion, muscle,
and energy needed to both push America off its pedestal and sustain global stability. Some
leading states, in any case, would side with America if push came to shove, Indeed, any evident American
decline might precipitate efforts to reinforce Americasleadership . Most important, the shared resentment of American hege -
mony would not dampen the clashes of interest among states. The more intense collisionsin
the event of Americas declinecould spark a wildfire of regional violence, rendered all the more
dangerous by the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. [P. 2-4]
Transition/Drawdown Bad: A2 "Should Transition Early" S/L

You cannot win a sooner is better argumentfirst, our schweller evidence destroys your
internal linkrealism dictates that a hegemon will maximize power, never elect into selfrestraint. There is not a chance in hell us leaders will transition to off-shore balancing. Theyll
simply become more unilateral
Second, that impact turns your stability argumentjust because hegemony will end someday
doesnt mean we shouldnt enjoy it while it is here. The status quo transition is an incredibly
violent one, creating a nuclear war, which is our brzezinski evidence
Even if you win the transition would happen now, it would be disastrousneed a gradual
drawdown to avoid war
Americas diminishing internationalism is not the product of political decay. Nor does it mark the return of the dark and
illusory brand of isolationism that so sorely misguided the nation in the past. It is the logical consequence of the times, of
Americas location, and of a strategic environment in which terror attacks against the homeland, not hegemonic wars in
Europe or Asia, represent the most immediate threat to the countrys well-being. The nations politics are in the process of
catching up with geopolitical realities.
At the same time, a waning internationalism does have the potential to turn into a dangerous
isolationism. Especially because of the natural security afforded by Americas location, the allure
of preserving that security by pulling back from commitments that may com promise it, and the
isolationist strains that have influenced U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the republic, a reduction of the countrys
global role does have the potential to go too far. A reining in of Americas overseas commitments is one
thing. It is inevitable and can be done gradually and with adequate preparation so as to mini mize
the attendant risks. An American withdrawal from global affairs is another matter altogether. It
would have dire consequences precisely because global stability is at present so dependent on
American power and purpose. [P. 65]
Transition/Drawdown Bad: A2 Isolationism Good F/L

First, isolationism dooms the world to great warsextend the 1nc impact evidencewithout
us leadership to exert a stabilizing influence, power wars will escalate and draw the us in
inevitably
Second, experience with world war ii gives greater probability to our claimproves there is a
high propensity for our claim to be true
Third, isolationism is untenableany major threat like terrorism or ballistic missiles can reach
the homeland and instability will devastate ability to trade/export
HAASS (VP of the Brookings Institute) 99
[Richard, Imperial Understretch, Oct. 25, p. online: http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/003/haass.html //wyo-tjc]
One alternative is isolationism, a philosophy in which there is not much of a foreign policy on the grounds that it is
not needed. The problem with isolationism is that the United States is affected by almost
everything that goes on in the world. The idea that there are discreet baskets called "foreign affairs" and
"domestic affairs" is no longer the case, if indeed it ever was. Increasingly, there are spillover effects, whether
what is at stake involves drugs, immigration, trade, ideas, or e-mail. Terrorism can come to our
shores. So, too, can missiles. Fortress America, even if it were desirable, is simply not doable.
What about a foreign policy designed simply to promote exports? Exports are one key to
economic growth and jobs. The problem is that trade does not take place in a vacuum. We
cannot have an export-dominated foreign policy in a world of instability. If there were a war on
the Korean peninsulasomething still in the realm of possibility it would have enormous consequences
for U.S. exports and economic relations in that part of the world . Or what would happen if Mexico were to
become a failed state like Haiti? Mexico is now our second-largest trading partner after Canada; the idea that trade with
Mexico could be sustained amid such instability is simply wrong. A trade-only or trade-dominant foreign policy simply is not
viable.
Fourth, its silly to think the us would stay out of iteither to check an aggressive power or
because of domestic politics, the us would be forced to enter
Transition/Drawdown Bad: A2 "Isolationism Good" Ext

Isolationism failscant hide from threats with globalization
HAAS (Dir., Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution) 2K
[Richard, Brookings Review, Spring, www.brook.edu/press/REVIEW/spring2000/haass.htm]
What might be described as the opposite alternative-minimalism or neo-isolationism-is arguably more doable but less
desirable. Although doing less abroad would be less costly in the near term, over time it could prove terribly expensive. The
United States cannot insulate itself in a world that is ever more global. Missiles, people, germs,
terrorists, ideas, drugs, funds, and goods all show little respect for state boundaries. Moreover,
an absence of American activism will create vacuums that will be filled by forces that in some
cases will be hostile to ourselves, creating the likelihood of conflict down the road.
Global interconnectedness demands preponderant american foreign policycant sit back on

the sidelines
HENRIKSON (Sr. Fellow at Hoover Inst) 99
[Thomas, Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with Rogue States, p. online: http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/94/94a.html //wyo-tjc]
Hard realities, not mere altruism, mean that America must act not like a policeman but like a
sheriff in the old Western frontier towns, acting alone on occasion, relying on deputies or long-standing
allies, or looking for a posse among regional partners. Or, in some cases, it may look for another sheriff, or
regional power, to organize local forces.(3) It cannot allow desperadoes to run loose without encouraging other outlaws to
test the limits of law and order. History instructs us that the U.S. withdrawal from world problems, leaving Europeans and
Asians to their own devices in the 1930s, led to the rise of militarism and aggression. Aloofness from international politics is
simply not a viable option.
We benefit materially from a stable and peaceful world. Our economic and political health
depend on cross-border trade and international stability . The percentage of our gross domestic product
(GDP) based on foreign trade has doubled since 1970. In 1997, exports alone reached 12 percent of GDP and imports
totaled 13 percent. Although exports and imports combined accounted for one-quarter of GDP, total trade accounted
for more than one-third of the average U.S. national income per capita ( $19,700). The United States,
which accounts for about 14 percent of total world trade (exports and imports), is the world's largest exporter of goods and
services, $933 billion in 1997. It is not in our interest to stand aside while rogue behavior unravels a
region's trade, economic, and human networks.
Transition/Drawdown Bad: A2 Regionalism Good F/L

First, cross-apply our impact evidenceregional balances of power will come undone because
there is not an objective outsider to force restraint. Makes competition and miscalc a certainty
Second, regionalized multipolarity is also destabilizing, risking conflict
HWANG & KUGLER (Professors of Political Science @ Honam & Claremont) 98
[Young-Bae & Jacek, The Likelihood of Conflict in East Asia and on the Korean Penninsula, World Affairs, Fall 1998, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
An important extension of the power parity perspective by Lemke (1995,1996,1997) demonstrates

that the same principles that hold true among the major powers at the global level also hold true
among regional leaders. Lemke's contribution is important because he shows that severe
conflicts of all types follow conditions of power parity. His empirical tests were based on the very diverse
regions of Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, demonstrating that the same conditions that lead to major
international confrontations hold true for major competitors in key regions . Finally, work by Bueno de Mesquita
and Lalman (1992), using a sophisticated bounded rationality approach, shows that while conditions for conflict and peace in the balance of power are inconsistent,
the conditions identified by power parity are consistent with the model and with the prevailing evidence. Extensions of this approach to nuclear deterrence by Kugler
and Zagare (1987) demonstrate the consistency of the parity argument with post-war behavior, but indicate that mutual assured destruction is logically a tenuous
strategy because deterrence may fail when risk propensity is high
Third, lack of legitimate leadership and capabilities dooms efforts to use regionalism in
absence of leadership
HAASS & STEIN (Brookings Institute) 99
[Richard & Sydney, What to do With American Primacy, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
What, then, are the options that fall between perfect internationalism and unilateralism? One idea, put forward by Samuel
P. Huntington and others, is dependence on regional powers, sometimes referred to as "pivotal states." There
are serious problems with this idea, however. In several regions, the strongest state is not
accepted as a legitimate policeman by its weaker neighbors : consider India, Israel, and China. Worse yet, in the Middle
East, for example, it is the dominant states (Iran and Iraq) that require policing.
A better option is regionalism. Regionalism is not to be confused with assigning the task of promoting order to regional hegemons. The former involves building
consensus and capacity on a regional scale, the latter the assertion of dominance by a single actor over its neighbors .
The problem with regionalism is that in many regions -- Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Levant,
the Persian Gulf -- the principal states do not agree on what constitutes regional order. In other
regions such as Europe, the problem is primarily one of capacity. Europe needs far more military
muscle -- and the ability to speak with a common voice -- to play an effective role on the
continent or beyond. The same holds for Latin America. In Africa, disagreement and a lack of
consensus limit what the principal regional organization (the Organization of African Unity) can do,
although subregional organizations have done some good in limited cases.
Fourth, they have no scenario for who steps inour uniqueness evidence proves that only the
us has the capabilities and will to exert a stabilizing role. Regional balances will fall prey to
the self-help system
Transition/Drawdown Bad: A2 "Regionalism Good" Ext

Regionalism fails in latin america
HAAS (Dir., Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution) 2K
[Richard, Foreign Affairs, November/December, LN]
Latin America (like the Asia -Pacific) is also relatively weak in regional institutions other than in the economic area where
both NAFTA and Mercosur provide important frameworks for trade. This weakness is less obvious than in Africa given the
prevalence of democratic, market-oriented societies. But there are disquieting trends toward populism in both Peru and
Venezuela, and even more troubling evidence that the government of Colombia is losing ground in its struggle with left wing
guerillas, drug traffickers, and paramilitaries.
Transition/Drawdown Bad: A2 Strategic Restraint F/L

Globalization makes neglecting some areas untenableinternationalism must be kept to
maintain security
During the 1990S we Americans had a legitimate national debate over humanitarian intervention
in places such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Our connection to those places was indirect-were we just
being altruistic? Were we there just because we couldn't stand seeing atrocities on CNN?- and the national interest
unclear. In Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, the connection was nightmarishly clear: Here
was a state that we Ameri- cans had permitted to fail, which was once seen as distant and
marginal, and that neglect had led directly to the mass slaughter of Americans . Even the most
stalwart conservatives have seen their illusions shattered on that score. As the Bush administration
acknowledged in September 2002 in its new national security strategy: "America is now threatened
less by con- quering states than we are by failing ones ."25 But accepting responsibility for
Afghanistan opened up a new dimension of global responsibility . For how do we really know where the
next Afghanistan is? Which states are we going to permit to fail now? No longer can we draw a defense
perimeter around certain regions and exclude others, as Secretary of State Dean Acheson did in the early
years of the Cold War (leaving the Korean peninsula, unfortunately, outside of it; the North invaded the South six months
later). Nor can we cut off and quarantine certain recalcitrant sections of the world, somewhat as
Rome once declared natural "boundaries" to an empire that did not include barbarian hordes
(boundaries that did not ultimately hold). Al-Qaeda may be destroyed some day, but some other threat will
follow it, and it will have even greater means to harm us. A former Pentagon planner, one of the smartest
men I know, once told me, "Outfits like al-Qaeda have the whole world as their option. They're like
water, they're going to go to the lowest place on earth." And from the lowest place on earth they
can reach us. So that's where we Americans must go too, brandishing both arms and aid, both
stealth weapons and the seductions of our success-mainly the global system we have built. We
are in this world with both feet now. We have achieved our Founding Fathers' fondest dream and,
at the same time, their worst nightmare. We are a shining success, the supreme power on earth.
And we are entangled everywhere. 24-25
Transition/Drawdown Bad: No Other Leader Ext

No alternative to hegemonylack of the us will be greeted with apolarity, global chaos and a
new dark age
FERGUSON (Professor of Finance and History @ NYU) 04
[Niall, A World Without Power, Foreign Policy, July/August, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative . If the United States retreats from its hegemonic
role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world--and certainly not the
United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia,
but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors
a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century ago, it
was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of
statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The
In his bestselling
1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy
concluded that, like all past empires, the U.S. and Russian superpowers would inevitably
succumb to overstretch. But their place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of China and Japan, both still unencumbered
by the dead weight of imperial military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago political scientist John
J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account . Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and after surviving the German and Japanese
challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace for the ascent of new rivals. " [A] rising China is the most
influence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival powers .
dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century," contends Mearsheimer. "[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing
Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead." China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (EU) too has the potential
Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is
both perennial and universal . The "unipolarity" identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the
simple reason that history hates a hyperpower . Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a
multipolar, multipower world. But what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the
world is actually heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of
power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been
to become "a formidable rival."
preoccupied with the achievements of great powers--whether civilizations, empires, or nationstates--they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded.
Anyone who dislikes U.S.

hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a
world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out
to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of
endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and
civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves .
Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of "apolarity," if you will) is hardly encouraging .
No other leader will emergecant overcome insitutional inertia

IKENBERRY (Assoc. Prof of Poliitcal Science @ Penn) 99
[G. John, Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American Postwar Order, International Security, Winter 98/99, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
the Western order has actually become more stable over time because the rules and
institutions have become more firmly embedded in the wider structures of politics and society. This is an argument about the
Fourth,
increasing returns to institutions, in this case Western security and economic institutions. Over the decades, the core institutions of Western order have sunk their
The result is that it is becoming

increasingly difficult for "alternative institutions" or "alternative leadership" to seriously emerge.
Western order has become institutionalized and path dependent--that is, more and more people
will have to disrupt their lives if the order is to radically change. This makes wholesale change
less likely.
roots ever more deeply into the political and economic structures of the states that participate within the order .
No other state has the ability to supplant american leadership

BRZEZINSKI (Fmr State Dept Official) 97
[Zbignew, The Grand Chessboard, Harper Collins, p. //wyo-tjc]
once American leadership begins to fade, Americas current global predominance is

unlikely to be replicated by any single state. Thus, the key question for the future is What will America bequeath to the world as the
Accordingly,
enduring legacy of its primacy?

The answer depends in part on how long that primacy lasts and on how energetically America shapes a framework of key power partnership that over time can be
more formally institutionalized. In fact, the window of historical opportunity for Americas constructive exploitation of its global power could prove to be relatively brief,
for both domestic and external reasons. A genuinely populist democracy has never before attained international supremacy .
The pursuit of power

and especially the economic costs and human sacrifice that the exercise of such power often
requires are not generally congenial to democratic instincts. Democratization is inimical to
imperial mobilization.
United states is the worlds only hegemonany other competitiors lack full-spectrum
dominance
MASTANDUNO (Assoc Professor of Govt at Dartmouth) 97
[Michael, Preserving the Unipolar Moment, International Security, Spring, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
Even without precise measurement, to focus on a range of power attributes leads to the
conclusion that the United States is now in a category by itself. Only the United States currently
excels in military power and preparedness, economic and technological capacity, size of
population and territory, resource endowment, political stability, and "soft power" attributes such as
ideology.[21] All other would-be great powers are limited or lopsided in one critical way or another. Thus
many commentators and theorists have concluded that the current structure is unipolar. In an article extending Waltz's theory to the post-Cold War era, Christopher
Layne opens with the assertion that "the Soviet Union's collapse transformed the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity."[22]
Transition/Drawdown Bad: U.S. Won't Give Up Hegemony Ext

American hegemony is inevitableit is only a question of exercising it in the best way
possible
Herein lies one of the curses of empire: to let go never looks safe, and indeed rarely is . The United
Kingdom withdrew from its leading role in world affairs without too much damage to itself (although at the price of massive
bloodshed in places such as India and Yemen), but that had much to do with the readiness of the United States to take its
place--to fill the vacuum left by British power and take up the British role in many parts of the world. Nor did the British have
much choice in their withdrawal from empire, other than by, as Machiavelli put it, "anticipating necessity," pulling back just
before forces too strong for them to master would have compelled them. The United States today also has less
choice about its role in world affairs than its worried leaders and their critics, or its anxious
friends and numerous enemies, think. The logic of empire is a logic of extension, and the strategic conundrum of
empire is that of over commitment and overstretch. Despite the wishes of French and Chinese politicians,
no countervailing state or federation will restore a balance-of-power system akin to that of
Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at least not in the near future. Despite the wishes of
idealists, no international institution has proven capable of effective action in the absence of the
power generated and exercised by states. And a third possibility--anarchy unleashed after a
disgusted United States recalls its legions in a spurt of democratic disgust at and indifference to
the rest of the planet--is too horrifying to contemplate. The real alternatives, then, are U.S.
hegemony exercised prudently or foolishly, consistently or fecklessly, safely or dangerously-and for this, U.S. leaders must look back to school themselves in the wisdom that will make such
statesmanship possible.
Offshore Balancing Defense: F/L

First, you have no internal link to thisthe us wont choose self-restraint now, which is the
schweller evidence
Second, the us would never adopt osb
LIND (Sr. Fellow at New America Foundation) 07
[Michael, Beyond Hegemony, National Interest, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
an offshore-balancing strategy, is unlikely to be adopted and would be

unwise. The offshore-balancing strategy would have the United States intervene only at the last
moment to "tip the balance" against one side in a contest among Eurasian great powers--China versus Japan, or Russia versus Germany or the European Union. It would be far better for the
United States to maintain a role in diplomacy and security in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, in
the hope of defusing conflicts and deterring aggressors, rather than to intervene belatedly, as it
did in the two world wars.
Another option favored by some realists and libertarians,
Third, it would fail to have a stabilizing effect:

A) onshore presence is key to credibility
There is no viable alternative grand strategy for the United States than primacy . Primacy is the best and most effective
means to maintain the security and safety of the United States for the reasons I argued in chapter 1. However, it is also the best because every other grand strategic "alternative" is
a chimera and can only weaken the United States, threaten the security and safety of the American people, and introduce great peril for the United
States and for other countries. A large part of what makes primacy such a success is that other countries know where the United States stands, what it will defend, and that it will be involved in disputes, both great and small. Accordingly, other
. Offshore balancing incurs the risks of primacy without its

benefits. It pledges that the United States will defend its interests with air power and sea power,
but not land power. That is curious because we could defend our interests with land power but choose not to, suggesting our threat to defend is not
serious, which weakens our credibility and invites challenges to the interests of the United
States. Offshore balancing increases the probability of conflict for the United States. It raises the
danger that the interests of the United States will be challenged not only from foes like China
and Iran, but, perversely, also from countries now allied with the United States like Japan and
Turkey.
countries have to respect the interests of the United States or face the consequences
B) it undermines american power in the long run

Books //wyo-tjc]
a strategy aimed at preserving American pre-eminence would require an even greater U.S.
commitment to its allies. The United States would not be merely an offshore balancer , a savior of last resort,
In fact,
as many recommend. It would not be a reluctant sheriff, rousing itself to action only when the threatened townsfolk turn to it in desperation. American pre-eminence cannot be maintained from a distance, by means of some postCold War version
of the Nixon doctrine, whereby the United States hangs back and keeps its powder dry. The United States would instead conceive of itself as at once a European power, an Asian power, a Middle Eastern power and, of course, a Western
Hemispheric power. It would act as if threats to the interests of our allies are threats to us, which indeed they are. It would act as if instability in important regions of the world, and the flouting of civilized rules of conduct in those regions, are threats
To act otherwise would make the United States appear a most

unreliable partner in world affairs, which would erode both American pre-eminence and the international order, and gradually undermine the very alliances on which U.S. security depends. Eventually,
the crises would appear at our doorstep. This is what it means to be a global superpower with global responsibilities. The costs of assuming these responsibilities are more than made
up by the benefits to American long-term interests. It is short-sighted to imagine that a policy of keeping our powder dry is
either safer or less expensive than a policy that aims to preclude and deter the emergence of new threats, that has the United
that affect us with almost the same immediacy as if they were occurring on our doorstep.
States arriving quickly at the scene of potential trouble before it has fully erupted, that addresses threats to the national interest before they have developed into full-blown crises. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison expressed a common but mistaken view
In fact, this is precisely the way for a

superpower to cease being a superpower. Astrong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to important regions of the world
would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability would attempt to alter the status
quo in their favor. It might even deter such challengers from undertaking expensive efforts to
arm themselves in the first place. An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt, on
the other hand, can only encourage such challenges. In Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East, the message we should be sending to potential foes is: Dont even
last year when she wrote that a superpower is more credible and effective when it maintains a measured distance from all regional conflicts.
think about it. That kind of deterrence offers the best recipe for lasting peace; it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should we fail to build such a deterrent capacity. [P. 15-16]
C) no other powers can provide stability

THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these
global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with
conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on
salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached . The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China
to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the
capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical
hope of solving the world's ills.
Offshore Balancing Defense: S/L

Offshore balancing fails as a grand strategy:
First, it would never come about. America will fight to retain its hegemony til the bitter end,
making involvement in global affairs inevitable and more violent that in a world of strong
american leadershipthats the schweller and lind evidence
Second, offshore balancing assumes the us can keep its distancethe kagan evidence
proves that the only way for it to do that is to prevent conflicts from occuring in the first place.
That is only possible in a world of hegemony. Meaning weve internal link turned any way for
them to access a large impact to offshore balancing.
Third, it cant pacify the worldour thayer and kagan cards prove that we need to have an
onshore presence to create stability, no other country can stabilize regions of the world, and
osb hurts american power in the long run, leaving it open to challengers
And, offshore balancing wont solve securitytek and globalization has shrunk distances too
much
In brief, Americas security dilemmas in the twenty_first century are coming to resemble the messy
and diverse criminal challenges that large urban centers have been confronting for years, with
percolating underworld violence both pervasive and normal. The risk inherent in this condition,
however, is magnified by the technological potential of lethal violence to suddenly get out of
hand and then massively escalate. Moreover, Americas ability to respond may be handicapped by the absence of
an easy_to_define and self-evident source of threat. In essence, Americas isolated national security of the
nineteenth century, which became defense through overseas alliances during the second half of
the twentieth, is transmuting into shared global vulnerability today [P. 16]
Offshore Balancing Bad: F/L

First, economy:
A) withdrawal to offshore balancing risks instability that destroys the economy
A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and
American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around
the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are
a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast , a strategy based on
retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United
States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they
. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home" ,

does not mean that others will respect American
wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression . In the
are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted
thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies,
anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then
the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American
soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground
presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.
B) extinction
BEARDEN (Lt. Col in US Army) 2K
[Thomas, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis, Free Republic, June 24, p. online //wyo-tjc]
Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have
increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations,
are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions.
response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into
the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception
of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive
strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within
The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps
most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
the United States itself.
Second, prolif and arms races:

A) transition to osb causes it
It is important to know what other countries think of the United States, but, equally,
it is a fundamental mistake to worry disproportionately about
what the rest of the world thinks. Leaders lead. That may be unpopular at times, indeed, perhaps most of the time. A cost of leadership is that the leader will be criticized for doing too much, or for
accomplishing too little. But at the same time, few states would want to replace the leadership of the U nited States with
the leadership of China. The allies of the United States are precisely its allies because to be so serves the interests of these countries. One country does not align itself with another for reasons of sentiment or emotion.
If the
United States adopted offshore balancing, many of those allies would terminate their relationship with the United States. They would be
forced to increase their own armaments, acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps ally against the
United States, even aiming their nuclear weapons at the United States. In those circumstances, the United States would be far less secure and much
worse off than it is now~ That might be the future if the United States changed its grand strategy . To be sure, at present the United
States is a great ally. It is rich and powerful, with many allies all over the world. It weilds enormous influence in international institutions as well. When a global problem arises, countries turn to the United States to solve it.
B) multiple nuclear wars

TOTTEN (Assoc. Professor at University of Arkansas) 94
[Samuel, The Widening Circle of Genocide, p. 289 //wyo-tjc]
There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including but not limited to the following: the
possibility that a nation threatened by destruction in a conventional war may resort to the use of its nuclear weapons; the miscalculation of a threat of an attack and the subsequent use of nuclear weapons in order to stave off
the suspected attack; a nuclear weapons accident due to carelessness or flawed technology (e.g., the accidental launching of a nuclear weapon); the use of such
weapons by an unstable leader; the use of such weapons by renegade military personnel during a period of instability (personal,
national or international); and, the theft (and/or development ) and use of such weapons by terrorists . While it is unlikely (though not impossible) that terrorists would be able
to design their own weapons, it is possible that they could do so with the assistance of a renegade government.
Third, global challengers

A) OSB invites threats
International politics is not a game

or a sport. There are no "time outs," there ls no halffime and no rest. lt never stops. There ls no hidlng from threats and
dangers in international politics. If there Is no diplomatic solution to the threats it confronts, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States Is what protects the country from such threats. Simply by
declaring that the United States is going home~ thus abandoning its commitments or making
half pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect its wishes to retreat In fact, to
make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of
the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true in the anarchic
realm of international politics. If the United States is not strong and does not actively protect and advance its interests, other
countries will prey upon those interests, and even on the United States itsel f
Second, U.S. power protects the United States. That sentence is as genuine and as important a statement about international politics as ~one can make.
B) the impact is nuclear war, which is our original impact
Offshore Balancing Bad: Europe F/L

Turn: Europe
Little A: Offshore balancing causes us to pull out of Europe
Layne and Schwarz, Your Authors, 02 (Christopher, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami and Benjamin, Former Executive Editor
of the World Policy Journal, The Hard Questions, The Atlantic Monthly, January)
the United States would endorse the EU's effortswhich Washington now opposesto acquire the
military capabilities it needs to defend its interests independent of the United States. At the same time, the United States
would begin a phased withdrawal from its European security commitments . To be sure, many U.S. policymakers
With respect to Europe,
have argued that the Europeans have demonstrated their incapacity (during the Balkan crises, for instance) to act effectively without U.S. "leadership." But these
protests are hypocriticalwho can blame the Europeans for their inability to assert themselves in security affairs when Washington has for decades repeatedly
An offshore balancing strategy would hold that

America's strategic interest in Europe does not demand that Washington insure against every
untoward event there. Disorder in the Balkans and other places on Europe's fringes should be a matter for Europeans, who have the wherewithal to
squelched European initiatives that would have made that assertion possible?
combat it, quarantine it, or, if they choose, ignore it.
Little B: German rearm and European conflict

Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at Chicago, 01 (John J., Foreign Affairs, September / October)
Without the American pacifier, Europe is not guaranteed to remain peaceful. Indeed, intense security competition among
the great powers would likely ensue because, upon American withdrawal , Europe would go from benign bipolarity to
unbalanced multipolarity, the most dangerous kind of power structure . The United Kingdom, France, Italy, and
Germany would have to build up their own military forces and provide for their own security. In effect , they would all become great powers,
making Europe multipolar and raising the ever-present possibility that they might fight among themselves . And
Germany would probably become a potential hegemon and thus the main source of worry. Looking at Europe today, such a forecast might appear far-fetched, but
that is because few are prepared to consider how radically the European security environment will be transformed by the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Once the major
European powers are forced to provide for their own defense ,
suspicions among them are certain to grow, thereby triggering
the familiar dynamics of great-power competition. The kind of trouble that might lie ahead for Europe can be illustrated by considering how
particular German measures aimed at enhancing its security might nevertheless lead to instability. If the United States removed its security umbrella from over
western Europe, Germany would likely move to acquire its own nuclear arsenal . This would be the case both because
nuclear weapons are an excellent deterrent, as Germany's governing elites recognized during the Cold War, but also because it would be the best way to escape
During the proliferation process, however, these neighbors would

probably contemplate using force to prevent Germany from going nuclear, and the result could
be a major crisis. Without the American military on its territory, furthermore, Germany would probably increase the size of its army and certainly would be
potential coercion by its three nuclear-armed neighbors .
more inclined to try to dominate central Europe. Why? Because Germany would fear Russian control of that critically important buffer zone between them. Of
course, Russia would have the same fear in reverse, which would likely lead to a serious security competition between them for control of central Europe. France,
meanwhile, would undoubtedly view such behavior by Germany with alarm and take measures to protect itself -- for example, by increasing its defense spending and
establishing closer relations with Russia. Germany, of course, would perceive these actions as hostile and respond with measures of its own.
And, Nuclear war

Glaser, Professor of Policy Studies at University of Chicago, 93 (Charles, Why NATO is Still the Best, International Security, Summer)
From an American perspective, a basic question is whether the United States still has security interests in Europe. The end of the Cold War is fueling calls for
American withdrawal from Europe, adding arguments to the already extensive debate over American grand strategy.
Isolationists believe, now more
than ever, that whatever dangers might threaten Europe will not threaten the U nited States. During the Cold War,
the most serious challenge to the traditional case for American involvement flowed from the nuclear revolution, which undermined geopolitical arguments for opposing
a European hegemon. Isolationists now add that we can be confident that Western Europe will be free from military conflict, because the passing of the Soviet Union
has eliminated the only serious external threat, and relations within the West are so good that military conflict is virtually unimaginable. However, although the lack of
U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of
The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of
major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the
threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The
United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power
war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus,
an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger,
Western Europe.
the United States should not be unconcerned about Europes future.
Offshore Balancing Bad: Free Trade F/L

Turn: International Trade
Little A: Offshore balancing decreases U.S. commitment to international trade
Layne,
Your Author, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami, 97 (Christopher, From
Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: AmericasFuture Grand Strategy, International Security, Volume 22,
Number 1, Summer)
It is logically inconsistent for preponderance's proponents to claim simultaneously that the United States is preeminent and that it is interdependent. In fact, unlike
Offshore balancing
would recognize that the United States, in fact, is not economically interdependent with the
international economy. The United States is well placed to adopt an insular grand strategy because
it can diversify its export markets; it can minimize its reliance on overseas raw materials (including
petroleum) by stockpiling, diversification, and substitution; and external trade is a relatively small
component of its gross domestic product (GDP). Merchandise exports account for only about 6 percent of U.S. GDP (the average for
states with smaller economies, very large and powerful states have relatively little interaction with the international economy.74
industrialized states is about 24 percent).75 To be sure, such aggregate figures may fail to capture the true extent of economic interdependence (because a large
part of international trade now is attributable to cross-national trade within individual firms). Hence it could be claimed that turmoil in the international system would
have a greater impact on U.S. prosperity than the above figure suggests. This argument should not be dismissed; however, if the United States adopts an offshore
balancing strategy, markets would adjust to a changing political and strategic context, and
be altered. More geopolitically secure regions especially the United States
over time investment and trade flows would
would be the beneficiaries of these alterations.
Little B: Nuclear war

Copley News Service 12-1-99
For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The
specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting
the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that
nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall
conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for
the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the
mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest
activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the
demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher
Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work
together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations
sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As
long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a
major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As
exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the
goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational
corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First
of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those
companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm,
Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who
work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross
domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter
the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the
singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting
world trade. They should be celebrating it.
Offshore Balancing Bad: Japan F/L

Turn: Japan
Little A: Offshore balancing would end the security treaty with Japan and ensures Japan rearm
Layne and Schwarz, Your Authors, 02 (Christopher, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami and Benjamin, Former Executive
Editor of the World Policy Journal, The Hard Questions, The Atlantic Monthly, January)
The United States would follow a similar policy with respect to Japan. Washington would announce to Tokyo its
intention to terminate the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty within a specified time period (say, five
years), at the end of which Japan, for more than fifty years a politically stable state, would have developed
whatever military means it believes necessary to function as an independent great power. An offshore
balancing strategy would turn on a simple truth: other states have at least as much interest as the
United States does in secure sea-lanes, access to resources, and regional stability. The less America does, and
the less others expect it to do, the more other states will do to help themselves.
Little B: Re-Arm causes arms races and war

Greb, PhD at Lawrence Livermore, 95 (G. A., Reasons for an American Military Presence in Asia, Document 43-95)
If Japan were to abandon its post war promise and decide to undertake a large arms build-up, the affect on
stability in the region would be enormous. Fears of a renationalized Japan would spur an arms race
throughout the Pacific Rim which would turn the region into a multipolar version of Cold War Europe. The Spratley
Islands, sea lane conflicts, and competing resource claims could much more easily turn into open war if
the region were to become this sort of armed camp. The ethnic differences and historical animosities would
exacerbate this effect and make war much more likely.
And, Nuclear war

Greb, PhD at Lawrence Livermore, 95 (G. A., Reasons for an American Military Presence in Asia, Document 43-95)
The Chinese could not ignore these events and would most likely intervene to stabilize the situation. Instead of
bringing relief however, the emergence of a non-Western nuclear power into the fray would increase
the chances of a conflict escalating beyond conventional bounds . For the first time, a crisis involving
all five of the major nuclear powers would emerge. The outcome of such a crisis would be unpredictable, but
the likelihood of a nuclear conflagration would be higher than at any other time in the nuclear age.
Offshore Balancing Bad: Nuclear Drawdown F/L

Turn: Nuclear Disarm
Little A: Offshore balancing causes deep nuclear cuts
Layne and Schwarz, Your Authors, 02 (Christopher, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami and Benjamin, Former Executive
Editor of the World Policy Journal, The Hard Questions, The Atlantic Monthly, January)
As an offshore balancer, the United States would abandon plans for NATO expansion (which Russia regards as a
strategic threat), and if Washington decides to undertake a national missile-defense program, it would follow through on
the recent agreement to make deep cuts in its strategic nuclear arsenal to reassure Russia and China that it
doesn't seek to gain a first-strike advantage. It would allow Russia to supervise its legitimate sphere of influencein
Chechnya and in Central Asia, where it is combating Islamic fundamentalists, as well as in parts of Eastern Europe and in
the states that formerly composed the Soviet Union. America's direct sphere of influence embraces the area from the
Canadian Arctic to Tierra del Fuego and from Greenland to Guam. Surely we can tolerate other great powers' enjoying
spheres of influence in their own parts of the world.
Little B: Proliferation and nuclear war

Quester, Professor of Government & Politics at the University of Maryland, And Utgoff, Deputy Director of
the Strategy, Forces, & Resources Division of the Intitute for Defense Analyses, 94 (George & Victor, NoFirst-Use and Nonproliferation: Redefining Extended Deterrence, The Washington Quarterly, Spring, V. 17, N.
2, P. 100)
Second, because the United States wants to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, it must also attach a high priority to
preventing their acquisition by additional states. If many more nations acquire nuclear weapons, the risk that
such weapons will be used will be greater, exactly the opposite of what a no-first-use policy is intended to
accomplish. To serve the goal of nuclear nonproliferation, then, the United States will also have to assure
allies, present and future, against conventional aggression. If this cannot be achieved , if such allies find
that the U.S. extended deterrent (conventional or nuclear) can no longer protect them, the risks of nuclear
proliferation by these states, and correspondingly of nuclear use, will rise. These two points are intertwined.
What deters aggression by renegade states works to reassure allies . What discourages proliferation by a
renegade does the same for countries friendly to the United States. If the United States is not to have a long
string of allies and adversaries, and nations that are neither, acquiring nuclear weapons, it will have to
maintain or improve its conventional forces, and, despite the current mood to the contrary, will have to maintain an
array of very capable nuclear forces. Finally, for the foreseeable future at least, it appears necessary that nuclear
first use should remain possible in extraordinary circumstances. This point will be developed at greater length later in this
article.
Offshore Balancing Bad: Renewables F/L

Turn: Oil
Little A: Offshore balancing causes a shift to renewables by increasing the price of Middle East
oil
Layne and Schwarz, Your Authors, 02 (Christopher, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami and Benjamin, Former Executive Editor
of the World Policy Journal, The Hard Questions, The Atlantic Monthly, January)
The United States may need to rethink its level of engagement in the unstable Middle East. Three Atlantic authors tackle the
issues of politics, oil, and the Persian Gulf. ather than attempt to impose a Pax Americana on this endemically turbulent area, the United States should devote the resources it currently spends on this
America should pursue a national energy policy that

would develop alternative sources of energy for the United States and, more important, the rest of the industrialized world. This colossal scientific and
industrial effort should be our highest national-security priority (see "Mideast Oil Forever?," by Joseph J. Romm and Charles B. Curtis, April, 1996, Atlantic). If the United States shifts
responsibility for stabilizing the region to the other great powers, the real price of Persian Gulf oil will become
extremely high for them. It would then be in their interests to pool resources and expertise with America in what
would amount to an international Manhattan Project to obviate the need for that oilthus dramatically reducing the revenue streams to the regimes in Iran, Iraq, and
costly and dangerous job to rendering the region economically and strategically irrelevant. That is,
Saudi Arabia. Doing so is surely a common international interest. If Washington were to spend the approximately $106 billion thataccording to Earl Ravenal, a former Pentagon analystit is
devoting this year to defending the Persian Gulf region, and if Western Europe, Japan, China, and Russia were to kick in what they would otherwise spend on policing the region, it's hard to imagine
that this goal couldn't be achieved.
Little B: Fossil fuels key to keeping oxygen in the biosphere balanced

Etheridge, PhD, Global Atmospheric Change Program, CSIRO Atmospheric Research, 5-25-2K (Dr. David,
Changes in the Global Environment, Australian Academy of Science, 2000 Annual General Meeting, Canberra, http://www.science.org.au/future/etheridge.htm)
Another tool we can apply to understand atmospheric composition changes is the use of isotopes. For example, organic carbon is depleted in the 13C isotope,
compared to carbon in other reservoirs such as the ocean and atmosphere. The CO2 increase from carbon released from fossil fuel and land clearing is therefore
The concentration
of oxygen in the atmosphere is decreasing, because oxygen is being combined stoichiometrically with
carbon from fossil fuels and from forest burning to form carbon dioxide. The increase in carbon dioxide is well known, but the
related decrease in oxygen is very small compared to its approximately 20 per cent atmospheric abundance. Measurement of the oxygen
accompanied by a decrease in the 13C/12C ratio. Precise measurements of oxygen concentration provide another powerful tracer .
change has presented a major measurement challenge. Although oxygens decrease could be viewed with concern, it will not have a noticeable effect for thousands
of years. The global oxygen trend, measured over the last 20 years or so in air archived at Cape Grim, could be explained quantitatively by the amount of fossil fuel
carbon known to have been burnt over this period. However, we know that large areas of forests have also been cleared and combusted, so the oxygen decrease
from this cause must have been approximately balanced by the release of oxygen from a greater rate of photosynthesis of the remaining terrestrial biosphere. This is
possibly a result of higher plant growth rates caused by higher CO2 levels, or climate change. The biosphere over this period is said to be in mass balance.
Measurements of trace gases are also possible from satellites. Satellite images show quite clearly the ozone depletion in the stratosphere over recent decades. For
this type of applicationn coverage of remote locations and measurement of large concentration changes satellites are well suited. However, satellite trace gas
measurement is presently too imprecise to determine global exchanges, where regional differences are only 1 per cent or less. Satellite measurements may well be
suited to detection of emissions 'hot spots', such as carbon monoxide from cities, or methane from biomass burning.
And, Upsetting the oxygen balance causes extinction

Schmidt & Harbert 96 (Unit 15: Fate of the Earth: The Balance of Nature, http://mac01.eps.pitt.edu/harbbook/ c_xv/chap15.html)
Take Earth's surface temperature, for example. The range of surface and water temperatures in the tropical regions of Earth are precisely optimum for the existence
of present-day life, yet the temperature of the planet under conditions of a carbon-dioxide-dominated atmosphere surely would be much higher. Fossil evidence
indicates that the prevailing temperatures in the tropics have been stable enough to support life throughout the past 3,500 million years, even though solar output has
increased by as much as 30% during this time, according to fairly reliable models for solar evolution. This has given rise to what is referred to as the Early Faint Sun
Paradox. Lovelock maintains that an active controlling mechanism could have manipulated the workings of Earth's atmosphere in such a way as to keep the
temperature nearly constant throughout the whole of this time. He points to the inherently unstable conditions that can be produced by positive feedback mechanisms
in climatic systems and suggests that a controlling mechanism would have been necessary to prevent temperature extremes from occurring that might have
The oxygen level in our atmosphere is clearly a result of biological activity, but
what is not so obvious is that the percentage of oxygen is precisely at optimum levels for use by
life. Increasing oxygen levels provide greater energy conversion efficiency, but too much oxygen
could bring about worldwide holocaust. The present level stands at 21%, but recent experiments have shown that the probability of a
destroyed all life on Earth.
forest fire being started by a lightning stroke increases by 70% for each 1% rise in oxygen concentration above the present level. Ignition is strongly dependent upon
the moisture content of combustible material, and so naturally-set fires are much more prevalent after prolonged drought. If the oxygen content should exceed 25%,
however, ignition becomes highly probable even in the damp vegetation of a rain forest. How is the oxygen concentration regulated? Lovelock thinks that methane
released into the atmosphere by the operation of the carbon cycle provides the necessary mechanism since it is readily oxidized, converting molecular oxygen into
water vapor. On the other hand, nitrous oxide produced in the nitrogen cycle eventually decomposes in the atmosphere into molecular nitrogen and oxygen. This
source of oxygen may provide the opposite controlling mechanism by which Gaia keeps the oxygen level optimized.
Little C: Burning fossil fuels is critical to CO2 fertilization which is the only way to feed the
world
Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide & Global Change, 2-21 -01 (Craig, The Most
Important Global Change, CO2 Science Magazine, www.co2science.org/edit/v4_edit/v4n8edit.htm)
our attention currently focused? Unfortunately, it is focused on reducing anthropogenic CO2 emissions to the
which is truly lamentable; for the continuation of those emissions is , ironically, our only real
hope for averting the near-certain future global food shortfall that is destined to occur if the Kyoto
So where is
atmosphere,
Protocol Crowd gets its way with the world. But how would allowing anthropogenic CO2 emissions to take their natural course help to ameliorate future hunger? The
elevated levels of atmospheric CO2 tend to reduce plant transpiration while

simultaneously enhancing plant photosynthesis, which two phenomena enable earth's vegetation to
produce considerably more food per unit of water used in the food production process . Literally
thousands of laboratory and field experiments - and that is no exaggeration - have verified this fact
beyond any doubt whatsoever. Indeed, this atmospheric CO2-derived blessing is as sure as death and taxes and as dependable as a mother's
answer resides in the fact that
love. But what do the climate-alarmist ideologues do about it? They spurn it. They deny it. They try to reverse it, in fact. And they do it to the detriment of all
mankind. So just how bad is the problem? We're glad you asked, for we've asked the same question ourselves (see our Journal Review Will There Be Enough
there will be enough, but just barely, and only if

the CO2 content of the air is allowed to rise unimpeded by misguided attempts to curtail the
burning of fossil fuels. What we have found (Idso and Idso, 2000) is that likely advancements in agricultural technology and expertise will only
increase world food production by about two-thirds of what will be required to feed the expected human population of the globe fifty years hence. But if the
air's CO2 content continues to rise as typically projected for "business as usual" scenarios, the aerial fertilization effect and the
water use efficiency-promoting properties of the expected rise in atmospheric CO2 concentration will stimulate our crops to supply the
final third of what will be required to meet our future dietary needs . Even under the best of conditions, however, the
Food?). And the answer, as we report in our Editorial of 15 November 2000, is yes,
match-up between future world food supply and demand will be so close as to leave extremely little room for ineptitude or error in our plans for supplying the various
staples required by the planet's expanding human family. Therefore, the Precautionary Principle - rightly applied (see our Editorial Prudence Misapplied) - demands
a crucial
element of any policy devised to deal with this challenge must be to not interfere with the
continuing evolution of earth's atmospheric CO2 concentration; for as described above, it is
essential that the air's CO2 content continue to grow in the future as it has in the past. In concluding this essay, we return to the
we do everything possible to stave off the potential food insufficiency crisis our increasing numbers could well create fifty years from now. And
writings of Wallace for some final words of wisdom. "There can be," he says, "no greater global challenge today on which physical and social scientists can work
together than the goal of producing the food required for future generations." And in this regard, he notes that a "concerted focus on improving water use efficiency
will increase the productivity of both rain fed and irrigated agriculture." If this approach is taken, and if we do nothing unwise or counter-productive with respect to
this effort, then, as Wallace states in his final sentence, "the prize is that more areas of the world, and especially those arid and semi-arid areas where population
growth is greatest, will be able to sustain their future populations." Truly, the long-term future of the planet's less-developed and poorer countries resides in the energy
policies of the world's wealthier industrialized nations; and upon the decisions these nations will shortly make about anthropogenic CO2 emissions hangs the fate of
the less-fortunate rest of the world.
It is imperative that the leaders of all nations wake up to the reality of what everyone is facing, especially
do the right thing. Don't unduly strive to limit any
nation's CO2 emissions. It will only hurt us all.
the poorer resource-limited countries with high rates of population growth, and
And, The impact is extinction

CO2 Science Magazine 10-24-01 (Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions Could Dramatically Increase Agricultural Production by Thwarting the Adverse Effects of
Ozone Pollution, www.co2science.org/edit/v4_edit/v4n43edit.htm)
Damage to crops caused by air pollutants is one of the major scourges of present-day agriculture. How great are the production losses caused by these plantdebilitating agents? In a recent study of the effects of ozone pollution in the Punjab region of Pakistan, Wahid et al. (2001) periodically applied a powerful ozone
protectant to soybean plants growing in three different locations in the general vicinity of the city of Lahore - a suburban site, a remote rural site, and a rural roadside
site - throughout two different growing seasons (one immediately post-monsoon and one the following spring or pre-monsoon). The results were truly astounding. At
the suburban site, application of the ozone protectant increased the weight of seeds produced per plant by 47% in the post-monsoon season and by 113% in the premonsoon season. At the remote rural site, the corresponding yield increases were 94% and 182%; and at the rural roadside site, they were 170% and 285%.
Averaged across all three sites and both seasons of the year, the mean increase in yield caused by countering the deleterious effects of this one major air pollutant
was nearly 150%. Due to their somewhat surprising finding that "the impacts of ozone on the yield of soybean are larger in the rural areas around Lahore than in
suburban areas of the city," the authors concluded "there may be substantial impacts of oxidants on crop yield across large areas of the Punjab." In addition, they
it is clear that
whatever could be done to reduce these massive crop losses - or, ideally, eliminate them altogether - would be a
godsend to the people of Pakistan and the inhabitants of many other areas of the globe. Fortunately, such a savior is silently
working its wonders throughout the entire world. That of which we speak, of course, is the ongoing rise in the
air's CO2 content, which counteracts the negative effects of ozone - and those of many other air
pollutants (Allen, 1990; Idso and Idso, 1994) - by restricting the noxious molecule's entry into plant leaves via induced reduction of leaf stomatal apertures
noted that earlier studies had revealed similar large ozone-induced losses in the productivity of local cultivars of wheat and rice. Hence,
(Reid and Fiscus, 1998), and by ameliorating its adverse biochemical activities when it does penetrate vegetative tissues (Reid et al., 1998). In a number of studies of
it has been found that a

nominal doubling of the air's CO2 concentration is sufficient to greatly reduce - and in some
cases completely eliminate - the yield-reducing effects of ozone pollution (Heagle et al., 1998a and 1998b; Miller et al., 1998;
these beneficial consequences of atmospheric CO2 enrichment for the crop studied by Wahid et al., i.e., soybeans ,
Reid and Fiscus, 1998; Reid et al., 1998). The same conclusion follows from the results of several studies that have looked at wheat in this regard (Heagle et al.,
2000; McKee et al., 2000; Pleijel et al., 2000; Tiedemann and Firsching, 2000). In fact, the work of Volin et al. (1998) suggests that these CO2-induced benefits will
likely be experienced by all plants. As the researchers directly state in the title of their paper: "species respond similarly regardless of photosynthetic pathway or plant
A doubling of the air's CO2 content could well double

agricultural production in many areas of the world by merely eliminating the adverse effects of but one air pollutant, i.e., ozone. Then, consider the
functional group." Think about the implications of these findings.
fact that by the mid-point of the current century, we will likely face a food production crisis of unimaginable proportions (see our Editorials of 21 February 2001 and 13
June 2001). Finally, ask yourself what the Precautionary Principle has to say about this state of affairs (see our Editorial of 4 July 2001). We conducted such an
exercise in our review of the paper of Hudak et al. (1999), concluding that perhaps our new mantra should be: Free the Biosphere! Let the air's CO2 content rise.
CO2 is the elixir of life. It is one of the primary raw materials - the other being water - out of which plants construct their
Without more of it in the air, our species - as well as most
of the rest of the planet's animal life - will not survive the 21st century intact. The biosphere will continue to
And we still feel that way.
tissues; and it is essential to their existence and our existence .
exist, but not as we know it; for most of its wild diversity of life will have been extinguished by mankind's mad rush to appropriate ever more land and water to grow
the food required to feed itself (Tilman et al., 2001). So we say again, let the air's CO2 content rise. It's the right thing to do, both scientifically and morally.
Offshore Balancing Bad: Russia F/L

Turn: Russia
Little A: Offshore balancing allows Russia to expand its sphere of influence
Layne and Schwarz, Your Authors, 02
(Christopher, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami and Benjamin, Former Executive Editor of the
World Policy Journal, The Hard Questions, The Atlantic Monthly, January)
As an offshore balancer, the United States would abandon plans for NATO expansion (which Russia regards as a strategic threat), and if Washington decides to
undertake a national missile-defense program, it would follow through on the recent agreement to make deep cuts in its strategic nuclear arsenal to reassure Russia and China that it doesn't seek to
would allow Russia to supervise its legitimate sphere of influencein Chechnya and in
Central Asia, where it is combating Islamic fundamentalists, as well as in parts of Eastern Europe and in the states that
formerly composed the Soviet Union. America's direct sphere of influence embraces the area from the Canadian Arctic to Tierra del Fuego and from Greenland
gain a first-strike advantage. It
to Guam. Surely we can tolerate other great powers' enjoying spheres of influence in their own parts of the world.
Little B: Nuclear war

Cohen,
Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation,

Foundation Reports, January 25)
96
(Ariel, THE NEW "GREAT GAME": OIL POLITICS IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA, Heritage
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts
to restore its empire will doom

Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone
has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a
tremendous price from Russian society. The
wars which would be required to restore the

Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world
stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may
escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized
missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted
Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and
throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and
the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. n15 Domination
of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian
imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the
Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and
Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by
pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which
Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult.
Offshore Balancing Bad: A2 Others Will Fill In: F/L

Theres no other nation that can replace the united states as a world stabilizer
In any case, the eventual end of American hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity
among the familiar major powers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will
it yield to another dominant hegemon that would displace the United State s by assuming a similar
political, military, economic, technological, and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last
century are too fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. It is noteworthy
that since 1880, in a comparative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their economic strength, military budgets
and assets, populations, etc.), the top five slots at sequential twenty-year intervals have been shared by just seven states:
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and China. Only the United States, however,
unambiguously earned inclusion among the top five in every one of the twenty- year intervals, and the gap in the year 2000
between the top-ranked United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before,
The former major European powersGreat Britain, Germany, and Franceare too weak to step into the
breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the European Union will become suf ficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete with the United States in the
politico-military arena, Russia is no longer an imperial power, and its central challenge is to recover
socioeconomically lest it lose its far eastern territories to China. Japans population is aging and its economy
has slowed; the conventional wisdom of the 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next superstate now has the ring of
historical irony. China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains
its internal political stability both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still con strained by an impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide.
The same is true of India, which additionally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity. [P. 2-3]
Offshore Balancing Bad: A2 Others Will Fill In S/L

First extend the brzezinski evidencethere can be no other state to fill americas shoes
because everyone is so far behind. All the european powers and the great powers of asia are
not entrenched or powerful enough to play a leadership role.
Second, this wipes out their ability to play defense on our impactsbecause there is no one to
step-up, a devestating vacuum opens, increasing incentives for violent competition, jacking up
the probability of our war scenarios in a world without hegemony
And, only america possess the power to fulfill any international governance task
WIARDA (Professor, National Security Policy, National War College) 96
[Howard, U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 229]
The United States must continue to lead. It will not do for the United States to abdicate its foreign policy responsibilities as it
did after World War I, to fail to recognize its own power and obligations, or to let the world drift into depression and the
horrors of Nazism. The United States is too big and powerful and the world still too dangerous for the
United States simply to withdraw into itself, tempting though that may be at times. Only the
United States has the multifaceted power (political, economic, military, moral) to serve as a
leader and example in the world; only the United States is sufficiently trusted to broker
variegated global conflicts. Only the United States can hold alliances together, provide sufficient
stimulus for widespread economic development, deliver large-scale assistance, and, by its
example and policies, stimulate democracy and human rights .
_____________________________________________
**Heg Good: Miscellaneous Answers to Answers**
Heg Good: A2 "Anti-Americanism" 2NC
Claims that US hegemony generates terrorism are falseall based on conspiracy theory
Rubin (Dir. Global Research in International Affairs Center) 01
[Barry, The Truth About US Middle East Policy, MERIA, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dec. 2001, p. online //wyo-tjc]
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack that killed around 3,500 people in the United States, there has been a great deal of discussion about U.S.
Middle East policy. The terrorists and those who supported them or at least sought to explain their deeds, spoke of past American policy as being responsible for
many observers--Arab and Muslim leaders,

Western Middle East experts, and Middle East journalists and intellectuals--claimed that this situation required an
profound grievances on the part of Arabs and Muslims. Accepting the reality of these grievances ,
apology for past American behavior, a change of course for future U.S. policy, and somehow
justified or explained the September attack But this argument and much of the debate following
the September 11, 2000 events has profoundly misrepresented the history and nature of U.S.
Middle East policy to the point where it has become a caricature of reality. (For a systematic presentation of arguments condemning U.S. policy, made
after the September 11 attacks, see Cameron Brown, The Shot Seen Around the World: The Middle East Reacts to September 11th, MERIA Journal, Vol. 5, Number
4 (December 2001) at <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/2001/issue4/jv5n4a4.html> Equally ,
such distortions make it far harder
to understand the terrorists true motives,
the reasons why many Arabs and Muslims seem to support or sympathize with them, and the
implications of these events for the region. Many things about American policy in the Middle East that contradict the case against the United States have been
forgotten or ignored. What is most important is that the truth is far different from the way it is being presented in so many places. And only by understanding this
history is it possible to comprehend the real reasons for the terrorism of September 11 and its interconnections with wider trends in the region. This article attempts to
set the record somewhat straighter. The ground rules for this article are as follows: In correcting the imbalance mentioned above the intention here is not to imply that
the United States has not made mistakes, that grievances (right or wrong) do not exist, or that the author necessarily endorses the specific U.S. policies and activities
much of the case against America is built on wild conspiracy theories that charge the
United States with deeds that were never committed. Other elements of the criticism are based on profound misrepresentations
cited. Still,
of American society originating in the Arab mass media, which is in itself the recipient of huge state subsidies and high levels of state direction .
There is no real relationship between us policy and anti-americanism. It is a political strategy

used by radicals to undermine domestic moderates
Rubin (Dir. Global Research in International Affairs Center) 01
The real basis of a wave of anti-Americanism in the Arab world is that this is a strategy that
offers something for everyone there, and at no significant cost either: --For the radical oppositionists,
anti-Americanism is a way to muster mass support after they failed to do so for an anti-government revolutionary strategy. Given
the inability of revolutionary Islamist movements to overthrow any Arab government using a variety of strategies, they are desperately seeking some new tactic. The
masses have overwhelmingly rejected the radical Islamists claims that they represent true Islam, noting the many ways that their views deviated from Islam as it was
always practiced. But this objection can be swept aside by clothing the "fundamentalists" heresies in the attractive garments of xenophobia. It is an old trick of
An added benefit for the radical opposition movements to use

anti-Americanism is that it is a relatively safe strategy. Arab regimes that will quickly and brutally repress a challenge to
totalitarian movements and one that works very well.
themselves will do nothing against militants who only attack the United States. The extremists real goal is to de-legitimize the moderate forces; mobilize the masses
using the existing hatred for America and stirring up more, and maintain the myth of Arab or Islamist unity against a foreign foe. Our enemy, they argue, cannot come
from our own ranks but must be something and someone external. The cause of our problems and suffering is not in any way due to our own actions or decisions but
--For the regimes, anti-Americanism is a way to distract

attention from their numerous failings. Instead of pressing for democracy, human rights, higher living standards, less corruption and
purely to the meddling of evil foreigners and their local agents.
incompetence, a change of leadership, or any of numerous other demands that would damage the interests of the governments and rulers, the focus of attention
could be turned to shouting at the United States.
This strategy defuses opposition and takes the pressure off the rulers to do anything
the regimes embrace antiAmericanism as both a defense and as a tool for strengthening their own power. Such a strategy appeases
constructive. In short, rather than fear anti-Americanism as a tool used by oppositions against them ,
the radicals, distracts their own citizens, and maintains their legitimacy as good militant Arabs (and Muslims). Governments have one more reason to demand
national unity, (i.e., to insist that no one criticize them or demand domestic change) in the face of this American "threat" to the Arabs and Muslims. Most Arab
governments are not so afraid of bin Ladin and his allies and the regimes certainly prefer that those forces attack America rather than themselves. While recognizing
that there is some risk in this strategy, the regimes view bin Ladin as a threat and problem only for America. Thus, they see little need to cooperate with the United
States in an anti-terrorist campaign.
Terrorism and anti-americanism isnt a reaction to us policyits a smoke and mirrors strategy
that has nothing to do with us behavior
RUBIN (Dir. Global Research in International Affairs Center) 01
All these groups can project anti-Americanism all the more fully and easily because they share a common premise based on past experience and current expectation:
Whatever noises it makes, the United States will not do very much to punish them for this behavior. For while the complaint is that the United States is responsible for
There is, then, a

strange concurrence of interests between bin Ladin and many Arab governments. The radicals
argue that those who oppose them are American puppets, and the moderates agree in pushing
their own people and the radicals to attack America instead of themselves. If the Arab and Muslim reaction is explained purely in
terms of Americas past sins and their own grievances, none of these points can be understood. The reality of the Middle East is thus
concealed and rendered incomprehensible . In short, it is not true that "where theres smoke,
everything bad that happens and is supposed to be a satanic bully, simultaneously they believe that the United States is impotent .
theres fire" in the sense that U.S. foreign policy itself has sparked antagonism. It would be more
accurate to say that where theres smoke, there are arsonists at work .
Heg Good: A2 Dont Need to Keep Upholding Hegemony

2NC
To rest on our laurels is follyus must maintain supremacy constantly to prevent violent
changes to the status quo
KAGAN (Prof of History at Yale) 2K
[Donald, Strength & Will: A Historical Perspective, Present Dangers: Crisis & Opportunity in American Foreign & Defense Policy, ed. Kagan & Kristol, Encounter Books //wyo-tjc]
The dominant view of American foreign and security policy today rests on the assumption that
the United States faces no serious threat at present and will face none in the foreseeable future .
The Soviet Union has collapsed, and there is no equivalent to a Nazi Germany or an imperial Japan on the horizon.
Because there is no peer competitor, the U.S. can enjoy the benefits of the peace dividend,
sharply reducing its defense spending, which will result in a windfall for domestic programs, tax cuts, deficit reduction and other delightful
benefits. Even after enormous cuts in the defense budget, the argument is made, the U.S. still spends more on military power than all the
other nations combined, is ahead of the others in military technology and is bound to remain ahead for a long time. To be sure, the advocates
of this view concede, there are some unpleasant people out therethe North Koreans, Saddam Hussein, the Communist Chinesebut they
can be tamed by patience, restraint, and the magic of trade and participation in the global economy; and in any case, none of them represents
a serious military challenge to America. Defense experts wedded to this view speak of a strategic pause which permits the U.S. to cut its
forces sharply now and spend its money better by preparing for the world of the future. Meanwhile, they say there is no great danger in our
reduced force structure. This is a natural perspective for a nation like our own, a liberal, democratic,
commercial republic, satisfied with the state of the world, and defended by two great oceans , as
well as our relative military superiority We are reluctant to maintain strong military forces, especially
ground forces. We prefer to believe in and rely upon the wonders of technology, the prospect of
some technological magic bullet that will make considerable conventional forces, and the
expense and casualties they may entail, unnecessary . Confronted with the responsibility to preserve the peace in our
own and the worlds interest, we put our faith in international organizations, in the end of history brought by the inevitable spread of
democracy and the inescapably irenic consequences of a global economy and the communications revolution. These are like the
delusions of states throughout history that have reached a secure position and have decided to
take a rest. They glory in their temporary superiority and imagine it will become permanent with
little or no effort on their part. But, as one historian points out, wealth and power, or economic
strength and military strength, are always relative; ... the international bal ances can never be still,
and it is a folly of statesmanship to assume that they ever could be. In fact, there is no
strategic pause. In international relations and military affairs, change can come with lightning speed. In
1930 no power seemed willing or able to disrupt the peace. Germany was effectively disarmed and Japan seemed to pose no threat. But
then, in 1931, Japan conquered Manchuria and defied the League of Nations and the world to do anything about it. Two years later, Hitler
came to power, tore up the Versailles Treaty and began rapid rearmament. In 1935 Italy attacked Ethiopia; in 1936 Hitler resurrected German
power by occupying the Rhineland. Only a few years after the strategic pause that provided a rationale for Britains defense policy in the
1920s and early 1930s, the world had become a very dangerous place, which Britains armed forces were no longer in any condition to
manage. When the strategic pause turned out to be an illusion, the British faced increasingly serious dangers to their interests and security.
Soon their allies had been conquered, their homeland was under attack, and they stood alone on the verge of defeat and conquest. Our
current strategic pause is so beguiling that we forget that dissatisfied states around the world
are working hard to increase their military power and to nullify American advantages. We for get
too that the appearance of a peer competitor is not a pre requisite for War. North Korea was nothing like
one in the 1950s, North Vietnam was not in the 1960s and 1970s, nor was Iraq in 1990; yet each of these states, with only regional ambitions,
nevertheless involved America in a costly war. In terms of global powers neither Germany nor Japan, not to speak of Italy, was a peer
competitor to the British Empire or to the United States, yet together they brought about the most terrible war in history and came close to
winning it. Winston Churchill rightly called the Second World War the unnecessary war. It was only one among many that could have been
prevented by responsible behavior on the part of those nations with the greatest reasons to preserve peace and the means to do so .
Deterring such wars requires the will to create and maintain a sufficient military force and the
will to use that force when necessary. The behavior of great powers, even in small crises, gives
important signals that are carefully read by dissatisfied and hos tile states. When they read
strength and a strong will, they tend to retreat and subside. When they read weakness and
timidity, they take risks. Understanding of and generosity toward the desires of dissatisfied nations, great and small, can be sound
policy in a context of strength and demonstrated courage and commitment. But when such gestures are seen as evidence of weakness and
fear, the results may be terrible for both sides. The chief problems facing American foreign policy today, as they
have since the end of the Cold War, are how to maintain and strengthen a situation in the world
that is unusually conducive to peace and to the goals and values of the United States , its allies and
friends. This condition is not the result of historical happenstance; it was achieved mostly by a readiness on the part of the West to acquire and sustain predominant
military force and the demonstrated willingness and capacity to use it when necessary. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the main reason for an
unprecedented commitment and sacrifice in peacetime on which the preservation of peace rested. Since then the U.S. has sharply reduced its military power, and its
reactions to world events have raised serious questions about its readiness to continue in the role of chief keeper of the peace. [P. 337-339 ]
U.S. should try to maintain primacy as long as possible by: (1) safeguarding economy; (2)
encouraging pro-u.s. balancing
WALT (Harvard JFK School of Govt) 05
[Stephen, In the National Interest, Boston Review, March 10, p. online //mac-dch]
Trying to increase the American lead might not be worth the effort (if only because the United States is already far ahead),
but allowing other states to catch up would mean relinquishing the advantages that primacy now
provides. For this reason alone, the central aim of American grand strategy in foreign policy
should be to preserve its current position for as long as possible. Several obvious implications
follow. First, American leaders should take care not to squander the nation's power
unnecessarily (by fighting unnecessary wars, for example) or mismanage its economy in ways that
undermine its long-term vitality. Second, the United States should avoid giving other states
additional incentives to build up their own power--either by acquiring new capabilities of their
own or by joining forces with others--and should encourage them to rely on America's help when
security problems arise in their own regions. In other words, we want to discourage balancing
against the United States, and encourage regional balancing with us.
Heg Good: A2 Extended Deterrence Not Credible 2NC

First, american extended deterrence is credible:
A) europethe cold war proves and theres no current hotspots in europe, checking breakdowns
B) east asiacredibility abounds and will continue
MCINNIS (Research Assoc. at CSIS) 05
[Kathleen, Extended Deterrence, Washington Quarterly, Summer, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
In the Asian theater, extended deterrence has been effective, and the United States possesses
some decent options for ensuring its effectiveness in the future. The long-standing commitment
of the United States to the survival of democratic states in the region, reinforced by security treaties with Japan and South Korea, has created a
great deal of U.S. political credibility in the region. This political credibility, combined with U.S. military capabili ties,
could be employed to deter the North Korean threat and assure U.S. allies in the region, thereby reducing the
chance that they will respond to Pyongyang by building their own nuclear weapons program. The U.S.
political commitment to its allies in Asia has been and remains robust, bolstered by the U.S.
troop presence in Japan and South Korea for the past 50 years. This remains true despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in
the Asian theater. Furthermore, should allies begin to doubt U.S. nuclear assurances , steps can be taken to reinforce the policys
credibility. As such, despite the major challenges presented by Pyongyangs nuclear declaration in February 2005, it is reasonably likely that East Asian allies will continue to choose to
rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella well into the future rather than set off a regional nuclear domino effect.
Second, unipolarity solves your scenarios:

A) the power structure stops challengers in the first place
Unipolar world more stable because power differential removes uncertainty and prevents
second-tier rivalry
Wohlforth (Asst. Prof., Intl Relations, Georgetown) 2K
[William C., Americas Strategic Choices, revised edition, ed. Brown, Cote Jr., Lynn-Jones & Miller, p. 292-293]
unipolarity is the least war prone of all

as long as unipolarity obtains, there is little uncertainty regarding alliance choices of the
calc ulation of power. The only options available to second-tier states are to bandwagon with the polar power (either explicitly or
implicitly) or, at least, to take no action that could incur its focused enmity. As long as their security policies are oriented around the power and preferences of the sole pole,
second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict prone rivalries for security or prestige . Once
Waltz argued that bipolarity is less war prone than multipolarity because it reduces uncertainty. By the same logic,
structures. For
the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail. Moreover, the unipolar leader has the capability to be far more interventionist than earlier system leaders. Exploiting
the other states' security dependence as well as its unilateral power advantages, the sole pole can maintain a system of alliances that keeps second-tier states out of power.
B) it solves miscalculation, which is at the heart of break-downs

[Stephen, Naval War College Review, Spring,
www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm]
A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer
the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why

the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive,
important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that
often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today,
. One reason is that

because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to
challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a hegemonic war (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war
via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other
major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly
even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go
however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possib ility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons
to war and weaker states dare not try.
Third, perfect deterrence is impossiblemust maximize power to minimize risks of war

Perfect deterrence of all attacks is not
possible-the United States may still be attacked at home or abroad and will always be vulnerable to some type of attack. The military and intelligence
community are, and must always remain, vigilant because, although they succeed in protecting
Americans the vast majority of the time, they are judged by failures like Pearl Harbor or 9/11. Moreover, although it is rare,
history shows that weaker states do attack stronger ones, as Japan did in 1941, or as Egypt and Syria did when they attacked Israel in 1973. But if a country were
foolish enough to attack the United States, it is very likely to be defeated soundly and absolutely
defeated and this fact helps maintain the massive deterrent power of the United States .
Nevertheless, the military prowess of the United States does not mean that states or terrorist groups will not attack it.
Heg Good: A2 "Power Diffusion" 2NC

Trade deficits are advantageousforces china and japan to stake the us
Much of the current account deficit is due to China and, to a lesser extent, Japan. That actually is good news
for the current account deficit of the United States because the Chinese, Japanese, and other central banks
in East Asia have an enormous stake in selling to the United States. These economies depend on
exports, and the United States is an enormous market for their products and services. To ensure that their
currency is weak against the American dollar, which is good for their export industries, they keep buying dollars and securities based on the dollar. If they did not, the dollar would lose value against the Chinese currency (the renminbi), causing
Chinese imports to cost more, resulting in fewer Americans buying them, in turn causing a loss of jobs and downturn in the
Chinese economy at a critical time-millions of Chinese are moving from rural areas to the cities to seek manufacturing jobs.
If there were a substantial downturn in the Chinese economy, unemployment could lead to
political unrest. The communist leaders of China are acutely aware of this, since economic problems
fueled the revolution in which they took power. Prominent historian Niall Ferguson estimates that if the dollar fell by
one-third against the renminbi, the Chinese could suffer a loss of about 10 percent of their GDP.27 That would be
catastrophic, and so it is unacceptable to the Chinese. Thus, China's economic interest requires
it to fund the current account deficit of the United States . "The United States may be discovering what the
British found in their imperial heyday," Ferguson writes; that is, "If you are a truly powerful empire, you can
borrow a lot of money at surprisingly reasonable rates. Today's deficits are in fact dwarfed in relative terms
by the amount the British borrowed to finance their Global War on (French) Terror between 1793 to 1815"-and the British
Empire lasted another 150 years.28
Heg Good: A2 "U.S. Aggression" 2NC

Realities of nuclear war force even a unipolar U.S. to adopt a cautious foreign policy towards
its rivals
Campbell Craig, "American Power Preponderance and the Nuclear Revolution," REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES v. 35, January 2009, pp. 27-44.
Having no recourse to the mechanism of great power cooperation to preserve stability, the US
will have to pursue equilibrium purely by making it a specific objective of its foreign policy by
developing strategies that would discourage states from turning against America and seeking
nuclear weapons. It could try to accomplish such a goal by the use of intimidation and fear, such as was implied by the Bush administrations National Security Strategy of 2002, but
this approach has, by any reasonable reckoning, failed. A unilateral and muscular unipolar foreign policy runs aground on the nuclear revolution, because the US, no matter how aggressively it acts,
cannot prevent determined small states from obtaining nuclear weapons and defying its will by means of force and intimidation, as the current situation in Iran, and in North Korea, both suggest. That
the US, if it is to avoid the dangers of

disequilibrium, is primed to gravitate toward a much more conciliatory and magnanimous
foreign policy. To specify what this means in a contemporary context, it will have far stronger incentives to deal with potentially recalcitrant small states in the manner of North Korea
multilateral diplomacy and economic rewards than it has done so far with Iran. In a more general sense , the US will have an equally strong incentive
to dissuade nations like North Korea or Iran from becoming recalcitrant in the first place.
Because sticks do not work against nuclear states, and have not worked even in the war against
non-nuclear Iraq, the US will have to resort to carrots: to persuade would-be rogue states to
accept American preponderance and reward them for doing so. It will therefore have a
compelling interest to be perceived as a magnanimous superpower by all other states and
especially those who possess or could readily obtain nuclear weapons; to deal with
transnational problems or regional conflicts that might embolden ambitious states to do
something about them themselves; and to provide security guarantees to vulnerable states, or states
is a deep distinction between unipolar powers of the prenuclear era and the US today. Therefore,
that successfully portray themselves as vulnerable
______________________________
**Hegemony Good: Central Asia**
Heg Good: Caspian F/L
First, american leadership in the caspian key to stability: boosts american hegemony, contains
russia and is key to checking terrorism and smuggling
KALICKI (Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 01
[Jan, Caspian Energy at the Cross-Roads, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. asp// wyo-tjc]
The countries surrounding the Caspian Sea -- Russia to the north, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the east,
Iran to the south, and Azerbaijan to the west -- hold some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. And together with
neighboring Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, they represent important economic, political,
and strategic interests for the United States. To advance those interests, Washington should strengthen its policy toward the Caspian by giving the
highest level of support to the cooperative development of regional energy reserves and pipelines. In particular, it should encourage the construction of multiple pipelines to ensure diverse and
reliable transportation of Caspian energy to regional and international markets.
Although the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will continue to dominate the global energy market for decades to come, oil and gas development in the Caspian basin could help
diversify, secure, and stabilize world energy supplies in the future, as resources from the North Sea have done in the past. The proven and possible energy reserves in or adjacent to the Caspian
region -- including at least 115 billion barrels of oil -- are in fact many times greater than those of the North Sea and should increase significantly with continuing exploration.
Such plentiful resources could generate huge returns for U.S. companies and their shareholders. American firms have already acquired 75 percent of Kazakhstan's mammoth Tengiz oil field, which is
now valued at more than $10 billion. Over time, as the capital generated from Caspian energy development spreads to other sectors, U.S. firms in other industries -- from infrastructure to
telecommunications to transportation and other services -- could also benefit.
In addition to these energy-related and commercial interests, the United States has important political and strategic stakes in the Caspian region -- including a NATO ally in Turkey, a former adversary
, the Caspian
serves as a trafficking area for weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, and narcotics -- a role
enhanced by the weakness of the region's governments . With few exceptions, the fledgling Caspian
republics are plagued with pervasive corruption, political repression, and the virtual absence of the rule of law. Even if
they can muster the political will to attempt reform themselves, the attempt will fail so long as
they lack the resources to build strong economic and political institutions. And until they build
close, substantive relations with the West, they will remain vulnerable to Russia's hegemonic
impulses. The cooperative development of regional energy reserves and pipelines -- independent of
their huge neighbors to the north and the south -- thus represents not only a boon for the United States and
the world at large, but also the surest way to provide for the Caspian nations' own security and
prosperity
in Russia, a currently turbulent regime in Iran, and several fragile new states. Located at the crossroads of western Europe, eastern Asia, and the Middle East
Second, failure to contain russia would destabilize all of eurasia, spark nuclear wars and put a
stranglehold on the west.
COHEN (PhD, Heritage Foundation) 96
[Ariel, The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Backgrounder, no. 1065, p.online// wyo-tjc]
Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russias transition to a

democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russias IMF and World Bank loans for
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies.
1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the
region, but for peace, world stability, and security.
these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of

mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian
empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world.
It would endanger not only Russias neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could
As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS,
imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15

Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have
resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase.
The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in
addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave
off Islamic militancy more difficult.
Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development
in the early 21st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become
precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern NIS. Only with oil
revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modern market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of
. The U.S. should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit
of both Western and local economies.
thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created
Heg Good: Caspian S/L

American military presence in the caspian is key to the stability of the caspian states and
preventing the reemergence of a hostile Russian hegemon as per the Kalicki 2002 evidence.
Russian imperialism would destabilize all of eurasia, sparking nuclear wars and ultimately a
giant power conflict between the US and Russia, as the cohen card proves
This outweighs case for several reasons
A) Magnitudea great power war and sudden nuclear wars trumps their case impact. Also,
the strength of us hegemony in the region means the status quo solves their terminal
impact in the caspian
B) Probabilitywere the only ones with uniqueness, as a strong military presence prevents
violence now. This proves our impact is true because theirs should have already
happened
C) Timeframeour kalicki and cohen cards prove russia is at the doorstep of the caspian,
looking to monopolize. Us presence is the only thing holding them back meaning postplan, a power vacuum would rapidly develop, ensuring a fast impact.
[optional:] additionally
Caspian instability and violence are inevitablea strong western presence is key to check
russian expansion and foster cooperative stability
BLANK (MacArthur Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute) 03
[Stephen, The Future of Caspian Security, Problems of Post-Communism, Jan/Feb, p. asp// wyo-tjc]
Heg Good: CaspianA2 "No Risk of Russian Hegemony"

2NC
First, american military engagement prevents russian adventurismour kalicki ev indicates
that russian bullying is unavoidable without a strong power to deter them and foster
development of the caspian states
Second, lack of american involvement in the caspian allows russias reemergence as an
imperial power
COHEN (PhD, Heritage Foundation) 96
[Ariel, The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Backgrounder, no. 1065, p.online// wyo-tjc]
The main threat to the equitable development of Eurasian oil is the Russian attempt to dominate
the region in a de facto alliance with the radical Islamic regime in Tehran.8 Russia benefits from
instability in the Caucasus, where wars and conflicts undermine independence and economic
development while hindering the export of oil from the regions states.9
Moscow has gone beyond words to establish its power in the Caucasus. The Russians are
setting up military bases in the region in order to gain exclusive control over all future pipelines. Georgia now has
four Russian bases and Armenia has three, while Azerbaijan is still holding out under severe pressure from Moscow. In addition, members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States are required to police their borders jointly with Russian border guards, and thus are denied effective control over their own territory.
The struggle to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus

and Central Asia started in early 1992. While not a full-scale war, this struggle employs a broad
spectrum of military, covert, diplomatic, and economic measures . The southern tier of the former Soviet Union is a
Attempts to Reintegrate the South.
zone of feverish Russian activity aimed at tightening Moscows grip in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The entire southern rim of Russia is a turbulent frontier, a
highly unstable environment in which metropolitan civilian and military elites, local players, and mid-level officers and bureaucrats drive the process of reintegration.10
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin called for a re-examination of Russias borders to the detriment of her neighbors, especially Ukraine and
Yeltsin reiterated Russias right to

conduct peacemaking in the near abroad, to protect Russian speakers and to exercise
freedom of action in its sphere of influence.11
Kazakhstan. For example, upon his return from a state visit to the U.S. in September 1994,
These statements were echoed on numerous occasions by former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and other key policymakers in Moscow. In his
September 1995 Decree On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States,12 Yeltsin outlined plans to create a CIS military
and economic union. Some observers have termed this design an informal empire on the cheap, a sustainable empire which is less centralized than the old Soviet
Union.13 The aim of such an arrangement would be to ensure Russias control of the oil and gas reserves in Eurasia.
Competing political interests inside Russias neighbors often prompt local elites to challenge the faction in power and to seek Moscows support. For example,
Russian oil chieftains in Kazakhstan and military commanders who are still in place in Moldova and Georgia naturally maintain close links with Moscow. Where it
lacks troops on the ground, Moscow supports the most pro-Russian faction in the conflict, such as Trans-Dniestrian ethnic Russians in Moldova, the separatist
Abkhazs in Georgia, warlords and former communist leaders in Azerbaijan, and pro-communist clans in Tajikistan. This is a classic scenario for imperial expansion.
What is common to these conflicts is that without Russian support, the pro-Moscow factions (regardless of their ethnicity) could not have dominated their respective
regions, and would be forced to seek negotiated and peaceful solutions. In each case, appeals by the legitimate governments of the Newly Independent States to
restore their territorial integrity were ignored by Moscow.
Russian political elites have not overcome the imperialist ideology that inspired both pre-1917
and Soviet expansionism. For todays Moscow bureaucrats and generals, as for their
predecessors in St. Petersburg prior to 1917, the turbulent southern periphery is a potential
source of political fortunes, promotions, and careers. For Russian politicians in search of a
grand cause, re-establishing the empire and paying for it with Eurasian oil revenues is a winning
proposition, especially in the murky environment in the aftermath of imperial collapse.
Third, lack of western development allows russian stranglehold on caspian oil

KALICKI (Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 01
[Jan, Caspian Energy at the Cross-Roads, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. asp// wyo-tjc]
For now, however, the Caspian nations, particularly Kazakhstan, still depend heavily on Russia for oil
transportation. Most of their oil exports go through Russian pipelines, including the new CPC
line, to Russian ports on the Black Sea, where they are then shipped through the Bosporus to international
markets. In fact, until the AIOC recently constructed a pipeline that carries some 115,000 barrels of "early oil" per day from
Baku to Supsa on Georgia's Black Sea coast, Russia held an effective monopoly on Caspian oil transportation.
Continued dependence on Russian pipelines would be dangerous because it would allow

Moscow to unilaterally raise tariffs and constrain Caspian exports, or threaten these actions to
win political or economic concessions from its neighbors. Both Kazakhstan (an energy exporter)
and Georgia (an energy importer) have been particularly vulnerable to such pressure, and their
future political autonomy will rest on their ability to secure independent access to international
energy markets.
Heg Good: CaspianA2 No U.S. Military Presence Now

2NC
First, thats falseour kalicki ev proves energy development necessitates military presence
because of the geopolitical interests involved.
Second, united states maintains substantial military presence in the caspian region, including
military aid and training for nations

[Stephen, A Violent Theater: Central Asias Militarization, The World and I, Feb. 1, p. ln// wyo-tjc]
Finally, there is the American military presence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus . This presence,
ratified by bilateral agreements, extends to all of the area except for Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Washington
now can render military assistance to Armenia, and discussions to provide it with genuine assistance began several years
ago. The U.S. presence comprises air bases, landing rights, and troops to defend those bases.
Regular training and advising for the host countries' troops also take place, whether through
bilateral agreements, multilateral venues like the Partnership for Peace exercises, or exercises
with the Central Asian Battalion. U.S. commanders have stated that these exercises and the mutual relationships
forged through them were vital in winning local governments' speedy agreement to host U.S. military bases and personnel
after September 11. Those forces will remain abroad at least through 2003 to complete the mission of extirpating terrorism
in Afghanistan and securing that country for the future. Of course, they do not even begin to address in public the strategic
issues connected with the possibility of using Central Asian or Transcaucasian bases and U.S. military assets there against
Iraq.
While American officials profess no interest in long-term bases in Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus, Washington's commitment to consolidating long-term security relationships
with those states has undoubtedly intensified. The final parameters of our relationship with local
regimes remain to be determined, but the United States can be expected to upgrade and extend
its overall presence. Bilateral and multilateral venues of military training, assistance, and
cooperation will continue, along with local governments' quest for something in the way of
security guarantees against threats to their security. Uzbekistan, for example, quite openly wants a U.S.
guarantee of its security. We can also expect, therefore, that the sale of U.S. weapons and technologies will soon figure in
these states' military profile, since those systems obviously go with American training and organization. Unsurprisingly, the
motives of those arms sellers will resemble those of the other states cited here, a quest for revenues and markets to keep
their firms going, as well as a political quest for influence over the security institutions and policies of the recipient states.
Heg Good: CaspianA2 U.S. Cant Stabilize Caspian 2NC

First, military presence and us dollars are keyour kalicki and cohen cards prove that the
positive flow of income allows stability and that military aid from the us makes internal
instability less likely
Second, western military involvement in the caspian region is key to integrate russia, reform
governance and stabilize the area
Third, us presence in the caspian through military aid key to stability because it instills
professionalism, effectiveness, cooperation and restraint
Fifth, american military presence in the caspian is key to opening up the region to globalized
integration which eliminates the risk of regional conflict
Sixth, natos partnership for peace solves caspian stabilitydepoliticizes military

relationships
Heg Good: CaspianA2 War Turns (Russia Backlash) 2NC

First, yes they willkalicki ev indicates the us military is powerful enough to deter russian
expansion and hostility
Second, theres no uniquenesswe have a huge military presence now. Either their impact is
simple untrue or the probability is near zero because the status quo is stable
Third, competition is a thing of the past9/11 led to a strategic sea-change with russia
accepting long-term american miliary presence.
TRENIN (nqa) 04
[Dmitri, A Farewell to the Great Game?, European Security, p. asp// wyo-tjc]
In terms of US-Russian cooperation, Afghanistan nevertheless was an exception, even within the region. Since the mid1990s, competition around the Caspian Sea and its oil reserves had been intensifying . Moscow
perceived American activities in the oil-rich former Soviet states bordering the Caspian as a deliberate attempt to drive it out
of the region and place those resources under US control. Washington, for its part, viewed Moscows meddling in the newly
independent nations as evidence of Russian neo-imperialism.
The United States might be vastly superior financially and more agile politically, but Russia was geographically closer and
possessed an enormous capacity for access denial. To many observers, the new Great Game was not just
a possibility; it was a daily reality.

September 11, 2001, changed much in the Russian-US geopolitical picture. First, it became clear
that the challenges that Russia and now America were facing were simila r, and that their enemies in
turn were closely allied among themselves. Second, President Putin decided to pull out of the costly
strategic contest with the United States, and concentrate instead on Russias domestic
economic agenda. Putin not only offered President Bush support on Afghanistan (including the provision of valuable
intelligence information, and material aid to the Afghan Northern Alliance which effectively ousted the Taliban), but raised
no objection to a US military presence in Central Asia. On the latter, he must have calculated,
correctly, that an attempt to block American access to air bases in Uzbekistan and elsewhere
would be hugely counter-productive. Between September 11 and September 22, 2001, Russian foreign and security policy underwent a
drastic change.1
The importance of this step can hardly be overstated. Putin was de facto conceding one of the most important principles of Russian post-Soviet military doctrine, that
is, denial to any third partyespecially the United Statesof a permanent military presence in, or a military alliance with, any member of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). It is true that had the Russian president tried to deny the United States entry to the region, he would likely have failed. Certainly
Uzbekistan, the biggest nation of them all, and probably others would have refused to follow Moscows line, thus turning Russias bullying into a reaffirmation of
Putin apparently knew he would have lost had he tried to maintain a hard line, but
he went far beyond accepting the inevitable to rethink the entire Russian strategy south of the
border. In Afghanistan, Putin contradicted those inside and outside Russia who hoped or feared that Moscow would use
national independence .
its contacts with the Northern Alliance to become the principal beneficiary of the defeat of the Taliban. Russia did not seek to
undermine the Bonn conference of Afghan factions; it dropped any plans that might have existed to send Russian forces
into Afghanistan as peacekeepers, a mere dozen years after the Soviet withdrawal; and it generally adopted a low profile in
Afghanistan, behind the Americans and their NATO allies. In Central Asia, Putin had to agree that the
American and Western military presence in the region was going to be long-term. The facesaving formula of stationing forces for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation meant, in
effect, that US and allied militaries would continue to have access to facilities in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistanand should they want it, in Kazakstan and Turkmenistanindefinitely. For its part, Moscow attempted to
consolidate its security links with its Collective Security Treaty (CST) partners (Astana, Bishkek, and Dushanbe) by means
of creating a regional military command. The prospects for this, however, remain uncertain.
Russia will accept western involement in the caspiancapitulation happening now

Cooperation through nato will prevent any us/russian conflict over the cis states
__________________________
**Hegemony Good: China**
Heg Good: China F/L
Loss of american credibility in asia sparks chinese adventurism and a bid to retake taiwan
DAO (staff) 03
[James, Why Keep US Troops?, The New York Times, Jan. 5, p. ln//wyo-tjc]
Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's
presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region
about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia.
"In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those
circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond."
In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts
about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japan more confident, he contends.
An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United States' commitmen t to the
40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we
would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said.
Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American
power, no matter how much the United States asserts its commitment to the region. China might
take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel
emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms .
"Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals
taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would
be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China
in the long term."
"Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region ."
Second, failure to deter an invasion sparks a global nuclear holocaust

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 96
[staff, China Prepares New Show of Strength, Feb. 6, p. ln// wyo-tjc]
While a peaceful solution remains a priority, both the politburo and the Peoples Liberation Army
have pledged to use force if necessary to regain the island on which the Nationalists settled after losing the
civil war to Mao Tse-tung in 1949.
A PLA analysis--leaked to Western media--suggests that in the event of war with Taiwan, the U.S. would not intervene
because U.S. commercial interests in China would be damaged and any intervention could lead to a new Sino-Russian
alliance.
The document, circulated among officers, concludes that even if the U.S. intervened, Washington could
only retard--but not reverse--the defeat of Taiwan, and a Sino-U.S. conflict might lead to a global
nuclear holocaust.
Heg Good: China S/L

Hegemony is essential to prevent the rise of an aggressive china. The khalilzad evidence
indicates that our system of alliances and forward military presence must be continuously
maintained to prevent china from trying to revise the status quo over taiwan. Next, the failure
of hegemony or perception by the chinese that the united states is not capable or willing to
intervene sparks a war over taiwan. The chicago tribune evidence proves this quickly grows
to a nuclear holocaust.
Second, this outweighs the case because
A) Sheer magnitudewar would be between two of the most powerful nuclear states in one
of the most populous areas of the world, triggering global escalation
B) Probability & timeframethe pla is just waiting for the right opportunity for the us to let
down its guard, allowing for instanteous warfare. Also, khalilzad proves the probability
of warfare will only get larger with time as china becomes more powerful.
Third, american military presence key to effectively deter chinese aggression for decades
ROSS (Professor of Political Science, Boston College) 02
[Robert, Navigating the Taiwan Strait, International Security, Fall, p. asp// wyo-tjc]
The United States can continue to deter China from initiating war in the Taiwan Strait for many
decades. In the absence of a Taiwan declaration of independence, China prefers to maintain the status quo and an
international environment conducive to economic and military modernization. Moreover, Chinese analysts
understand that China is vastly inferior to the United States in nearly all facets of international
power and that it will remain so for a long time. One analyst estimated that Chinese military
technology is fifteen to twenty years behind that of the United States . n90 More important, Chinese analyses
of "comprehensive national power," which takes into account the military, technological, educational, and economic bases of national strength,
estimated in 2000 that China would catch up to the United States in 2043 if Chinese comprehensive national power grew at a rate of 6
percent per year and U.S. comprehensive national power grew at 3 percent per year.n91
During the Cold War, the most pessimistic U.S. civilian and government analysts insisted that only if the United States possessed war-winning
capabilities and/or escalation dominance could it deter the Soviet use of force in Europe . n92 In the twenty-first century, the
United States possesses escalation dominance in the Taiwan Strait. At every level of escalation,
from conventional to nuclear warfare, the United States can engage and defeat Chinese forces.
Moreover, it can do so with minimal casualties and rapid deployment, undermining any Chinese
confidence in the utility of asymmetric and fait accompli strategies. Chinese military and civilian
leaders have acknowledged both U.S. resolve and its superior war-winning capabilities.
Confidence in its deterrence capabilities enables the United States to protect Taiwan while
developing cooperative relations with China. This was post-Cold War U.S. policy toward China in both the George H.W.
Bush and Clinton administrations. Maintaining this policy is both possible and necessary. On the one hand, the United States should continue
to develop its capabilities in long-range precision-guided weaponry and in its command-and-control facilities. It should also continue to
develop and forward deploy not only aircraft carriers but also Trident SSGNs and UAVs, platforms that enable the United States to deliver
precision-guided weaponry and carry out surveillance with minimal risk of casualties, thus further reducing PRC expectations that asymmetric
capabilities or a fait accompli strategy could deter U.S. defense of Taiwan .
Heg deters China/Taiwan war

Brookes 08 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. He is also a member of the congressional U.S.-China Economic and
Security
Review Commission (Peter, Heritage, Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might, November 24, 2008
We know that China is undergoing a major military buildup , especially involving its power projection forces--i.e., air force, navy, and
ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing peacetime defense
budget, growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years. I would daresay
that military
tensions across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater
today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political
status quo via military means. China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor and rival, Taiwan, a
vibrant, free-market democracy. It is believed by many analysts that absent American military might, China would quickly unite
Taiwan with the mainland under force of arms. In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that
the United States maintains provides the basis for stability in the Pacific, since the region has
failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO .
Risk of war over taiwan is exceedingly high

MUNRO (Dir. Asian Studies at Center for Security Studies) 2K
[Ross, China: The Challenge of a Rising Power, Present Dangers: Crisis & Opportunity in American Foreign & Defense Policy, ed. Kagan & Kristol, Encounter Books
//wyo-tjc]
No issue in U.S.-China relations today is more volatile, or more charged with immediate danger
for the United States, than Taiwan. Primarily because of the Clinton administrations ineptitude,
the possibility of another military confrontation between China and Taiwan has risen dramatically
over the past year. Such a confrontation would immediately present the United States with a dilemma much more
serious than it faced in 1996, when it was necessary to dispatch two U.S. naval aircraft carrier task forces to waters near
Taiwan to convince China to end its threatening military actions against the island republic. Although still enjoying
clear-cut military superiority, U.S. forces would have to weigh the threat posed by Russian-built
anti-ship missiles and other advanced new weapons that the Peoples Liberation Army has
deployed since 1996. [P. 48]
Heg Good: ChinaA2 China Isnt a Military Threat 2NC

First, they have enough power to believe they could make a move towards taiwan should they
think the us is failing.
Second, any army with millions of soliders and several nuclear weapons can be incredibly
devestating even if they arent the best in the world.
Third, assuming we can wait on the china issue is dangerouschinas military can seriously
threaten the us even if it doesnt have symmetrical capability
//wyo-tjc]
Clintons policy of engagement owes much of its remaining public credibility to a cohort of China specialists in and out of
government who have fervently argued throughout the 1 990s that Chinas armed forces are weak and backward and
therefore pose no significant military threat to the United States. Members of this weak China school insist
that those who argue otherwise are alarmists who exaggerate Chinas military capabilities. Their
analysis is simplistic; but it is the subtext that is truly dangerous: even if Chinas goal is to dominate Asia
and even if China views the United States as the enemy, there is still no need to be alarmed because China is so far behind
us militarily. We have plenty of time, they say, to wait for Clintons engagement policy to work and for
China to evolve before we should worry about this alleged China threat. In the real world, there are many
reasons to worry about the Chinese military threat right now. Many elements of Chinas military, including
most of its land forces, are indeed quite backward. But Chinas strategy for building up its military is
shrewdly focusing its limited resources on a few advanced weapons programs and a limited
number of military units that can inflict maximum damage on the United States and its Asian
partners, especially Taiwan. Chinese strategists are not trying to match the U.S. gun for gun.
Instead, they are looking for those weapons that can give China an asymmetrical but decisive
advantage in any conflict.
We have already seen, for instance, how Chinas missile arsenal today poses a threat to U.S.
interests. While the weak China school often comes close to suggesting that we neednt worry about Chinas Navy until
it acquires a blue water capability in Asia comparable to ours, the Chinese dont think that way at all. They are
mounting anti-ship missiles not just on new, Russian-built Sovre menny-class destroyers but
also on small naval craft, making it potentially very costly for the U.S. Navy to mount even a
show of force in the next Taiwan crisis. China is also investing heavily in information warfare and space warfare
as a relatively inexpensive way of countering some of our most advanced military technology. And since Chinese authorities
recently permitted publication of Unrestricted War, U.S. war plans must take into account the possibility that China will also
use weapons ranging from terrorism to an engineered financial panic against us.
Not that China isnt spending in more traditional areas as well. Thanks in part to the huge trade surplus it is running with the
United States, China can afford to pay the Russians at least one billion dollars a year for warplanes, submarines, and other
advanced weapons, including even its best multiple-warhead missile technology. [P. 62-63]
Heg Good: ChinaA2 China Wont Be Aggressive 2NC

First, thats not trueour khalilzad evidence proves that china may turn revisionist if they
perceive them being relatively ahead of the us.
Second, they have the will to be aggressivenationalist delusions and resentment towards
hegemony guarantee the threat. Us must stay powerful to prevent them from acting on it.
Third, chinas rise is likely to be hostile because clinton-era policies have emboldened it
//wyo-tjc]
Virtually every serious strategic thinker in the United States today agrees that China, if current trends continue,
represents a greater potential danger in the long term than any other nation in the world. M any
analysts go considerably further: We are convinced that the danger is not just potential and long-term,
but here and now, real and present. It is the proximity of the threat, in fact, that constitutes one of
the most serious indictments of current policy.
If the Clinton administration had only failed to take seriously the danger that China may pose to the United States in
the long term, we could at least comfort ourselves with the prospect of a future, strategically minded president repairing the
damage and reversing the trends that President Clinton set in motion. But the administrations strategic obtuseness
and its policy of appeasement has emboldened China to the degree that the next few years could
well prove to be an extremely dangerous period in U.S-China relations . [P. 47-48]
Heg Good: ChinaA2 Containment Bad/Engagement Good

2NC
Engagement theory is mistakenhistorical record proves and china will only become more
authoritarian without pressure
//wyo-tjc]
Events in 1994 did not destroy the long-standing myth , first propagated by Christian missionaries in the
nineteenth century, that we can change China. Even after abandoning a policy of link agethe threat
of closing Americas markets to Chinese exports to induce Chinese reformsClinton did not abandon the myth
but instead reformulated it as engagement. At the core of this new policy was the dubious
proposition that if the United States helped China grow economically , mainly by trading with and
investing in it, this would lead inexorably to a market economy, a middle class, civil society, rule of
law, pluralism and, ultimately, democracy. Whats more, China would become a responsible member of the international
community, restrained by its dependence on trade and investment from acting aggressively in the world.
Engagement was a masterstroke by a master political phrasemaker. After the terms adoption, the Clinton administration and its defenders
defined critics of its China policy as opponents of engagement and therefore in favor of isolating China . Engagement also
served as a politically palatable screen for hiding the administrations surrender of China policy
to the new China lobby of U.S. business interests who had successfully derailed linkage and had then begun to press
the administration to suspend or eviscerate restrictions on exporting high technology to China. From 1994 on, the Clinton administration did
not make a single major decision regarding China that was opposed by the pro-China business lobby.
Packaging China policy as engagement may have been a domes tic political success, but it was
still in conflict with American national interests. In the long term, of course, there is a correla tion
between economic development and democratization, but far from 100 percent, and it has little
relevance to the matter of U.S. policy towards China in the present . Consider that in 1900, one could have
argued that Germanys and Japans level and rate of economic development guaranteed that both countries would become democracies
integrated with the world community. Yet both subsequently suffered under ruthless regimes that launched three horrendously destructive
major wars between them; and that reality, not long-term prospects, was what Western democracies had to deal with.
In China, a transition to democracy could take many decades, and is by no means guaranteed.
Per capita income in predominantly Chinese Singapore today surpasses most industrial democ racies, yet Singapore remains essentially a one-party authoritar ian city-state, however benign it
might be. Indeed, China itself grows richer yearly, yet there is probably less political freedom
today than a decade ago. In fact, since Clintons 1988 visit, a new wave of political repression has continued into the
new century. [P. 61-62]
And even if engagement is good, need hegemony as a backstop incase engagement fails.

Rather than rush to premature judgment, America should at this stage focus its efforts on
shaping the character of Chinas growing ambition and channeling its increasing strength in
benign directions. Washington should send a signal to Beijing that by moderating the scope of
its ambition it will in fact expand its leverage and room to maneuver. This task means engaging
rather than isolating China, and elevating Beijings status and voice to satisfy its yearning to move up the
international buerarchy; [he goal should be to find ways of accommodating Chinas gradual
emergence as a major power, while at the same time hedging against the possibility of an
aggressive turn in Chinese intentions. America must seek to bind and bound China, but remain
guarded about the possibility that China might refuse to play along. [P. 275-276 ]
Heg Good: ChinaA2 Containment Risks Self-Fulfilling

Prophecy 2NC
First, this argument doesnt assume deterrenceour khalilzad evidence proves that animosity
and warfare are inevitable regardless of whether we treat china like a threat. Thats the reason
we need to have hegemony as a deterrent.
Second, this argument is ridiculousamerica is not the sole determinant of sino actions, such
rhetoric is just a bluff and the risks of playing is soft are worse
Many Western experts have warned that the United States can turn China into an enemy by
treating it like one. This bit of strategic folk wisdom contains a kernel of truth, but it is less profound,
and less helpful as a guide to policy than it is sometimes made to seem. As has already been
suggested, China may become an enemy, even if the United States treats it like a friend. Nor is it
clear in the present situation exactly which U.S. actions would be regarded as provocative or
what their full effects might be. Chinese officials regularly warn of dire consequences if the United States and its
allies proceed in certain ways. Some of this rhetoric may in fact give a clear indication of Chinas intended response, but
some of it is merely deterrent bluff. In any case, there will inevitably be some steps that the
United States needs to take to bolster its own strategic position in Asia, even at the risk of
arousing the ire of the present Chinese leadership. If the United States makes preserving cordial
relations with China (or even maintaining stability) the premier aim of its Asia policy, it will have
effectively given Beijing a veto over everything it does in the region.
The dangers of acting in an overly provocative fashion have received a great deal of attention in
recent years from American decision-makers. But there is another danger as well: If the United States
appears unduly passive or detached, if it fails to respond adequately to Chinese initiatives, or appears excessively
sensitive and responsive to criticism from Beijing, it may set in motion forces that could serve in the long
run to undermine its geopolitical position. Unlike China, the United States is not an Asian power by
virtue of geography but rather as the result of a deliberate exer cise of political determination.
And soalthough their urgency and plausibility may ebb and flowthere will always be questions about the
willingness and ability of the United States to remain engaged in Asia. China, by contrast, is not
going anywhere, and everyone in the region knows it. This fact could be a major advantage to the United States,
because a distant great power is likely to appear less threatening to weaker states, and more desirable as a strategic
partner, than one that it is close by. But this difference could also be turned into a significant liability for
the United States by Chinese strategists intent on displacing it. They might try to fuel doubts
about American reliability and staying power, perhaps by staging tests of resolve from which
they expect Washington to back down, or by developing military capabilities that strain the
American will and ability to respond, or, more subtly by luring the U.S. into expressions of amity and deference
that seem to suggest acknowledgment of Chinas growing strength. In responding to such stratagems, the United States will
have to act in ways intended to convince its current and potential allies, as well as the Chinese themselves, of its
seriousness and steadiness of purpose. [P. 204-205]
Heg Good: ChinaA2 Democratization Solves Chinas Rise

2NC
First, thats wrongrealist imperatives and nationalism will override pacifying effects of
democracy. China will take a hardline on taiwan whenever it has the chance.
Second, even if their argument is true, its too far off. China is still very authoritarian.
American hegemony is a key backstop until democracy can take hold.
Third, transitional pressures will result in aggressive policies.
Even, or perhaps especially, if China is on the road to increasing political openness and eventual
democratization, there may still be good reasons to worry about her external behavior . One
statistical study of the past two hundred years suggests that it is precisely when they are in the process of
making a transition from autocratic to more popular rule that states are most likely to pur sue
policies that bring them into conflict with their neighbors. In such societies political institutions are typically
weak, political participation is rapidly increasing, and old, established interests feel threatened. Under these
conditions, ambitious politicians will often seek to rally supporters behind programs that
combine growth in military power with external assertiveness . [P. 202]
And heg will solve thisallows leverage to promote chinese democratization and pacify their
rise
WOLFOWITZ (Bush National Security Crony) 2K
[Paul, Statesmanship in the New Century, Present Dangers: Crisis & Opportunity in American Foreign & Defense Policy, ed. Kagan & Kristol, Encounter Books //wyo-tjc]
The U.S. interest in supporting democratic trends in China is more than just international social
work. Although our capacity to influence China is limited, the U.S. has a fundamental strategic
interest in encouraging greater openness there. Even though democracies are not as irenic as the extreme
proponents of democratic peace like to argueconsider the Mexican War as just one examplein the case of China there
are reasons to think that a more democratic China will also be more accepting of a peaceful status quo
in the Western Pacific. Democracy in China will not automatically resolve all the points of
potential competition with the U.S.nor did it in Japan. Nevertheless, a China that governs its
own people by force is more likely to try to impose its will on its neighbors, while conversely a
China that is democratic is more likely to respect the choice of its neighbors. And its neighbors ,
including the United States, are more likely to trust it and accept its growing influence.
There are other reasons as well why democratic change in China has strategic as well as humanitarian significance. The Chinese Communist
Party formally claims the right to govern more than a billion people on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, a doctrine that has little more legitimacy
in China today than the divine right of kings had in England in the early nineteenth century. Yet the British had already developed a
substantial alternative basis for the legitimacy of government, whereas Chinas leaders seem afraid to do so. That leaves them only with
economic growth and nationalism as claims for legitimacy. A government whose legitimacy rested on valid claims to be representative would
have less need to make dangerous appeals to nationalism. Finally, and not insignificantly, a democratic China would have a
far better chance of coming to terms with Taiwan peacefully; until then, Taiwans own success at
democracy is a disturbing example for Beijings rulers. I have even been told by a Chinese
Communist Party member that what terrifies those old men in Beijing is the demonstration by
Taiwan that Chinese can manage democracy successfully [P. 325-326]
Heg Good: ChinaA2 Hegemony Makes War Inevitable

2NC
First, thats not trueover fifty years of american forward deployment in asia shows china will
accept the status quo. The ross evidence read above proves well have successful deterrence
for decades to come.
Second, our khalilzad 99 card answers thisthey assume that china would ever have the
perception that america is weak enough to attack but maintaining strong hegemonic
advantages ensures that deterrence will prevail and check chinese ambitions.
Third, hardline containment and clarity of american will to intervene will effectively deter china.
KAGAN (CEIP) 2K
[Robert, Washington Post, How China will Take Taiwan, March 12, 2000, p. ln//wyo-tjc]
What then? In the absence of diplomatic or political solutions, the only way to avert a future Chinese attack on Taiwan is to
deter it right now, and that may require some tough decisions. The Taiwanese are begging the Clinton administration to sell
them four guided missile destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar system, which would give Taiwan early warning of an
attack and significantly improve its ability to knock out incoming missiles. So far the administration has opposed the sale on
the grounds that it would offend Beijing.
The United States also needs to convince Chinese leaders that Washington will not just twiddle
its thumbs when an attack begins. Right now, the U.S. military conducts no exercises with Taiwan, engages in no
joint planning and cannot even communicate with the Taiwanese military in a crisis. This preposterous legacy of America's
normalization of relations with China more than two decades ago has become a positive invitation to war. But the Clinton
administration opposes remedying the problem, because that too would offend Beijing.
In its classic form, the psychology of appeasement convinces peace-loving peoples that any
effort to deter a future conflict is too provocative and therefore too dangerous. The appeasing
nation comes to believe that defenselessness and lack of preparation for a conflict is not only
safer but a sign of maturity. And then the war starts.
Heg Good: ChinaA2 U.S. Wont Intervene 2NC

First, there are several reasons the us couldnt stay out of a war
A) China would target themus forces already in the region would come under fire and
leaders might perceive incentives to weaken the us and keep them out.
B) Domestic politicsthe us electorate would force bush to join the fight and stick up for
democracy
Second, commitment to intervene in taiwan is the linchpin to the crediblity of all of americas
security commitmentstheyll intervene even if its a losing war.
//wyo-tjc]
If there was a confrontation and the United States delayed or avoided coming to Taiwans
assistance, the result would prove catastrophic for U.S. interests. Taiwan is not just an old and
democratic friend of the United States; it is also, despite its relatively small size, an essential factor in
counterbalancing an increasingly powerful China. If the United States failed to assist Taiwan, Asian
countries would conclude that we were no longer committed to supporting a balance of power in
Asia or to supporting our allies in the region. Led by Japan, our friends would scurry to make
concessions to China, possibly including closing their ports and airfields to U.S. armed forces.
Our days as a true Asian power would be numbered . On paper, our military strength might still dwarf Chinas.
But American credibility in Asia would be shattered because we would have revealed that we lacked the political will to use
that military power when the stakes were high. [P. 48-49]
______________________________
**Hegemony Good: Democracy**
Heg Good: Democracy F/L
First, leadership is critical to democratization efforts
ALBRIGHT (Fmr Sect. Of State) 97
[Madeline, Federal News Service, 11 Feb., p. ln//wyo-tjc]
Mr. Chairman, more than seven years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall and five years since the demise of the
Soviet Union. Today, America is secure, our economy vibrant, and our ideals ascendant . Across the
globe, the movement towards open societies and open markets is wider and deeper than ever before. Democracy's
triumph is neither accidental nor irreversible; it is the result of sustained American leadership. It
would not have been possible without the power of our example, the strength of our military, or
the constancy and creativity of our diplomacy . That is the central lesson of the twentieth century -- and this
lesson must continue to guide us if we are to safeguard our interests as we enter the twenty-first. Make no mistake: the
interests served by American foreign policy are not the abstract inventions of State Department
planners; they are the concrete real, ties of our daily lives . Think about it. Would the American people be as
secure if weapons of mass destruction, instead of being controlled, fell into the wrong hands? That is precisely what would
have happened if the Administration and Congress had not acted to ensure the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear weapons
program, the freezing of North Korea's, and the securing of Russia's.
Second, democratic consolidation prevents war and extinction

CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT 1995
[
staff, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, Oct, p. online: http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html //wyo-tjc]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former
Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies
through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and
have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears
increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are
associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for
legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly
democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to
aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their
own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor
terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to
threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long
run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they
must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to
honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to
breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property
rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security
and prosperity can be built.
Heg Good: Democracy S/L

American leadership is critical to global democracy promotionthe albright evidence proves
that political pressure and diplomatic and foreign aid is a deliberate strategy to use american
power to promote democracy
Second, the impact is the carnegie evidencelarge scale power wars and horrendous
genocides can only be eliminated permanently through the promotion of democracy, making
the world peaceful for generations and avoiding inevitable extinction at the hands of
undemocratic states. The magnitude of this impact trumps their case impact as state violence
and nuclear war will happen inevitably should the democratic mission fail
Hegemony critical for success of democracy promotion
[Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 42-43//wyo-tjc]
The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government,
democracy, and other elements of its ideology of liberalism . Using American power to spread
democracy can be a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as for the United States. This is because
democracies are more likely to align themselves with the United States and be sympathetic to its
worldview. In addition, there is a chance-small as it may be-that once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict will
he reduced further. Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict
against Israel.58 This idea has had a big effect on President George W. Bush. He has said that Sharansky's worldview "is part of my presidential DNA."59 That
democracy in the Middle East would have this impact is debatable. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people
would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in October 2004, even
though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. Elections were held in Iraq in January 2005, the first free elections in that country's history. The
military
power of the United States put Iraq on the path to democracy~ Democracy has spread to Latin
America, Europe, Asia, the Caucasus, and now even the Middle East is becoming increasingly
democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress
has been made in Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt. The march of democracy has been impressive. Although
democracies have their flaws, simply put, democracy is the best form of government. Winston Churchill recognized this over half a century ago: "Democracy is the
worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." The United States should do what it can to foster the spread of
democracy throughout the world.
American hegemony is key to democracy promotion

THAYER (Professor of Strategic Studies at Missouri State) 06 [Bradley, In Defense of Primacy, National Interest, Dec, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology
of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United
States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align
with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview .( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain
U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do
not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in
concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.
Leadership is critical to global democracy promotion

BRZEZINSKI
(Fmr NSA) 1999
[Zbignew, The Eurasian Chessboard, p. online: www.treemedia.com/cfrlibrary/library/geopolitics/brzezinski.html //wyo-tjc]
Obviously, that condition is temporary. But its duration, and what follows it, is of critical importance not only to America's well-being but more generally to international
peace. The sudden emergence of the first and only global power has created a situation in which an equally quick end to its supremacy -- either because of
America's withdrawal from the world or because of the sudden emergence of a successful rival -- would produce massive
international instability. In effect, it would prompt global anarchy. The Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington is
right in boldly asserting: A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and
less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have
more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international
primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future
of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.(1)
Heg Good: International Law F/L

First, growth of international law depends upon u.s. leadership in this area
Goldstone (Hauser Global Professor at NYU) 04
[Richard, A Decade in Human Rights Law, Human Rights Brief, Spring, p. ln //mac-dch]
The late High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was tragically killed in Baghdad in August 2003, put the issue as follows: [Such] measures must be taken in transparency,
they must be of short duration, and must respect the fundamental, non-derogable rights embodied in our human rights norms. They must take place within the framework of the law. Without that, the
terrorists will ultimately win and we will ultimately lose--as we would have allowed them to destroy the very foundation of our modern human civilization.
All who value the protection of human rights and the dignity of all people must remain vigilant in these difficult and worrisome times. They should help those in authority hold a balance between the
necessity of protecting the lives of citizens on the one hand, and protecting their fundamental civil liberties on the other. They must ensure that governments and their officials do not rely on
repressive measures for no reason other than to placate the fears of the populace and to ensure that opinion polls are favorable.
Whether these post-9/11 developments will permanently damage the advances referred to earlier
or whether it will turn out to be only an unfortunate detour, it is too early to determine. Whatever
their effect, I have no doubt that the movement towards an international rule of law will depend
primarily upon the leadership of the United States. It is my fervent hope that America will soon
resume its leadership of the free and democratic world and will do so by the exercise not of its
great power but by the example of its equally great values .
Second, strong international law is critical to prevent bloody genocides and nuclear war
Shaw (Prof International Relations at Sussex Univ.) 01
[Martin, The Unfinished Global Revolution, Review of International Studies, October, p. online: http://www.martinshaw.org/unfinished.pdf //wyo-tjc]
The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the anti-imperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need
to recognise three fundamental truths. First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity.
Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international
thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left
The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the
minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming
decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the
increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is consolidated in each national context but second, on
how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West.
From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organisations and civil society as ends in themselves. They
must aim to civilise local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratising local states is not a separate task
84
Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks
are essential to the control of violence . (To put this another way: the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the
from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war.
global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. We need these power networks, but we need to tame them too, to make their messy
bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of cosmopolitan democracy argued for by David Held 85. It will also require us
This is not a separate problem: social

and economic reform is an essential ingredient of alternatives to warlike and genocidal power;
these feed off and reinforce corrupt and criminal political economies . Fourth, if we need the global-Western state, if
to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities .
we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop
international political interventions, legal institutions and robust peacekeeping as strategic alternatives to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that
international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid.86 As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes
on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between
people and state, as well as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist,
international networks of both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political
the
alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into partial defeat, or degenerate into new
genocidal wars - perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for
crises to push Western and other governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.87 What I have outlined is a huge challenge; but
students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.
____________________________
**Hegemony Good: East Asia**
Heg Good: East Asia F/L
First, us withdrawal from asia sparks japan into rapid nuclear armament, attack on taiwan and
north korean proliferation
DAO (staff) 03
[James, Why Keep US Troops?, The New York Times, Jan. 5, p. ln//wyo-tjc]
Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's
Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei

and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain
presumptive supercop.
stability in Asia.
"In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong ," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the
national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese
might respond."
In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts
about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the
A secure Korea makes Japan more

confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United
States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese
leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons , he argues. "If we did it, we would
stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said.
Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American
power, no matter how much the United States asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the
opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea
could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms .
"Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals
taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would
Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says.
be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China
in the long term."
"Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional ," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in
the region."
Second, increasing asian nuclearization runs the risk of wild-fire proliferation and arms-racing,
leading to miscalculation and nuclear war
Assuming, for the moment that an Asia with more nuclear powers would be more stable than one
with fewer, there would still be serious difficulties involved in negotiating the transition to such a
world. As in other regions, small, nascent nuclear forces will be especially vulnerable to
preemption. In Japan the prevailing nuclear allergy could lead first to delays in acquiring deterrent forces and then to a desperate and dangerous
scramble for nuclear weapons. In Asia, the prospects for a peaceful transition may be further complicated by the fact that the present and potential nuclear powers
are both numerous and strategically intertwined. The nuclearization of Korea (North, South or, whether through reunification or competitive arms programs, both
together) could lead to a similar development in Japan, which might cause China to accelerate and expand its nuclear programs, which could then have an impact on
the defense policies of Taiwan, India (and through it, Pakistan) and Russia (which would also be affected by events in Japan and Korea). All of this would influence
the behavior of the United States. Similar
shockwaves could also travel through the system in different directions
(for example, from India to China to Japan to Korea). A rapid, multifaceted expansion in nuclear capabilities
could increase the dangers of misperception, miscalculation, and war.
Heg Good: East Asia S/L

American hegemony is critical to prevent wars throughout east asiaextend the 1nc dao
evidence. Failure of us presence would set off japanese nuclearization because of a security
dilemma and encourage china and north korea to start wars because they perceive the us is
too weak to intervene.
Second, this new multipolarity in asia sparks massive nuclear warsthe friedberg evidence
proves that increasing nuclearization and tensions will have a high probability of causing war
because there are no mitigating factors in asia and everyone is so strategically intertwined.
This would swamp back the case impact because:
A) The timeframe would be nearly instanteouschina and korea are waiting for the right
moment and japan has the capabilties and will to go nuclear overnight without the us.
B) Probability and magnitudethe strategic complications of so many new nuclear powers
threatens to drag in major outside powers like russia and the us, escalating to massive
conflicts, as the friedberg ev proves.
Current collapse of US hegemony triggers Asian wars
David Calleo, (Prof., International Studies, Johns Hopkins U.), FOLLIES OF POWER: AMERICAS UNIPOLAR FANTASY,
2009, 149-150.
An increasingly
plural world system presents abundant prospects for conflict. The rise of China, for example, points
toward violent confrontations among Asian growth, Western prosperity, and the world's physical
environment. Present trends also suggest a continuing surfeit and proliferation of nuclear weapons. In effect, an
unsentimental vision of the future supports a Hobbesian diagnosis, even if it denies a Hobbesian prescription. There will be conflict but no
hegemon to suppress it.
Today's trends belie not only realist expectations of Hobbesian hegemony but also liberal expectations of Kantian perpetual peace.
US alliances the cornerstone of East Asian security

C. Fred Bergsten, (Dir., Peterson Institute for International Affairs), CHINAS RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES,
2008, 176.
The United States remains the essential guarantor of East Asian security and balance of power through its military
presence and alliances. Perhaps uniquely in the world, countries in the region continue to rely on and
welcome this commitment from the United States to safeguard regional peace and stability and
prevent the rise of a regional hegemon .
Hegemony solves Asian stability

White, 08 Prof. of Strategic Studies at Australian National University; Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute (Hugh, Why War in Asia Remains Thinkable,
http://www.iiss.org/conferences/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/fifth-session-conflict-in-asia/why-war-in-asia-remainsthinkable-profhugh-white/ June 2)
It can help to start by thinking about the sources of the remarkable peace that has characterised
East Asia in recent decades. As Rich Armitage said over lunch yesterday, it has been the best thirty to thirty-five
years in Asias long history. The foundation of that peace has been a remarkable set of
relationships between the US, China and Japan that arose at the end of the Vietnam War, and
which I call the Post-Vietnam Order. The heart of that order was a posture of double assurance
provided by the US to the other two powers. The US has simultaneously assured China about its
security from Japan, and Japan about its security from China. Obviously, but crucially, US
primacy was the absolute core of this order.
Heg Good: East Asia Quick Hitter

Collapse of hegemony would lead to an asian nuclear world-war:
- Japanese rearmament
- Sino arms race
- Sino-taiwan war
- Sino-india/pakistan wars
Ultimately, war or peace in the Far East will be determined largely by how China and Japan interact with each other and
with the United States. If the United States were to withdraw its forces from the region, a repetition of
the twentieth century European scenario would be very probable. Japan would have little choice
but to rapidly unveil and accelerate its ongoing rearmament; China would be likely to engage in a
rapid buildup of its nuclear forces, which till now have been designed to give China a minimal deterrent; the
Taiwan Straits would become the locus of Chinese national self-assertion; Korea would most
likely experience a violent end to its partition and perhaps emerge unified as a nuclear power;
and the Chinese-Indian-Pakistani nuclear triangle could provide a dangerous umbrella for the
resumption of open conventional warfare. A single match could then set off an explosion . [P. 110111]
Heg Good: East AsiaA2 Deterrence/Prolif Good 2NC

First, the 1nc friedburg evidence answers thisthe intersecting nature of strategic fronts in
asia mean that proliferation wont be able to stabilize as a traditional deterrent
Second, the dao evidence proves proliferation will be rampant and fast-paced, decreasing
caution and encouraging mistakes and risk-taking
Thrid, deterrence and proliferation will fail in asiamultipolarity makes deterrence unstable
and conventional conflicts could escalate
Even a successful transition to a many sided nuclear balance would not necessarily guarantee
peace. As during the Cold War, nuclear armed states would, of course, remain free to use force against lesser opponents,
although by doing so they might run the risk of colliding with one another. As to the possibility of war among
nuclear powers, it is not obvious that nuclear multipolarity will necessarily be as stable as
nuclear bipolarity. Forces adequate for deterring a single opponent (by appearing capable of absorbing
its first strike and then hitting back against it with overwhelming destructive power) might not be sufficient to deter
two or more opponents acting together. The members of such a nuclear alliance might be more inclined to believe
that, if they teamed up to attack their common enemy, they could diminish its forces to the point where each could afford to
absorb a fraction of the resulting retaliatory blow. These calculations could prove to be mistaken, with
disastrous consequences all around but, as Stanley Hoffmann pointed out almost thirty years ago: The more
nuclear powers there are, the more uneventheir stage of nuclear development, the more
complicated calculations will be [and] the more dangerous yet likely misperceptions will
become.
Proliferation would also not eliminate the possibility that nuclear states might use conventional
force against one another. During the Cold War, military strategists in both the United States and the Soviet
Union worried that the emergence of a nuclear stalemate might increase the danger of a less-than-all-out war between
them. The fact that these fears proved empty does not mean that all hostile nuclear powers will necessarily behave with
similar restraint in the future. The superpowers avoided fighting both because they knew that there was
some chance that even the smallest confrontation could blossom into total war and, equally
important, because nothing that they might have considered fighting for seemed worth the risk of escalation. Other
leaders, facing different stakes (and with varying degrees of risk-aversion) could make different
decisions.
And, nuclear weapons will proliferate faster than asian countries can adapt to the new security
realities, risking war
Most of the mitigating factors discussed here are likely, by their very nature, to evolve at a modest
pace. Even nations that have experienced revolutions do not always change their characters overnight. The maturation of
democracy in Russia and Korea and its birth in China will take time, as will the fading of decades-old national grievances
and the resolution of the disputes that have helped keep them alive. The development of powerful international
institutions in Europe took many years. A similar achievement will not be accomplished in Asia,
under less auspicious circumstances, with the mere wave of a hand. Economic interdependence is advancing at a
rapid pace, but its geographic scope is still limited, its political effects mixed, and its future course uncertain. Nuclear
weapons could spread quite quickly across Asia and, by fundamentally altering the balance
between the perceived costs and benefits of war, their proliferation could conceivably promise
more stability than insecurity. Needless to say, however, this scenario is fraught with
uncertainties and dangers.
While they may only just be beginning to do so, the competitive interactions conducive to
greater instability could gain strength quite rapidly. The security dilemma is, in essence, an amplifier or
anxieties, in which the defensive exertions of the participants stimulate each other and feed back upon themselves. Once
initiated, a multi-sided security scramble could accelerate quickly to high levels of competitive
military and diplomatic activity. Among its other consequences, this turn of events would likely disrupt the further
evolution of whatever mitigating tendencies are presently developing in Asia. Mounting insecurity could intensify
feelings of nationalism, slow the construction of sturdy economic and institutional ties, and
weaken or reverse any trend toward increasing democratization . If they did not actually promote it, these
developments, in turn, would certainly do nothing to discourage further competitive behavior.
The anticipation of war, like the expectation of peace, can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Virtuous
upward spirals can become vicious downward ones.
Heg Good: East AsiaA2 Multipolarity Stable 2NC

First, multipolarity wont be peaceful in asia for several reasons:
A) Interconnectionsmultiple borders and spheres means calculations about threats and
stability will break down
B) Fears of regional aggressorsfear about either a chinese or japanese rise to power will
cause states to prepare for the worst
C) Ratechanges in power balances and proliferation will be rapid, making miscalculation
huge
Second, asia lacks conflict mitigatorsrise of multipolarity will ineivtable lead to great power
wars
On the Eastern half of the Eurasian landmass , as on its western wing, a new multipolar sub-system is
beginning to emerge out of the wreckage of the Cold War. While firm predictions are impossible (or, in any case,
imprudent), the workings of this new Asian system could turn out to be far different from those of its
European counterpart. In Europe, as the neo-liberal optimists suggest, there appears to be an
abundance of factors at work that should serve to mitigate the troubling tendencie s to which
multipolar systems have often been prone in the past. In Asia, by contrast, many of these same soothing
forces are either absent or of dubious strength and permanence . While civil wars and ethnic strife will
continue for some time to smolder along Europes peripheries, in the long run it is Asia that seems far more
likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict. The half millennium during which Europe was the
worlds primary generator of war (as well as of wealth and knowledge) is coming to a close. But, for
better and for worse, Europes past could be Asias future . [p. 7]
[Prefer this evidence because its specific to the entirty of east asia, better than their generic
multipolarity evidence]
____________________________
**Hegemony Good: Economy**
Heg Good: Economy F/L
First, hegemony is key to international trade and interdependencestability opens conditions
necessary for growth**
[Stephen, Naval War College Review, Spring, www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm]
By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy
also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world
peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier
for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse . Investors are
more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on
others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will
also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that
extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time . By
providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political
conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a
prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries.
Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within
Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global
prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests. The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various
institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of globalization is itself partly an artifact of
American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, Without America on duty, there will be no America Online.
A global economic collapse would escalate to full-scale conflict and rapid extinction
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse,
the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point
where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost
certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and
South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose longrange nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan . In addition to immediate responses,
the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict,
escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress
conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then
compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary . The real legacy of the MAD
concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has
to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and
massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great
percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting
great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere , at
least for many decades.
Heg Good: Economy S/L

American preponderance is critical to the sustainabilitity of economic growthextend the 1nc
walt evidence. Because hegemony stabilizes areas and removes security competition from
the equation, states of the world are free to invest in trade and economic growth, sinking in
connections of interdependence.
Second, this is critical to avoid disruption of economic growththe impact to that is the
bearden evidence. Economic collapse sparks an accidental nuclear launch that escalates to
planetary extinction.
This impact overwhelms the case because:
A) its fastperception that the us is going away would stampede states into securing
resources and goods for their own use, devestating cooperative trade and investment
B) the magnitudebearden outlines that just about every scenario for war is triggered by
a crash, subsuming and turning their case advantages
U.S. engagement is necessary to stabilize the global economy
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor, Johns Hopkins University, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA
ACTS AS THE WORLD'S GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2006, p. 193-194
Still, a serious, prolonged failure of the international economy, inflicting the kind of hardship the
world experienced in the 1930s (which some Asian countries also suffered as a result of their fiscal crises in the
1990s) does not lie beyond the realm of possibility. Market economies remain subject to cyclical
downturns, which public policy can limit but has not found a way to eliminate entirely. Markets also have an
inherent tendency to form bubbles, excessive values for particular assets, whether seventeenth century Dutch
tulips or twentieth century Japanese real estate and Thai cur rcncy, that cause economic harm when the bubble bursts and
prices plunge. In responding to these events, governments can make errors . They can act too slowly, or fail
to implement the proper policies, or implement improper ones. .Moreover, the global economy and the national economies
that comprise it. like a living organism, change constantly and sometimes rapidly: Capital Hows across sovereign borders,
for instance, far more rapidly and in much greater volume in the early twenty-first century than ever before. This means that
measures that successfully address economic malfunctions at one time may have less effect at another, just as medical science must cope with the appearance of new strains of influenza against which existing vaccines arc not effective. Most
importantly, since the Great Depression, an active American international economic role has been
crucial both in fortifying the conditions for global economic well-being and in coping with the
problems that have occurred, especially periodic recessions and currency crises, by applying
the lessons of the past. The absence of such a role could weaken those conditions and
aggravate those problems.
Hegemony is key to the global economy because strategic stability allows growth
Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal
International Economic Order (LIEO)-a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital
and labor markets-to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is
a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this
network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when
"economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability"; soldiers create the
conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and "we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in
he acknowledged that
ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity..
.business follows the flag."6
American hegemony key to global economy and success of globalization

THAYER
(Professor of Strategic Studies at Missouri State)
06 [Bradley, In Defense of Primacy, National Interest, Dec, p. asp]
With its allies, the

United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by
free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The
economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good
from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for
Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy .
the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and
benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology,
helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service
diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his
youth, Lal now recognizes that the
only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is
through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated
through American primacy.( n4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems , Lal is one of the strongest
academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides .
Heg Good: EconomyA2 Hegemony Hurts Growth 2NC

First, thats not truetheir evidence only proves that defense commitments are a slight drag
on growththey dont identify it as enough to cause a crash or even a recession.
Second, hegemony only costs about three percent of gdp. Its a drop in the bucket
TO UNDERSTAND just how dominant the United States is today, one needs to look at each of the standard components of
national power in succession. In the military arena, the United States is poised to spend more on
defense in 2003 than the next 15 -- 20 biggest spenders combined. The United States has
overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world's dominant air force, the only truly blue-water navy,
and a unique capability to project power around the globe . And its military advantage is even more apparent in
quality than in quantity. The United States leads the world in exploiting the military applications of advanced communications and information
technology and it has demonstrated an unrivaled ability to coordinate and process information about the battlefield and destroy targets from
afar with extraordinary precision. Washington is not making it easy for others to catch up, moreover, given
the massive gap in spending on military research and development (R&D), on which the United States
spends three times more than the next six powers combined . Looked at another way, the United States
currently spends more on military R&D than Germany or the United Kingdom spends on defense in total.
No state in the modern history of international politics has come close to the military
predominance these numbers suggest. And the United States purchases this preeminence with
only 3.5 percent of its GDP. As historian Paul Kennedy notes, "being Number One at great cost is one
thing; being the world's single superpower on the cheap is astonishing."
Third, our scenario comes firstour walt evidence identifies hegemony as what makes
massive volumes of international trade and growth possible in the first place, meaning the
benefits are comparatively better than any costs
Fourth, us withdrawal actually jacks economic performancenew dangers from withdrawal
increases costs of defense
KHALILZAD (RAND) 95
[Zalmay, From Containment to Global Leadership, RAND //wyo-tjc]
Realistically and over the longer term, however, a neoisolationist approach might well increase the
danger of major conflicts, require greater US defense effort down the line, threaten world peace,
and eventually undermine US prosperity. By withdrawing from Europe and Asia, the United States
would deliberately risk weakening the institutions and solidarity of the worlds community of
democratic powers, establishing a favorable climate for the spread of disorder in other words, a return
to conditions similar to those of the first half of the 20 th century. In the 1920s and 1930s, American isolationism had disastrous consequences
for world peace. Then, the United States was but one of several major powers; now it is the preponderant power, the shock of U.S.
withdrawal from the world would be even greater.
__________________________
**Hegemony Good: Europe**
Heg Good: Europe F/L
First, collapse of american security guarantees leads to violent multipolarity, german
proliferation, possible preemptive warfare and clashes between germany and russia
MEARSHEIMER (Professor of Poli Sci at University of Chicago) 01
[John J., The Future of the American Pacifier, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
Without the American pacifier, Europe is not guaranteed to remain peaceful. Indeed, intense security competition
among the great powers would likely ensue because, upon American withdrawal, Europe would
go from benign bipolarity to unbalanced multipolarity, the most dangerous kind of power
structure. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany would have to build up their own military forces
and provide for their own security. In effect, they would all become great powers, making Europe multipolar
and raising the ever-present possibility that they might fight among themselves . And Germany would
probably become a potential hegemon and thus the main source of worry. Looking at Europe today, such a
forecast might appear far-fetched, but that is because few are prepared to consider how radically
the European security environment will be transformed by the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Once
the major European powers are forced to provide for their own defense, suspicions among them
are certain to grow, thereby triggering the familiar dynamics of great-power competition . The kind
of trouble that might lie ahead for Europe can be illustrated by considering how particular German measures aimed at
enhancing its security might nevertheless lead to instability. If the United States removed its security umbrella
from over western Europe, Germany would likely move to acquire its own nuclear arsenal . This
would be the case both because nuclear weapons are an excellent deterrent, as Germany's governing elites
recognized during the Cold War, but also because it would be the best way to escape potential coercion
by its three nuclear-armed neighbors. During the proliferation process, however, these
neighbors would probably contemplate using force to prevent Germany from going nuclear, and
the result could be a major crisis. Without the American military on its territory, furthermore,
Germany would probably increase the size of its army and certainly would be more inclined to
try to dominate central Europe. Why? Because Germany would fear Russian control of that
critically important buffer zone between them. Of course, Russia would have the same fear in
reverse, which would likely lead to a serious security competition between them for control of
central Europe. France, meanwhile, would undoubtedly view such behavior by Germany with alarm
and take measures to protect itself --for example, by increasing its defense spending and
establishing closer relations with Russia. Germany, of course, would perceive these actions as
hostile and respond with measures of its own.
Second, a european power war would escalate, drawing the us into a nuclear war
GLASER (Asst. Prof of Policy Studies at U of Chicago) 93
[Charles, Why NATO is Still the Best, International Security, Summer 93 // wyo-tjc]
From an American perspective, a basic question is whether the United States still has security interests in Europe. The end
of the Cold War is fueling calls for American withdrawal from Europe, adding arguments to the already extensive debate
over American grand strategy. Isolationists believe, now more than ever, that whatever dangers might
threaten Europe will not threaten the United States . During the Cold War, the most serious challenge to the
traditional case for American involvement flowed from the nuclear revolution, which undermined geopolitical arguments for
opposing a European hegemon. Isolationists now add that we can be confident that Western Europe will be free from
military conflict, because the passing of the Soviet Union has eliminated the only serious external threat, and relations within
the West are so good that military conflict is virtually unimaginable. However, although the lack of an imminent
Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated
from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not
eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a
smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European
hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S.
security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations
suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially
if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland . Thus, the United
States should not be unconcerned about Europes future.
Heg Good: Europe S/L

Hegemony is critical to prevent a nuclear world war three over europeextend the
mearschiemer evidenceamerican leadership and security guarantees dampens inevitable
hegemonic rivalry between germany, russia and the rest of europe. Withdrawal would lead
instanteously to german proliferation. This sparks numerous wars and preemptive attacks
that escalate.
Second, our glaser evidence proves that this would inevitably escalate, drawing the us in and
leading to a massive nuclear war involving the american arsenal.
This impact swamps the caseshort distances and existence of nuclear arsenals mean
germany would be stampeded into aquiring great power capabilities as fast as possible, which
would also make the threshold for the outbreak of conflict extremely low. Finally, a nuclear
war that escalates to american and russian involvement would be the most cataclysmic war
imaginable, outweighing the case by sheer magnitude
US presence and leadership in europe prevents military competition, wars and economic
collapse
ART (Prof. Of IR at Brandeis) 96
[Robert, Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO, Political Science Quarterly, Spring// wyo-tjc]
The United States presence in Europe is crucial . The role of the United States goes beyond balancing the
Soviet Union. The United States keeps our national rivalries down. We are now faced with the
emergence of a friendly local superpower-Germany. Our chances of succeeding are greater if the United
States stays. If it goes, however, the effects will be felt way beyond the security field -in GATT,
agriculture, and so forth. If NATO breaks up, our economic structures are threatened also. [85]
Seen in this perspective, America's military presence helps maintain the benign security
environment within Western Europe. America's balancing role is a principal instrument that
helps keep both external threats and internal fears from corroding Western Europe's cohesion.
Through its military presence, the United States helps buffer, dampen , and thereby keep within defined
bounds the inevitable tensions that will continue to arise among the Western Europeans . If it can help
reduce or even completely eradicate the fear that security competitions may arise once again within Western Europe, the
United States can, so to speak, take this matter out of discussion and remove it from Western Europe's already crowded
agenda. By doing so, it will enable the Western Europeans to preserve and perhaps advance their
political-economic integration. The United States cannot force further integration, but it can help produce conditions
that can facilitate it, if the West Europeans are so inclined. Even more important, its military presence there
can provide an added barrier against a headlong backslide into an unbridled nationalism that
potentially could threaten even the Common Market . A Western Europe that fails to achieve the goals of
economic and political union called for in the Maastricht Treaty may not be a severe loss to the United States. But a
Western Europe that has failed to achieve these union goals and that then backslides into a
destructive state of competing nationalism would be. The American presence can both assist the
movement towards greater union and also prevent corrosive nationalistic backsliding .
Collapse of europe leads to reemergence of russian and german hegemony, conflict and the
risk of nuclear war
KHALILZAD & LESSER et al (RAND Analyst) 98 [Zalmay & Ian, editors, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, RAND Books, p. online // wyo-tjc]
In Europe, the failure of integration efforts create a vacuum of power and influence. Western
Europe is unable to project stability and prosperity into Eastern Europe and the Balkans, a void
that could be filled by a powerful Germany or by renationalization and possible conflict recurring along
national and ethnic lines. The NATO alliance has either become irrelevant or has disintegrated
because of disagreements among member states. Although the Russia of world III is authoritarian but weak in the wake of failed
political and economic reform, the overall depressed state of Europe could allow Moscow to reemerge as a
potential hegemon, at least over the eastern part of the continent (Lesser, Nardulli, and Arghavan, 1996). China
tugs on Russia from the east, and Iran and Pakistan from the south. Amidst these tensions, a
catastrophic breakdown of a country that still possesses thousands of nuclear weapons is a
never-toodistant possibility.
American leadership abroad is critical to international stability throughout eurasia
BRZEZINSKI (Fmr National Security Adviser) 97

[Zbignew, A Geostrategy for Eurasia, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
No state is likely to
match the United States in the four key dimensions of power--military, economic, technological,
and cultural--that confer global political clout. Short of American abdication, the only real
alternative to American leadership is international anarchy. President Clinton is correct when he says America has become
AMERICA'S STATUS as the world's premier power is unlikely to be contested by any single challenger for more than a generation .
the world's "indispensable nation." America's global stewardship will be tested by tension, turbulence, and periodic conflict. In Europe, there are signs that the
momentum for integration and enlargement is waning and that nationalisms may reawaken. Large-scale unemployment persists even in the most successful
European states, breeding xenophobic reactions that could cause French or German politics to lurch toward extremism. Europe's aspirations for unity will be met only
if Europe is encouraged, and occasionally prodded, by the United States. Russia's future is less certain and the prospects for its positive evolution more tenuous .
America must therefore shape a political context that is congenial to Russia's assimilation into a
larger framework of European cooperation, while fostering the independence of its newly
sovereign neighbors. Yet the viability of, say, Ukraine or Uzbekistan will remain uncertain, especially if America fails to support their efforts at national
consolidation. The chances of a grand accommodation with China could also be threatened by a crisis
over Taiwan, internal Chinese political dynamics, or simply a downward spiral in Sino-American
relations. Sino-American hostility could strain the United States' relationship with Japan, perhaps causing disruption in Japan itself . Asian stability
would then be at risk, and these events could even affect the posture and cohesion of a country
like India, which is critical to stability in South Asia. In a volatile Eurasia, the immediate task is
to ensure that no state or combination of states gains the ability to expel the United States or
even diminish its decisive role. However, the promotion of a stable transcontinental balance should not be viewed as an end in itself, only as a
means toward shaping genuine strategic partnerships in the key regions of Eurasia . A benign American hegemony must still
discourage others from posing a challenge, not only by making its costs too high, but also by
respecting the legitimate interests of Eurasia's regional aspirants . More specifically, the medium-term goal requires
fostering genuine partnerships with a more united and politically defined Europe, a regionally preeminent China, a postimperial and Europe-oriented Russia, and a
democratic India. But it will be success or failure in forging broader strategic relationships with Europe and China that shapes Russia's future role and determines
Eurasia's central power equation.
Heg Good: EuropeA2 Europe Will Stabilize Itself 2NC

Europe is dependent on the us militarily for at least 30 more years
RUSSELL (Naval War College) 03
[Richard, NATOs European Members: Partners or Dependents, p. online: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Winter/art2-w03.htm //wyo-tjc]
The lack of adequate funding generally impedes the modernization of European forces, which
are largely obsolescent in their weapons and equipment. European publics and politicians have
been loath to fund their militaries at the expense of social welfare programs . The European Union (EU)
has 375 million people, compared with the American population of 280 million, but the fifteen EU members collectively
spend on their armed forces a figure amounting to about 57 percent of the U.S. defense budget.2 Moreover, the few military
acquisition programs that the Europeans have been able to undertake are proving inordinately expensive in comparison to
equivalent American systems. The Europeans, driven by the political incentives to sustain employment
in arms industries and by a desire to avoid dependence on the United States for major weapons
systems, are sinking substantial amounts of money into domestic arms procurement. Such
programs as the Eurofighter and a new military transport aircraft have been plagued by cost
overruns and delivery delays .
If one could set aside issues of employment and prestige, one could argue that the European militaries would be far better
off buying American weapons systems. Large purchases of American armored vehicles and transport and combat aircraft
would lower per-unit costs for buyers on both sides of the Atlantic. The American weapons systems are also more capable
and easier to sustain than their untested European counterparts. In such a case, though the Europeans would in fact be
more dependent on the United States for major weapons systems than they would wish, their political voices would carry
more weight in Nato councils, because they would have military means.
As it is, the European militaries, broadly speaking, are about thirty years behind those of the
United States; their capabilities are roughly equivalent to those of the American military in the
Vietnam War. The Europeans lack, for instance, strategic bombers, military transport aircraft, airto-air refueling, precision munitions, rapid deployment capabilities, cruise missiles, and
spaceborne surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications assets . These shortcomings in
comparison with U.S. forces, moreover, probably will grow larger as Washington exploits transformational technologies to
modernize its own forces. The Europeans are poorly situated to exploit the rapid information-
technology advances, which are critical to command, control, computers, intelligence, and
logistics.3
The Europeans for the foreseeable future will be unable to maximize destruction of enemy forces while minimizing
collateral damage to innocent civilians. Without accurate, time-sensitive intelligence coupled with precision munitions,
European militaries will not be able to wage war within the moral parameters expected by European public opinion. As Nato
secretary general Lord Robertson has said, the Europeans need precision munitions, which are the only things you can
now use to satisfy international law and international public opinion.
Heg Good: EuropeA2 German Hegemony Not a Threat

2NC
First, extend the mearscheimer evidenceamerican security presence is the only thing that
dampens realist imperatives of germany to proliferate.
Second, their evidence that germany is too integrated or passive assumes a world made
possible by american powerthis will collapse because germany will fear nuclear coercion
and france and russia will fear german ressurgence, making their worst fears self-fulfilling.
Third, risk of german resurgence and a realist foreign policy still very real
KAGAN (CEIP) 03
[Robert, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, New York //wyo-tjc]
And, of course, it is precisely this fear of sliding backward that still hangs over Europeans, even
as Europe moves forward. Europeans, particularly the French and the Germans, are not entirely
sure that the problem once known as the "German problem" really has been solved . Neither France
under Franois Mitterrand nor Britain under Margaret Thatcher was pleased at the prospect of German reunification after
the end of the Cold War; each had to be coaxed along and reassured by the Americans, just as British and French leaders
had been coaxed along to accept German reintegration four decades before. As their various and often very different
proposals for the future constitution of Europe suggest, the French are still not confident they can trust the
Germans, and the Germans are still not sure they can trust themselves. Nearly six decades after
the end of World War II, a French official can still remark: "People say, `It is a terrible thing that
Germany is not working.' But I say, `Really? When Germany is working, six months later it is
usually march- ing d beneath the surface of such jokes lies a genuine, lingering trepidation about
a Germany that is still too big for the European continent . Last summer, when German Chan- cellor Gerhard Schroeder
defied the Bush administration's call for European support in Iraq, his insistence on dealing with such matters in "the German way" was perhaps even more unsettling
to his European neighbors than it was to the United States. Ironically, even German pacifism and neutralism can frighten Europeans when a German leader speaks
of "the German way." Such fears can at times hinder progress toward deeper integration, but they also have driven the European project forward despite
innumerable obstacles. European integration is propelled forward in part by the Germans' fears about themselves. The European project must succeed, Joschka
Fischer warns, for how else can "the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany's dimensions and central situation" be overcome?48 Those historic
German "temptations" play at the back of many a Euro- pean mind. And every time Europe contemplates the use of military force, or is forced to do so by the United
States, there is no avoiding at least momentary consideration of what effect such a military action might have on the "German question" that seems never entirely to
disappear. 63-64
Germany has the power capabilities to be a great hegemon on the continent

MEARSHEIMER (Professor of Poli Sci at University of Chicago) 01
[John J., The Future of the American Pacifier, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
FIVE EUROPEAN STATES now have sufficient wealth and population to qualify as potential great powers: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia.
Germany has the earmarks of a potential hegemon. It is the wealthiest European

state, has the second-largest population (after Russia), and has the most powerful army in the
region. Nevertheless, Germany is not a great power today, much less a potential hegemon, because it
has no nuclear weapons of its own and because it is heavily dependent on the United States for its
security. If American troops were pulled out of Europe, however, and Germany became responsible
for its own defense, it would probably acquire its own nuclear arsenal and increase the size of its
army, transforming itself into something much more formidable.
To illustrate Germany's potential military might, consider the population and wealth differentials
between Germany and Russia during the twentieth century. Although Russia has always enjoyed
a significant population advantage over Germany, its present edge is smaller than at any other time
in the past hundred years. For example, Russia had approximately 2.6 times as many people as Germany in 1913 (175 million vs. 67 million), and
Of these, however, only
twice as many in 1940 (170 million vs. 85 million). Despite this population disadvantage, Germany was a potential hegemon in both those years because of its
marked advantage in wealth. It had a roughly 3.6-to-1 advantage in industrial might over Russia in 1913, and a 1.3-to-1 advantage in 1940.
Over the last 15 years, the balance has shifted quite rapidly in Germany's favor, bringing it back
to a very powerful position. In 1987, a representative year of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had roughly 4.7 times as many people as did West
Germany (285 million vs. 61 million). Russia today, however, has only about 1.8 times as many people as Germany (147 million vs. 82 million), and Germany has a
startling 6.6-to-1 advantage in wealth. Thus Germany now has a significant advantage in latent power over Russia, much like it had in the early twentieth century,
when it was the dominant power in Europe.
Germany also has an advantage in conventional military power. The size of Germany's standing
army is 221,000 soldiers, and it can be quickly augmented by 295,400 reserves, thus creating a
highly effective fighting force of more than half a million soldiers . Russia has about 348,000 soldiers in its standing
army, and although it has a large pool of reserves, they are poorly trained and hard to mobilize quickly and efficiently in a crisis. In terms of quality, the German army
Only on the nuclear front does Russia dominate, but

Germany has the wherewithal to rectify this asymmetry if it chooses to.
is well trained and well led, whereas the Russian army is neither .
___________________________________
**Hegemony Good: Great Power Wars**
Heg Good: Great Power Wars F/L
Absence of us power leads to a global vacuum, arms races and wars across multiple theaters
The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the United States creates
stability in international politics. That is vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor
Joseph Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken
away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were
taken away, most countries would be much worse off, and arms races, vicious security
competition, and wars would result. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances.
We can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India
and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an
intense arms race between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far
bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S.
power, we see that the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace and stability.
The time-frame is nearly instantaneous

In reflecting on the security implications of this new reality, it is important to bear in mind the points made earlier. America
is the world-transforming society, even revolutionary in its subversive impact in sovereignty-based international politics. At
the same time, America is a traditional power, unilaterally protective of its own security while sustaining
international stability not only for its own benefit, but for that of the international community as a
whole. The latter task compels U.S. policymakers to concentrate on the more traditional U.S. role
as the linchpin of global stability. Despite the new realities of global interdependence and the mounting
preoccupation of the international community with such new global issues as ecology, global warming,
AIDS, and poverty, the argument that American power is uniquely central to world peace is
supported by a simple hypothetical test: What would happen if the U.S. Congress were to
mandate the prompt retraction of U.S. military power from its three crucial foreign deployments
Europe, the Far East, and the Persian Gulf?
Any such U.S. withdrawal would without doubt plunge the world almost immediately into a
politically chaotic crisis, In Europe, there would be a pell mell rush by some to rearm but also to
reach a special arrangement with Russia. In the Far East, war would probably break out on the
Korean Peninsula while Japan would undertake a rash program of rearmament, including
nuclear weapons. In the Persian Gulf area, Iran would become dominant and would intimidate
adjoining Arab states. [P. 17]
Heg Good: Great Power Wars S/L

Collapse of american hegemony will spark world-war three: extend the thayer and brzezinski
cards. Failure of hegemony spurs former allies like europe and japan to rearm, destabilizing
these regions and sparking wars for primacy that engulf the entire eurasian landmass. The
middle east would also break out into warfare
This outweighs case because of the sheer magnitudea world of hegemony both promises to
prevent their scenarios from escalating in the status quo but would also subsume and trigger
their scenario, turning back any advantage to the case.
Also, this impact happens almost overnightthe shock of the collapse will railroad countries
into making dangerous moves to rearm or seize power in the leadership vacuum.
Collapse of US hegemony causes global war
Thomas Donnelly, (Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute), THE CURRENT AND FUTURE ROLES, MISSIONS,
AND CAPABILITIES OF U.S. MILITARY LAND POWER, Hrg., Senate Armed Services Comm., Mar. 26, 200 9, 20.
American international leadership has a number of geopolitical, economic, and security corollaries. Indeed, our
security role is the bedrock of today's global order; conversely, absent the organizing function played
by the United States, the world would most likely devolve into a competition between various blocs of
states, and non-state actors -- terror groups, criminal syndicates and the like -- would find
themselves in constant conflict. The dangers of failing states, or, as John Quincy Adams called them, derelict states,
would be exponentially greater and the world's ability to address these dangers so much weaker .
US hegemony necessary to prevent the world from devolving into power blocks
Fred Kaplan, (Ph.D., MIT & Foreign Policy Journalist), DAYDREAM BELIEVERS: HOW A FEW GRAND IDEAS WRECKED
AMERICAN POWER, 2008, 195.
On a more strategic level, a
world without blocs or clear power centers could easily devolve into anarchy, in
which no country or group of countries can amass the strength and legitimacy to reward the good, deter
or punish the bad, and impose rules and order. In such a world, the shrewd assertion of American power remains
essential because America is the only nation theoretically capable of global leadership--because
it is, for now, the only nation that possesses global reach, politically, economically, and militarily .
Heg Good: Great Power WarsQuick Hitter F/L

American leadership is critical to prevent the rise of a hostile rival and a global nuclear war
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a
return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a
vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises
leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more
receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a
better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear
proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally,
U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United
States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers,
including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a
bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsAsian Rearm Impact S/L

Increasing asian nuclearization runs the risk of wild-fire proliferation and arms-racing, leading
to miscalculation and nuclear war
Assuming, for the moment that an Asia with more nuclear powers would be more stable than one
with fewer, there would still be serious difficulties involved in negotiating the transition to such a
world. As in other regions, small, nascent nuclear forces will be especially vulnerable to
preemption. In Japan the prevailing nuclear allergy could lead first to delays in acquiring
deterrent forces and then to a desperate and dangerous scramble for nuclear weapons. In Asia,
the prospects for a peaceful transition may be further complicated by the fact that the present
and potential nuclear powers are both numerous and strategically intertwined . The
nuclearization of Korea (North, South or, whether through reunification or competitive arms programs, both together)
could lead to a similar development in Japan, which might cause China to accelerate and expand
its nuclear programs, which could then have an impact on the defense policies of Taiwan, India
(and through it, Pakistan) and Russia (which would also be affected by events in Japan and Korea). All of this
would influence the behavior of the United States. Similar shockwaves could also travel through the
system in different directions (for example, from India to China to Japan to Korea). A rapid, multifaceted
expansion in nuclear capabilities could increase the dangers of misperception, miscalculation,
and war.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsEconomy Impact S/L

A global economic collapse would escalate to full-scale conflict and rapid extinction
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse,
the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point
where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost
certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and
South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose longrange nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan . In addition to immediate responses,
the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict,
escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress
conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then
compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary . The real legacy of the MAD
concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has
to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and
massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great
percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting
great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere , at
least for many decades.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsEurope Impact S/L

A european power war would escalate, drawing the us into a nuclear war
GLASER (Asst. Prof of Policy Studies at U of Chicago) 93
[Charles, Why NATO is Still the Best, International Security, Summer 93 // wyo-tjc]
From an American perspective, a basic question is whether the United States still has security interests in Europe. The end
of the Cold War is fueling calls for American withdrawal from Europe, adding arguments to the already extensive debate
over American grand strategy. Isolationists believe, now more than ever, that whatever dangers might
threaten Europe will not threaten the United States. During the Cold War, the most serious challenge to the
traditional case for American involvement flowed from the nuclear revolution, which undermined geopolitical arguments for
opposing a European hegemon. Isolationists now add that we can be confident that Western Europe will be free from
military conflict, because the passing of the Soviet Union has eliminated the only serious external threat, and relations within
the West are so good that military conflict is virtually unimaginable.
However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S.
security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the
Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war,
especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear
weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless
remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a
war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could
escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against
the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europes future.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsMiddle East Impact S/L

Existence of israeli nuclear arsenal means that any midast war risks a global nuclear conflict
STEINBACH (DC Iraq Coalition) 3/02
[John, Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Threat to Peace, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm, accessed 4/19/04 //mac-dch]
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious
implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear
war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire
missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now
be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is
gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."( 42) Russia and before it the
Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes . It is widely reported that
the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super
sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer
needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control
negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and
dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the
familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not
reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world
conflagration." (44)
Heg Good: Great Power WarsProlif Impact S/L

New horizontal proliferation risks several scenarios for nuclear war
There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including but not limited to
the following: the possibility that a nation threatened by destruction in a conventional war may resort to
the use of its nuclear weapons; the miscalculation of a threat of an attack and the subsequent use of
nuclear weapons in order to stave off the suspected attack; a nuclear weapons accident due to
carelessness or flawed technology (e.g., the accidental launching of a nuclear weapon); the use of such
weapons by an unstable leader; the use of such weapons by renegade military personnel during a
period of instability (personal, national or international); and, the theft (and/or development) and use of such
weapons by terrorists. While it is unlikely (though not impossible) that terrorists would be able to design their own
weapons, it is possible that they could do so with the assistance of a renegade government.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsMultiwarrant

U.S. withdrawal risks terrorism, prolif, and economic decline
Although the spread of nuclear weapons to powerful countries had the potential, should they
wage war using them, to cause far more damage, the possession ot such arma ments by
terrorists posed the most urgent global threat because such groups were apparently actively
attempting to acquire them and would surely use them if they succeede d. To the extent that American foreign policies
reduced the likc-lihood that such an attack would take place, the United Slates was performing a service of unsurpassed importance for the rest of the world. Although the spread of nuclear weapons,
, counted as the most serious potential

consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's government, it
was not the only one. In the previous period of American international reticence, the 1920s and
1930s, the global economy suffered serious damage that a more active American role might have
mitigated. A twenty-first-ccntury American retreat could have similarly adverse international
economic consequences.
with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be lired in anger somewhere in the world
The U.S. role is so prominent that its collapse risks global instability, economic collapse
The overall American role in the world since World War II therefore has something in common with the theme of the Frank
Capra film It's a Wonderful Life, in which the angel Clarence, played by Henry Travcrs, shows James Stewart, playing the
bank clerk George Bailey, who believes his existence to have been worthless, how life in his small town of Bedford Falls
would have unfolded had he never been born. George Bailey learns that people he knows and loves turn out to be far worse
off without him. So it is with the United States and its role as the world's government. Without that
role, the world very likely would have been in the past, and would become in the future, a less
secure and less prosperous place. The abdication by ihc United States of some or all of the
responsibilities lor international security that it had come to bear in the first decade of the
twenty-first century would deprive the international system of one of its principal safety features,
which keeps countries from smashing into each other, as they arc historically prone to do. In this
sense, a world without America would be the equivalent of a freeway full of cars without brakes.
Similarly, should the American government abandon some or all of the ways in which it had , at the
dawn of the new century, come to support global economic activity, the world economy would
function less effectively and might even suffer a severe and costly breakdown. A world without
the United States would in this way resemble a fleet ot cars without gasoline.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsA2 Other Countries Fill In

2NC
Only a liberal, seafaring empire can create public goods
Josef Joffe, (Fellow in International Relations, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sep/Oct 2009, 21-35.
The United States is the default power, the country that occupies center stage because there is
nobody else with the requisite power and purpose. Why not any of the others? On a speculative note, it may take a
liberal, seafaring empire to turn national interests into international public goods. The United Kingdom built
a global empire for itself, but in the process it produced a whole slew of precious public goods: free trade, freedom of the seas, and the gold standard.
No other country or group of countries is prepared to be the guardian of the global commons
Josef Joffe, (Fellow in International Relations, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sep/Oct 2009, 21-35.
The EU comes close, but it has neither the

means nor the will to act strategically. Japan, although rich enough to marshal the means, will continue to huddle
under the United States' strategic umbrella as long as it is extended. India has the size and the
population, but apart from being the poorest of them all, it is trapped in a permanent conflict with
Pakistan (and a latent one with China), which monopolizes its resources and attention. China and Russia are
revisionist powers in business only for themselves . They also lack the right polity.
It is difficult to imagine China, India, Japan, Russia, or the EU as guardians of the larger common interest.
Asia prefers the US to act as the dominant global power

Dean Cheng, (Chinese Military Analyst, CNA Corporations Project Asia), JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, 4th Quarterly 200 9,
33.
Instead of allying with each other, much of Asia prefers Washington as the guarantor of regional stability. Moreover, if the
United States is not always the most trusted nation, it is generally the least distrusted . The result
has been a series of individual bilateral alliances, coupled with a general willingness to rely on the United States to preserve
the regional balance of power. In terms of formal alliances, there is a "wagon wheel" of bilateral
agreements with the United States at the hub.
US more likely to stabilize Asia than China

Dean Cheng, (Chinese Military Analyst, CNA Corporations Project Asia), JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, 4th Quarterly 200 9,
34.
Compared with major regional powers such as Japan or China, the United States offers significant
advantages as the preserver of the overall regional balance of power. Given the overlapping demands and claims
involving just about every Asian state, no regional power is likely to be seen as an honest broker . By contrast,
Washington has no territorial aspirations in the region, and much less historical baggage than
any of the major Asian states. At the same time, unlike any grouping of smaller states such as Malaysia, Thailand, or Indonesia, the
United States also possesses a range of instruments of power, making it less subject to
intimidation by major regional powers such as the PRC. Finally, by seeking to preserve the status quo and ensure that no
single Asian power would come to dominate the region, the United States has maximized the opportunities for the majority of Asian states, at minimal cost to them. In
essence, America has freed local resources for "butter" that would otherwise have gone toward guns. In particular, the U.S. alliance with Japan has served these
functions, while reassuring the region.
And, countries wont fill the gap. Only aggressive us primacy keeps the peace
Lieber, Professor of Government at Georgetown, 97 (Robert, Eagle Adrift)
In other areas, however, American leadership also remains fundamental and there does exist some degree of
latitude for policy choice. At the same time, there is little evidence of any effective substitute for American
leadership in organizing collective action. In its absence, the more likely alternative is not that
other countries or institutions will do so, but that there will instead be inaction and a greater
degree of international instability and conflict. For example, in the post-Cold War environment, cooperation
on the part of major powers in seeking to limit proliferation, maintain a liberal international trade
regime, or bring peace to Bosnia is unlikely to be sustained without an active, ongoing American
role. Though nonhegemonic repine maintenance may be possible under some circumstances as in the case of the
European Union, ad hoc efforts, understandings, and weak organizational bodies are unlikely to be
effective in the absence of American leadership.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsA2 Strategic War Risk

Overblown 2NC
Risk of a major strategic war with russia or china is still a possibility
Certain conclusions specific to Americas security flow from the above argument. The first of the principal threats
to international security listed earlier (p. 12)_namely, a central strategic warstill poses a grave
ultimate threat, but is no longer the most likely to occur. For years to come, maintaining stable
mutual nuclear deterrence with Russia will remain a major security responsibility of U.S.
policymakers. Within a decade or so, it is likely that China will also become ableto inflict
unacceptable damage on American society in the event of a central strategic war . [P. 18-19]
Heg Good: Great Power WarsBig Khalilzad

Withdrawal of us leadership sparks global power wars throughout europe, asia and the middle
east, economic collapse, and nuclear prolif and war
What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West
European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle
East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural
leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the
territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its
domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the
But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S.

withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy.
The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its
own security and build up its military capabilities . China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already
fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability
dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This
could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons . Given
former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated .
Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its
nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly , if it should
so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among
could come significant

risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance
could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia . If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely
prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten
Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea
U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in
such a power might seek global hegemony and the United

States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic
than the last. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for
regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection,
the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their
independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by
purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a
the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia,
significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be
Hegemony over the Persian

Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and
domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply
and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between
the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East
Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the
unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts . Higher oil prices would
used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oilimporting nations .
reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and
imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of
The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood
of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue
necessary adjustments might be high.
states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the
The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD
capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the
security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed .
world.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsBrooks

And, hegemony prevents wars around the globe, proliferation, and nuclear war
Brookes, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 7-4-06 (Peter, Why They Need Us: Imagine a World
Without America, New York Post, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed070406a.cfm)
The picture isn't pretty. Absent U.S. leadership, diplomatic influence, military might, economic power and
unprecedented generosity, life aboard planet earth would likely be pretty grim, indeed. Set aside the differences
America made last century - just imagine a world where this country had vanished on Jan. 1, 2001. On security, the United
States is the global balance of power. While it's not our preference, we are the world's "cop on the beat,"
providing critical stability in some of the planet's toughest neighborhoods. Without the U.S. "Globo-cop," rivals
India and Pakistan might well find cause to unleash the dogs of war in South Asia - undoubtedly leading to
history's first nuclear (weapons) exchange. Talk about Fourth of July fireworks . . .In Afghanistan, al Qaeda would still
be an honored guest, scheming over a global caliphate stretching from Spain to Indonesia. It wouldn't be sending fighters to
Iraq; instead, Osama's gang would be fighting them tooth and nail from Saudi Arabia to "Eurabia." In Asia, China would
be the "Middle Kingdom," gobbling up democratic Taiwan and compelling pacifist Japan (reluctantly) to
join the nuclear weapons club. The Koreas might fight another horrific war, resulting in millions of
deaths. A resurgent Russia, meanwhile, would be breathing down the neck of its "near abroad"
neighbors. Forget the democratic revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, Comrade! In Europe, they'd be taking orders from
Paris or Berlin - if those rivals weren't at each other's throats again. In Africa, Liberia would still be under Charles Taylor's
sway, and Sudan would have no peace agreement. And what other nation could or would provide freedom of the seas for
commerce, including the shipment of oil and gas - all free of charge? Weapons of mass destruction would be
everywhere. North Korea would be brandishing a solid nuclear arsenal . Libya would not have given up
its weapons, and Pakistan's prodigious proliferator, A.Q. Khan, would still be going door to door, hawking his nuclear wares.
Also missing would be other gifts from "Uncle Sugar" - starting with 22 percent of the U.N. budget. That includes half the
operations of the World Food Program, which feeds over 100 million in 81 countries. Gone would be 17 percent of
UNICEF's costs to feed, vaccinate, educate and protect children in 157 countries - and 31 percent of the budget of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, which assists more than 19 million refugees across the globe. In 2005, Washington
dispensed $28 billion in foreign aid, more than double the amount of the next highest donor (Japan), contributing nearly 26
percent of all official development assistance from the large industrialized countries. Moreover, President Bush's five-year
$15 billion commitment under the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is the largest commitment by a single nation toward an
international health initiative - ever - working in over 100 (mostly African) countries. The United States is the world's
economic engine. We not only have the largest economy, we spend 40 percent of the world's budget on R&D, driving
mind-boggling innovation in areas like information technology, defense and medicine. We're the world's ATM , too,
providing 17 percent of the International Monetary Fund's resources for nations in fiscal crisis, and funding 13 percent of
World Bank programs that dole out billions in development assistance to needy countries. And what does Uncle Sam get in
return? Mostly grief, especially from all the ungrateful freeloaders who benefit tremendously from the global "public goods"
we so selflessly provide with our time, effort, blood and treasure. How easily - and conveniently - they forget . . . unless they
need help, of course. But let us never forget, especially today, that despite the name-calling, the jeers, the petty
jealousies, we're the envy of the world - and rightfully so. The fact is that no matter what anyone says: No country
has given so much to so many so often - while asking for so little in return - for so little gratitude than this great country of
ours. So Happy birthday, America! Stand tall and proud - you've earned it.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsFerguson

Collapse of american power spreads global instability, epidemics, poverty, terrorism and
nuclear wars
FERGUSON (Professor of Finance and History @ NYU) 04 [Niall, A World Without Power, Foreign Policy, July/August, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
Suppose, in a worst-case scenario, that U.S. neoconservative hubris is humbled in Iraq and that the Bush administration's project to democratize the Middle East at gunpoint ends in ignominious
withdrawal, going from empire to decolonization in less than two years. Suppose also that no aspiring rival power shows interest in filling the resulting vacuums - not only in coping with Iraq but
conceivably also Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Haiti.
What would an apolar future look like?
The answer is not easy, as there have been very few

periods in world history with no contenders for the role of global, or at least regional, hegemon. The nearest approximation in modern times could be the 1920s, when the United States walked away
from President Woodrow Wilson's project of global democracy and collective security centered on the League of Nations. There was certainly a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe after the
collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman empires, but it did not last long. The old West European empires were quick to snap up the choice leftovers of Ottoman rule in the
Middle East. The Bolsheviks had reassembled the czarist empire by 1922. And by 1936, German revanche was already far advanced. One must go back much further in history to find a period of true
and enduring apolarity; as far back, in fact, as the ninth and 10th centuries. In this era, the remains of the Roman Empire--Rome and Byzantium--receded from the height of their power. The
leadership of the West was divided between the pope, who led Christendom, and the heirs of Charlemagne, who divided up his short-lived empire under the Treaty of Verdun in 843. No credible
claimant to the title of emperor emerged until Otto was crowned in 962, and even he was merely a German prince with pretensions (never realized) to rule Italy. Byzantium, meanwhile, was dealing
with the Bulgar rebellion to the north. By 900, the Abbasid caliphate initially established by Abu al-Abbas in 750 had passed its peak; it was in steep decline by the middle of the 10th century. In China,
too, imperial power was in a dip between the T'ang and Sung dynasties. Both these empires had splendid capitals--Baghdad and Ch'ang-an--but neither had serious aspirations of territorial
expansion. The weakness of the old empires allowed new and smaller entities to flourish. When the Khazar tribe converted to Judaism in 740, their khanate occupied a Eurasian power vacuum
between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. In Kiev, far from the reach of Byzantium, the regent Olga laid the foundation for the future Russian Empire in 957 when she converted to the Orthodox
Church. The Seljuks--forebears of the Ottoman Turks--carved the Sultanate of Rum as the Abbasid caliphate lost its grip over Asia Minor. Africa had its mini-empire in Ghana; Central America had its
Mayan civilization. Connections between these entities were minimal or nonexistent. This condition was the antithesis of globalization. It was a world broken up into disconnected, introverted
civilizations. One feature of the age was that, in the absence of strong secular polities, religious questions often produced serious convulsions. Indeed, religious institutions often set the political
agenda. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Byzantium was racked by controversy over the proper role of icons in worship. By the 11th century, the pope felt confident enough to humble Holy Roman
Emperor Henry IV during the battle over which of them should have the right to appoint bishops. The new monastic orders amassed considerable power in Christendom, particularly the Cluniacs, the
first order to centralize monastic authority. In the Muslim world, it was the ulema (clerics) who truly ruled. This atmosphere helps explain why the period ended with the extraordinary holy wars known
as the Crusades, the first of which was launched by European Christians in 1095. Yet, this apparent clash of civilizations was in many ways just another example of the apolar world's susceptibility to
long-distance military raids directed at urban centers by more backward peoples. The Vikings repeatedly attacked West European towns in the ninth century--Nantes in 842, Seville in 844, to name
just two. One Frankish chronicler lamented "the endless flood of Vikings" sweeping southward. Byzantium, too, was sacked in 860 by raiders from Rus, the kernel of the future Russia. This "fierce
and savage tribe" showed "no mercy," lamented the Byzantine patriarch. It was like "the roaring sea ... destroying everything, sparing nothing." Such were the conditions of an anarchic age. Small
wonder that the future seemed to lie in creating small, defensible, political units: the Venetian republic--the quintessential city-state, which was conducting its own foreign policy by 840--or Alfred the
Great's England, arguably the first thing resembling a nation-state in European history, created in 886. SUPERPOWER FAILURE Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age
of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powers--the United States, Europe, and China--retreating into their own
regional spheres of influence. But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World War?
The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each
considers itself in some way representative of the "international community." Surely their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of
the Dark Ages? Yet universal claims were also an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of
other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven. The reality was
political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward.
With the end of states' monopoly on the means of violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication, humanity has entered an era
characterized as much by disintegration as integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower multinational corporations and
nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal
organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international
community is not global at all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors who truly wield
Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient

anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a
hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark
global power--including both the monks and the Vikings of our time . So what is left?
Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed
production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is
now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization-the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised
living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which
a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even
depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less
hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-
An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist

system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires .
Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point.
Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would
The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to

Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease,
terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise
liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear
wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir,
perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical
Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders . In Africa, the great plagues of aids and malaria would continue their
deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately
be felt on the edges of the waning great powers .
guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of
If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by
minor setbacks on the imperial frontier-its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they
are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of
power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at
all. It would be apolarity-a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival
great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder .
Charlemagne.
Heg Good: Great Power WarsHirsh

American withdrawal leads to global instability, pulling the united states into destructive
nuclear wars
Yes, it is possible. But first we must cross a psychological threshold ourselves. We need to grasp what many other
nations already understand: the meaning of America in today's world. Despite a century of intense global engagement,
America is still something of a colossus with an infant's brain, unaware of the havoc its tentative, giant-sized baby steps can
cause. We still have some growing up to do as a nation. One of my favorite movies has always been ft's a Wonderful Life.
Like everyone, I'm a sucker for the sentiment. But I also thought the conceit was ingenious: What if we could all be granted,
like Jimmy Stewart's George Bailey, a look at the world without us? I think it's useful to apply the same conceit to the oneuberpower world. Suppose, with the end of the Soviet Union, America had mysteriously disappeared
as well or, more realistically, had retreated to within its borders, as it had wanted to do ever since
the end of World War II. What would a Jeffersonian America, withdrawn behind its oceans, likely
see unfolding overseas? Probably a restoration of the old power jostle that has sent mankind
back to war for many millennia. One possible scenario: Japan would have reacquired a full-scale
military and nuclear weapons, and would have bid for regional hegemony with China. Europe
would have had no counterbalance to yet another descent into intraregional competition and,
lacking the annealing structure of the postwar Atlantic alliance, may never have achieved
monetary union. Russia would have bid for Eurasian dominance, as it has throughout its modern
history. Most important of all, the global trading system, which the United States virtually
reinvented after World War II (with some help from John Maynard Keynes and others), would almost certainly
have broken down amid all these renewed rivalries, killing globalization before it even got
started. That in turn would have accelerated many of the above developments . A war of some kind
would have been extremely likely. And given the evidence of the last century, which shows that America
has been increasingly drawn into global conflicts, the U.S. president would be pulled in againbut this time in a high-tech, nuclearized, and very lethal age of warfare . America has a unique
opportunity to thwart history's most ruthless dictate: that nations are ever fated to return to a state of anarchy and war. It has
a unique opportunity do what no great power in history has ever done-to perpetuate indefinitely the global system we have
created, to foster an international community with American power at its center that is so secure that it may never be
challenged. But this can be done only through a delicate balancing of all our tools of power and influence. And it can be
done only by bridging the ideological gulf that continues to divide Americans over our place in the world. 10-11
_________________________
**Hegemony Good: Japan**
Heg Good: Japan F/L
First, assurance of american hegemony is critical to prevent a resurgent nuclear japan that
would spark arms races and war.
KHALILZAD & LESSER et al (RAND Analyst) 98
[Zalmay & Ian, editors, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, RAND Books, p. online // wyo-tjc]
The third vital interest is to ensure the survival of American allies critical for a number of
reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the United States has treaty obligations to two
important Asian states, Japan and South Korea. While meeting these obligations is necessary to maintain the
credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is consequential for directly substantive reasons as well. In both
instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in implicit bargains that are indispensable
to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security

guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons
as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation
on the part of both states to resurrect the nuclear option will increase to the consequent detriment of
Americas global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as
well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional build-up , especially of maritime
and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a longrange
power-projection capability possessing offensive orientation . Even if such forces are developed primarily
for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas regionwide that in turn
would lead to intensive arms-racing, growing suspicions, and possibly war.
Second, the instability from re-arms fuels wildfire proliferation, a series of wars and eventual
emergence of a hostile asian rival to the united states.
China in world III eschews democratization and normalization for an accelerated program of
military modernization, especially air and naval power-projection capabilities (Tellis et al., 1996).
Japan might choose to go in one of several directions in the face of Chinas drive for regional superiority. Tokyo might decide
to ally itself with Beijing; it might seek U.S. support in balancing China; or it might compete with China for Asian leadership.
In the worst caseour world IIIJapan loses faith in U.S. security guarantees and chooses the
latter path. Tokyo begins converting its economic power into military strength and deploys a
small nuclear arsenal to defend itself and its interests against what it perceives as malign Chinese designs. In the
rest of Asia, the second-tier powers jockey for position alongside one or another of the competitors within a complex context
of border and resource disputes. In this world, NBC proliferation proceeds at a rapid clip, as actors see
nuclear weapons in particular as insurance policies against the dangers around them. Power
relations are fluid to the point of instability as small countries seek protectors and larger powers
recruit clients. And in this world, it seems likely that a global competitor to the United States
could emerge, perhaps as a result of an alliance of convenience between one of the Asian competitors and Russia.
Heg Good: Japan S/L

On the japan scenario, extend the first khalilzad and lesser cardamerican guarantees of
hegemony in east asia are the sole reason japan has not attempted to rearm. Any perception
that those guarantees are failing will cause japan to rearm because they fear neighbors like
china.
Second, this fans instability and warfare across the entire continent as others proliferate and
engage in arms races to secure a strategic advantage, causing multiple regional wars that
could go nuclear.
This impact outweighs case because
A) timeframejapan has the latent abilities to go nuclear essentially the next day, making
the impact extremely fast.
B) probabilitythe intersecting security interests, small distances and rate of
proliferation make the threshold for a nuclear war incredibly low
C) sheer magnitudeeven though its unlikely the us would be able to stay out of wars to
begin with, this scenario ultimately concludes in a hostile global challenger to america, the
most certain scenario for a devestating global nuclear power war that subsumes all
others.
Heg Good: JapanRearm Links S/L

First, the khalilzad & lesser evidence proves hegemony is key to deter japanese rearmament
because it acts as a less threatening stand-in for their nuclear deterrent, allowing japan to be
assured that china wont be able to coerce them.
Second, collapse and withdrawal of american leadership in east asia leads to rapid japanese
renuclearization and possible japan/sino alliance against the us
Could a revived Japan, a decade or two hence, become a global challenger to the United States, economically or militarily,
as was predicted a decade ago? It seems unlikely. Roughly the size of California, Japan will never have the geographical or
population scale of the United States. Its record of economic success and its popular culture provide Japan with soft power,
but the nations ethnocentric attitudes and policies undercut that. Japan does show some ambition to improve its status as a
world power. It seeks a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and polls show that many younger
Japanese are interested in becoming a more normal country in terms of defense. Some politicians have started a
movement to revise Article 9 of the countrys constitution, which restricts Japans forces to selfdefense. If the United States were to drop its alliance with Japan and follow the advice of those
who want us to stay offshore and shift our allegiance back and forth to balance China and
Japan, we could produce the sense of insecurity that might lead Japan to de cide it had to
develop its own nuclear capacity.
Alternatively, if Japan were to ally with China, the combined re sources of the two countries
would make a potent coalition. While not impossible, such an alliance seems unlikely unless the
United States makes a serious diplomatic or military blunder. Not only have the wounds of the 193os failed
to heal completely, but China and Japan have conflicting visions of Japans proper place in Asia and in the world. China
would want to constrain Japan, but Japan might not want to play second fiddle. In the highly unlikely prospect that
the United States were to withdraw from the East Asian region, Japan might join a Chinese
bandwagon. But given Japanese concerns about the rise of Chinese power, continued alliance with the United States is
the most likely outcome. An allied East Asia is not a plausible candidate to be the challenger that displaces the United
States. [P. 24-25]
Heg Good: JapanTimeframe Fast S/L

Faltering asian security could move japan towards nuclearizationwould happen in a matter
of months
CALDER (Director of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations @ Princeton) 96
[Kent E., Asias Empty Tank, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 1996, vol. 75, no. 2, p. asp// wyo-tjc]
Deepening nuclear uncertainties across northeast Asia could have especially troubling implications for Japan. That
shadow superpower could easily go nuclear in a matter of months if the technology alone were at
issue. If regional nuclear frictions worsen and the U.S. commitment to Japan's security is vague,
such a fateful move, although unlikely, is not inconceivable during the prospectively turbulent first
decade of the coming century.
Japan has the latent capabilities to become a nuclear super-power essentially overnight
Despite such limitations, Japan nevertheless has the financial, industrial, and technological resources
to become a major military power should its regional security environment worsen , international
economic institutions collapse, and the alliance be abrogated. Japanese hedging against the possibility of a
more hostile regional security environment and abrogation of the alliance can be seen in recent
plans: (1) to improve the intelligence capabilities of the SDF, including the use of satellites; (2) to procure transport aircraft
that can fly greater distances and carry more than existing C-1 and C-130 aircraft; (3) to acquire air-refueling tankers for
patrol planes; and (4) to perhaps acquire defensive aircraft carriers. Moreover, Japan possesses stockpiles of
near-weapons-grade plutonium. It could, therefore, become a nuclear superpower quickly, if it

had the political will to do so. Choice of the nuclear card will remain unlikely, however, given the legacy of World
War II, the enormous benefits Japan currently derives from maintenance of the status quo, and the continued willingness of
the United States to extend a nuclear umbrella over Japan.
Heg Good: JapanA2 Prolif/Rearm is Stable 2NC

First, our 1nc khalilzad and lesser evidence gives several reason rearmament will not be
stable:
A) Leadership vacuumwithout a stabilizing pole of power, japan and china would become
rivals.
B) Build-up would be threateningany large capability of japan could be used for offense,
creating new security vulnerabilities
C) Rate of proliferationthe quick turnaround time for new arsenals makes preemption and
miscalc certain.
Second, adventurist foreign policy would accompany new weaponsjapan would aggresively
compete for resources and influence on the continent, causing instability
The second potential driver of conflict would be the emergence of great-power nationalism in
Japan over the long term (20152025). Although a much less likely development, a combination of trends already
identified could produce such an outcome. This development would follow a period of prolonged political
instability; failure to restructure and deregulate the Japanese economy, with highly adverse
consequences for long-term economic growth prospects (stagnant or negative growth) and high
unemployment; great strains in U.S.-Japan relations; development of an autonomous Japanese
security policy and offensive conventional weapons; abrogation of the alliance; and a major shift in the locus
of Japanese interests away from the United States and toward Asia. Most likely, Japan would become a state
possessing nuclear weapons. Because of the legacy of past Japanese behavior in Asia, however,
Japans neighbors would be alarmed by such a development, which also would increase the
costs for the United States of maintaining stability in East Asia , if it still chose to do so. Great-power
nationalism likely would be accompanied by a revival of prewar Japans strategy of attempting to construct a coprosperity
sphere primarily through coercive means, given Japans dependence on imported resources. This nationalism would
involve a resurrection of Japans prewar goals toward the Asia-Pacific region, centered on the
attainment, through either direct military seizure or indirect intimidation, of unchallengeable
control over major sources of raw materials and markets throughout much of the region . Such a
transformation in Japans relations with other Asia-Pacific countries would require the acquisition of highly sophisticated
offensive and defensive conventional capabilities and a limited nuclear capability. It would become more likely not only as a
result of a fundamental breakdown in the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship and global trading system, but also in response to
strong insecurities associated with such events as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a unified Korea, the breakdown of
order in China, and the development of a Sino- Korean military entente.
______________________________
**Hegemony Good: Middle East**
Heg Good: Middle East F/L
First, us military presence key to prevent middle east power vacuum, hostile hegemons and
arab-israeli war
In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional
domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak
oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their
independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by
purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates
the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world
economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its
disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United
States and other oilimporting nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq
would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the
shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process
would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the
Israelis.
The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf
would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid
involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in
Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports
and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross
domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high.
The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North
Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States
withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states
possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this
happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be
harmed.
Second, existence of israeli nuclear arsenal means that any midast war risks a global nuclear
conflict
STEINBACH (DC Iraq Coalition) 3/02
[John, Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Threat to Peace, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm, accessed 4/19/04 //mac-dch]
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has
serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat
of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again ,... or should any
Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort,
would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and
the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported
that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S.
nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland
seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously
destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel
refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason -
could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
the deepening Middle East conflict
Heg Good: Middle East S/L

Failure of american leadership would open up a vacuum in the persian gulf that would lead to
rapid territorial wars, proliferation and an israeli/arab war which would escalate to a full scale
nuclear war, as per our khalilzad and steinbach cards.
This impact outweighs case because of:
A) Timeframeas soon as american engagement wavers, a vacuum opens almost
immediately. Our khalilzad ev argues iran is just waiting for the us to look weak to make
its move.
B) Probabilitytheir impact has no uniqueness as the us is engaged there nowthis proves
that only a decrease in the us presence threatens instability.
C) Magnitudethe rapid escalation of a new mid-east war would draw in the great powers
and trump the magnitude of case.
U.S. needs to reassert hegemony in the Middle East to prevent global conflict
Niall Ferguson, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History, Harvard University, The Next War of the World,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 5, September/October 2006, ASP.
The obvious conclusion is that a new "war of the world" may already be brewing in a region that,
incredible though it may seem, has yet to sate its appetite for violence. And the ramifications of
such a Middle Eastern conflagration would be truly global. Economically, the world would have
to contend with oil at above $100 a barrel. Politically, those countries in western Europe with
substantial Muslim populations might also find themselves affected as sectarian tensions
radiated outward. Meanwhile, the ethnic war between Jews and Arabs in Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the
West Bank shows no sign of abating. Is it credible that the United States will remain unscathed if the Middle East
erupts? Although such an outcome may seem to be a low-probability, nightmare scenario, it is already more likely
than the scenario of enduring peace in the region . If the history of the twentieth century is any guide, only
economic stabilization and a credible reassertion of U.S. authority are likely to halt the drift
toward chaos. Neither is a likely prospect. On the contrary, the speed with which responsibility for security in Iraq is
being handed over to the predominantly Shiite and Kurdish security forces may accelerate the descent into internecine
strife. Significantly, the audio statement released by Osama bin Laden in June excoriated not only the American-led
"occupiers" of Iraq but also "certain sectors of the Iraqi people those who refused [neutrality] and stood to fight on the
side of the crusaders." His allusions to "rejectionists," "traitors," and "agents of the Americans" were clearly intended to
justify al Qaeda's policy of targeting Iraq's Shiites. The war of the worlds that H. G. Wells imagined never
came to pass. But a war of the world did. The sobering possibility we urgently need to confront
is that another global conflict is brewing today-centered not on Poland or Manchuria, but more
likely on Palestine and Mesopotamia.
American strategic presence in the middle east is key to stabilityits the only thing that can
moderate balances of power
RUSSEL (Prof. Security Studies at Georgetown) 05
[Richard, The Persian Gulfs Collective Security Mirage, Middle East Policy, , Winter, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
The future contours of Persian Gulf security likely will resemble those of the past 25 years . Iraq,
Iran and Saudi Arabia will continue to compete for dominance, and the small Gulf states will play off the big three, looking
for configurations that best advance their national interests. All save Iran will do the same with the United States and,
to a lesser extent, the Europeans, Chinese and Russians. The bull in the china shop will be Iran. Its influence will
stem from its large population of about 70 million and from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).10 Tehran has an army of
350,000, with four armored divisions, six infantry divisions, two commando divisions and some independent armored,
infantry and commando brigades, but it is poorly equipped and trained. The regimes most capable and loyal fighters are in
the Revolutionary Guard Corps of some 100,000 troops, organized into 16-20 divisions. These ground forces give Iran
geopolitical weight, but its air force of some 52,000 personnel is equipped with poorly maintained and aging combat
aircraft.11 An American over-the-horizon presence would be the instrument of statecraft to tend,
mend and shape the struggle for power in the Gulf. The United States would have to act as the
balancing power to maintain some loose form of stability. Iraq and Saudi Arabia with populations of
about 25 million and 26 million, respectively12 might allow their political competition to prevent them
from pooling resources to counterbalance Iran. And the small Arab Gulf states will likely look to
the United States for defense reassurance to bolster their autonomies from traditional Saudi
influence, especially as they lean toward greater domestic political and economic reforms and
freedoms than their Saudi counterparts. Saudi Arabia, too, will likely come under increasing domestic
pressure from al-Qaeda and militant Islamic opposition .
American leadership is essential for peace in all dimensions in the middle east
BROWNBACK (nqa) 01
[Sam, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FDCH, p. ln]
At the same time, American leadership is essential to the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace, and to the
realization of the legitimate aspirations and needs of both sides. It is essential to strengthening
our key Arab partnerships and to cooperating with the international community to contain
threats posed by the Iraqi regime, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat
terrorism, and counter threatening Iranian behavior.erican leadership is also essential to
maintaining secure access to energy resources, helping our friends in the region join the global
economy through economic reform and improved trade ties, and advancing our core values ,
especially democratic freedoms and respect for human rights.
Heg Good: Middle EastLinks S/L

First, american leadership is critical to maintain middle east peace. The 1nc khalilzad
evidence makes a few key claims:
A) Regime supportamerican security presence buttresses regimes that could otherwise
fail, sparking civil war.
B) Containmentthe gulf states are too weak to hold off bids for hegemony by states like
iran that would otherwise dominate the gulf
C) Israelamerican deterrence of aggression prevents israel from being aggressive,
checking a nuclear war
Second, us engagement prevents rapid wmd proliferation and mass instability throughout the
middle east
Finally, the most important extraregional variable for the future of regional security will be the United States itself. Our
analysis highlights the enduring nature of U.S. interests in the Middle East. The level and character of our
engagement and presence, and our capacity for power projection in times of crisis, will be
dominant elements in the regional security equation for the foreseeable future. The influence of
the United States on the strategic environment across the region under current conditions
cannot be overemphasized. American withdrawalthe end of Americas role as preeminent security guarantor
could transform the security picture in profound terms and could affect the propensity for
conflict and cooperation far beyond the region, as other extraregional actors move to fill the
strategic vacuum. One of the many potentially disastrous consequences of U.S. withdrawal
might be the much more rapid spread of weapons of mass destruction as regional powers strive
to substitute for American deterrence or capitalize on their newfound freedom of action .
Heg Good: Middle EastA2 War Wont Escalate 2NC

First, war would escalate for a few reasons
A) Oil suppliesthe economic importance of the region would drag actors into the fray and
get them involved in the fight.
B) Israeli retaliationour steinbach evidence indicates the israel would spark a broader
strategic war should peace fail.
Second, middle east war could draw in interested actors from europe, russia and china
By the end of the century, it is possible that every European capital will be within range of
ballistic missiles based across the Mediterranean, in the Levant, or in the Gulf. This, taken
together with the potential for refugee flows and spillovers of political violence from crises on
Europes Mediterranean and Middle Eastern periphery, makes it clear that future strategies will
have to pay attention to Europes growing exposure to the retaliatory and spillover
consequences of Western action anywhere in the Middle East . Some awareness of this issue could be
seen during the Gulf War, with (ultimately overstated) concerns about terrorism, ballistic missile risks to southern Europe,
and threats to Western assets in North Africa and elsewhere.44 A future conflict in the Gulf, under conditions of greater
European exposure, could have very different consequences, including greater European and Turkish reluctance to offer
access to facilities, overflight, and military forces if this means placing their own territory at risk. Cooperation might ultimately
be forthcoming if the stakes are high and clear enough, but the calculus of cooperation and its price could be very different.
In the context of the ballistic missile risk, more effective and rapidly deployable defenses may be part of the answer to
improving the prospects for enroute (as well as in-theater) access and cooperation. The reality, and the perception, of other
spillover risks may be more difficult to address.
Developments in the greater Middle East will also have a potentially important role in security
within Russia and its near abroad. There will be numerous points of interaction , from the character
of Islamic activism on Russias southern flank and its effect on separatist movements and on the political evolution of the
Caucasus and Central Asia, to Russias own WMD and ballistic missile exposure. The evolution of Eurasia in security terms
will be directly affected by the prospects for stability in Afghanistan, Iran, or Turkey. The prospects for the
reassertion of Russian control over Central Asia and the Caucasus will be constrained to the
extent that land communications between the new republics and the Middle East expand. A more
assertive Turkey could also find itself in overt competition with Russia for influence in the Turkic
republics. In the worst case, political vacuums and separatist movements in the Caucasus could
pull Moscow and Ankara into conflict, directly or through proxies.
The Asia-Pacific region may also be increasingly, although less directly, exposed to the
consequences of developments within the Middle East. Energy security is a long-standing point
of interaction for Japan and could become an important stake for China. Beyond economic
interests, there is a demonstrated potential for Muslim and Turkic identity and separatist
pressures to affect the stability of western China . Pakistan could be drawn into closer strategic relationships
with Muslim states to its west, with arms and technology transfer implications noted earlier.
Heg Good: Peace Process F/L

U.S. leadership is necessary to address the Israel/Palestine crisis
Zbignew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor, "Major Foreign Policy Challenges for the Next U.S.
President," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 1, 2009, pp. 53-60.
The IsraeliPalestinian peace process needs to be addressed as a priority . It is evident by now that the
parties in the conflict will never reach a solution by themselves . Therefore, they have to be helped.
America, with Europes help, can do so by defining explicitly the fundamental requirements of a
genuine peace of reconciliation. The US President, even before sending a new envoy to the region, should state on the record that a peaceful accommodation
between the two parties has to involve, first, a demilitarized Palestinian state, perhaps with a NATO presence on its soil to enhance Israels sense of security; second, a territorial settlement based on
the 1967 lines with equitable exchanges permitting Israel to incorporate the more heavily urbanized settlements on the fringes of those lines; third, acceptance by both parties of the fact that
Palestinian refugees cannot return to what is now Israel, though they should be provided with some compensation and assistance for settling preferably in the independent Palestinian state; and last
acceptance by Israelis that a durable peace of reconciliation will require the genuine
sharing of Jerusalem as the capital of two states, with some kind of joint arrangement for the old
city and a Palestinian flag over the golden dome.
but not least,
______________________________
**Hegemony Good: Proliferation**
Heg Good: Prolif F/L
First, strong american leadership is critical to prevent the wildfire proliferation across most of
the world.
ROSEN (Prof National Security & Military Affairs @ Harvard) 03
[Stephen Peter, An Empire, If You Can Keep It, National Interest, Spring 2003, p. asp //wyo-tjc]
Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up
the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the
Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their
own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be
much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less
secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which
all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria,
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological
weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be
very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone
else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the
end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at
all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.
Second, new horizontal proliferation risks several scenarios for nuclear war
There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including but not limited to
the following: the possibility that a nation threatened by destruction in a conventional war may resort to
the use of its nuclear weapons; the miscalculation of a threat of an attack and the subsequent use of
nuclear weapons in order to stave off the suspected attack; a nuclear weapons accident due to
carelessness or flawed technology (e.g., the accidental launching of a nuclear weapon); the use of such
weapons by an unstable leader; the use of such weapons by renegade military personnel during a
period of instability (personal, national or international); and, the theft (and/or development) and use of such
weapons by terrorists. While it is unlikely (though not impossible) that terrorists would be able to design their own
weapons, it is possible that they could do so with the assistance of a renegade government.
Heg Good: Prolif S/L

Collapse of american hegemony sparks proliferation and nuclear wars the world overextend
the rosen 2003 evidenceamerican security guarantees and stabilizing influence is the critical
brake on most of the worlds nuclear ambitions.
Second, the impact is devastatingour totten evidence gives a laundry list of scenarios where
new proliferation may cause a nuclear war. This impact is most probable because the rapid
rate of proliferation maximizes the danger and the multiple scenarios make some use
unavoidable
Finally, this is the largest impact because such incidents will escalate to full-scale destruction
UTGOFF (Institute for Defense Analysis) 02
[Victor, Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions, Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer, p. 90 //wyo-tjc]
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons,
and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum
destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed
toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all,
nations wearing nuclear six-shooters on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is
today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
Heg solves prolif creates global pressure against nuclearization

Saslow 10 staff writer at the Washington Post [Eli, Top officials stress nuclear strength, Washington Post, 4/12/10,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/11/AR2010041103344.html]
Gates said the United States is "stronger, not weaker," in large part because of an increased focus on
missile defense that includes more than $1 billion to be spent on the development of groundbased interceptors in Alaska. Also, he credited Obama for helping build worldwide pressure against Iran
and North Korea, long perceived as nuclear threats. Iran, Gates said, is "not nuclear capable," but he added, "They are continuing
to make progress on these programs." "What has to happen is the Iranian government has to decide that its own
security is better served by not having nuclear weapons than by having them ," Gates said on NBC's
"Meet the Press." "It's a combination of more missile defense in the Gulf to show them that any attack
we can defend against and react against." Clinton echoed this on ABC's "This Week." Then, during an interview that aired only hours
before she joined Obama at Blair House to meet visiting dignitaries, she issued what sounded like a warning. "Let no one be mistaken," she said.
"The United States will defend ourselves and defend our partners and allies."
Heg Good: ProlifA2 Hegemony Causes Prolif 2NC

First, our rosen evidence is excellent on this questionhegemony is more likely to prevent
proliferation than cause it because:
a) Deterrencestates know theyll invoke american wrath if they proliferate.
b) Security guaranteesnuclear umbrellas throughout europe, asia and the middle east
stop the need for nuclear arsenals
c) Stabilityin a world with less conflict, there are no security dilemmas to spur
proliferation
Second, extending strategic nuclear umbrellas is the best check against proliferation
An effective halt to further nuclear proliferation in this conflict- ridden region will ultimately have
to be based on a regional arrangement. If nations are to forsake the acquisition of nuclear
weapons, they must have alternative sources of security: either a binding alliance with a nuclear-armed ally
or a credible international guarantee. A region-wide agreement banning nuclear weaponson the model of the convention
adopted some years ago by South American stateswould be the preferable outcome. But in the absence of
regional consensus, the only effective alternative is for the United States, or perhaps the permanent
members of the UN Security Council, to provide a guarantee of protection against nuclear attack to any
state in the region that abjures nuclear weapons. [P. 77-78]
________________________________
**Hegemony Good: Rogue States**
Heg Good: Rogue States F/L
First, strong hegemony and force projection is the only way to deal with rogue states
In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side, meaning
that how the United States responds to a regional rogue has worldwide implications. Rogue
leaders draw conclusions from weak responses to aggression . That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein,
escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his
campaign to extirpate Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is
a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold war, and it may afford the
only realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may
not be enough. Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist
conflict raised the specter of a wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia.
Political inaction creates vacuums, which can suck in states to fill the void. Although the United
States does not want to be the world's sheriff, living in a world without law and order is not an
auspicious prospect. This said, it must be emphasized that the United States ought not intervene
militarily in every conflict or humanitarian crisis. Indeed, it should pick its interventions with
great care. Offering Washington's good offices to mediate disputes in distant corners is one thing; dispatching armed
forces to far-flung deserts, jungles, or mountains is quite another.
A global doctrine setting forth all-inclusive guidelines is difficult to cast in stone. Containment, the doctrine articulated in
response to Soviet global ambitions, offered a realistic guideline for policymakers. A similar response to rogue states cannot
be easily cloned for each contingency but may require the United States to corral allies or partners into a unified policy, as
circumstances dictate. But watching rogue behavior with complacency or relying on the United Nations courts disaster in the
age of weapons of mass destruction.
Most incidents of civil turmoil need not engage U.S. military forces. Regrettable as the bloody civil war in Sri Lanka is, it
demands no American intervention, for the ethnic conflict between the secessionist Tamil minority and the Sinhalese
majority is largely an internal affair. Political turmoil in Cambodia is largely a domestic problem. Even the civil war in the
Congo, which has drawn in small military forces from Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and Zimbabwe, is a Central African affair.
Aside from international prodding, the simmering Congolese fighting is better left to Africans to resolve than to outsiders. In
the case of the decades-long slaughter in southern Sudan, the United States can serve a humanitarian cause by calling
international attention to Khartoum's genocide of Christian and animist peoples. These types of conflicts, however, do not
endanger U.S. strategic interests, undermine regional order, threaten global commercial relationships, or, realistically, call
for direct humanitarian intervention. No weapons of mass destruction menace surrounding peoples or allies. Thus, there is
no compelling reason for U.S. military deployment.
Terrorist rogue states, in contrast, must be confronted with robust measures, or the world will go
down the same path as it did in the 1930s, when Europe and the United States allowed Nazi
Germany to propagate its ideology across half a dozen states, to rearm for a war of conquest,
and to intimidate the democracies into appeasement. Rogue states push the world toward
anarchy and away from stability. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser to President Carter, cited
preventing global anarchy as one of the two goals of "America's global engagement, namely, that of forging an enduring
framework of global geopolitical cooperation." The other key goal is "impeding the emergence of a power rival."(4)
Second, failure to deter rogues sparks a nuclear crisis and war

BOOT (Olin Sr. Fellow) 04
[Max Boot, Neocons. (Think Again), FOREIGN POLICY, January/February 2004, n. 140 p. 20+. //mac-dch]
True. The greatest danger to the United States today is the possibility that some rogue state will
develop nuclear weapons and then share them with terrorist groups . Iran and North Korea are the two likeliest
culprits. Neither would be willing to negotiate away its nuclear arsenal; no treaty would be any trustworthier than the 1994 Agreed Framework that North Korea
violated. Neocons think the only way to ensure U.S. security is to topple the tyrannical regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran.
This objective does not mean, however, that neocons are agitating for preemptive war. They do not rule out force if necessary. But their preferred solution is to use
political, diplomatic, economic, and military pressure, short of actual war, to bring down these dictators--the same strategy the United States followed with the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. The Iranian and North Korean peoples want to be free; the United States should help them by every means possible, while doing nothing
Regime change may seem like a radical policy but it is actually the best
way to prevent a nuclear crisis that could lead to war. Endless negotiating with these
governments--the preferred strategy of self-described pragmatists and moderates--is likely to
bring about the very crisis it is meant to avert.
to provide support for their oppressors.
Heg Good: Rogue States S/L

Strong leadership is the only way to prevent rogue states from inciting aggressionfirst,
extend the henrikson evidenceus must maintain force projection capabilities and a credible
will to use it to prevent rogue regimes from attempting to revise the status quo.
Second, the impact is a deterrence failure that could provoke a nuclear warthe boot
evidence indicates that ignorning or coddling rogues only encourages risk-taking on their part
that escalates to a full-scale conflagration.
U.S. power key to containing rogue regimes and solidifying rule of law
Both Americanists and Globalists are right in important ways. Take the Americanists first. Despite globalization, power
remains the coin of the realm in international politics. Five decades of concerted U.S. and allied efforts may have
transformed Europe into a Kantian zone of perpetual peace where the rule of law has triumphed, but in much of the rest of
the world military might continues to hold sway. True, no country, not even China, poses the geostrategic threat to the
United States that first Germany and then the Soviet Union did in the previous century. Still, lesser- order threats abound,
from Pyongyang to Teheran to Baghdad, and U.S. military and economic power will be needed to contain, if not extinguish,
them. More broadly, the rule of law demands more than simply codifying rules of behavior. It also
requires the willingness and ability to enforce them. But that requirement , as Mancur Olson
demonstrated years ago, runs into a fundamental collective-action problemif the potential costs of
action are great and the benefits widely shared, few will be willing to incur the costs. That is
where overwhelming power, and the concomitant willingness and ability to provide for global
public goods, makes a crucial difference. So, without American primacyor something like itit
is doubtful that the rule of law can be sustained. The wise application of American primacy can further U.S.
values and interests. The use (or threat) of American military might evicted Iraqi troops from Kuwait, convinced Haiti's
military junta to relinquish power, ended Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, and broke al- Qaida's hold over Afghanistan. Nor
does American primacy advance only U.S. interests and values. As the one country willing and
able to break deadlocks and stalemates preventing progress on issues from promoting peace in
the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to preserving financial stability around the world, the United
States frequently advances the interests of most other democratic states as well. Often, the
United States is exactly what Madeleine Albright said it wasthe indispensable nation that makes it
possible to mobilize the world into effective action.
US leadership key to preventing adventurist-sponsored terrorism

The end of the cold war a decade ago has ushered in a greatly transformed international landscape. Instead of a pacific era
of peace and political harmony, the world, and particularly the United States, has been confronted with a menacing
challenge of rogue regimes whose propensity for violence is matched by their intentions to disrupt regional stability,
contribute to outlaw behavior worldwide, or to possess weapons of mass destruction. Ruthless rogues also
endanger American interests and citizens by their active or passive sponsorship of terrorism. If
left unchecked, rogue states like Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and others will threaten innocent
populations, undermine international norms, and spawn other pariah regimes, as the global
order becomes tolerant of this political malignancy.
Failing and rogue states are biggest security threat provides breeding grounds for
proliferation and terrorism
HAGEL (Nebraska Senator) 04
[Chuck, Republican Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004, asp // wyo-tjc]
The challenges to U.S. leadership and security will come not from rival global powers, but from
weak states. Terrorism finds sanctuary in failed or failing states, in unresolved regional conflicts,
and in the misery of endemic poverty and despair. Rogue regimes that support terrorism seek
legitimacy and power through the possession of weapons of mass destruction, rather than from
the will of their people. Terrorism and proliferation go hand in glove with the challenges of failed
and failing states.
Five billion of the world's six billion people live in less developed regions. Most of the world's
population growth in this century will come from these regions, where nearly one in three people is under the age of 15. As
this younger generation grows into adulthood, it will be the greatest force for change in world
politics in the first half of the twenty-first century. Many governments in the developing world, especially in Africa, the
greater Middle East, and Asia, will not be able to meet the basic demands of their growing populations for jobs, health care,
and security. Although poverty and despair do not "cause" terrorism, they provide a fertile
environment for it to prosper. The strains of demography, frustrated economic development, and
authoritarian governments contribute to radicalized populations and politics . The developing world's
crisis of governance thus cannot be separated from the United States' greater global interests. This is the context in which
discussions of current foreign policy must be understood.
_________________________
**Hegemony Good: Russia**
Heg Good: Russia Collapse F/L
First, leadership is critical to engage with russia and prevent total economic and political
collapse
Russia is still trying to find a place for itself in the world. Although still weakening militarily and
economically, as heir to the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal it is capable of conducting an all-out
nuclear attack on the United States. Consequently, it requires special attention under any
circumstances. In the near term -- 10 years -- Moscow is unlikely to pose a global challenge. Even in its current
weakened condition, however, Russia can pose a major regional threat if it moves toward
reimperialization. This scenario has been dubbed "Weimar Russia ," denoting the possibility that,
embittered by its economic and political troubles and humiliations, Russia may attempt to recover its past glory by turning to
ultranationalist policies, particularly the reincorporation of -- or hegemony over -- part or all of the old "internal" empire. In
the aftermath of the December 1993 parliamentary elections and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's strong showing in them, many
Russians indicated a strong preference for reincorporation of the so-called near abroad -- the states on the territory of the
former Soviet Union. But, more recently, concerns about costs and negative international reaction have resulted in a shift in
favor of hegemony -- Russian geopolitical and economic domination of weak but nominally independent states.
To avoid Russian hegemony over the near abroad, to say nothing of creating the groundwork for
future cooperation on a whole range of international matters, the United States and the other
members of the democratic zone of peace have a substantial interest in helping Russia become
a "normal" country, that is, a country that does not hanker for an empire and whose domestic life
is not distorted by overmilitarization. Ideally, it would become a prosperous, free market, Western-style
democracy. Whether Russia will succeed in becoming a normal state is difficult to predict, but the stakes justify a major
Western effort. Even so, the key determinant is Russian domestic politics, over which, under the circumstances, the United
States can have only limited influence, and the domestic trends are not very hopeful.
Second, russias collapse leads to a host of humanitarian crises, environmental devastation,

nuclear usage and wmd terrorism throughout europe**
OLIKER & CHARLICK-PALEY (RAND Analysts) 02
[Olga & Tanya, Assessing Russias Decline, RAND Books, p. online// wyo-tjc]
Both increased conflict propensity and Russian infrastructure deterioration in turn increase the
likelihood of a humanitarian catastrophe, whether from war itself, from an industrial or nuclear
accident, from a health crisis, or from physical and economic isolation of parts of the country. Whether the result is
refugees; hunger and mass starvation; spread of radiation; or an epidemic, the situation is
unlikely to be limited to Russian soil alone. Moreover, Russian weakness makes it more difficult
for its own security and emergency forces to effectively respond, aggravating the problem . There
are those who would argue that while this bodes ill for Russia, it has little impact on the United States. Such an argument
ignores several key U.S. interests that are directly affected by Russias future. The security of Washingtons European and
Asian allies who are directly affected by what happens in and near Russia and by stability on Russias periphery . Whether
the threat is from radiation or refugees or involves the spread of violence, U.S. allies have
excellent reasons to fear an increased Russian propensity to crisis. The secure and reliable
export of energy resources from the Caspian basin.10 Most of the export pipelines from the Caspian basin go
through Russia. Furthermore, Russias strong interests in the Caspian ensure that it will remain deeply involved there, even
if more non-Russian pipelines are built. The assurance of nuclear security and prevention of nuclear
use, either sanctioned or otherwise. Insofar as Russian deterioration increases the risks that
portions of its nuclear weapons stockpile (or other materials) could be employed or diverted into
dangerous hands, the United States has a vital interest in these events. The prevention of the
rise, growth, maintenance, or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist
groups. The growth of criminal activity in Russia combined with the potential for failure of central control in parts of the
country create a real danger of cooperation between criminals and terrorist groups in ways that can hurt the United States
and/or its allies. The threat of diversion or acquisition of nuclear or other WMD material by either
criminal or terrorist groups also cannot be ignored. The alleviation of mass human suffering wherever it may
occur. The United States has set precedents of willingness and ability to help when a wide range of states have faced
humanitarian catastrophes. Washington could well feel a similar imperative to assist Russia in a crisis situation.11
Heg Good: RussiaA2 No Risk of Collapse 2NC

Claims of reform and sustainability are overstatedthe volatile nature of russias virtual
economy still put it at risk for disintegration
OLIKER & CHARLICK-PALEY (RAND Analysts) 02
[Olga & Tanya, Assessing Russias Decline, RAND Books, p. online// wyo-tjc]
However, there are those who believe that these improvements are not sustainable. Gaddy and Ickes
argue that the current recovery is a result of external factors, particularly high oil prices, rather
than the institutional change that would make lasting change possible. Moreover, the virtual
economy described above remains in place and continues to create disincentives to real reform.
They argue that while ruble depreciation has made Russian goods more competitive, the drop in household income and
consumption (compared to 1997 1998, it is up slightly from 20002001) suggests a negative undercurrent to these positive
figures. Gaddy and Ickes go on to say that While Gaddy and Ickes may tend to understate the real positive changes that are
visible in the Russian economy, they are right to question their sustainability and the need for more fundamental reforms.
Economic growth based fundamentally on the high price of oil cannot be a recipe for long-term
success, particularly when oil production and investment in Russian oil industry infrastructure
continue to lag.57 Data presented by Vladimir Popov bear this out. He notes that Russian investment remains
low and agricultural and housing subsidies high. Changes in these areas would be difficult and
unpopular, but they are necessary for sustainable success . Russia also needs to fundamentally improve its
legal and tax framework to attract foreign direct investment, levels of which remain very low in Russia, especially when
compared on a per capita level with states such as Hungary or Azerbaijan (although it should be noted that the Azerbaijani
oil sector accounts for a good deal of the investment). 58 As Mark Kramer points out, the current system, with its lack of
protection for private property or contract enforcement, regulated securities markets, mechanisms to protect shareholder
rights, or effective banks, is unlikely to attract foreign or domestic investors.59
______________________________
**Hegemony Good: South Asia**
Heg Good: Kashmir F/L
First, effective leadership necessary to diffuse tensions and prevent an india/pakistan nuclear
war
For the time being. the key US. interest is to prevent a nuclear war from erupting between Pakistan
and India and to discourage any further regional proliferation , especially since there can he little doubt that
the once-imperial and nationally ambitious Iran looks with understandable envy at its nuclear-armed neighbors. Of the two
goals, the prevention of a nuclear war may be somewhat easier to pursue because the very possession of nuclear
weaponry is forcing both the Indian and the Pakistani militaries to calculate more cautiously the potential consequences of
their periodic border clashes.
Nonetheless, the unresolved issue of Kashmir is bound to produce repeated collisions, each of
which inflames the volatile and religiously conflicted Muslim and Hindu masses. Pakistan could
then even become a fundamentalist Muslim state ( thus probably determining Afghanistans fate as well), while
India might be seized by fanatical Hindu passions. Irrationality might then overwhelm the strategic restraint
inherent in the nuclear calculus.
Just as the West for years has been relatively indifferent to the unresolved Palestinian issue, so
it has also neglected Kashmir. India has been able to insist formally that there is no Kashmir issue, either between India and Pakistan or for the
international community as a wholethat it is an internal matter. Pakistan in turn has relied on thinly camouflaged official support for guerrilla and terrorist actions
against Indias control of the province as a way of keeping the issue alivethereby also precipitating increasingly heavy-handed Indian repression of Kashmiris
suspected of disloyalty. Once both countries acquired nuclear weapons, the Kashmir issue inevitably gained wider international significance.
The question of Kashmir has now become part of the larger problem of instability in the Global Balkans .
Its peaceful resolution is likely to

he at least as difficult as that of the Arab-Israeli conflict . The conflict involves two major states that jointly
have a population approaching 1.2 billion peopleroughly one-fifth of the worldand much of that population is still premodern, semiliterate, and susceptible (even among the elites) to demagogic appeals. Fostering a compromise in
that setting will require sustained outside engagement, considerable international pressure,
major political and financial inducements, and a great deal of patience.
Here again, political solidarity between the United States and the European Union , perhaps tangibly
backed by Japan, would make eventual success more likely. Great Britain, for historical reasons, can play
an important diplomatic role, especially in concert with the United States . Both Russia and China may be
supportive, since neither would benefit from a nuclear war in its immediate proximity, and each can subtly influence the major purchaser of its arms exports (India in
the case of Russia, Pakistan in the case of China). The reality, however, is that a major collective international effort is likely only in the face of an imminent threat of
war, with international concern rapidly fading once the threat recedes [P. 76-77]
Second, south asian nuclear war risks extinctiion

CALDICOTT (Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility) 02
[Helen, The New Nuclear Danger, 2002, p. xii // wyo-tjc]
The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India , an
ancient enemy, could respond in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear
weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's
2, 250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully
in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth .
Heg Good: Kashmir S/L

American leadership is critical to prevent a nuclear war over kashmirextend the brzezinski
2004 evidencethe united states must use and expand its influence in southwest asia to
broker peace over kashmir and deter either india or pakistan from making moves to change
the status quo.
Second, this impact trumps the caseextend the caldicott evidence. The size and proximity
of a kashmiri nuclear war promises miscalculation and escalation to a larger conflict that
results in extinction, completely subsuming the case impact.
Third, indo-pak nuclear war in kashmir causes extinction via nuclear winter
WASHINGTON TIMES 01
[STAFF, The Most Dangerous Place, July 8, 2001, p. lexis// wyo-tjc]
The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally
occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It
has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger
nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy
no sanctuary.
This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense
Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries . Both
India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their
defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending
Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.
Korea, taiwan and kashmir could all ignite into full-scale wars overnight.
CAMPBELL (Sr. Vice President at CSIS) 01
[Kurt M., The Cusp of Strategic Change in Asia, Orbis, Summer2001, Vol. 45 Issue 3// wyo-tjc]
Asia embarks upon the new century with a dubious distinction. While the much-overused phrase "the Pacific Century"
conjures up images of commercial promise and political dynamism, the reality is that Asia is a dangerous place. For the
first time in modern political history, every major challenge to peace and stability in the
international arena is currently found in greater Asia. Any of three situations could trigger a
major conflagration virtually overnight: the still-dangerous division of the Korean peninsula, the
increasingly tense and unpredictable situation across the Taiwan Strait, and the volatile nuclear
competition between India and Pakistan. Europe by comparison seems absolutely peace loving--ongoing
troubles in the Balkans notwithstanding.
__________________________________
**Hegemony Good: South China Sea**
Heg Good: South China Sea F/L
First, forward military presence in the pacific deters china and stabilizes the spratleys,
allowing a political solution to be brokered*
ODGAARD (Asst Prof, of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark) 01
[Liselotte, Deterrence and Co-operation in the South China Sea, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Aug 1, p. ln// wyo-tjc]
The South China Sea constitutes a first line of defence for the littoral states of Southeast Asia.
As a consequence, they cannot afford to ignore the worst-case scenario of conflict involving
China. The majority of the Southeast Asian states have embarked on a modernization of their
naval capabilities, aimed at developing a deterrent force as well as a force capable of engaging in military operations at sea .
However, the financial crisis of the late 1990s delayed some of these efforts, making the
Southeast Asian states more reliant on bilateral defence arrangements, in particular with the
United States. The main countries in the U.S. network of military co-operation agreements are Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.
In substitution of the permanent base arrangements during the Cold War, U.S. troops have resumed joint exercises with the Philippines from
2000. In general, the military agreements facilitate training, exercises, and interoperability,
permitting the United States to be seen to be engaged in Southeast Asia as a flexible regional
balancer.
The United States shares the widespread perception within Southeast Asia that China's moves in the South China Sea indicate that it might have expansionist
intentions. Thus, the United States has maintained its strategy of forward deployment. However, China is a power of second rank compared with the United States,
and as such, is no immediate threat to the latter. Therefore, Washington prefers that the regional states settle their disputes without its involvement as long as these
do not pose a threat to U.S. interests. Although the United States looks at China's Spratly policy as an indication of its possible bid for regional hegemony, it is not
prepared to play an active part in the Spratly dispute unless freedom of navigation through Southeast Asian waters is threatened. At the same time, the United States
maintains its support for the ASEAN position on the non-use of force concerning dispute settlement in the South China Sea. Thus, the U.S. policy on the Spratlys may
be characterized as guarded non-involvement.
American reservations about direct involvement in the Spratly dispute do not imply that cordial relations between the United States and China are on the agenda. On
the contrary, since 1999, the relationship between the two powers has suffered a downturn because of Chinese opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) air strikes in Yugoslavia, the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and accusations of Chinese military espionage in the United States. The
Administration of George W. Bush is unlikely to call for a revival of the idea of a strategic partnership with China. Bush describes China as a strategic competitor. [4]
In line with this hardening of U.S. policy towards China, Bush has voiced strong support for a theatre missile defence (TMD) system covering Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan. Technological constraints are likely to force Bush to moderate his position on such defence plans. However, U.S. reassurances that research and
development on the TMD will continue only leaves China with the option of proceeding with military modernization to build up its deterrence capabilities.
This geostrategic picture suggests that co-operation on managing the regional balance of power is not on the cards. Instead, a structure of deterrence appears to be
in the making. Deterrence is directed at the intentions of opponents: if the existence of deterrent forces are seen to prevent the opponent from achieving gains
through aggression, the opponent will refrain from attack. Thus, the power-projection capabilities of the various states are constrained by a mutual display of force
between the United States and the Southeast Asian states on the one hand, and China on the other.
A structure of deterrence does not operate on the basis of cooperation between opposing powers. Nor can deterrence be equated with violence and volatility. On the
contrary,
the consolidation of a structure of deterrence in the South China Sea may provide
Southeast Asia with the level of military security and reassurance necessary to allow for the
development of stronger co-operative ties with China.
Second, conflict in the scs escalates to full-scale nuclear war

STRAITS TIMES 95
[staff, Choose Your Own Style of Democracy, May 21, p. ln// wyo-tjc]
In his speech, Dr Mahathir also painted three scenarios for Asia.
In the first -the worst possible scenario -Asian countries would go to war against each other , he
said. It might start with clashes between Asian countries over the Spratly Islands because of China's
insistence that the South China Sea belonged to it along with all the islands, reefs and seabed minerals. In this
scenario, the United States would offer to help and would be welcomed by Asean, he said. The Pacific Fleet
begins to patrol the South China Sea. Clashes occur between the Chinese navy and the US Navy. China
declares war on the US and a full-scale war breaks out with both sides resorting to nuclear
weapons.
Heg Good: South China Sea S/L

China will inevitably miscalculate and invade the south-china sea if it perceives american
hegemony is flaggingthe 1nc odgaard evidence proves that american forward presence is
critical to deter china long enough for a political solution to be brokered.
Second, the impact is that a chinese invasion would force the us to intervene even if
hegemony is waning . This escalates to clashes between the two powers and possible nuclear
warthats the straits times evidence
US military alliances and superior militaries throughout asia all check chinese aggression in
the south china sea
KORB (vice presidentand director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations) 02
[Lawrence, Is China's rapid military buildup threatening U.S. interests in East Asia?, Insight on the News, 8.5, p. ln// wyo-tjc]
Many Chinese strategists openly worry about what they regard as the "encirclement" of China by
U.S. military might in the wake of Sept. 11. With the United States deploying troops in Afghanistan and Central Asia,
selling sophisticated arms to Taiwan, helping modernize the Japanese military and enhancing military relations with the
Philippines and Pakistan, China sees itself as geopolitically surrounded. China's sense of unease also has been heightened
by Russia's overtures to, and new partnership with, NATO, although in public it is not critical - it values the pretense of its
own "strategic partnership" with Russia too highly. The most contentious issue to U.S.-Sino relations
remains Taiwan. Eventual reunification with Taiwan is still an overriding objective for China . The
PRC recently deployed a range of short-range ballistic missiles and an Israeli-made antiradar weapon on its shoreline facing
Taiwan. The PLA also has been engaged in large-scale military exercises there during the last weeks of June. But what
does that mean? China's participation in the global economy, its stake in regional stability and
even its successful bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing are reasons enough for China
to avoid confrontations with the United States over Taiwan, not to mention the fact that they
would lose a military struggle. In the short term, in spite of all the aggressive blustering by
Chinese and Taiwanese politicians, it appears that they both wish to maintain the status quo for the
foreseeable future. The Bush administration also appears to be taking steps to defuse the tension: It has not yet
delivered the advanced air-to-air missiles purchased by Taiwan for fears of upsetting the military balance in the region.
China, of course, does want to extend its sphere of influence even beyond Taiwan. But any such
influence in the East China Sea is contingent on airpower, where China is handicapped by
primitive machines, and must contend with both superior U.S. and Japanese aircraft in the
region. China's recent acquisition of Soviet SU-27s, a late 1970s fighter jet, does not alter this reality. Similarly, the
southern portions of the South China Sea are beyond the scope of China's land-based aircraft
where Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia each possess more advanced U.S. or British aircraft. If
China did invest in aircraft carriers, it could have the minimum three-vessel fleet by 2020. Its
forces, however, still would be trumped by those deployed by the maritime Southeast Asian
countries, as well as the United States. Only the northern reaches of the South China Sea, which include waters
east of Vietnam and the Paracel Islands, are within the range of Chinese land-based aircraft. The Chinese leadership,
however, apparently realizes that provoking the United States, given the new world order, will not
assist in realizing its ambitions. Since Sept. 11, China largely has made all the right gestures
toward the United States, including support for the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan . Bush has
visited China twice since September 2001 and, while personal warmth between Zemin and Bush was minimal, the scripted
exchange was mutually reassuring. Bush also called Zemin after announcing withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and offered
to hold "high-level strategic talks" on the issue; China, on its part, did not openly criticize the U.S. decision to withdraw.
____________________________
**Hegemony Good: Terrorism**
Heg Good: Terrorism F/L
Leadership is key to global stability-withdrawal would lead to terrorism and global conflicts
Peter Brooks, Senior Fellow, Heritage Foundation, "Why They Need Us: Imagine a World Without America,
NEW YORK POST, July 4, 2006. Available from the World Wide Web at:
www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed070406a.cfm, accessed 10/10/06.
For all the worldwide whining and bellyaching about the United States, today - America's 230th birthday - provides an
opportune time for them to consider for just a moment what the world might be like without good ol' Uncle Sam. The
picture isn't pretty. Absent U.S. leadership, diplomatic influence, military might, economic power
and unprecedented generosity, life aboard planet earth would likely be pretty grim , indeed. Set aside
the differences America made last century - just imagine a world where this country had vanished on Jan. 1, 2001. On
security, the United States is the global balance of power. While it's not our preference, we are the
world's "cop on the beat," providing critical stability in some of the planet's toughest
neighborhoods. Without the U.S. "Globo-cop," rivals India and Pakistan might well find cause to
unleash the dogs of war in South Asia - undoubtedly leading to history's first nuclear (weapons)
exchange. Talk about Fourth of July fireworks . . . In Afghanistan, al Qaeda would still be an honored
guest, scheming over a global caliphate stretching from Spain to Indonesia. It wouldn't be
sending fighters to Iraq; instead, Osama's gang would be fighting them tooth and nail from Saudi
Arabia to "Eurabia." In Asia, China would be the "Middle Kingdom," gobbling up democratic
Taiwan and compelling pacifist Japan (reluctantly) to join the nuclear weapons club. The Koreas
might fight another horrific war, resulting in millions of deaths. A resurgent Russia, meanwhile,
would be breathing down the neck of its "near abroad" neighbors . Forget the democratic revolutions in
Ukraine and Georgia, Comrade! In Europe, they'd be taking orders from Paris or Berlin - if those rivals
weren't at each other's throats again. In Africa, Liberia would still be under Charles Taylor's sway, and Sudan
would have no peace agreement. And what other nation could or would provide freedom of the seas for commerce,
including the shipment of oil and gas - all free of charge? Weapons of mass destruction would be everywhere.
North Korea would be brandishing a solid nuclear arsenal. Libya would not have given up its
weapons, and Pakistan's prodigious proliferator, A.Q. Khan, would still be going door to door,
hawking his nuclear wares.
Heg Good: Terrorism S/L

Their evidence only assumes a world where we are not a benevolent hegemon Soft power
solves any risk of a terrorist attack
Steinberg, 08 Dean of the Lyndon Johnson School of Public Affairs at Texas Austin (James, Real Leaders Do Soft Power: Learning the Lessons of Iraq,
Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2008)
Third, the
strategy undermined the U.S. global position by calling into question the legitimacy of
U.S. leadership. This element of U.S. soft power is particularly critical in the face of terrorist threats,
which compel the United States to push the envelope of preventive force. The world rallied to the
United States after 9/11 and supported the invasion of Afghanistan because the Taliban's alliance
with al Qaeda represented a clear and present danger. The argument behind the necessity of dispatching Saddam, however,
was more [End Page 160] remote. By acting without the support of others, the administration fueled a fear that
the United States would act in an unconstrained fashion that would damage the interests of
others and encourage other, more dangerous nations to follow a similar course. By lowering the
substantive bar constraining the use of force in the absence of an imminent threat and rejecting
the alternative that would put in place procedural checks, such as approval by the UN Security Council or a regional
organization such as NATO, the invasion of Iraq unintentionally fueled a global public perception that both al
Qaeda and the United States were threats to peace and stability . The administration believed that overwhelming U.S.
military power freed the United States from having to seek the support of others because other countries would have no choice but to side with the world's sole
U.S. primacy makes it all the more important that the United States
pay judicious attention to legitimacy and greater compliance with international law rather than it
being an excuse to throw them overboard in the hubris of the moment.
superpower. Yet, those theorists got it backward.
US hegemony solves terrorism their evidence reflects too narrow a view of hegemony
Mendelsohn 09 (Barak Mendelsohn, assistant professor of political science, Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony
and Interstate Cooperation in the War, University of Chicago Press, pg 220)
U.S. policies in the

aftermath of 9/11 have been unilateralist and have reflected malignant and parochial intentions,
this book has emphasized the positive role of American hegemony in the war on terrorism. The
hegemon sets the agenda, provides resources, and in its leadership maintains focus on the
target. That states have taken on this tremendous enterprise should be attributed first and
foremost to the working of hegemony. Without it, success would become even more elusive.
Charges leveled at the United States reflect a narrow view of hegemony that leads to an
oversimplification of its working and conceals significant aspects of U.S. policy in the framework
of the war on terrorism. This book has demonstrated how the United States, even under the Bush administration, has been engaged in
The actions of hegemony, too, are critical to success in defeating the al Qaeda-led jihadi movement. Contrary to accusations that
multilateralism to a much greater extent than is generally assumed.
US hegemony is key to the fight against terrorism no unilateral conflicts

Mendelsohn 09 (Barak Mendelsohn, assistant professor of political science, Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony
and Interstate Cooperation in the War, University of Chicago Press, pg 3)
The encompassing picture of the war on terrorism presented in this book also brings to light the
multifaceted nature of U.S. actions. Detailing spheres of action that typically do not get the same
attention as the violent face of counterterrorism, this study shows that allegations directed at the
United States overstate its unilateralist inclinations, In fact, U.S. hegemony has been
orchestrating a multilateral effort against the jihadi movement. Unilateral action taken by the
United States in the war on terrorism is often consistent with the wars grand design, which sets
general parameters but largely maintains states freedom of action. Nevertheless, even the hegemon is sometimes
tempted to breach the boundaries of legitimate action set by the international society. When it does, cooperation falters: the societys members demonstrate an
inclination to protect the system from the jihadi threat, but also to restrain U.S. hegemony when its actions are incompatible with the societys constitutive ideas.
Secondary powers, in particular, serve as corrective agents, helping to produce a system of checks and balances.
Heg Good: TerrorismA2 "Withdrawal Solves Terrorism" F/L

First, theres no basisanti-american hatred has nothing to do with us foreign policy
RUBIN (Dir. Global Research in International Affairs Center) 01
There are four ways being used to distort this history. The first is simply to ignore the truth about U.S. policy. This has been an extremely important factor. For reasons
of their own, discussed below, the Arab and Iranian media hardly ever say anything positive about the United States, while Arab and Iranian leaders --even
those who benefit from U.S. help--rarely praise America.
Shut off from contrary information and constantly fed antagonistic

views, it is hardly surprising that the masses are hostile to the United States. Those who would present a different view are discouraged by peer pressure,
Ironically, the most blatant omission of all is that the United

States was the outside power that played the greatest role in freeing Afghanistan from Soviet
control. Bin Ladin and his sympathizers must conceal this point since they want to claim total credit for this
achievement and, of course, to admit otherwise would make them subject to accusations of being American agents. The second technique is to
distort the record. For example, bin Ladin himself charges that the suffering of Muslims in Kosovo and Bosnia--whom the United States actually
censorship, and fear of being labeled a U.S. puppet .
protected--or in places like east Timor, the Philippines, and Algeria--where the United States had no role--are Americas fault. In other areas, American motives can be
misrepresented. For instance, U.S. humanitarian efforts in Somalia are portrayed as an imperialistic, anti-Muslim campaign defeated by heroic local resistance.
A third method,
and one that has been less noticed by outside observers, is to ignore other threats to the region.
Again, the Arab media and leaders are complicit in this approach, having laid a foundation for it by their own presentation of issues .
An outstanding example here is the whitewashing of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. After all, the Iraqi leader began two wars; killing hundreds of thousands of
Muslims and Arabs; looted and vandalized Kuwait; threatened all his neighbors and thus the holy cities of Mecca and Medina also; tortured and repressed his own
people, against some of whom he also used chemical weapons; fired missiles at Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel; and was working to develop nuclear arms with which
he could seize power in the Gulf. Yet now the Arab peoples are told that it is the United States, not Iraq, which threatens to dominate the Gulf and enslave its people.
American-backed international sanctions against Iraq and the use of sporadic force to make Iraq less dangerous are cited as major reasons justifying the assault on
America. The strange implicit alliance between bin Ladin and Saddam Husayn, a secularist who has killed many Muslim clerics (albeit Shia ones mainly) is one of the
Fourth and finally, there has been an attempt to reduce all of American
policy to a single issue, defined as "U.S. support for Israel," while also distorting the nature and policies of Israel itself. This
more bizarre elements of the situation .
point is discussed, below. For the moment, though, it can be said that to try to negate all the United States has done for the Arab and Muslim world--and all that it has
We should not
believe, then, as too many American intellectuals and Middle East experts have done--that the United States is guilty of grave sins
against the Arab world or Iran that merit shame, repentance, and a change in basic policies. Equally, we should not accept the idea so prevalent in
the Arab world that past American behavior explains or justifies the September 11, 2001 attack . The reasons for these attitudes and the
new anti-American strategy are far deeper and far more embedded in Middle East politics than
merely a response to U.S. policies.
NOT done to the Arab and Muslim world--on the sole basis of US-Israel relations shows the flimsiness of the case against America .
Second, withdrawal wont solve itterrorists already angry and multipolarity will leave us less
able to deal with them
Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet
Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of
terrorism has been a perennial problem in history,

and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the
twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the
United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and
hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the
situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action
against them would be reduced.
bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But
Third, disengagement wont stop terrorismthere will be more attacks because theyll think
the us is weak
BETTS (Prof & Dir. Institute of War and Peace Studies @ Columbia) 02
[Richard, The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: The Tactical Advantages of Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Spring, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
How far the United States goes to adapt to the second edge of primacy probably depends on whether stunning damage is inflicted by terrorists again, or September 11 gradually fades into history. If
al Qaeda and its ilk are crippled, and some years pass without more catastrophic attacks on U.S. home territory, scar tissue will harden on the soft underbelly, and the positive view of primacy will be
reinforced. If the war against terrorism falters, however, and the exercise of power fails to prevent more big incidents, the consensus will crack. Then more extreme policy options will get more
some, who may believe the words of Sheik Salman al-Awdah, a dissident Saudi religious scholar, who said,
got out of their obligations overseas ... no one would bother
them."[29] More likely, however, would be a more violent reaction. There is no reason to assume
that terrorist enemies would let America off the hook if it retreated and would not remain as
implacable as ever. Facing inability to suppress the threat through normal combat, covert action, and diplomatic pressure, many Americans would consider escalation to more
attention. Retrenchment and retreat will look more appealing to
"If America
just let well enough alone, and
ferocious strategies. In recent decades, the march of liberal legalism has delegitimized tactics and brutalities that once were accepted, but this delegitimation has occurred only in the context of
fundamental security and dominance of the Western powers, not in a situation where they felt under supreme threat. In a situation of that sort, it is foolhardy to assume that American strategy would
never turn to tactics like those used against Japanese and German civilians, or by the civilized French in the sale guerre in Algeria, or by the Russians in Chechnya in hopes of effectively eradicating
terrorists despite astronomical damage to the civilian societies within which they lurk.
Heg Good: TerrorismA2 "Withdrawal Solves Terrorism" S/L

First, theres no link between us policy and anti-american terrorour rubin evidence proves
anti-american sentiment is sustained because of middle eastern politics. This means
hegemony doesnt cause terrorism and a withdrawal wont do anything to decrease it
Second, a world without primacy is worsethe brooks & wohlforth and the betts evidence
proves that terrorists are already good and pissed at us and withdrawal wont make them unmad. Loss of hegemony increases the risk of terror because it hamstrings us ability to fight it
while also encouraging attacks because of perceived weakness.
_____________________
**Heg Good: Warming**
Heg Good: Warming F/L
Warming
US military power and leadership is key to solve climate change.
Maybee 08 (Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 98, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
For the purpose of this essay, national security is defined as the need to maintain the safety, prosperity, and survival of the nation-state through the use of instruments
of national power: diplomatic,
military, economic, and informational power will be the drivers of GCC

responses as they provide the needed resources ideas and technology. It will be through
invoking military and diplomatic power that resources are used and new ideas are implemented
to overcome any GCC challenges. In addition to fighting and winning the nations wars, the US military has a long
history of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, but the potential impacts of GCC should lead national security
policymakers to consider how environmental security will play a role in the future.
Unchecked warming risks destruction of the planetHawking says so

Steve Connor, journalist, Hawking Warns: We Must Recognize the Catastrophic Danges of Climate
Change, INDEPENDNET, 1-18-07, www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/envronmt/climate/2007/0118doomsday.htm,
accessed 5-20-08.
Climate change stands alongside the use of nuclear weapons as one of the greatest threats
posed to the future of the world, the Cambridge cosmologist Stephen Hawking has said . Professor
Hawking said that we stand on the precipice of a second nuclear age and a period of exceptional
climate change, both of which could destroy the planet as we know it. He was speaking at the Royal Society
in London yesterday at a conference organised by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists which has decided to move the minute
hand of its "Doomsday Clock" forward to five minutes to midnight to reflect the increased dangers faced by the world.
Scientists devised the clock in 1947 as a way of expressing to the public the risk of nuclear conflagration following the use
of the atomic weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. " As we stand at
the brink of a second nuclear age and a period of unprecedented climate change, scientists have
a special responsibility, once again, to inform the public and to advise leaders about the perils
that humanity faces," Professor Hawking said. "As scientists, we understand the dangers of nuclear
weapons and their devastating effects, and we are learning how human activities and
technologies are affecting climate systems in ways that may forever change life on Earth. "As
citizens of the world, we have a duty to share that knowledge. We have a duty, as well, to alert the public to the unnecessary
risks that we live with every day, and to the perils we foresee if governments and societies do not take action now to render
nuclear weapons obsolete and to prevent further climate change.
Heg Good: Warming S/L

NEXT, warming
US leadership is necessary to drive global initiatives to solve global warmingwithout us,
nothing will happenthats our Maybee ev
AND, more evidence
Maybee 08 (Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 98, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
The national security implications of GCC pose unique challenges for the United States in part
because it is best suited to lead counter-GCC efforts. The Nation has the economic and
informational power to develop and resource effective methods and the international status to
foster global cooperation and implementation. The U.S. military already has a robust capacity to
respond and could continue to develop and use it to help other nations to build that capacity. In
addition, by addressing environmental security, the United States may foster trust and cooperation
while beginning to anticipate some GCC effects.
AND, our extinction impact

The single most accomplished scientist in the world, Stephen Hawking, says that warming will
destroy the planet in the same way as would a nuclear waryou should defer to our evidence
because, well, its Stephen Hawking
If thats not enough, we have more ev
Failure to slow warming risks extinction
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, staff, Global Warming Threatens Earth with Mass Extinction:, June 20,
2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/06/19/1055828440526.html.
Global warming over the next century could trigger a catastrophe to rival the worst mass extinction in the
history of the planet, scientists have warned. Researchers at Bristol University have discovered that a mere 6 degrees of global
warming was enough to wipe out up to 95 per cent of the species which were alive on earth at the
end of the Permian period, 250 million years ago. United Nations scientists from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predict up to 6
degrees of warming for the next 100 years if nothing is done about emissions of greenhouse
gases, principally carbon dioxide, the chief cause of global warming. The Permian mass extinction is now thought to have been caused by gigantic volcanic
eruptions that triggered a runaway greenhouse effect and nearly put an end to life on Earth. Conditions in what geologists have termed this "post apocalyptic
greenhouse" were so severe that only one large land animal was left alive and it took 100 million years for species diversity to return to former levels.
Industrialism increasing greenhouse gases, risking destruction of all life on earth

Joseph George Caldwell, PhD, The End of the World, and the New World Order, updae of an article
published 10/26/00, March 6, 2003, www.foundation.bw/TheEndOfTheWorld.htm.
Industrial gasses are poisoning the atmosphere to such an extent that the ozone layer that
protects all biological life from extreme radiation is being destroyed. These gasses are
contributing to global warming. Signs of global warming are dramatic and ubiquitous ; see the web site
http://www.climatehotmap.org for a description of the global-warming picture. Mankinds large numbers and industrial activity are causing such great changes to the
that it is conceivable that all life on the planets surface could be extinguished in a
relatively short time.
atmosphere
Unrestrained warming risks extinction

Tony Dutzik, Frontier Group and Emily Figdor, U.S. PIRG Education Fund, Environment North Carolina,
Research & Policy Center, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: SIX STEPS TO CUT GLOBAL WARMING
POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES, Summer 2006. Available from the World Wide Web at:
www.environmentnorthcarolina.org/uploads/Ue/Sz/UeSzbzUzGX8deYBF1HJ0fg/Rising_to_the_Challenge.pdf, accessed 10/10/06.
Scientists tell us that if we continue on a business-as-usual path, releasing more global warming
pollution every year, the consequences for human beings and the planet will be dire . Scientists dont yet
the overall picture is clear:

unrestrained global warming will severely disrupt the environment and the ecosystems on which
all life depends.
have the tools to tell us with certainty which areas of the planet will be most dramatically affected, but

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**Heg Good: Uniqueness Topshelf**

THIRD, we have overwhelming hard power

(Former National Security Adviser)

07 [Zbigniew, Second Chance, P. 192]

Heg High Now: Topshelf S/L

US continues to dominate the world

American power is unrivaledhegemony in all categories

finds itself in a special position in international politics: by almost any measure-economic,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 88 n. 2, March/April 2009, ASP.

Heg High Now: Economy F/L

despite the fact that the American

US is the unsurpassed economic leader. Not even the EU can overtake it

Heg High Now: Economy S/L

Most foreign exchanges are in dollars

64 percent of all identified official foreign exchange holdings were

Hegemony high economic power

America possesses economic hegemonyleads in competiveness

Heg High Now: Hard Power F/L

FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 88 n. 2, March/April 2009, ASP.

Heg High Now: Hard Power S/L

Hegemony high military power

American hard power is unrivaledextremely high

Hegemony high naval strength

US accounts for of the worlds military expenditures

Iraq is ultimately likely

U.S. accounts for nearly half of the globe's military expenditures .

US spends what the rest of the world spends on defense

In 2008 it reached $647 billion,

US spends what the rest of the world spends on defense

US military spending massively increasing

US hard power is unparalleled:

U.S. military power greatly outstrips that of all rivals

distribution of military power. Typically this is measured in

U.S. military might is overwhelming and eclipses even European capabilities

Heg High Now: Soft Power F/L

Obama's international popularity helps bolster U.S. leadership

Heg High Now: Soft Power S/L

US has extensive soft power

Soft power is available in abundance at present

the attractiveness of American values , political

Soft power high education

US has recovered soft power lost during the Iraq war

Obama has undertaken many specific measures to increase soft power

Soft power remains high--we have extensive global influence

Heg High Now: A2 "Bush Dooms" 2NC

FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 88 n. 2, March/April 2009, ASP.

Heg High Now: A2 "European Economic Power" 2NC

Heg High Now: A2 "Financial Crisis" 2NC

crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development.

Financial crisis doesnt threaten US hegemonywill hurt Europe a lot more

Financial crisis helps the US: it increases Middle East influence

research assistance for this article.)

in its expansionary fiscal policy.

Heg High Now: A2 "Iraq" 2NC

FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 88 n. 2, March/April 2009, ASP.

Heg High Now: A2 "Obama" 2NC

Heg High Now: A2 "Others Have Economic Power" 2NC

Hegemony Brinks: General

technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are

The United States

SECOND, egemony is sustainable no challengers

THIRD, the foundation of leadership remainstheir ev only describes blips in short-term

Heg Sustainable (General): S/L

Heg Good: Uniqueness Topshelf