3d 1318
This case arises from the execution of search and administrative warrants by
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") agents authorizing the removal
of Elian Gonzalez ("Elian") from his great-uncle's home in Miami on April 22,
2000. Appellants, individuals that were present during the execution of the
warrants, filed a complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"),
28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq., against the United States ("the government"), seeking
damages for injuries caused by the INS agents' use of force during the search.
Appellants Mirtha Maria Falcon and her two minor children, Antonio Ortega
and Yuliet Colon, and appellants Alexei Torres, Angela Taina Toro, and Carlos
R. Zayas (referred to collectively as the "dismissed plaintiffs") challenge the
district court's order dismissing their claims for lack of subject matter
Prior to filing suit in federal court, each appellant filed an administrative claim,
or a Standard Form 95 ("SF-95"),3 with the United States Department of Justice
("Department"). The claims were filed on April 22, 2002, exactly two years
from the day the appellants' claims accrued. The appellants attached to each
SF-95 a copy of the amended complaint filed in an earlier case, Dalrymple v.
Reno, 164 F.Supp.2d 1364 (S.D.Fla.2001), in which fifty-two plaintiffs
The district court denied the government's motion for summary judgment as to
the assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims of
the remaining appellants who were allegedly not on the Gonzalez's property,
were not advancing towards the agents or the Gonzalez's property, and who
were gassed at a close range either behind the barricade or on their own
property (collectively referred to as the "trial plaintiffs").5 The district court
concluded that there was a question of fact as to whether the use of gas as to the
trial plaintiffs was objectively reasonable. After a six-day bench trial, the
district court entered judgment in favor of the government as to the trial
plaintiffs' claims, finding that they failed to establish by a preponderance of
credible evidence that the use of force was unreasonable under the
circumstances. The district court found that the deployment of the gas gun was
in response to the demonstrators' threats and that the agent was 10 to 15 feet
away from the demonstrators when he deployed the gun. The district court's
findings of fact were supported by videotape evidence which corroborated the
agents' testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
warrants.
8
Because the district court found that the trial plaintiffs failed to prove that the
circumstances under which they were exposed to gas was different from the
circumstances surrounding the use of gas against the summary judgment
plaintiffs, the district court relied on its earlier holding that, as a matter of law,
the use of either tear gas or pepper spray was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. Thus, the agents' use of gas did not support the trial plaintiffs'
assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims under
the FTCA. Accordingly, the district court entered final judgment in favor of the
government. Appellants then perfected this appeal.
II. ISSUES
9
Appellants present two issues for appellate review: (1) whether the district
court erred in dismissing the dismissed plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on the basis that they failed to satisfy the statutory
prerequisite of providing a sum certain in their administrative claims before
filing suit against the government under the FTCA; and (2) whether, as to the
remaining appellants, the district court erred in finding that, as a matter of law,
the agents' use of tear gas during the execution of the warrants was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances because it violated the INS's policies and
procedures.
We review de novo the district court's order granting a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n v. United
States EPA, 311 F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir.2002). We review a district court's
grant of summary judgment de novo. McCormick v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 333
F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (11th Cir.2003). "We review a district court's legal
conclusion de novo and its fact findings for clear error." Cohen v. United States,
151 F.3d 1338, 1340 (11th Cir.1998).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Lack of Jurisdiction
11
The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity
for tort claims. Suarez v. United States, 22 F.3d 1064, 1065 (11th Cir.1994). "It
allows the government to be sued by certain parties under certain circumstances
. . . ." Id. However, "[a] federal court may not exercise jurisdiction over a suit
under the FTCA unless the claimant first files an administrative claim with the
appropriate agency." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 2675(a)). The administrative claim
must be filed within two years from the time the claim accrues and must be
"accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain." 28 C.F.R.
14.2(a); 28 U.S.C. 2675, 2401(b). "When the sum certain is omitted, the
administrative claim fails to meet the statutory prerequisite to maintaining a suit
against the government, and leaves the district court without jurisdiction to hear
the case." Suarez, 22 F.3d at 1065.
12
The dismissed plaintiffs do not dispute that they failed to provide a sum certain
on their SF-95s when they were filed on April 22, 2002. However, they
contend that because they submitted additional documentation with the SF-95s
from which the government could have ascertained a sum certain, and because
they corrected the omission within one month of the filings, the "technical
deficiency" does not preclude the federal court from hearing the case.
Specifically, the dismissed plaintiffs argue that the additional ninety-seven SF95s, which included a sum certain and were filed on the same day and in the
same box as the dismissed plaintiffs' SF-95s, provided sufficient notice to the
government of the claimed amount and therefore satisfied the jurisdictional
requirement of the FTCA. The dismissed plaintiffs additionally assert that the
attached Dalrymple v. Reno complaint, in which plaintiffs sought $100 million,
is sufficient documentation from which the government could have ascertained
a sum certain for each of the dismissed plaintiffs. Finally, the dismissed
plaintiffs concede that they did not correct the omission within the two year
statute of limitations for filing an administrative claim; however, they contend
that the omission does not preclude the federal court's jurisdiction because they
corrected the omissions within one month of the filings, and the government
was not prejudiced by the delay.6
13
This court has stated that it takes "a somewhat lenient approach to the `sum
certain' requirement." Tidd v. United States, 786 F.2d 1565, 1567 n. 6 (11th
Cir.1986). However, "[w]e have held that the FTCA requires, at a minimum,
that a claimant expressly claim a sum certain or provide documentation which
will allow the agency to calculate or estimate the damages to the claimant."
Suarez, 22 F.3d at 1066. The government contends that neither the additional
documentation attached to the dismissed plaintiffs' claims nor the correction
made after the statute of limitations expired satisfies the prerequisite to filing
suit under the FTCA. We agree.
14
The FTCA requires that each claim and each claimant meet the prerequisites
for maintaining a suit against the government. 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). As our
sister circuits have held, in multiple claimant actions under the FTCA "each
claimant must `individually satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of filing a
proper claim.'" Haceesa v. United States, 309 F.3d 722, 734 (10th Cir.2002)
(quoting Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 249 (4th Cir.1993)); see also Keene
Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Where separate
claims are aggregated under the FTCA, the claimant must present the
government with a definite damage amount for each claim."). Accordingly,
because each claimant must independently satisfy the prerequisite for filing suit
under the FTCA by providing a sum certain claim, we conclude that the other
ninety-seven claimants who filed a sum certain claim do not satisfy the
statutory prerequisite for the dismissed plaintiffs who omitted a sum certain in
their claims.
15
16
we hold that the Dalrymple complaint does not meet this court's standard for
satisfying the statutory prerequisite for filing suit under the FTCA.
17
18
The remaining appellants contend that the district court erred in finding that, as
a matter of law, the agents' use of tear gas was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances, and thus not actionable under Florida tort law. Appellants argue
that the use of tear gas, rather than pepper spray, violated the INS's policies and
procedures in effect at the time of the execution of the warrants, as well as the
INS's Operational Plan, and thus does not constitute an objectively reasonable
use of force and gives rise to tortious causes of action under Florida law. 11 Even
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the summary judgment
plaintiffs, and thus assuming that tear gas was used and such use violated the
INS's policies, procedures, and plan, the appellants fail to establish that such a
violation supports liability under Florida tort law.
19
Violating an internal policy or procedure does not create a cause of action under
Adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court
held that the agents' actions did not constitute a tort because the agents' use of
force was objectively reasonable, and thus privileged under Florida law.
Specifically, in his report and recommendation the magistrate judge relied on
section 776.05 of the Florida statute, which provides, in part,
21
A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer has summoned or
directed to assist him or her, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a
lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The
officer is justified in the use of any force:
22
23
Fla. Stat. 776.05 (2000). The appellants do not attempt to dispute the
magistrate judge's findings adopted by the district court that the "evidence in
the record establishes that many protestors sought to interfere with the INS
officers' ability to execute the warrants and remove Elian Gonzalez from the
Gonzalez home" and evidence supporting the district court's finding that "the
conduct of many protestors and certain plaintiffs would constitute obstruction
and/or interference under both Florida and federal law."
24
The magistrate judge found that the gas gun was used only in response to
threats posed by the demonstrators. For example, the magistrate judge found
that the demonstrators posed a threat when they ran towards the Gonzalez's
property upon the agents' arrival and then refused to return to the opposite side
of the street barricade upon the agents' requests. The magistrate judge further
found that, as a result, an agent sprayed the Israeli gas gun in the direction of
the demonstrators who were advancing on the property. The magistrate judge
found that the gun was used again when the demonstrators behind the barricade
posed a threat by surging towards the front of the barricade while throwing
objects including rocks, bottles, a stool, and coolers at the agents and refused to
comply with the verbal and physical commands of the agents. Based on these
undisputed findings of fact, we agree with the district court that such
obstruction and interference posed by the demonstrators justified the use of
either pepper spray or tear gas and was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.
25
Additionally, the trial plaintiffs contend that the district court's findings of fact
that the Israeli gas gun contained oleoresin capsicum ("OC spray"), or pepper
spray, are clearly erroneous because the parties agreed in the Joint Pretrial
Stipulations that the gas gun was filled with 0-chlorobenzalmalononitrile ("CS
gas"), or tear gas. After reviewing the trial transcript, we conclude that the
district court's findings of fact are supported by testimony presented at trial. (R.
Vol. 7, Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 45, 47-48.) "For a reviewing court to conclude that a
district court clearly erred in its finding of fact, the reviewing court, after
examining the entire record, must be left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." Lykes Bros., Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 64 F.3d 630, 636 (11th Cir.1995) (internal quotation omitted).
Having reviewed the entire record, we are not left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. There is evidence that supports
both the district court's finding and the trial plaintiffs' contention. When there is
evidence supporting conflicting findings of fact, "the resolution of such factual
disputes is the province of the trial court." Id.
V. CONCLUSION
26
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's final judgment entered
in favor of the government.
27
AFFIRMED.
Notes:
*
Honorable Richard Mills, United States District Judge for the Central District
of Illinois, sitting by designation
Appellants assert that Plaintiff Conception Maria Cabral ("Cabral") appeals the
district court's order dismissing her claims for lack of jurisdiction. Our review
of the Notice of Appeal reveals that Cabral is not listed as one of the plaintiffs
appealing to this court, thus she is not an appellant to this action. However, the
same legal analysis and reasoning set out in this opinion would apply to her
claims as well
This decision was eventually appealed to this court and we affirmed the INS's
findings that the petitions were legally voidSee Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d
1338 (11th Cir.2000).
A Standard Form 95 is the standard form used to file a claim against the
government under the FTCASee 28 C.F.R. 14.2(a).
Appellants asserted at oral argument that this court should toll the two-year
statute of limitations for filing a sum certain under the FTCA. When
questioned, appellants asserted that this argument was implicitly made to the
court in its initial brief. However, after carefully reviewing the appellants'
initial brief, we conclude that the appellants failed to raise the issue sufficiently
for discussion, and thus it is deemed abandonedSee Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d
1337, 1349 n. 10 (11th Cir.2005).
InBonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc),
this court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
The four appellants include Mirtha Maria Falcon, Antonio Ortega, Yuliet
Colon, and Angela Taina Toro
prejudgment interest, both of which are not available under the FTCA. See 28
U.S.C. 2674.
10
It is undisputed that the appellants' claims accrued on April 22, 2000, and thus
the two-year statute of limitations ran on April 22, 2002, the day they filed their
administrative claims
11
Although appellants argued to the district court that the violation of the internal
policies and procedures created a "zone of risk" sufficient to support liability
for negligence under Florida tort law, the appellants did not raise this argument
to this court in their initial brief. Accordingly, we deem it abandonedSee
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 816 (11th Cir.2001).
However, even if this court were to consider the merits of such argument, for
the reasons stated above, we agree with the district court that any negligence
claims premised on the agents' use of tear gas fail as a matter of law because
their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.