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United States, 564 U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2273, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011)
(holding fleeing police officers in a vehicle was a violent felony under the ACCA).
Thus, Gillespie was not entitled to relief under 2255 because he was sentenced
properly as an armed career criminal.
Over Gillespies objections, the district court adopted the magistrates report
and recommendation and denied Gillespies 2255 motion.
II.
In reviewing a district courts denial of a 2255 motion, we review findings
of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v. McKay, 657
F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 112 (2012). The scope of
review in a 2255 appeal is limited to issues specified in the COA. Murray v.
United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998). We are bound by a prior
panel opinion until the opinions holding is overruled or undermined to the point of
abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc. Archer, 531
F.3d at 1352.
Under the ACCA, a defendant qualifies for the mandatory minimum
sentence of 15 years of imprisonment as an armed career criminal if he has at least
3 prior convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both,
committed on occasions different from one another. 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). A
violent felony is defined as any felony punishable by more than one year that
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has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another. 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). A crime
may qualify as a violent felony under the ACCAs residual clause if it involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and is
roughly similarin kind as well as in the degree of risk posedto the enumerated
offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving explosives. 18 U.S.C.
924(e)(2)(B)(ii); Begay, 553 U.S. at 143-44, 128 S.Ct. at 1585-86.
Florida law provides that a person commits the third-degree felony of simple
vehicle flight when he willfully flees or attempts to elude a law enforcement
officer in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle, with agency insignia and
other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and
lights activated. Fla. Stat. 316.1935(2); United States v. Petite, 703 F.3d 1290,
1292 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jun. 13, 2013). Simple vehicle flight
carries a maximum sentence of five years of imprisonment. Fla. Stat.
775.082(3)(d); Petite, 703 F.3d at 1293. It is a lesser included offense of the next
subsection of the Florida statute, which provides:
(3) Any person who willfully flees or attempts to elude a law
enforcement officer in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle,
with agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently
displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated, and during
the course of the fleeing or attempted eluding:
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, 131 S.Ct. at 2277, as recognized in Petite, 703 F.3d at 1299. However, the
Supreme Court later examined a similar Indiana vehicle flight statute, Ind. Code
35-44-3-3, and held that [f]elony vehicle flight is a violent felony for purposes
of ACCA. Sykes, 564 U.S. at
that the crime fell within the residual clause of 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because it
categorically presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id.
at
, 131 S.Ct. at 2272. The risk is comparable to that posed by arson and
burglary, the crimes closest analogs among the enumerated offenses. Id at __, 131
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, 131 S.Ct.
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intentional vehicle flight, which is an inherently risky offense. See Petite, 703 F.3d
at 1299-1301.
Gillespie further suggests that his case is distinguishable because he was
convicted under an earlier version of 316.1935(2) than the one at issue in Petite.
However, he does not explain how the two versions were materially different.
Regardless, Gillespie does not suggest that the version of 316.1935 under which
he was convicted did not punish intentional vehicle flight, which we have held is
an inherently risky offense that qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA. See
id. Because Gillespies ACCA challenge is foreclosed by Petite, it is unnecessary
for us to consider whether such a challenge is cognizable under 2255. The
government has waived the defenses of procedural default and non-retroactivity.
AFFIRMED.