Civil Law - Marriage

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 1
EN BANC
ROSARIO T. MECARAL, A.C.
No.
8392
Complainant,
[ Formerly CBD
Case No. 08-2175]
Present:
- versus -
ATTY. DANILO S.
VELASQUEZ,
Respondent.
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
x------------------------------- - - - -x
DECISI
ON
PER
CURIAM:
Rosario T.
Mecaral
June 29, 2010

(complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD)[1] with Gross Misconduct and Gross
Immoral Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper [2] as
follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she
became his lover and common-law wife. In October 2007,
respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin

in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a religious group
known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of
which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his
visits became scarce in November to December 2007,
prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious,
respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his
instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected
her with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24,
2007, the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed.
Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she
was guarded 24 hours a day by the women members including
a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia),
having received information that she was weak, pale and
walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of
Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social Welfare
Department which immediately dispatched two women
volunteers to rescue her. The religious group refused to release
her, however, without the instruction of respondent. It took
PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo
(PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against
respondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with
bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur
on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage to
his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.
In support of her charges, complainant submitted
documents including the following: Affidavit[3] of Delia dated
February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1
Robedillo[4] dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the

Certificate of Marriage[5] between respondent and Leny H.
Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract[6]between
respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office
Certification[7] dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage of
Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in
Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent
on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified
machine copy of the Resolution[8] of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and the
Information[9] lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval,
Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and
Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein complainant.
The subsequent detention and torture of the

complainant is gross misconduct [which] only
a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the
respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON
1A
lawyer
shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal
processes.
xxxx
Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008

[10]
Order of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit
his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his
expressed intent to properly make [his] defense in a verified
pleading,[11] he did not file any Answer.
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set
on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly notified,
only complainants counsel was present. Respondent and his
counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the
CBD, in his Report and Recommendation[12] dated September
29, 2008, found that:
[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a
mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley
and Leny, are grossly immoral which no
civilized society in the world can countenance.
In the long line of cases, the Supreme

Court has consistently imposed severe penalty
for grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like the
case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano
Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court]
ordered the disbarment of the respondent for
maintaining extra-marital relations with a
married woman, and having a child with her. In
the instant case, not only did the respondent
commit bigamy for contracting marriages with
Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996,
but the respondent also made his secretary
(complainant) his mistress and subsequently,
tortured her to the point of death. All these
circumstances showed the moral fiber
respondent is made of, which [leave] the
undersigned with no choice but to recommend
the disbarment of Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez.
[13]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by

Resolution[14] dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the
Investigating Commissioners findings and APPROVED the
recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP
Commissioners evaluation and recommendation well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege.[15] When a lawyers moral
character is assailed, such that his right to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves
him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is
morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[16]
the supreme authority of the Republic of the

Philippines; I will support its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God, (underscoring
supplied),
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never

attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges
brought against him, suggesting that they are true. [17] Despite
his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that he would
come up with his defense in a verified pleading, he never did.
Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent
violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
he also violated the Lawyers Oath reading:
I _________, having been permitted to
continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in

conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
The April 30, 2008 Resolution[18] of the Provincial
Prosecutor on complainants charge against respondent and
Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special
noting, viz:

[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x
Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the
complaint) has the effect of strengthening the
allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez.
Indeed, it is clear now that there was really
physical restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez
upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as he
claimed that on the day private complainant was
fetched by the two women and police officers,
complainant was already freely roaming around
the place and thus, could not have been
physically detained. However, it is not really
necessary that Rosario be physically kept within
an enclosure to restrict her freedom of
locomotion. In fact, she was always
accompanied wherever she would wander, that
it could be impossible for her to escape
especially considering the remoteness and the
distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran,
Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is a
resident. The people from the Faith Healers
Association had the express and implied orders
coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez
to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let
her go freely. That can be gleaned from the
affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita
Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded whenever
Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant
had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and
feet.[19] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution

in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein corespondent corroborated the testimonies of complainants
witnesses, and that the allegations against him remain
unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him
by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence
needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.[20]
In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly
immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct,
respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer.
[21]
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S.

Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is
immediately executory and ordered to be part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court
of the Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-99-1312. July 31, 2002]
ERMELINDA ESCLEO, complainant,

vs.
MARITESS DORADO, Court Stenographer II, Metropolitan

Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint instituted
by Ms Ermelinda Escleo against Ms Maritess Dorado, Court
Stenographer II, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Makati City. Respondent is alleged to have solicited from
complainants sister the amount of P2,000.00 as down
payment of an unauthorized facilitation fee to expedite the
latters marriage. Complainant narrates that on January 8,
1998, her sister, Ma. Phoebe Q. Carbon went to the City Hall
of Makati to secure a marriage license.
Ms Carbon was then engaged to a Korean citizen. She
approached respondent who asked her to fill up some forms
and to pay the amount of P5,000.00. After some bargaining,
the amount was reduced to P4,000.00. Ms Carbon made a
down payment of P2,000.00, and was informed that the
marriage ceremony was scheduled for January 12, 1998 at
1:30 p.m.
Upon returning home, Ms Carbon informed complainant of
the arrangements. Finding the amount paid by her sister
exorbitant, complainant went to respondents office the
following day. She demanded that respondent return the down
payment of P2,000.00 and the document evidencing the legal
capacity of her sisters fianc to marry, which had been given to
respondent for processing. Respondent, however, refused to
return the money and the document allegedly because she
had given them to a certain Caloy of Imus, Cavite.
A shouting match ensued between the parties. The

Commotion caught the attention of respondents superior,
MeTC Judge Estella Bernabe, who inquired as to the cause of
the argument. Complainant explained to the Judge the events
that had just transpired. Judge Bernabe informed complainant
that no fees are supposed to be charged for the solemnization
of marriage and instructed her to put her complaint in writing.
Judge Bernabe referred complainant to MeTC Executive
Judge Leticia Ulibarri.
When complainant returned the next day, January 11,
1998, respondent still failed to return the money as well as the
document. Respondent even told complainant that they should
consider themselves fortunate that they were charged only
P4,000.00, considering that the so-called japayukis were
ordinarily charged P15,000.00. Complainant said she did not
care and demanded the document evidencing the Koreans
legal capacity to marry. Respondent told her to withdraw her
complaint first. Complainant refused, however.[1]
Ms. Escleo registered her complaint before Executive
Judge Ulibarri. On January 13 and 14, 1998, Judge Ulibarri
conducted an investigation of the charges against respondent.
Both complainant and respondent were in attendance on both
dates. Phoebe Carbon was also present in the investigation
held on January 14, 1998. The proceedings before Judge
Ulibarri were transcribed and the case was subsequently
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
Directed to file an answer, respondent submitted an
affidavit vehemently denying the charges. She related that on
January 8, 1998, while she was busy transcribing her
stenographic notes, a certain Ma. Phoebe Q. Carbon, together
with her foreigner-fianc, approached her. Ms Carbon sought
her assistance on how they could be married at the soonest
possible time without having to await the lapse of the 10-day

period of publication of their application for a marriage license.
Ms Carbon explained that the urgency of the wedding was due
to the fact that they were already deemed overstaying in the
country. Since respondent was allegedly busy at work, she
directed Ms Carbon to proceed to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar to secure a marriage license and to return to her only
after she already had in her possession the necessary
document. Since Ms Carbon, then almost in tears, was quite
insistent in her request for assistance, respondent decided to
seek the help of a friend from Cavite in securing a marriage
license for Ms Carbon and her fianc.
The next day, a very angry complainant came to
respondents office. Respondent explained to her that, hindi
ako ang naglalakad ng kasal at wala na sa akin ang legal
capacity dahilan sa ipina-process na ni Phoebe ng madalian,
at babalik na lamang si Phoebe para magbayad at
magpakasal sa January 12 or 13. Complainant proceeded to
report the matter to MeTC Executive Judge Ulibarri, who then
ordered respondent to return the documents of complainants
sister.
Respondent denied having done anything wrong or having
received money from either complainant or Ms Carbon. On the
contrary, she asserted that she was actually trying to be helpful
in expediting the couples application for a marriage license.[2]
Appended to respondents affidavit were the affidavits[3] of
Ma. Elvie N. Cruz and Luzviminda C. Sional, who both claimed
to be present when the January 9, 1998 encounter between
complainant and respondent took place. Affiants stated that
complainant shouted at respondent, spewing unpleasant
words. Respondent calmly tried to explain to complainant but
the latter continued yelling at her.
In a Resolution dated June 9, 1999, the Court resolved to

refer the case to Sandiganbayan Justice Romulo Quimbo
(Ret.), consultant of the OCA, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Justice Quimbo related in his Report the proceedings that
transpired in his investigation:
WesetthefirsthearingonSeptember13,1999.Subpoenasweresent
tobothcomplainantandrespondent.Onlytherespondentappeared.
Itdoesnotappearonrecordwhetherthecomplainantreceivedthe
subpoenamailedtoher.
Therespondentsoughtthepostponementofthehearingasshe
wantedtoretaintheservicesofalawyer.Forthisreason,wereset
thehearingtoOctober6,1999butbecauserespondentsuffereda
miscarriageandcouldnotbepresent,wecancelledsaidhearing.On
October20,1999,respondentappearedwithAtty.EdithaMiaofthe
PublicAttorneysOffice.Complainantwasagainabsent.
Theundersignedaskedrespondentwhethershemadeanswersto
questionspropoundedbyHon.LeticiaQuerubinUlibarri,Executive
JudgeoftheMakatiMeTCandcontainedintwotranscriptsof
stenographicnotestakenataninvestigationofthecomplaintofthe
presentcomplainantwhichthesaidJudgeUlibarriconductedon
January13and14,1998.Thesetwotranscriptsnowformpartofthe
recordofthiscasehavingbeentransmittedbyJudgeUlibarri.
Respondentscounselmanifestedthatthesaidanswersweregiven
underduress.We,therefore,calledJudgeUlibarritoappearand
testifyintheinvestigation.OnDecember1,1999,JudgeUlibarri,
underoath,assuredtheundersignedthattheanswerswhich
respondentgaveandwhichappearinthetwotranscriptswere
voluntarilymadeandthatnocompulsionwasexertedtoextractthe
same.

AfterthedeclarationofJudgeUlibarri,therespondentoptednotto
testifyinherownbehalfnortopresentevidence.Insteadsheprayed
fortimetofileapositionpaperwhichtheundersignedreceivedon
December21,1999.[4]
In her Position Paper dated December 15, 1999,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
evidence. She argued that the failure of the complainant to
attend the investigation violated her right to cross-examine her
accuser. She added that the complaint is based merely on
hearsay, complainant not having personal knowledge of the
transaction between respondent and complainants sister.
Respondent likewise contended that she was deprived of
her right to due process. In the investigation by Judge Ulibarri,
which was conducted a day after the complaint was filed,
respondent was not given the opportunity to answer the
complaint in writing. Neither was she given the usual three
days to prepare for trial. Moreover, the Judge did not inform
her of her right against self- incrimination.
The acts complained of, respondent also pointed out, are
not within her duties and, hence, could not be punished
therefor. Finally, it was complainants sister who solicited
respondents help and respondent should not be penalized for
merely helping one in need.
Respondent attached, as Annex 1 to her Position Paper,
an Affidavit executed by one Felicitas Sanje, who claimed to
be a Minister/Reverend of the Spiritual Filipino Catholic Church
and, as such, was authorized to conduct marriages within
Metro Manila. The authority was evidenced by a Certificate of
Registration and Authority to Solemnize Marriage [5] signed by
the Civil Registry Coordinator (for the Civil Registrar General).
Sanje alleged that he frequents the City Hall of Makati. He

is regularly approached by those who wish to get married but
whose papers are not in order and, hence, cannot be married
by a judge. He stated that he usually charges P2,000.00 for
Filipinos and P5,000.00 for foreigners. The fee covers the
processing of the marriage license, counseling, and other
requirements, including a certified photocopy of the marriage
certificate.
On January 8, 1998, at around 2:30 to 3:00 p.m., Sanje
saw respondent talking to two persons. One of them, the
woman, was on the verge of tears as she talked to respondent
who was then busy with her typewriter. Sanje claimed that he
overheard the woman pleading for respondent to help them.
The woman said that they needed to get married (right away),
otherwise, they would be deemed overstaying in the country.
Sanje heard respondent say, [A]ng alam ko P5,000.00 ang
bayad kapag foreigner ang ikinakasal, kasama na ang lahat
ng papeles, pero hindi ako masyadong sigurado, kaya bahala
ng kayong mag-usap. The couple then handed respondent the
document evidencing the Koreans legal capacity to marry and
their application for a marriage license. They asked
respondent to wait for them while they had their money
converted to local currency. Respondent and Sanje waited for
the two until 5:00 p.m. but the couple did not return. As Sanje
had overheard their conversation, respondent gave him the
documents. Sanje had the papers processed since he would
be conducting the marriage ceremony.
When Sanje returned to City Hall the next day, he learned
that the couple had not returned. Instead, one Esmerlinda (sic)
Escleo demanded from respondent the document evidencing
the foreigners legal capacity to marry. Respondent informed
her that the document had already been filed in Imus, Cavite,
where the marriage license was to be obtained. Sanje
subsequently discovered that Escleo had filed a complaint

against respondent for charging exorbitant fees, although no
money had been even actually paid. Despite such failure to
pay, Sanje gave the couple their marriage license. He did not
solemnize
their
marriage,
however, because
they
were magulong kausap.
- Kasi Maam, magpapakasal daw sila. Tapos, sabi ko,

dito pwede ten days, sabi ko sa kanila, tapos
sabi ko...
In his Report, dated January 7, 2000, Justice Quimbo

found respondent guilty of misconduct, although it may not be
characterized as gross misconduct. He recommended that
respondent be suspended for a period of three (3) months,
without pay, and that she be warned that the commission of
the same or similar act would merit a more severe
punishment.[6]
- Tapos sabi niya, magkano ang sisingilin mo?
The Court concurs with the Hearing Officers findings and

recommendation, save for the penalty.
Whether or not the complaint is hearsay, and whether or
not respondent was deprived of her right to cross-examine
complainant, who failed to attend the hearing called by Justice
Quimbo, are largely immaterial. Respondents purpose in
raising these issues is obviously to exclude the evidence
presented by complainant. But assuming these arguments are
meritorious, there is still ample evidence to establish
respondents guilt -evidence provided by respondent herself.
In the investigation conducted by Judge Ulibarri,
respondent bared that she had the papers processed, handing
the document and the amount of P2,000.00 to a certain
Raquel from the property. She also revealed that, by merely
antedating the marriage license, the 10-day posting
requirement could be skirted. The agent or go-between
justified the large fee.
Maritess Dorado
Court
Maritess Dorado
- Sabi ko, pwede na ang P1,500.00 kasi foreigner.
Tapos sabi niya, eh kasi uuwi na sila sa Iloilo.
Tapos sabi ko, kasi pwede nating iano yan, kaya
lang mahal, maybayad kasi hindi tayo
makakakuha tsaka hindi ka makaka-aalis, sabi
kong ganon sa kanya, pumayag naman sila,
Huwebes yon Maam, nagmamadali sila, eh di
pinalakad ko na po, Maam nung Huwebes.
Court
- Kanino mo pinalakad?
Maritess Dorado
- Duon po sa naglalakad ng license, kay Raquel.
Court
- Sino yung Raquel, sann [sic] nagtatrabajo?
Maritess Dorado
- Sa Property ata yon.

Court
Court
- Property ng?
- I-a-anti-date, aIin ang i-a-antidate?
Maritess Dorado
Maritess Dorado
- Ng Makati.
- yung pong license.
Court
Court
- Property o licensing?
- Bakit, na-a-antidate ba yon?
Maritess Dorado
Maritess Dorado
- Property.
- Hindi ko po alam, kasi hindi po ako ang naglalakad,

basta yon lang ang inaano niya.
Court
Court
- Ano ang full name niya?
- So yung P2,000.00 ibinigay mo kay Raquel?
Maritess Dorado
Maritess Dorado
- Basta Raquel ang alani ko.
- Yes, Maam.
Court
Court
- Eh Eapos binigay mo yung pera, yung P2,000.00?
Maritess Dorado
- Maam, kailangan ng license, dahil kasi i-a-anti-date
yung ano ng kapatid niya, dahil yuon ng ang
request nila para rnakasal sila dahil aalis sila
daw.
- Ngayon, ang sabi eh di P2,000.00, pero may

balance pang P2,000.00 dahil P4,000.00 ang
usapan ninyo, bakit nag-sisingil ka ng ganoong
kalaki, eh wala namang bayad ang... eh ang
alam ko singkwenta pesos lang, bakit nagsisingil
ka ng ganoong kalaki?
Maritess Dorado

- Siya lang naman po ang nag-ano, sinabi ko naman
sa kanila na pwede mura dahil dito.
Court
- Mura ang singil mo, P1,500.00, ang sinabi mo
P1,500.00?
Maritess Dorado
- Hindi ho syempre Maarn, may-agent naman yan
tsaka tatawad pa naman.
Court
- Bakit kailangan may-agent pa ang kasal?
Maritess Dorado
- Hindi ko naman ho kilala, kung baga ini-refer lang
sila sa akin.[7]
Respondent was not deprived of due process in the
investigation conducted by Judge Ulibarri. What is repugnant
to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. [8]In
administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of
procedure are not strictly applied.[9] Respondent cannot deny
that she was accorded, and indeed availed herself of, the
opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before Judge
Ulibarri.
Respondent also claims that she had a right to be
informed of her right against self-incrimination, pursuant to
Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution:
Anypersonunderinvestigationforthecommissionofanoffense
shallhavetherighttobeinformedofhisrighttoremainsilentandto
havecompetentandindependentcounselpreferablyofhisown
choice.
This provision is not applicable because respondent was
not under investigation for the commission of an offense;
hence, the rights granted by said provision did not attach.
Judge Ulibarri was under no constitutional obligation to inform
respondent of such right.
Lastly, respondent insists that the acts complained of have
no connection with her duties as court stenographer and that
she was merely helping complainants sister, for which
punishment is undeserved.
The law prescribes certain requirements for a valid
marriage license to issue.[10] By agreeing to make it appear
that complainants sister and her fianc complied with these
requirements, specifically by the antedating of the marriage
license, respondent abetted the circumvention of the law.
Worse, she did this for a fee. If respondent believes such to be
an act of kindness, she certainly has a skewed notion of
charity.
Clearly, respondent may be held for her acts although
they do not involve her functions as stenographer. The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees[11] mandates all public officials and employees to
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
Customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest.[12] The conduct especially of Court personnel must
always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let them be free of any suspicion
that may taint the judiciary.[13]

For abetting the circumvention of the legal requirements in
the issuance of a marriage license, respondent is guilty of
Simple Misconduct punishable by suspension for one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months. This appearing to be
her first offense, a one month and one day suspension is
deemed sufficient as her penalty.[14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Maritess M. Dorado is found
guilty of Simple Misconduct and is SUSPENDED for a period
of ONE (1) MONTH AND ONE (1) DAY, without pay. She is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.,
C.J.,
(Chairman),
Vitug,
Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Ynares-
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of
the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL &
PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action
for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of
action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already
dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of
plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from
assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.
[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
[2]
Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a
pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and
correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court

reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is
the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a
special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers
it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage
of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such
case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation
of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons

from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa
miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
and that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code
to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their
being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit
of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate
the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the

marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based
on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within
the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code
provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged
impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice
shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in
cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having
of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the
time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the

time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this
case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time
before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place[21] and
cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while
the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void

marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership
through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the
children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50
in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54
of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at
all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the

effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband
and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent
by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based
only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to

remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.
CASTRO, respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order

of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private

respondent.
SO ORDERED.
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private

respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims
that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc

juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
PUNO, J.:
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his

answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M.
Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including
the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in
Pasig, Metro Manila.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife
since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was
only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant,

that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the
couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The
baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her
daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before
leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there
was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from
the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay
City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20,
1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not
appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(SGD.) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig
on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license.
Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her
signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in
Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the
marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the
certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent
appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local
civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the
Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between
the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent
appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued
by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not
in their record adequately proved that no such license was
ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for
relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of
private respondent Castro that she had no part in the
procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus
insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony

of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal
presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between
the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court
disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer,
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when
he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no.
3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization
of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or
not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage
license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F.
Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24,
1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil
Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar.
Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar
of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect
that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is
not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in

court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written
statement signed by an officer having custody
of an official record or by his deputy, that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or
entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by
the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied
by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and
inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to

corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the
subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of
a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly
known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either
or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown
to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified
during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband,
Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the
proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof,
he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was
properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be
faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to
show that there was collusion between private respondent and
her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate
court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null
and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the
fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented
by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no

showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
THE
G.R. No. 175581

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
- versus JOSE A. DAYOT,

Respondent.
x - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - x
FELISA
TECSONDAYOT,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 179474

Present:
- versus -
JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 28, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581

and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CAG.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose
Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and
Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2]In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, [3] also dated 24 November
1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint [4] for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which
led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to
Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder
in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks
later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother
from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged

signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers
so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to
do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about
their relationship.Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave
them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when
he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the
sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that
it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations
and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality
of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.
[5]
In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to
Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa
filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service
for one year without emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing
the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation
and analysis of the evidence presented by both
parties, this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case

is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against
[Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24
November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would
easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they
were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa]
but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of
paper for the release of the said package. Another
indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard
was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told
him that her brother would kill them if he will not
sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less,
three months to discover that the pieces of paper that
he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by
[Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the
marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he
wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement
of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988,
one year after he discovered the marriage contract he
is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again,
in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as
the person to be contacted in case of

emergency. This Court does not believe that the only
reason why her name was written in his company
I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is
just but a lame excuse because if he really considers
her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have
written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness
stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily
affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N.
taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was
asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed
that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother
she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the
more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud.[10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses
action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code
which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery
of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument
that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed
an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at
the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the

marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August
2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
[13]
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage

between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or
intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5)
of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud
and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then
he had only until February, 1991 within which to file
an action for annulment of marriage. However, it

was only on July 7, 1993that Jose filed the complaint
for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion
that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit
to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and
wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity
of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by
the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of
Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing
officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court
of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 [17] of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to
the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or
religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7 [18] of
the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion
for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the
requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital

cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision,
dated 7 November 2006, the falloof which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11,
2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the
ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting
parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had
attained the age of majority, that being unmarried,
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme
Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year commonlaw cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that

continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must
be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware
or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but

to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10
May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review
before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and
set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007,
this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that

a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be
void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it
is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of
a marriage license.[21]
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT

WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT
IS
ESTOPPED
FROM
ASSAILING
THE
LEGALITY
OF
HIS

MARRIAGE FOR
LICEN[S]E.[24]
LACK
OF
MARRIAGE
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of

Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar
from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing
prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought
the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and
an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their
marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between
Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall
jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim
that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is
the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the
affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential
and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit
was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the
parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their
marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be
considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its
Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses
notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25
July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District
24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card,
dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on
the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their
union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites
of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
these requisites are complied with:
(1)
Legal
contracting parties;
capacity
of
the
(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a
marriage
of
exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. [28] Article 80(3)[29] of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than
the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is
the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This is in stark contrast to the
old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did
not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of
death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2)
consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age
of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties

shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation
from legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they
desire to marry each other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition
at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably
construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. [40] Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the

former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us
with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies
only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years
of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the
language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not
as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts [42] in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not
lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage. [43] The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her
by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March
1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited
Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether

they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are
ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already wellsettled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive
on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November
1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it
cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76,
that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage,
this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at
bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling
Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code [51] that
every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them
from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and
Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or
compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without
prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.
[52]
The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of
a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we
must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures
set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the

Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the
fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If
the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere
scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was
no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because
he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that
equity finds no room for application where there is a law.[54]There is a
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities
are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is
without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error
that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that
it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity;
hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does
not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the
rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage. [57] It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CAG.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively
the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C.
SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, respondents.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court

Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were
charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports
of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the
court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5)
infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring
payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed
their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents
was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to
Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga
City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was
however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his
wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual
antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the
records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against
respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C.
Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I,
Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages

even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following
couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the
absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater
and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte.
As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F,
G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license

number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the
reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several
days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were
not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo,
who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the
marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed
Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile
to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he
was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was
only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage
Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo
who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract
and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that
apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation
for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims
that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by
respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed
Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of
their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage
between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34
of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and
to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do
so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with
the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the
administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because
the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not
contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these

marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that
the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido,
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in
the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to
avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did
not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the
present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991
regarding the number of marriages solemnized
and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he
solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when
in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and
void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have
notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial
Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that
respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each
document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and
failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry
where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered
is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible
for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are
merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees
which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers
that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial
Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever
alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is

liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself;
that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts;
that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the
Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and
P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is
paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report
were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is
the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number
of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant
Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the
marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims
that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued
by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held
accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees
because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that
this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for
his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore,
respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or
preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the
ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in
the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of
court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell
Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy
reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later
found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because
she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City
she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was
appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and,
since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to
sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use
thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the
Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications
for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has
the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no
hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that
the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8)
months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims
that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item
which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs.
Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by
respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that
she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt
therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond
has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money
was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been
shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer
of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited
with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk
of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt;
that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the
bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the
proper procedure therefor.

Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was
archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the
accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do
with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk
of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got
detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex
Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of
respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured;
that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant
to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he
never employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate
household help; and that he had to order the case archived
because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and
the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from
the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such
entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that
while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy
failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she
deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate
Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick
leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from
said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that
she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash
the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any
bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in

her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted
P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to
the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive
Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his
Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with
the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the
same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and
exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in
said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry
and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which,
being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by
logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at
length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal
solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is
charged with having solemnized without a
marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya
and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and
Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank
space in the marriage contracts to show the
number of the marriage was solemnized as
required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties and their
witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge
Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the
marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and

Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their
marriage certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages
the contracting parties were not furnished a copy
of their marriage contract and the Local Civil
Registrar was not sent either a copy of the
marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the
Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown
to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon
without a marriage license. The testimonies of
Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, and the photographs taken when
Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage
(Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage.
Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their
marriage was solemnized and bring with them
their marriage license. In the meantime, they
already started living together as husband and
wife believing that the formal requisites of
marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the
parties allegedly did not have a marriage license.
He declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it
and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar
did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that
he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they
merely show as if he was solemnizing the

marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This
happened because of the pleading of the mother
of one of the contracting parties that he consent to
be photographed to show that as if he was
solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the
food for the wedding reception was already
prepared, visitors were already invited and the
place of the parties where the reception would be
held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away
from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult
to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the
marriage certificate or contract, the same did not
bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the
marriage certificate, do not by themselves show
that he did not solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the
testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also
declared, among others, that Bocaya and his
bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return
after ten (10) days with their marriage license and
whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the
wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon
and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c,
K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and
K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated
solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures
may convince a person of the explanation of
Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.

Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe
that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be
photographed as if he was solemnizing a
marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom
he did not even know for the alleged reasons
given. It would be highly improper and
unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as
an instrument of deceit by making it appear that
Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when
in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their
marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and
Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that
he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it
was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit
that they have been living together as husband
and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12;
Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any

date either when it was solemnized, it was stated
that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two
(2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together as husband and
wife for almost six (6) years already before they
got married as they stated in their joint affidavit,
Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13)
years old when he started living with Edralin as
his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge
Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this
when he solemnized their marriage as it was his
duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a
false joint affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was
already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again
Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage
license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by
Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the
marriage of the same couple for the second time
is that he did not consider the first marriage he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as
(a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon
Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date
should be placed in the marriage certificate to
show when he solemnized the marriage and that
the contracting parties were not furnished a copy
of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the
marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second
time with a marriage license already only gave
rise to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only made to

appear that it was solemnized under exceptional
character as there was not marriage license and
Judge Palaypayon had already signed the
marriage certificate. If it was true that he
solemnized the first marriage under exceptional
character where a marriage license was not
required, why did he already require the parties to
have a marriage license when he solemnized their
marriage for the second time?
a marriage license. On cross-examination,

however, both admitted that they did not know
who prepared their affidavits. They were just told,
Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and
Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go
to the Municipal building and sign their joint
affidavits there which were already prepared
before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first

marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a
marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not
state the date when the marriage was solemnized
and that the contracting parties were not furnished
a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well
taken as they are not any of those grounds under
Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code
which declare a marriage void from the beginning.
Even if no one, however, received a copy of the
marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid
(Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are
not the guardian(s) of his official function and
under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to
furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their
marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay

and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage
contract was signed by them and by their two (2)
witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent
Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee
was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June
7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F4).
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo

and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater
and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and
Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint
affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not
solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1).
Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did
not solemnize their marriage as they did not have
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized

the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly
because there was no marriage license. On her
part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the
marriage was solemnized. When she was asked,
however, why did she sign the marriage contract
as a witness she answered that she thought the
marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 1028-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court
of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage
contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two
principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know that the
marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon.
This is found very difficult to believe.

Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of
having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias
and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and
their witnesses also signed the marriage contract
and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge
Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their
marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William
Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate
his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not
testify in this case and so his affidavit has no
probative value.
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge

Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and
procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not
true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to
K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy
herself who declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting
parties and their witnesses sign the marriage
contract only after Judge Palaypayon has
solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and

practice have been that before the contracting
parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in
order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned
the task of preparing the marriage contract, to
already let the parties and their witnesses sign
their marriage contracts, as what happened to
Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor,
among others. His purpose was to save his
precious time as he has been solemnizing
marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times
everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence

to show also that he was really solemnizing three
(3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary
his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows
that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending
cases and he solemnized only seven (7)
marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His
monthly report of cases for September, 1992
shows also that he solemnized only four (4)
marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is

highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to
be first asked by the solemnizing officer and
declare that they take each other as husband and
wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence
of at least two (2) witnesses before they are
supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,
Family Code).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized

marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has
presented and marked in evidence several
marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of
persons and certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons
who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in
this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and
certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge
Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized
these marriages illegally also. He is not charged
that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.

The second charge against herein respondents,
that of having falsified the monthly report of cases
submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in
the monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the
corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have
been sufficiently proven by the complainants
insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and
September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both
signed by the respondents, show that for said
month there were six (6) documents notarized by
Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio
Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial
register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
however, shows that there were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by
Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to
Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no
falsification of the monthly report of cases for July,
1992 because there were only six (6) notarized
documents that were paid (for) as shown by
official receipts. He did not, however, present
evidence of the alleged official receipts showing
that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were
paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with
respect to the number of documents notarized
should not be based on how many notarized
documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the
number of documents placed or recorded in the
notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not
personally verifying and checking anymore the
correctness of the monthly reports because he

relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of
Court and whom he has assumed to have
checked and verified the records. He merely signs
the monthly report when it is already signed by
respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well
taken because he is required to have close
supervision in the preparation of the monthly
report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally
responsible for the proper discharge of his
functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs.
Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro,
174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot
take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the
blame of the falsification of the monthly report of
cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly
assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of
cases, but the preparation and custody of
marriage contracts, notarized documents and the
notarial register. By her own admission she has
assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was
supposed to perform, yet according to her she
never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of
the court to find out the number of documents
notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the
preparation of the monthly report of cases to
Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he
claims that he only typed the monthly report
based on the data given to him by her, still it is her

duty to verify and check whether the report is
correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo
was the one in custody of marriage contracts,
notarized documents and notarial register, among
other things, is not acceptable not only because
as clerk of court she was supposed to be in
custody, control and supervision of all court
records including documents and other properties
of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court),
but she herself admitted that from January, 1992
she was already in full control of all the records of
the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection
with the charge of falsification, however, also
shows that respondent Baroy did not account for
what happened to the notarial fees received for
those documents notarized during the month of
July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced
in this case also sufficiently show that she
received cash bond deposits and she did not
deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary
receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents
reported to have been notarized by Judge
Palaypayon although the documents notarized for
said month were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) as recorded in the notarial register. For
September, 1992, there were only five (5)
documents reported as notarized for that month,
though the notarial register show(s) that there
were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized.
The fee for each document notarized as
appearing in the notarial register was P18.50.
Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what

was actually being charged was P20.00.
Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to
the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned
over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to
show that she really sent to the Supreme Court
the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document
notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be
fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself
declared that some notarial fees were allowed by
her at her own discretion to be paid later.
Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been
accounted for by Baroy considering that she
admitted that even (i)n those instances where the
marriages were not solemnized due to lack of
marriage license the solemnization fees were not
returned anymore, unless the contracting parties
made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any
instance when solemnization fee was returned
when the marriage was not solemnized due to
lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon
Sambo did not turn over to her some of the
notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not
only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but
the minutes of the conference of the personnel of
the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992
shows that on that date Baroy informed the
personnel of the court that she was taking over
the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly
the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial
fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to
her were for those documents notarized (i)n July

and September, 1992 already. Besides there
never was any demand she made for Sambo to
turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his
possession. Neither was there any memorandum
she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that
she has been holding meetings and issuing
memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V,
W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on
October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain
Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after
she assumed office and for this cash bond she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did
not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own
cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in
that case where the cash bond was deposited
informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally
deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after
this administrative case was already filed (TSN,
pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however,
shows that actually Baroy opened an account with
the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993
when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims
that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the
initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it
were true, it was only after keeping to herself the
cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
for around one year and five months when she
finally deposited it because of the filing of this

case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two
days after she finally deposited the One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she
withdrew it from the bank without any authority or
order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993,
or after almost three (3) months after she
withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond
(TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show
that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy
received also a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo
Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash
bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an
annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1).
Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did
not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the
Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the
parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that
they would settle the case amicably. It was on
April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when
Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release
of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she
assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to
issue temporary receipt only for cash bond
deposits and other payments and collections she
received. She further admitted that some of these
temporary receipts she issued she failed to place
the number of the receipts such as that receipt
marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy
claims that she did not know that she had to use

the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was
only from February, 1993, after this case was
already filed, when she only started issuing official
receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in
order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave
Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The
evidence adduced with respect to this charge,
show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand
Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1).
The same was paid partly in cash and in check
(Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was
brought to court in order to be installed in the
chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed
in the same box when it was bought and was not
used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge
Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00)
Pesos on installment basis with a down payment
of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof
thereof the respondents presented a typewritten
receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt
was signed by both respondents and by the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and
another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not
beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a
time when she was applying for the vacant
position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was
eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the
time she bought the air conditioner on August 24,
1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge
Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere
typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this

case was already filed. The receipt could have
been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness
did not testify in this case. The sale is between the
Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court.
All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action
as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their)
conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA
27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon
received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without
issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did
not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond
she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however,
has no probative value as she did not show that
this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the
hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a
temporary receipt for it and this has been
discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the
getting of detention prisoners to work in his house
and one of them escaped while in his custody and
was never found again. To hide this fact, the case
against said accused was ordered archived by
Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with
respect to this particular charge, show that in
Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen
Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex
Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12,
1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh.

25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was
taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail
where said accused was confined and that he
escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is
solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz,
a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not
sufficient. The complainants should have
presented records from the police of Tinambac to
show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the
municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under
detention and said accused escaped while in the
custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated
April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving
said case appears to be without basis. The order
states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
the records show that the warrant of arrest (was)
issued against the accused, but up to this moment
there is no return of service for the warrant of
arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4).
The records of said case, however, show that in
fact there was a return of the service of the
warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing
that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated
April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047
referred only to one of the accused who remained
at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe,
were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have
issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who
allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to
be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true
that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he

ordered the case archived was because he heard
from the police that Alano escaped. This
explanation is not acceptable either. He should
ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring
to court Alano, the former should have been
required to explain in writing why Alano was not
brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano
escaped from jail, he should have issued an order
for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not
be arrested when the case should have been
ordered archived. The order archiving this case
for the reason that he only heard that Alano
escaped is another circumstance which gave rise
to a suspicion that Alano might have really
escaped while in his custody only that the
complainants could not present records or other
documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that
they collected filing fees on collection cases filed
by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
which was supposed to be exempted in paying
filing fees under existing laws and that the filing
fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy
in her personal account in the bank. The evidence
presented show that on February 4, 1992 the
Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases
for collection against farmers and it paid the total
amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos
representing filing fees. The complainants cited
Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended,
which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of
filing fees on collection of sums of money cases
filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do
with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural

Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy
who received them and besides, on February 4,
1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy
claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees.
The records, however, shows that respondent
Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank
dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the
bank would not pay she would submit all Rural
Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by
respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether
the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt
from the payment of filing fees pursuant to
Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of
threatening the bank to have its cases be
submitted to the court in order to have them
dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was
made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here,
there is an undue delay again in complying with
her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence
presented by the complainants sufficiently show
that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr.
had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a
marriage license, and that it having been shown
that he did not comply with his duty in closely
supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of
the monthly report of cases being submitted to the
Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July
and September, 1992 where it has been proven
that the reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of documents
notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he
be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND

(P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the
same or similar offenses will be more severely
dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts or certificates of those
marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they were
solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local
Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the
marriage contract, will not absolve him from
liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a
marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is
the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of
marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family
Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his
negligence or failure to comply with his duty of
closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions,
particularly the preparation of the monthly report
of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His
explanation that he only signed the monthly report
of cases only when his clerk of court already
signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his
duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify
the records if the monthly reports prepared by his
clerk of court do not contain false statements. It
was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or incompetence of court
personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).

In view also of the foregoing finding that
respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of
court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified
the monthly report of cases for the months of July
and September, 1992 with respect to the number
of documents notarized, for having failed to
account (for) the notarial fees she received for
said two (2) months period; for having failed to
account (for) the solemnization fees of those
marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the
solemnization fees were not returned; for
unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts,
some of which were issued unnumbered; for
receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29,
1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos for which she issued only a temporary
receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land
Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993,
or after one year and five months in her
possession and after this case was already filed;
for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any
court order or authority and redepositing it only on
July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo
Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC,
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued
only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X
and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or
with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered
released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on
February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against
farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos, but turning over said amount to the
Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is
respectfully recommended that said respondent
clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be

dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits
shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue
official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court
deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of
the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions
for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127,
Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also
provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately
issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits
from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact
the collection with the municipal, city or provincial
treasurer and their deposits, can only be
withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the
Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136,
Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court
Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982,
also provides that "all collections of funds of
fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall
be deposited immediately by the clerk of court
concerned upon receipt thereof with City,
Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court
is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such
deposits shall be made except upon lawful order
of the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with
the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them.
By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of
her duties and functions as a clerk of court and
accountable officer. The gross neglect of her
duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious

misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from
office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma
Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas
City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was
held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to
keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by
him/her shall be deposited immediately upon
receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos.
5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated
December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to
remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected
constitutes serious misconduct and her
misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found
guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
(the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal
(from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct
and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must
be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification
as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel,
they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence

of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those
affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for
herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised
Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of
course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction
to be imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be
modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal
solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken
to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the
institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil
status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses
charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the
performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00
on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern
warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the

Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and
furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

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Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 1

June 29, 2010

respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 2

The subsequent detention and torture of the

Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008

In the long line of cases, the Supreme

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 3

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by

the supreme authority of the Republic of the

Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 4

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S.

ERMELINDA ESCLEO, complainant,

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 5

MARITESS DORADO, Court Stenographer II, Metropolitan

A shouting match ensued between the parties. The

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 6

In a Resolution dated June 9, 1999, the Court resolved to

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 7

Sanje alleged that he frequents the City Hall of Makati. He

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 8

- Kasi Maam, magpapakasal daw sila. Tapos, sabi ko,

In his Report, dated January 7, 2000, Justice Quimbo

- Tapos sabi niya, magkano ang sisingilin mo?

The Court concurs with the Hearing Officers findings and

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 9

- I-a-anti-date, aIin ang i-a-antidate?

- yung pong license.

- Bakit, na-a-antidate ba yon?

- Hindi ko po alam, kasi hindi po ako ang naglalakad,

- Ngayon, ang sabi eh di P2,000.00, pero may

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 10

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 11

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 12

Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 13

should be the years immediately before the day of the

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 14

marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 15

competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 16

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order

Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 17

(SGD.) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 18

We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 19

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 20

G.R. No. 175581

- versus JOSE A. DAYOT,

G.R. No. 179474

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581

Civil LawFamily Code: Article 1- Formal Requisites of a valid Marriage 21