A.

DEFINITON
TAYAG vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC.
G.R. No. L-23145
November 29, 1968
Facts:
Idonah Slade Perkins, died in New York in 1960, left among others, two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of Benguet
Consolidated, the certificates being in the possession of the County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary
administrator of the estate of the deceased.
A dispute arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to
which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question. Anciallry administrator wanted possession
of the shares so as to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors.
On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust Company, to
"produce and deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary administrator did not
comply with the order, and on February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring
the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or] considered as lost."
The order of the Lower Court is of the following tenor: (1) considers as lost for all purposes in connection with the
administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33,002
shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said certificates cancelled,
and (3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either
the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this Court."
Appeal to the order was made by Benguet Consolidated. Appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator
because the said stock certificates are in existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator, the
County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A...."
Issue/ Held: WON the appeal is meritorious.- NO. The order was called for by the realities of the situation.
Ratio: The Court took into account the factual circumstances in uphoding the oder by the Lower Court that the shares of
stock be considered lost t for all purposes in connection with the administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of
Idonah Slade Perkins.
1.

Territorial scope of authority of administrator. It is a "general rule universally recognized" that administration, whether
principal or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was
granted," the corollary being "that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in
another state or country." Since the actual situs of the shares of stock of a domestic corporation is in the Philippines,
it should be administered by the ancillary admisnitrator.

2.

Element of fiction of loss is necessary given the factual circumstances. Since there is a refusal, persistently
adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation
owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary
in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Otherwise, to yield to
the stubborn refusal of the domicillary administrator, the task incumbent under the law of the ancillary administrator
could not be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.

3.

Lawful order of the court overrides the by-laws of Benguet Consolidated. Benguet Consolidated stresses that in the
event of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates of stock
allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or certificates would await the "final decision by
[a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]." SC held that Benguet Consolidated's obedience to a lawful court order
certainly constitutes a valid defense, assuming that such apprehension of a possible court action against it could
possibly materialize.

4.

A corporation is not immune from judicial action.

Definitions of Corporation:
"...a corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law...." It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely
dependent on its will. As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial person, owing its
existence through creation by a sovereign power." (Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Co. Law Rev. 343 (1907).

"an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." (Chief Justice Marshall, Dartmouth
College v. Woodward )
"A corporation is not in fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as though it were a person by process of fiction, or
by regarding it as an artificial person distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.... It owes its existence to law. It is
an artificial person created by law for certain specific purposes, the extent of whose existence, powers and liberties is fixed
by its charter." (Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations )
...a juristic person, resulting from an association of human beings granted legal personality by the state, puts the matter
neatly. (Pound on Jurisprudence)

There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to quote from Friedmann, "is the reality
of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state recognition and concession." A corporation as known to
Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to law.
It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator. More than
that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever
called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of persuasive authority in our
jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the
appropriate court action to enforce its right. Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control in those instances, where a
duty under the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to confer upon it not autonomy which may
be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the source
of its very existence; it is to contend that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored at will.
So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.

MONFORT HERMANOS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs ANTONIO B. MONFORT III

G.R. No. 152542 : July 8, 2004
G.R. No. 155472 : July 8, 2004
Facts:
Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation, a domestic private corporation, is the registered owner of a farm,
fishpond and sugar cane plantation known as Haciendas San Antonio II, Marapara, Pinanoag and Tinampa-an, all situated in
Cadiz City. It also owns one unit of motor vehicle and two units of tractors. The same allowed Ramon H. Monfort, its
Executive Vice President, to breed and maintain fighting cocks in his personal capacity at Hacienda San Antonio. In 1997,
the group of Antonio Monfort III, through force and intimidation, allegedly took possession of the 4 Haciendas, the produce
thereon and the motor vehicle and tractors, as well as the fighting cocks of Ramon H. Monfort.
In G.R. No. 155472: The Corporation, represented by its President, Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra, and Ramon H. Monfort, in his
personal capacity, filed against the group of Antonio Monfort III, a complaint for delivery of motor vehicle, tractors and 378
fighting cocks, with prayer for injunction and damages. Motion to dismiss on the ground of Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra's lack
of capacity to sue on behalf of the Corporation was denied.
In G.R. No. 152542: Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra filed on behalf of the Corporation a complaint for forcible entry, preliminary
mandatory injunction with temporary restraining order and damages against the group of Antonio Monfort III.
The group of Antonio Monfort III alleged that they are possessing and controlling the Haciendas and harvesting the produce
therein on behalf of the corporation and not for themselves. They likewise raised the affirmative defense of lack of legal
capacity of Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra to sue on behalf of the Corporation.
Complaint was eventually dismissed.
Basis of claim of Salvatierra\s lack of capacity to sue: The group of Antonio Monfort III claims that the March 31, 1997 Board
Resolution authorizing Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra and/or Ramon H. Monfort to represent the Corporation is void because the
purported Members of the Board who passed the same were not validly elected officers of the Corporation.
Issue/ Held: WON Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra has the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Corporation. -NO. Ma.
Antonia M. Salvatierra failed to prove that four of those who authorized her to represent the Corporation were the
lawfully elected Members of the Board of the Corporation. As such, they cannot confer valid authority for her to sue
on behalf of the corporation.
Ratio:
A corporation has no power except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are
implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors
and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue
and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical
acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized
for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.
Corporation failed to comply with Section 26 of the Corporation Code, requiring submission to the SEC within thirty (30) days
after the election the names, nationalities and residences of the elected directors, trustees and officers of the Corporation.
1.

In the case at bar, the fact that four of the six Members of the Board listed in the 1996 General Information Sheet
are already dead at the time the March 31, 1997 Board Resolution was issued, does not automatically make the
four signatories (i.e., Paul M. Monfort, Yvete M. Benedicto, Jaqueline M. Yusay and Ester S. Monfort) to the said
Board Resolution (whose name do not appear in the 1996 General Information Sheet) as among the incumbent
Members of the Board. This is because it was not established that they were duly elected to replace the said
deceased Board Members.

To correct the alleged error in the General Information Sheet, the retained accountant of the Corporation informed the SEC in
its November 11, 1998 letter that the non-inclusion of the lawfully elected directors in the 1996 General Information Sheet
was attributable to its oversight and not the fault of the Corporation. This belated attempt, however, did not erase the doubt
as to whether an election was indeed held.
2.

What further militates against the purported election of those who signed the March 31, 1997 Board Resolution was
the belated submission of the alleged Minutes of the October 16, 1996 meeting where the questioned officers were
elected. The issue of legal capacity of Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra was raised before the lower court by the group of
Antonio Monfort III as early as 1997, but the Minutes of said October 16, 1996 meeting was presented by the
Corporation only in its September 29, 1999 Comment before the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the Corporation failed
to prove that the same October 16, 1996 Minutes was submitted to the SEC.

PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125469
October 27, 1997
Facts:
The Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI), a domestic real estate corporation, had sought to offer its shares to the public in order to
raise funds allegedly to develop its properties and pay its loans with several banking institutions. In January, 1995, PALI was
issued a Permit to Sell its shares to the public by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To facilitate the trading of
its shares among investors, PALI sought to course the trading of its shares through the Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc.
(PSE), for which purpose it filed with the said stock exchange an application to list its shares, with supporting documents
attached.
On February 8, 1996, the Listing Committee of the PSE, upon a perusal of PALI's application, recommended to the PSE's
Board of Governors the approval of PALI's listing application.
On February 14, 1996, before it could act upon PALI's application, the Board of Governors of the PSE received a letter from
the heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, claiming that the late President Marcos was the legal and beneficial owner of certain
properties forming part of the Puerto Azul Beach Hotel and Resort Complex which PALI claims to be among its assets and
that the Ternate Development Corporation, which is among the stockholders of PALI, likewise appears to have been held and
continue to be held in trust by one Rebecco Panlilio for then President Marcos and now, effectively for his estate, and
requested PALI's application to be deferred. PALI was requested to comment upon the said letter.
PALI's answer stated that the properties forming part of the Puerto Azul Beach Hotel and Resort Complex were not claimed
by PALI as its assets. On the contrary, the resort is actually owned by Fantasia Filipina Resort, Inc. and the Puerto Azul
Country Club, entities distinct from PALI. Furthermore, the Ternate Development Corporation owns only 1.20% of PALI.
The Board of Governors of the PSE reached its decision to reject PALI's application, citing the existence of serious claims,
issues and circumstances surrounding PALI's ownership over its assets that adversely affect the suitability of listing PALI's
shares in the stock exchange.
PALI wrote a letter to the SEC addressed to the then Acting Chairman, Perfecto R. Yasay, Jr., bringing to the SEC's attention
the action taken by the PSE. SEC rendered its Order, reversing the PSE's decision. SEC ordered to immediately cause the
listing of the PALI shares in the Exchange.
CA: SEC had both jurisdiction and authority to look into the decision of the petitioner PSE, for the purpose of ensuring fair
administration of the exchange. Both as a corporation and as a stock exchange, the petitioner is subject to public
respondent's jurisdiction, regulation and control. PALI complied with all the requirements for public listing, affirming the
SEC's ruling.
Issue/Held: WON SEC has the authority to order the PSE to list the shares of PALI in the stock exchange. - YES, but
he Court finds that the SEC had acted arbitrarily in arrogating unto itself the discretion of approving the application
for listing in the PSE of the private respondent PALI, since this is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the
PSE, a corporation entity, whose business judgments are respected in the absence of bad faith.
Ratio:
1.

SEC with jurisdition. It is undeniable that the petitioner PSE is not an ordinary corporation, in that although it is
clothed with the markings of a corporate entity, it functions as the primary channel through which the vessels of
capital trade ply. The PSE's relevance to the continued operation and filtration of the securities transactions in the
country gives it a distinct color of importance such that government intervention in its affairs becomes justified, if not
necessarily. Indeed, as the only operational stock exchange in the country today, the PSE enjoys a monopoly of
securities transactions, and as such, it yields an immense influence upon the country's economy.

Due to this special nature of stock exchanges, the country's lawmakers has seen it wise to give special treatment to the
administration and regulation of stock exchanges
Sections 3, 6, and 38 of PD 902-A give the SEC the special mandate to be vigilant in the supervision of the affairs of stock
exchanges so that the interests of the investing public may be fully safeguard.
Section 31 of Presidential Decree 902-A, standing alone, is enough authority to uphold the SEC's challenged control authority
over the petitioner PSE even as it provides that "the Commission shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision, and control
over all corporations, partnerships or associations, who are the grantees of primary franchises and/or a license or permit
issued by the government to operate in the Philippines. . ." The SEC's regulatory authority over private corporations
encompasses a wide margin of areas, touching nearly all of a corporation's concerns. This authority springs from the fact that

1This Act shall be administered by the (Securities and Exchange) Commission which shall continue to have the organization, powers, and functions provided by
Presidential Decree Numbered 902-A, 1653, 1758, and 1799 and Executive Order No. 708. The Commission shall, except as otherwise expressly provided, have
the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as it may consider appropriate in the public interest for the enforcement of the provisions hereof.

a corporation owes its existence to the concession of its corporate franchise from the state.
The SEC's power to look into the subject ruling of the PSE, therefore, may be implied from or be considered as necessary or
incidental to the carrying out of the SEC's express power to insure fair dealing in securities traded upon a stock exchange or
to ensure the fair administration of such exchange. It is, likewise, observed that the principal function of the SEC is the
supervision and control over corporations, partnerships and associations with the end in view that investment in these entities
may be encouraged and protected, and their activities for the promotion of economic development.
This is not to say, however, that the PSE's management prerogatives are under the absolute control of the SEC. The
PSE is, alter all, a corporation authorized by its corporate franchise to engage in its proposed and duly approved
business.
A corporation is but an association of individuals, allowed to transact under an assumed corporate name, and with a distinct
legal personality. In organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no constitutional immunities and perquisites appropriate
to such a body. As to its corporate and management decisions, therefore, the state will generally not interfere with the
same. Questions of policy and of management are left to the honest decision of the officers and directors of a corporation,
and the courts are without authority to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the board of directors. The board is the
business manager of the corporation, and so long as it acts in good faith, its orders are not reviewable by the courts.
Thus, notwithstanding the regulatory power of the SEC over the PSE, and the resultant authority to reverse the PSE's
decision in matters of application for listing in the market, the SEC may exercise such power only if the PSE's judgment is
attended by bad faith. In Board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw, it was held that bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a
known duty through some motive or interest of ill will, partaking of the nature of fraud.
2.

There was no bad faith in the decision of PSE not to allow listing of PALI shares. In reaching its decision to
deny the application for listing of PALI, the PSE considered important facts, which, in the general scheme, brings to
serious question the qualification of PALI to sell its shares to the public through the stock exchange.

During the time for receiving objections to the application, the PSE heard from the representative of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family who claim the properties of the private respondent to be part of
the Marcos estate. In time, the PCGG confirmed this claim. In fact, an order of sequestration has been issued
covering the properties of PALI, and suit for reconveyance to the state has been filed in the Sandiganbayan
Court. How the properties were effectively transferred, despite the sequestration order, from the TDC and
MSDC to Rebecco Panlilio, and to the private respondent PALI, in only a short span of time, are not yet
explained to the Court, but it is clear that such circumstances give rise to serious doubt as to the integrity of
PALI as a stock issuer.

For the purpose of determining whether PSE acted correctly in refusing the application of PALI, the true
ownership of the properties of PALI need not be determined as an absolute fact. What is material is that the
uncertainty of the properties' ownership and alienability exists, and this puts to question the qualification of
PALI's public offering.

Bache and Co. v. Ruiz

GR No. L-32409
February 27, 1971
Facts:
In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its
President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to: (1) declare null and void the Search Warrant issued; (2) order
respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as
well as from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been made on the basis
of the said documents, papers and effects; and (3) order the return of the latter to petitioners.
At that time the request for the issuance of the Search Warrant was made by respondent De Leon, with his witness Logronio,
respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the
depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the
depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition
was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de
Leon's application for search warrant and respondent Logronio's deposition, the Search Warrant was then sign by
respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala
Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners' lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of
documents. Documents were uses as basis in assessing the Corporation for tax deficiencies.
Issue/Held: WON a corporation is entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizures.- YES.
Ratio:
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is charged with a
violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers,
cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a
corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation
is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a
collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against
unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, the
ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search
and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber
Company, et al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against
unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock
or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity . . ."

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were
searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and
whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner.
Issue/Held: WON the Search Warrant is null and void.- YES
Ratio:
a) Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness; his participation was limited to
listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury,

b)
c)

and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal
examination.
The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. Search Warrant was issued for "[v]iolation of
Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly
Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209."
The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

Search Warrant is null and void. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO2

G.R. No. L-19550
June 19, 1967
Facts: A total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to
the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioners allege that the search warrants are null and void because: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the
warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any
event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2)
major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Issues/Held: WON as to the first group, petitioners as officers of the Corporation have a cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof.- NO
Ratio:

Said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in
said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.

It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of
or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants.

Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D.
CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE
DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

BATAAN SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING vs. PCGG

G.R. No. 75885 May 27, 1987
Facts:
Challenged by a private corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders
Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino on February 28, 1986 and March 12, 1986, respectively,
and (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts done, in accordance with said executive orders by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government and/or its Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation.
BASECO describes itself in its petition as "a shiprepair and shipbuilding company * * incorporated as a domestic private
corporation * * (on Aug. 30, 1972) by a consortium of Filipino shipowners and shipping executives. Its main office is at
Engineer Island, Port Area, Manila, where its Engineer Island Shipyard is housed, and its main shipyard is located at
Mariveles Bataan." Barely six months after its incorporation, BASECO acquired from National Shipyard & Steel Corporation,
or NASSCO, a government-owned or controlled corporation, the latter's shipyard at Mariveles, Bataan, known as the Bataan
National Shipyard (BNS), and except for NASSCO's Engineer Island Shops and certain equipment of the BNS, consigned
for future negotiation all its structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants, equipment and facilities, in stock or in
transit. This it did in virtue of a "Contract of Purchase and Sale with Chattel Mortgage" executed on February 13, 1973. The
price was P52,000,000.00.
Unaccountably, the price of P52,000,000.00 was reduced by more than one-half, to P24,311,550.00, about eight (8) months
later. A document to this effect was executed on October 9, 1973, entitled "Memorandum Agreement," and was signed for
NASSCO by Arturo Pacificador, as Presiding Officer of the Board of Directors, and David R. Ines, as General Manager. This
agreement bore, at the top right corner of the first page, the word "APPROVED" in the handwriting of President Marcos,
followed by his usual full signature.
On October 1, 1974, BASECO acquired three hundred (300) hectares of land in Mariveles from the Export Processing Zone
Authority for the price of P10,047,940.00 of which, as set out in the document of sale, P2,000.000.00 was paid upon its
execution, and the balance stipulated to be payable in installments.
Some nine months afterwards, or on July 15, 1975, to be precise, BASECO, again with the intervention of President Marcos,
acquired ownership of the rest of the assets of NASSCO which had not been included in the first two (2) purchase
documents. Transferred to BASECO were NASSCO's "ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over all equipment and
facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable or semi-expendable assets, located
at the Engineer Island, known as the Engineer Island Shops, including all the equipment of the Bataan National Shipyards
(BNS) which were excluded from the sale of NBS to BASECO but retained by BASECO and all other selected equipment and
machineries of NASSCO at J. Panganiban Smelting Plant."
Other evidence submitted to the Court by the Solicitor General proves that President Marcos not only exercised
control over BASECO, but also that he actually owns well nigh one hundred percent of its outstanding stock.
The Solicitor General has drawn the Court's attention to the intriguing circumstance that found in Malacanang shortly after
the sudden flight of President Marcos, were certificates corresponding to more than ninety-five percent (95%) of all the
outstanding shares of stock of BASECO, endorsed in blank, together with deeds of assignment of practically all the
outstanding shares of stock of the three (3) corporations above mentioned (which hold 95.82% of all BASECO stock), signed
by the owners thereof although not notarized.
The Sequestration, Takeover, and Other Orders Complained of:
a.

b.
c.

Basic sequestration order of various companies and The TAKEOVER Order- While BASECO concedes that
"sequestration without resorting to judicial action, might be made within the context of Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2
before March 25, 1986 when the Freedom Constitution was promulgated, under the principle that the law promulgated
by the ruler under a revolutionary regime is the law of the land, it ceased to be acceptable when the same ruler opted to
promulgate the Freedom Constitution on March 25, 1986 wherein under Section I of the same, Article IV (Bill of Rights)
of the 1973 Constitution was adopted providing, among others, that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and
property without due process of law." (Const., Art. I V, Sec. 1)."
Order of production of business documents and records- BASECO argues that the order to produce corporate records
from 1973 to 1986, which it has apparently already complied with, was issued without court authority and infringed its
constitutional right against self-incrimination, and unreasonable search and seizure.
BASECO contends that the PCGG had unduly interfered with its right of dominion and management of its business
affairs on the following matters:
i. Orders Re Engineer Island1. Termination of Contract for Security Services
2. Change of Mode of Payment of Entry Charges
ii. Aborted contract for improvement of wharf at Engineer Island
iii. Order for Operation of Sesiman Rock Quarry, Mariveles, Bataan

iv.
v.

Order to Dispose of Scrap, etc.

Termination of Services of BASECO Officers

Executive Order No. 1

Executive Order No. 1 stresses the "urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth," and postulates that "vast resources of the
government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad." Upon these premises, the Presidential Commission on Good Government was created,
"charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to (certain specified) matters," among which was precisely* * The recovery of all in-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.

Executive Order No. 2

Executive Order No. 2 gives additional and more specific data and directions respecting "the recovery of ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime." It declares that:
1) * * the Government of the Philippines is in possession of evidence showing that there are assets and properties
purportedly pertaining to former Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close
relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them
directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the government
of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue
advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment and
causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines:" and
2) * * said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings,
shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the
Philippines and in various countries of the world."

Executive Order No. 14

PCGG is empowered, "with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, * * to file
and prosecute all cases investigated by it * * as may be warranted by its findings." All such cases, whether civil or criminal,
are to be filed "with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof."
Issue/Held: WON the issuance of the sequestration and take-over orders was valid- Yes
Ratio: In the light of the affirmative showing by the Government that, prima facie at least, the stockholders and directors of
BASECO as of April, 1986 were mere "dummies," nominees or alter egos of President Marcos; at any rate, that they are no
longer owners of any shares of stock in the corporation, the conclusion cannot be avoided that said stockholders and
directors have no basis and no standing whatever to cause the filing and prosecution of the instant proceeding; and to grant
relief to BASECO, as prayed for in the petition, would in effect be to restore the assets, properties and business sequestered
and taken over by the PCGG to persons who are "dummies," nominees or alter egos of the former president.
The facts herein stated at some length do indeed show that the private corporation known as BASECO was "owned or
controlled by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos * * during his administration, * * through nominees, by taking advantage
of * * (his) public office and/or using * * (his) powers, authority, influence * *," and that NASSCO and other property of the
government had been taken over by BASECO; and the situation justified the sequestration as well as the provisional
takeover of the corporation in the public interest, in accordance with the terms of Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, pending the
filing of the requisite actions with the Sandiganbayan to cause divestment of title thereto from Marcos, and its adjudication in
favor of the Republic pursuant to Executive Order No. 14.
Issue/Held: WON the Executive Orders are Bills of Attainder.- NO, Executive Orders not a Bill of Attainder.
Ratio:
1.

2.

Nothing in the executive orders can be reasonably construed as a determination or declaration of guilt. On the
contrary, the executive orders, inclusive of Executive Order No. 14, make it perfectly clear that any judgment of guilt
in the amassing or acquisition of "ill-gotten wealth" is to be handed down by a judicial tribunal, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed and prosecuted by the PCGG.
N o punishment is inflicted by the executive orders, as the merest glance at their provisions will immediately make
apparent. In no sense, therefore, may the executive orders be regarded as a bill of attainder.

Issue/Held: WON there is a violation of right against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizure.- NO

10

Ratio:
It is elementary that the right against self-incrimination has no application to juridical persons.
While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity
statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to
show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges
Relevant jurisprudence is also cited by the Solicitor General.
* * corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private individuals have. * *
They are not at all within the privilege against self-incrimination, although this court more than once has
said that the privilege runs very closely with the 4th Amendment's Search and Seizure provisions. It is also
settled that an officer of the company cannot refuse to produce its records in its possession upon the plea
that they will either incriminate him or may incriminate it." (Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186; emphasis, the Solicitor General's).
* * The corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.
It received certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the
limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter.
Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is
a reserve right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its
powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of
certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been
employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and
papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this, that an officer of the corporation which is charged
with a criminal violation of the statute may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce
its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of
such privileges. (Wilson v. United States, 55 Law Ed., 771, 780 [emphasis, the Solicitor General's])
At any rate, Executive Order No. 14-A, amending Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 assures protection to individuals
required to produce evidence before the PCGG against any possible violation of his right against self-incrimination. It gives
them immunity from prosecution on the basis of testimony or information he is compelled to present. As amended, said
Section 4 now provides that
xxx xxx xxx
The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony, or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case,
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
The constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures finds no application to the case at bar either.
There has been no search undertaken by any agent or representative of the PCGG, and of course no seizure on the
occasion thereof.
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
The Court is unanimous insofar as the judgment at bar upholds the imperative need of recovering the ill-gotten properties
amassed by the previous regime, which "deserves the fullest support of the judiciary and all sectors of society." The Court is
likewise unanimous in its judgment dismissing the petition to declare unconstitutional and void Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2
to annul the sequestration order of April 14, 1986. For indeed, the 1987 Constitution overwhelmingly adopted by the people
at the February 2, 1987 plebiscite expressly recognized in Article XVIII, section 26 thereof the vital functions of respondent
PCGG to achieve the mandate of the people to recover such ill-gotten wealth and properties as ordained by Proclamation
No. 3 promulgated on March 25, 1986. The Court is likewise unanimous as to the general rule set forth in the main opinion
that "the PCGG cannot exercise acts of dominion over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over" and "(T)he
PCGG may thus exercise only powers of administration over the property or business sequestered or provisionally taken
over, much like a court-appointed receiver, such as to bring and defend actions in its own name; receive rents; collect debts
due; pay outstanding debts; and generally do such other acts and things as may be necessary to fulfill its mission as
conservator and administrator.
PADILLA, J., concurring:

11

The majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Narvasa maintains and upholds the valid distinction between acts of conservation
and preservation of assets and acts of ownership. Sequestration, freeze and temporary take-over encompass the first type of
acts. They do not include the second type of acts which are reserved only to the rightful owner of the assets or business
sequestered or temporarily taken over.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Melencio- Herrera qualifies the concurrence in so far as the voting of sequestered stork is concerned.
The voting of sequestered stock is, to my mind, an exercise of an attribute of ownership. It goes beyond the purpose of a writ
of sequestration, which is essentially to preserve the property in litigation (Article 2005, Civil Code). Sequestration is in the
nature of a judicial deposit (ibid.).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
We are all agreed in the Court that the PCGG is not a judge. It is an investigator and prosecutor. Sequestration is only a
preliminary or ancillary remedy. There must be a principal and independent suit filed in court to establish the true ownership
of sequestered properties. The factual premise that a sequestered property was ill-gotten by former President Marcos, his
family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates cannot be assumed. The fact of ownership must be established in a
proper suit before a court of justice.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Cruz is convinced and so submit that the PCGG cannot at this time take over the BASECO without any court order and
exercise thereover acts of ownership without court supervision. Voting the shares is an act of ownership. Reorganizing the
board of directors is an act of ownership. Such acts are clearly unauthorized. As the majority opinion itself stresses, the
PCGG is merely an administrator whose authority is limited to preventing the sequestered properties from being dissipated or
clandestinely transferred.

12

CHING vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G. R. No. 164317

February 6, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner was the Senior Vice-President of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (PBMI). Sometime in September to October 1980,
PBMI, through petitioner, applied with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (respondent bank) for the issuance of
commercial letters of credit to finance its importation of assorted goods.
RCBC approved the application, and irrevocable letters of credit were issued in favor of petitioner. The goods were
purchased and delivered in trust to PBMI. Petitioner signed 13 trust receipts as surety, acknowledging delivery of respective
goods.
Under the receipts, petitioner agreed to hold the goods in trust for the said bank, with authority to sell but not by way of
conditional sale, pledge or otherwise; and in case such goods were sold, to turn over the proceeds thereof as soon as
received, to apply against the relative acceptances and payment of other indebtedness to respondent bank. In case the
goods remained unsold within the specified period, the goods were to be returned to respondent bank without any need of
demand. Thus, said "goods, manufactured products or proceeds thereof, whether in the form of money or bills, receivables,
or accounts separate and capable of identification" were respondent banks property.
When the trust receipts matured, petitioner failed to return the goods to respondent bank, or to return their value amounting
to P6,940,280.66 despite demands. Thus, a criminal case for estafa was filed against the Senior VP.
The RTC, however, granted the Motion to Quash the Informations filed by petitioner on the ground that the material
allegations therein did not amount to estafa.
In the meantime, the Court rendered judgment in Allied Banking Corporation v. Ordoez, holding that the penal provision of
P.D. No. 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by the trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions
involving goods which are to be sold (retailed), reshipped, stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold.
The Court also ruled that "the non-payment of the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the obligation of the
entrustee to pay."
Thus, the criminal complaint for estafa was re-filed.
Issue: WON the Honorable Secretary of Justice correctly ruled that petitioner Alfredo Ching is the officer
responsible for the offense charged.- NO
Ratio:
Assertions of Petitioner that he had no direct participation in the transaction other than being the Senior VP of the PBMI is too
dull that it cannot even just dent the findings of the respondent Secretary, viz:
"x x x it is apropos to quote section 13 of PD 115 which states in part, viz:
xxx If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other judicial entities, the penalty
provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein
responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense.
"There is no dispute that it was the respondent, who as senior vice-president of PBM, executed the thirteen (13) trust
receipts. As such, the law points to him as the official responsible for the offense. Since a corporation cannot be
proceeded against criminally because it cannot commit crime in which personal violence or malicious intent is required,
criminal action is limited to the corporate agents guilty of an act amounting to a crime and never against the corporation
itself (West Coast Life Ins. Co. vs. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401; Times, [I]nc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303). Thus, the execution by
respondent of said receipts is enough to indict him as the official responsible for violation of PD 115.
xxx
"In regard to the other assigned errors, we note that the respondent bound himself under the terms of the trust receipts
not only as a corporate official of PBM but also as its surety. It is evident that these are two (2) capacities which do not
exclude the other. Logically, he can be proceeded against in two (2) ways: first, as surety as determined by the Supreme
Court in its decision in RCBC vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 739; and, secondly, as the corporate official responsible for
the offense under PD 115, the present case is an appropriate remedy under our penal law.
"Moreover, PD 115 explicitly allows the prosecution of corporate officers without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from
the criminal offense thus, the civil liability imposed on respondent in RCBC vs. Court of Appeals case is clearly separate
and distinct from his criminal liability under PD 115."

13

The Court rules that although petitioner signed the trust receipts merely as Senior Vice-President of PBMI and had no
physical possession of the goods, he cannot avoid prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 115.3
The crime defined in P.D. No. 115 is malum prohibitum but is classified as estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, or estafa with abuse of confidence. It may be committed by a corporation or other juridical entity or by
natural persons.
Though the entrustee is a corporation, nevertheless, the law specifically makes the officers, employees or other officers or
persons responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities of such corporation and/or board of directors,
officers, or other officials or employees responsible for the offense. The rationale is that such officers or employees are
vested with the authority and responsibility to devise means necessary to ensure compliance with the law and, if they fail to
do so, are held criminally accountable; thus, they have a responsible share in the violations of the law.
If the crime is committed by a corporation or other juridical entity, the directors, officers, employees or other officers
thereof responsible for the offense shall be charged and penalized for the crime, precisely because of the nature of
the crime and the penalty therefor. A corporation cannot be arrested and imprisoned; hence, cannot be penalized for
a crime punishable by imprisonment. However, a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a crime if the
imposable penalty is fine. Even if the statute prescribes both fine and imprisonment as penalty, a corporation may
be prosecuted and, if found guilty, may be fined.

3 The penalty clause of the law, Section 13 of P.D. No. 115 reads:
Section 13. Penalty Clause. The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to
the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or
disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three hundred and
fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the violation
or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the
directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal
offense.

14

FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK vs. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER

G.R. No. 141994. January 17, 2005
Facts:
In their radio documentary show, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents
against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC') and its administrators. Claiming
that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (Ago'), as Dean of AMEC's College of Medicine, filed a
complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990.
Excerpts of the alleged libelous statements, as follows:

if you have children taking medical course at AMEC-BCCM, advise them to pass all subjects because if they fail in any subject
they will repeat their year level, taking up all subjects including those they have passed already.
Earlier AMEC students in Physical Therapy had complained that the course is not recognized by DECS.
Students are required to take and pay for the subject even if the subject does not have an instructor - such greed for money on
the part of AMEC's administration.
On the other hand, the administrators of AMEC-BCCM, AMEC Science High School and the AMEC-Institute of Mass
Communication in their effort to minimize expenses in terms of salary are absorbing or continues to accept 'rejects' AMEC is a
dumping ground, garbage, not merely of moral and physical misfits.
When they become members of society outside of campus will be liabilities rather than assets.

Issues/Held:
1. WON the statements are libelous.- YES
2. WON AMEC is entitled to moral damages.- YES
3. WON award of Attys fees is proper.- NO
4. WON FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for payment of moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of
suit.- YES
Ratio:
1.

Statements are libelous. Rima and Alegre failed to show adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in
airing the supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre
should have presented the public issues 'free from inaccurate and misleading information.
True, AMEC is a private learning institution whose business of educating students is 'genuinely imbued with public
interest. The welfare of the youth in general and AMEC's students in particular is a matter which the public has the
right to know. However, in contrast with the case of Borjal, the questioned broadcasts are not based on
established facts.
In Borjal , the Court elucidated on the 'doctrine of fair comment, thus:
[F]air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel
or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person
in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that
the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

2.

Given the circumstances of the case, AMEC is entitled to moral damages of Php150,000.
General Rule: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it
cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock.4
Exception: Item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code: Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases: x x x (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; x x x.
This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a
juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for
moral damages.

The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al . to justify the award of moral damages. However, the Court's statement in Mambulao that
'a corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages' is an obiter dictum.

15

Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest
mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither in
such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the
recovery of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral
damages.
3.

Award of attys fees is not proper. AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for attorney's fees. AMEC did not
adduce evidence to warrant the award of attorney's fees.

4.

FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre. The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against
FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
a. An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the
course and scope of his or her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the
defamation.
b. There is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.

16