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Juan Alcantara et al vs.

Secretary of Interior et al,

GR No. L-43592, May 17, 1935
Petitioners are confinees at the Culion Leper Colony in Culion, Palawan, having voted in
previous decisions in the Philippine Islands. That after a public meeting, they adopted a resolution
demanding a right to vote in the upcoming Plebiscite and requesting the electoral precincts be
established within the radius of the colony so that qualified voters therein could register. The resolution
was sent to the Governor-General who referred the same to the Secretary of Interior, and through its
legal division ruled that no new electorate precincts could be created because the Plebiscite was
considered a special election.
Because of the ruling, Petitioners requested by telegram, the Interior Department to authorize
the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors to register the qualified voters of the colony. The request was
denied on the ground that Petitioners were not bona fide residents of Culion Palawan, not having been
residents of Culion for six months next preceding the day of the plebiscite, for they have not acquired
residence in Culion as they are confined as lepers against their will and having no intention to reside
therein as provided in Secs. 430-431 of the Administrative Code, as amended.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioners are residents of Culion, Palawan, and as such, qualified to register and
vote therein in the upcoming plebiscite.
The Court ruled that, in the United States, the Constitution limits the right of the States to
discriminate against person by reason of race, color or previous condition of servitude in their exercise
of the right of suffrage.
That at present, the closest thing the Philippines to a Constitution is the Jones Law which only
provision contained in that law as to the qualification of voters are found under Sec. 15.
Also, the Philippine Legislature has prescribed the qualifications and disqualifications of voters
in Sec. 431 and 432, respectively, of the Revised Administrative Code.
There being nothing in the above-mentioned provisions which could provide a definite answer
to the issue at hand, the Court resorted to law and jurisprudence of similar issue from the different
States of the limited States. The Court found that in one State, it held that 'for the purpose of voting, no
person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence while a student at any seminary of learning.
In other jurisdictions, a contrary conclusion was reached upon the theory that under such a
constitutional provision, an inmate of such institution may acquire a residence at the home. In another
case, it was held that 'in the absence of such constitutional prohibition, the rule in is that a permanent
member of a soldier's home has a residence at such home for the purpose of voting'.
After comparing such, the Court ruled that under our liberal, petitioners are residents of Culion,
Palawan, and entitled to register and vote in the upcoming plebiscite, but the case must be remanded to
the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors to determine if petitioners have the prescribed qualifications
and none of the disqualifications under Sec. 431 and 432 of the Revised Administrative Code.

AL Verlila, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody vs. Juan Posadas, Jr, Collector
of Internal Revenue
GR No. L-43314, December 19, 1935
Arthur Grayson Moody, an American citizen, arrived in the Philippines in 1902 or 1903 and
engaged actively in business here up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India.
His reason for departing in the Philippines surreptitiously was his disinclination in being
confined in the Culion Leper Colony, as required by law, having contracted leprosy sometime in 1928.
Before his death, he executed a last will and testament naming his sister, Ida Palmer, as sole heir
of his estate, comprising of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under Philippine laws.
That after his will was probated, the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed his estate for
inheritance tax amounting to 77,018.39 pesos and income tax of 13,001.41 pesos.
Plaintiff paid such taxes under protest on the ground that 'there is no valid law or regulation of
the Government of the Philippine under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied,
assessed or collected upon transfer, death and succession of intangible personal properties of a person
not domiciled in the Philippines'.
Whether or not Arthur Graydon Moody is domiciled in the Philippines and thus subject to
assessment and collection of inheritance tax.
The Court found compelling the fact that during Moody's stay in the Philippines that he was
actively engaged in business here with the corporations organized under our laws and that even during
the times he left the country, there is no record that he ever done any business outside of the country,
and that he returned here to his residence in the Elk's Club in Manila.
Furthermore, there was no evidence or record adduced by the plaintiff that he adopted a new
domicile while he was absent from Manila, when he left surreptitiously and diagnosed with leprosy.
Our Civil Code (Art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as 'the place of their usual
Pedro Gallego vs. Vicente Vera
GR No. L-48641, November 24, 1941

This is a petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte declaring illegal petitioner's election to the Office of Municipal Mayor
of Abuyog, Leyte in 1940 on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Pedro Gallego
is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After his studies in the Catarman Agriculture School, he became a school
teacher in some municipalities in Leyte, including in his home town of Abuyog. After his defeat in the
Mayoral elections in Abuyog in 1937, finding himself in debt and unemployed, he left Abuyog to find
work and eventually became a nurseryman in a chinchona plantation of the Bureau of Forestry in
Malay-balay, Bukidnon and worked there until he retired in 1940. Gallego registered as an elector in
Bukidnon and vote there in the elections for assemblyman in 1938 and 1940. He then paid for and
obtained a residence certificate from the municipal treasurer of Malay-balay which stated that he had
resided there for a year and a half.
Whether or not Pedro Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new
one in Malay-balay, Bukidnon.
The Court held that Gallego did not lose his original domicile when he worked at Malay-balay,
Bukidnon, registered as a voter there and secured a residence certificate.
In the definition of residence in the election law under the 1935 Constitution, it provides that in
order to acquire a domicile by choice there must concur:

Residence or a bodily presence in the new locality.


An intention to remain there (animus manendi).


An intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi)

The purpose to remain in the old domicile must be fore an indefinite period of time. The Court
believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malay-balay indefinitely because:

When he was employed in other places, he always returned to Abuyog

His purpose for leaving was to make up for his financial drawback caused by his
loss in the mayoral election.
He did not move his family to Malay-balay even though he was offered housing
there by the Government.

He visited his family of ten during the period of employment Malay-balay.

The Court also stated that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification was
to 'include a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve the community.'

Floretina Villahermosa v. Commissioner of Immigration

G.R. No. L-1663 March 31, 1948
Delfin Co, 18 years of age, the son of Chinese citizen, Co Sut, and a Filipino mother, herein petitioner,
was apprehended for leading a group of 69 Chinese immigrants in illegally entering the Philippines on
March 24, 1947 in Ilocos Sur. Being a Chinese citizen, Delfin was sentenced to be deported back to
After hearing of her sons apprehension, petitioner filed with the Civil Registry of Tarlac, under
Commonwealth Act No. 53, an Oath of Allegiance for the purpose of resuming her Filipino citizenship
which she had lost upon her marriage to Co Sut.
She then interposed in her sons defense that he could not be deported being the child of a Filipino
mother and therefore a Filipino citizen himself.
Whether or not Delfin Co is a Filipino citizen by virtue of being borne by a Filipino mother.
The Court held that Delfin Co was not a Filipino citizen. Under the 1935 Constitution, the provision on
citizenship that would have applied to petitioners contention is paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article IV
which provides that Filipino citizens are those whose mothers are Filipino and upon reaching the age
of majority elect Filipino citizenship. In the case at hand, Delfin was still a minor of 18 years of age
therefore such provision does not apply, thus he remains a Chinese citizen.
In Re: Robert Cu v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-3018 July 18, 1951
The case is a review of the decision of the inferior courts in dismissing Robert Cus Petition for
Naturalization on the finding that it was moot and academic due to the fact that he was already a
Filipino citizen by virtue of being borne by a Filipino mother and electing Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
Robert Cu was born in Angat, Bulacan in 1913 of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, but whose
marriage the petitioner could not prove as a fact. When he was about five months of age his mother
died. On reaching the age of five years, his father brought him to China where he was left in the care of
During the Naturalization proceeding, as required by law that such petition be supported by affidavits

of two witnesses, both of which must be Filipino citizens, petitioner presented Dr. Jose Ku Yeg Keng
and Dr. Pastor Gomez. Dr. Keng was disqualified as a witness as he was not a Filipino citizen and the
Government objected to Dr. Gomezs testimony which the Court sustained.
Whether or not the trial Robert Cus Petition for Naturalization should be granted despite his failure to
comply with the requirement of presenting two Filipino witnesses.
The Court ruled that the petition must fail. The Court stated that our Naturalization proceedings were
patterned to that of the United States which also required that such petition be supported by the
affidavits of two witnesses who must be citizens of the United States. The Court relied on two cases
decide in the United States which held that failure to comply with the witness requirement does not
merely make the petition voidable but void. It further stated that, although such decisions were not
binding on the Court, but, as a rational rule of statutory construction, when a court adopts a statute from
another state or country, it shall also adopt the construction placed upon it by such state or country
before its adoption.
Testate estate of C.O. Bohanan, deceased. Philippine Trust Co. v. Magdalena C. Bohanan, Edward C.
Bohanan, and Mary Lydia Bohanan
G.R. No. L-1205 January 30, 1960
C.O. Bohanan was a citizen of the Unites States having been born in the State of Nebraska, having
properties there and in the state of California. At the time of his death he was a resident of the
Philippines and was married to Magdalena and with children, Edward and Mary.
In his last will and testament, which was probated and allowed in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
he left half of his estate to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles in trust for the
benefit of his grandson and the other half to his borther aand sister. He also left legacies of six thousand
pesos each to his son and daughter to be paid in three year instalments, and to other persons.
His wife and children, herein petitioners, questioned the validity of the will claiming that they were
deprived of their legitime that our laws reuired.
Whether or not petitioners were entitled and deprived of their legitime.
The Court ruled against the respondents. It held that since the testator was a citizen of the United States
and that under our laws the validity of wills is determined by the law of the place where the testator is a

citizen of, it is the law of the United States, specifically the testamentary laws of the state of Nevada
applies. Also, as proven by evidence presented by the administrator of the estate, Philippine Trust Co.,
Nebraska law provides that there is no conjugal property between husband and wife and that a testator
has absolute freedom to dispose of his properties as he sees fit.
Caraballo vs Republic
G.R. L-15080 25 April 1962
Facts: Petitioner is an American citizen enlisted in the US Air force detailed in Clark Field and stayed
here with his Filipina wife. Since they were childless, they sought to adopt a 3-month old child. The
court granted the petition for adoption citing that it would be to the best interest of the child. However,
the Government (Provincial Fiscal) appealed this decision citing that being a non-resident alien, he is
not qualified to adopt.

Issues: Whether or not a foreigner is qualified to adopt a child; Whether or not he is a resident
Ruling: Oppositor is correct that petitioner is disqualified to adopt under the law (335-4 CC) for being
a non-resident alien. Petition for adoption was dismissed.
A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently and to which he intends to return
after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile.
A person is deemed a resident of a place in a country or state where he has his abode and lives there
permanently. It is a place chosen by him freely and voluntarily, although he may later on change his
mind and live elsewhere.
Actual or physical presence or stay of a person in a place, not of his free and voluntary choice and
without intent to remain there indefinitely, does not make him a resident of the place. Since he does
not intend to remain in the country indefinitely then he cannot be deemed a resident of such country.
Aznar vs Christensen-Garcia L-16749 31 Jan 1963
Decedent is a US citizen whose will was probated in accordance with law. Oppositor was apparently
an heir who contended that he was deprived of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child.
In deciding a special proceeding case, the court approved the final account and project of partition
having been done in accordance with the express provision of decedents will. Since decedent was a
US citizen, his successional rights and intrinsic validity of the will are to be governed by the law of
Oppositor appealed this decision contending that Art.946 of the California civil code requires that the
domiciliary law of the decedent should apply and asserted that Philippine law should govern.

Issue: Which law should govern: Philippine or California?

Oppositor is correct that Philippine law should govern, being the domicile of decedent,
pursuant to the conflicts of law rule of California (Art.946). Case was remanded to the court of origin
with instructions that partition should be made in accordance with the Philippine law on succession.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.
Since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
properties here, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home
in the State of California.
Deceased still remained as a US citizen. He appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that
State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. It was never lost even by his stay in the Philippines.
Article 16 NCC applies. ( intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.)
Thus, RENVOI doctrine is also applicable.
The law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California,
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar.
The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football match, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the
country of his domicile.
The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Art. 887(4)& 894, NCC, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

G.R. L-19977. Oct 30, 1964
Lao Chay and Ng Siu Lian vs Galang, Commissionerr of Immigration (CI)

Facts: Chinese wife and her 3 children came to the Philippines as temporary visitors. They asked the
BI for cancellation of their ACR because the husband was admitted as a Filipino citizen.
CI granted the petition of the husband and the 3 children but denied that of the wife. To stop her
deportation, she filed a petition in the CFI. The court granted her petition, and held that the alien wife
was not required to have the same qualifications as those required of applicants for naturalization, it
being enough that she is not otherwise disqualified.

Issue: Whether or not the wife of a Chinese who obtained papers of Philippine citizenship
automatically follows the citizenship of her husband
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473, as amended) provides in part as. Effect
of the naturalization on wife and any woman who is now or may here-after be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
An alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines acquires the citizenship of her husband
only if he has all the qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications provided in
Section 4 of the law.
(Attach provision of CA 473 Sec.2 and Sec 4 HERETO >>>)
Although Wife does not possess the qualifications for naturalization, and her marriage to the
naturalized husband is deemed as automatically vesting in her Filipino citizenship.

G.R. L-24252 30 Jan 1967

Zita Ngo Burca vs Republic
Facts: Petitioner is a Chinese citizen and married to a native-born Filipino.
In a petition for naturalization, petitioner alleged that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the law. She was the lone witness presented. She too only submitted
supporting documents. The SolGen opposed her petition. Still, her petition was granted.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was naturalized in accordance with law
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not by the
mere fact of marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen. She "shall only be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines" if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized".
An alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there
is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized. Said wife must possess the qualifications under
Section 2, and must not be laboring under any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4, of the
Revised Naturalization Law.

Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, Here, the case was
submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were presented. This does not
meet with the legal requirement.
The Court accordingly ruled that:
(1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor
by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2,
and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law;
(2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one
year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and
(3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than
the judgment of a competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino
citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
G.R. L-21289 04 October 1971
Moy Ya Lim Yao (M) and Lau Yuen Yeung (L) versus Commsr of Immigration (CI)
Facts: Petitioners sought the issuance of writ of injunction against the CI restraining the latter from
ordering and causing her arrest and deportation.
Petitioner L, a Chinese citizen, applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant.
After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the country.
Apparetly, she got married to co-petitioner, M, who was already a naturalized Filipino.
L brought an action for injunction to pre-empt her deportation. During trial, it was found that L could
neither speak either English nor Tagalog, could not name any Filipino neighbor, except for one named
Rosa; neither did she know the names of her brothers-in-law or sisters-in-law. The court dismissed the
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is qualified to become Filipino citizen
In order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough
that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial
naturalization apparently from declaration of intention to oath-taking, before she can become a Filipina.
In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis
that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance
before her marriage. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.
If she desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other
applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the
knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle local languages, make her children study in
Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently
of her husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application for naturalization,
with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc.,
until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and
only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be
a citizen of the Philippines.

The Court permanently enjoined CI from causing her arrest and deportation as well as the confiscation
of the bond of appellant L, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant M.
G.R. 124371 23November 2000
Paula Llorente vs CA, Alicia Llorente
Facts: Decedent Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. In 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner
Paula got married. Afterwards he left to serve his tour of duty during WW II. In 1943 Lorenzo was
admitted as a US Citizen.
In 1945 he returned to the Philippines only to discover that Paula was pregnant and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother Ceferino. Since then, Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live
with her.
Lorenzo returned to the US, and in 1951 filed for divorce. It became final in 1952.
In 1958 when he returned to Manila, Lorenzo married Alicia. Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. They had three children.
In 1981 he executed a last will and testament, bequeathing his properties to Alicia and their 3 children.
Lorenzo filed a petition for probate. His will was subsequently admitted to probate. Before the
proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died in June 1985.
In Sept 1985 Paula filed for letters of administration over the estate. On Dec 1985, Alicia filed in
testate proceedings a petition for issuance of letters testamentary. The trial court denied Alicias
petition and that of Paulas granted, since the divorce granted to Lorenzo was void and inapplicable
here. Paula was also declared to be one of the legal heirs of Lorenzo.
Issues: Who are entitled to inherit from decedent? Which law should apply Philippine law or New
York state law?
Petition granted. CA decision set aside
1) the Court REVERSED the decision of the RTC and RECOGNIZED as VALID the foreign decree of
divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo on 1952.
2) the Court REMANDED the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
decedents will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved
While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the domiciliary
theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.
There is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York
State law.

Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2)
marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these
incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual
and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of Foreign Decree of Divorce: Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
NCC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Validity of Decedents Will: Owing to Art. 17 NCC, the clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to Alicia and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals, and specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law
G.R. No. 159507 19April 2006
Aniceto Saludo vs American Express Intl (AMEX)
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent AMEX, which stemmed from the
alleged dishonor and subsequent cancellation of petitioners credit card. Petitioner was the
congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte. Respondent prayed for dismissal of the case on the
ground of improper venue.
RTC denied respondents affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. RTC held that
"residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as
the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can
have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be the place of his residence.
Thereafter, on appeal to the CA, it held that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo,, because not
one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. . The CA declared that petitioner was not a
resident thereof. For purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence
or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency
x-x-x- "There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. X-x-x-x

Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by
any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident Southern Leyte, the CA referred to his community tax
certificate, which was issued at Pasay City. It cited that under the law, the CTC shall be paid in the
place of residence of the individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is
located. It also pointed out that petitioner's law office, which was also representing him in the present
case, is located in Pasay City.
Issue: Whether or not venue was improperly laid
Petition granted. CA decision reversed, set aside. RTC ruling reinstated. The Court held that the venue
was proper.
It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for
bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible
to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of
It is undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term
residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not
by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
As a member of Congress, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the
requirements for the said position, including that he was then a resident of the district which he was
representing, i.e., Southern Leyte.
Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used
in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x
The definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the
term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such

Therefore, residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2)
personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the
Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law."
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus,
it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had
his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is
also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions.
Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner, was also his residence, as the term
is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."