Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR
OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has
thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it
again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After
three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT
for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a
degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took
the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to
take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights
to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the
private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed

with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS

Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional
grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989,
declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT
as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to
those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous
Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is
some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing
of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation
of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the
power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is
also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also
been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the
regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as
noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools
in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social
and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like

the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today
of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States
of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in
other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own,
and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even
attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case
was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for
the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the
case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the
applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and,
indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be
regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to
repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a

constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which
the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge
to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his
patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he
should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a
plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By
the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist
cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate
this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not
absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to
those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be
accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more
reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause
is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between
medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and
the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of
the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more
vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an
equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the
tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.
In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent
has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say
the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is
stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute
incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is
a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that
has not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is
more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate
calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be
a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who
should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied
banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our
system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is
best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we
may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court
dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 A check with the Department of Education showed that the private
respondent had actually taken and flunked four tests already and was
applying to take a fifth examination. 2 He also failed this fifth test.
2 Rollo, pp. 26-34.

3 152 SCRA 730.

4 US vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85; Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Ynot v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659.
5 Article XIV, Section 5(3).
DECS vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission
Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his
application based on the three-flunk-rule. He then filed a petition before
the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging
the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC
therefore this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution
provides that every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted
and the RTC ruling was reversed.

The Judicial Branch

Basahin sa Filipino
Contents:
Introduction
The Supreme Court
The Chief Justice
Introduction
Judicial power rests with the Supreme Court and the lower courts, as established
by law (Art. VIII, sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution). Its duty is to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable (Art.
VIII Sec. 1 (2)).
The judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy. Its appropriation may not be reduced by the
Legislature below the appropriated amount the previous year (Art. VIII, Sec. 3).

Rules and procedures

The Rules of Court of the Philippines, as amended and the rules and regulations
issued by the Supreme Court, define the rules and procedures of the judiciary.
These rules and regulations are in the form of administrative matters,
administrative orders, circulars, memorandum circulars, memorandum orders, and
OCA circulars. The Supreme Court disseminates these rules and regulations to all
courts, publishes important ones in newspapers of general circulation, prints them
in book or pamphlet form, and uploads them to the Supreme Court website and the
Supreme Court E-Library website.
On June 21, 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility for the legal profession. The draft was prepared by the Committee
on Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

Appointments to the judiciary

By virtue of Article VIII, Section 8, appointments to the judiciary are made by the
President of the Philippines based on a list submitted by the Judicial and Bar
Council which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court. Its principal
function is to screen prospective appointees to any judicial post. It is composed of
the chief justice as ex-officio chairman, the Secretary of Justice and representatives
of Congress as ex-officio members, and a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme Court and a representative of
the private sector as members.
Philippine Judicial Academy
The Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) is the training school for justices,
judge, court personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts. It was originally
created by the Supreme Court on March 16, 1996 by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 35-96, and was institutionalized on February 26, 1998 by virtue of
Republic Act No. 8557. No appointee to the bench may commence the discharge
his adjudicative function without completing the prescribed court training in the
academy. Its organizational structure and administrative setup are provided for by
the Supreme Court in its en banc resolution (Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-scPHILJA).
Philippine Mediation Center
The Philippine Mediation Center was organized pursuant to the en banc Supreme
Court Resolution A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, dated October 16, 2001, and in
line with the objectives of the Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) to
decongest court dockets, among others, the court prescribed guidelines in
institutionalizing and implementing the mediation program in the Philippines. The
same resolution designated the Philippine Judicial Academy as the component unit
of the Supreme Court for Court-Annexed Mediation and other Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and established the Philippine Mediation Center
(PMC).
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office was organized to implement the
rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education for members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (B.M. No. 850 Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE)). It holds office in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines main office.
Katarungang Pambarangay

Presidential Decree No. 1508, or the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, took effect
on December 11, 1978, and established a system of amicably settling disputes at
the barangay level. This decree and the Local Government Code provided rules
and procedures, Title I, Chapter 7, Sections 339-422. This system of amicable
settlement of dispute aims to promote the speedy administration of justice by
easing the congestion of court dockets. The court does not take cognizance of
cases filed if they are not filed first with the Katarungang Pambarangay.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) system
Republic Act No. 9285 institutionalized the use of an alternative dispute resolution
system, which serves to promote the speedy and impartial administration of justice
and unclog the court dockets. This act shall be without prejudice to the adoption of
the Supreme Court of any ADR system such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration
or any combination thereof.

The Supreme Court

History of the Supreme Court
Royal audencia
The royal audencia was established on May 5, 1583, composed of a president, four
oidores (justices) and a fiscal. The audencia exercised both administrative and
judicial functions. Its functions and structure were modified in 1815 when a chief
justice replaced its president and the number of justices was increased. It came to
be known as the Audencia Territorial de Manila with two branches, civil and
criminal. A royal decree issued on July 24, 1861 converted it to a purely judicial
body with its decisions appealable to the Court of Spain in Madrid. A territorial
audencia in Cebu, and audencia for criminal cases in Vigan were organized on
February 26, 1898.
Philippine Revolution and First Republic
In the three phases of the revolution: 1896-1897; 1898; 1899-1901, the exigencies
of war prevented the thorough organization of the administration of justice.
Katipunan councils, then the provisional governments of Tejeros, Biak-na-Bato,

and the Revolutionary Republic proclaimed in Kawit, essentially had General

Emilio Aguinaldo exercising decree-making powers instituting ad hoc courts and
reviewing any appeals concerning their decisions.
In 1899, when the Malolos Constitution was ratified, it provided for a Supreme
Court of Justice. President Aguinaldo proposed the appointment of Apolinario
Mabini as Chief Justice, but the appointment and the convening of the Supreme
Court of Justice never materialized because of the Philippine-American War.
American military rule
During the Philippine-American War, General Wesley Merrit suspended the
audencias when a military government was established after Manila fell to
American forces in August, 1898. Major General Elwell S. Otis re-established the
Audencia on May 29, 1899 by virtue of General Order No. 20, which provided for
six Filipino members of the audencia.
Establishment of the Supreme Court
With the establishment of civil government, Act No. 136 of the Philippine
Commission abolished the audencia and established the present Supreme Court on
June 11, 1901, with Cayetano Arellano as the first chief justice together with
associate justicesthe majority of whom were Americans.
Commonwealth: Filipinization of the Supreme Court
With the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, the membership was increased to 11
with two divisions of five members each. The Supreme Court was Filipinized
upon the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines on November 15,
1935. The composition of the court was reduced by virtue of Commonwealth Act
No. 3. It provided for a Supreme Court, headed by a chief justice with six associate
justices.
World War II and the Third Republic
During World War II, the National Assembly passed legislation granting
emergency powers to President Manuel L. Quezon; Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos
was made concurrent Secretary of Justice and acting President of the Philippines in
unoccupied areas. After his capture and execution at the hands of the Japanese, the
Commonwealth government-in-exile had no system of courts.

Meanwhile, the Japanese organized the Philippine Executive Commission in

occupied areas on January 8, 1942, which gave way to the Second Republic in
October 14, 1943. By the end of World War II, the regular function of the courts
had been restored, beginning with the appointment of a new Supreme Court on
June 6, 1945. On September 17, 1945, the laws of the Second Republic were
declared null and void; a Supreme Court decision on Co Kim Cham v. Eusebio
Valdez Tan Keh and Arsenio P. Dizon recognized this.
Martial law
The Supreme Court was retained during the martial law years under rules similar to
the 1935 Constitution, but with the exception few key factors, e.g.:
1. The 1973 Constitution further increased the membership of the Supreme
Court to 15, with two divisions;
2. The process by which a chief justice and associate justices are appointed was
changed under to grant the president (Ferdinand Marcos during this time) the
sole authority to appoint members of the Supreme Court. There were five
chief justices that were appointed under this provision.
Present-day Supreme Court
Pursuant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is
composed of a chief Justice and 14 associate justices who serve until the age of 70.
The court may sit en banc or in one of its three divisions composed of five
members each. The chief justice and associate justices are appointed by the
President of the Philippines, chosen from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and
Bar Council. The president must fill up a vacancy within 90 days of occurrence.
Article VIII, Section 4 (2) of the constitution explicitly provides for the cases that
must be heard en banc, and Section 4 (3) for cases that may be heard by divisions.
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 transferred the administrative
supervision of all courts and their personnel from the Department of Justice to the
Supreme Court. This was affirmed by Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution. To effectively discharge this constitutional mandate, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) was created under Presidential Decree No. 828, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 842 (and its functions further strengthened by
a resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated October 24, 1996). Its principal
function is the supervision and administration of the lower courts throughout the

Philippines and all their personnel. It reports and recommends to the Supreme
Court all actions that affect the lower court management. The OCA is headed by
the court administrator, three deputy court administrators, and three assistant court
administrators.
According to the 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5, the Supreme Court
exercises the following powers:
1. Exercise jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm, on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of the lower courts in:
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question;
All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue;
All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher;
All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved;
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignments shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
1. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts; the

admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar; and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
2. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law (Sec. 5 , id.).
The Supreme Court has adopted and promulgated the Rules of Court for the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleadings and practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission in the
practice of law. Amendments are promulgated through the Committee on Revision of Rules. The Court
also issues administrative rules and regulations in the form of court issuances posted on the Supreme
Court E-Library website.

The Chief Justice

The incumbent
Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno
Tenure as Chief Justice: August 24, 2012 present
Appointed by: Benigno S. Aquino III
Age at Appointment: 52
Read her biography from on website of the Supreme Court
Full roster of chief justices
The position of chief justice was created in 1901 by virtue of the establishment of
the Philippine Supreme Court. At the time, the chief justice was appointed by the
President of the United States: the court was composed mainly of American
citizens with a Filipino chief justice.
The incumbent Chief Justice, Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno, appointed by President
Benigno S. Aquino III, took her oath of office on August 25, 2012. She is the first
woman to hold the position.
There were six chief justices appointed by the President of the United States. In
1935, upon the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the power to
appoint the chief justice was transferred to the President of the Philippines.
According to the 1935 Constitution, the President of the Philippines shall make

appointments with concurrence of the National Assembly. There have been six
Chief Justices who were appointed under the 1935 Constitution. The only chief
justice that was not appointed by a president was Chief Justice Jose Yulo, who was
in office during the Japanese occupation, from 1942 until the liberation of the
Philippines in 1945. During this time, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was
appointed by the Philippine Executive Committee headed by Jorge B. Vargas.
The 1943 Constitution provided for the members of the Supreme Court and the
chief justice to be appointed by the president with the concurrence of his cabinet.
Upon the declaration of martial law and the subsequent establishment of the 1973
Constitution, the process of selection of the Chief Justice of the Philippines was
changed. The power of Congress to veto an appointment by the president to the
office of the chief justice was removed. According to the 1973 Constitution, The
Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by
the President. There were five chief justices that were appointed under this
provision.
After the revolution of 1986, a new constitution was enacted and a new process of
selecting a chief magistrate was created. Former chief justice and 1986
Constitutional Commission delegate Roberto V. Concepcion introduced the
concept of the Judicial and Bar Council. The aim of the Council is to de-politicize
the judiciary by lessening the appointing power of the president. To read more
about the appointment of chief justices, members of the judiciary, and the Office of
the Ombudsman, please click here.
To date, there have been nine chief justices appointed under the conditions of the
1986 Constitution.
Chief justices listed according to appointing President of the Philippines
Of the 15 Presidents of the Philippines, only eight have been able to appoint an
individual to the highest judicial post in the land. The following is the list of
presidents who appointed chief Jjstices and their appointees.
1. Manuel L. Quezon
o Jose Abad Santos
2. Sergio Osmea
o Manuel V. Moran

3. Elpidio Quirino
o Ricardo M. Paras
4. Carlos P. Garcia
o Cesar Bengzon
5. Ferdinand E. Marcos
o Roberto V. Concepcion
o Querube Makalintal
o Fred Ruiz Castro
o Enrique M. Fernando
o Felix V. Makasiar
o Ramon C. Aquino
6. Corazon C. Aquino
o Claudio Teehankee
o Pedro L. Yap
o Marcelo B. Fernan
o Andres R. Narvasa
7. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
o Hilario G. Davide
8. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
o Artemio Panganiban
o Reynato Puno

o Renato C. Corona
9. Benigno S. Aquino III
o Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno

Notable chief justices

Of the list of chief justices, there are a few individuals that stand out for having
gone above and beyond their duty and tenure as chief justice.
1. Cayetano Arellano: Cayetano Arellano was the first Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. He was appointed in 1901 when the Supreme Court was
created through Act No. 136, along with three American justices and one
Filipino justice.
2. Ramon Avancea: Appointed in 1925 by U.S. President Calvin Coolidge,
he is known for ushering in an all-Filipino Supreme Court in 1935. Upon the
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, American justices
were no longer allowed to sit in the Philippine Supreme Courtthus, new
justices were appointed, all of whom were of Filipino citizenship.
3. Jose Abad Santos: As a wartime chief justice, Abad Santos took on two
different roles; he was the chief justice and concurrently the Secretary of
Justice. When President Quezon left the Philippines to evade capture by the
Japanese, Abad Santos chose to stay in the country as a caretaker of the
government. On May 2, 1942, the Japanese military caught Abad Santos in
Cebu and invited him to become one of the members of their puppet
government. Abad Santos refused to collaborate. He died at the hands of the
Japanese on May 2, 1942. His last words to his son were, Do not cry,
Pepito, show to these people that you are brave. It is an honor to die for
ones country. Not everybody has that chance.
4. Manuel V. Moran: Appointed in 1945 by President Sergio Osmea, Manuel
V. Moran would serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for six years.

Upon his retirement in 1951, Moran was appointed as Philippine

Ambassador to Spain and concurrently to the Holy See. During President
Quirinos administration, Moran was once again offered a position in the
Supreme Court in 1953, at the twilight of Quirinos presidency. Moran,
however, refused the midnight appointment.
5. Roberto V. Concepcion: He went into early retirement for refusing to grant
absolute power to Ferdinand Marcos, the president who appointed him. In
the resolution of Javellana v. Executive Secretary, Concepcion argued
against the validity of the 1973 Constitution and its questionable aspects.
Accordingly, he dissented, along with Justices Teehankee, Zaldivar, and
Fernando, from implementing the 1973 Constitution. Due to the courts
decision, Concepcion would enter early retirement, 50 days before his
originally scheduled retirement date.
6. Claudio Teehankee: Claudio Teehankee was known for his firm antimartial law stance during his tenure in the Supreme Court. Teehankee
resisted multiple attempts by the Marcos administration to garner absolute
power by issuing questionable decrees. In 1973, he was part of the bloc that
dissented from the implementation of the 1973 Constitution. In 1980, he
dissented from the proposed judicial reorganization act of President Marcos.
In 1986, after the EDSA Revolution, he administered the Oath of Office of
President Corazon C. Aquino in Club Filipino. He was appointed Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court in 1986 by President Corazon C. Aquino
7. Hilario G. Davide: Appointed by President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in 1998,
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide was known as the presiding judge of the first
impeachment proceedings in Asia. During the impeachment of President
Estrada, he conducted proceedings with impartiality. Following EDSA II
uprising, which deposed President Estrada, Davide swore in Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the 14th President of the Philippines.
8. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno: Appointed by President Benigno S. Aquino III
in 2012, Chief Justice Sereno is the first woman appointed to the position.
Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals is the second highest tribunal in the country, which was
established on February 1, 1936 by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 3. The
current form of the Court of Appeals was constituted through Batas Pambansa Blg.

129, as amended by Executive Order No. 33, s. 1986, Republic Act No. 7902, and
Republic Act No. 8246.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of
Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commission.
The Court of Appeals shall also have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or proceedings.
The Court of Appeals is composed of one presiding justice and 68 associate
justices, all of which are appointed by the President from a shortlist submitted by
the Judicial and Bar Council. The associate justices shall have precedence
according to the dates (or order, in case of similar appointment dates) of their
respective appointments. The qualifications for the justices of the Supreme Court
also apply to members of the Court of Appeals.
The current presiding justice of the Court of Appeals is Andres Reyes Jr., who is
set to retire on May 11, 2020.
Court of Tax Appeals
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which is of the same level as the Court of
Appeals, was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 1125, which was signed into
law on June 16, 1954. Its present-day form was constituted through RA 1125, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9282 and Republic Act No. 9503.
The CTA exercises jurisdiction in the following:
1. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving

disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under
the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue
Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction
shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local
tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of
their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability
for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or
release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or
other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and
taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city
board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to
him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of
the Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of
Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and
302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may
appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.

2. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from
violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and
Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, that offenses
or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of
taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than
P1 million or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be
tried by the regular courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
1. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them,
in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
2. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
3. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases
involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees,
charges and penalties: Provided, however, that collection
cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than
P1 million shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
1. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax
collection cases originally decided by them, in
their respective territorial jurisdiction.

2. Over petitions for review of the judgments,

resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts
in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over
tax collection cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their
respective jurisdiction.
The CTA is composed of one presiding justice and 8 associate justices, all of which
are appointed by the President from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and Bar
Council. The associate justices shall have precedence according to the dates (or
order, in case of similar appointment dates) of their respective appointments. The
qualifications for the justices of the Court of Appeals also apply to members of the
CTA.
The current presiding justice of the CTA is Roman del Rosario, who is set to retire
on October 6, 2025.
Sandiganbayan
To attain the highest norms of official conduct among officials and employees in
the government, the creation of a special graft court to be known as the
Sandiganbayan was provided for in Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution. This court was formally established through Presidential Decree No.
1606, which was signed into law on December 10, 1978.
Through Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers), Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution, the Sandiganbayan was carried over to the post-EDSA Revolution
republic. The current form of the Sandiganbayan was constituted through PD 1606,
s. 1978, as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8245.
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
1. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act

No. 6758), specifically including:
1. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department heads;
2. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city
department heads;
3. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
4. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
5. Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of
senior superintendent or higher;
6. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
7. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or -controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as grade 27 and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
constitution;
4. Chairmen and members of constitutional commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the constitution; and
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

2. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a
of this section in relation to their office.
3. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, s. 1986.
In addition, the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan also has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1,2,14 and 14-A issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in govemmentowned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public
officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
The Sandiganbayan comprises of one presiding justice and 14 associate justices, all
of which are appointed by the President from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial
and Bar Council. The associate justices shall have precedence according to the
dates (or order, in case of similar appointment dates) of their respective
appointments.
The qualifications to become a member of the Sandiganbayan are as follows:
1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. at least 40 years of age
3. has been a judge of a court for at least ten years, or been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to
the bar as a prerequisite for at least ten years.

The current presiding justice of the Sandiganbayan is Amparo Cabotaje-Tang, who

is set to retire on November 8, 2024.