[G.R. No. 127845.

March 10, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and
appellee, vs. LODRIGO BAYYA, defendant and
appellant.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
For automatic review here is a judgment handed down
by Branch 16[1] of the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan,
Isabela, finding appellant Lodrigo[2] Bayya guilty of
incestuous rape and sentencing him to the ultimate
penalty of DEATH.
Filed on October 9, 1995 by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Pacifico Paas and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2467,
the accusatory portion of the Information indicting
appellant, alleges:
"That on or about the year 1994 and for sometimes
(sic) thereafter in the municipality of Burgos, province
of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused armed with a knife,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force, intimidation and with lewd designs,
have carnal knowledge with his own daughter ROSIE S.
BAYYA for several times against the latters (sic) will and
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[3]
After appellant pleaded Not Guilty upon arraignment on
Nov. 22, 1995[4], trial ensued.
From the decision of Nov. 15, 1996 under review, it can
be gleaned that:
"This is a case of a father raping his own daughter, a
minor, aged 12 when she was first sexually assaulted
up to July 12, 1995, the last molestation having done
on her on said date (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
xxx it appears that Rosie Bayya, a minor, revealed to
her aunt, Trinidad Garcia, her horrible tale at the hands
of her father, the accused herein, six (6) days after the
last sexual assault on her when Rosie was asked by her
to baby-sit for another aunt of hers at Santiago,
Isabela. She was compelled to reveal what befell her
when she was informed that her father asked her to go
back home but never wanted to (sic), knowing that her
father would continue raping her. She told her aunt
Trining that she does not like to go home because her
father used to have sexual intercourse with her.
With the revelation made by Rosie Bayya, her aunt
Trining went back to Malasin, Burgos, Isabela to inform
Melquiades Bayya, Rosies granduncle who in turn
informed a certain Major Turingan of the PNP what the

accused did to his daughter (sic). The girl was brought

to the PNP station of Burgos to give her statement
which she did where she divulged what her father did
to her.
The gist of her testimony in court is that sometime in
1994 when she was still 12 years old, her father, the
accused, forced her at the point of a knife to have
sexual intercourse with her in the family house at
Malasin, Burgos, Isabela. Being afraid as he threatened
her, the accused succeeded in undressing the young
daughter and he inserted his penis into her vagina. She
felt pain as a result and just kept to herself what her
father did fearing that her father would make good his
threats if she squealed on him. She just cried
helplessly.
The first sexual molestation happened at an unholy
hour at noon time (sic) when her mother and the rest
of the siblings were out, her mother working in the field
at the time. Her father repeated this bestial act in their
house about twice a week when her mother was not at
home; at times only a sister six years of age was
present but probably did not know what her father was
doing to her elder sister. Then later, he used her four
(4) times a month and the last that she remembered
was on July 12, 1995. After she was advised to file a
complaint at her behest, she was brought to the PNP
station at Burgos to continue and wind up her ordeal
with a physical examination of her by a public
physician, Dr. Elvie[5] Amurao of the Roxas District
Hospital at Roxas, a nearby town of Burgos.
Dr. Amurao found old lacerations compatible with the
claim of the complainant that she was raped months
before her examination."[6]
Appellant and his wife, Cecilia Bayya, took the witness
stand for the defense.
Appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal
knowledge of his daughter, Rosie Bayya, twice but
theorized that he was "out of his mind"[7] when he did
the lecherous acts on her. He traced his criminal
behavior to a childhood that was neglected and forlorn
in the mountains of Isabela, let alone the maltreatment
endured in the hands of his very own parents.[8]
On the other hand, Cecilia Bayya, mother of the victim
and wife of appellant, manifested on the witness stand
her "neutral" stance[9] in the case. Nonetheless, she
disclosed that she had forgiven her husband for his
salacious conduct since they are poor and she cannot
eke out a living without appellant as breadwinner. [10]
Finding the facts established by the evidence falling
squarely under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the lower court,
after trial on the merits, rendered a judgment of
conviction, sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate
penalty of DEATH, disposing thus:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the court
hereby sentences the accused LODRIGO BAYYA to
suffer the supreme penalty of death without award to
any form of damages for obvious reasons.
SO ORDERED."[11]
At the outset, it bears stressing that having admitted
authorship of the offense charged, appellant does not
dispute the trial courts finding of guilt. However,
appellant questions the penalty imposed below,
contending that since the information made no
reference to Republic Act No. 7659, it was a reversible
error to convict thereunder. And because the only
penal provision relied upon by the prosecution is Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, he could only be
sentenced to the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua in accordance therewith.
Therefore, the only issue raised by appellant is whether
there was a transgression of his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him, in
view of the fact that the Information is silent about the
applicability of R.A. No. 7659.
While departing from appellants strained reasoning,
the Court nonetheless agrees with and adopts his
submission that the trial court erred in imposing the
capital punishment on him.
A careful perusal of the Information indicting appellant
reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the
minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya.
Instructive in this regard is Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information.
The purpose of the above-quoted rule is to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.[12]Elaborating on the
defendants right to be informed, the Court held in
Pecho vs. People[13] that the objectives of this right are:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make the
defense;

2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for

protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the
trial court be complete - to the end that the accused
may suitably prepare his defense. Corollary to this, an
indictment must fully state the elements of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as it is the
recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates the
nature and cause of accusation against the accused.[14]
The Court held recently that to sustain a conviction
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the prosecution
must allege and prove the basic elements of: 1) sexual
congress; 2) with a woman; 3) by force and without
consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of the
death penalty, the additional elements that 4) the
victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the
rape; and 5) the offender is a parent (whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.[15]
In the case under scrutiny, the information does not
allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya,
although the same was proven during the trial as borne
by the records. The omission is not merely formal in
nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held
liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters
not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of
guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of
any offense, not charged in the Complaint or
information on which he is tried or therein necessarily
included. He has a right to be informed of the nature of
the offense with which he is charged before he is put
on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher
than that charged in the Complaint or information on
which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial
of that right.[16]
The Information under consideration charges nothing
more than simple rape defined and penalized in the
first and second paragraphs of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, that is - having carnal knowledge
of a woman by means of force and intimidation and
against her will. The additional allegation that the
offender is a parent of the offended party can only be
deemed a generic aggravating circumstance. The
failure of the prosecution to allege the age of the
victim has effectively removed the crime from the
ambit of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
prescribing the death penalty "when the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consaguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim".

Previously, this Court had occasion to hold that the

death penalty may be imposed only If the information
alleges and the evidence has proven both the age of
the victim and her relationship to the offender.[17] This
theory of "concurring allegations" finds support in the
earlier case of People vs. Ramos[18] where the Court
enunciated that the concurrence of the minority of the
victim and her relationship with the offender gives a
different character to the rape defined in the first part
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, having, as it
does, the effect of raising the imposable penalty for
rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and
supreme penalty of DEATH.

SO ORDERED.

The Court explained in Ramos that relationship and

minority must be alleged jointly if the death penalty is
sought to be imposed because the same partakes of
the nature of a special qualifying circumstance which
has the effect of increasing the prescribed penalty by
degrees. When either one of the said circumstances is
omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the
information and proven by the evidence may be
considered merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance in accordance with the general principles
of criminal law. But since the penalty for simple rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the
single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
generic aggravating circumstance cannot effectively
augment the criminal liability of appellant, it being
required that the single indivisible penalty prescribed
by law is to be applied regardless of any modifying
circumstance in attendance.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Since the appellant had been informed of the elements

of simple rape under the information indicting him and
nothing more, he could only be convicted of simple
rape and sentenced toreclusion perpetua as prescribed
by law.[19]

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1994, in

the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage
of night time and with the use of bolo, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the person of JORJA
SORIANO y Rigor by hacking the latter, thereby
inflicting upon the latter serious injuries which directly
caused her death.

In conclusion, the Court also takes note of the fact that

the trial court failed to award an indemnity ex
delicto to the victim pursuant to Article 100[20] in
relation to Article 104[21] of the Revised Penal Code. In
line with prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages
should also be awarded to the victim in such amount
as the court deems just[22]. The award of exemplary
damages is also indicated considering that the
relationship between the offender and the victim
aggravates the crime of rape, such as in the present
case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under
review is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant LODRIGO BAYYA is adjudged guilty of simple
rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the victim,
ROSIE S. BAYYA, P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto,
apart from P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
the appellant.

[G.R. Nos. 131736-37. March 11, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JOEY MANLANSING y AMBROSIO,
and MARIO MANLANSING y AMBROSIO, accusedappellants.
DECISION

For automatic review is the joint decision[1] dated May

2, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 27, in Criminal Cases No. 6150-AF and No.
6151-AF, convicting appellants of two counts of murder
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death for
each count. Appellants were also ordered to pay the
heirs of the victims P250,000 for actual damages
and P500,000 as moral damages for each count of
murder.
Appellants are brothers. For four years they were
tenants of the spouses Magin[2] and Jorja Soriano.
In an amended information dated December 30, 1994,
appellants were charged with the murder of Jorja
Soriano allegedly committed as follows:

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
In an amended information also dated December 30,
1994, and similarly worded except for the victims
name, appellants Joey and Mario Manlansing were
likewise charged with the murder of Magin Soriano. [4]
Inasmuch as the two cases were interrelated, having
arisen from the same incident, the two cases were
consolidated.
On arraignment, Joey Manlansing pleaded not guilty to
both charges, while Mario Manlansing pleaded guilty to
two counts of murder. After they waived pre-trial, both
cases were heard on the merits.

For the prosecution, SPO2 CASTILLONES of the

Philippine National Police (PNP), testified that at around
8:00 A.M. on December 28, 1994, a concerned citizen
informed the Cabanatuan City Police Station of an
alleged killing in a house at Bitas, Cabanatuan City.
Immediately, a team composed of P/Insp. Bienvenido
Padua, SPO2 Castillones, and SPO1 Edgardo Pangilinan
went to the place.[5] When they arrived at the Soriano
residence, they spotted bloodstains on the
ceiling. Before they entered the house, they waited for
Nestor Villa of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) who was tasked to take fingerprints at the crime
scene.[6] In the stockroom on the first floor, they found
the lifeless body of 70-year-old Magin in a pool of
blood.[7] There were several wounds on his hands and
arms, as well as cuts on his head. They took pictures of
the corpse.[8] Upstairs, they found the corpse of his 68year-old spouse, Jorja, on the floor, her throat slit and
her neck hacked.[9] Her throat was stuffed with a small
towel and bloodstains covered her stomach.[10] The
investigators also took photos of the deceased. When
they turned her body over, they found a six-inch
bloodstained knife, with the initials JF carved in the
handle.[11] The police made rough sketches[12] and took
more photographs,[13] while Villa lifted fingerprints from
the scene and the knife.[14] These were sent to the NBI
office in Manila. The cadavers were brought to the City
Health Office for autopsy.

in the face to prevent her from shouting, while Mario

was assaulting her husband.[20]

DR. JUN CONCEPCION, medical officer of Cabanatuan

City, who autopsied the bodies, testified that Magins
death was due to hypovolemic shock secondary to
multiple hacking wounds on the head and nape.
[15]
Jorjas death was the result of hypovolemic shock
secondary to hacking wound on the neck, right side.
[16]
They died between 10:00 P.M. on December 27,
1994 to 3:00 A.M. of December 28, 1994. Dr.
Concepcion testified that from the nature of the injuries
sustained, the wounds could have been inflicted by
more than one person, since two different weapons
were used.[17] He declared that the weapon used to
inflict the hacking wounds was not pointed, while the
stab wounds were caused by a sharp and pointed
instrument.[18]

BAYANI[25] PALAD, a dactyloscopy expert, testified that

a comparison of the prints from the crime scene
showed that two prints matched the left middle and
ring fingerprints of appellant Joey Manlansing.[26]

Two carpenters constructing a chapel for the Sorianos

said that appellants frequented the house of the
victims even at night. They reported seeing appellants
enter the Sorianos house on the night of December 27,
1994. Thus, the police ordered a manhunt for the
Manlansing brothers.
On December 28, 1994, appellant Joey Manlansing was
arrested in Sta. Clara, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija and brought
back to Cabanatuan City for questioning. During
custodial investigation, Atty. Edgardo Villarin, the city
legal officer, advised him not to talk.[19] Nevertheless,
he named his brother, Mario, as the killer. He denied
participation in the killing, but he admitted boxing Jorja

SPO3 CAMPOS declared that on December 29, 1994,

the police were tipped that appellant Mario Manlansing
was hiding in Paniqui, Tarlac. Accompanied by Enrique
Manlansing, appellants father, they went to Paniqui and
apprehended Mario.[21] During the custodial
investigation, assisted by counsel, he confessed. [22] He
said he hid the bolo at his sister-in-laws house in Sta.
Clara, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.[23]It was recovered and
sent to the NBI in Manila for examination.
NBI forensic chemist ALICIA LIBERATO testified that she
examined a bolo and a knife and found human
bloodstains on them.[24]
On December 30, 1994, a re-enactment of the crime
was done at the crime scene. Mario said that after he
killed the spouses, he and Joey ransacked bags in the
house but found neither money nor jewelry. He told
Joey to change his clothes so they could go. Mario then
got some rags and tried to clean up the place. He went
to the bathroom downstairs to wash the bolo and the
rags.
NBI fingerprint expert NESTOR VILLA took the
fingerprints from the crime scene and sent them to the
office in Manila for examination.

For the defense, MARIO MANLANSING claimed he alone

was responsible for the deaths. In open court, Mario
affirmed his confession and insisted that his brother
had nothing to do with the deaths.[27]He claimed that
Joey woke up only after he killed Magin[28] and that Joey
tried to unsuccessfully stop him from attacking
Jorja. He said he killed the couple out of anger after
Jorja told him that he was going to be ejected as a
tenant. Mario said Joey knew nothing of his motive.[29]
On the stand, appellant JOEY MANLANSING affirmed his
sworn statement naming Mario as the person solely
responsible for killing the spouses. He denied any
participation in it,[30] but admitted hitting Jorja because
she was shouting and he did not want his brother to
hear her, lest he attack her too. [31]
The defense also presented ENRIQUE MANLANSING,
the father of the appellants. He testified that he
fetched Mario from Paniqui, Tarlac, in order to
surrender him to the authorities.[32]
Finally, the prosecution presented a balut vendor,
MARIO BARTOLOME, as its rebuttal witness. He testified
that on the night of the killings, he was plying his trade
at Cynthias Eatery, right across the Sorianos

residence. At around 11:00 P.M. he offered his wares to

two persons who came out of the Sorianos house. He
noticed that both had bloodied shirts. When he
inquired about the bloodstains, they answered they
had just killed a pig and threatened he could be next.
Scared, he shut up. The following day, he heard about
the killings on the radio but did not inform the police
about his encounter with the appellants. It was only
after his conscience bothered him that he reported it to
the police.[33]
After trial, appellants were convicted, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that the guilt of both
accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt
and therefore sentences them (to):
1) Death in Criminal Case No. 6150;
2) Death in Criminal Case No. 6151;
3) In both cases to pay the heirs of the deceased:
a) P250,000.00 by way of funeral and other expenses
and actual damages.
b) P500,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[34]
Hence, this automatic review. Appellants allege in their
brief that the trial court committed the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT JOEY MANLANSING IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 6150-AF AND 6151-AF DESPITE THE FACT
THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING
THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF NIGHTTIME.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN APPRECIATING
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
DEATH PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANTS MARIO
MANLANSING AND JOEY MANLANSING.

Two principal issues are for resolution: (1) Did the trial
court err in convicting both appellants Mario
Manlansing and Joey Manlansing for alleged conspiracy
to kill the Sorianos? (2) Did the trial court err in
imposing the death penalty upon appellants?
On the first issue, appellants contend that since there
were no other witnesses, nothing can be clearer than
the confession of appellant Mario Manlansing that he
alone killed the couple and that his brother Joey had
nothing to do with the incident. They submit that a
confession if freely and voluntarily given is deserving of
the highest credit. Inasmuch as Marios confession was
freely and voluntarily given and was reiterated by him
during trial, the lower court erred in not giving credit to
said confession.
Appellants also aver that the trial court likewise erred
in finding Joey guilty of conspiring with Mario
notwithstanding Marios categorical confession that
Joey had no participation in the killings.Appellants
contend that the mere fact that they are siblings does
not mean that Marios testimony was not
credible. According to appellants, an accused in a
criminal case may competently testify for or against
any of his co-accused.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) avers that the guilt of appellant Joey Manlansing
as a conspirator has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. First, he admitted boxing Jorja in the face.
However, he explained that he only did this out of fear
that Mario might hear her shout and attack her. But, as
stressed by the OSG, the medico-legal evidence
contradicts Joeys statement that he boxed Jorja only
once. The autopsy report showed that Jorja sustained
hematoma on her face and chest, an indication that
she was struck several times. Second, the city medical
officer, Dr. Concepcion, testified that from the nature
and types of wounds found on the bodies of the
victims, one person alone could not have inflicted the
fatal injuries. The police recovered two different types
of weapons, namely, a bolo and a knife. Third, a
comparison of the fingerprints taken from the crime
scene and Joeys standard fingerprints showed that two
of his fingerprints were recovered from the crime
scene. Fourth, Mario admitted during the re-enactment
of the incident that he and Joey ransacked the place
looking for cash and jewelry. Fifth, rebuttal witness
Mario Bartolome testified that he saw appellants step
out of the Sorianos house on the night of the killings
wearing bloodstained shirts. Finally, Joeys flight from
Cabanatuan City belies his innocence regarding the
killing of the Sorianos. Flight is an indication of guilt, for
a truly innocent person would normally stand his
ground, and grasp the first opportunity to defend
himself and clear his name.
While giving credence to the confession of Mario
Manlansing that he killed the couple, the trial court

disbelieved appellants claim that he alone did both

killings and that Joey had no participation
therein.Instead, it relied on a chain of circumstances to
show that appellants conspired to kill the Sorianos, and
committed the crimes pursuant to that conspiracy.
The conviction of Joey Manlansing is thus anchored on
the premise that there was conspiracy between the
brothers. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
crime and decide to commit it.[35] Conspiracy does not
require a previous plan or agreement to commit an
assault. It is sufficient that at the time of the
aggression all the accused manifested by their acts a
common intent or desire to attack.[36] Jurisprudence
tells us consistently that the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime
may be considered to show an extant conspiracy.
[37]
The testimonial and physical evidence on record
reveals that Joeys conduct during and after the attack
of his brother on the spouses was conspiratorial. Most
significant of these pieces of evidence is the finding of
Dr. Concepcion, that from the depth and nature of the
victims wounds, the weapon used for hacking could not
be the same as the one used for stabbing. The
discovery of the two weapons, a bolo recovered in
Tarlac where Mario hid and which he admitted was his,
and a knife recovered underneath Magins corpse,
confirms the finding that the wounds were inflicted by
two different weapons. If indeed, as Mario confessed,
he did the killings single-handedly, he would then be
using a bolo and a knife either simultaneously,
alternatively, or successively in killing Magin. As Dr.
Concepcion opined, simultaneously hacking and
stabbing by using a long weapon and another short
bladed weapon was impossible. That Mario would use
both the bolo and the knife alternatively or
successively is unlikely to be true and contrary to the
nature of reality. The logical conclusion would then be
that, considering the two weapons, there were at least
two attackers, each using one deadly instrument.
There are other reasons for us to discount the story of
the brothers that only Mario single-handedly killed the
spouses. For one, we find inconsistencies in their
testimonies. In Joeys sworn statement, which he
executed in front of witnesses and in the presence of
counsel, he said he punched Jorja , . . . para walang
makarinig . . . .[38] In his testimony in court he said,
Because she might be heard by my brother and he
might attack her.[39] Again, Mario said that Joey tried to
stop him from hurting Jorja and while trying to grapple
the bolo from him, Joey got wounded.[40] Yet, Joey in his
sworn statement does not mention getting wounded
and said that he was merely elbowed by his brother
when he tried to stop the latter from harming Jorja.
[41]
And, in his testimony in open court, he merely said
Mario hurled insulting words at him as they struggled
over the bolo.[42] He does not say anything about being
wounded. A major variation in Joeys statements that

gives his reason for assaulting a victim and an

omission of an important detail, i.e. his being wounded,
together cast doubt on Marios disavowal that Joey did
not participate in the killings. His story was obviously
an afterthought to absolve his younger
sibling.Testimonies to be believed must not only come
from the mouth of credible witnesses but should by
themselves be credible, reasonable and in accord with
human experience.[43]
In addition, the brothers footprints and fingerprints
were lifted from the crime scene. Before they fled they
both tried to wipe out traces of their foot and
handprints. Both admitted that they ransacked the
place for valuables after the spouses were slain. Lastly,
on their way out of the compound, a witness whom
they threatened to be butchered like a hog, saw them
with their shirts bloodstained.
All the foregoing details presented as evidence by the
prosecution more than suffices to show that the
brothers were united and had cooperated in a
conspiracy to attack the spouses. In a conspiracy, the
act of one conspirator is the act of the other coconspirator. Thus, Joey is equally responsible as his
brother, Mario for the death of the Sorianos.
Mario and Joey were convicted on the basis of Marios
sworn statements confessing to the killing of the
spouses, the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution, as well as on circumstantial evidence
addressed before the trial court. To sustain a conviction
on circumstantial evidence, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[44] The circumstances
themselves, taken together, should point to overt acts
of the accused that would logically point to the
conclusion, and no other, that the accused is guilty of
the crime charged and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent. [45]
We agree with the trial court and the OSG that the
chain of circumstances, all of which have already been
discussed, can only lead to the conclusion that Joey
and Mario cooperated to commit the killings. To
summarize, they are: (1) the medico-legal officers
testimony that two different bladed weapons were
used, (2) his finding that one person alone could not
have inflicted the wounds simultaneously, (3) the
recovery of two distinct bladed weapons, (4) Joeys
admission that he boxed Jorja (4) both appellants
admission that they searched the victims belongings
for cash and valuables, (5) the presence of Joeys
fingerprints at the scene of the crime, and (6) the
testimony of the balut vendor that he saw the brothers
with bloodstained shirts leaving the locus
criminis together. Thus, we find no error committed by

the trial court in holding that both appellants had

conspired and are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
killing Magin and Jorja Soriano.
However, we are unable to agree now with the trial
court that the offenses committed by appellants could
be qualified as murder. They are guilty only of double
homicide. Hence, it is improper now to impose the
death penalty on each of them.
A review of the informations filed against appellants, in
relation to prevailing law and jurisprudence as well as
the newly adopted revisions of the Rules of Court
favorable to the accused will show that the crimes of
the brothers could not be qualified as murder. Only
recently in People vs. Gario Alba alias Mario Alba, G.R.
No. 130523, promulgated January 29, 2002, we ruled
that pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[46]which took
effect on December 1, 2000, the information should
state not only the designation of the offense and the
acts and omissions constituting it but shall also specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.[47] We
noted in Gario Alba, that although the circumstance of
treachery was stated in the information, it was not
alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to
murder. Since the information in Gario Alba, failed to
specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the
killing to murder, treachery was considered only a
generic aggravating circumstance, hence, we said
that the crime committed in Gario Alba was homicide
and not murder.
So is it with the present case. None of the aggravating
circumstances were alleged in the informations nor in
the amended informations with specificity as a
qualifying circumstance elevating either killing to
murder. Thus, conformably with Gario Alba, the
offenses committed by appellants only constitute two
counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty
for homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence both
appellants to death.
In evaluating the circumstances that qualified the
crimes to murder, the trial court considered, aside from
evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime, and use of
a deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of superior strength and dwelling.
We note that abuse of superior strength and dwelling
were not alleged in the informations. In accordance
then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, abuse of superior strength and
dwelling may not be appreciated to convict
the brothers. Further, should there be a finding of
treachery, then abuse of superior strength is absorbed
by the former. We are thus left to review only the
allegation that the aggravating circumstances of

evident premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity were

present in the commission of the crimes.
At the outset, we shall discount nocturnity as an
aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the
darkness of the night was not purposely sought by the
offenders to facilitate the commission of the crime nor
to ensure its execution with impunity.
The element of evident premeditation is manifested by
the planning and preparation undertaken by the
offender prior to the commission of the crime.[48] It is
not presumed from the mere lapse of time[49]nor can it
be deduced from sheer speculation.[50] An intangible
matter, evident premeditation is exhibited from these
circumstances --- (1) the time when the offender has
appeared determined to commit the crime; (2) the act
evidently indicating that the offender has clung to his
determination; (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
determination to commit the crime and the execution
thereof during which the offender could have reflected
upon the consequences of his act.[51] In the present
case, all three circumstances are present and clear
from the testimony alone of Mario. The TSN reads:
Q: That conversation about the seedling, how long did
it take?
A: Only about fifteen minutes also, and then they went
upstairs.
Q: How long did you stay there after they left you
watching the TV?
A: When they went up, my brother Joey also retired for
the night and I continued watching the TV and I turned
off the TV at round 10:00 oclock.
Q: After turning off the TV, what else did you do?
A: And then, I planned the method by which I could kill.
Q: Sino? (Literally: Who?)
Atty. Jackie A. Garcia:
Pinlano mo bang patayin sila? (Literally: Did you plan to
kill them?)
A: I did not plan. It was only after hearing the words of
Mrs. Soriano that she will have us killed.
Fiscal Amis:
When you switch off the TV at 10:00 oclock, how long
did you stay here in the sala before you went up?
A: After switching off the TV, I stayed for ten minutes
here and planning how to have them out of their room
and I thought of the telephone.

Q: After deciding about the method by which you can

have them out of the room, what did you do?
A: I got the bolo from my bag which was then placed
on a chair. (witness pointing to a chair beside the door)
I went upstairs and I placed it beside the laundry
basket.
Q: What time was that?
Atty. Jackie A. Garcia:
May I request of clarification. Maybe the time element
be clarified as to how long from the time to turn the TV
off?
Fiscal Amis:
7:15 when they brought the matter up, saka lang sila
na-scold and then again, they watched the TV until
10:00 oclock.
Q: Do you have a watch?

Q: What did you do when you went upstairs?

A: The phone was ringing and I told them that there
was somebody calling, so I knocked. When I knocked,
the door was opened by the old man who came out of
the room.
Q: Who was that old man?
A: Majen.
Q: You are referring to Majen Soriano?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: When he went out of the room, what happened?
A: He went by the telephone which is near the
staircase and he told me that theres nobody in the
telephone.
Fiscal Ignacio E. Domingo:

A: None, Maam.

Talaga bang nagriring ang telepono? (Literally: Was the

telephone ringing really?)

Q: What time approximately do you think was it when

you went upstairs?

A: The telephone was not really ringing. It was just my

alibi.

A: It took me ten minutes, after 10:00 oclock when I

stayed in sala and it took me around five minutes to
position the bolo and the telephone before I knock at
their door.

Fiscal Amis:

Q: How did you know that it was already 10:00 oclock

when you switched off the TV?
A: I was watching and there was no clock there.
(witness pointing to the TV)
Q: You said that you intended to kill the victim with the
use of bolo. Was that reason why you brought the bolo
with you?
A: I have no intention to use the bolo to kill them
initially, it was only that I thought of the bolo when we
were scolded.
Q: Was Majen Soriano able to shout for help?
A: Only at the time when I first hacked him.
Q: Was he still able to shout for help again?
A: No more.
Q: When he fell down the stairs, was he able to shout
for help?
A: He moaned when he fell down.[52]
Earlier, during the re-enactment, Mario testified,

At this juncture, PO3 Enrico Campose is posing as the

old man Majen Soriano. PO2 Soriano is positioning
himself upon instruction of the respondent Mario
Manlansing beside a small table where the telephone
was supposedly stationed.
Q: Then what happened?
A: I gave a telephone to Majen Soriano and then I took
two steps backward and I got the bolo which was
placed beside the laundry basket. When he saw that I
was holding a bolo, he sprang from his chair and I
immediately hacked him hitting his head and I saw
blood from his head, then he made several steps and
again, I hacked his head and he fell down the stairs.
Q: Where did you get the bolo?
A: I placed it there.
Q: When did you place it there?
A: When I planned to kill him and before I knock at
their door, I placed the bolo beside the laundry
basket. When he fell down the stairs, I followed him
there. (witness pointing to the place where the body
was then lying down) Majen rolled down the stairs and
his head was near the refrigerator (which is located at
the bottom of the stairs). (witness positioning himself
with his left foot on the first step and the right foot on

the second step and demonstrating that he again

hacked the victim Majen Soriano)

cases may only be considered as generic aggravating

circumstances.

Q: Saan-saan tinamaan ang victim? (Literally: Where

was the victim hit?)

Coming now to the consideration of mitigating

circumstances in the commission of the offense, Mario
contends that the trial court failed to take into account
the mitigating circumstances of his voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty.

A: I hacked the old man on his head and then I went

down and dragged him.
Q: Saan mo hinawakan? (Literally: Where did you hold
him?)
A: I placed my handkerchief in his mouth and dragged
him by his mouth toward the room while my other
hand was holding his clothes. I dragged him inside the
room and with the handkerchief stuffed in his mouth
was boiling with blood (kumukulo ng dugo).
Q: Was he still alive when you dragged inside the
room?
A: Buhay siya at nanginginig pa siya at doon na siya
nalagutan ng hininga.[53] (Literally: He was alive and
still shaking and only then did his breathing stop.)
(Underscoring ours.)
Based on these testimonies on record, we have no
hesitation in concluding that there was evident
premeditation in the commission of the
crimes. Likewise, treachery therein attendant was duly
proved.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission
without any risk to the aggressor, without the slightest
provocation on the victims part.[54] While mere
suddenness of attack does not automatically mean
treachery,[55] in these cases the narration of events
before and during the commission of the attacks
clearly indicate the presence of treachery. Appellants
were allowed inside the house of the couple. They were
even given supper after which the elderly couple went
upstairs to their bedroom. Appellants remained
downstairs and continued watching television. As the
OSG correctly points out, the victims in extending their
hospitality to their tenants, had neither hint nor
suspicion of the fate that Mario had in store for
them. When Mario lured Magin to the phone, the latter
was unaware he would be attacked.

For voluntary surrender to be a mitigating

circumstance, the following must concur: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary.[56] Recall that after
the killings, Mario went into hiding in Paniqui, Tarlac
and only surrendered after the Cabanatuan City police
were tipped on his whereabouts and sent a team to
arrest him. He did not spare the authorities the trouble
and expense necessary to search and capture
him. Clearly, Marios surrender was neither
spontaneous nor voluntary. Thus, the OSG was correct
when it said that Mario did not voluntarily surrender.
However, the trial court did err when it failed to
appreciate Marios plea of guilty to the two charges
against him. Under Article 13 (7)[57] of the Code, a plea
of guilty on arraignment is a mitigating circumstance.
Insofar as Joey is concerned, there was no voluntary
surrender and no voluntary plea of guilt, thus no
circumstance is available to him to mitigate his crime.
The rule is that when both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attend the commission of the crime, the
court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another
in consideration of their number and importance, for
the purpose of applying the penalty.[58]
In the case of Mario, the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation is offset by his spontaneous and
voluntary admission of guilt. Thus, there is only
treachery, treated as a generic aggravating
circumstance, left to consider against him. Applying
Article 64, par. 3,[59] of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty imposable is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period. Further applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is imprisonment
within the range of prision mayor as minimum and the
maximum of reclusion temporal as maximum.

In Jorjas case, Joey claims he had boxed Jorja before

Mario hacked her to death. But according to Mario, she
was asleep when he entered the bedroom. He said she
shouted, but not loud, before he stuffed her mouth with
a towel and slashed her neck. The attack on Jorja then
was also without warning and was treacherous.

In Joeys case, no mitigating circumstance could be

appreciated in his favor for unlike his brother he did not
plead guilty. Two generic aggravating circumstances,
evident premeditation and treachery, are thus to be
considered against him. Applying Article 64, par. 6, of
the Revised Penal Code,[60] and the Indeterminate
Sentence Law Joey shall serve the same indeterminate
sentence as Mario.

We must reiterate at this juncture, however, that the

evident premeditation and the treachery in the present

A final word on damages. The trial court awarded the

surviving heirs of the victims P250,000 by way of

funeral and other expenses and as actual damages. In

these cases, the prosecution failed to present any
receipts to substantiate their claims for expenses
allegedly incurred. To be entitled to such damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence available to
the injured party.[61] However, as the heirs of the
victims did actually incur funeral expenses, we are
justified in awarding P10,000 not for purposes of
indemnification, but by way of temperate damages, in
each case.[62]
We also find the award of P500,000 in moral damages
excessive. Moral damages are not meant to enrich an
injured party. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,
[63]
the award in each case should be reduced
to P50,000. In addition, P50,000 as civil indemnity in
each of these cases is mandatory and is granted to the
heirs of the victims without need of further proof other
than the commission of the crime.[64]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27 in Cabanatuan City in the consolidated
cases, Criminal Case No. 6150-AF and Criminal Case
No. 6151-AF, finding both Joey Manlansing and Mario
Manlansing, guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt
for the death of both Magin Soriano and Jorja Soriano,
is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Mario Manlansing and
Joey Manlansing are each declared GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of HOMICIDE defined in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Each appellant is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for an indefinite
period of 17 years, and 4 months as minimum to
twenty (20) years as maximum for each count of
homicide, with accessory penalties provided by
law. Further, each appellant is ORDERED to pay the
heirs of each victim P50,000 as civil
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as
temperate damages. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117402. July 21, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ROLLIE ALVARADO Y
LLANER, accused-appellant.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
At around 6:30 in the evening of May 26, 1991, Zosimo
Estao was stabbed dead by one of five (5) men who
arrived at his house located at Andromeda,
municipality of Angono, Rizal.An information for murder

qualified by treachery and evident premeditation was

thereafter filed against herein appellant Rollie Alvarado
and four (4) others whose true names and
whereabouts were unknown. As his co-accused all
remained at large, only appellant underwent trial.
From the collective testimonies of victim Zosimos wife
Felicidad Estao[1] daughter Rosalie Estao[2] and sister
Leonora Arocha,[3] the prosecutions version of the
killing was that on the aforementioned time, date and
place and while Felicidad and Zosimo were doing
certain household chores, appellant and his four (4)
companions arrived and hurled the following challenge
on Zosimo: Lumabas ka, kalbo, kung matapang ka. As
soon as Zosimo has gotten out of their house,
appellants companions held him on both arms. Rosalie
who was riding a bicycle and Leonora who was in her
house which was only three (3) meters away from
Zosimos residence, saw appellant stab the helpless
Zosimo on the stomach with a bolo which caused the
latter to fall on the ground. One Joselito dela Cruz,
Zosimos friend who tried to pacify appellant, was
likewise stabbed on the stomach. Zosimo was
thereafter rushed to the Angono District Hospital but
he expired before reaching it. At the hospital, Rosalie
saw appellant who she identified to the policemen
present as her fathers assailant.
The prosecution presented two (2) other
witnesses. Zosimos brother Paulito Estao testified on
the funeral expenses amounting to P17,000.00 he
shouldered. [4] Dr. Dario Gajardo, who performed the
post mortem examination of Zosimo, testified that as
per his findings, Zosimos body bore a wound on the left
ear and a fatal stab wound on the right lumbar region
caused by a single bladed weapon the trajectory of
which, was upward toward the posterior portion of the
body x x x. [5]
Appellant, as defense, denied any involvement in the
killing and averred that he likewise was a victim in the
incident in question. In brief, he claimed that he was on
his way to the house of an aunt after taking a snack at
a store in Arveemar Subdivision when he saw a
commotion involving two (2) drunk persons armed with
bolos chasing each other. Appellant tried to ignore the
incident by proceeding with his journey, but found
himself running away after noticing one of the drunk
men giving chase on him. He was hacked on the left
foot by his pursuer who he identified as one Pacing,
Zosimos brother-in-law. Appellant was thereafter
brought by his relatives to the Angono hospital but was
transferred to the Orthopedic hospital on that same
evening. He came to know that he was a suspect in the
killing of Zosimo when policemen were already
guarding him at both hospitals. He was immediately
brought to the police station after his
discharge. Despite Pacings assault on his person, he
did not file any case against the former. Appellant also
denied having any previous acquaintance with the

victim Zosimo and his wife Rosalie Estao, and claimed

that he was being implicated to the crime simply
because some of the other suspects were admittedly
his friends.[6]
Rafael Velasco, a laborer-friend of appellant, essentially
corroborated the latters story of denial and as to the
circumstances surrounding appellants hacking by
Pacing, having viewed the incident some twenty (20)
meters away from atop the wall near the river situated
between Arveemar Subdivision and Phase III of Doa
Justa Village, Angono Rizal. He, however, was not
among those who brought appellant to the hospital as
he was to visit a friend at that time.[7]
PO3 Edgar Fetalvero, one of the responding policemen
present at the Angono hospital, testified that Rosalie
mentioned the name Sonny Alvarado upon being asked
who her fathers assailant was. Furthermore, when
Rosalie was accompanied to the operating room where
appellant was staying and asked to identify the
suspect, she said she does not know the wounded
patient. This witness admitted not having executed any
affidavit on the matter as he deemed it proper to leave
it entirely to investigator Edmund Lorena who, after all,
was also present at the hospital and personally heard
all of Rosalies statements. He testified for the defense
upon the invitation of appellant and his counsel Atty.
Diloy.[8]
The last witness for the defense was Walter
Nuyda. Prior to his testimony, the prosecution,
apparently questioning the propriety of Nuyda being
allowed to testify, made manifest the fact of the
presence in court of this witness during the past
hearings despite Fiscal Venzons queries whether there
were other witnesses present to which defense counsel
replied none. The trial court nonetheless allowed
Nuyda to take the witness stand. Nuyda, who brought
along a sketch of where the killing took place for
reference, thus testified that while he was taking a
walk homeward bound, he heard two (2) women
shouting Namatay na si Sadam. Sadam referred to the
victim Zosimo as the latter was allegedly known to be
a trouble-maker when inebriated. He allegedly saw
appellant walking naturally and Rosalie riding a bicycle
already crying, at around 6:00 in the evening, but
denied having seen the actual killing of Zosimo.[9]
Having found the prosecutions story specifically the
eyewitness accounts of Rosalie and Leonora to be more
credible than appellants denial, the trial court in its
now assailed decision of January 7, 1994 convicted
appellant of murder, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Zosimos
heirs P17,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 for
Zosimos death and costs.
Before us, appellant assigns the following errors, the
gist of which evidently goes into credibility:

I
The court a quo grave erred in finding accusedappellant Rollie Alvarado guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt despite insufficiency of evidence and
also in disregarding the theory of the defense.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
which are biased and unreliable.
This is another occasion to stress anew that the trial
court, more than the reviewing tribunal, is in a better
position to gauge credibility of witnesses and to
properly appreciate the relative weight of the often
conflicting evidence for both parties,[10] having had the
direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and
determine if they were telling the truth or not.[11] And
since appellate courts do not deal with live witnesses
but only with the cold pages of a written record,[12] this
Court gives the highest respect to the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of eyewitness.[13] We have
gone over the records and found that the trial court
correctly upheld the prosecutions case.
Rosalie positively identified appellant in open court as
the one among the five (5) men who stabbed her
father Zosimo. She thus testified:
FISCAL ANG:
Q And can you tell us how was your father challenged?
A They were shouting at him, sir.
Q And after your father came out of your house, what
happened next?
A He was pulled out by the man and they stabbed him
Q Now, you said that he was pulled by the man, how
was he pulled and who pulled at your father?
A I could recognize only one of them, sir.
Q Now, how many were holding at your father?
A Four (4), sir.
Q How about the fifth one?
A He was the one who stabbed my father, sir.
Q Now, this person who stabbed to (sic) your father, do
you know him?
A Yes, sir
Q Now, is he in Court?
A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please point that person if he is in Court?

A Yes, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Q Now, how was your brother retrained by these 4

person (sic)?

The witness is pointing at a man wearing a white shirt,

who identified himself as Rollie Alvarado.
Q Now, Miss Witness, how (sic) the accused Rollie
Alvarado stabbed your father?
A While he was being held by the other man he
stabbed him on the left side of the stomach.

A He was held by the 4 men on both sides. Two on each

sides hold on the arms and shoulder.
Q So your brother was not able to move whatsoever?
A No, sir.

Q Now, what kind of weapon did he use?

Q And was not able to defend himself at any thrust if

any?

A Bolo, sir.[14]

A No more, sir.

Leonora corroborated Rosalies story by giving a similar

account:

Q After which Rollie Alvarado stabbed your brother?

Q Now, you said many persons went to your place, can

you recall who went to see your brother, can you recall
who were they?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they?
A They were Rollie Alvarado, Jun, Sammy also the
brother of Rollie Alvarado, they were five of them, I
could no longer recall the name of the rest.
Q So you were able to recall only 3 of the 5?
A Yes sir.
Q Now, if you will see the faces, will you be able to
recall who they are?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to the person on this room if any of the
5 persons is here in the Court room.

A Yes sir.[15]
Well settled is the rule that greater weight is given to
the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than the accuseds denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime.
[16]
This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving
evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified
on affirmative matters.[17]
Appellant would, however, attempt to undermine the
prosecutions case by claiming that:
1) Rosalie and Leonora are unreliable and biased
witnesses as they are the daughter and sister
respectively, of victim Zosimo,
2) Rosalie failed to identify appellant at the Angono
hospital and in fact mentioned another name Sonny
Alvarado as testified to by defense witness PO3
Fetalvero, and

A (Witness pointing to a man wearing a white shirt and

maong pants, who identified himself as Rollie
Alvarado.)

3) the prosecution failed to present as its witness

Joselito dela Cruz Zosimos friend who was himself
stabbed in the incident but who fortunately survived
who, according to appellant, is the only credible
witness who could identify the assailants of the victim.

Q After the 5 persons went to your house and call your

brother and challenged your brother, what happened
next?

These arguments do not persuade.

A He was held by the 4 companion of Rollie Alvarado

and he was stabbed by Rollie Alvarado.
Q When you say he, you mean Zosimo Estao?
A The one who stabbed Zosimo Estao.
Q Now, to clarify, correct me if I am wrong, your
brother Zosimo Estao was retrained by 4 persons and
after which Rollie Alvarado stabbed your brother, am I
correct?

On the first argument, the consistent ruling is that

mere relationship of witnesses to the victim, whether
by consanguinity or affinity, does not necessarily
impair their credibility as witnesses. This is specially so
when the witnesses, like Rosalie and Leonora, were
present at the scene of the crime.[18] Another way of
putting it is that relationship per se of witnesses with
the victim does not necessarily mean they are biased;
on the contrary, their relationship with the victim would
deter them from implicating anybody to the crime.
[19]
Furthermore, the records do not provide any
compelling answer as to why Rosalie and Leonora

would falsely accuse appellant. Equally settled is that

where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate
that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
they were not so actuated and their testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.[20]
On the second, assuming[21] that Rosalie indeed failed
to recognize appellant at the Angono hospital and
named another person as her fathers assailant, it could
nonetheless be explained by the fact that she was at
that time not in her normal equanimity - being in a
state of shock of grief over her fathers violent and
untimely death. As this Court has once said, it is not a
common experience for a person to witness the
perpetration of an atrocious crime. The shocking
experience usually distorts his/her normal pattern of
reaction.[22] Thus, Rosalies mistake in identifying
another person as one of the accused does not make
her an entirely untrustworthy witness. It does not make
her whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not
inconsistent with a truthful testimony.[23] Besides, what
is controlling is Rosalies in-court identification of
appellant, duly corroborated by Leonora, as the person
who delivered the death blow on Zosimo.
On the third, it is not for the defense to press any
speculation that a certain person not presented by the
prosecution would likely be the most credible witness
to bolster the case of the state. Suffice it to state that
the matter of deciding whom to present as witness for
the prosecution is not for the accused or for the trial
court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the
prosecutor. [24]
This Court will likewise leave undisturbed the following
finding of the trial court, that:
While there are some differences in the testimony of
Rosalie Estao in Court with sworn statements she gave
to the police regarding as to where she is at the time
the victim was stabbed, yet the Court feels that the
same are minor matters and would rather
strengthened (sic) the credibility of her testimony. [25]
Such finding is further supported by the dictum that
discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits
and testimonies made at the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit the witnesses, since ex-parte
affidavits are generally incomplete.[26]
We, however, take exception to the trial courts
pronouncement that what qualified the killing of
Zosimo to murder is the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. As earlier mentioned, the
information alleged treachery and evident
premeditation, not abuse of superior strength. It is the
existence of treachery which qualifies the crime to
murder since Zosimo was killed after already being in a
helpless condition,[27] it appearing that Zosimos hands

were being held by appellants companions before he

was stabbed by appellant. Granting that abuse of
superior strength was also alleged, it is nonetheless
absorbed in treachery.[28]
Lastly, on the issue of penalty, the Office of the
Solicitor General makes the following observation and
recommendation:
We observe that a modification in the penalty imposed
on the appellant is called for in view of the amendment
of Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by Republic Act
No. 7659 [1993]. As amended by Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 7659 [1993] and explained by this
Honorable Court in People v. Cua, G.R. No. 82292,
March 1, 1995, the duration of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years and
one day to forty years. In view of the fact that the
penalty of reclusion perpetua now has a specified
duration, a judgment imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua should specify a straight
penalty within the range of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Given the presence of treachery and
evident premeditation, any one of which serves to
qualify the crime to murder, we respectfully
recommend that the penalty of thirty-four (34) years
of reclusion perpetua be meted out to the appellant.
[29]

We cannot accede to this recommendation in view of

this Courts En Banc Resolution in People v. Lucas dated
January 9, 1995[30] where it was clarified that Although
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration
of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one
(1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible
penalty. Reclusion perpetua, therefore, retains its
nature as having no minimum, medium and maximum
periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the crime.[31]
WHEREFORE, the modification of a particular
disquisition made by the trial court notwithstanding
(re: treachery as the qualifying circumstance and not
abuse of superior strength), appellants conviction for
murder and the penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary
liabilities imposed on him are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 154182. December 17, 2004]

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z.
TEVES, petitioners, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether a public
official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for unlawful
intervention, in his official capacity, in the issuance of a
license in favor of a business enterprise in which he
has a pecuniary interest may be convicted, together
with his spouse, of violation of that same provision
premised on his mere possession of such interest.
Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros
Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul
and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision[1] of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2337 convicting
them of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law
for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia.
The indictment reads:[2]
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of
the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses EDGAR Y.
TEVES and TERESITA TEVES of violation of Section 3(h)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime
subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being
then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,
committing the crime-herein charged in relation to,
while in the performance and taking advantage of his
official functions, and conspiring and confederating
with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the
issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to
operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in
favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y.
Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest
therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is
actually owned and operated by him and
accused Teresita Teves.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the
petitioners pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and trial were
thereafter set.

demurrer to evidence.[4] On 29 July 1998, the

Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits A to S of the
prosecutions evidence but rejected Exhibits T, U, and V.
[5]
It also denied petitioners demurrer to evidence,[6] as
well as their motion for reconsideration.[7] This
notwithstanding, the petitioners filed a Manifestation
that they were, nonetheless, dispensing with the
presentation of witnesses because the evidence on
record are inadequate to support their conviction.
On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
decision[8] (1) convicting petitioners Edgar and Teresita
Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law;
(2) imposing upon them an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as
minimum to twelve years as maximum; and (3)
ordering the confiscation of all their rights, interests,
and participation in the assets and properties of the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the
Government, as well as perpetual disqualification from
public office.[9] The conviction was anchored on the
finding that the petitioners possessed pecuniary
interest in the said business enterprise on the grounds
that (a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves
divested himself of his pecuniary interest in said
cockpit; (b) as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of
record the owner/licensee of the cockpit; and (c) since
Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each
other from 1983 until 1992, their property relations as
husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, was that of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over which
the petitioners have pecuniary interest. This pecuniary
interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991, and thus falls under the prohibited
acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
The Sandiganbayan, however, absolved the petitioners
of the charge of causing the issuance of a business
permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center on or about 4 February 1992 for not
being well-founded.
On 26 August 2002, the petitioners filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari[10] seeking to annul and
set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan.

The petitioners and the prosecution agreed on the

authenticity of the prosecutions documentary
evidence. Thus, the prosecution dispensed with the
testimonies of witnesses and formally offered its
documentary evidence marked as Exhibits A to V.[3]

At first, we denied the petition for failure of the

petitioners to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan
committed any reversible error in the challenged
decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.[11] But upon
petitioners motion for reconsideration,[12] we reinstated
the petition.[13]

On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their

Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the
prosecution and moved for leave of court to file a

The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan

committed serious and palpable errors in convicting
them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged

unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his official

capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation
of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. But they were
convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary
interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991,
which is essentially different from the offense with
which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist
that their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them was
transgressed because they were never apprised at any
stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that
they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried
for, violation of the LGC of 1991.
The variance doctrine invoked by the respondent is but
a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over
their constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against them.

any business, contract, or transaction in connection

with which the person possessing the financial interest
intervenes in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or any law from having
any interest. The use of the conjunctive word or
demonstrates the alternative mode or nature of the
manner of execution of the final element of the
violation of the provision. Although the information
may have alleged only one of the modalities of
committing the offense, the other mode is deemed
included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. There
was, therefore, no violation of the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the nature or cause of
the accusation against them in view of the variance
doctrine, which finds statutory support in Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

Second, according to the petitioners, their alleged

prohibited pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit in
1992 was not proved. The Sandiganbayan presumed
that since Mayor Teves was the cockpit operator and
licensee in 1989, said interest continued to exist until
1992. It also presumed that the cockpit was the
conjugal property of Mayor Teves and his wife, and that
their pecuniary interest thereof was direct. But under
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, any
interest thereon is at most inchoate and indirect.

Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law provides:

Also assigned as glaring error is the conviction of

Teresita Teves, who is not a public officer. In the
information, only Mayor Teves was accused of having a
direct financial or pecuniary interest in the operation of
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Negros
Oriental. His wife was merely charged as a coconspirator of her husbands alleged act of while in the
performance and taking advantage of his official
functions, willfully, unlawfully and criminally caus[ing]
the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license
to operate the said cockpit arena. Teresita Teves could
not be convicted because conspiracy was not
established. Besides, the Sandiganbayan had already
absolved the petitioners of this offense.
On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), insists that the
uncontroverted documentary evidence proved that
petitioner Edgar Teves had direct pecuniary interest
over the cockpit in question as early as 26 September
1983. That interest continued even though he
transferred the management thereof to his wife
Teresita Teves in 1992, since their property relations
were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains.
The existence of that prohibited interest is by itself a
criminal offense under Section 89(2) of the LGC of
1991. It is necessarily included in the offense charged
against the petitioners, i.e., for violation of Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law, which proscribes the possession
of a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in

The petition is not totally devoid of merit.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In

addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements set out in the afore-quoted
legislative definition of the crime of violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction;
3. He either
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest; or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by any law.
There are, therefore, two modes by which a public
officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law. The first mode is if in connection with his
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction, the public officer intervenes or takes part
in his official capacity. The second mode is when he is
prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or any law.

We quote herein the Sandiganbayans declaration

regarding petitioners culpability anent the first mode:
[T]hat portion of the Information which seeks to
indict the spouses Teves for his causing the
issuance of a business permit/license to operate
the Valencia cockpit on or about February 4, 1992 is
not well-founded.
Mayor Edgar Teves could not have issued a
permit to operate the cockpit in the year 1992
because as of January 1, 1992 the license could be
issued only by the Sangguniang Bayan. He may have
issued the permit or license in 1991 or even before
that when he legally could, but that is not the charge.
The charge is for acts committed in 1992. [14] [Emphasis
supplied].
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against
Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business
permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center is not well-founded. This it based,
and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the
Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to
operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed,
under Section 447(3)[15] of the LGC of 1991, which took
effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan
that has the authority to issue a license for the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits.
Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer
of the Sangguniang Bayan,[16] under the LGC of 1991,
the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could
not have intervened or taken part in his official
capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the
material time, as alleged in the information, because
he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. [17]
A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict Teresita
Teves as a co-conspirator in the absence of a finding
that Mayor Teves himself is guilty of the offense
charged. In short, the Sandiganbayan correctly
absolved the petitioners of the charge based on the
first mode. And there is no need to belabor this point.
The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the
petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law based on the second mode. It reasoned that the
evidence overwhelmingly evinces that Mayor Teves had
a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.
The information accuses petitioner Edgar Teves, then
Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, of
causing, while in the performance and taking
advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and
confederating with his wife the issuance of the
appropriate business permit/license to operate the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one

Daniel Teves. The last part of the dispositive portion of

the information states that said accused Edgar Y.
Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest
therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is
actually owned and operated by him and
accused Teresita Teves.
A careful reading of the information reveals that the
afore-quoted last part thereof is merely an allegation of
the second element of the crime, which is, that he has
a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction. Not by any stretch of
imagination can it be discerned or construed that the
afore-quoted last part of the information charges the
petitioners with the second mode by which Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law may be violated. Hence, we agree
with the petitioners that the charge was for unlawful
intervention in the issuance of the license to operate
the Valencia Cockpit. There was no charge for
possession of pecuniary interest prohibited by law.
However, the evidence for the prosecution has
established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental,[18] owned the cockpit in
question. In his sworn application for registration of
cockpit filed on 26 September 1983[19] with the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City,
as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January
1989[20] he stated that he is the owner and manager of
the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested
himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his
ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a
thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual
with things of that nature.[21] His affidavit[22] dated 27
September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990
he turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs.
Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no
longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity
due to other work pressure is not sufficient proof that
he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit.
Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to
Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner
of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over
the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would
have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly
held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained
married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as
such their property relation can be presumed to be that
of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all
the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be
owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his
interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is,

therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of

1991, which reads:

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary

interest in any business, contract or transaction; and

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary

Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:

3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the

Constitution or any law.

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other

games licensed by a local government unit. [Emphasis
supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest. But can the
petitioners be convicted thereof, considering that it
was not charged in the information?
The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5,
Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. When there is a variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint
or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter.
The elements of the offense charged in this case, which
is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit
license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law, are
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction,
whether or not prohibited by law; and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest.
On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the
offense proved, which is possession of prohibited
interest in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law, are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense

proved constitute or form part of those constituting the
offense charged. Put differently, the first and second
elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the
information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the
offense proved is necessarily included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds
application to this case, thereby warranting the
conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense
proved.
The next question we have to grapple with is under
what law should petitioner Edgar Teves be punished. It
must be observed that Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law is a general provision, it being applicable to all
prohibited interests; while Section 89(2) of the LGC of
1991 is a special provision, as it specifically treats of
interest in a cockpit. Notably, the two statutes provide
for different penalties. The Anti-Graft Law, particularly
Section 9, provides as follows:
SEC. 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public official or
private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this
Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than
six years and one month nor more than fifteen years,
perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of
any prohibited interest.
On the other hand, Section 514 of the LGC of 1991
prescribes a lighter penalty; thus:
SECTION 514. Engaging in Prohibited Business
Transactions or Possessing Illegal Pecuniary Interest.
Any local official and any person or persons dealing
with him who violate the prohibitions provided in
Section 89 of Book I hereof shall be punished with
imprisonment for six months and one day to six years,
or a fine of not less than Three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at
the discretion of the court.
It is a rule of statutory construction that where one
statute deals with a subject in general terms, and
another deals with a part of the same subject in a more
detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible;
but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail
regardless of whether it was passed prior to the
general statute.[23] Or where two statutes are of
contrary tenor or of different dates but are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one

designed therefor specially should prevail over the

other.[24]
Conformably with these rules, the LGC of 1991, which
specifically prohibits local officials from possessing
pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local
government unit and which, in itself, prescribes the
punishment for violation thereof, is paramount to the
Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes possession of
prohibited interest in a general manner. Moreover, the
latter took effect on 17 August 1960, while the former
became effective on 1 January 1991. Being the earlier
statute, the Anti-Graft Law has to yield to the LGC of
1991, which is the later expression of legislative will. [25]
In the imposition on petitioner Edgar Teves of the
penalty provided in the LGC of 1991, we take judicial
notice of the fact that under the old LGC, mere
possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not
among the prohibitions enumerated in Section
41[26] thereof. Such possession became unlawful or
prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991,
which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar
Teves stands charged with an offense in connection
with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4
February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of
the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much
aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance thereof
would not excuse him from criminal liability, such
would justify the imposition of the lighter penalty of a
fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.
Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted.
The charge against her is conspiracy in causing the
issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to
operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center.
For this charge, she was acquitted. But as discussed
earlier, that charge also includes conspiracy in the
possession of prohibited interest.
Conspiracy must be established separately from the
crime itself and must meet the same degree of
proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence,
for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime,
all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be
strong enough to show community of criminal design.
[27]

Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married

to an erring spouse.[28] For a spouse or any person to
be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of
the others, it is essential that there be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design. Except when he is
the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt act as a
direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the
crime planned to be committed. The overt act must

consist of active participation in the actual commission

of the crime itself or of moral assistance to his coconspirators.[29]
Section 4(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, the provision which
applies to private individuals, states:
SEC. 4. Prohibitions on private individuals.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
We find no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita
Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused,
her husband to commit the second mode of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of
the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December
1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary
interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was
before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January
1990, that he transferred the management of the
cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it
was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of
the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications
for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in
question dated 28 January 1990[30]and 18 February
1991,[31] she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and
Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her renewal
application dated 6 January 1992,[32] she referred to
herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise
in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for
Calendar Years 1991[33] and 1992,[34] which she
submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992,
respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the
cockpit registration, she signed her name as
Operator/Licensee.
The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly pass as
acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the
violation of the Anti-Graft Law that would render her
equally liable as her husband. If ever she did those
acts, it was because she herself was an owner of the
cockpit. Not being a public official, she was not
prohibited from holding an interest in cockpit.
Prudence, however, dictates that she too should have
divested herself of her ownership over the cockpit
upon the effectivity of the LGC of 1991; otherwise, as
stated earlier, considering her property relation with
her husband, her ownership would result in vesting
direct prohibited interest upon her husband.
In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral
certainty of guilt.[35] The burden of proof is upon the
prosecution to establish each and every element of the
crime and that the accused is either responsible for its
commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since

no conspiracy was proved, the acquittal of petitioner

Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 16 July 2002
Decision of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, in
Criminal Case No. 2337 is hereby MODIFIED in that (1)
EDGAR Y. TEVES is convicted of violation of Section 3(h)
of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, for possession of pecuniary or financial

interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section

89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991, and is
sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000; and (2) TERESITA
Z. TEVES is hereby ACQUITTED of such offense.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.