The effect does not exist in the conditions that are separated or
combined[.]
Therefore, how can that which is not found in the conditions
come to be From the conditions?
If things did not exist without essence, the phrase, "When this
exists so this will be," would not be acceptable.
As for the other key premise, recall that the causal realist's main
objection to the regularity theory is that it is completely
inexplicable how an effect follows from or is causally dependent
on certain conditions, if the effect is neither present in some form
in the conditions nor necessarily connected to the conditions. But,
Garfield contends that this objection (as well as the causal-power
theory) presupposes that both the conditions and the effect are not
sunya, that they must have an essence. That is to say, according to
Garfield , Nagarjuna responds "by drawing attention to the
connection between a causal power view of causation and an
essentialist view of phenomena." In other words, "if one views
phenomena as having and as emerging from causal powers, one
views them as having essences and as being connected to the
essences of other phenomena."5 But now, the causal realist has a
problem, because verse 10, the premise (a), denies precisely what
the causal realist is insisting on. It denies the presupposition that
causation is a relationship between independent substances with
essential natures. Premise (a) claims that there can be no causal
relationship, substantive or not, between things that are not sunya.
Therefore, Garfield contends, Nagarjuna is arguing that
thing that it is sOnya is not that that thing lacks an essence or selfnature, but that it possess that essence or self-nature by virtue of
conventions.
I will argue in the last section that this is close to what Nagarjuna
eventually recommends, but to "accept the utility of our causal
discourse and explanatory practices" does not necessarily mean
that causation is empty or a matter of convention. Moreover, once
again, why would it not be just as useful to apply causation to
things-in-themselves? Finally, if the important purpose of chapter
1 is to defend the emptiness of causation, it is odd that the term is
never mentioned. How could Nagarjuna expect the reader to
know that "without essence" is a synonym for sunyata and, more
important, that it is to mean "to exist as a convention?" In fact, I
believe that it is not his concern in chapter 1 to defend a regularity
theory of prati-- tyasamutpada, empty or not, against the theories
of a causal realist.
If things did not exist without essence, the phrase, "When this
exists so this will be," would not be acceptable.
Or, equivalently:
We are used to dealing with all kinds of causal questions, such as,
for example, "Why do you think that a short in the electrical
system caused the fire?" or "What brought on his nervous
breakdown?" The answer we give to any causal question clearly
depends on our knowledge of the particular facts of the situation
and our general knowledge of such things as electrical systems
and the symptoms and causes of a nervous breakdown. I would
think that there are many of us who have no idea how to answer
one or the other or both of these questions. Anyone who lacks the
basic conceptual or theoretical understanding of a phenomenon
would not know what to look for or even where to begin.
Nevertheless, as a result of past experience, we are certain that
there must be, in each situation, some actual set of conditions that
best explains
the existence of any
phenomenon.
Pratityasamutpada can be taken, on the simplest, most
rudimentary level, to refer to this universally accepted practice
and belief that everything has a cause, that every phenomenon is
dependently arisen. We might call this the scientific principle of
pratityasamutpada.
We would not have the rudimentary notion of cause and effect, for
example, unless we experienced not only the regularity with
which sequences of events occur but also the particular kinds of
effects associated with particular kinds of things. We experience
the heat or burning of fire, the sounds of animals, the breaking of
glass by hard objects, and so forth. Our conception of causation,
in terms of its origin, is connected not only to temporal succession
but also to the observable properties of various kinds of objects
and of our ideas of the nature of these objects and properties. The
crucial implication of the contingent origin of our ideas and
beliefs about causation is that the very meaning of the term,
indeed of any term, is constituted by its place in a web of other
concepts and beliefs.
The term drsti (view) is used to refer to the answer we give to this
kind of question, and it is understood that the answer, the view
given, must be rationally compelling, either logically
demonstrable or self-evident. This is because, according to the
essentialist view of meaning, the relationship between a term and
its designatum must be necessary and eternal. Nagarjuna realizes
that no drs.ti can satisfy this condition, but it remains an obsession
nevertheless. Frederick Streng has it right when he explicates drsti
as standing for "illusory mental effort-a view, or doctrine that
claims absolutely validity on the grounds that it asserts a selfevident truth."19 Streng could be talking about treating causation
as a necessary connection or causal powers when he remarks on
the "inappropriateness of our acting as if we could discern a selfevident reality either in the conditioned 'thing' or in some
identifiable 'element' of our experience (like 'origination,'
'duration,' or 'cessation')." The problem, he notes, is that "[b]y
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its
knowledge it is burdened by questions which, prescribed by the
very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as
transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.21
It is not difficult to see that that "all this is sunya" declares that we
should relinquish the view of metaphysical realism. We should
resist being tempted by the view that what we experience and
believe about our world are mere representations that may or may
not correspond to (or be "made true by") the real existents, the
"inherent existents," that exist independent of and beyond our
experience. The danger of operating from this view, Nagarjuna
advises, is that "If you perceive the existence of all things in terms
of their [inherent] essence, then this perception of all things will
be without the perception of causes and conditions" (24:16). The
consequence of seeking for the real, independent essence of
things, of thinking that we only experience the appearance of
what really exists, is to overlook or confine to the background the
causal and semantic relationships that are actually at work in
giving us the world that we have, all that should count as real.
The truth, Rorty explains (and this is the causal side of the
doctrine of pratityasamutpada), is that