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Surviving the return to normalcy:

Social movements, democratic
consolidation and economic
restructuring
Philip Oxhorn
Published online: 04 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Philip Oxhorn (1996) Surviving the return to normalcy: Social movements,
democratic consolidation and economic restructuring, International Review of Sociology: Revue
Internationale de Sociologie, 6:1, 117-134, DOI: 10.1080/03906701.1996.9971189
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03906701.1996.9971189

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International Review of SociologyRevue Internationale de Sociologie, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1996

Surviving the Return to 'Normalcy': Social Movements,

Democratic Consolidation and Economic Restructuring*
PHILIP OXHORN

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Introduction
As most of Latin America confronts the dual challenge of consolidating fragile
democratic regimes and restoring economic dynamism, the political relevance of
social movements is ambiguous. On the one hand, social movements and grassroots
mobilization more generally can help alleviate many of the destabilizing pressures
associated with political and economic change. They offer alternative channels for
participation and building consensus which can be complementary to the role
played by political parties. Through self-help initiatives and consensus-building at
the local level, they can contribute to a decrease in the pressures placed on the
state. Social movements can also be a source of moderation by rejecting the
excessive politicization and populist tendencies associated with political parties and
elites in the region, especially during periods of rapid political and economic
change.
On the other hand, the social movements which had played important roles in
successful transitions to democracy generally experienced a dramatic demobilization after democratic politics were restored. In fact, this demobilization actually
began during the democratic transition itself, as political parties quickly come to
dominate political participation once the first elections were announced by the
authoritarian regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Such demobilization, particularly of the lower classes or popular sectors, has continued long after the return
to democracy. It stands in stark contrast to the experience under many repressive
authoritarian regimes, which popular mobilizations helped undermine. Paradoxically, redemocratization in Latin America has been associated with the retreat of
civil society (Oxhorn, forthcoming a). Rather than expanding to fill the new
political space that democracy should offer social movements, once important
movements seem to lose their political significance and all but disappear. In other
words, as the "costs" of participating in collective action are lowered with the
restoration of democratic political rights, the actual level of collective action also
appears to decline. Yet democratic transitions in Latin America have hardly been
panaceas for resolving popular sector needs and demands, particularly in terms of
poverty alleviation and growing income inequality. For example, in countries like
Argentina, Brazil and Peru, such demobilization has occurred in the midst of the
tremendous economic dislocations caused by hyper-inflation, high levels of unemployment and economic restructuring. Whereas the popular sectors seemed to
organize in order to protect themselves from the socio-economic dislocations
associated with repressive authoritarian rule, they seem to have lost their dynamism
in the face of similar dislocations under less repressive civilian democratic regimes.
Little research has been done on the dynamics of such demobilization processes,
not to mention their longer term significance for democratic consolidation.
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O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), for example, assert that this demobilization
reflects the preponderant role that political parties play in organizing elections.
They neither analyze the actual ways in which political parties curtail autonomous
popular sector mobilization, nor do they explore the implications of such processes
for nature of political participation under the subsequent democratic regime
(Oxhom, 1994a).
More generally, Tarrow suggests that this rise and fall of social movement
activity during democratic transitions reflects the inherent nature of periods of mass
social mobilization, which tend to come in 'waves of mobilization' or 'cycles of
protest' (Tarrow, 1989a, b, 1991). Waves of mobilizations are seen as collective
responses to expanding political opportunities. Mobilization spreads through society
as the costs and risks of collective action decrease, while the potential benefits
increase. Such waves either end abruptly, as a result of state repression, or more
slowly with the '...institutionalization of the most successful movements, factionalization within them and between them and new groups which rise on the crest of
the wave, and the exhaustion of mass political involvement' (Tarrow, 1991, p. 15).
Citing examples of studies of protest movements in both developed and developing
countries, Tarrow implies a clear teleology in the evolution of social movement
activity that inevitably ends with the demobilization and/or political marginalization of mass-based social movements.
The problem with this kind of characterization is that it is too simplistic
and mechanical when applied to democratic transitions in Latin America. As
Tarrow himself notes, most theories dealing with the cyclical nature of social
mobilization were developed in the context of liberal democratic states (Tarrow,
1991, p. 13). The usefulness of such theories for understanding processes of regime
change in non-democratic states is problematic for several reasons. The exclusionary nature of authoritarian regimes can generate extensive social mobilization
before there is any observable change in the political opportunity structure, and
such mobilization can then help create new political opportunities by increasing
the likelihood that a democratic transition will begin (Garretn, 1989a; Oxhom,
1996).1 As a result, it becomes difficult to determine precisely when mobilizational
cycles begin. Similarly, the extreme levels of uncertainty that define transition
processes at all of their various stages make it difficult to categorize social
mobilization according to discrete periods or any specific teleology. Social mobilization appears to decline at the precise moment that political opportunities reach
a new peak. The social mobilization that often precedes political liberalization
may provide a reservoir of organizational experiences that could influence subsequent mobilization after the regime change. Even the extent and nature of
political change after a transition often remains ambiguous (Hagopian, 1993). At
the same time, only some demands expressed through social mobilization will have
been met (and usually only partially), while new demands and expectations are
likely to arise. The new political rules of the game will favor some actors over
others. Old patterns of mobilization and organization which were appropriate for
the authoritarian context may no longer be effective in articulating political
demands after the transition, forcing those involved in social mobilization to seek
alternative forms of participation and organization. Analyzing social mobilization in
terms of discrete cycles or waves that only partially overlap with different phases in
processes of regime change and democratic consolidation obscures sources of
continuity and discontinuity in mass political participation. In particular, the
insights that previous patterns of social mobilization during the authoritarian period

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119

can shed on the future potential for social mobilization under a democratic regime
might be lost.
These various sources of ambiguity underscore the need for more detailed
theoretical and empirical analyses of how this social demobilization actually comes
about and, more importantly, why it continues after the instauration of democratic
institutions. As part of such an effort, this paper will examine popular sector
mobilization. The first section will argue that popular sector organizational activity
can serve as a foundation for democratic consolidation in Latin American by
helping to create strong civil societies. The second section will then examine the
causes of popular sector demobilization during and after democratic transitions.
Three sets of factors will be emphasized: (1) The dominance of political parties
and/or populist leaders in electoral politics; (2) the retreat of the Catholic Church
from more politically conspicuous activities; and (3) the difficulties of translating
political experiences under an authoritarian regime to the practice of democratic
politics. The implications of these theoretical arguments will then be explored by
briefly contrasting the experiences of popular sector mobilization in Chile and El
Salvador.
The Popular Sectors, Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation
High levels of popular sector mobilization are generally viewed as politically
destabilizing in Latin America.2 This is based on the assumption that such
mobilization will inevitably place excessive demands upon the state. Such an
assumption is consistent with emergence of the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes
in a number of countries throughout the region in the 1960s and 1970s. It also
contributed to the institutionalization of rigid, hierarchical processes of controlled
inclusion for the popular sectors dating back at least to the 1930s (Oxhorn, 1996a).
Though state corporatism, populist appeals and clientelism, political elites have
been able to limit popular sector political participation, subordinating popular
sector collective interests to their own. When processes of controlled inclusion broke
down and were no longer able to contain rising popular sector pressures for reform,
the result was the violent imposition of authoritarian rule.
Controlled inclusion is both a cause and an effect of the weak civil societies found
in most Latin American countries. The kinds of self-constituted, autonomous
collective actors which contributed to the emergence of strong civil societies in
Western Europe, Canada and the United States did not emerge in most of Latin
America. Labor movements, for example, were closely tied to state corporatist
institutions (as in Mexico and Brazil), or politicized through their excessive
dependence on elite-dominated political parties (as in Argentina and Chile).3 This
general problem was accentuated by the notorious concentration of economic and
political resources in Latin America. In political terms, the extreme concentration
of resources has led to the polarization of Latin American societies between the
'haves' and 'have-nots' as popular sector mobilization rises.
Ironically, controlled inclusion exacerbated the destabilizing effects of this polarization. The hierarchical nature of controlled inclusion necessarily directed all
societal demands toward a centralized state for their ultimate resolution. The state
in effect became the sole referent for seeking responses to demands and there were
only limited self-help initiatives within civil society. Even labor disputes frequently
became politicized through some form of state intervention.4 This state-centered
characteristic of controlled inclusion contributed to the politicized nature of most

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P. Oxhorn

Latin American states, and generated pressures for change that eventually could not
be contained in a number of countries. When this happened, democratic regimes
were violently overthrown, and even limited processes of controlled inclusion were
rolled back (Oxhorn, 1996a).
The 1990s offer a radically different context for understanding popular sector
mobilization. Throughout the region, there has been a gradual shift away from
state-centered import-substituting industrialization (ISI) as a development model to
an outward-oriented market-based development model with only a minimal state
role in the economy. The so-called crisis of the developmental state has further
contributed to a new political style in which the state is no longer portrayed as the
sole, or even preferred, referent when seeking the resolution of social demands.
State mediation has been superseded by mediation through the market as private
actors (both individuals and groups) seek solutions to their problems.
This is perhaps most clear hi the increasingly predominant strategy for dealing
with poverty and unemployment in the region: targeted assistance (Oxhorn and
Ducatenzeiler, 1994). Minimal state welfare provisions are channelled directly to
the poor in order to allow them to overcome any obstacles to their full participation
in the market. The emphasis is on short-term solutions which will allow these
people to become self-supporting through their participation in the labor market. In
order to further increase the efficiency of social welfare services, their administration is decentralized to allow for implementation at the community level. Municipal
governments, non-governmental agencies and, in many instances, popular organizations formed by the poor play important roles in designing services and
determining the allocation of funds. Overly centralized and bureaucratized social
welfare programs are generally accepted as being inefficient and corrupt. Old
state-corporatist institutions appear to have only limited usefulness for containing
popular sector mobilization under the new development model, although they may
play a pivotal role in silencing initial opposition to the initial imposition of that
development model.
Targeted assistance can easily lead to new forms of controlled inclusion of the
popular sectors (Dresser, 1992). It also does not adequately address the underlying
structural causes of poverty and inequality in Latin America (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler, 1994). But targeted assistance underscores some important reasons why high
levels of popular sector mobilization will not be as potentially destabilizing in the
future as they might have been in the past. Targeted assistance, and the new
development model which it undergirds, are not state-centric. They represent the
emergence of alternative channels for participation and building consensus outside
of the central state apparatus. The emphasis in both is clearly on the economic
realm, but it is not limited (intentionally or not) to the market. Decentralization of
the state and its decreased economic role have opened up new channels for
participation at the local or grassroots level, as well as informal channels outside of
state and political party institutions. State-society relations in general have been
altered, opening up substantially more space for society-based activities which do
not threaten to overload state institutions as was feared in the past.
At the same time, recent authoritarian regimes have contributed to the emergence of a new type of popular sector organizational activity. Such activity was a
response to the authoritarian experience itself. It reflected the nature of state
repression, as well as the various economic dislocations suffered by the popular
sectors as a consequence of authoritarian rule and efforts to deal with economic
stagnation (Oxhorn, 1996 a, b). This new type of organizational activity emerged

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throughout virtually all of the region.5 While the organizations ran a wide gamut,
they often shared a number of common characteristics. For our current purposes,
three are worth highlighting.
First, this particular type of popular mobilization is not maximalist in either its
political demands or expectations. Unlike their revolutionary predecessors of the
1960s, the popular organizations and movements of the 1980s and 1990s have
generally not been concerned with taking power or seizing control of the state.
Similarly, their emphasis is on reform rather than revolutionary change. There is
a clear dynamic of self-help: groups seeking to resolve their own immediate
problems and contribute to more gradual processes of social transformation. This
can help reduce pressures on state resources. These organizations can also help
increase the efficiency of existing social welfare programs, as targeted assistance
programs recognize. At the same time, these new organizations are jealous of
maintaining their autonomy from outside actors, particularly the state and political
parties. As a result, popular mobilization of this sort can contribute to greater levels
of societal pluralism, a hallmark of a strong civil society (Schmitter, 1986).6
A second common feature of this type of popular mobilization is that it is
generally organized at the grassroots or community level. This distinguishes this
kind of organizational activity from functionally-based organizations, particularly
the labor movements and class-based peasant movements which traditionally
supported the radical left in Latin America. Such organizations are generally
concerned with consumption-oriented demands rather than relations of production,
and this further contributes to their relative pragmatism on political matters.
Finally, this organizational activity stresses participation and internal democracy.
Consensus is the preferred mechanism for arriving at decisions. As such, this kind
of popular mobilization can reinforce tendencies toward moderation and pluralism.
It can serve as a pillar for democratic politics, rather than an inherent threat to
democratic stability. Moreover, this emphasis on participation and democracy
suggests that popular mobilization can serve as a bulwark against the real threats
to stability caused by populism (Oxhorn, 1996b). Popular sector organizations of
the kind being discussed here reject populism, as well as clientelism, given their
inherently undemocratic and hierarchical characteristics. Similarly, populist appeals
are at odds with these organizations' self-help dynamic. This suggests that higher
levels of popular mobilization, involving more and more of the urban and rural
poor, is the surest way to prevent a return of populist tendencies which have been
a primary source of instability (both politically and economically) throughout Latin
America at least since the 1930s and 1940s.
Popular sector mobilization (at least in this form) unambiguously helps strengthen
Latin American civil societies. It can serve as an important democratic counterweight to authoritarian tendencies at the level of the political elite and central state
apparatus. As such, popular sector organizational activity can contribute to one of
the fundamental defining concepts of political democracy: cooperation (Schmitter and
Karl, 1991). It can be an important factor in determining whether fragile democratization processes consolidate themselves, finally reversing the cyclical pattern of
politics which has characterized Latin America for most of this century.
Earlier processes of controlled inclusion prevented this from taking place by
blocking the emergence of self-constituted, autonomous popular sector mobilization. Controlled inclusion ultimately reinforced the subordinate position of popular
sectors within Latin American societies, regardless of any short-term benefits they
might have received (Oxhorn, 1996b). Recent authoritarian regimes and the

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P. Oxhom

economic crisis of the 1980s have undermined controlled inclusion in every

country. At the same time, they contributed to the emergence of a new type of
popular sector organizational activity which can help curb the various excesses of
the past which contributed to the collapse of previous democratic experiments. In
this respect, the new democratic regimes have an important advantage in comparison to their predecessors.
To some, this undoubtedly would appear to be an overly idealistic and romanticized vision of popular sector organizational activity. Obviously, popular
organizations are neither perfect nor pure and innocent. Many of the same
problems that plague the larger societies of which they form a part also surface
within popular organizations.7 Still, popular organizational activity as described
here represents something newand very positivethat should be encouraged, not
feared. Ironically, even the targeted assistance programs which had their origins in
Pinochet's Chile recognize (at least rhetorically) the positive contributions that these
kinds of organizations can make toward democratic political stability and improved
standards of living for the poor (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler, 1994).
Popular organizations still remain weak. Despite their self-dynamic, the urban
and rural poor's poverty necessitates significant external assistance. Isolation and a
complete lack of relations with the larger political system, especially the state and
political parties, is unrealistic and counter-productive. Under authoritarian regimes,
popular organizations may have had little choice. The return to democracy,
however, offers new opportunities for popular organizations, as well as new
challenges. Yet, as already noted, popular organizations seem to be having a
difficult time adapting to these, to the extent that their continued political relevance
is now in doubt. This should be of concern to those striving to consolidate
democratic regimes in the region. The challenge for those concerned with promoting Latin American democracy is to preserve and take advantage of past
organizational experiences among the popular sectors in order to further strengthen
Latin American civil societies and democratic regimes. The specific nature of this
challenge will be addressed in the following section.
Popular Sector Demobilization and the Retreat of Civil Society
While popular sector demobilization might appear to be the natural ending to some
sort of mobilization cycle, the actual process of demobilization and its causes are
more complicated. It occurs in a context in which the 'costs' of participation are
declining dramatically in terms of decreased repression and greater opportunities
for political participation. While the instauration of a democratic regime indicates
that at least some of the demands being expressed by such mobilization have been
met, the conservative nature of recent transitions in Latin America means that
demands for greater levels of political participation and accountability will (at best)
have been only partially met. Moreover, the restoration of competitive politics
suggests a greater likelihood that demands expressed through popular mobilization
will be met in the future, compared to the recent authoritarian past that generated
much higher levels of popular sector mobilization. In other words, why does
popular sector mobilization decline just as the environment appears to become
more propitious and important demands remain unmet? What are the obstacles to
revitalizing popular sector mobilization under the new democratic regime?
In trying to answer these questions, three related sets of factors need to be
emphasized. They include the dominance of political parties and/or populist

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Surviving the Return to 'Normalcy' 123

leaders in electoral politics, and the retreat of the Catholic Church from more
politically conspicuous activities. Most important, they argue, have been the
difficulties that the popular sectors confronted in translating their political experiences under an authoritarian regime to the practice of democratic politics.
Together, these factors have contributed to the increasing political marginalization
of the popular sectors from democratic politics. Historically, such marginalization
has not led to the establishment of stable democratic regimes, and it is difficult to
imagine how it will do so in the future.
As O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) note, popular sector demobilization actually
begins during the transition process. Once the authoritarian regime pronounces
that elections will be held, political parties quickly come to dominate political
activity as they negotiate electoral rules with the regime and then organize electoral
campaigns. Up until this time, O'Donnell and Schmitter explain, parties were
secondary to social mobilization (what they refer to as the 'popular upsurge') in
pressuring the regime for further political liberalization. Once such mobilization
'succeeds' in forcing the regime to accept the inevitability of elections, however,
continued popular mobilization would be counter-productive and only invite a
backlash from regime hardliners. Political parties thus perform what O'Donnell and
Schmitter see as the essential function of containing social mobilization and
re-directing political activity to more narrow election-related activities which the
parties can control.
Whether or not this demobilization is essential for the successful conclusion of
democratic transitions,8 it has had important long term effects for subsequent
popular sector mobilization after the transition is over. Popular sector demobilization is not necessarily as 'natural' as cyclical theories would predict. It also involves
more conflict and trade-offs than O'Donnell and Schmitter seem to assume. This
is due to the nature of the transition processes and how the popular sectors are
demobilized. It also reflects the predominant role that political parties have played
in them, which has paved the way to continued party dominance over forms of
political participation in the subsequent democratic regime.
Recent transitions to democracy have been controlled by relatively small groups
of elites. Some form of political democracy generally remained the ultimate goal,
but in their final phases, these transitions have been reduced to elite struggles over
the definition of democratic rules of the game and institutions which would best
protect their own interests (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Karl, 1986; MacEwan,
1988; Hagopian, 1990). The most obvious aspect of this are the so-called 'pacts',
which entail safeguards protecting specific economic and institutional interests of
elite actors associated with the outgoing authoritarian regime. Less apparent are
other struggles (such as those over the nature of the institutions which will
determine the likely outcomes of future electoral contests, the apportionment of
representation within important state agencies, staffing of the new civilian administration, etc.) which also affect who will be relative 'winners' and 'losers' under the
new democratic regime. Important decisions (many of which may not become
known until after the transition process has been completed) are being made by
increasingly smaller groups of individuals. Old elite prerogatives are preserved and
new ones are enshrined as the 'spoils' of a regime change are allocated to those in
the best position to claim them.
From the perspective of the popular sectors, the transition takes on an increasingly exclusionary quality. They see themselves progressively marginalized from
political processes in which they have a very big stake. Moreover, this marginaliza-

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P. Oxhom

tion is frequently justified in terms of political stability and the end goal of political
democracy, despite what might be perceived as the self-serving nature of these
processes for the elites involved. For many popular sector leaders, there is also a
keen (perhaps often exaggerated) sense that it was their efforts in mobilizing people
that made it possible for the transition to advance as far as it had. The result may
be a growing sense of frustration as these leaders feel they are being denied the
influence at this critical juncture which they rightfully deserve. At the same time,
the various elite interests that predominate as a result of pacts often seem to do so
at the expense of non-elite interests. This is particularly true in the area of human
rights and economic policies where, respectively, strict limits are placed on the
possibilities for seeking justice and a more equitable distribution of resources in the
future.
Under these circumstances, popular sector leaders have few choices. There is
little incentive to continue mobilizing and organizing autonomously from political
parties. Many simply abandon political activity altogether, either marginalizing
themselves from popular organizations, or restricting their activity to individual
grassroots organizations with no projection beyond the community level. For these
leaders, the disillusionment with transition politics may reflect a romantic or naive
vision of democratic politics which itself is the product of their experiences under
authoritarian rule. Particularly for younger people who never experienced democratic politics, their first taste of 'democracy' is a bitter one that leads to
withdrawal.9
For other popular sector leaders, the alternative is to work within political parties.
This offers potential access to resources and positions of power and influence. Such
popular sector leaders may or may not continue to work with popular organizations. If they do continue to work with them, it is now as a representative of a
particular party. While party activists in most cases had worked closely with popular
organizations during the authoritarian regime, the transition and subsequent return
to democracy allows their respective parties to exercise closer control over their
activities with regard to popular sector mobilization. Compared to the authoritarian
regime, party activists will enjoy much less autonomy of action. This can further
alienate the potential members of popular organizations and social movements. For
a variety of reasons, many of the people likely to join popular organizations eschew
party militancy of any sort, or insist on a strict delineation between 'partisan' and
'social' activities that may not be feasible under the changing political circumstances. Many of the party activists who choose this route will attempt (with varying
levels of success) to represent popular sector interests within their respective parties.
While this needs to be encouraged, it has all too often come at the expense of
autonomous popular sector mobilization.
Independently of their direct impact on popular sector mobilization, these
transition processes also reinforce a pattern of politics which indirectly constrains
future potential popular sector mobilization. This is the result of the principal role
played by political parties in transitions. As O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) note,
political parties will always come to the fore once the transition processes reaches
the stage of calling elections. This is because of the role parties play in organizing
elections, presenting candidates, etc., in all political democracies. The problem in
terms of popular sector mobilization is that the peculiar nature of recent transitions
tends to reinforce a political party monopoly over political participation. Alternative
forms of participation which are common in the consolidated democracies of
industrialized nations, including social movements, find it difficult to gain access to

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decision-making processes that are increasingly controlled by party elites. Pacts and
other negotiations seriously narrow the institutional space for non-party participation. It is self-reinforcing because all of the incentives for capable leaders point
toward working within parties or suffering political marginalization.
This general problem is exacerbated in the case of popular sector organizational
activities due to the problems that this particular organizational form faces in trying
to articulate itself with political parties (Oxhorn, 1994c). Popular organizations as
they have emerged in much of Latin America in recent decades and traditional
political parties represent competing forms of territorial representation. The organizational styles of the two are often directly at odds. Whereas popular organizations
stress internal democracy, direct participation and consensus, parties often rely
more on hierarchy, principles of representation and majority rule. For members of
popular organizations, values of self-help, solidarity and 'belonging' often predominate over the more result-oriented pragmatism of political parties concerned with
winning political power. Such tensions, of course, are not inevitable. For example,
the most important new currents in leftist thinking in Latin America (represented,
for example, by the Workers Party in Brazil and Chile's Socialist Party and Party
for Democracy) define themselves in part by seeking a more fluid and 'equal'
relationship with popular social movements. The tensions between party and
movement still exist (Keck, 1992; Oxhorn, 1996b), but for the first time in Latin
America, conscious efforts are being made by party elites to address these problems
in a positive way.10
Despite the importance of these new tendencies within the political left, the
predominant form of non-party political activity that emerges under these circumstances is political populism. Recently, it is a form of mobilization best represented
by Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil. Populism is
but one consequence of the lack of autonomous popular sector organizational
activity (Oxhorn, 1994a, 1996b). Populist appeals offer a convenient outlet for
growing popular sector frustrations that traditional parties do not provide. In the
long term (if not sooner), populism tends to undermine popular sector interests
severely (Oxhorn, 1996a). Autonomous popular sector organizational activity,
working with political parties, is the best safeguard against the resurgence of
populism. It allows for the active participation of the poor in a constructive fashion.
It can provide a positive outlet for their frustrations which reinforces democratic
institutions, rather than undermining them the way populism has historically done.
In the absence of popular sector mobilization, the alternative for the popular
sectors that seems to emerge in the transition is between apathy and incorporation
through political parties or populism. Popular organizations and movements do not
fade away as much as they are beheaded as a result of the choices their leaders
make. In many fundamental respects, this pattern seems to reflect a return to the
processes of controlled inclusion which characterized previous democratic experiments in the region. To the extent that this is true, one could also expect a similar
pattern in terms of political instability. Moreover, it is unclear how successful
controlled inclusion can ultimately be given the changing development model and
reduced role of the state. In other words, it is possible that the ultimately
destabilizing tendencies associated with controlled inclusion will emerge even more
quickly than in the past, given the state's reduced capacity to meet rising social
demands. This is particularly true given the vulnerability of the new outward-oriented development model to the economic disequilibrium that populism necessarily
entails (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991).

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P. Oxhom

An important factor for mitigating these potential dangers to democratic consolidation in the region are the multiple experiences of autonomous popular sector
mobilization dating back to the previous authoritarian period. This would involve
adapting those experiences to the democratic situation after the transition has been
successfully concluded. It implies reversing popular sector marginalization from the
political process that began during the transition. In other words, how can the
popular sectors be 're-engaged' politically in a positive fashion after they have
become disengaged?
This task is made more complicated than it otherwise would be by the Catholic
Church's retreat from politically conspicuous activities. During the 1960s and
1970s, the Church had assumed a critical role in defending human rights and
championing a return to democratic civilian rule throughout the region. New
extremes in state repression, as well as progressive influences emanating from
Vatican II reforms and the emergence of liberation theology, led the Church to
abandon its previous pattern of political passivity and complacency. The Church
(albeit reluctantly in many instances) found itself thrust into an active political role
which challenged the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. In its new political
role, the Church played a pivotal role in supporting popular sector organizational
activity in many countries." Popular organizations were allowed to use Church
facilities, offering them at least some protection from the state's repressive apparatus, while at the same time legitimating popular organizations in the eyes of
potential members. Moreover, priests and nuns were often critical in bringing
people together to form new groups. The Church provided important material
assistance for groups. Just as important, the Church also provided more intangible
kinds of assistance by giving the poor leadership training and other organizational
skills.
In recent years, the Church has withdrawn from this more politically active role
within society (Cleary and Stewart-Gambino, 1992). Recent transitions to democracy meant that the Church no longer felt compelled to defend human rights
publicly. From the Church's perspective, that task, as well as more general
problems relating to social inequity, were once again the responsibility of elected
civilian governments. At the same time, the Church is facing a new challenge in the
form of the spreading popularity of politically conservative protestant evangelical
groups (Martin, 1990; toll, 1990). This has accentuated the Church's withdrawal
from politics. Evangelicalism is seen as representing an explicitly apolitical religious
alternative to what many have characterized as the Catholic Church's excessive
concern with temporal affairs. To deal with the challenge, the Church as an
institution has re-directed its resources away from social concerns toward traditional
activities emphasizing the Church's spiritual mission. This had already been the
Church's proclivity since the late 1970s, under the leadership of Pope John Paul II.
The sudden growth in evangelicalism in the 1980s (in the context of a similarly
growing wave of democratic transitions) only gave more urgency to the Pope's calls
for spiritual renewal within the Church.12
The Church's transformation has affected popular sector organizational activity
in several ways. The Church's acceptance of popular organizations at the grassroots
level is varied. It depends on the particular leanings of individual priests and nuns.
In all cases, however, material resources are simply not as readily available as they
formerly were. Increasingly, they are non-existent. Beyond the grassroots level, the
links between the Church and popular sector organizational activity are even more
tenuous. In general, the Church has not helped (and in most cases not even

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127

encouraged) the poor to take advantage of the increased opportunities for participation and organization created by democratic regimes. Whereas the Church was
often an essential facilitator of popular sector organizational activity under authoritarian regimes, it has refused to play that role once the authoritarian regimes had
ended. The popular sectors have lost a critical ally their efforts to create an
autonomous social actor.
The need for such an ally, however, is no less now than it had been during the
period o repressive authoritarian rule. This is due to the nature of political
democracy and the difficulties the popular sectors confront in trying to adapt their
organizational experiences to a democratic context.
The sudden instauration of democratic institutions in itself cannot eliminate the
popular sectors' more general fears of formal political participation and distrust of
legal structures. Such fears and distrust reflect years of experience with authoritarian institutions. They are an obstacle to increased popular sector organizational
activity under a democratic regime. Members of the popular sectors often struggled
actively for a transition to democracy, but there often remains an important
amount of skepticism regarding the extent and nature of political change once it is
achieved. New democratic institutions will have to win the trust of the popular
sectors before they will participate actively within them, either individually or
collectively.
This problem is only compounded by what is frequently perceived as the slow
pace of real change, despite the change in regimes. The agreements or pacts
reached during the transition often set the stage for later frustrations by constraining the scope of future socio-economic and political reforms. In many cases,
democratic transitions took place in the midst of economic crises which did not
disappear with the departure of the old regime. Despite the transfer of power to
elected officials, close allies of the former authoritarian regime often retain important positions of power, particularly at the local and regional levels which often
interact most with community organizations. This further reinforces the apparent
lack of change. In other words, regime change does not frequently translate into
noticeable changes in the day-to-day lives of most people.
The perceived slow pace of change and persistent fears make it difficult to
expand participation beyond the minority of people who had participated actively
in popular organizations during the period of authoritarian rule. For those who had
participated, there is frequently a growing sense of frustration. After years of
struggle in the face of substantial risks, a certain disillusionment on the part of
popular sector leaders with the limits democratic politics in most Latin America
countries may be inevitable. On the one hand, (the perhaps unrealistic) expectations
of many popular sector leaders for democracy have often gone unmet. On the other
hand, political elites seem to have benefitted most from the return to democratic
politics. As already noted, many popular sector leaders dealt with this by either
striving to become party elites in their own right, working exclusively within party
structures, or withdrew from political activities altogether. Either way, the prospects
for continued autonomous popular sector organizational activity diminish considerably.
Such problems associated with the slow pace of change and popular sector
frustration really accentuate other, more fundamental problems that autonomous
popular sector organizational will have to overcome. The authoritarian regime
played an important role as an unambiguous 'enemy' of popular sector interests. As
such, it helped catalyze popular sector mobilization in a way that side-stepped other

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P. Oxhom

problems of popular sector mobilization. These problems become much more

critical with the installation of a democratic regime and the disappearance of a clear
enemy to mobilize against. However disillusioned the popular sectors may be with
political democracy, a preferred alternative has not yet emerged. Moreover, many
of those who were actively involved in popular sector organizational activity during
the authoritarian regime remain genuinely committed to political democracy as an
end in itself, regardless of its shortcomings (Oxhorn, 1996b).
Ironically, this commitment to political democracy has actually complicated the
problem of autonomous popular sector organizational activity. Potential leaders of
such mobilization are unsure of how to express their growing frustration. Many had
never participated in democratic politics and do know how to take advantage of the
opportunities for participation that it may offer. At the same time, they fear that
mobilization could create destabilizing pressures which would threaten the viability
of the democratic regime. Under an authoritarian regime, such people either did
not think about the potentially destabilizing effects of their activities, or had this as
their explicit goal. Now the fear (often echoed, if not encouraged, by political elites)
is that any autonomous mobilization would be counter-productive.
At the grassroots level, popular organizations may remain quite strong and
vibrant. But their activities become increasingly focused on self-help and the
alleviation of immediate material needs. Such organizational activity is no longer
politically relevant in the same way it was during the authoritarian regime. It may
even ben seen as an alternative to political action and a way of coping with the
limits of political democracy. This is the type of popular sector mobilization
encouraged by targeted assistance social welfare policies. As such, however, it offers
few possibilities for altering the structural causes of poverty.
To go beyond this, popular sector organizational activity will have to be
associated with concrete alternative policy options. Under an authoritarian regime,
popular sector policy alternatives were not needed to mobilize people and influence
politics because the immediate goal was overthrowing the authoritarian regime.13
Yet to influence democratic politics in a constructive fashion, the popular sectors
must develop their own policy alternatives. Otherwise, they will be dependent upon
those who can, whether they be political parties or populist leaders.
The lack of concrete proposals is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of popular
organizations under democratic regimes. At the grassroots level, popular organizations often continue to exhibit a remarkable capacity for self-help after democratic
transitions have been completed. But their capacity to formulate policies and
suggest alternatives is quite limited. This reflects the popular sectors' poverty and
lack of resources. Little technical assistance is available to help a popular social
movement emerge with this kind of capacity. In contrast, the labour movement has
historically enjoyed a high level of technical support and resources. One obvious
reason is that labor unions could collect dues. As a relatively privileged segment of
the popular sectors, people with jobs in the formal economy had resources that
could readily be tapped to help create an infrastructure for developing their own
policy alternatives. Less obvious is the absence of an ideology such as marxism
which captured the imaginations of intellectuals and political organizers who then
dedicated themselves to pursing working class interests politically.
This is not to suggest that the challenge of remobilizing the popular sectors to
retrieve the positive organizational experiences associated with authoritarianism is
an impossible one. Rather, it underscores the role that political will must play if the
popular sectors are to be constructively re-engaged in democratic politics. The

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129

potential leaders of popular social movements and, in particular, political party

elites must consciously work towards such an end. This is why assumptions about
the political effects of popular sector mobilization are so important. If people
continue to assume that popular sector mobilization is destabilizing, it most
probably will be if popular sector frustrations continue to grow and extremists are
able to take advantage of them to pursue their own interests. In many ways, this
has been the typical pattern in Latin America. The true tragedy would be if a
unique opportunity to break what has been a vicious circle is lost.

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Is Popular Sector Demobilization the 'Normal' State of Affairs in

Democracy? Some Insights from Chile and El Salvador
Where does this leave the poor? As Latin America grapples with the dual challenge
of consolidating fragile democratic regimes and restoring dynamic economic
growth, two opposing scenarios seem to emerge. In one, the popular sectors
become an active participant in seeking societal solutions to these daunting
problems. Drawing on their experiences of autonomous organization during the
preceding authoritarian regime, the popular sectors are re-engaged in politics by
maintaining the same type of democratic, reformist patterns of mobilization that
helped secure the democratic transition in the first place. Such a scenario is without
precedent in Latin America and seems to go against trends already emerging in
most countries. As such, it may also be overly idealistic. Yet the working classes of
the industrialized countries persevered against elite resistance which was often
violent, and they have played a critical role in consolidating political democracy in
those countries (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Dependent development in Latin
America has effected class formation so as to rule out a similar democratizing role
for the proletariat by itself. Instead, that task would seem to fall on the popular
sectors more generally (Oxhorn, 1992).
Yet the obstacles to such a role being played by the popular sectors are, as
suggested above, probably much greater than they were for the proletariat in the
early part of this century. Moreover, the proletariat has clear advantages over the
popular sectors more generally in terms of resources and their strategic position
within the economy. For this reason, a second scenario seems more realistic:
continued popular sector demobilization and apathy. This suggests a new form of
controlled inclusion, one which is less state-centered and but preserves the subordinate position of the popular sectors within Latin American societies. Political
democracy provides important participation rights, but on terms established by
other actors. Autonomous popular sector organizational activity loses its political
significance because (at best) it is confined to the grassroots. Fragmented and often
competing with one another, popular organizations can diffuse conflict only until
more attractive alternatives emerge at the national level. Historically, these alternatives have been leftist extremism and equally destabilizing populism. Whereas the
first scenario offers the promise (however remote) of a new and better future, the
second risks repeating the past.
Chile and El Salvador's very different experiences with popular sector organizational activity illustrate some of the implications of the above arguments in a
particularly illuminating way. Both countries exhibited high levels of popular sector
mobilization during their respective authoritarian regimes. The level of political
violence was obviously much higher in El Salvador, but popular sector organizational activities in both countries were affected in fundamental ways by the

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P. Oxhorn

authoritarian regimes under which they emerged. Chile's transition was completed
almost five years ago, and its democratic regime appears to be more consolidated
compared to almost any other country in the region. El Salvador's transition was
only just recently completed, and its democratic regime is still quite fragile. After
years of civil war, the economy is just beginning to recover, while Chile's economy
is the most dynamic in the region. A brief discussion of the different roles that
popular organizations have played in both countries' respective democratization
processes highlights the potential of continued popular sector mobilization in an
intriguing way.14
In comparing Chile and El Salvador in terms of popular mobilization, two
contrasts stand out: whereas Chile has a highly institutionalized political party
system and has experienced decreasing levels of popular sector mobilization since
the mid-1980s, El Salvador has historically suffered from weak political parties and
its level of popular sector mobilization continues to be high. As suggested above,
this apparent relationship between the strength of political parties and the level of
popular sector mobilization is not coincidental.
In Chile, political parties were able to exert control over autonomous popular
sector organizational activity as the return of political democracy approached. This
helped ensure a smooth transition and contributed to Chile's apparent democratic
consolidation. But it also came at the cost of continued popular sector mobilization
once the transition had been completed.
The example of the Comando Unitario de Pobladores (CUP) illustrates this well. The
CUP traced its origins back to the early 1980s. Popular sector leaders from leftist
political parties began working toward the explicit goal of creating an autonomous
popular social movement which could represent popular sector interests in dealings
with the state and political parties. Partisan squabbling nearly destroyed the CUP
in 1986, but by 1987 the CUP's leaders seemed to be close to creating an
independent social movement. In June of that year, the CUP was able to organize
a moderately successful March Against Hunger in order to defend purely popular
sector (as opposed to partisan) interests. One year later, opposition parties were in
the midst of preparations for a campaign to defeat Pinochet in an upcoming
plebiscite to determine whether Pinochet would continue in office, or if a transition
to democracy could take place. When the CUP tried to organize a second March
Against Hunger, the parties concluded that this could jeopardize their chances of
beating Pinochet in the plebiscite. The CUP's leaders (who still belonged to political
parties) were removed from positions within the CUP and the movement ceased to
exist within six months.
In the meantime, political parties were able to take advantage of new opportunities associated with the upcoming plebiscite to re-establish their own links to
Chilean society. In 1987, the military regime enacted legislation allowing for the
legalization of parties for the first time since the 1973 coup. Significantly, parties
were required to collect 30,000 signatures across Chile to become legalized,
'forcing' them to re-establish long-severed ties to different groups within society.
Once legalized, the parties then had at least limited access to the mass media. They
also became active participants in the electoral process, particularly in mobilizing
people to register to vote.
This contrasts markedly with the Salvadoran experience. During the civil war,
popular organizations had developed a close relationship with the principal guerrilla movement, the Farabundo Martii National Liberation Front (FMLN). Yet it
was one of support, not dependence. The FMLN's strategy of 'defensive war' drew

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a fairly sharp distinction between its military operations and the social activities of
the popular organizations designed to help people cope with the ravages of civil
war. These distinct yet complementary roles allowed popular organizations to
achieve a level of institutionalization and influence within El Salvador to which
efforts such as the CUP could only aspire.
After the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992, the FMLN suddenly had to
transform itself from a guerrilla movement into a political party capable of
competing in elections against the much better organized Right. As such, the
FMLN could not hope to monopolize popular sector political participation in the
same way that Chilean political parties could. It had to devote resources to creating
new party structures with only limited experience in doing so. In contrast to Chile,
where political parties were able to take advantage of the opportunity to register
voters, political parties in El Salvador had to rely on popular organizations to
mobilize people to register to vote. After the elections, divisions within the FMLN
have resurfaced. As the FMLN's political future is put in doubt, the problem of
creating effective party structures for successfully competing in a democratic regime
is only prolonged. This, too, should provide (by necessity) more space for popular
sector organizational activity to continue to develop as the popular sectors begin to
interact with a now democratically legitimated rightwing government.
Paradoxically, popular sector organizational activity is stronger and more likely
to play an important political role in El Salvador's fledgling democracy than in
Chile's consolidated democratic regime. While such popular mobilization can be a
central pillar in support of Latin American democracy, this is not meant to imply
that El Salvador's democratic prospects are in any way better than Chile's. The
reality is quite different. Popular organizations can help sustain democracy in ways
which have been largely lacking in Latin America, but they cannot do it alone.
Political parties play crucial roles in democratic regimes that other actors cannot fill.
Chile's own successful transition and current democratic stability underscore this
point quite effectively, in comparison to most of the rest of Latin America where
party systems are notoriously weak.
Yet political parties are also not able to sustain political democracy by themselves. This is something that Chile's previous experiment with democracy amply
demonstrated. Other actors, particularly popular movements, have equally important but complementary roles to play in maintaining democratic stability. Processes
of controlled inclusion constrained the emergence of these actors in the past and
must be avoided in the future. In El Salvador, political actors may be forced to
accept such popular mobilization by necessity, in order to cope with their own
weaknesses and shortcomings. The irony is that Salvadoran political elites may have
no choice but to promote the kinds of popular sector mobilization that democratic
political elites elsewhere should choose to do voluntarily.
Notes
1. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) similarly argue that social mobilization will only become
extensive after divisions with the authoritarian regime reduce the costs of collective action
through political liberalization. My own research in Chile and El Salvador, however, suggests
that popular sector mobilization is often a direct result of the authoritarian experience itself and
is independent of increasing levels of political liberalization. See Oxhorn, forthcoming a and b.
2. The classic statement of this is found in Huntington, 1968. It also is predominant in the literature
on authoritarian regimes in Latin America. See O'Donnell (1973); Malloy (1977); Collier (1979).
More recently, Karl (1990) concluded that no stable democracy has resulted in Latin American

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3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

P. Oxhorn
when mass-based actors become even momentarily dominant. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986)
similarly conclude that, beyond a particular point in the transition process, popular sector
mobilization needs to be constrained by the re-emergence of political parties in order to avoid
the threat of a counter-coup by hardline elements within the authoritarian regime. I will return
to this in more detail below.
Peronist control over the Argentine labor movement is quite distinct from the role political
parties played in Chile's labor movement. In both cases, however, organized labor essentially lost
its autonomy as a social actor representing its members' interests as distinct from the political
parties/elites vying for control over the state. Political elites sought to pursue their own more
narrow interests with the support of organized labor in exchange for labor's limited access to
state resources for addressing some of the immediate needs of workers. In this way, the
movements ultimately became dependent upon the elite actor(s) responsible for the initial
assistance, without addressing the structural causes of popular sector problemsalthough
Allende's Popular Unity Government did try. Collier and Collier (1991); Oxhorn, (1996a). The
Chilean case is discussed at length in Oxhorn (1996b). Also see Bitar (1986); Garretn (1989b).
It should be noted that this pattern was closely related to the import-substituting model of
industrialization that was prevalent in much of Latin America from the 1930s through the early
1980s. See Oxhorn (1994b).
For example, see Slater (1985); Calderon (1986); Eckstein (1989); Jelin (1990); Escobar and
Alvarez (1992).
The recent Chiapas uprising represents a partial exception given that the peasant movement did
take up arms. Yet the still unfolding events in Mexico underscore the basic argument being
presented here: the relatively moderate nature of the demands and expectations expressed by
new forms of popular mobilization. The peasant insurrection did not seek to seize power directly
or create a new socio-economic and political order. Rather, the peasant rebels took up arms to
force the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to implement economic policies designed
to allow the people of Chiapas to take advantage of the economic opportunities opened up by
free trade with the US and Canada, as well as political reforms to create an effective liberal
democratic regime. While their means seem more akin to those of early peasant movements,
their goals are not and this is important.
Popular movements in El Salvador (which will be discussed in greater detail below) are
another partial exception. Here, however, there was a clear and important distinction between
popular mobilization dealing with military and non-military activities. Organizations dealing
with the latter were surprisingly similar to those being discussed here in their demands,
expectations and structures.
A good example of this can be found in the actual practice of the Christian Base Communities
associated with liberation theology at the grassroots level. See Burdick (1992). More generally,
age-old problems of clientelism, apathy, etc., still pervade poor communities. See Gay (1993).
O'Donnell and Schmitter clearly assert that it is. While the argument is consistent with their
overall perspective that transitions processes are highly uncertain, it is based more on deductive
logic than firm empirical evidence. As they note, none of the transitions which they studied
actually experienced the kind of hardliner backlash they feared. Moreover, for whatever reasons,
the demobilization of social movements has occurred in every case. But this does not imply any
causal relationship. The presumption is that mobilization (fortuitously) went as far (or almost as
far) as it could, without crossing some invisible line that would invite a reversal of the transition
process. The argument here is that the relationship between popular sector political activity
which is autonomous of political parties and political instability is much more ambiguous. Given
the clear limits that have been placed on the new democratic regimes which emerged, one
should not too readily take for granted the assumption that popular mobilization is destabilizing.
As even O'Donnell and Schmitter are forced to conclude, mass mobilizations have filled 'the
crucial role of pushing the transition further than it would otherwise have gone' (p. 56). One can
only speculate as to what would have been the outcome if such demobilization had not occurred,
or had occurred in a different manner.
This problem may be exacerbated under the democratic regime if, as is often the case, people
perceive only very limited changes in their daily lives. I will return to this point below.
I will return to this point below.
For a general argument concerning the role that the Catholic Church played as a 'protective
umbrella' in fostering oppositional activity within the popular sectors, see Oxhorn (1996b). Also
see Bruneau (1974); Smith (1982); Levine (1986); Mainwaring (1986).
Interestingly, the Church's own political mobilization in recent years seems to reflect some sort

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of natural cycle or wave. Mounting state repression and the destruction of democratic institutions
changed the Church's political opportunity structure: it had to fill the political vacuum and
defend civil society against the state, or risk losing its own credibility as a moral institution. With
the return to political democracy, the Church's basic demands were met: minimal guarantees for
human rights were restored and civilian politicians could again compete to represent the interests
of different segments of society politically. At the same time, divisions within the Church became
more pronounced. A more conservative and less politically concerned leadership group became
dominant at the highest levels of the Church's institutional hierarchy. The Church's efforts
turned away from social mobilization toward more traditional (and apolitical) concerns.
13. For this reason, such mobilization alone is insufficient to ensure a transition to democracy. For
this to happen, the opposition must develop a clear alternative to the institutional arrangement
offered by the authoritarian regime. See Garretn (1989b).
14. The Chilean case is treated in much greater detail in Oxhorn (1994d, 1996b). The Salvadoran
case is discussed in Oxhorn (1996b).

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